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Abdul Aziz Al-Saud and the great game in Arabia, 1896-1946

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Abdul Aziz Al-Saud and the Great Game in Arabia, 1896-1946

by
Hassan S. Abedin

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of

the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

King's College London

2002

d`Y

LC
uff.

i.

Abstract

This thesis examines the diplomacy of Abdul Aziz Al-Saud, the founder of
for
financial
his
legitimacy,
Saudi
Arabia
in
struggle
political
stability
modern
during
national
security
and
historical
and

analytical

understanding

the period 1896-1946. This study combines

approaches to provide

a more comprehensive

broad
issues.
First,
three
the extent to which 'Wahhabism'
of

formed the raison d'etre for the creation of the modern Saudi state. How could
legitimacy
for
'non-believers'
through
then
turn
to
religion
claiming
a ruler
Ottoman
Muslim
Porte? Among the most significant points
the
support against
discussed is the role of Mubarak al-Sabah, ruler of Kuwait in the shaping of
Abdul Aziz's political philosophy and support for early Saudi forays in Arabia.
This topic,

dealt in detail in this work,

is often understudied

in the

contemporary literature.
Second, Abdul Aziz's autonomy

or lack thereof in his expansionist

Ottoman
intrigue, and the establishment of
tribal
the
of
politics,
role
policy and
Britain as the major supporter of the Al-Saud. Previous scholarship has often
underestimated how early on treaty relations were initiated with the Porte.
Third, the factors that led to American involvement in Saudi Arabia and the
interplay

of corporate,

government

and Saudi officials

which,

in part,

contributed to Anglo-American tensions during the Second World War period.

Also examined are the strategies employed by Washington and London to
maintain what they perceived as, control over Abdul Aziz and the gradual
United
States
the
of
as guarantor of Saudi security and stability.
emergence
How did the ruler of a distant Arabian country, which took no part in the war
effort, manage to gain special extension of Lend Lease Aid by the President of
the United States when all other nations, including Britain were cut off in 1945.
This work contrasts some of the existing scholarship on the history of
the Middle East which emphasises the role of Western colonial powers in
shaping the political landscape of the region, often underestimating the role of
local actors.

ll

Table of Contents

Abstract

..............................................................................................
Table of Contents
...............................................................................
Acknowledgments
...........................................................................
Map of Saudi Arabia
........................................................................
Transliteration Note
..........................................................................

i
ii
vi
viii
ix

Introduction
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
................................................................
Major Themes
.....................................................................................
Sources and Methodology
......................................................................
Structure of the Thesis
..........................................................................

1
3
4
8

Chapter 1

The Creation of a Dynasty:

The Rise of the House of al-Saud Prior to the 20thCentury
..........................

10

The Education of Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab

16
...................................
The Search for Political Legitimacy: Alliance and Empire: 1744-1818
21
............
Ottoman and Egyptian Intervention in Arabia
31
........................................
European Penetration

........................................................................

The Second House of al-Saud

...............................................................
Ottoman-Egyptian Rivalry
..................................................................
The Return of Faisal ibn Turki
.............................................................
Hail Eclipses Riyadh
..........................................................................

34
35
38
40
43

Chapter 2
Exile in Kuwait

.................................................................................
Taking Advantage of Anglo-Ottoman Rivalry
.........................................
Early Forays into Najd
........................................................................
Proxy War in Arabia: Mubarak and the Capture of Najd
...........................

46
50
59
66

Britain and the Establishment of an Independent Saudi Entity

75
....................
83
Saudi-Ottoman Political Relations
........................................................
88
The End of a Rival
.............................................................................
Chapter 3
Rivals and Rebels: Ibn Saud and Sharif Hussein
.......................................
Mobilising New Forces: The Ikhwan
.....................................................
Ikhwan Settlements
..........................................................................
Problems of Subsidy
........................................................................

92
96
100
104

Chapter 4
Ibn Saud and Britain s 'Ottoman First' Policy
.......................................

108
.

Shakespeareand Ibn Saud

................................................................

112

Ottoman-Saudi Treaty

117

......................................................................

Outbreak of World War ...................................................................

Anglo-Saudi Alliance: The 1915Treaty of Darin
....................................

120
.
125

British Intelligence and Ibn Saud

........................................................
Harry St. John Philby
.......................................................................
The Ikhwan and Sharif Hussein
.........................................................
An Invitation to London
..................................................................

128

Reorganising British Administration

..................................................

134
138
146
.
149
.

Chapter 5
From Conquest to Rebellion:
The Ikhwan Warriors of Ibn Saud 1921-1930
.........................................
Ikhwan Raids and the Northwest Frontier
............................................
The Issue of the Caliphate
.................................................................
The Conquest of Hijaz
.....................................................................
Administering Hijaz
........................................................................
The Ikhwan Revolt
..........................................................................
Secret Funding of the Ikhwan
............................................................

154
163
168
171
179
185
198

iv

Aftermath of Rebellion
.....................................................................

199

Chapter 6
America Arrives in Arabia

................................................................

202

On the Path to Oil

...........................................................................
The Politics of Oil: 1935-1940
.............................................................
Oil Company Pressure Grows: 1940-1943
............................................

218

'Cash for Oil'-Lobbying for Aid to Ibn Saud

..........................................

228

211

223

The British Threat and Lend Lease Aid for Ibn Saud
240
..............................
Petroleum Reserves Corporation: Washington Enters the Oil Business....... 250
Oil Company Take Over: A Strategy of Failure
......................................

254

Chapter 7
Anglo-American Rivalry

..................................................................

Anxious Allies

................................................................................
The Expansion of U. S. Military Presence
..............................................
The Changing of the Guard
...............................................................
A Historic Meeting
..........................................................................
The Death of Roosevelt
.....................................................................
Britain and the Emergence of a New American Policy
............................
The Spectre of Communism
...............................................................

262
270
275
280
284
291
298
304

Prelude to the Cold War

....................................................................

310

Conclusion

314

....................................................................................
Appendix I: Abbreviated Genealogy of Rulers of Al-Saud
.....................
Bibliography
..................................................................................

322
323

Acknowledgements

Over the years that I have worked on this thesis there have been a number
of people that have provided encouragement and support. It would be
impossible to state all their names or adequately convey my appreciation to
few
However,
there
that I would like to mention.
are a
each one.
To my supervisor Professor Efraim Karsh I would like to express my
deep appreciation for his encouragement and support throughout

the

for
I
his patience in the face of slow
this
work.
am
grateful
production of
for
his
understanding
and
progress

during my absences as a result of

family obligations. I would also like to thank Dr Rory Miller for his vital
comments and helpful suggestions that were beneficial to both the style
Professor
James
Piscatori was generous with his
layout
this
work.
of
and
kind
in
his
library.
to
providing
was
extremely
access
and
extensive
advice
There are several private individuals

and officials in Saudi Arabia

deserving
States
United
While
thanks.
the
who
are
of
respecting their
and
for
confidentiality,
requests

I would

nevertheless like to express my

for
feedback
their
time,
critical
comments
appreciation
and
on a number of
issues raised in this thesis. In particular

I would

like to mention

Ambassador Hermann Eilts whose company and conversation I enjoyed

immensely. I am grateful to him for sharing his encyclopedic knowledge of
Saudi Arabia and insight into American-Saudi relations.
I would like to thank Ms. M. Ebtehaj, Librarian at the Middle East
Centre, Oxford and Mrs. L. E. Williamson
Oxford for their unfailing

at the Rhodes House Library,

courtesy and professional help in procuring

research material. The staffs at the King Faisal Foundation Library, Riyadh
King
Abdul
Aziz University Library, Jeddah were also extremely
the
and
helpful. I found it quite ironic to discover in their collections, which were
proudly

shown off to me, a significant number of materials that were

unflattering to the regime.

V1

Thanks are also due to the staffs at the Public Record Office,
London, and at the US National Archives in Washington, D. C. for their
assistance in my archival research.

I am particularly

grateful for the

assistance provided by Major M. U. Qudsi (US Army) and his family. Their
generosity

and

hospitality

of greatly

facilitated

research visits

to

institutions in the Washington, D. C. area.

Finally,
Throughout

I owe a tremendous

debt to my parents and family.

the years of my research and writing

they endured great

hardship and inconvenience. My father, on whose wisdom, foresight and

friendship I relied, passed away during the course of this doctoral work.
My ability to balance family obligations and research commitments was
tested on many occasions. I cannot articulate the depth of gratitude to my
for
immeasurable
their
my
wife
and
courage, and support
mother, siblings
in those difficult

times. It was their

sacrifice, encouragement

and

confidence in my abilities that was crucial to the completion of this thesis. I

dedicate this work to all of them.

vii

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viii

Transliteration

A modified

Note

version of the International Journal of Middle East Studies

transliteration system has been used for this thesis. For practical purposes
diacritical

marks have been eliminated. Place names with an accepted

English spelling

and personal names of prominent

political

leaders,

figures
are spelled in accordance with English norms.
cultural or religious
Thus Mecca rather than Makkah, Abdul Aziz rather than Abd al-Aziz, and
sheikh rather than shaykh.
The 'al'

preceding

family

names are capitalised

to indicate

family
i.
Al-Saud
tribal
groups
e.
and
and Al-Rashid. In the case
prominent
of individual

Faisal
such
as
al-Duwish,
names,

the 'al' has not been

capitalised.
The name of the founder of modern Saudi Arabia is spelled by the
Saudi Ministry of Information as King Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman AlSaud. To avoid excessive verbiage I have used the shortened form Abdul
Aziz Al-Saud or as he is commonly referred to in English, Ibn Saud.

ABEDIN-INTRODUCTION

Introduction

'Modern Arab politics is conditioned by leadersmore than by political issues' 1

E.A. Speiser
The ultimate source of power here, as in the whole course of Arab history, is the
personality of the commander'
Gertrude Bell

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 2

Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia
".
OF

'

deployment^American
the
and allied troops into the Kingdom.
authorised
Although approval was ostensibly given by the leading religious scholars,
including

the chief of the council of scholars and grand mufti, Sheikh

Abdul Aziz bin Baz, the decision resulted in much controversy within the
Islamic
3
the
wider
world.
country and
The repercussions of that decision and the subsequent increase in
the American
Kingdom

military

tremendously.

presence in the region have impacted on the

An increasingly

vocal and visible opposition

developed
has
inside and outside the country. Attacks on
movement
American targets in 1995 and 1996, and more recently the events of
September 2001, are indicative of the extent to which they are willing to use
violence and murder to achieve their aims.
As a consequence relations between Saudi Arabia and the United
States are undergoing

tremendous

scrutiny

and re-examination.

In

particular questions are being asked about the nature of the Kingdom's
Wahhabi ideology, its legitimacy and its future path. These issues all have
their

roots in the historical

past and by examining

the precedent

1 E.A. Speiser, The United Statesand the Near East, Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1947, p. 109.
2 The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was officially founded on September 23,1932. Prior to this
the territory of was known as the 'Kingdom of Hijaz and Najd and its Dependencies'.
3 Mordechai Abir, Government, Societyand the Gulf Crises, London: Routledge, 178.
p.

ABEDIN-INTRODUCTION

find
insight
be
Aziz
it
late
Abdul
to
by
King
the
possible
may
established
into the determinants of current and future Saudi policy.
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia comprises the largest country in the
Arabian Peninsula and is home to Islam's holiest cities. Its role as the
by
its
if
is
Muslim
the
role
not
exceeded,
matched,
world
spiritual centre of
Arabia
Saudi
the
largest
of
one
quarter
contains
the
oil
producer.
world's
as
barrels
billion
260
total
of oil.
oil with reserves exceeding
world's

The

development
led
by
has
to
and social
rapid economic
oil
wealth provided
have
divisions
deep
it
brought
has
tension
and
which
with
change and
become increasingly evident in the last decade.
Though the modern Kingdom is in its seventh decade, it traces its
between
the
back
to
religious
century
alliance
an
eighteenth
origins
leader
Wahhab,
ibn
Abdul
the
Muhammad
Sheikh
and
political
reformer,
Muhammad Al-Saud in the central Arabian region of Najd .4 This union

fused
house
it
Al-Saud
legitimacy
to
the
the
to
cause of
of
and
provided
Abdul Wahhab's revivalist mission which sought to return Arabian society
to the practices of the very first Islamic community .5 Abdul Wahhab's
beliefs
the
and rituals of the people around
primary concerns were with

him-the pagan practices,superstitions, and ignorance of traditional Islamic

learning that was prevalent at the time. Political leadership was left to his

followers
Muhammad
Al-Saud
Abdul
Wahhab's
were
and
partner
strategic

4 By 1806 the Saudi-Wahhabi alliance had the holy cities of Mecca and Medina from
Ottoman control. In response the Ottoman Porte launched an assault on Arabia which
crushed the alliance in the early nineteenth century. A second attempt by the descendants
of Muhammad Al-Saud to revive the Saudi-Wahhabi entity later that century was
partially successful until it too was defeated by the rival family dynasty of the Al-Rashid.
See E. Rehatsek, 'The History of the Wahhabys in Arabia and India' Art. XVIII January 14,
,
1880 in the Journal of the BombayBranch of the Royal Asiatic Society,Vol. XIV, 1880, pp. 274401. A history of the Wahhabi movement forms part of the Report on Ibn Saud, January 21,
1918, India Office Records, The British Library, London (hereafter cited as IOR)
L/P&S/18/B270.
5 Abdul Wahhab followed the Hanbali school of Islamic jurisprudence, and his guiding
principle was that of tawhid (unity) which brought together belief in one creator and
obedience to the Qura' n and Sunnah (the sayings and practices of Prophet Muhammad).
See Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples,Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1991, pp. 257-258,280,349. Also R. Bayley Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century,
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965, pp. 6-7.

ABEDIN-INTRODUCTION

instructed that obedience to the amir was a part of faith. 6 After initial
successes, Ottoman and Egyptian forces crushed the alliance in the early
nineteenth century. Attempts to revive the Saudi-Wahhabi entity later that
century were partially successful until defeated by the rival family dynasty
of the Al-Rashid.
In the early twentieth century the founder of the modern Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia, Abdul Aziz Al-Saud, considered himself heir to this
Saudi-Wahhabi

alliance

and established

his rule

on the principles

established by his predecessors. As a result Saudi Arabia's constitution is

the Quran and its laws are derived from shari'ah (Islamic jurisprudence)
it
one of the most conservative regimes in the Middle
making

East.7

However, despite this Abdul Aziz began from an early stage to court the
'infidel'

British

and helped undermine

the authority

of the Muslim

Ottoman sovereign in the region. In fact, Britain more than any other
Muslim power became the source of economic and political stability for
Abdul Aziz. This role was subsequently taken over by the United States
during the Second World War. Throughout, as shall be seen, Abdul Aziz
successfully played the 'great game' in Arabia, negotiating with competing
colonial and imperialist powers to achieve his political ends.

Major Themes
This thesis shall examine Ibn Saud's struggle for political

legitimacy,

financial stability and national security. It shall focus particularly

on his

Britain
with
relationship
and the United States and the development of
dependency on these foreign powers. Within the scope of this work three
broad issues will be addressed. First, the extent to which 'Wahhabism'
6 This association between the Al-Saud and the Al-Alshaikh, as Muhammad ibn Abdul
Wahhab and his descendants came to be known, translated political loyalty into a
religious obligation. According to Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab's teachings, a Muslim
must give an oath of allegiance, bai' ah to a ruler who is owed allegiance as long as he
follows and implements Islamic law. See Ayman al-Yassini, Religion and State in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, London: Westview Press, 1985, pp. 26-29.
7 Turki al-Hamad, Political Order in Changing Societies- Saudi Arabia: Modernization in
a
Traditional Context, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Southern California, 1985, p.73.

ABEDIN-INTRODUCTION

formed the raison d'etre for the creation of the modern Saudi state and the
Ibn
Saud,
a ruler
of
attempts
and paradoxical

seemingly contradictory

for
'non-believers'
legitimacy
to
turn
through
to
support
religion
claiming
lack
in
Saud's
Second
Ibn
Porte?
Ottoman
thereof
the
autonomy
or
against
his expansionist policy and the role of tribal politics, Ottoman intrigue and
the establishment of Britain as the major supporter of the Al-Saud. Third, it
American
the
of
early
years
shall examine

interests and subsequent

Saudi
Britain
the
guarantor
of
security and stability.
as
supplanting of

All

the while it shall seek to contrast much of the existing scholarship on the
history of the Middle East which emphasises the role of Western colonial
powers

in

the

shaping

political

landscape

of

the

region,

often

local
the
actors.
of
role
underestimating

Sources and Methodology

Primary sources consulted for this thesis came from the official archives of
Britain and the United States. Documents of the British Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, Colonial Office and Cabinet papers were examined
Office
Kew.
The
Government
India
Record
Public
the
the
at
records
of
of
at
Gulf
India
Office
Records,
British
the
the
to
examined
were
at
pertaining
Library,

U. S. State Department

London.

and

Defence Department

documents were examined at the National Archives in Washington, D. C.

and Suitland, Maryland.
Papers relating to Congressional Hearings on Petroleum, the records
of the Petroleum Administer for War, and the Department of the Interior
Library
the
at
of Congress, Washington D. C. Other primary
were consulted
sources included

the published

collections of declassified documents,

Secondary
and
papers
memoirs.
sources were consulted at a variety
private
institutional
libraries.
and
of private

Primary and secondary sources were consulted at the following

institutions:

King Abdul

Foundation

Library,

Aziz University

Library, Jeddah; King Faisal

Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; Gellman Library,

George

ABEDIN-INTRODUCTION

Washington University, Washington, D. C; Bodleian Library, Rhodes House

Library and Middle East Centre Library, Oxford University; British Library
School
Science,
London,
Library
Economic
LSE,
Political
the
of
of
and
of
Oriental and African Studies, London; Liddell Hart Centre for Military
Archives, King's College, London.
While traditional scholars of state formation, such as Tilly, focus on
formal institutions-parliaments,

bureaucracies, etc., Davis argues that in

the case of societies in the Gulf, the ruler must be capable of producing
him
8
When
ideological
that
that
tie
to
the
symbols
population
cultural and
linkage fails or when regimes simply rely on distributive

methods i. e.

lead
this
to the collapse of authority-as
then
may
wealth,
circulation of oil
occurred with

the Shah of Iran. 9 This thesis supports that view and

formulated
Aziz
how
Abdul
examines

those symbols and then turned

it
them
conflicted with realpolitik
when
against

which has created a

legitimacy.
in
Saudi
imbalance
political
constant

This thesis combines analytical and historical approachesto provide

the
of
underlying
picture
complete
more
a

motivations

of Ibn Saud's

domestic and foreign policies. It charts the uneasy dichotomy between

interests
hand,
domestic
the
the
on
one
security
and
and
socioeconomic
from
Wahhabi
ideology on the other. In doing
stemming
political pressures

bridge
between
historical
it
to
a
seeks
provide
earlier
studies oriented
so
towards state formation

and tribal politics with those focused on the

political economy of oil in the post Second World War period leading up to
the oil crises of 1973. It also provides insight into the origins of the current

in
Saudi
Arabia
have
been
increasingly visible
movement
opposition
which
in the post Gulf war period and most especially and tragically since
September2001.

8 Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation of National Statesin Western Europe, Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1975.
9 Eric Davis, 'Theorizing Statecraft and Social Change in Arab Oil-Producing Countries' in
E. Davis and N. Gavrielides eds., Statecraft in the Middle East: Oil, Historical Memory, and
Popular Culture, Miami: Florida International University Press, 1991, p. 13.

ABEDIN-INTRODUCTION

There

historical
several
are

works

Kingdom
the
modern
of
establishment
particularly

on

Arabia

prior

to the

of Saud Arabia. These provide

history.
Arabian
in
valuable material on specific moments

Most notable are the contributions of Winder who covered the early SaudiWahhabi polities in the nineteenth century and Troeller whose interest lay
in the 1910-1926 period. Kostiner focuses on aspects of state formation and
tribal politics in a valuable study of the 1916-1936 period, as does Helms 1
Leatherdale's work follows British interests in Arabia from the conquest of
Hijaz to the era immediately preceding the outbreak of the Second World
War. " These works are primarily

pre-occupied with examining Ottoman

Kuwait
in
importance
interests
the
British
of
underestimate
and often
and
the establishment of the Saudi state.
Those that do have an American dimension tend to be written from
boom
the
and as such centre on the
the perspective of
post-1973 oil
Kingdom.
the
stability
of
economic and political
include works by Abir,

Bligh, Quandt

Important

examples

latter
Safran.
12
The
two
and

from
United
States
in
Saudi
the
the
security
perspective
of
concentrate on
light of Cold War politics. Others focus on oil and the political economy of
Saudi Arabia. Of these the most notable are by Anderson, Miller, Painter,
lucid
Rubin
13
Barry
Anglo-American
Stoff.
provides
a
examination
of
and
10Christine Moss Helms, The Cohesionof Saudi Arabia, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1981; Joseph Kostiner, TheMaking of Saudi Arabia: From Chieftaincy to Monarchical
State,1916-1936,Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
11Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, Gary Troeller, The Birth of Saudi Arabia:
Britain and the Rise of the House of Saud, London: Frank Cass, 1976; Clive Leatherdale,
Britainnd Saudi Arabia 1925-1939: The-ImperialOasis, London: Frank Cass, 1983.
12Mordechai Abir, Oil, Power and Politics: Conflict and Arabia, the Red Seaand the Gulf,
London: Frank Cass, 1974; Alexander Bligh, From Prince To King: Royal Successionin the
House of Saud in the Twentieth Century, New York: New York University Press, 1984; Nadav
Questfor Security, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988.
Safran, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless
William Quandt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980's: Foreign Policy, Security, and Oil, Washington,
D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1981.
13Irvine Anderson, Aramco, the United Statesand Saudi Arabia: A Study of the Dynamics of
Foreign Oil Policy, 1933-1950, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981; Aaron Miller,
Searchfor Security: Saudi Arabian Oil and American Foreign Policy 1939-1949,Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1980; David Painter, Oil and the American Century: The
Political Economyof U.S. Foreign Oil Policy, 1941-1954,Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1986; Michael Stoff, Oil, War and American Security: The Searchfor a
National Policy on Foreign Oil, 1941-1947,New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1980;

ABEDIN-INTRODUCTION

by
Gulf
Two.
More
World
War
during
works
war
recent post
relations
Simmons and Vassiliev have focused on current dissent and regime
historical
do
14
They
narrative, yet their sources are
provide
a
stability.
diplomatic
do
include
biographies
travel
not
accounts and
and
exclusively
papers or official reports.
One of the most prolific writers on Saudi Arabia has been the British
diplomat/ adventurer Harry St. John Philby. As an advisor to Ibn Saud he
had a unique perspective. His work is a fascinating insight into the rituals
had
in
Philby
history
life,
Arabian
served
as
official
culture.
and
of court
the British Indian Government but left service acrimoniously prior to the
for
left
him
life-long
disdain
This
Kingdom.
the
with a
establishment of
British policy which is reflected in his work. While Leslie McLoughlin
provides a worthwhile

biography on Ibn Saud, primarily

based on other

biographies, memoirs and anecdotes, but lacking in its use of diplomatic

have
Saudi
Arabia
journalistic
More
also
accounts of
popular and
records.
been written by Robert Lacey, David Holden, Richard Johns, and Said
Aburish. 15

There are two classic works in Arabic dealing with eighteenth and
history.
Saudi
first
The
is
Tarikh
Najd,
Unwan
al-Majdfi
nineteenth century
(The Symbol of Glory in the History of Najd) by Uthman Ibn Bishr who
died in 1873. The second is Husayn Ibn Ghannam's Tarikh Najd. A more
contemporary work is the four volume Shibh al-Jazirahfi ahd al Malik Abd alAziz, published in 1970 and written by a Syrian, Khair al-Din Zirkili who
Saudi
in
Foreign
Ministry.
However,
Zirkili
the
worked

sources much of

14Barry Rubin, The Great Powersin the Middle East: 1941-1947,London: Frank Cass, 1980;
Geoff Simmons, Saudi Arabia the Shapeof Client Feudalism,London: Macmillan 1998;
AlexeiVassiliev The History of Saudi Arabia, London: Saqi Books, 1997. There has been a
proliferation of journal articles as well as books focused on post-Gulf war opposition
movements. One recent example of note is the informative work by Mamoun Fandy, Saudi
Arabia and the Politics of Dissent, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999.
15Leslie McLoughlin, Ibn Saud: Founder of a Kingdom, London: Macmillan, 1993; Robert
Lacey, The Kingdom: Arabia and the House of Saud, New York: Avon, 1981; David
Holden, and Richard Johns The House of Saud, London: Sidgewick and Jackson, 1981; Said
Aburish, The Rise, Corruption and Coming Fall of the House of Saud, London, Bloomsbury,
1994.

