MCIAA vs LAPU-LAPU

Mciaa is an instrumentality of the government; thus, its properties actually,

solely and exclusively used for public purposes, consisting of the airport
terminal building, airfield, runway, taxiway and the lots on which they are
situated, are not subject to real property tax and respondent City is not
justified in collecting taxes from petitioner over said properties.
in the 2006 MIAA case, we held that MIAAs airport lands and buildings are
exempt from real estate tax imposed by local governments; that it is not a
GOCC but an instrumentality of the national government, with its real
properties being owned by the Republic of the Philippines, and these are
exempt from real estate tax.
Many government instrumentalities are vested with corporate
powers but they do not become stock or non-stock corporations,
which is a necessary condition before an agency or instrumentality is
deemed a government-owned or controlled corporation. Examples are
the Mactan International Airport Authority, the Philippine Ports Authority, the
University of the Philippines and Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. All these
government instrumentalities exercise corporate powers but they
are not organized as stock or non-stock corporations as required by
Section 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code. These
government instrumentalities are sometimes loosely called government
corporate entities. However, they are not government-owned or controlled
corporations in the strict sense as understood under the Administrative Code,
which is the governing law defining the legal relationship and status of
government entities.
MIAA is Not a Government-Owned or Controlled Corporation. MIAA is a
government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to
perform efficiently its governmental functions. MIAA is like any other
government instrumentality, the only difference is that MIAA is
vested with corporate powers.
When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate
powers, the instrumentality does not become a corporation. Unless
the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation, it remains a government instrumentality exercising not
only governmental but also corporate powers. Thus, MIAA exercises
the governmental powers of eminent domain, police authority and
the levying of fees and charges. At the same time, MIAA exercises
all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar
as these powers are not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Executive Order.
a. A government-owned or controlled corporation must be organized as
a stock or non-stock corporation. MIAA is not organized as a stock or
nonstock corporation. MIAA is not a stock corporation because it has
no capital stock divided into shares. MIAA has no stockholders or
voting shares. xxx

b. does not have capital stock that is divided into shares. MIAA is also not
a non-stock corporation because it has no members. Non-stock
corporations cannot distribute any part of their income to their
members. Section 11 of the MIAA Charter mandates MIAA to remit 20%
of its annual gross operating income to the National Treasury. This
prevents MIAA from qualifying as a non-stock corporation. MIAA is not
organized for any of these purposes. MIAA, a public utility, is organized
to operate an international and domestic airport for public use.
LIMITATIONS ON THE TAXING POWER OF THE LGC AGAINST NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
OR ITS INSTRUMENTALITY:
SEC. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government
Units. - Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of
the following:
xxxx
(o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its
agencies and instrumentalities and local government units. x x x.
Section 133(o) recognizes the basic principle that local governments
cannot tax the national government, which historically merely delegated
to local governments the power to tax. While the 1987 Constitution now
includes taxation as one of the powers of local governments, local
governments may only exercise such power subject to such guidelines
and limitations as the Congress may provide.
When local governments invoke the power to tax on national government
instrumentalities, such power is construed strictly against local governments. The
rule is that a tax is never presumed and there must be clear language in the law
imposing the tax. Any doubt whether a person, article or activity is taxable is
resolved against taxation. This rule applies with greater force when local
governments seek to tax national government instrumentalities.
Another rule is that a tax exemption is strictly construed against the taxpayer
claiming the exemption. However, when Congress grants an exemption to a
national government instrumentality from local taxation, such exemption
is construed liberally in favor of the national government instrumentality.
There is, moreover, no point in national and local governments taxing each
other, unless a sound and compelling policy requires such transfer of
public funds from one government pocket to another.
There is also no reason for local governments to tax national government
instrumentalities for rendering essential public services to inhabitants of
local governments. The only exception is when the legislature clearly
intended to tax government instrumentalities for the delivery of essential
public services for sound and compelling policy considerations. There

must be express language in the law empowering local governments to

tax national government instrumentalities. Any doubt whether such power
exists is resolved against local governments.
The Republic may grant the beneficial use of its real property to an agency
or instrumentality of the national government. This happens when title of
the real property is transferred to an agency or instrumentality even as
the Republic remains the owner of the real property. Such arrangement
does not result in the loss of the tax exemption. Section 234(a) of the
Local Government Code states that real property owned by the Republic
loses its tax exemption only if the beneficial use thereof has been
granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person.