ABEDIN-INTRODUCTION

his information from his mentor, fellow compatriot and advisor at the royal
Sheikh
Yusuf
Yassin.
Though
Zirkili
court,

provides worthwhile

insights

into the development of the Kingdom in the twentieth century one must
recognise its origins as an 'official view'. One work that could serve as an
official

history

has been produced

by Professor Abdullah

Salih al-

Uthaymeen, Dean of the Department of History at King Saud University,

Riyadh. His multi-volume

Tarikh al-Mamlakah al-Arabiyyah al-Suudiyyah is

well past its eighth re-print. 16It relies extensively on Ibn Bishr, Zirkili, and
English writers such as Burkhardt and Philby. Due to the dearth of deby
documents
the Saudi authorities several contemporary
classified official
Arabic works on Saudi political history have relied on English language
from
biographies
Arabic
authors
gather
material
memoirs,
sources.
and
published

collections

of

declassified

documents

and

translate

the

information for their own audience.

Structure of the Thesis

This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 examines the life,
Muhammad
ideology
ibn
Abdul Wahhab and his contribution
of
and
work
to the creation of the Al-Saud dynasty. It traces successive attempts by the
Al-Saud to establish political entities during the eighteenth and nineteenth
in
Arabia.
Chapter
2 traces the early influences on Abdul
central
centuries
Aziz, his rise as a desert ruler, and the use of religion and tribal politics to
establish a polity that was ultimately reliant on settled urban communities.
It will examine the influence of the Kuwaiti ruler, Mubarak al-Sabah, and
intrigue
against the Ottoman Porte. Chapter 3 introduces a new band
early
of warriors, the Ikhwan, and examines their origins, ideology and their
efforts to expand the Saudi polity. Chapter 4 covers the period of the First
r
16Uthman Ibn Bishr, Llnwan al-Majdfi Tarikh Najd, (The Symbol of Glory in the History of
Najd), reprinted Riyadh: Matba'at al-Riyadh al-Haditha, no date, 2 vols; Abdullah Saleh
Al-Uthaimeen, Tarikh al-Mamlaka al-Arabiyya al-Suudyah, Riyadh: al-Ubaikan, 2 vols. 1996;
Khair al Din Al-Zirkili, Shibh al-jazira fi ahd al-Malik Abdul Aziz, Beirut: Dar al-Qalam, 4
parts in 3 Volumes, 1970.

ABEDIN-INTRODUCTION

World War, and Ibn Saud's attempts to obtain British recognition and the
It
Whitehall
India.
debates
in
that
also examines the
and
ensued
policy
details
Ibn
5
Sharif
Hussein.
Chapter
between
Ibn
Saud
and
animosity
Saud's post war expansion; the conquest of Hijaz; raids into Iraq and
Transjordan, and the subsequent rebellion of the Ikhwan. In this period Ibn
Saud succeeds in being accepted by Britain as the main power to back in
Arabia. Chapter 6 traces the origin of American interests in Arabia in the
1930's; Ibn Saud's negotiations with the oil company and the development
Chapter
7
Anglo-American
Saudi-American
examines
relations.
of

rivalry

Second
Arabia
the
the
Saudi
strategic
concerns
outcome
of
of
as
an
over
World War; and also the strategies employed by Washington and London
to maintain, what they perceived as, control over Ibn Saud; and the
dominance
United
States
that
the
the
occupied
at
of
position
subsequent
end of the War.

10

ABEDIN-ONE

Chapter 1
The Creation of a Dynasty:
The Rise of the House of Al-Saud Prior to the 20th Century
The tribal origins of the Al-Saud are located deep within the interior of
known
1
Great
its
Najd
the
Arabia
aridh.
core
as
and
central
-the region of
deserts surround Najd on three sides. As a plateau Najd is divided into two
hard
(aaliyat)
Najd
is
Upper
volcanic rock,
composed
mainly
of
sections.
but
it
is
layer
the
Its
thin
scrubs
soil
can
only
sustain
of
sand.
gravel and
(safiylat)
has
live.
Najd
Lower
the
in
nomadic populace
area which most of
This
limestone
area receives a greater amount of
shale.
rock and
plains of
fertile
the
The
soil
conditions
nurtured
and
pastures
greener
rainfall.

in
the
towns
settlements
area.
agricultural
and
of
growth
The greatest period of growth was from the fifteenth to eighteenth
from
tribes
the mountainous
centuries when several streams of migrating
by
Attracted
into
Najd?
their
way
areas of the west and southwest made
the availability

forces,
foreign
these
the
absence of
political
of water and

from
Hijazi and Yemeni authorities and the
independence
tribes sought
Sheikhs of the Gulf coast. The newcomers also altered the demographic
Indigenous
Najd
tribes
the
of
such as the al-Mughira, alregion.
of
makeup
Fudul and al-Katheer faced competition for resources from the newcomers
who were primarily

from sections of the Anaizah, al-Dhafir, Qahtan, al-

Dawasir and Banu Khalid tribes Control and access to water wells and
.3
1 E. Rehatsek, The History of the Wahhabys in Arabia and India' Art. XVIII, January 14,
1880 in the Journal of the BombayBranch of the Royal Asiatic Society,Vol. XIV, 1880, pp. 274401. A history of the Wahhabi movement forms part of the Report on Ibn Saud, January 21,
Another important work on this period is R. Bayley Winder,
1918, IOR, L/P&S/18/B270.
Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965.
2 Western travellers to the region in the Nineteenth Century that published informative
works about this region include: William Palgrave, Narrative of a Year's Journey Through
Central and EasternArabia, London Macmillan, 1865 Vol. Iⅈ John L. Burckhardt, Travels
in Arabia, London: Colburn, 1829; Charles Doughty, Travels in Arabia Deserta,London:
Jonathan Cape, 1936; G.F. Sadleir, Diary of a JourneyAcross Arabia, 1819, (first published
1866) Cambridge: Oleander, reprinted 1977.
3For details about tribal migrations and socio-political conditions of Arabia see John Habib,
The Ikhwan Movement of Najd: Its Rise, Development,and Decline, Ph.D. Thesis, University of

11

ABEDIN-ONE

largest
tribes
Only
the
became
strongest
and
matters of survival.
pasture
Weaker
tribes
them.
to
were pushed out, sometimes
access
could guarantee
finding refuge among townspeople where they settled and engaged in
for
left
Najd
Some
livelihood.
for
tribes
other
a
or
shepherding
commerce
Shammar
Iraq,
the
Lam
Bani
to
units
of
while
southern
migrated
areas; the
Further
Damascus.
towards
Anaizah
movements
the
north
moved
and
in
long
droughts
the
by
fuelled
the
unusually
of
several
occurrence
were
in
frequent
tribal
Yet
power
changes
and
migrations
seventeenth century.
structures

were common

in Najdi

history.

A particular

tribe could

dominate for no more than a hundred years before succumbing to another

more powerful one .4`,
All tribes, settled and nomadic, had their own chieftainS. In some
influence
the
tribal
one
of
a
were
under
groups
or
settlements
several
cases
for
be
family.
He
his
securing
would
responsible
particular chieftain and
to
through
share areas
agreement
whether
to
water and pasture
access
It
holding
land
forcibly
by
was
all
rivals.
tribes
and
expelling
or
other
with
(such
Ottoman,
force
itself
imposed
the
the
as
on
area
only when a superior
by
disputes
the
Rashidi
that
Saudi or
over resources were settled
powers)
then
Once
that
expelled
or
was
authority
receded
established authority.
friction among the tribes returned. Even so, the limited jurisdiction of the
Caravans
to
to
their
area.
a
small
maintain
order
ability
chieftains reduced
dira
by
the
to
travellers
assaults
robbers when outside
were prone
and
(tribal area) of a friendly chieftain. 5
A common form of attack among the beduin tribes was the raid
(ghazw). Its objective was usually to gain food, supplies and travel animals.
Camels were the most popular target because of their high value. The
Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1978, p. 11. See also Uwaidah al-Juhany, The History of Najd Prior to
the Wahhabis;A Study of Social, Political and Religious Conditions in Najd During Three
Centuries Precedingthe Wahhabi ReformMovement, Ph.D. Thesis, Univ. Microfilms Int., Ann
Arbor, 1984, pp. 62,153. Also Joseph Kostiner, TheMaking of Saudi Arabia: From Chieftaincy
to Monarchical State 1916-1936, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. Hereafter cited as
MOSA.
4a1-Juhany,A History of Najd Prior to the Wahhabis,pp. 123,131.
SIbid., pp. 165-166. In addition to the caravan trade townspeople also engaged in some
agricultural production when they had accessto good water wells.

12

ABEDIN-ONE

bloody.
swift
and
not
necessarily
ghazwWas` usually

Xt

differed from

those raids born out of blood feuds or motivated by the goal of expanding
territory-raiders

would seek to gain as much booty as possible in a short

6
back
before
fleeing
to
their
time
own
encampments.
span of
In

the

predominant

struggle

for

leadership,

primogeniture

method of gaining power. Although

was

not

the

chieftains could be

brother,
by
their
cousin, uncle or
any
eldest
sons,
male
relative,
succeeded
nephew was an equally

eligible

candidate. Personality

and physical

factors
falconry,
),
fighting,
in
hunting,
(at
etc.
significant
were
prowess
determining who actually took power. Large families often became victims
feuds,
fight
for
as
numerous
claimants
would
vicious
of sibling rivalry, and
the chance to attain the highest position. Once in power the chief was
land
free
lease,
his
legal
to
the
under
control;
sell or
owner of all
considered
having
his
he
Yet
the
to
no
standing
of
own,
chose.
army
whomever
give
tribal

chieftain

loyal
members of the tribe to secure the
relied on

lasted
his
His
instructions.
effectiveness
as
ruler
often
only
of
enforcement
feared,
longer
his
If
his
long
was
a
chieftain
no
respected and
prestige.
as
as
leadership could face serious challenges.
Efforts to bolster his support often involved inviting settlers into the
tribal dira (territory) who would ideally, but not necessarily, be related to
the chieftain's clan. These new arrivals would merge with the larger tribe,
becoming
time
absorbed completely. Their presence increased the size
over
broadened
for
base.
In
the
the
supporters
and
chieftain's
revenue
return
of
his
dira
in
from
to
the
taxes
settle
chieftain
extracted
crops and
permission
imposed a form of sales tax, the rate of which varied from family to family
depending on the strength of their relationship to the chief.? Extending
invitations was at the chiefs discretion and could be done to individuals as
One
have
invitation,
lasting impact on
to
that
to
groups.
such
as
was
well
6 As'ad AbuKhalil, 'Ghazw' in the Oxford Encyclopediaof the Modern Islamic World, New
York; Oxford University Press, 1995. Vol. 2, pp. 66-67. Hereafter cited as Oxford
Encyclopedia.
7a1-Juhany,A History of Najd Prior to the Wahhabis,pp. 177,181.

13

ABEDIN-ONE

Najd and Arabia as a whole, was made in 1744 in the Najdi town of
Diriyya.

Its chief, Muhammad

Muhammad

ibn Abdul

ibn Saud offered sanctuary to Sheikh

Wahhab, a religious

been
had
scholar who

home.
his
8
forced
out of
previous
persecuted and
Born in the central Najd town of Uyayna in 1703, Abdul Wahhab
his
his
birth
At
line
from
long
the
time
of
of religious scholars.
a
came
(judge)
ibn
Ali
Musharraf,
Sulayman
the
chief
qadi
of the
was
grandfather,
town and was noted for having studied under the tutelage of the famed
boy
9
instruction
The
Musa
Damascus,
young
received
al-Hujawi.
scholar of
from his grandfather in subjects such as the Qur'an, and principles of
Islamic law (figh). In 1713 Sulayman passed away leaving his post as qadi
for
his
Wahhab.
Muhammad
Abdul
tutoring
to
the
son
responsibility
and
Yet in 1727 Abdul Wahhab left Uyayna as a result of a disagreement with
the amir of Uyayna. 10Forced to seek patronage elsewhere, his family was
Huraymila.
in
town
the
of
neighbouring
welcomed
difficulties

However, even there

because
Abdul
Wahhab's
son, Muhammad, was openly
arose

critical of the religious practices of the townspeople.

Though the people of Najd had not adopted any other religion,
Islamic practices had weakened and there had been a resurgence in rituals
One
tribal
origin.
such example was prayers offered to
and
of a pre-Islamic
in
'holy
trees'
order to guarantee safe passage while on a journey;
so called

8 Philby, Saudi Arabia, London: Ernest Benn, 1955, pp. 34-35. A biography of Muhammad
Ibn Abdul Wahhab and history of the early Saudi state can be found in Memorial of the
Government of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jeddah; July 31,1955, Vol. 1.
9 For the history of Najd in the Nineteenth Century there are few surviving Arabic sources
written in the period. One of the most significant is Unwan al-Majd fi Tarikh Najd, (The
Symbol of Glory in the History of Najd) by Uthman Ibn Bishr who died in 1873. Reprinted
in Riyadh: Matba'at al-Riyadh al-Haditha, no date, 2 vols. See vol. 1, p. 6. Philby uses Ibn
Bishr extensively in his book Saudi Arabia, London: Ernest Benn, 1955. This author has
used both sources. One of the first responsibilities assigned to young Muhammad was to
complete the rituals of the pilgrimage to Mecca. Thus at age twelve Muhammad ibn Abdul
Wahhab made the long journey from central Najd to the Hijaz. During his visit he came
across a far more diverse culture and population unlike the uniformity of Najd. However,
he also found many Hijazi's lax in their religious practices which would later provide the
impetus for reform across Arabia.
1Uthman Ibn Bishr, Unwan al-Majdfi Tarikh Najd, Part 1, p. 10. Also Derek Hopwood, The
Ideological Basis: Ibn Abdul Wahhab's Muslim Revivalism' in State, Societyand Economy in
Saudi Arabia, ed. Tim Niblock, London: Croom Helm, 1982, p. 26.

14

ABEDIN-ONE

for
the
worldly
the
graves of pious men asking
prayers made at
or
did
functioned
in
the use
"
Although
towns,
as
some
mosques still
success.
instead
law
Islamic
tribal
the
of
the
or
urf
and customs
use of
sharia,
of
Islamic law was prevalent. 12 This traditional

based
on oral
was
practice

it
the
down
the
through
with
contrasted
and
generations
custom passed
final
law.
In
involving
Islamic
the
the
urf,
chief was
cases
more text-based
laws
Since
legislate
the sharia
or
ones.
new
annul
old
arbitrator and could
by
to
to
permitted
revelation many
what
was
restrict activities
sought
fear
judges
discouraged
the
of
out of
activities of sharia
or restricted
chiefs
losing their own power to make the law. 13

Being the son and grandson of judges, Muhammad ibn Abdul

Wahhab understood the difficulties of implementing Islamic law when the
influence of tribal custom was still strong. He was also in a position to
observe the abuse of authority

by other judges-which

was perhaps

functioned.
With
harsh
in
by
they
the
no
which
conditions
encouraged
formal court buildings or permanent court officials to assist, the qadi would
from
his
his
home,
dispense
the
have
the
to
on
services
mosque,
often
At
judgements
times
the
in
the
were not written or
marketplace.
street or
be
for
it
judge
to
the
was
not
uncommon
asked to
and
anywhere
recorded
favour
for
in
in
the
claimant
of
return
a gift or payment.
simply rule
Without a fixed income or government subsidy, the qadi would often have
to supplement

their income by other work,

although

some received

litigants
from
had
However,
the
community
or
pay
all
expenses.
stipends
buying
it
in
the
this
abused,
of verdicts, allowing a
was
resulted
when
litigant to bribe the judge to obtain a favorable ruling. 14

11Ibn Bishr, Unwan al-Majdfi Tarikh Najd, Part 1, p. 9. Also Rehatsek, 'The History of the
Wahhabys in Arabia and India'
'2 John L. Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedwins and the Wahhabys,London: Colburn, 1829, Vol. 1,
pp. 288-289.
Juhany, A History of Najd Prior to the Wahhabis,p. 180. Philby's impression of the
13a1
situation at the time of ibn Abdul Wahhab's youth was one where ; "Islam was definitely
the religion of all self respecting people in the towns and villages of Najd; and there was
pity, amounting to sympathy, rather than condemnation for the practices of the ignorant".
See Philby, Saudi Arabia, p. 34.
14al-Juhany, A History of Najd Prior to the Wahhabis,p. 180.

15

ABEDIN-ONE

Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab considered paying for legal services

father
bribery.
his
15
Yet
took such
to
tantamount
own
as abhorrent and
dependent
on this system as well as on the patronage of
and
was
payment
the amir. This is perhaps why his father did not share the same exuberance
for a forceful change to the status quo that fired his idealistic son. Unable to
leadership
by
local
being
local
the
as not
perceived
practice and
alter
having

the maturity

or religious

knowledge

to be taken seriously,

Muhammad became increasingly frustrated. Leaving home seemed to be

the best choice and so, with the intention of travelling and studying, he set
Islamic
learning.
journey
the
to
to
centres of
out

He began in Medina, a city that attracted scholars of jurisprudence

(flqh) from varying backgrounds and traditions from across the Islamic
Muhammad
There
world.

formed important

leading
with
relationships

became
Sheikh
Muhammad
figures
a
student
of
subsequently
and
religious
Hayat al-Sindia noted Hanafi scholar and leader in the Naqshabandi sufi
his
in
Medina
Muhammad
Wahhab
ibn
Abdul
Through
16
contacts
order.
he
found
in
Iraq.
Moving
Basra
introductions
to
to
tutelage
scholars
gained
Shafi'e
Maliki
Muhammad
Sheikh
the
al-Majmu'e,
a
scholar
and
of
under
during
It
his
ibn
in
Iraq
Muhammad
jurisprudence.
that
was
stay
of
schools
Abdul

Wahhab developed some of his most notable views. There he

(visitation
the
of
practice
ziyarat
prolific
al-qubur
of graves) of
witnessed
martyrs and pious persons, notably at the tombs of the grandson and
Muhammad.
Prophet
of
nephew

The deceased were asked for tawassul

(intercession) with God on the supplicants behalf. 17Muhammad ibn Abdul

Wahhab was abhorred by this and could accept nor remain silent about its

1sIbid., pp. 283-284. Also Rehatsek, 'The History of the Wahhabys in Arabia and India'.
16TheNaqshbandiyah Sufi order was one of the most prominent in Central Asia, the
Indian Subcontinent and Mesopotamia between the 14th and 18th centuries. Followers of
this order were strict in following the sharia and were noted for their shunning of music
and dance. Emphasis was on prayer as was well as political activism. These qualities
seemed to have deeply influenced Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab. See Hamid Algar on
'Nagshbandiyah' in Oxford Encyclopedia, Vol. 3 pp. 226-229.
17SeeAyman al-Yassini on'Wahhabiyah', Oxford Encyclopedia,Vol. 4, pp. 307-308

16

ABEDIN-ONE

His
views
practice.

however,

brought

him

into

conflict

with

local

worshippers.
Financially drained yet filled with knowledge and the experiences of
his travels Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab decided to return to his family
in Huraymila.

The relationship

with his father was still strained over

did
him
deference
Muhammad
but
in
issues,
to
not openly preach
religious
death
father's
in
1740.
his
until

The Education of Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab

The focus of study for a young scholar at that time was fiqh (jurisprudence),
tafseer (the meaning of the Qur'an) and the hadith (traditions

of the

by
Wahhab
influenced
Abdul
ibn
the
Muhammad
was
work
also
prophet).
founded
(778-855
CE)
Hanbal,
ibn
Ahmad
who
scholar
a ninth-century
of
for
his
18
jurisprudence.
Hanbal
fiqh
Hanbali
was noted
the
or school of
criticism

outstanding
philosophy

of the ruling

Caliph

for allowing

Aristotelian

and speculative reasoning, called kalam, to enter into the

The
thought.
most active proponents of speculative
religious schools of
reasoning-the
attributes

'Mu'atazila'-sought

and ventured

into

rational

explanations

the interpretation

for

divine

of anthropomorphic

descriptions of God in certain Qura'nic verses.19Ahmad ibn Hanbal spoke

for
divisive
field
debate
but
jailed
introspective
the
and
was
of
out against
his opposition because the Caliph Al-Mamun himself was sympathetic to
the Mu'atazila. It was not until the reign of Caliph Al-Mutawakkil

(841-861

CE) that Hanbal could teach openly again and his ideas attracted a large
following.
A later adherent of Hanbal, Taqi al-Din Ahmad ibn Taymiya (12631328 CE) was to have even more influence on Abdul Wahhab's thought. 20
18Ahmad ibn Hanbal was born in Baghdad and studied in both Basra and Hijaz. He had
among his teachers notable Hanafi jurists such as Abu Yousef and in addition, the leader
of the Shafi'e school, Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafi'e.
19lgnaz Goldziher, Introduction to Islamic Theologyand Law, Tr. by Andras and Ruth
Hamori, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981, pp. 85-87.
2OIbnTaymiyah was born in Harran where both his father and grandfather had been
leading scholars of the Hanbali school of Islamic jurisprudence. Taqi al-Din ibn Taymiya,

17

ABEDIN-ONE

Ibn

Taymiya

(philosophy),

was

for

noted

worshipping

his

outspoken

views

at gravesites, veneration

falsafa
against

of saints and the

21
He
time
the
the
ulema
of
accused
sufi
orders.
of
some
pantheistic practices
of neglect and encouraging

the "propagation

heretical
of sins and

innovations" for which they should be punished since it was they "more
than others" who had a responsibility

to preserve the Islamic ummah

(community). 22
Ibn Taymiya was also critical of the blind following

of religious

(independent
ijtihad
that
to
reasoning) was
accept
practices and refused
declaring
faith
he
Moreover,
3
that
the
simple act of
was
asserted
closed.
believer,
become
that
true
to
all of a persons outward actions
a
enough
not
be
had
He
in
Islamic
intentions
inward
to
accordance
with
norms.
and

(an
bid'a
innovation)
the
as
and
ziyarat
al-qubur
of
practices
viewed
(violating
24
Those
led
Allah)
the
that
to
shirk
unity of
something which
be
fought,
killed,
if
to
they claimed
even
even
shirk
were
of
acts
committed

to profess faith.
Ibn Taymiya looked to the salafal-saleh(the first three generations of
Muslims) to serve as manifestations of the proper Islamic model25 That
highest
have
leadership
Islamic
the
to
set
examples
of
and
was
generation
living. Subsequent scholars had the duty of ensuring that same model was
(rulers)
Islamic
implementation
The
to
the
were
umara
ensure
of
continued.
laws and prevent bid'a (innovations) from diluting that inherited model.
Sharh al-Ageedahal-Wasitiyah, Riyadh: Darrusalam Publishers, 1996, p. 9. Also Richard
Martin, and Mark Woodward, Defendersof Reasonin Islam, Oxford: Oneworld, 1997, pp.
123-125.
2lTagi al-Din Ibn Taymiya, Mukhtaser Iqtida al-Sirat al-Mustaqeem,Riyadh: Darrussalam
Publishers 1996, pp. 129-133.Also Goldziher, Introduction to Islamic Theologyand Law,
p. 110-111
22Taqial-Din Ibn Taymiya, al Hisbafi al-Islam (Public Duties in Islam: The Institution of
the Hisba) Tr. by Muhtar Holland, Leicester: Islamic Foundation, 1992, pp. 131-132.
231yadHilal, Studies in Usul al-Fiqh, Walnut, CA, Islamic Cultural Workshop, (no date),
p. 129-131.
24Taqial-Din Ibn Taymiya, Sharh al-Ageedahal-Wasitiyah, pp. 11-12. Also Ronald Nettler on
'Ibn Taymiyah' in Oxford Encyclopedia,Vol. 2 pp. 165-166. The Mongol invasion had a deep
impact on Ibn Taymiya; his family had to move to Damascus to avoid a brutal Mongol
occupation; and the activities of certain non-Muslim minority groups at the time led to his
belief that they should be treated harshly for their betrayal.