PELIZLOY REALTY CORPORATION v province of beguet

The principal issue in this case is the scope of authority of a province to impose an
amusement tax?
WON the Province of Benguet has authority to levy amusement taxes on admission
fees for resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, tourist spots,
and other places for recreation;

The power to tax "is an attribute of sovereignty,"7 and as such, inheres in the
State. Such, however, is not true for provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays as they are not the sovereign;8 rather, they are mere "territorial
and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines".
In Icard v. City Council of BaguioIt is settled that a municipal corporation
unlike a sovereign state is clothed with no inherent power of
taxation. The charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that
power or the municipality, cannot assume it. And the power when granted is
to be construed in strictissimi juris. Any doubt or ambiguity arising
out of the term used in granting that power must be resolved
against the municipality. Inferences, implications, deductions all these
have no place in the interpretation of the taxing power of a municipal
corporation.
Therefore, the power of a province to tax is limited to the extent that
such power is delegated to it either by the Constitution or by
statute. Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution is clear on this point:
o Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create
its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees and charges
subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may
provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes,
fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local governments

Section 133 provides for the common limitations on the taxing powers of
LGUs. Specifically, Section 133 (i) prohibits the levy by LGUs of percentage or
value-added tax (VAT) on sales, barters or exchanges or similar transactions
on goods or services except as otherwise provided by the LGC.
PERCENTAGE TAX is a "tax measured by a certain percentage of the gross
selling price or gross value in money of goods sold, bartered or imported; or
of the gross receipts or earnings derived by any person engaged in the sale
of services."
Amusement taxes are fixed at a certain percentage of the gross receipts
incurred by certain specified establishments.
Amusement taxes are percentage taxes.
Provinces are not barred from levying amusement taxes even if
amusement taxes are a form of percentage taxes. Section 133 (i) of
the LGC prohibits the levy of percentage taxes "except as otherwise
provided" by the LGC.
Section 140 expressly allows for the imposition by provinces of
amusement taxes on "the proprietors, lessees, or operators of
theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other
places of amusement."
"Amusement Places" include theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses and
other places of amusement where one seeks admission to entertain oneself
by seeing or viewing the show or performances. They are all venues
primarily for the staging of spectacles or the holding of public shows,
exhibitions, performances, and other events meant to be viewed by an
audience.
Resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots
cannot be considered venues primarily "where one seeks admission
to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or
performances". It follows that they cannot be considered as among
the other places of amusement contemplated by Section 140 of the
LGC and which may properly be subject to amusement taxes.
The power to tax when granted to a province is to be construed in strictissimi
juris. Any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the term used in granting that
power must be resolved against the province.
Any declaration as to the Province of Benguet's lack of authority to levy
amusement taxes must be limited to admission fees to resorts, swimming
pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots.

ANGELES CITY VS ANGELES CITY POWER CORP

Being a special civil action for certiorari, the issue in the instant case is limited to the determination of whether the
RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Angeles City and its City
Treasurer from levying, selling, and disposing the properties of AEC. All other matters pertaining to the validity of
the
tax assessment and AECs tax exemption must therefore be left for the determination of the RTC where the main
case is pending decision?

The prohibition on the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the collection of

taxes applies only to national internal revenue taxes, and not to local taxes.
The LGC does not specifically prohibit an injunction enjoining the collection of taxes.
A principle deeply embedded in our jurisprudence is that taxes being the lifeblood of the government should be
collected promptly,26 without unnecessary hindrance27 or delay.28 In line with this principle, the National Internal
Revenue Code of 1997 (NIRC) expressly provides that no court shall have the authority to grant an injunction to
restrain the collection of any national internal revenue tax, fee or charge imposed by the code. 29 An exception to
this
rule obtains only when in the opinion of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) the collection thereof may jeopardize the
interest of the government and/or the taxpayer. --> this is true only for national taxes
Valley Trading Co., Inc. v. Court of First Instance of Isabela, Branch II, we ruled that:
Unlike the National Internal Revenue Code, the Local Tax Code does not contain any specific provision
prohibiting
courts from enjoining the collection of local taxes . Such statutory lapse or intent, however it may be
viewed,
may
have allowed preliminary injunction where local taxes are involved but cannot negate the procedural
rules
and
requirements under Rule 58.
The purpose of injunction is to prevent injury and damage from being incurred, otherwise, it will
render
any
judgment
in this case ineffectual. Two requisites must exist to warrant the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,
namely:
(1)
the
existence
of
a
clear and unmistakable right that must be protected; and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the
writ
to
prevent serious damage.33
(The Court is fully aware of the Supreme Court pronouncement that injunction is not proper to restrain the
collection
of taxes. The issue here as of the moment is the restraining of the respondent from pursuing its auction
sale
of
the
petitioners properties. The right of ownership and possession of the petitioner over the properties subject
of
the
auction sale is at stake. Engr. Abordos testimony reveals and even his Affidavit Exhibit "S" showed that if
the
auction
sale
will
push
thru,
petitioner will not only lose control and operation of its facility, but its employees will also be denied access
to
equipments vital to petitioners operations, and since only the petitioner has the capability to operate
Petersville
sub
station, there will be a massive power failure or blackout which will adversely affect business and
economy,
if
not
lives and properties in Angeles City and surrounding communities.)
A final note. While we are mindful that the damage to a taxpayers property rights generally takes a back seat to
the
paramount need of the State for funds to sustain governmental functions, 40 this rule finds no application in the
instant case where the disputed tax assessment is not yet due and demandable.
The
issues
of
tax
exemption,
double
taxation, prescription and the alleged retroactive application of the RRCAC, raised in the protest of AEC now
pending with the RTC, must first be resolved before the properties of AEC can be levied. In the meantime, AECs
rights of ownership and possession must be respected.

SMART VS BATANGAS
The question now is whether the trial court resolved a local tax case in order to fall within the ambit of the CTAs
appellate jurisdiction This question, in turn, depends ultimately on whether the fees imposed under Ordinance No.
18 are in fact taxes.
The Court finds that the fees imposed under Ordinance No. 18 are not taxes.

Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that "each local government unit shall have the power to
create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations
as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges
shall
accrue
exclusively
to
the
local
government."
Consistent with this constitutional mandate, the LGC grants the taxing powers to each local government unit.
Specifically, Section 142 of the LGC grants municipalities the power to levy taxes, fees, and charges not otherwise
levied by provinces. Section 143 of the LGC provides for the scale of taxes on business that may be imposed by
municipalities17 while Section 14718 of the same law provides for the fees and charges that may be imposed by
municipalities
on
business
and
occupation.
The LGC defines the term "charges" as referring to pecuniary liability, as rents or fees against persons or property,
while the term "fee" means "a charge fixed by law or ordinance for the regulation or inspection of a business or
activity."
As clearly stated in its whereas clauses, the primary purpose of Ordinance No. 18 is to regulate the "placing,
stringing, attaching, installing, repair and construction of all gas mains, electric, telegraph and telephone wires,
conduits, meters and other apparatus" listed therein, which included Smarts telecommunications tower. Clearly,
the
purpose of the assailed Ordinance is to regulate the enumerated activities particularly related to the construction
and maintenance of various structures. The fees in Ordinance No. 18 are not impositions on the building or
structure
itself; rather, they are impositions on the activity subject of government regulation, such as the installation and
construction
of
the
structures.22
Since the main purpose of Ordinance No. 18 is to regulate certain construction activities of the identified special
projects, which included "cell sites" or telecommunications towers, the fees imposed in Ordinance No. 18 are
primarily regulatory in nature, and not primarily revenue-raising. While the fees may contribute to the revenues of
the Municipality, this effect is merely incidental. Thus, the fees imposed in Ordinance No. 18 are not taxes.
In Progressive Development Corporation v. Quezon City, 23 the Court declared that "if the generating of revenue
is
the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the
primary
purpose, the fact that incidentally revenue is also obtained does not make the imposition a tax.
In Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Victorias, 24 the Court reiterated that the purpose and effect of the
imposition determine whether it is a tax or a fee, and that the lack of any standards for such imposition gives the
presumption
that
the
same
is
a
tax.
We accordingly say that the designation given by the municipal authorities does not decide whether the imposition
is
properly a license tax or a license fee. The determining factors are the purpose and effect of the imposition as may
be apparent from the provisions of the ordinance.
As discussed, the fees in Ordinance No.18 are not taxes. Logically, the imposition does not appear in the
enumeration
of
taxes
under
Section
143
of
the
LGC.
Moreover, even if the fees do not appear in Section 143 or any other provision in the LGC, the Municipality is
empowered to impose taxes, fees and charges, not specifically enumerated in the LGC or taxed under the Tax
Code or other applicable law. Section 186 of the LGC, granting local government units wide latitude in imposing
fees,
expressly
provides:
Section 186. Power To Levy Other Taxes, Fees or Charges. - Local government units may exercise the power to
levy taxes, fees or charges on any base or subject not otherwise specifically enumerated herein or taxed under the
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, or other applicable laws: Provided, That the taxes,
fees, or charges shall not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, confiscatory or contrary to declared national policy:
Provided, further, That the ordinance levying such taxes, fees or charges shall not be enacted without any prior
public hearing conducted for the purpose.
On the contention that it encroaches NTCs regulatory power
The fees are not imposed to regulate the administrative, technical, financial, or marketing operations of
telecommunications entities, such as Smarts; rather, to regulate the installation and maintenance of physical
structures Smarts cell sites or telecommunications tower. The regulation of the installation and maintenance of
such physical structures is an exercise of the police power of the Municipality. Clearly, the Municipality does not
encroach on NTCs regulatory powers.
An ordinance carries with it the presumption of validity. The question of reasonableness though is open to judicial
inquiry. Much should be left thus to the discretion of municipal authorities. Courts will go slow in writing off an
ordinance as unreasonable unless the amount is so excessive as to be prohibitive, arbitrary, unreasonable,