18

ABEDIN-ONE

Ibn Taymiy s view was that as long as the amir (ruler) fulfilled this duty
then he was to be obeyed. Only if there was a clear violation of Islamic law
leader
harsh
be
Even
if
his
justified.
the
and oppressive
was
removal
could
the ulema had a responsibility

to try and correct him before trying to

described
it
him.
Taymiya
Ibn
thus:
remove
Everyone to who obedience is paid is one of those
in command, and every one of these is under obligation
to command what Allah has commanded and to forbid
forbidden.
has
And everyone who owes them
he
what
Allah,
is
to
them
to
obey
obedience
obliged
in
obedience
defiance
26
Allah.
in
them
to
of
obey
not
and
Ibn Taymiya was fiercely opposed to the Mongol rulers because he saw
them publicly claiming to be adherents of Islam but in reality working to
for
faith
lashed
He
the
it.
at
some
ulema
subverting
of
out
undermine
believers by not fulfilling their duty to Islam, seeking instead to ingratiate
themselves with the new leadership. They were violating
kept
Islamic
the
that
community
principle

the unifying

together; that of tawheed and

instead, tolerated the expression of shirk manifested in Mongol rule.

Tawheedliterally means 'oneness'and unity of God. Yet the essence

belief,
it
to
to
this
confined
simply
supposed
not
was
also
was
concept
of
in
itself
a person's speech, actions, and even emotions.
manifest

Ibn

Taymiya wrote passionately about tawheed and this would later greatly
influence

the young

mind

of Muhammad

ibn Abdul

Wahhab who

Islam
"eternal
God"
"the
tawheed
the
religion
of
of
and
religion
considered
itself" 27 To understand the beliefs of Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab more
be
The
is
tawheed
this
said.
concept
should
of
comprised of three
about
28
elements:
main
First, tawheedal-rububiyah; the unity of Lordship, required the belief
that God was the Creator of all things and did not depend on anything for
25Taqial Din Ibn Taymiya, Muqdimahfi Amwal al-Tafseer(An Introduction to the Principles
of Tafseer) tr. by Muhammad Ansari, Birmingham, UK: Hidayah 1993, pp. 12-16

Taymiya, al-Hisbafi al-Islam,p.117.

261bn

27Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab, Kitab al-Tawheed Riyadh: Dar al-Salaam Publishing,
1986, p. 14.
28A.A. Bilal Philips, The Fundamentalsof Tawheed,Riyadh: Tawheed Publications, 1990,
pp. 5-26 provide detailed description of these concepts.

19

ABEDIN-ONE

living
had
fact
The
things
that
the ability to move,
objects
or
sustenance.
do
because
God
to
them
gave
permission
so.
change and grow was
Furthermore a person's fortune or misfortune were to be considered tests
from God and not the result of using charms, amulets, potions or other
his
devices.
Man's
the
actions
were
of
result
choices, a good
superstitious
but
from
bad
situation,
and
vice-versa,
a
all were tests of
result could come
faith. To believe otherwise or rely on the zodiac, good luck charms or to
have fear of black cats and broken mirrors were contradictory to this aspect
29
tawheed.
of
Second, tawheed al-asmaa wa al-sifaat; embodied the concept of the
God
be
God's
and
attributes,
whereby
must
names
referred to
unity of
descriptions
in
Quran
the
the
to
without adding meaning to the
according
human
His
inferring
to
attributes
similar
meanings.
were
other
names or
beings in name only not in degree, thus when God is said to be 'seeing and
hearing' it is taken in the absolute sense without

the limitations

that

humans have. This was an issue because of the philosophical arguments

that arose over the concept of the nature of God and Ibn Taymiya had
dangers
discourse.
indulging
in
the
of
such
strong views about
Third, tawheedal-ibadah or tawheedal-ilahiya; unity of worship, where
be
directed
God
No
intercessors
to
towards
were
worship
only.
and
prayer
between man and God were acceptable, whether pious men or prophets.
Worship or ibada, in this case also includes having love for, trust in and fear
of

God.

The

fulfilment

of

worship

was

the

adherence

to

the

from
God's
law
the
in
and
abstention
prohibitions
of
all
commandments
following
life.
Not
implementing
the sharia,
private
or
and
public
of
areas
for example, would be a violation of this part of tawheed.
However, in the time of Ibn Taymiya many of these principles were
kalam
The
followed.
prevalence of
and the practice of ziyarat al qubur
not
tawheed
the
violations
of
al asmaawa al-sifat and tawheed
of
examples
were

291bid. See also Qura'n, chapter : verse 39:62,64: 11 and 2:155.

20

ABEDIN-ONE

30
Moreover,
Prophet
to
to
the
supplications
addressed
saints
or
al-ibadah
Muhammad were considered acts of shirk (associating partners with God),
31
A
Muslim
forms
idolatry.
who indulged in these practices was
of
and
fought,
be
hypocrite
killed
32 Though the
and
should
even
considered a
formally
had
Arabia
adopted any other religion besides Islam
not
people of
their actions and superstitions went against what tawheedrepresented and
for that reason Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab was motivated to change
believer
believed
if
He
that
a
also
willingly
society.

followed a leader or

did
laws
that
the
or
society
of a group
not uphold the principles of
obeyed
tawheedthen he had become an unbeliever. He declared that anyone "who
by
book
kafir"
Allah
is
judgment
"all
the
than
taghut
other
of
a
and
a
makes
forces
33
Taghut
for
kafir"
to
those
referred
which
compete
man's
are
Beduin
law
(urf)
tribalism,
etc.
as
nationalism
customary
such
and
attention
Ottoman law were considered to be among the taghut. 34
Shirk too, could be committed
worshipping

in many ways; shirk al-iddiya:

other than Allah, shirk al niyya wa al-irada wa al-qasd- having

or will to violate the principles of tawheed; shirk al-ta'a in

themselves
who
rulers
were
accepting
a state of shirk; and
and
obeying
the intention

loving
35
God
The
than
something
more
al-mahabba
guardians of
shirk
tawheed were, as ibn Taymiya stated, those "who hold command" (i. e. the
leaders).
Muhammed
scholars and

ibn Abdul

Wahhab was therefore

backing
to
in
the
secure
political
need
of
of
an
amir
order to
conscious
(dawla
Islamic
islamiya
dar
entity
proper
or
a
al-Islam) where the
establish
be
innovations
His
have
ideas
and
enforced
quashed.
would
often
sharia
30Kalam was the practice of theological speculation where doctrines considered beyond
human comprehension (such as the nature and essenceof God) were debated and
for
develop
See
Goldziher,
in
to
them.
Introduction to
rational
explanations
order
analyzed
Islamic Theologyand Law, p. 85.
31Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab, Kitab al-Tawheed,pp. 130-131.
32Philips, The Fundamentalsof Tawheed,pp. 5-26.
331bid.,p. 26. kafir literally means'one who conceals the truth' but is often simply
translated as unbeliever. Cited in Christine Moss Helms, The Cohesionof Saudi Arabia,
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981, pp. 88-89.
34Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedwins and the Wahhabys,vol. 1 pp. 288-289. Qura'nic references
to these subjects can be found in Chapter 3 verses 31-32,16: 36 and 4:80.

ABEDIN-ONE

21

been referred to as 'Wahhabi

but neither he nor his followers used that

term. Rather his followers described themselves as ahl al-tawheed(people of

unity) or the Muwahhfdun

(unitarians).

The Search for Political Legitimacy: Alliance and Empire 1744-1818

After his period of travel, Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab returned to
and though in his mid-thirties, still deferred to his father and

Huraymila

preach his views. The ideas of the son were still not

did not publicly

in

welcome

the

embarrassment

to

community
the

and

his

father

family 36 Nevertheless,

was

keen

during

to

this

avoid
period

Muhammad was able to produce kitab al-tawheed, a book which outlined

basic
his
thoughts and principles. It was not until the death of his
many of
father in 1740 that Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab allowed himself to
he
Initially
secured the patronage of Uthman ibn Muammar
openly.
preach
the amir of Uyayna, the town where he had been born and where his family
had prestige. Muammar offered protection and instructed his people to
follow

the teachings of their new imam, now referred to as Sheikh

Muhammad

ibn Abdul Wahhab. The marriage into Muammar's family

between
the two men. 37
the
relationship
solidified
With the political backing of Muammar and the men of Uyayna at
his disposal Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab was able to implement the
principles and begin reforms. As the imam and chief qadi he
laws
in
implementing
sharia
many areas. Crimes of theft and
started
Muwahhldun

murder

were punished with

amputation

and beheading. Domes and

holy
the
tombs
upon
erected
of
men (i. e. the 'companions' of
mausoleums
Prophet Muhammad) were demolished. Books were destroyed if they did
interpretation
fit
the
not

of the Muwahbddun doctrine. The practices of

35Sheikh Abdul Rahman ibn Hasan ibn Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab in Majmu'at al
Tawheed ed. by Rashid Rida, Cairo: al-Manar, 1927. Cited in Helms, Cohesion, p. 91
36Derek Hopwood, The Ideological Basis: Ibn Abdul Wahhab's Muslim Revivalism' in
State, Societyand Economy in Saudi Arabia, ed., Tim Niblock, London: Croom Helm, 1982,
p. 29.
37Ibn Bishr, Unwan al-Majd fi Tarikh Najd, vol. 1 pp. 9-10.

22

ABEDIN-ONE

Friday
in
the
the
sermons and
rulers
praising

prayers for the

-special
Prophet were forbidden 38 In addition other ulema, were criticised for their

for
failing
to end
corruption
of
and
accused
weakness
and
complacency,
(bid'a).
They
blame
for
innovation
to
the ignorance and lack
were
religious
of religious education of the public.

In response,the establishedulemaaccusedibn Abdul Wahhab of not

following the sharia himself by creating trouble and encouraging people to
lawful
their
amirs. One chief in particular, Sulayman ibn
revolt against
Hamad al-Humaidi,

was particularly

angered by this incitement.

Al-

Humaidi was head of the powerful Banu Khalid tribe in the eastern region
al-Hasa.
his
It
through
ports that much of the trade with Uyayna
was
of
Sulayman
threatened to impose economic sanctions on
was conducted.
Uyayna if Uthman ibn Muammar did not expel the aggravating Sheikh. 39
Unable to withstand the pressure from al-Humaidi, Muammar was forced
to comply. He arranged for one of his men to escort the Sheikh out of town.
According to an account by Harry Philby, the escort had orders to kill the
Sheikh once beyond the town limits, but the task proved too difficult for
the man and Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab was able to leave safely 40
Abdul Wahhab found refuge in the town of Diriyyah in 1744. The
had
long
Diriyya
Banu
Khalid
the
a
rivalry
with
of
people
and several
including
its
the
town
of
relatives
of
residents
amir, Muhammad
prominent
ibn Saud, had adopted Muwahhidun

concepts 41 It is to the amir's wife,

Mudhi, that some accounts attribute the success of convincing Muhammed

ibn Saud to give patronage to the Sheikh 42 She prevailed despite the
38al-Yassini, Religion and State, pp. 24-25.
39Rehatsek,'The History of the Wahhabys in Arabia and India' p. 278. The Banu Khalid
territory lay between Najd and the Gulf coast and were in a position to threaten vital trade
through
al-Hasa.
passed
which
routes

4OPhilby,SaudiArabia,p-38-

41J.G. Lorimer, Gazetteerof the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia, London: 1913, Part I,
Vol. II, Chapter VII, p. 1053. Also Report on Ibn Saud, January 21,1918, PRO, IOR
L/P&S/18/B270.
42Leslie McLoughlin, Ibn Saud: Founder of a Kingdom, London: Macmillan, 1993, p. 7. Also
Philby, Saudi Arabia, p. 39; al-Yassini Religion and State, p. 25; Rehatsek, The History of the
Wahhabys in Arabia and India' pp. 274-401. This was done over the protests of Thunayyan
ibn Saud, the amir brother who opposed the alliance.

23

ABEDIN-ONE

brother-in-law,
her
protests of

Thunayyan Ibn Saud, who opposed any

Saudi-Muwahhidun
Wahhab.
The
Abdul
alliance with

(sometimes referred

to by other authors as Saudi-Wahhabi) alliance that began in 1744 was to

impact greatly on Arabian politics well into the twentieth century. 43
The first two years of the Sheikh's stay were spent in spreading the
lectured
Islam.
He
'proper
taught
to
the
the
of
practice'
and
return
call of
letters
to neighboring rulers and notables enjoining them to
and wrote
follow the path of tawheed.44Encouraging unity based on a brotherhood of
faith and not along tribal bonds, Abdul Wahhab hoped to initiate a change
in the mentality
committing

of the beduins. He warned

of the seriousness of

disobeying
Allah.
He reinforced
the
commands
of
shirk and

by
Saud's
ibn
Muhammad
legitimized
rule
exhorting people to obey
and
their amir. Following ibn Taymiya's argument on obedience to rulers, the
Sheikh taught that as long as the sharia was implemented, Muhammad ibn
Saud could not be opposed and that to defy their Islamic leader was
faith
did
in
faith.
Those
their
their
that
the
actions
not
manifest
against
killed
45
fought
be
and
would
With the patronage of the amir of Diriyyah, Abdul Wahhab was able
began
his
ideas
to propagate them among the people
and
openly
to preach
of Najd

without

understanding

fear. After

building

a base of support

and

an

of his ideas he began the second part of 'commanding the

forbidding
From
1746,
the
evil'
which
was
physical
action.
good and
Muhammad ibn Saud's men began their forays into neighboring towns to
implement the rule of the sharia. Those towns that resisted were fought
from
Sheikh
Muhammad
The
ibn
Saud
they
also
secured
submitted.
a
until
booty
fifth
be
to
and
of
all
revenues
which
a
could
spent on
receive
pledge

43al-Juhany,A History of Najd Prior to the Wahhabis.,p. 288. The descendants of Muhammad
ibn Abdul Wahhab are often known by family name of 'al Al-Sheikh'.
44al-Yassini, Ayman. 'Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab' in Oxford Encyclopedia,Vol. 2,
pp. 159-160.
45IbnTaymiya, al-Hisbafi al-Islam, p. 117.

24

ABEDIN-ONE

fact,
Abdul
Wahhab
fit
46
In
he
controlled all areas of religious,
saw
what
educational and judicial concern.
The two decades following

the alliance saw the expansion and

from
Tribal
territory.
chiefs
al-Hasa in the east, Najran in
consolidation of
the southwest and Hijaz in the west made various attempts to keep the
Muwahhldun

Najd
Arabia.
Though they
to
confined
central
of
warriors

came close to success on several occasions they were unable to remove the
had
from
Najd
from
the
the
tribes
scene
completely.
support
challengers
that were either convinced of the Muwahkidun

call, or who sought to

benefit from ghazw or those who were simply afraid of being the victims of
dun
forces
In
Muwahh
themselves.
event,
any
always managed to
ghazw
did
47
This
death,
in 1765, of
the
themselves
struggle
not
stop
at
resupply
Muhammad

ibn Saud. His son Abdul Aziz simply stepped in and was

(bai'a).
Muhammad
the
of
allegiance
pledge
given

ibn Abdul Wahhab

his
to
give
support and advice to the new amir and carried on his
continued
48
of
religious
reform.
programme
This period was also observed by one of the first Europeans to
first
Arabia,
into
the
certainly
serious explorer, Carsten Niebuhr.
venture
He was a Dutch officer in the Corps of Engineers on a surveying mission
by
Frederick
V.
49
King
The
King
sought to gain a greater
chartered
understanding

of the Bible by examining the geography, culture and

languages of the Middle East and the Holy Lands. In 1762 Niebuhr visited
Jeddah on the Red Sea and during 1764-1765 travelled along the eastern
he
learned
Arabia
Saudi-Muwahh
the
dun
the
where
of
spread
of
of
coast
Though
alliance.

he was a contemporary

of Muhammad

ibn Abdul

46a1-Yassini,Religion and State, p. 31.

Questfor Security, Ithaca: Cornell University
47Nadav Safran, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless
Press, 1988 p. 10.
48Lorimer, Gazetteerof the Persian Gulf, Part I, Vol-II, Chapter VII, p. 1054. Also Memorial of
the Government of Saudi Arabia, 1955, Vol. 1, pp. 120-121.
49The court of the King had drawn up a 235 page dossier full of questions to which it
linguistic,
The
covered
geographical,
questions
answers.
sociological and
sought
It
the
the
to
topics.
objective
of
mission
was
answer as many of the questions as
zoological
this
Niebuhr
became
first
As
the
European to accurately
of
mission
a
result
possible.

25

ABEDIN-ONE

Wahhab the two men never met and it appears that he was able to
Muwah'Edun
the
the
of
underlying purpose
appreciate

mission. Niebuhr's

Saudi
before
167
the
establishment of modern
years
comments made
Arabia

are prophetic:

"It

has already produced

a revolution

in the

hereafter
influence
Arabia,
the
state of
probably
and
will
of
government
this country still further. "50
Niebuhr was part of a six strong team but none of the others
disease,
long
harsh
the
the
the
to
of
and
climate,
ravages
survive
managed
journey home. Niebuhr's determination and will to survive was matched
by his curiosity and interest in learning. He was fascinated not only in the
but
Arabia
history
the
of
geography and

in flora and fauna as well.

Niebuhr also seems to have made a genuine effort to understand local

the
the
merchant, student and religious
common
man,
out
seeking
people,
leaders to learn their ways and ideas. His work was a major contribution to
the understanding

of the region in his time. Though his knowledge

of

Islam and Arabian politics was limited prior to his travels he seems to have
both:
gained considerable grasp of
The Musulman religion, as professed by the Sunnites, is surely far
different from what it was instituted by Mahomet. This sect follow
the authority of some commentators, who explain the Alcoran by
their own whimsies, and exalt their private opinions into doctrines
long
It
Mahometan
train of saints,
the
system.
acknowledges
a
of
in
invoked
cases of necessity, and to whom many absurd
who are
have
been
favour
in
these
to
ascribed,
and
said
are
wrought
miracles
in
themselves
to
the
addressed
saints,
who
preference to
of persons
God. It gives faith to the virtues of amulets, and the efficacy of
foolish vows. In short, it has gradually adopted many pieces of
in
Alcoran,
justified
the
condemned
are
which
and
only
superstition,
by the strained interpretations of the Doctors The new religion of
...
Abd ul Wahheb deserves therefore to be regarded as a reformation
back
its
it
Mahometism,
to
reducing
original simplicity. He has
of
but
further
Arab
hardly
be
than
some
other
reformers:
an
can
gone
delicate
in
hand.
51
to
a
matters
with
act
such
expected
had also to visit the cities of Najaf and
in
Egypt
height
the
the
and
of
pyramids
calculate
Karbala in Iraq. See Robin Bidwell, Travellers in Arabia, Garnet: Reading, 1994, pp. 32-49.
50CarstenNiebuhr, Travels Through Arabia, and Other Countries in the East, Translated by
Robert Heron, Edinburgh: R.Morrison and Son, 1792. Reprinted 1994, Reading: Garnet
Pub, Vol. 2, p. 131. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was established in 1932.
51Niebuhr, Travels Through Arabia, and Other Countries in the East, pp. 135-136.

26

ABEDIN-ONE

Unfortunately,

few historical accounts refer to Niebuhr and this author

his
find
to
contribution to the history of Arabia in the
reference
could not
Lacey
Safran.
52
Kostiner,
Yet
Hogarth
he
that
or
of,
al-Yassini,
said
works
knew of no serious explorer who did not consult Niebuhr's work before
did
Arabia
trip
to
or
who
not end up quoting him on his
embarking on a
53
return.
By 1770, much of the peninsula, with the exception of Yemen, was
under Muwaridun
Mesopotamia

influence. In the north, raids were carried out into

Syria
to the outskirts
and

of Damascus, thus placing

caravan and pilgrim

from
the centre of the Ottoman
routes

dominance
Saudi
under
empire

In 1773, Riyadh, the chief city in Najd

important

finally
taken-thus
was

vindicating

Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab. At

had
he
his
followers
thirty
spent
almost
years
guiding
and
age seventy
he
had
In
House
Al-Saud.
been
the
of
return
entrusted with the
supporting
responsibility

for all religious, educational, and judicial issues. Now in

let
he
broaden
Al-Saud
boundaries
the
the
the
amirs
of
of
semi-retirement,
the realm. Thus the Sheikh lived long enough to influence the first two
Saudi-Muwahdun
the
of
amirs

entity. Moreover, he was able to inculcate

his ideas into the minds of sons and grandsons of the Al-Saud family who
would

themselves be taking

Muhammad

ibn Abdul

future

leadership

roles. When in 1792

Wahhab himself passed away his four

sons

father's
his
lifetime
he
In
had
their
work.
seen the creation of a
continued
dominate
had
to
Arabia.
that
come
a
considerable
portion
of
polity

52Robert Lacey, The Kingdom: Arabia and the House of Saud, New York: Avon, 1981;
State;
Safran,
Saudi
Kostiner,
Arabia,;
Religion
MOSA Meanwhile Niebuhr's
and
al-Yassini,
.
historic contribution was recognised as early as 1880 by Rehatsek, 'The History of the
Wahhabys in Arabia and India' pp. 274-401.
53Hogarth, quoted in the Introduction to Niebuhr's Travels Through Arabia, 1994 reprint
VI.
p.
,
S4Lorimer,Gazetteerof the Persian Gulf, Part I, Vol. II, Chapter VII, p. 1054. The precedent
Euphrates
in
to
time
the
this
of
raiding
up
and to the outskirts of Damascus
established
by
Abdul
Aziz
ibn Saud to increase the size of his
in
twentieth
the
century
was used
territory during the Uqair conference of 1922 where boundary agreements with Iraq and
Transjordan were being discussed.