oppressive, or confiscatory. A rule which has gained acceptance is that factors relevant to such an inquiry are the
municipal conditions as a whole and the nature of the business made subject to imposition.
To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful,
breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court
must
sustain legislation because "to invalidate [a law] based on xx x baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not
only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it." This presumption of
constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the
Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the
discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck down.

CITY OF MANILA VS Hon. Caridad

The
basic
question
posed
before this Court is whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an
interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case.
On March 30, 2004, the Legislature passed into law Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282) amending RA 1125 by
expanding the jurisdiction of the CTA, enlarging its membership and elevating its rank to the level of a collegiate
court with special jurisdiction. Pertinent portions of the amendatory act provides thus: (see statute)
A perusal of the above provisions would show that, while it is clearly stated that the CTA has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by
them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction, there is no categorical statement under RA 1125 as
well as the amendatory RA 9282, which provides that the CTA has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari assailing
interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in local tax cases filed before it.
The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no express grant of such power, with respect to the CTA, Section 1,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law and that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the
part
of
any
branch
or
instrumentality
of
the
Government.
On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly interpreted that the power of the CTA includes
that of determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari in these cases.
Indeed, in order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must have the authority to
issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the CTA, it
can reasonably be assumed that the law intended to transfer also such power as is deemed necessary, if not
indispensable, in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why the transfer should only be
considered
as
partial,
not
total.
Consistent with the above pronouncement, this Court has held as early as the case of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v.
Jaramillo, et al.29 that "if a case may be appealed to a particular court or judicial tribunal or body, then said court or
judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction."30 This principle was affirmed in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals, 31 where the Court stated that "a court
may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or
writ
of error, the final orders or decisions of the lower court." 32 The rulings in J.M. Tuason and De Jesus were reiterated
in the more recent cases of Galang, Jr. v. Geronimo 33 and Bulilis v. Nuez.
The grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power necessary to exercise
it
effectively,
to
make all orders that will preserve the subject of the action, and to give effect to the final
determination
of
the
appeal.
It carries with it the power to protect that jurisdiction and to make the decisions of the court
thereunder
effective.
The
court, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, has authority to control all auxiliary and incidental matters
necessary
to
the
efficient and proper exercise of that jurisdiction. For this purpose, it may, when necessary, prohibit or
restrain
the

performance of any act which might interfere with the proper exercise of its rightful jurisdiction in
cases
pending
before it.3