27

ABEDIN-ONE

The one area where Muwahhddun operations were slow to penetrate

Hijaz
Sharif
Mecca,
the
the
the
of
where
ruler,
region
of
western
was
Ghalib ibn Musa'd was opposed to the Muwahiddun/Wahhabi

polity. 55

The strength of Ghalib's rule varied, and was dependent upon the success
differences
distribution
largesse.
he
his
Yet
tribal
of
and
of
manipulation
of
did successfully challenge the encroachment of the Saudi-Muwahh dun
forces. Much of the 1790's was spent in battle, with neither side achieving a
decisive victory. 56 In 1799, after many stalemates, a truce was finally
Ghalib
having
Sharif
jurisdiction
in
was
recognised
as
which
agreed

over

Mecca, as well as the Utayba and Harb tribal territories and all of northern
Asir. 57Abdul Aziz and his men were invited to perform the pilgrimage in
Mecca and to celebrate the Eid festival. However this nearly led to further
boisterous
Hijazi
the
clashes when
dancing which

inflamed

abruptly withdrew

ceremonies included

the Muwahdun

singing

sensitivities. 58 Abdul

and
Aziz

his men before an incident occurred and turned their

attention eastwards.
The city of Karbala, in Iraq was famous for the tomb of Hussain,
Its
Prophet.
immense
local
the
was
a
presence
matter
of
of
pride
grandson
and it was a site that attracted numerous worshippers.

To the strict

S5UsingTurkish sources from Istanbul and Baghdad, Gerald de Gaury in his book Rulers of
Mecca provides an interesting history of Hijaz and the office of Sharif of Mecca. See Gerald
DeGaury, Rulers of Mecca,New York: Roy Publishers, 1949, especially pp. 177-207.
56Rehatsek, 'The History of the Wahhabys in Arabia and India' pp. 281-282.
57DeGaury, Rulers of Mecca, p. 181
58CharlesDidier, Sojourn with the Grand Sharif of Makkah ,tr. by Richard Boulind,
Cambridge: Oleander Press, 1985, pp. 8,55, and 63. This is an account of a French traveller
during
1854-1856.
Didier
Hijaz
the
the
period
observed grand mausoleums
visited
who
long
the
tombs
the
of
pious
saints
and
robes which the people wore were
over
constructed
deemed ostentatious by the Muwahkldun who kept their robes short and above the ankle
be
Another
Didier
described
'waste'
to
cloth
and
arrogant.
practice
not
was the
as
so
'branding' of male children on the fortieth day of their birth with deep incisions, three on
The
the
temple.
two
identified
the person
scars
were
permanent
on
and
and
cheek
each
beduin,
Land'.
Among
'Holy
from
the
being
the
superstitions and occult beliefs
as
be
found
'holy'
Trees
that
could
considered
were
strewn with pieces of cloth
abounded.
Sacrificing
by
done
to
travellers
off
evil
ward
spirits.
camels
was
also
as parts of
placed
described
These
in the Safarnamehof
customs
were
also
vividly
ceremonies.
exorcism
Mirza Mohammed Hosayn Farhani, (tr. by H. Farmayan and E. Daniel as'A Shiite
Pilgrimage to Mecca 1885-1886' Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990, pp. 225-228.).
Farhani was an Iranian notable who wrote an account of his pilgrimage journey. An

28

ABEDIN-ONE

interpretations

Wahhab
Abdul
ibn
the veneration of any man was
of

lead
force
59
Abdul
Aziz
10,000
In
1801
Islam.
to
of
a
roughly
antithetical
60
Several
6,000
the
to
thousand people were
attack
city
camels
men and
killed,

the tomb

and other

gravesites were

pillaged

and the city

forces
did
in
Najd,
Saudi
61
Unlike
the
and
around
attacks
not
plundered.
seek to obtain territorial

did
they seek to establish their
nor
control

from
Such
the
tribute
people.
an occupation would
extract
sovereignty or
likely result in the dispatch of the Ottoman army. Abdul Aziz chose to
his
to
their
then
enjoy
allowing
men
plunder and giving
retreat,
and
attack
them g boost of morale. 62
It is ironic that during the lifetime of the Sheikh such a campaign
Shi'i
initiated.
Indeed
of
pilgrimage
was
not
site
with the
major
a
against
followers
his
for
Wahhab
Abdul
ibn
and
enacting strict
reputation of
Muwahiddun
violators
of
punishments against

principles it is surprising

that the most notorious act which the Muwahhidun

army embarked upon,

death
decade
Sheikh.
Especially
the
the
of
after
since that
a
occurred almost
incident

was in

Muwahhidun.

itself

part

of what

made the reputation

of the

The Karbala attack highlights the differences between raids

during the lifetime of the Sheikh and those after his death. Muhammad ibn
Abdul Wahhab was primarily

a teacher and a man of scholarly debate.

Even though he promulgated strong verdicts against those who 'deviated

from the faith', he was realistic and politically pragmatic.
Although his support for the Al-Saud legitimized

their rule there

faith.
to
the
task
Rather,
the
assigned
army
of
spreading
standing
no
was
from
beduin
drawn
The
Sheikh
tribes
towns.
and
were
rallied
conscripts
his
book
Qajar
decorated
to
the
of
was
presented
version
ruler Naseruddin
elaborately
Shah in 1887.
59Lorimer, Gazetteerof the Persian Gulf, Part I, Vol. II, Chapter VII, p. 1059. See also David
Edens, The Anatomy of the Saudi Revolution' in the International Journal of Middle East
Studies, vol. 5,1974, pp. 50-64; Philby Saudi Arabia, pp. 92-93..
60Rehatsek, 'The History of the Wahhabys in Arabia and India', p. 284.
61Wahba, Arabian Days, p. 91and Philby Saudi Arabia, p. 93.
6TThiswas not the first time that Karbala had been attacked and the ornate graveyards
levelled. In 851 the Abbasid Caliph al-Mutawakkil also destroyed the tombs to curtail the
by
Shi'a
inhabitants.
See
Lorimer,
Gazetteerof the
importance
on
shrines
placed
growing
Persian Gulf, Vol. 1, part 1, pp. 179-180.

29

ABEDIN-ONE

his followers to rebel against the Ottomans who had 'left their religion' by
Those
joined
foreign
that
the struggle were promised
practices.
adopting
'paradise' through martyrdom while those that lived could look forward to
their share of booty, in addition to a reward from the almighty. 63 It was
through the appeal of both 'worldly'

treasures and reward in the 'afterlife'

that the beduin were drawn into the Muwahiddun

cause.

Within two years of the attack on Karbala Abdul Aziz had launched
Hijaz.
May
he
into
In
1803
the
wrested control of
major assaults westwards
the holy city of Mecca from the grasp of Sharif Ghalib. 64 The defeated
leader and the ulema of Mecca were obliged to pledge their allegiance
(bai'a) to Abdul Aziz and acknowledge their acceptance of Muwahkldun
local
To
did
the
the
of
many
merchants
surprise
conquerors
not
principles.
business
However,
that
the
trade
continued
as
and
ensured
usual.
prohibit
social and moral codes of the city were made stricter, prohibiting

music

fortunate
but
inhabitants
than
they
the
tobacco,
more
were
of previous
and
Muwahbidun

deaths.
their
conquests; many of whom met

For Abdul Aziz Al-Saud, the victorious capture of the holy city was
his
he
Upon
Diriyya,
lived.
killed
to
was
return
attacked
and
after
short
Friday prayers by a man who sought to avenge the death of his sons in the
Succession
his
Karbala.
Saud
to
was
granted
son
who was already
on
raid
leader.
65
Determined
his
father's
legacy Saud
to
continue
an experienced
forces
Medina-where
his
to
the
capture
city
of
some practices,
organised
did
by
inflame
Muwahvidun
to
visiting
pilgrims,
much
especially
Prophet
had
become
The
tomb
the
of
a mausoleum, adorned
sensibilities.
into
for
had
for
turned
intercession
to
site
a
pilgrims
and
pray
gifts
with
66
had
The
Almighty.
decoration
the
new
ruler
extraneous
with
pieces
63Aziz Al-Azmeh'Wahhabite Polity' in Arabia and the Gulf From Traditional to Modern
States, ed. I. RNetton, New Jersey: Barnes and Noble, 1986, pp. 75-91.
64Philby, Saudi Arabia, p. 95 and DeGaury, Rulers of Mecca, p. 186.
65Lorimer, Gazetteerof the Persian Gulf, Part I, Vol. II, Chapter VII, pp. 1062-1063.
66Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab had been extremely critical of superstition surrounding
trees and devoted a chapter in his Kitab al-Tawheedagainst it. See ibn Abdul Wahhab, Kital
9.
Part
Chapter
the
tree
included
tearing off a piece of
of
ritual
of
worship
al-Tawheed
keep
it
hanging
tree
the
to
on
evil spirits away. Another practice involved the
clothing and
disease
bad
town
to
of
rid
a
or
a
camel
a
omen. The animal would be first
of
slaughtering

ABEDIN-ONE

30

dead
Prayers
from
to
the
the
tomb.
and other unorthodox rituals
removed
Saud
banned.
This
unpopular
made
were

among some, but the people

feared
him.
undoubtedly
Having secured the two holy cities Saud was in a powerful position.
Though he had taken the role of amir, he did not alter the political status
figurehead
Sharif
Ghalib
leader-albeit
to
to
allow
remain a
quo, choosing
to forestall an immediate Ottoman attack. Saud did, however, appoint a
Mecca
in
who was to ensure that the religious practices of the
qadi
new
followed
people

the teachings of Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab. Who

better to serve that function than the grandson of the 'great Sheikh' himself
Sulayman ibn Abdullah ibn Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab. 67 This was
followed by other appointments of members of the family of ibn Abdul
Wahhab to judicial

positions throughout

Hijaz. These judges were to

dispense their services without taking payment of any kind from the locals.
In case of disagreement with a particular verdict, the appeals could be
lodged directly with the amir, thus giving Saud the ultimate power of veto.

Collections for the public treasury, or bayt al-mal were undertaken

by special agents appointed by Saud, who taxed merchant capital and
booty.
68
At
in
beduin
the
time,
typical
of
raiding
same
a
portion
received
Saud
his
the
the
entertained
noble
and
poor
style,
at
majlis and
chief
proffered
throughout

He
to
respected
guests.
successfully extended influence
gifts
western Arabia, reigning

in wayward

tribes and raiding

heavily into Syria right up to Damascus and Aleppo. This balance of

diplomatic
and
manoeuvring was essential to the
military success
been
have
rule
would
and
successful if it were not
maintenance of effective
for the determination of Constantinople to exact its revenge.

led around the town where it was believed it would absorb evil spirits and then it would
be sacrificed which was thought to kill the bad omen. These examples can be found in
Didier, Sojourn With the Sharif, pp. 8 and 63. See also Edens, The Anatomy of the Saudi
Revolution' pp. 50-64.
67al-Yassini. Religion and State, p. 43.
68Didier, Sojourn With the Sharif, p. 97. Also Lorimer, Gazetteerof the Persian Gulf, Part. I, Vol.
I, p. 179.

31

ABEDIN-ONE

Ottoman and Egyptian

Intervention

in Arabia 69

The Ottoman response to the loss of Hijaz was slow. European intrigue and
diverted
Asian
Central
in
the attention of an already
the
provinces
conflict
Beleaguered

in

Constantinople,

Sultan

Selim.

delegated the task of recapturing the holy places to Muhammad

Ali of

weakened

Caliphate.

Egypt. However, Ali had problems of his own with the Mamluk dynasty
his
in
Egypt
before
to
took
time
consolidate
power
acting on the
and
fact
Muhammad
7
In
order

Ali 's force, consisting largely of Albanian

did
land
led
by
his
Tusun,
in
Hijaz
October
1811,
son
not
until
and
soldiers
Saud
Mecca.
Marching
captured
northwards
seven years after

towards

Sinai, the soldiers took territory where there were fewer strongholds of the
Al-Saud before making an attempt, in early 1812, on the key city of
Medina. Due to the allegiance of many local tribes Saud was forewarned of
the advancing army. He moved first to catch the attackers in an ambush as
they passed through a valley. The overconfident Egyptian force was caught

by surprise and forced to retreat with many casualties.71

Tusun would have to wait the best part of a year for reinforcements
to arrive from Egypt and in the meantime he began a campaign to win over
local tribal chiefs with gifts and bribes. Thus when reinforcements finally
did arrive in October 1812 he was able to field a combined beduin-Egyptian
force to lay siege on the city of Medina. His tight hold forced the city to

69Egyptian operations in Arabia and a history of Wahhabi power in eighteenth and

detail
in
in
War
Office
January
21,1918, IOR
a
are
provided
report
of
centuries
nineteenth
Also Lorimer Gazetteerof the Persian Gulf, Part I, Vol. II pp. 1081L/P&S/18/B270/P337.
1093. See also M. W. Daly, ed. The CambridgeHistory of Egypt, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998,2Vols, and Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, especially
Chapter 2.
70Muhammad Ali became the wali (governor) of Egypt in 1805 when the Ottoman Sultan
him
delicate
in
to
the
following
forced
to
order
maintain
the
political
appoint
situation
was
French withdrawal. Ali was concerned from the beginning that the Sultan would try and
Hijaz
designed
It
the
him.
that
the
to
to distract him and
mission
was
possible
was
remove
Nevertheless
Ali
his
to
also realised that controlling the holy
exhaustion.
resources
stretch
in
immense
Muslim
him
the
prestige
world and provide him a staging
cities would give
See
Daly,
Vol.
2
139-146.
Also
Rehatsek,
The
for
History of the
pp.
conquests.
other
area
Wahhabys in Arabia and India' pp. 322-325.
71Ibn Bishr, Unwan al-Majdfi Tarikh Najd, Part I, pp. 155-156; Lorimer, Gazetteerof the
Persian Gulf, Part I, Vol. II, Chapter VIII, pp. 1080-1085.Also Daly, The CambridgeHistory of
Egypt, Vo1.2 p. 198 and the Memorial of the Governmentof Saudi Arabia, 1955,Vol. 1, p. 136.

ABEDIN-ONE

32

fortnight-boosting
a
surrender within

Tusun's confidence and his troops

72
He
immeasurably.
went on to take Mecca in January 1813. The
morale
beduins
looking
for booty to Tusun's camp. Saud
brought
more
successes
found he was unable to retain beduin allegiance when they sensed better
half
Egyptian
Being
the
side.
way across the peninsula in
with
spoils
Diriyya, he could do little to ensure the Hijazi tribes stayed in line. Before
Saud could organise a Najdi force to re-take Hijaz, he died suddenly in
April 1814.73
Leadership was handed over to Saud's son, Abdullah who took over
losses
defections
Battlefield
difficult
time.
tribal
and
meant that he had
at a
quickly to reassert control and establish undisputed authority among the
tribes. 74Matters were complicated when a great uncle (the brother of his
leader
the
and tried to claim his own right
challenged
young
grandfather),
to rule based on being the son of Muhammad

ibn Saud-the dynastic

founder. Tension increased within the family and among the tribes as the
issue of rightful

succession was debated. Abdullah

ibn Saud eventually

from
his
but
the
great
challenge
uncle
off
could not repair the
staved
damage to Muwahiddun

unity. Sensing this weakness, more opportunistic

beduin tribes defected to the Egyptian side. 75With the Al-Saud weakened
Najd,
Tusun
he
had put an end
to
mainly
seemed
confident
and confined
to the threat. Reluctant to engage in further bloody battles he secured a
treaty with Abdullah ibn Saud that maintained the status quo and in which
the Muwahiddun

would give up their claims to the Hijaz. With a treaty

Egypt
in
November
Tusun
to
1815,
returned
whereupon he
negotiated,
died
76
thereafter.
shortly
contracted plague and
In the absence of a strong Egyptian presence Abdullah

ibn Saud

began to re-assert his authority in the peninsula. Muhammad Ali, incensed

n Ibn Bishr, Unwan al-Majdfi Tarikh Najd, Part I, pp. 157-158. Also Rehatsek, "The History
India'
322-325.
Arabia
in
Wahhabys
the
and
pp.
of
73Ibn Bishr, Unwan al-Majdfi Tarikh Najd, Part I, p. 176
74D. G. Hogarth, A History of Arabia, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1922, p. 104. Didier, Sojourn
With the Sharif, p. 103. Lorimer, Gazetteer,Part I, Vol. II, Chapter VIII, p. 1082.
75War Office Report, January 21,1918, PRO, IOR L/ P&S/ 18/ B270/ P337.
76Daly, The CambridgeHistory of Egypt, Vol. 2 p. 201

ABEDIN-ONE

33

by this violation of the treaty, sent his elder son Ibrahim to the Hijaz with a
heavily armed contingent of soldiers in September 18167' Their mission
heart
Arabia
into
the
to
of
was
reach
and destroy the Saudi power base in
Najd. Following the tactics of Tusun, Ibrahim began by undermining

the

web of tribal alliances that was the backbone of the Al-Saud's strength.
Through money, guns and gifts, tribe after tribe was seduced to the
Egyptian side. As Ibrahim pushed towards Najd, sections of Mutayr and
Harb tribesman defected to join him. Abdullah Al-Saud could not provide
strong leadership nor promise sufficient booty to keep them in his fold.
Moreover, many tribes saw this as an opportunity

to escape the tax and

tribute they were required to pay as part of their allegiance to the Najdi
amir.
Despite Ibrahim s desire for a swift victory, his army of over five
thousand soldiers and a dozen artillery

guns, directed by a French

for
lay
Diriyya
siege
around
more than six months. Abdullah ibn
engineer,
Saud eventually agreed to surrender in the hope that the town and his
family

would

be spared.

However,

Muhammad

All

was

not

hearing
Upon
his
that
victor.
army had Najd virtually
magnanimous

a
in

their grasp he ordered Diriyyah's houses to be ripped down and burntthe town's walls were to be shelled into pulp. Several hundred members of
the Al-Saud and ibn Abdul Wahhab families were expelled from Najd and
brought

to Cairo. Shortly thereafter Abdullah

Al-Saud was moved to

Constantinople where he was publicly executed for treason. 78Meanwhile

Ibrahim was instructed to proceed through Najd and the surrounding
territories

to destroy any remaining

pockets of Saudi/Muwahhidun

defeat
The
Al-Saud
the
of
reduced the importance of central
sympathisers.
Arabia as Saudi power was crushed, returning

Najd to tribal feuding.

77P.M. Holt, Egyptand theFertileCrescent1516-1922,London: Longmans,1966,p. 180.

78Lorimer, Gazetteerof the Persian Gulf, Part. 1, Vol. II p. 1090; Ibn Bishr, Unwan al-Majdfi
Tarikh Najd part I p. 207; Holt, Egypt and the Fertile Crescent1516-1922, p. 180. See also
Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 16-18, Hogarth A History of Arabia p. 105;
Lacey The Kingdom, p. 62 and Safran Saudi Arabia, p. 13 for details of the destruction of
Diriyya.

34

ABEDIN-ONE

Muhammad Ali had no interest in maintaining permanent garrisons there

forces
Hijaz.
79
his
the
to
coast
western
of
and retired

European Penetration
Ironically, the destruction of the Saudi entity opened the way for greater
European penetration of Arabia. Muhammad
approval

obtain

of his rule

indulged

Ali of Egypt, anxious to

the requests of curious

and

adventurous Europeans who sought to explore the interior of Arabia. The

famous Bruckhardt expedition was provided with an escort and allowed
by
a non-Muslim
access
unprecedented

to Mecca and Medina. French

feted
doctors
Egyptian
hospitality
Italian
were
with
officers and

on their

trips into Asir and the Hijaz. Britain, though not entirely displeased by the
destruction of Saudi-Muwahhldun

power, was nevertheless made anxious

by the extension of Muhammad Ali's influence into Arabia. This in turn

provided

for
Egypt's
France
to enter the strategically
ally,
avenue
an

important Persian Gulf. French warships harassed British merchant vessels

fomenting
in
French
active
were
anti-British sentiment among
agents
and
the local chiefs-80
British interests in the Gulf were motivated by the desire to defend
her
to
colonial prize-India.
shipping routes

The period 1793-1810 saw

disruption
due
trade
to
to French attacks as
and
supply
routes
considerable
flee
rom
Qawasim.
However,
local
Britain
the
did
as
raiders
fk
as
not wish
well
to commit large naval forces to the role of policeman in the Gulf. Instead,
Britain sought to employ local rulers for the task. A flurry of treaties were
beginning
Sheikhs
Bahrain
Arab
in
1820.81
In return for
with
with
signed
had
Arab
the
to
British
take
rulers
protection,
and
on
a
agent and
subsidies
79Arnold T. Wilson, The Persian Gulf, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928, pp. 198-199. Also
Lorimer, Gazetteerof the Persian Gulf, Part. 1, Vol. II p. 1090.
80The French landed in Egypt in 1798 and Napoleon was anxious to build up France's
Sea
Persian
Gulf.
Captain
G.
Sadlier
Red
in
the
and
was sent by the Government
presence
Egyptian-French
British
interests
investigate
threats
to
in the Persian Gulf. His
India
to
of
trip was the first documented crossing of the Arabian Peninsula from east to west. See
Sadlier Diary of a JourneyAcross Arabia.
81Lorimer, Gazetteer,Part I Vol. I, pp. 658-677; Troeller, The Birth of Saudi Arabia, p. 15. and
McLoughlin, Ibn Saud, p. 10.

ABEDIN-ONE

35

British
the
of
piracy
against
suppression
ships. These provisions
support
were later expanded to stipulate that the Sheikhs were not to accept
from
lease
land
any
other
power
nor
without British approval.
subsidies
This did not however end French involvement. The rule of Muhammad Ali
in Egypt was a constant reminder of France's influence in the region. 82
For all his French sympathies Muhammad Ali 's chief concern was
the expansion of his power, preferably at the expense of the Ottoman
Sultan. He worked to create a highly centralised nominally independent
Constantinople's
taking
of
advantage
weakened leadership. In fact
state,
his power was such that even the Ottoman

Sultan was seeking his

for
Sultan
Mahmudnhad
help
to suppress a
reluctantly
asked
assistance.
rebellion

in Greece that Ottoman soldiers had been unable to quell.

Egyptian forces not only succeeded but advanced to take Athens. 83In the
Hijaz, three hundred members of the Sharifian family, from among whom
the Sharif of Mecca was traditionally
Muhammad
limited

selected, were exiled to Egypt.

Ali appointed a Sharif of his own choice with a stipend and

authority

thus making the position little more than that of an

Egyptian civil servant.

The Second House of Al-Saud

Najd became the focus of renewed activity among the Saudi-Wahhabi
families but from a different branch. Until that time the Saudi amirs were
descendants of Abdul Aziz ibn Muhammad Al-Saud, the eldest son of the
founder. With much of that branch exiled by Muhammad Ali to Egypt
there was an opportunity

for others in the extended family

to come

forward and take a leadership position. This was seized upon in 1824 by
Turki ibn Abdullah ibn Muhammad ibn Saud.84 Turki was also a grandson
Hogarth, A History
82War Office report of January 21,1918, IOR L/P&S/18/B270/P337;
of Arabia, p. 110.
83Muhammad Ali also sent several armies southwards into the Sudan, see Daly, The
CambridgeHistory of Egypt, Vol. 2, pp. 204-210.
84Lorimer, Gazetteerof the Persian Gulf, Part. I, Vol. II, Chapter VIII, pp. 1093-1094. Also
Memorial of the Government of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 31,1955, Vol. 1
p. 155.

36

ABEDIN-ONE

line
(this
from
but
the
founder
the
the
of
second
son,
same
the
was
of
Abdullah

ibn Muhammad

who had made an unsuccessful attempt to

for
in
Saud
1814).
ibn
Abdullah
control
challenge
Throughout

the decade of 1824-1834,

Turki

concentrated

on

building his power base around Riyadh using familiar tactics of rallying
tribal support and conquering territory. With support from the ulema of
Riyadh and from the family of the 'Al-AlSheikh'

(known as the family of

Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab), Turki was able to extend his influence
into

much

of central

Arabia.

Yet he was careful

to avoid

direct

confrontations with Egyptian and Ottoman forces as well as the Sheikhs on

had
85
he
However,
interests.
Britain
Gulf
was clever
the
coast with whom
Qatar
Sheikhs
Bahrain
in
to
tribute
the
to,
of
and
with
pay
negotiate
enough
free
from
be
Muwhh{dun
for
to
them
raids.
order
By 1834, as had occurred in the past, dissension and rivalry within
the extended family threatened the dynasty. This time the instigator was
Mishari ibn Abdul Rahman ibn Saud, a cousin from the Abdul Aziz line of
for
himself.
His
to
claim
power
sought
method was
who
previous amirs
followed
Turki
He
daring.
the
out
of
mosque after prayers and
and
simple
killed him. Proceeding to the houses of the Al-Sheikh family he obtained
bai'a from them after promising that their lives would be spared. 86Mishari

before
few
for
just
the
the
in
of
son
a
weeks
murdered amir
power
was
had
been
ibn
Turki
Faisal
Riyadh.
the
time
to
on
a
campaign
at
of
returned
his fathers assassination and had come for revenge. He refused to accept
father
Faisal
his
his
the
as
amir.
rallied
men to storm his
of
the murderer

father's former fortress that Mishari had taken over. During the night raid
Abdullah
ibn
Lieutenants,
Al-Rashid,
Faisal's
trusted
managed to
one of
break into Mishari's bedroom and avenged the death of the late amir Turki.

85Rehatsek, 'The History of the Wahhabys in Arabia and India' pp. 337-339. See also
'Note on Central Arabia' IOR L/P&S/18/B334; Ibn
Office
India
entitled
report
undated
Bishr, Unwan, pp. 13-17.
Gazetteer
Persian
Gulf, Part. I, Vol. II, Chapter
Lorimer,
the
114;
Days,
Arabian
Wahba,
of
86
p.
VIII p. 1094; Ibn Bishr, Linwan, Part II, pp. 38-39.

ABEDIN-ONE

37

Forever grateful for this service Faisal appointed

Abdullah

Al-Rashid

governor for life of Hail a town in northwest Najd. 87

Meanwhile such disruption and instability in Riyadh prompted the
Qatar
fealty
Bahrain
to
their
to the Al-Saud. Other
and
renounce
amirs of
tribes, notably the Banu Khalid of al-Hasa also saw their chance to rebel.
Though Faisal secured a second reign for the Abdul
territory

had significantly

Aziz line, Saudi

shrunk in size. Again inter-family

rivalry and

loss of tribal support had plagued the stability of the Saudi-Muwahhidun

move
designed
fortify
his
In
that
to
was
a
position in northwestern
entity.
Najd, Faisal appointed Abdullah ibn Ali Al-Rashid as governor of the Hail
but
it
At
the
time
the appointment was to
was a shrewd move
region.
haunt successive Saudi amirs into the twentieth century as the Al-Rashid
became fierce rivals, launching a dynasty of their own and seeking to
dispel the Al-Saud altogether from the Arabian peninsula. 88
Observing the renewed activity in Najd and the return of the AlSaud, Muhammad

Ali in Egypt became concerned at new threats to his

his
into
He
from
Hijaz.
1818
the
reached
pool
of
captives
of
prize
assault on
Diriyya

to find a young Saudi who could lead an assault on Najd. The

Egyptian ruler selected Khalid ibn Saud from the Abdul Aziz line for the
task. Khalid was the youngest brother of the very same Abdullah who had
had
been
Diriyya
in
then
Constantinople.
and
at
executed
surrendered
Khalid was a small boy at the time of his capture and was raised and
's
Muhammad
Ali
Egypt
instruction.
in
89
Having
at
grown into a
educated
be
divide
he
loyalties
to
in
Najd
to
used
was
man
and become the
young
instrument

to prevent a Saudi-Muwahiddun

bid to establish a 'second

kingdom' 90

87Abdullah was also provided with men and supplies to make Hail his capital. This
long
Al-Rashid
to
the
cast
a
shadow
as
was
reward
emerged as a rival dynasty
generous
that would haunt all Saudi amirs until the early 20thCentury. Rehatsek, The History of the
Wahhabys in Arabia and India' Art. XVIII, p. 339.
88Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, p. 105
89Lorimer, Gazetteer,Part I, Vol. lI, Chapter VIII, p. 1104; Didier, Sojourn With the Sharif,
p. 108.
90Wahba, Arabian Days, pp. 113-115.

ABEDIN-ONE

38

Provided with Egyptian arms, soldiers and joined by beduin seeking

to ingratiate themselves with Egypt, Khalid dutifully

marched on Riyadh.

Learning of the advancing army Faisal attempted to ambush the force but
faced mass desertions after his men heard reports about the size of
Egyptian units. 91It was not only the size but experience of the officers that
helped Khalid make rapid progress into Arabia. By the end of 1838, Khalid
had achieved his goal and sent the captured Faisal and sons into exile in
Cairo 92

Ottoman-Egyptian

Rivalry 93

Flushed with victories in the Sudan, Greece and Arabia, Muhammad Ali
desire
His
Syria
he
to
greatest
was
glory.
possess
more
and
sought
for
his
his
he
it
Ottoman
that
receive
as
reward
aiding
would
expected
Greek
94
Sultan
in
Mahmudi.
the
the
suppression
of
rebellion.
superior
however, concerned at Ali 's ambitions for power, refused to award Syria to
him. In 1832 Muhammad Ali resolved to take Syria by force and amassed
his troops for an invasion. With his eldest son Ibrahim in command the
forces stormed into Syria, routing the Ottoman army. The vicious attack
prompted

the Sultan to declare war on the occupiers and launched

Ottoman ground and naval units against Egyptian forces in Syria.

Ibrahim however, managed to fight, as well as bribe, Ottoman forces

into defeat. The Ottoman naval commander simply sailed his fleet into
Alexandria
following

harbour
eight

and surrendered

years

Syria

to Muhammad

remained

under

Ali. 95

Egyptian

For the
authority.

Ibn Bishr,
91'Note on Central Arabia' India Office Report (no date) IOR L/P&S/18/B334;
Unwan, Part II, p. 70. Lorimer, Gazetteer,Part I, Vo1.II, Chapter VIII, p. 1097
92Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 118-120 ; Ibn Bishr, Unwan, Part II,
Saudi
Arabia,
The
Birth
15.
Troeller,
81-83;
s
p.
of
p.
93It is beyond the scope of this thesis to delve into the history of Ottoman-Egyptian
downfall.
Muhammad
All's
A
details
for
the
is
Daly's, The
this
of
useful
source
or
relations
CambridgeHistory of Egypt, Vo1.2, especially pp. 165-179.
% Syria would provide extra manpower for his armies and was also a rich source of wood
Egypt.
Ibid.,
166.
in
in
p.
supply
short
which was
95Muhammad Ali successfully bribed the Ottoman grand admiral Ahmad Fawzi. Daly,
The CambridgeHistory of Egypt,Vol. 2. p. 172. See also Mansfield, A History of the Middle East,
p. 58.

39

ABEDIN-ONE

Meanwhile

Muhammad

Ali 's rebellious but successful campaigns were

danger
integrity
to
the
by
European
powers as a
seen

of the Ottoman

had
Egypt
territories.
to
threat
strongholds
already
colonial
empire and a
in
Arabia
the
Sea
Red
central
the
which
pressured
a
presence
and
along
British

Russia
Fearing
India.
that
to
might
route

Ottoman-Egyptian

tension to make territorial

take advantage of

acquisitions

of its own

Britain and France came to the aid of the Ottoman Caliph. The Prime
Minister of Britain, Henry Palmerston, lobbied the major powers of Europe,
principally

Austria, Prussia, and France to demand that Muhammad

Ali

leave Syria and return the Ottoman fleet to Mahmud. 96

Muhammad Ali, however, flatly refused. Britain resolved to employ
force and sent in her navy to shell Beirut and land troops in the city.
Muhammad

Ali 's son 'Ibrahim led a force to push back the invaders but

direct
fled
Facing
Egypt.
to
defeated
confrontation
and subsequently
was
demands.
European
Egypt
Ali
to
Muhammad
Britain,
succumbed
with
's
Ottoman
Empire.
Muhammad
Ali
being
the
to
a province of
returned
Hijaz were revoked and were
(Crete),
Greece
Syria,
in
and
acquisitions
famed
97
The
Egyptian
Ottoman
territories.
army was
once again made
for
forces
Total
in
all armed
numbers
were capped at
size.
ordered reduced
high
from
hundred
down
time
two
thousand,
of
over
an
all
eighteen
became
former
Ali
Muhammad
Egypt
98
their
a
shadow
of
and
thousand.
selves.
This had substantial repercussions for Najd and Khalid Al-Saud's
Egyptian proxy rule.

By late 1841 most of Muhammad Ali 's troops had

force.
To
Khalid
leaving
only
small
compound matters
a
with
pulled out,
Khalid had not been very successful in winning the hearts or the respect of
habits,
language
had
His
Egyptian
the
even
mannerisms,
ulema.
people, or
96J.B. Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf 1795-1880,Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991,
pp. 270-279.
97The Ottoman Sultan issued an order on June 211841 which declared that Muhammad
his
be
but
for
life
in
Egypt
that
be
armies
reduced
size and that Egypt
Ali would
of
ruler
foreign
Ottoman state. Daly, The
the
treaties
the
as
bound
to
powers
with
same
was
Cambridge History of Egypt,Vol. 2.
date)
(no
Report
IOR
Office
L/P&S/18/B334.
India
Arabia'
Central
98'Note on

40

ABEDIN-0NE

from
him
him.
influences
European
the
which
alienated
society
around
and
He had relied greatly on Egyptian soldiers and beduin mercenaries to
loss
his
With
benefactor,
his
Egyptian
it was not
the
of
position.
maintain
long before a distant family member challenged him for leadership.
Abdullah ibn Thunayyan was the son of Thunayyan ibn Saud, the
founder.
dynastic
had
been
Thunayyan
brother
the
of
a notable
younger
ibn
Abdul
Wahhab
his
descendants
had
the
with
alliance
and
opponent of
in
Gaining
backing
local
the
share
ruling.
enjoyed
any
of
previously
not
from
Abdullah
force
Khalid
the
to
to
ulema
was
among
able
and
notables
Abdullah
down.
For
the
the
two
of
next
greater
part
years
step

ibn

Thunayyan managed affairs of Riyadh but faced constant harassment from

the deposed Khalid who remained in the vicinity

of Najd and kept

99
his
lost
influence.
to
regain
scheming

The Return of Faisal ibn Turki

The years 1814-1843 marked a period of intense inter-family

rivalry,

Saudi
100
An
in
Saudi
territory.
threats
and
a
reduction
effective
external
his
diplomatic
First,
to
the
two
maintain
rule.
elements
skills
amir required
keep
tribal
and
good relations with other amirs both large
to manage
chiefs
Many
and small.

battlefield

and territorial

losses could

have been

had
defected
beduin
if
Successful
to
the
tribes
not
other
side.
prevented
larger
forces
Egyptian
Ottoman
or
were usually those
campaigns against
Successful
hit
Saudi amirs such as Saud ibn
tactics.
run
and
that employed
Abdul

Aziz (1803-1814) had been victorious

because they rarely made

direct assaults on the better-equipped forces of their enemies. Second, the

firm
but
forgiving
that
was
also
a
personality
and generous.
amir required
He had to appeal to the ulema but face down any relative or tribal chief that
99While on a visit to Jeddah in 1854 the French traveller Charles Didier met with the
deposed Khalid who had decamped to the less restrictive atmosphere of the Hijaz. The
former amir regaled the Frenchman with stories of Muwahhidun politics in the stormy
1830's and 40's. Despite his loss of prestige Khalid apparently bore no personal animosity
towards Faisal or other family members. Didier, Sojourn with the Sharif, p. 108.
1Winder, Saudi Arabia, in the Nineteenth Century, p. 65; Ibn Bishr, Unwan part II, pp. 1117; Lorimer, Gazetteerof the Persian Gulf, Part. I, Vol. II, Chapter VIII, pp. 1096-1098.

41

ABEDIN-ONE

him.
to
challenge
might seek

Even without the interference of Ottoman

delicate
Egyptian
task.
that
was a
powers
and
It was not until 1843 that a period of relative stability began in Najd.
In that year Faisal ibn Turki, who had been exiled to Cairo in 1838,
from
Egypt
Najd.
101
Abdullah
to
to
and
return
escape
managed

ibn

Thunayyan knew that he did not have the popularity of Faisal, who was an
leader.
Thunayyan
distinguished
and
well
respected
stepped aside.
already
Faisal established a new fortress in Riyadh and built a large mosque in the
by
Faisal
The
the apparent realization
of
was
marked
reign
second
city.
that Saudi power
throughout

could not be unilaterally

projected and sustained

Arabia. In accepting the realpolitik of his situation Faisal kept

his distance from British interests on the coast and from Ottomans in Hijaz,
tempering

the

zeal which

characterized

early

Saudi-Muwahhidun

Faisal
Sheikh
Although
the
the
teachings
ensured
spread
of
of
conquests.
ibn Abdul Wahhab, he did not force beduin in all areas to conform to the
his
however,
Any
doctrine.
to
challenges
political
authority
were
religious
ruthlessly

suppressed.

Relations

with

important

families

were

by
Faisal's
into
Al-Rashid
family
the
the
sons
marriage
of
and
strengthened
the Ajman tribe. In dealing with rulers of Qatar and Bahrain his appointed
from
local
families
drawn
As
long
to
reduce
antagonisms.
were
as
agents
Faisal,
his
local
to
tribute
acknowledging
was
made
authority,
of
payment
less
Thus
left
or
alone.
a combination of shrewd
more
chiefs were
diplomacy and forceful personality allowed Faisal to maintain stability and
his
death
from
in
1865.102
1843
Najd
till
control of
The period after Faisal's death was to become reminiscent of the
family feuds of the past with quarrelling and constantly changing amirs.

101Rehatsek, 'The History of the Wahhabys in Arabia and India' pp. 335-339. Also Lorimer,
Gazetteerof the Persian Gulf, Part. I, Vol. II, Chapter VIII, p. 1107.
102'Noteon Central Arabia' India Office Report (no date) IOR L/P&S/18/B334. Memorial
Ministry
Jeddah:
Foreign
Saudi
Arabia,
Affairs,
July
Government
31,1955,
Vol. I,
of
the
of
of
p. 191

42

ABEDIN-ONE

Fathering

four

sons (Abdullah,

Sa'oud; 03 Muhammad

and

Abdul

Rahman), there were several possible successors. They were all from
different mothers and tension between them was often high. Although
Abdullah was the eldest and had been nominated as successor he still felt
threatened. In order to secure his position he placed men loyal to him in
This
his
the
the
court.
came
at
expense of
positions of power around
younger

brothers

who

had aspirations

of their

own.

Fearing

that

Abdullah's appointees would conspire to rob him of his chance to rule the
third brother, Sa'oud, plotted to take over. With support from the Ajman
tribe, from which both his wife and mother originated, Sa'oud seized
family
by
1871.
The
from
Abdullah
in
the conflict and
was
split
power
internal divisions ensued. Muhammad rallied to Abdullah's side but was
by
Abdullah
Sa'oud.
Finally,
Turki,
ibn
a
paternal
uncle,
arrested
quickly
family
his
did
tribal
the
and
coup,
used
alliances
of
accept
own to
not
who
force Sa'oud out. 104For a two-year period Abdullah ibn Turki ruled with
the help of his nephew and former amir, Abdullah ibn Faisal.

However, Sa'oud retaliated in 1873, mustering support to regain

his
Abdullah
ibn
Turki
in
he
died
He
uncle
prison,
where
placed
power.
his
brothers
Abdullah
Muhammad
and
escaped capture.
soon after, while
The youngest brother Abdul Rahman was not viewed as a threat and was
Yet
Sa'oud
Riyadh.
Sa'oud
himself
in
fell
to
to
close
stay
victim to
allowed
For
Abdul
died
in
1875.
Rahman,
his
in
twenties, and the
small-pox and
he
in
brother
become
the
the
time,
this
the
city
at
meant
would
other
only
hearing
Sa'oud's
However,
death,
the
Abdullah
upon
news
of
amir.
new
back
Riyadh
their
to
Muhammad
way
made
where they confronted
and

lo3Though this name can also be spelled 'Saud', to avoid confusion with the family name
'Al-Saud' and other relatives of the same name I have adopted this spelling to distinguish
this individual.
104For details of family dynamics see Lorimer, Gazetteer,Part I, Vol. II, Chapter VIII, pp.
1121,1128-1130. Philby, Saudi Arabia, p. 226 and Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth
Century, pp. 229-261.

43

ABEDIN-ONE

Abdul

Rahman.

Exerting

pressure on their

youngest

they

sibling

to
favour
down
in
Abdullah.
105
him
of
step
encouraged
While

the brothers were still debating who should rule, their

had
force
Sa'oud,
They
their
the
organized
of
a
of
sons
own.
nephews,
hoped to save Riyadh from their bickering uncles by taking the city
themselves. However, this threat seems to have motivated the uncles to
had
become
Abdul
Rahman,
differences.
just
their
who
a proud
settle
father of new-born son, Abdul Aziz, ceded his place to the elder Abdullah.
The nephews, though frustrated, did not give up hope of returning

the

dynasty to their family line.

Hail Eclipses Riyadh

In Hail, Muhammad

ibn Abdullah

Al-Rashid, the son of the governor

Al-Saud
by
Faisal,
the
took
the
quarrelling
advantage
of
among
appointed
to broaden his own power base. During the late 1870's and early 80's he led
his
included
to
taking over
spread
rule,
which
notably
campaign
an active
forming
in
Arabian
towns
al-Qassim
and
alliances with eastern
central
Mutayr
Harb
the
and
sections of

tribes. 106This enabled Al-Rashid

to

Hijaz
Najd
Kuwait.
the
towards
trade
the
of
coming
out
routes
and
control
Not only did the Al-Saud suffer a drop in trade but they no longer received
tribute payments from the towns of al-Qassim or Hail. 107Abdullah and his
brothers made several attempts to recapture territory

without

success.

However, the Al-Saud had lost their fortune and had been overshadowed
by the Al-Rashid.
humiliation

The ruler of Hail did however, spare Riyadh the

Abdullah
being
to remain in power. He
allowed
sacked
and
of

did not actively seek the removal of the Al-Saud from authority,
108
their
subservience.
content with

105Gary Troeller, The Birth of Saudi Arabia, London: Frank Cass, 1987, p. 18 ; Lorimer,
Gazetteer,Part I, Vol. II, Chapter VIII, pp. 1133-1134.
106War Office Report, January 21,1918, IOR L/P&S/18/B270/P337.
107Hogarth, A History of Arabia, p. 115.
108Lorimer, Gazetteer, Part I, Vol. II, Chapter VIII, pp. 1136-1137.

being

44

ABEDIN-ONE

Yet in 1887 the infamous nephews, (the 'sons of Sa'oud'), made a

in
This
Riyadh.
taking
time,
they
take
to
were
successful
attempt
second
their uncle Abdallah prisoner. Concerned about the stability of Riyadh, AlRashid ended his 'hands off' approach, sending in a large force to re-take
fed
However,
free
Abdullah.
to
up with the weakness of Saudi
the city and
his
Salim
Subhan,
ibn
Al-Rashid
ibn
Muhammad
own
man,
placed
as
rule
Abdullah
Riyadh.
amir of

Al-Saud was 'invited'

to Hail as a 'special

Rashidi
Riyadh
the
The
109
acknowledged
new
amir and
of
ulema
guest'.
decided
Subhan
fealty.
Salim
ibn
to
the
their
meanwhile,
pursue
pledged
'sons of Sa'oud' on his own initiative. This resulted in further battles in
killed.
The
in
Hail
third
the
two
sought
refuge
were
and
sons
of
which
begged for clemency. Muhammad ibn Al-Rashid granted the request and
dismissed
him.
Subhan's
displeased
and
pursuit
unauthorised
with
was
Abdullah

ibn Faisal was then allowed to return as amir under Rashidi

suzerainty.

When Abdullah died in 1899 his youngest brother Abdul Rahman

between
Riyadh
For
two
the
to
relations
years
next
and
power.
returned
Hail were strained due to various attempts by Abdul Rahman to break
diplomacy
by
first
Al-Rashid.
At
this
and
patience
was
met
with
away.
However, when tribes in al-Qassim sought to take advantage of the soft
line Hail seemed to be employing with Riyadh they rebelled themselves.
Soon Abdul Rahman threw in his lot with them. With this mass show of
he moved to crush forcibly
Al-Rashid's
evaporated
and
patience
rebellion
faced
battle
Both
the
each
other
at
sides
of Mulaida in 1891
the renegades.
but the rebellious tribes were decisively defeated. Riyadh returned to the
firm grasp of Hail and the ulema quickly reaffirmed their allegiance to
Muhammad ibn Al-Rashid. 110Abdul Rahman went into exile in the desert.
He took with him his young son Abdul Aziz, while sending the rest of the

109Ibid. This essentially meant that Abdullah was under house arrest and though provided
Also Winder, Saudi Arabia in the
food
constantly
under
watch.
was
shelter,
and
with
Nineteenth Century, pp. 270-271.
110Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 272-273.

45

ABEDIN-ONE

family to Bahrain where they were welcomed into the house of the ruling
amir.
Throughout

these fluctuations

a background

played

in leadership the ulema of Najd

role politically,

in that they did not espouse

leadership for themselves. However, they did influence the contests for
leadership by endorsing the rule of the victorious amir-in

principle to

fitnah
fitnah.
To
bloodshed
was one of the cardinal
prevent
and
prevent
concepts of Muwahhklun
political

leadership;

maintaining

belief and a pillar of Ibn Taymiya's argument on

the individual

leader was less important

faith
"'
Islam
the
the
as
of
nation.
and
order
civil

Quran, fitnah is described as "worse than killing"

than
In the

and this motivated the

its
112
Concern
find
to
occurrence.
to
prevent
solutions
over
quick
ulema
igniting fitnah was the justification used by the ulema in Najd to accept
bloodshed
because
to
took
could
resist
cause
power
and
whichever ruler
loss of life and property. Even though many of, the prominent members
Wahhab
into
ibn
Abdul
Al-Saud
family
the
from
the
and
married
of
were
better
it
to accept a ruler, even an oppressive one, so
too
they
considered
long as he enforced Islamic law. Thus as Riyadh passed through the hands
Rashidi
Egyptian,
the
Saudi,
to
powers
ulema
pledged
and
allegiance
the
of
113
time.
the
the
at
victor
whoever was
Since principles of governance were the same no matter who ruled,
the fight was over which individual
them. Thus the religious
fluctuated.

had the opportunity

to implement

order remained stable but the political

one

With the defeat at Mulaida the political order of Najd had

114
hands
again.
once
changed
4W

"'Ibn Taymiya, al-Hisbafi al-Islam.