REPUBLIC VS PARANAQUE
WON the Philippine Reclamation Authority is a GOCC?
a
GOCC
must
be
"organized
as
a
stock
or
non-stock
corporation"
while
an
instrumentality is vested by law with corporate powers. Likewise, when the law makes a government
instrumentality
operationally autonomous, the instrumentality remains part of the National Government machinery although not
integrated
with
the
department
framework.
When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality does not necessarily
become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it
remains a government instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also corporate powers.
Two requisites must concur before one may be classified as a stock corporation, namely: (1) that it has capital stock
divided into shares; and (2) that it is authorized to distribute dividends and allotments of surplus and profits to its
stockholders. If only one requisite is present, it cannot be properly classified as a stock corporation. As for non-stock
corporations, they must have members and must not distribute any part of their income to said members. 3
In the case at bench, PRA is not a GOCC because it is neither a stock nor a non-stock corporation. It cannot be
considered as a stock corporation because although it has a capital stock divided into no par value shares as
provided in Section 74 of P.D. No. 1084, it is not authorized to distribute dividends, surplus allotments or profits to
stockholders. There is no provision whatsoever in P.D. No. 1084 or in any of the subsequent executive issuances
pertaining to PRA, particularly, E.O. No. 525, 5 E.O. No. 6546 and EO No. 7987 that authorizes PRA to distribute
dividends,
surplus
allotments
or
profits
to
its
stockholders.
PRA cannot be considered a non-stock corporation either because it does not have members. A non-stock
corporation must have members.8 Moreover, it was not organized for any of the purposes mentioned in Section 88
of the Corporation Code. Specifically, it was created to manage all government reclamation projects.
Furthermore, there is another reason why the PRA cannot be classified as a GOCC. Section 16, Article XII of the
1987
Constitution
provides
as
follows:
Section 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of
private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or established by special
charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability.
The fundamental provision above authorizes Congress to create GOCCs through special charters on two conditions:
1) the GOCC must be established for the common good; and 2) the GOCC must meet the test of economic viability.
In this case, PRA may have passed the first condition of common good but failed the second one - economic
viability. Undoubtedly, the purpose behind the creation of PRA was not for economic or commercial activities.
Neither was it created to compete in the market place considering that there were no other competing reclamation
companies being operated by the private sector. As mentioned earlier, PRA was created essentially to perform a
public service considering that it was primarily responsible for a coordinated, economical and efficient reclamation,
administration and operation of lands belonging to the government with the object of maximizing their utilization
and
hastening their development consistent with the public interest.
In contrast, government instrumentalities vested with corporate powers and performing governmental or public
functions need not meet the test of economic viability. These instrumentalities perform essential public services for
the common good, services that every modern State must provide its citizens. These instrumentalities need not be
economically viable since the government may even subsidize their entire operations. These instrumentalities are
not the "government-owned or controlled corporations" referred to in Section 16, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.
Clearly, respondent has no valid or legal basis in taxing the subject reclaimed lands managed by PRA. On the other
hand, Section 234(a) of the LGC, in relation to its Section 133(o), exempts PRA from paying realty taxes and
protects it from the taxing powers of local government units.

TEAM PACIFIC
Procedural aspect

Whether
or
not
a
Rule
65
petition
for
certiorari
was
the
appropriate
remedy
from
Dazas inaction on TPCs letter-protest is, however, an entirely different issue which we are now called upon to
resolve, considering the RTCs ruling that it should have filed an ordinary appeal instead. As correctly observed by
TPC, after all, Section 195 of the Local Government Code does not elaborate on how an appeal is to be made from
the denial by a local treasurer of a protest on assessment made by a taxpayer.
Republic
Act
9282, the law which expanded the jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).

No.

The foregoing pronouncements notwithstanding, we find that TPC erroneously availed of the wrong remedy in filing
a Rule 65 petition for certiorari to question Dazas inaction on its letter-protest. The rule is settled that, as a special
civil action, certiorari is available only if the following essential requisites concur: (1) it must be directed against a
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer must have
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction;
and, (3) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 17 Judicial
function entails the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then
undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. Quasi-judicial function, on
the other hand, refers to the action and discretion of public administrative officers or bodies, which are required to
investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for
their
official
action
and
to
exercise
discretion
of
a
judicial
nature. 18

Gauged from the foregoing definitions, Daza, the Local Treasurer cannot be said to be performing a judicial
or
quasi-judicial
function
in
assessing TPCs business tax and/or effectively denying its protest as then Municipal Treasurer of Taguig.
For
this
reason, Dazas actions are not the proper subjects of a Rule 65 petition for certiorari which is the appropriate
remedy in cases where a the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions acted without or
in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in law.19 Narrow in scope and inflexible in character, 20 certiorari is an extraordinary remedy
designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. 21 It is likewise considered mutually
exclusive with appeal22 like the one provided by Article 195 of the Local Government Code for a local treasurers
denial of or inaction on a protest.