112John Williams on'Fitnah' in Oxford Encyclopedia,Vol. 2, pp. 26-28. Also the Quran
217.
191
2,
and
verses
chapter
213Helms, The Cohesionof Saudi Arabia, pp. 80-81
114Lorimer, Gazetteer, Part I, Vol. II, Chapter VIII, p. 1144.

ABEDIN-TWO

46

Chapter 2
Exile in Kuwait
Mubarak Al-Sabah, the ruler of Kuwait,

served as mentor, guide and

political instructor to the young Abdul Aziz Al-Saud. The contribution

the Kuwaiti

ruler

to the development

of Saudi political

of

strategy is

1
significant.
extremely
Humbled and defeated at the battle of Mulaidah, the Al-Saud were
forced out of Riyadh. There were few tribes prepared to risk the wrath of
the Al-Rashid by offering them protection. Initially,

the Al-Saud found

home
Ajman.
Al-Qassim,
But there was a price
in
the
tribal
the
of
shelter
on the head of Abdul Rahman, and no guarantees that an enterprising
tribesman, would not turn him in. Arrangements were made for the family
Bahrain
Al-Saud
Abdul
Rahman entered the
to
to
the
go
while
members of
Arabian
central
vast

desert known

as the Rub al-Khali

(the Empty

Quarter)? Far from the reaches of the Al-Rashid and the Ottomans, he was
Al-Murrah
hide
in
the
the
to
company
of
able

tribe. Sheltered from the

desert
domain
by
Al-Murrah
lived
their
the
world
still
a primitive
outside
dishevelled
Barely
in appearance they
clothed,
unkempt
and
existence.
lived a basic existence, surviving
However,

the Al-Murrah

on a diet of dates and camel's milk. 3

had a reputation

as fierce raiders and were

desert
for
before
the
to
out
of
racing
attack
caravans
swiftly
notorious
dunes.
dared
Few
into
to
the
venture after them.
retreating

1 For details of this period see Lorimer, Gazetteerof the Persian Gulf, Part I, Vol. lI, Chapter
VIII, pp. 1141-1145; H. C. Armstrong, Lord of Arabia: Ibn Saud, Intimate Study of a King,
London: Arthur Baker, 1934; Ameen Rihani, Ibn Sa'oud of Arabia, Boston: HoughtonMifflin, 1928; Muhammad Asad, The Road to Mecca, Gibralter: Dar al-Andalus, 1980; David
Howarth, The Desert King: A Life of Ibn Saud, London: Collins, 1964; William Yale, The Near
East, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1968; Daniel Van Der Meulen, The Wells of
Ibn Saud, London: Murray, 1957. Also Helms, The Cohesionof Saudi Arabia, and Troeller, The
Birth of Saudi Arabia.
2 Van Der Meulen, The Wells of Ibn Saud p. 40. Van Der Meulen was the Dutch Consul in
Jeddah and had studied Arabic and Islam under the famous Professor Snouck Hurgronje
Lord
Arabia,
29.
Armstrong,
Also
Leiden.
of
p.
at
3The Al-Murrah were fiercely independent tribe and only some sections of it had any
in
late
Muwahiddun
18th
the
Century,
the
movement
with
see Rehatsek, The
contact
History of the Wahhabys in Arabia and India' pp. 274-401.

47

ABEDIN-TWO

In contrast to the scarcity of the Empty Quarter, the women and

family
Al-Saud
the
enjoyed the comfort and protection of the
children of
It
Bahrain.
Abdul
Aziz,
family
there
that
the young son of
was
of
ruling
Abdul Rahman became very ill. Diagnosed with rheumatic fever the boy
from
doctors
by
Dutch
Reformed
the
the
treated
medical
mission
of
was
Church of America.

This early exposure to modern medicine instilled a

lifelong reliance and trust in physicians in the future King. 4 Upon recovery
from his bout of fever Abdul Aziz joined his father with the Al-Murrah and
life
beduin
living
boy,
learning
the
the skills
two
of
carefree
a
years
spent
horsemanship,
knowledge
desert;
tracking,
the
swordplay,
gaining
of
of
desert
in
him
His
the
time
spent
would
provide
with
plant and wildlife .5
insight into the customs and lifestyle of the desert peoples. For his father

however, it was not the life for a boy from a respectable religious family.
Proper study of Islamic texts was necessary, but there were no such
family
living
in
the
split
and
exile.
with
opportunities

It came as a welcome relief when in 1893 the ruler of Kuwait,

Muhammad

Al-Sabah, extended an invitation

to the family. With the

(aman)
Abdul
Rahman
his
and
a
monthly
stipend
safety
and
of
promise
family could once again be united Summoning the women and children
.6
from Bahrain, they settled down for almost a decade-long stay. Abdul Aziz

distractions
into
the
thrust
of
cultures
exotic
mix
and
of a
was suddenly
busy commercial city. In the 1890's Kuwait was a key port in the Gulf,
from
Arabia
Iraq
from
to
trade
and
central
came
with
ships
caravans
where
Coffee,
bought
tea,
the
rice,
guns
and
pearls
were
world.
and sold.
across

There were "merchants from Bombay and Teheran, Indians, Persians,

41nfact in his later years as King, Abdul Aziz would frequently request Western medical
Van Der Meulen, Ibn Saud, pp. 40-41.
his
for
ailments.
attention
5Dates for Abdul Aziz's birth vary between 1876 and 1880. See Leslie McLoughlin, Ibn
Saud: Founder of a Kingdom, London: Macmillan, 1993, p. 14; Armstrong, Lord of Arabia, p. 29.
6The stipend was actually provided by the Ottoman Porte. From 1893 till 1904 Abdul
Rahman received a monthly stipend of 58 Turkish Liras. It was part of a policy designed to
keep Arab various leaders 'in play' and allowed the Porte to use one chief against the
Ottoman
See
by
it
British
the
Ambassador,
politics.
report
suited
when
other
Constantinople to SSFA, March 27 1905, FCO Confidential Print: Affairs of Arabia, PRO FO
406/21 F8482/R87/I.

48

ABEDIN-TWO

Syrians from Aleppo and Damascus, Armenians, Turks and Jews, traders
from all the east" Streets full of sailors and travellers exchanging news of
.7
far away cities and events; a sensuous atmosphere unlike the rough
barrenness of the Empty Quarter. As a father, Abdul Rahman was certainly
by
distractions
becoming
his
the
the
enamoured
of
son
about
concerned
from
Abdul
Aziz
to
tutor
al-Qassim
provide
was summoned
city and so a
instruction
the
proper
with

in the principles of faith and teachings of

Sheikh Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab.

In addition to this classical religious education Abdul Aziz benefited
from a budding friendship with Mubarak Al-Sabah, the younger brother of
the Kuwaiti

ruler. Although

liking
Mubarak
took
to the
a
much older,

teenager and spent much time mentoring

Abdul

Aziz. 8 Later, when

Mubarak himself became ruler, Abdul Aziz was a frequent guest at the
diplomatic
first
hand.
intrigue
to
witness political and
royal court and able
It was Mubarak who provided the young boy with his first introduction to
British power in the Gulf and who introduced him to visiting officials from
His Majesty's Government.

Attired in their dress uniforms, adorned with

feast
British
swords,
officers
polished
were
a
medals, colourful sashes and
for the eyes of a boy from the desert. As Harry Philby remarked:
It was undoubtedly at this period that the young Abdul Aziz
developed a boyish admiration for British imperialism which
by
life,
him
through
the proviso
modified
only
accompanied
that it should not impinge upon his own sphere of activity. 9
However, at the time Abdul Rahman moved to Kuwait, tensions were high
family.
The
Sheikh
Muhammad,
Al-Sabah
his
amir,
the
and
ruling
within
brother Jarrah were in disagreement with their ambitious younger sibling
Mubarak. Besides personality clashes, tight controls had been placed on
fuelled
further.
10One of the issues
tensions
Mubarak's expenditures which
7Armstrong, Lord of Arabia,p. 38.

Saud,
Ibn
Wells
Meulen,
der
p. 44
Van
of
8

9H. Philby, ArabianJubilee,London: Hale, 1952,p.6

10As a young man Mubarak's rebelliousness caused him to be sent off to Bombay where
his
further
by
funds in gambling and other
brothers
his
squandering
incensed
he
indulgences, Armstrong, Lord of Arabia, pp. 40-43

49

ABEDIN-TWO

disagreed
brothers
Ottoman
the
the
the
was
relationship
which
with
upon
Porte. Mubarak opposed his brothers pro-Ottoman sympathies, believing
instead that Kuwait should strive for greater independence 11 He admired
the arrangements of the Trucial States that had treaties with
providing

them with assistance, supplies and protection. The treaties also

kept
Ottoman
interference
that
to a minimum.
was
guaranteed
Muhammad,
unhappy

Britain

Sheikh

however, had no desire to change the status quo and was

with Mubarak's interference. Hoping

to keep him distracted

dispatched
deal
Mubarak
to
was
with a rebellion of tribesmen in
elsewhere
the south. However, to the disappointment of his elder siblings, Mubarak
determined
his
to
and
even
more
victorious
make
mark on the
returned
future of Kuwait.
On the night of May 17,1896, as Sheikh Muhammad slept, Mubarak
led a small band of men onto the rooftop of his brother's house. Sneaking
into the master bedroom Mubarak shot his brother in the head at point
blank range. At another house nearby Mubarak's other brother Jarrah met
family
fate.
The
the same
members learned of the
next morning stunned
deaths when they found Mubarak presiding over the royal court. He had
ipsofacto become the new Shaikh of Kuwait 12
To pre-empt any moves against him he pledged allegiance to the
Porte and kept the Ottoman flag flying at the palace.13 Then using the
late
brother,
Mubarak
bribe
his
Ottoman
to
attempted
of
officials to
wealth
lawful
him
Kuwait.
However,
the
this was not
ruler
of
as
recognise

11Salwa Alghanim, The Reign of Mubarak Al-Sabah: Shaikh of Kuwait, 1896-1915, London:
I. B.Tauris, 1998. See especially chapter 1 for detail on inter-family rivalry of the Al-Sabah.
Also Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours, pp. 136-137 and Frederick Anscombe, The
Ottoman Gulf the Creation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, New York: Columbia
University Press, 1997, pp. 93-94.
12 British Embassy, Constantinople to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (hereafter
SSFA) July 6 1896, PRO FO 406/14 F7380/E1/R1/I.
13Soonafter taking over, Mubarak's nephews (sons of the murdered Muhammad) made an
help
the
the
to
their
city
with
retake
of
attempt
maternal uncle Sheikh Yusuf
unsucessful
Ibrahim of Durra. Then Saood, another son, approached the British Consul at Basra and
in
for
Kuwait
loyalty
in
to HM Government. See
return
retaking
assistance
sought
Secretary of State for India (hereafter SSFI) Hamilton to Government of India, July 23,
1897, FO 406/14 F7380/E1/R14/I.
rr
Vili

ABEDIN-TWO

50

as the vali of Basra, Hamdi Pasha was insulted by the offer

straightforward

fact
Lira
in
10,000
and was
more in favour
of
direct

Ottoman

control. 14 At the very least, he preferred

recognise one of the surviving

Through

strategic

Constantinople,

donations

Mubarak

instructed, to extend
VIStficE CrDVt(rDf

(adtRi-nistr

bringing
of

all

sons of the murdered

courtesy

Al-Sabah.

at the court in

Not only was Hamdi

to Mubarak

under

that the Porte

Muhammad

of cash and gifts to advisors

was able to prevail.

Kuwait

as the new

Pasha

kaimakam

) of Kuwait but Hamdi himself was later transferred from

his post. If this bold move surprised the young Abdul Aziz it was only to
be the beginning of a long tutorial for the future head of the Al-Saud.

Taking Advantage of Anglo-Ottoman

Rivalry

Mubarak was a shrewd ruler and knew that he would have to proceed
he
had
Although
obtained Ottoman patronage, Mubarak kept
cautiously.
this secret and looked for additional sources of support. In September 1897
he appealed to the British to grant him protection on the same terms as
Sheikhs of the Trucial coast because of his concerns that the Ottoman
Empire would absorb Kuwait. In return, he offered to assist Britain in
keeping the peace in the Gulf. 15Lieutenant Colonel M. J. Meade, the British
Resident in the Gulf, was intrigued

by this request and believed there

favourably:
benefits
be
in
"Koweit posses an excellent
responding
would
harbour, and will, under our protection undoubtedly

become one of the

in
Persian
Gulf".
16
important
the
places
most
However, Meade's superiors were reluctant to proceed and chose
Kuwaiti
Mubarak
to
to
overtures.
respond
persisted and on November
not
6,1897, while meeting with Commander Moubray of the British warship
Pigeon he reiterated the request for British protection. Mubarak cited

14 Memo Captain J.F. Whyte to British Consul, Basra, March 22 1897, FO 406/14
F7380/E1/R3/I.
15 India Office to Foreign Office , April 7 1987, FO 406/14 F7380/R5/I, See also
Government of India to SSFI, September 19,1897, FO 406/14 F7380/E1/R6/I.
16 M. J. Meade, Resident, Gulf to Government of India, September 25,1897, FO 406/14
F7380/E4/R23/I.

51

ABEDIN-TWO

had
Sheikh
Issa
Bahrain
his
from
the
of
who
extolled
ally
correspondence
fact
in
Commander
inquired
When
to
the
British
as whether
rule.
virtues of
the amir was not already under Turkish protection Mubarak vehemently
denied the allegation, and on the contrary, told the Commander that he
[the]
17
Turkish
"throw
yoke"
to
off all
sought
Although Britain did not recognise Kuwait as an integral part of the
Ottoman empire, she acknowledged Ottoman influence in the country 18
Mubarak was seen as an Ottoman subject and the Government of India
"did not propose to interfere in the affairs of that Chiefship more than may
be necessary for the maintenance of the general peace of the Persian
Gulf". 19The Foreign Office concurred with this view and no further action
20
taken.
was
About this time reports were circulating

of Russian designs on

Kuwait and that Moscow was anxious to set up a coaling station in the
led
flurry
interest
Russian
to
This
21
a
new
territory.

of correspondence

between the Secretary of State for India and the Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs. While there was uncertainty as to the seriousness of the
Russian move, neither the Foreign Office nor the India Office was sure how
to proceed. However,

the Admiralty

believed that the Russian threat

however,
Russia
descends
"If
through
be
taken
ever
seriously:
should
Persia to establish herself on the shores of the Gulf, Koweit would be the
into
Gulf.
"22
for
the
get
she
might
ships
which
any
natural port
In the opinion of the Resident, M. J. Meade, closer British ties with
Kuwait were extremely desirable. Not only would that allow Mubarak to
fight
but
in
the
the
trade
important
against
piracy
and
slave
role
play an
FO 406/14
17 Lt. Commander Moubray to Resident, Gulf, November 7,1897,
F7380/E2/R26/I. See also B.C. Busch, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1894-1914, Berkeley:
Univ. of California Press 1967, p. 102.
is Secretary of State for India (SSFI) Hamilton to Government of India, July 23,1897, FO
406/14, F7380/E1/R14/I.
19India Office to Foreign Office, September 28,1897, FO 406/14 F7380/R16/I.
20Foreign Office to India Office, November 28,1897, FO 406/14 F7380/R24/I.
India,
Government
December 22,1897, FO 406/14
Baghdad
General,
to
Consul
of
n British
F7380/E2/R27/I

52

ABEDIN-TWO

from
foothold:
establishing
a
powers
much
coveted
other
would prevent
"Even if we are not immediately interested in getting hold of Koweit for
let
fall
hands
it
into
to
the
afford
of any other
ourselves we cannot
23
power".
The Foreign Office was unable to establish clear policy guidelines on
the matter and left the decision to the Government of India. The Secretary
Affairs
for
Foreign
State
was willing
of

to support a proposal to make

Kuwait a British protectorate, but only if the Viceroy felt it was desirable. 24
In fact the Government of India was becoming increasingly nervous about
Germany,
Kuwait.
Russia
France
European
entering
powers
and
other
footholds
Gulf
in
the
strategic
region -a prospect that cast
were all seeking
further
link
25
Fearing
India.
to
these
the
encroachment
vital
of
on
shadow
a
powers

the Viceroy

changed tack and authorised

negotiations

with

Kuwait. 26Provided that Mubarak did not cede, lease, or mortgage any of
his territories to any foreign government or subjects of a foreign power
finalise
Viceroy
British
to
the
treaty.
was
ready
a
consent,
prior
without
The task of negotiating the treaty with Mubarak was given to the
Resident, M. J. Meade. Although Meade was authorised to offer a monthly
deal
it
Mubarak
in
the
that
to
was
clear
sweeten
was not
order
subsidy
interested in British money. Instead he wanted guarantees that Britain
holdings
his
inside
Ottoman
territory.
real
estate
personal
protect
would
The Al-Sabah family owned sizeable portions of land and lucrative date
farms near Basra, but under Ottoman law, only citizens of the Porte could
Britain,
If
Mubarak
losing
treaty
signed
was
with
a
risked
own property.
his Ottoman citizenship. His family property could be forfeited and
be
lost.
Mubarak
income
would
also wanted written
considerable annual
his aid if any military action was
Britain
to
that
come
would
assurances
22 Admiral Beaumont, Admiralty to Foreign Office , February 18,1898, FO 406/14
F7380/R32/I.
23Colonel M. J. Meade, Resident, Gulf to FCO, March 28,1898, FO 406/14, F7380/R33/I.
24Foreign Office to India Office, December 5,1898, FO 406/14 F7380/R36/I.
25Electric telegraph lines ran overland through Iran and Iraq to India. See McLoughlin, Ibn
Saud, p. 17 and Lacey, The Kingdom, p. 35.

53

ABEDIN-TWO

taken on his land by Ottoman forces. In fact, Mubarak's other brothers,

Hamud and Jabir, declared that their acceptance of a British treaty was
conditional upon such assurances.
However, Colonel Meade had no authority to grant such assurances
%

nd after being pressed, declared that he would have to leave Kuwait to

from
his
further
later
instruction
then
superiors
and
return
at
some
seek
date to finalise the agreement 27 Mubarak did not wish to risk losing the
opportunity

to have a treaty in hand and agreed to drop the issue. His

brothers objected, preferring

writing.

to wait until

Britain

made promises in

Mubarak overruled them and signed the treaty with Britain on

January 23,1899. One of the most important clauses was that the treaty
28
Though
identical
Trucial
to
those
established
with
secret
other
a
remain
had
Kuwait
important
treaty
the
one
with
exception-a
states
prohibited

Mubarak

clause that

from accepting representatives of- foreign powers

Government
The
Indian
British
Foreign
Office
the
consent.
or
prior
without

had not included this new stipulation. It was added by the British Resident
himself and was, as will be discussed later, to have a lasting impact on
future events. 29
When Lord Hamilton, the Secretary of State for India became aware
he
Government
treaty
the
to
the
the
of
protested
provisions
of India that
of
the Resident in the Gulf "was not authorised" to include the prohibition

on

foreign representatives 30 Such a clause might be used to deny Ottoman

Kuwait
into
Anglo-Ottoman
could
which
adversely
affect
entry
officials
his
Meade
Mubarak
Defending
himself
that
had
actions,
stated
relations.

from
the
to
the
prevent
representatives
clause
of
other
powers
requested
26Foreign Office to India Office, January4,1899, FO 406/14, F7380/R40/I.

p Resident, Gulf to Government of India, January 30,1899, FO 406/14 F7380/E2/R71/I.

28The text of the treaty dated 23 January 1899, can be found in India Office to Foreign
Office, March 14,1899, FO 406/14, F7380/E3/R71/I.
29Some authQrs have incorrectly argued that the clause was deliberately added by the
British to prohibit Ottoman officials from Kuwait, however the Secretary of State for India
be
See
David
to
the
Finnie,
this
Shifting Lines in the
that
case.
appear
even
not
anxious
was
Sand: Kuwait's Elusive Frontier with Iraq, Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1992 p. 16-17.
30 Secretary of State, India to Government of India, March 30,1899, FO 406/14:
F7380/R81/I.

54

ABEDIN-TWO

taking up residence in Kuwait 31Although still unhappy at the inclusion of

the clause, the Secretary of State was nevertheless, resigned to leaving it in
become
been
Mubarak
had
that
Hamilton
concerned
should
not
also
place.
further
intrigue
Britain
in
his
by
to
treaty
and
engage
with
emboldened
Kuwait's advantage.
Hamilton was not pleased when his suspicions turned out to be true.
Mubarak did indeed exhibit greater confidence after signing the treaty. He
leaked news of his new relationship with Britain and wasconfident

enough

to raise import taxes on goods of Turkish origin. 32Ottoman officials were

immediately

33
had
in
Kuwait
It
been
intentions
British
not
suspicious of

had
fact
Mubarak
British
keep
the
that
the
to
received
secret
possible
Resident at court. Meade himself had to grudgingly report that "the Turks
Sheikh
knowledge
the
have
negotiations
with
to
of
our
recent
some
appear
had
been
learned
fact
Meade
that
M
In
Koweit"
reinforcements
when
of
it
Basra,
in
to
suggest a military strike was
the
seemed
to
garrison
sent
being contemplated. Meade suggested diplomatic approaches be quickly
forces
Otherwise,
if
Turkish
Kuwait.
issue
the
were
of
made to resolve
be
difficult
it
to
their
to
prevent
movement without
would
attack
mobilised
direct
confrontation
a

and would likely escalate Ottoman intrigue in the

area:
Our interests in the Persian Gulf however, make it well nigh
impossible that we should allow Turkey or any other Power,
foothold
its
to
obtain
a
at Koweit, which may
subjects,
or
become the eastern terminus of a railway on the shortest
Its
India.
harbour
to
natural
advantages
and
good
route
are
it
if
it
that
affect
us
seriously
will
ever passes into
all such

31 Resident, Gulf (Meade) to Government of India, May 21 1899, FO 406/14:

F7380/E2/R93/I.
32Mubarak levied a 5% import tax on all imports which was a clear challenge to Ottoman
Basra to Ambassador, Constantinople, May 3,1899, FO
Consul,
British
sovereignty.
406/14: F7380/E2/R86/I.
had
Admiralty
been given orders to "forbid and
know
the
did
that
What
they
was
33
not
be
Kuwait
by
Turkish
"
the
made
upon
may
which
attack
authorities.
armed
any
prevent
F7380/R47/I.
406/14:
6
FO
1899,
February
Admiralty,
FO to
34Resident, Gulf to Government of India, April 30,1899 FO 406/14: F7380/E1/R85/I.

55

ABEDIN-TWO

be
hands,
and
should
we
prepared to sacrifice much
other
before we relinquish our interest in the place 3s
However, the situation was already escalating. The British Consul at Basra,
A. C. Wratislaw, alerted the Foreign Office to the seriousness of Ottoman
Mubarak's
had
been
Hamdi
Pasha,
by
that
old
nemesis,
reporting
concerns
This
Basra.
that
the
meant
estranged nephews
return
of
vali
as
reinstated
(sons of the brothers murdered by Mubarak) would

have the political

leadership
Kuwaiti
36
They
to
they
claims
on
make
would
needed
support
be more amenable to Ottoman control and could be used by Hamdi to
for
37
The
Imperial
the
action.
pretext
military
court was
necessary
provide
for
Mubarak.
The
British
support
situation was not
already suspicious of
helped by Mubarak's brazen imposition of taxes or his boasting. It had
had
been
bribery
Mubarak
defeat
lavish
that
been
to
through
able
only
Hamdi's last attempt to invade and annexe Kuwait into the Basra vilayet.
The British
prudent

Ambassador, Nicholas O'Conor agreed that it would

to warn

the Porte against any military

be

action in Kuwait 38

However, it was equally, if not more, important for Mubarak to be told to

"be more cautious in his action and language" 39
Consensus had developed in the field and within certain quarters in
London on the need to be forthright about British interests in Kuwait. The
35Resident, Gulf to Government of India, May 7 1899, FO 406/14: F7380/E3/R91/I. In fact
between
British officials in the Gulf. The Consul, Basra
disagreement
there was some
fa
had
been
by
Porte
kaimakam
Mubarak
the
the
that
appointed
as
of
asserted
Najd, while the Political Resident (Meade) had no idea Mubarak had taken a Turkish title.
In fact the Resident did not believe the Consul's assertion. Meade's own man had spoken
had
Ottoman
Sheikh
if
taken
the
title. Mubarak told him that he
Mubarak
an
asked
to
and
had not and so Meade felt reassured that the Sheikh had been honest with him. In fact
Mubarak had indeed taken the title and the Consul's information was correct.
Nevertheless, this shows the lack of information sharing and the occasional friction among
first
be
the
to report accurate information back to their respective
to
British officials vying
Gulf
Consul
Basra,
Resident,
May
30
to
See
1899,
FO
406/14:
also
superiors.
Basra to Resident, Gulf
June 2 1899, FO
F7380/E2/R96/I.
; Consul,
406/14: F7380/E3/R96/I.
FO 406/14:
36 Consul, Basra to Ambassador, Constantinople, April 22,1899,
F7380/E1/R83/I.
37Resident, Gulf to Government of India, May 7,1899, FO 406/14: F7380/E3/R91/I.
3sAmbassador, Constantinople to SSFA May 24 1899, FO 406/14: F7380/R83/I also
Ambassador, Constantinople to SSFA, June 6 1899, FO 406/14: F7380/R86/I.

ABEDIN-TWO

56

Resident in the Gulf, the Ambassador in Constantinople, the Consul in

Basra, the India Office and the Government of India were all in agreement
decision
it
for
40
Nevertheless,
issue
Lord Salisbury, (the
this
was
a
on
Prime Minister and Secretary of State) and he had no desire to risk creating
a potentially tense situation that could result from a direct warning to the
Porte. Instead Salisbury favoured a more circuitous route and instructions
Basra
Consul
in
Hamdi
be
Pasha
issued
that
to
the
told in effect that
were
'get
him
Kuwait
into
knowing
trouble',
would
upon
an attack

that the

Constantinople
soon enough 41 The Consul was also
reach
message would
to send Mubarak a strong message urging caution in his actions and
language. The Government of India was also instructed to make sure that
Mubarak received a similar message from the Resident in the Gulf 42
In Constantinople, Ambassador O'Conor anticipated that he would
be called in to explain British policy after the Porte received reports from
Hamdi Pasha. O'Conor believed that by reassuring the Sultan that Britain's
her
in
interest
protecting
commercial and political interests in the
was
only
definite
by
Kuwaiti
independence,
any
statements
about
avoiding
and
gulf,
the issue could be resolved satisfactorily 43 Upon becoming aware of this
the India Office immediately rejected this proposal. It felt strongly that the
January 1899 agreement was based on the premise that Kuwait

was

independent. There should be no encouragement of the view that Turkey

had any territorial

rights over Kuwait. 44 Moreover, the Government

of

India did not want to be in a situation where their ability to respond to an

(which
Mubarak
help
do
for
to
was
entitled
under the terms of the
appeal
As
O'Conor
a
compromised.
result
was
was instructed
agreement)

to

39Ambassador, Constantinople to Prime Minister (Marquis of Salisbury), June 6 1899, FO

406/14: F7380/R86/I.
40Government of India to SSFI (Hamilton), June 1 1899, FO 406/14: F7380/E1/R91/I ; also
India Office to Foreign Office, June 71899, FO 406/14: F7380/R85/I.
41Salisbury wanted the consul in Basra to inform Hamdi Pasha of the unpleasantness that
Ottoman
Kuwait.
from
Prime
Minister
(Marquis
attack
on
an
result
of Salisbury) to
would
Ambassador, Constantinople, June 17,1899, FO 406/14: F7380/R88/I.
42Foreign Office to India Office, June 18,1899, FO 406/14: F7380/R89/I.
PM/SSFA,
July
Constantinople
5,1899 FO 406/14: F7380/R95/I.
to
Ambassador,
'u
44India Office to Foreign Office, July 18,1899, FO 406/14: F7380/R100/I.

57

ABEDIN-TWO

by
keep
line
in
the
Porte
the
to
his
the
to
with
points
raised
remarks
restrict
India Office. 45
The potential for a rapid escalation of hostilities between the Porte
Kuwait
and

lengthy
British
the
communications
about
concerns
raised

Office
Foreign
by
the
and
that
of
representatives
were utilised
procedures
for
information
it
The
took
India.
time
Government
exchange was
the
of
hazardous in the dynamic situation in the region at the time. For example,
if the Consul in Basra had vital information for the attention of the Political
Resident in the Gulf, he would

first send it to the Ambassador in

Constantinople who would pass it to the Foreign Office in London, which

housed
(also
London
in
in
Office
the
India
it
to
the
and
then
send
would
Government
India,
be
the
to
It
then
building).
of
which
sent
would
same
Resident in the Gulf. It could take
dispatched
finally
the
to
it
have
would
departments.
these
through
for
to
travel
all
a simple cable
weeks
By mutual consent the two branches agreed that the Consul in Basra
should

directly

communicate

with

the Resident on any matter

of

developed
If
Kuwait.
the
seriously enough
situation
importance regarding
the Consul was even authorised

to communicate

directly

with

the

Government of India 46 In turn the Resident was instructed to keep the

Consul at Basra up to date on developments in the area 47 This was an
but
it
is
indicative
traditional
breaking
the
command
of
of
chain
of
unusual
Government.
branches
the
tensions
of
within
the growing
Meanwhile, Ottoman officials were increasingly disconcerted over
forming
be
Kuwait
by
Britain
to
with
intimate
seemed
and
relations
the
Mubarak's increasingly bold manner. In an effort to exert greater control
inspector
harbour
dispatch
to
and
Porte
a
customs
master to
the
attempted
had
Mubarak
to
the
them
However,
48
accept
officials
refused
Kuwait
and
in
Basra was incensed
Ottoman
The
commander
garrison
forcibly expelled.

FO
July
25,1899
406/14: F7380/R103/I.
Constantinople,
Ambassador,
45SSFA to
FO
406/14:
30,1899
F7380/R106/I.
August
Office,
India
Office
to
46Foreign
FO
September
2,1899,
406/14:
F7380/R108/I.
Office
Foreign
Office
to
India
47
U Ambassador, Constantinople to SSFA, September 6,1899 FO 406/14: F7380/R109/I.

58

ABEDIN-TWO

launch
to
a military
ready
and
Mubarak

expedition

against Kuwait

for his defiance. 49 As reports filtered

to punish

back to London the

Prime
Minister
the
of
attitude
quickly changed. Within
previously cautious
hours of receiving the news of - the incident he instructed Ambassador
O'Conor to be direct with the Porte:
You should lose no time in warning the Turkish Government
that Her Majesty's Government, while having themselves no
design on Koweit, have friendly relations with the Sheikh of
that place. Further, that a very inconvenient and disagreeable
be
realised if an attempt were made to
question would
Turkish
authority or customs control at Koweit
establish
Her
Majesty's
previous
agreement
with
without
Government. 50
Orders were also immediately given to the Admiralty for a British warship
to be despatched to Kuwait with specific instructions to protect Mubarak
from any Ottoman attack 51
The Porte attempted to show its displeasure with Britain and it took
O'Conor a few days before he was granted an audience with the Ottoman
Foreign Minister, Tewfik Pasha. The British Ambassador was not put off by
his hosts. He had the advantage of knowing the extent of Turkish overtures
to Kuwait since Mubarak had proudly shown the British Resident all the
from
he
52
Porte
O'Conor
direct
the
received
was
and to
correspondence
the point. He warned Tewfik Pasha that Britain had a preponderant
interest in Kuwait and did not approve of the Porte imposing their officials
49Ambassador, Constantinople to SSFA, September 8,1899, FO 406/14: F7380/R111/I.
50 Prime Minister (Marquis of Salisbury) to Ambassador, Constantinople, September 8,
1899 FO 406/14: F7380/R112/I.
F7380/R113/I. The
51 Foreign Office to Admiralty, September 9,1899, FO 406/14
Admiralty dispatched the Sphinx. This decision was communicated to the India Office
India
in
informed
Government
turn
Resident,
the
Gulf
in the Gulf.
the
told
of
which
which
However, no word was given to the Consul in Basra. The Consul discovered the Ship's
letter
from
He
Captain
by
the
private
received
a
chance.
of the Sphinx who
mission
happened to be a friend. The Captain had written to say that he had suddenly been
by
Turks.
The
Consul
Kuwait
the
to
to
an
attack
prevent
was surprised that the
ordered
Foreign Office had taken such action. He saw no reason for alarm since the Turks could
Kuwait
Moreover
invasion
invasion
"could
hardly
launch
be
overnight.
of
such
an
an
not
Consulate",
that
this
Consul Basra, to
would
reach
no
news
secrecy
such
organised with
Ambassador, Constantinople September 16,1899, FO 406/14 F7380/E2/R130/I.

ABEDIN-TWO

59

Her
Majesty's
53
Nor
Government
Sheikh
the
would
stand idly if any
upon

further
impose
to
changesto the status quo. The Porte
attempts were made
"do
Kuwait"
to
question
not
raise
a
now
about
well
would
To the ambassador's surprise the Foreign Minister

completely

backed down, became deferential and apologetic. Tewfik explained that

there had been a misunderstanding and that there had been no intention of
launching
harbour
master
or
a
a military attack on Kuwait. It
establishing
had been the Naval Commander of Basra who had acted of his own device
from
Constantinople.
instructions
Almost
immediately,
the
and without
-95
tension diffused. Ultimately Mubarak came out the victor. He had achieved
direct and overt support from Britain and by virtue of his secret treaty,
Kuwait was protected from Ottoman reprisals.
Early Forays into Najd
Historically,

Kuwait was secure so long as the tribes of the interior were

busy fighting amongst themselves and no unified group emerged that was
able to threaten the small coastal principality.

Assured that British power

him,
Mubarak
behind
gained the confidence he needed to expand his
was
Arabian
Najd
interior.
56
He
into
the
and
was particularly concerned
reach
Hail,
base
the
the
city
of
power
northeastern
of the Al-Rashid. The
with
House of Al-Rashid had granted refuge to his disgruntled nephews and
from
Constantinople
as well as the allegiance of numerous
enjoyed support
tribes 57 Mubarak had previously been reluctant to engage them fully but
him
launch
assault
on
they could
an
at any time. However, in 1897 the
head
family,
Muhammad
the
ibn Al-Rashid
powerful
of
and
charismatic

S2Mubarak Al-Sabah to Resident, Gulf, January 13,1900, (translated from Arabic) FO

406/15 F7495/E4/R16/II.
53Ambassador, Constantinople to SSFA September 13 1899, FO 406/14: F7380/R120/I.
54 Ambassador, Constantinople to SSFA September 15 1899, FO 406/14: F7380/R123/I.
Queen Victoria reigned for sixty three years until her death on January 22,1901. She died
by
King Edward VII.
and
was
succeeded
of
age
years
at eighty-one
ssAmbassador, Constantinople to SSFA September 13 1899, FO 406/14: F7380/R120/I.
56Madawi al-Rasheed, Politics in an Arabian Oasis,London: I. B. Taurus 1991, p. 61.
57 Ahmad Abu-Hakima, The Modern History of Kuwait: 1750-1965, London: Luzac&Co.
1983, p. 113; Phiiby, Saudi Arabia , p. 237,

ABEDIN-TWO

60

died. The ensuing power struggle divided the family and created chaos in
Hail.
Mubarak saw an opportunity to strike and chose to place at the head
Rahman
ibn
Faisal
Al-Saud.
Abdul
Goldberg
his
argues that
campaign
of
Mubarak was seeking to divert the attention of the Al-Rashid away from
Kuwait by "lending his support to the plans of the Al-Saud". 58However, it
is more likely that the situation was in fact the opposite-with

Mubarak the

for
his
Al-Saud
the
own purposes. British reports at the time
one who used
indicate that Abdul Rahman Al-Saud had "few, if any, men of his own" and
Al-Sabah.
for
Mubarak
59
The
Kuwaiti
supplies
on
men
and
relied greatly
be
desert
the
to
student
of
art
of
a
shrewd
politics and
ruler was proving
Aziz
ibn
Abdul
Rahman
Abdul
Al-Saud
Although
is
the
young
warfare.
likely
he
his
it
is
than
that
took
more
part with
not specifically mentioned,
father in some of these raids. This early period would have provided him
he
later
his
in
for
that
the
would
use
skills
own
struggle
necessary
with
Riyadh.
By the summer of 1900, Mubarak had arranged for Abdul Rahman
to be joined by Shakh Sa'dun of the Muntafik tribe (who was also an enemy
With
from
Kuwait
Al-Rashid).
they
the
men,
money
and
supplies
of
raids
loyal
Al-Rashid.
tribes
to
the
on
caravans
scale
and
small
undertook
British officials in the Gulf initially treated this insignificant and inevitable
tribal raiding. However, in early October 1900 the force made a particularly
Hail,
booty
before
coming
away
with
on
raid
and
animals
successful
loyal
Kuwait.
Forces
Al-Rashid
back
in
to
the
to
engaged
pursuit
retreating
force
heading
for
Rashidi
News
Kuwait
British
the
of
a
made
raiders.
of
fearful
60
A
clash.
and
of
a
major
proposal to send a
nervous
officials
but
Government
India
the
for
considered,
of
was
was
anxious
gunboat
force.
before
Colonel
details
Kemball, the
show
of
making
such
a
more
58 Jacob Goldberg, The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia: 1902-1918, Cambrdige: Harvard
University Press, 1986, p.42
59Consul, Basra to Embassy, Constantinople, December 28,1900, FO F7742/R5/I/III,
p. 4.
60Secretary,Embassy Constantinople to SSFA/PM (Salisbury), October 3,1900, FO 406/15
F7495/R53/II

61

ABEDIN-TWO

Political Resident in the Gulf was ordered to proceed to

Kuwait and

hostilities
breaking
61
likelihood
the
of
out.
establish
Kemball arrived in Kuwait on October 20 and learned that Mubarak
least
day's
from
journey
interior,
Nevertheless,
in
the
the
a
at
city.
still
was
he interviewed Mubarak's eldest son, Jabir to ascertain the cause of recent
Rashidi
Kemball
that
the
attack was indeed provoked by
reported
events.
the Kuwaiti backed raid on Hail. Yet he condoned the Kuwaiti attack as an
justified
his
because
Mubarak
in
he
was
actions
self-defence.
was
act of
his
bitter
the
to
trying
of
authority
weaken
rivals the Al-Rashid.
simply
More interesting though is Kemball's assertion that it was the Al-Saud who
for
from
Riyadh
in
Kuwait
Al-Rashid
the
assistance
regaining
approached
Al-Saud
instigator
Rahman
Abdul
the
that
chief
was
of the whole
and
62
affair.
No doubt this was the view that the Kuwaiti
to take. Kemball's information

British

ruler wanted the

based
was
on the accounts of

Mubarak loyalists. In essence responsibility for the conflict was placed on

the Al-Saud with Mubarak simply taking advantage of their desire to
Hail.
Mubarak
threat
the
of
was painted as the noble ruler
eliminate
coming

to the assistance of another respected family

chief for the

honourable task of regaining their family seat.

In any case, the Government

of India was more interested in

Kemball's security assessment which was dismissive of any serious threats

to the area as a result of recent activities. He was confident that Mubarak
"proceed
interference
to
from
extremes"
or
prompt
unwanted
not
would
the Porte:
So far as Kuwait is concerned, he is (Mubarak) probably well
hold
his
he
is
to
own,
and
able
not likely to take any steps
bring
himself
into difficulties with Turkey. 63
which would

61Government of India to SSFI (Hamilton) October 8,1900 FO 406/15 F7495/E1/R55/II

62Resident, Gulf (Kemball) to Government of India, November 3,1900 FO 406/15
F7495/E3/R90/II.
63 Resident, Gulf (Kemball) to Government of India, October 30,1900 FO 406/15
F7495/E2/R91/II.

62

ABEDIN-TWO

India was reassured that the Al-Rashid were already weakened and that
there was little chance of an attack on Kuwait. Since Mubarak had not
have
been
his
he
The
Resident
help,
for
confident
of
position.
must
asked
have
felt
it
to
to
the
that
a
gunboat
not
necessary
sent
area
and
was
advised
it might actually be counterproductive-giving

larger
than necessary
a

boost to Mubarak's ego.

The India Office in London however, was not so optimistic. Reports
had been received that the Al-Rashid were still bent on exacting revenge
forces
Basra.
had
There
they pressed the vali of
their
that
reached
and
Basra for several demands-that

Mubarak make financial restitution for

the raids, give an apology and recognise that the Al-Rashid, were the
rightful

rulers of Najd-otherwise

Kuwait would be attacked. M It would

fears.
Kemball's
the
that
report calmed
reassurances of
none of
seem
However, it seems likely that his report had not been received at that time.
Even though

Kemball

had sent his report

on November

3 to the

Government of India, the India Office in London did not seem to know
for
State
Secretary
India,
12,
Lord
Hamilton,
November
On
the
it.
of
about
India
line
Government
three
telegram:
the
a
short
of
with
cabled
Reported from Bussorah [Basra] that Amir of Najd [Ibn
Rashid] demands from Turks satisfaction against Koweit,
failing which he will attack. Has Kemball yet reported to you
What
facts
there?
the
are
as to the quarrel
on position
between the Amir and Sheikh [Mubarak]?. 65
Hamilton
information

but
did
to
take
action
not seem to have much
was anxious
to go on. Nor could the Government of India provide much

had
been
that
Its
shorter
and
stated
simply
even
was
no
action
reply
solace.

64Admiralty to Foreign Office November 10,1900 FO 406/15 F7495/R62/II

Basra to Secretary, Embassy Constantinople, November 13,1900
F7495/E1/R74/II.
65 SSFI (Hamilton) to Government of India, November 12,1900,
F7495/E2/R63/II

and Consul,
FO 406/15
FO

406/15

63

ABEDIN-TWO

taken on the assumption that London would

provide

instructions

if

66
necessary.
With no concrete information about the events in Kuwait, Hamilton
feared the worst. He requested the Foreign Office to immediately dispatch
Kuwait
Ibn
Rashid
to
to
Agent
British
warn
against making
warship
on
a
a
Hamilton
did
invaders
If
the
to
take
ordered
place
attack
an
any attempts.
be expelled. Mubarak was to be given shelter aboard the British warship
Following
Foreign
Office
67
this
the
to
it
request
return
safe
was
until
felt
but
it
hours,
to
temper
the
the
necessary
exuberance
of
within
replied
Indian branch of the service. There would be a huge political fall out if
British warships opened fire on subjects of the Ottoman empire (i. e. the AlRashid), more so if British troops landed at Kuwait. Therefore, while the
Foreign Office authorised a ship to take an Agent to Kuwait (which would
did
for
it
be
Kemball)
the
to
situation
not
give
examine
permission
again
for
be
invaders
68
the
taken
to
expulsion
of
nor
any
any active measures
.

While London had been groping to come up with a policy to deal

had
decided
Three
Porte
Kuwait,
in
the
already
on
action.
with events
battalions

of Turkish

troops were sent to the Basra area to prevent

hostilities from breaking out. The vali was instructed to resolve the dispute
longer
Hamdi
Pasha
fit.
69
By
Basra
time
this
he
was
no
vali
of
and
saw
as
his successor, Muhsin Pasha moved quickly. Emissaries were dispatched to
Ibn Rashid and Mubarak with orders for them to desist. Ibn Rashid was
deal
Hail
Porte
Sheikh
the
to
to
the
to
and
allow
with
of
return
urged
Kuwait. 70While Al- Rashid was ready to comply, Mubarak tried to ignore
Ibn
him.
He
Rashid
in
to
the
to
out
meet
rode
north and
restrain
attempts
66Government of India to SSFI, November 12,1900, FO 406/15 F7495/E1/R63/II. Later,
been
had
Al-Saud
incident,
learn
the
the
the
that
cause
Viceroy
of
see Viceroy to
would
the
SSFI, November 19,1900, FO 406/15 F7495/E1/R75/II
67India Office to Foreign Office November 14,1900 FO 406/15 F7495/R63/II
68Foreign Office to India Office, November 14,1900 FO 406/15 F7495/R65/II. Kemball
himself had been opposed to sending a warship. See Resident, Gulf (Kemball) to
Government of India November 3,1900, FO 406/15 F7495/E3/R90/II.
69 Consul, Basra to Secretary, Embassy Constantinople, November 13 1900 FO 406/15
F7495/E1/R74/II.

64

ABEDIN-TWO

by
However,
he
Muhsin.
the
sent
when
reached near the
emissary
avoided
town of Zubair the emissary caught up and pressured him to retreat.
Mubarak was caught-he could not refuse a direct request by the vali and so
he agreed to travel to Basra where a meeting had been arranged with
Muhsin Pasha. The exact nature of the discussions is not clear but British
his
blamed
innocence
Mubarak
Abdul
that
protested
and
sources suggest
Rahman Al-Saud as the cause for the fallout with Ibn Rashid. Mubarak also
himself
largesse.
ingratiate
the
through
to
vali
with
new
gifts
and
managed
The Porte was soothed with pledges of loyalty and by the construction in
Kuwait of a mosque in the name of the Sultan. 71
Thus, on November 16, Kemball reported that the "Arab crises is
72
home".
He
both
their
on
way
was relieved and assumed
sides are
passed;
it no longer necessary for him to return to Kuwait. However, the India
Office still wanted him to go and meet with Mubarak. Kernball protested
by
complicate
matters
causing Mubarak to believe
that such a visit might
by
from
British
be
his
trouble
the
he
and
so
protected
embolden
that
would
backed
Office
down.
India
73
The
Resident
It
that
the
then
actions. was only
had
Mubarak
The
fact
India
that
that
great
survival
skills.
reassured
Mubarak had developed a rapport with the vali of Basra meant he was
likely to receive favourable treatment in case of further clashes with Hail.
Meanwhile the Al-Rashid would probably be discouraged from attempting
further attacks on Kuwait.
It was recognised however, that Mubarak

would

continue

his

Hail
disclaiming
Saudi
for
involvement:
the
raids
on
while
any
support
"That Mubarak is a clever and ambitious man there can be no doubt. and
..
he has no intention of coming to any amicable arrangement with the Amir

" Report of events of November 1900 in Consul, Basra to Embassy, Constantinople,

November 22,1900, FO 406/15 F7495/R92/II
71 Secretary, Embassy Constantinople to SSFA/PM (Salisbury) November 12,1900 FO
406/15 F7495/R73/II. Also Consul, Basra to Embassy, Constantinople, November 22,1900
FO 406/15 F7495/R92/II.
72Resident, Gulf to Government of India November 17 1900, FO 406/15 F7495/E5/R90/II.
73 India Office to Foreign Office November 21,1900 FO 406/15 F7495/E1/R87/II.;
and
Government of India to SSFI, November 26 1900, FO 406/15 F7495/E2/R87/II.

65

ABEDIN-TWO

fact
Kemball
74
In
Najd".
was quite concerned with the attitude of the
of
Sheikh. He feared that Mubarak had already become too confident of
British support
Kemball

would

losing
healthy
fear
Ottoman
a
was
of
and
warn

Mubarak

against

provoking

the

reprisals.
Porte

"It
Hail:
seems to me that you are pursuing
encouraging raids on

by
a

dangerous policy by continuing to provoke the Amir of Nejd, and again I

75
keep
to
quiet".
counsel you
Furthermore, the Consul at Basra believed that Mubarak appeared
to have lost the initiative and could expect Ibn Rashid to try once again to
be
Consul
The
to
uneasy
with
what
appeared
was
more
a
settle scores.
Turkish victory:
Mubarak has been to much expense and trouble in organising
bidding
large
the
and
yet,
at
army,
of the Vali,
an equipping a
he has to return to Koweit without striking a blow. By his
he
has
Turks
here
the
to assert their
allowed
once
more
visit
his
Koweit,
indeed,
in
which
over
correspondence
suzerainty
with the Valis and the Sultan since his accession to the
Sheikhship, he has constantly admitted. 76

While the focus of these events was on Mubarak Al-Sabah it is important to

important
the
other
point out

historical actor that emerged from this

little
interest
in
Al-Saud.
For
Up
there
the
this
time
the
was
until
period.
first time in the twentieth century the Al-Saud begin to appear in British
British
Kuwaiti-Ottoman
'
As
concern
of
over
a
possible
a
result
reports?
begin
India
discuss
in
London
family
to
their
and
officials
name,
conflict,
their history and supposed ambitions and would soon come to view them
Arabia.
in
power
as the most significant

74 Resident, Gulf (Kemball) to Government of India December 3,1901, FO 78/5173

F7742/E3/R6/III.
75Resident, Gulf to Mubarak Al-Sabah December 10,1901, FO 78/5173/7742/E3/R9/III
76 Report of Consul, Basra to Embassy, Constantinople, November 22,1900 FO 406/15
F7495/R92/II.
77 Resident, Gulf (Kemball) to Government of India November 3 1900 FO 406/15
Constantinople,
Embassy,
Basra
Consul,
And
to
November 22,1900 FO
F7495/E3/R90/II.
406/15 F7495/R92/II.

66

ABEDIN-TWO

Proxy War in Arabia: Mubarak and the Capture of Najd

Mubarak Al-Sabah did not heed the advice of the British Resident and on
December 18,1900, he moved northwest out of Kuwait. Meeting up with
Abdul Rahman Al-Saud and other tribal supporters, preparations were
78
Hail.
Taking
for
fresh
time to rally tribes and
against
campaigns
made
forces
Mubarak's
In
January
to
thousand.
swelled
several
gather provisions
1901 the force moved their camp inside Najdi territory. 79 Mubarak and
Abdul Rahman met with the chiefs of the Anayza and Qassimi tribes.
Selling them on tales of victory and booty they pledged bai'a and joined the
had
large
Mubarak
Najd
80
With
gained
control
of
a
part
of
a
stroke
party.
Riyadh.
the
of
exception
with
He made no attempt to take the city himself but in a calculated
do
his
job.
While
Abdul
Saudi
Rahman
dispatched
the
to
allies
move
his
Abdul
Aziz
Riyadh
to
the
son,
went
party,
main
and
with
stayed
invoked the claim to leadership based on their family heritage 81 The

his
him
however,
soldiers as agents of Mubarak Alsaw
and
townspeople,
Sabah and had no desire to become vassals of the Kuwaitis. Moreover, they
from
Al-Rashid
ba'ia
(pledge
fearful
the
to
the
whom
of reprisals
of
were
loyalty) had already been given. Although the Rashidi governor was
hiding

in the city's

fortress it was only

a matter

of time

before

from
in
Hail.
The
Riyadh
situation
quickly turned
came
reinforcements
left
Aziz
Abdul
was
into a stalemate.
with a tenuous hold on the city. This
fact did not stop Mubarak from claiming victory. Indeed, he boasted that

FO 78/ 5173
78 Consul, Basra to Embassy, Constantinople, December 28,1900
F7742/R5/III
79Consul, Basra to Ambassador, Constantinople, February 16,1901, FO 78/ 5173
F7742/E1/R14/III,
p. 15. Also India Office Report, 'Note on Central Arabia', n. d., IOR
L/P&S/18/B334. See also Philby, Saudi Arabia, pp. 238-239.
FO 78/5173
80 Secret Agent, Kuwait to Resident, Gulf, February 19,1901,
F7742/E3/R41/III, pp. 27-28.
81This account from Najdi oral history was given by Dr. A. A Masri, Professor, King Saud
University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, during a lecture held at King's College, University of
London, 14 March 1995. Reference to this incident can also be found in Goldrup, Saudi
Arabia p, 26.

67

ABEDIN-TWO

had
Najd
the
willingly
of
people
all

offered their fealty to him and that he

had appointed Abdul Rahman as governor of Riyadh. 82

On February 27,1901,

having
after
staked his claim to Najd,

Mubarak mobilised his forces for the four hundred-mile

journey to the

Rashidi capital of Hail. Great efforts were made to win over tribes allied to
Ibn Rashid. Initially

this was quite successful, and the force managed to

little
Arabia
It
with
opposition.
central
of
was only when they
most
cross
Shammar,
Ibn
Rashid
Jebel
that
to
came out to intercept them.
came near
The two sides met on March 17,1901 at Sarif near the town of Buraydah.
Official reports for March and April indicate the uncertainty

of British

battle.
Rumours
Mubarak's
the
the
of
outcome
were
about
rife
of
officials
death but none of the British political officers in the Gulf had a clear picture
83
happened.
had
of what
Finally, British officials learned from a Turkish source that Mubarak
heading
back
M
Kuwait.
Apparently,
during
battle,
to
the
and
alive
was still
force
deserted,
leaving
Mubarak's
beduins
in
Kuwaiti
the
the
party
some of
Rashid
Ibn
captured the camels, supplies and ammunition
outnumbered.
Kuwaiti
the
of

forces. Mubarak lost his brother, Hamoud and nephew

Sabah in the battle and was forced to retreat. 85 Abdul

Aziz Al-Saud

his
hopes
the
holding
that
setback
and
about
realised
word
of
received
Riyadh had evaporated. Departing the city at night, he fled to Kuwait.
The forays into central Arabia had been an unqualified disaster for
Mubarak and the Al-Saud. Kuwait was now on the defensive. The furious
Al-Rashid had declared that unless Mubarak was removed as ruler of

82 Mubarak Al-Sabah to Jabir ibn Mubarak (his son) February 25 1901, letter in Agent,
Kuwait to Resident, Gulf, February 25,1901, FO 78/ 5173 F7742/E4/R41/I/III,
pp. 28-29.
83Consul, Basra to Ambassador, Constantinople 29 March 1901, PRO FO 195/2096, p. 65.
84The Vali at Basra sent his aide de camp to Kuwait to find out what happened and found
Mubarak was alive and back home. See detailed report by Consul, Basra to Ambassador,
Constantinople, April 10,1901, PRO FO 195/2096, p. 110-115, also FO 78/ 5173
F7742/E1/R73/III. See also Dickson, Kuwait and her Neighbours, p. 137.
FO 78/5173
85Consul, Basra to Ambassador, Constantinople, March 16,1901,
F7742/R36/I/III,
p. 53. Also Ambassador, Constantinople, March 29,1901, Ibid, p. 64;
SSFA to IO, March 30,1901, Ibid, p. 65.

68

ABEDIN-TWO

Kuwait

the city would

Mubarak

be attacked. 86 Kuwait

mobilised

defences and

for
benefactors
his
British
supplies of arms and
called on

ammunition.

The Foreign

Office authorised

defence.
The
Admiralty
Kuwait's
to
warships

the dispatch

of British

sent three ships, with one

harbour
Kuwait
Britain's
inside
the
as
a
clear
sign
of
stationed right
had
fact
87
The
that
the
the
to
situation
arisen out of
ruler.
commitment
Mubarak's confidence in British protection was not lost on British officials:
The Sheikh of Kuwait appears to be a ruler of considerable
determination of character, wily and self seeking. He is
by
his
Convention
with the British
probably emboldened
Government to go farther than he otherwise would do and
him
His
Majesty's
Government
saving
counts
upon
possibly
from the consequences of an unsuccessful attack upon his
(Ibn
Abdul
Aziz
Rashid)
Najd.
88
of
neighbour
powerful
By the time the forces of Ibn Rashid came to within a few miles of Kuwait,
heavily
defended
by
injleezi
the
the
had
that
was
city
spread
news
(English) 89 Among the defenders was a small band of Saudi forces carrying
(the
declaration
Islamic
inscribed
the
banners
shahadah
was
which
on
green
90
Avoiding
Altheir
faith)
the
positions.
an
outright
assault
marking
of
Rashid lay siege for a few weeks, during which time only a few hundred
from
With
Porte
Ibn
Rashid
the
taken.
support
substantial
no
sheep were
finally gave up and withdrew to Hail. It was clear that British support
had
Mubarak's
difference.
the
the
special
relationship
put
off
all
made
drama
The
Rashid.
Ibr
deterred
Ottomans and
was costly nevertheless for
Mubarak.

Although

the Al-Rashid were thwarted,

he had risked his

have provided the Turks with the excuse

Kuwait,
in
could
and
position
they sought to invade.
SSFA,
April
29,1901,
PRO
FO 78/5173, #29, pp. 154-155
Constantinople
to
Ambassador,
86
F7742/R48/IH, p. 31.
87Foreign Office to Admiralty, March 30,1901, FO 78/5173 F7742/R212/III, p. 68.
88Ambassador, Constantinople to SSFA, April 10,1901, Affairs of Kuwait: Political
F7742/R35/III.
#59,
42-49
78/5173
FO
pp.
Department,
78/5173
FO
29,1901,
April
#33, p. 150, F7742/R51/I/III,
Admiralty,
Office
to
89Foreign
Bosanquet to Admiralty, May 1,1901, FO 78/5173 #300, p. 170
Admiral
Also
32.
p.
F7742/E1/R55/I/111 p. 34.See also Lacey, The Kingdom, p. 41.
90This was later to become the national flag of Saudi Arabia

ABEDIN-TWO

69

Still an ambitious man however, Mubarak now turned to his protege

to carry out a proxy war to eliminate the Rashidi menace and establish a
Kuwaiti protectorate inland. Abdul Rahman who had thus far led Saudi
forces, withdrew

from active campaigning and allowed his son Abdul

Aziz, to take command of the front line. With Mubarak's encouragement

Abdul Aziz planned another attempt on Riyadh. With a force of around
forty men, composed almost entirely of members of the Al-Saud clan, he
from
Heading
1901.
Kuwait
he
hoped
October
in
to
southwest
set off
from
Initially
the
tribes
this was successful and
along
way.
gather support
but
drew
the
to
sixty,
as
winter
above
near, enthusiasm
numbers swelled
dropped.
91
Abdul
Aziz
his
took
remaining party into
numbers
waned and
the isolation of the Empty Quarter to wait. They rested, prayed and fasted
the month of Ramadan. By keeping out of sight Abdul Aziz sought to lull
the Rashidi governor of Riyadh into a false sense of security. After two
began
for
desert
On
15
January
in
their
1902
they
the
the
quest
city.
months
the green banner was unfurled and Abdul Aziz made way for Riyadh. This
know
he
Riyadh
he
to
that
the
of
time
people
was coming in the
wanted
Muhammad
Islam
the
to
teachings
ibn
Abdul
re-establish
of
and
of
name
Wahhab.
An accurate account of how the city was taken is difficult to gather
himself
in
different
Aziz
Abdul
told
the
story
many
ways, adding
since
it
him.
Even
Philby,
his
in
others
when
suited
subtracting
and
parts
new
biography Saudi Arabia, states that the details of the capture had "been told
happened
92
know
However there are some
to
actually
what
too often"

basic consistencies. This author found a report in the Foreign Office

Confidential Print seriesdetailing the capture of Riyadh which was written
by the British Assistant Political Agent in Bahrain in February, 1902. This

91Philby, Saudi Arabia, p. 239. The amount of booty was relatively small. This and the cold
lose
to
their
enthusiasm and return to their tribes.
men
many
caused
winters
92Philby, Saudi Arabia, p. 239.

ABEDIN-TWO

70

by
less
later
Philby
been
has
or
reproduced
and
chroniclers
more
account
93
the
event.
of
Ibn Saud is said to have set out with his band of men for the purpose
did
declare
his
Najd.
He
beduin
intentions
true
the
of
not
until
of raiding
he had reached the outskirts of Riyadh. There he announced his plan to
take the city and to remove the Rashidi governor. Sending the main party
to take shelter in a date grove near the city walls to avoid detection Ibn
Saud took just eight of his most trusted men with him inside the city. It was
his
his
brother
Muhammad
two
cousins,
of
of
up
and
a core group made
loyal retainers. 94The small group scaled the city walls and crept through
house
to
the
darkened
they
came
of Amir Ajlan, the
the
streets until
house
Ibn
learned
into
Saud
Bursting
Ajlan
the
town.
that
the
governor of
fort.
be
he
his
in
It
the
that
there
palace
would
spent
nights
at
and
was not
least an hour after daybreak before he returned. With tension mounting
Ibn Saud summoned the rest of his party hiding in the date groves. The
house
door
Ajlan's
in
the
to
the
watching
nervously
palace
waited
group
let
When
the
to
the
the
gates
were
opened
street.
amir
across
was
which
hiding.
for
leapt
Ajlan
turned
the
the
out
of
and
ran
safety of
attackers
out,
killed
he
he
but
tried to get through the
and
as
was struck
the palace
door. 95The raiders pressed on into the palace killing fourteen guards and
After
Ibn
Saud
leapt
Rashid.
Ibn
the
to
the
securing
area,
of
officials
he
had
his
that
to
the
people
re-conquered
announced
parapet and
he
lectured
invited
to
He
the
the
them
palace
notables
where
on
country.
leniency
Rashid
Al-Saud.
ibn
the
He urged all
the
and
on
of
the misrule of
lay
down
to
their arms and submit.
to
want
peace
those who professed

"Translated
Bahrain
Agent,
Political
report
purport of an Account of the
Assistant
93
Abdur
Abdul-Aziz-bin-Shaikh
Shaikh
Rahman-el-Faisal Al Saood'
by
Riadh
Capture of
included in Resident, Gulf to Government of India, March 2,1902, FO 406/16
For accounts by contemporary authors see Lacey The Kingdom, pp. 48F8218/E9/R122/N.
Near
The
East, pp. 257-260; Goldrup, Saudi Arabia,
Yale,
20-22;
Saud,
Ibn
McLoughlin,
pp.
52;
pp. 29-31
Al-Saud
Abdul
ibn
Jiluwi
Aziz
Abdullah
ibn
Musaid
Al-Saud.
and
His
%
were
cousins
138-139.
Her
Neighbours,
Kuwait
Dickson
pp.
and
Also
95
see

71

ABEDIN-TWO

The ulema of Riyadh were hesitant to confer complete authority on

the young untried Abdul Aziz. By virtue of his successful capture of the
but
Abdul
Aziz
had
the
to
they conferred upon his
they
as
amir
accept
city
father, Abdul Rahman the title of imam.96Eager to cement his ties with the
Abdul
Aziz
daughter
the
married
of the chief qadi'
establishment
religious
(judge) Sheikh Abdullah ibn Abdul Lateef. From this point Abdul Aziz,
having made a name for himself throughout

central Arabia, was often

'Ibn
Saud'.
to
simply as
referred
The Al-Rashid despite frustration at the loss of Riyadh took time to
By
force
the
time
they
to
counter
attack.
were ready to move on
a
assemble
Riyadh the city was too heavily defended. Their attempts were met by hit
lightening
feint
raids
and
attacks, which were Ibn
and run manoeuvres,
Saud's. trade marks. 97The success of these tactics frustrated Ibn Rashid and
forced him to wait in vain for Constantinople to send assistance.
British officials first learned of the capture of Riyadh by the Al-Saud
in a letter dated 20 Shawwal 1319 (30 January 1902) sent by Mubarak alSabah. The Resident in the Gulf was informed that the people of Najd were
fort
Aziz
Riyadh
had
Abdul
been
that
the
98
and
of
captured.
round
rallying
The Kuwaiti amir led the Resident to believe that this was an entirely
indigenous reaction and that Abdul Aziz had achieved victory through his
own solitary efforts:

"I do not think that he (Mubarak) is in any way

Abdul
Aziz".
99
for
The
Resident
the
of
proceedings
was unsure
responsible
but
doubtful
in
Najd
longevity
the
was
of
affairs
about
the
state
of
new
of
Abdul
Aziz
"Whether
be
Saudi
will
regime:
able to re-establish
the new

96India Office Report, 'Note on Central Arabia' IOR L/P&S/18/B334. Also Lacey, The
Kingdom, p. 67. and Asad The Road to Mecca., p. 172-173. Goldrup's account (Saudi Arabia
He
Arabic
different.
indicating
Abdul
that
Rahman
is
cites
sources
as
31)
slightly
p.
leave
Riyadh
his
to
threatened
became
the
title
and
unless
refused
son
amir.
emphatically
This version is quite typical of the exaggerated language style of some Arabic historical
inclined
is
to
to
the
this
weight
give
greater
other accounts.
author
and
writers
97Dickson Kuwait and Her Neighbours,p. 139.
98Mubarak Al-Sabah to Resident, Gulf, 20 Shawwal 1319, enclosure in Resident, Gulf to
Government of India, February 6 1902, Report 109, File 8218, Vo1.Il Part IV, p. 62
February
India,
Government
17,1902,
Gulf
PRO FO 406/16
to
of
Resident,
99
F8218/E1/R126/IV.

72

ABEDIN-TWO

himself in the kingdom of his ancestors remains to be seen. His ultimate

defeat by Ibn Rashid would seem to be probable. "100
However, Mubarak had in fact set an excellent example on how to
Saudi
the
new
regime was soon to call upon Britain
and
consolidate power
for support. In a letter to the Resident, Abdul Rahman requested that
Britain treat him as a British protege. 101In return for financial support he
from
Ottoman
the
take
to
region
of
al-Hasa
away
coastal
control. 102
offered
The letter included a tacit threat to turn to Russia if no response was
forthcoming-103 The British Resident however, was reluctant to entertain
had
Al-Saud
The
the request.
an uncertain and perhaps temporary hold on
Riyadh. It was likely that Ibn Rashid would try to regain his lost territory
Amir
Najd.
The
did
Resident
feel
he
the
that
of
still
considered
not
was
and
Kemball
his
doubts
to
the
a
response.
reported
warranted
a
request
such
Government
agree[s]

with

"The
Government
India
they
concurred:
and
of
your

view,

that

pending

further

of India

developments,

no

be
Abdul-bin
Feysal,
in
to
given
and
your
should
action
encouragement
his
letter
is
"104
from
to
approved.
replying
abstaining
In keeping with Mubarak's strategy, the Al-Saud also sent pledges
Sultan.
But
Porte
Ottoman
the
loyalty
the
to
was now wary of possible
of
Saudi designs on al-Hasa and dispatched a new governor along with
reinforcements

four
large
500
and
calibre mountain guns to the
men
of

100Resident, Gulf, February 19,1902, PRO FO 406/16, F8218/E1/R122/N.

10,Abdul Rahman bin Feysal al Saud to Resident, Gulf, 5th Safar 1320 (May 14 1902), PRO
FO 406/16: F8218/E9/R164/IV.
1O2IndiaOffice Report, 'Note on Central Arabia' IOR L/P&S/18/B334. Russia had tried
in Kuwait. Then in 1899 the Germans
in
1898
to
cooling
station
establish
a
unsuccessfully
Kuwait
to
the
Baghdad
the
Ottomans
line.
end
station
make
plans
made
of
the
railway
and
These events made Britain concerned over the protection of Kuwait. See Troeller, The Birth
21-22.
Arabia,
Saudi
pp.
of
in
Kuwait
Rahman
Abdul
he was approached by the
1901
December
was
In
while
103
Russian Consul in Bushire who offered Russian assistance and protection in the fight to
Abdul Rahman not to take up this offer but instead to
Mubrak
but
Najd
encouraged
regain
Officer,
Senior
Naval
Report
Perisan
for
Gulf
(Lt.
Commander
British
of
protection.
the
ask
J.G. Armstrong) to Admiral Bosanquet, Admiralty, May 27 1902, PRO FO 406/16: F8218/
E1/R159/IV.
104Government of India to Resident, Gulf, June 23 1902, FO 406/16: F8218/E10/R164/IV.

73

ABEDIN-TWO

designed
keep
Ibn
Rashid
in
In
Porte
105
to
the
a
gesture
play,
region.
for
loyalty
devotion
Sultan.
him
106
to
the
and
medals
with
awarded
By this time it seemed clear to British officials that in fact Mubarak
was "notoriously
little without

Ibn
Saoud,
abetting
and
who could have done
aiding

his help". 107Abdul Aziz's successes in consolidating tribal

further
him
take
towns
to
more
and
gain
support allowed
support

from

local tribes. Through

the summer

pledges of

of 1902 numerous

Ibn
Rashid.
There
took
with
place
raids
were small victories
and
skirmishes
began
focus
but
Rashid
Ibn
he
both
to
also
attacks
on
what
sides
saw as
on
the source of the Al-Saud's support-Kuwait.

Tribes under Mubarak's

Ibn
Rashid
he
the
retaliated
as
against
plundered
were
one
saw
protection
Government
India
became
The
of
the
concerned that such
chief enemy.
as
hostilities would bring unwanted Ottoman intervention.

The Secretary of

State for India ordered that Mubarak should be warned "not to encourage
him
difficulties
bring
into
Nejd
(i.
likely
Ibn
Rashid)
to
with
e.
or
any action
108
A
issued
Ottoman
Turkish
to
the
was
warning
also
authorities".
with
Minister of Foreign Affairs, that HMG wanted to respect the status quo in
Kuwait

but would not stand by if she was attacked. The Minister was

Wali
Basra
Ibn
have
Rashid's
to
the
to
put
a
of
stop
raids on
urged
Mubarakl09
From Mubarak's point of view, to cease aiding and abetting Ibn
Saud would leave Ibn Rashid truly powerful and in a position to threaten
Kuwait. He would manoeuvre around British objections and attempt to
foreign
Mubarak
he
kept
that
power.
each
the
of
out
ensured
most
gain
Abdul Aziz in play by introducing the young man to the Russian Consul
Boyarin.
Mubarak
knew
Russian
Consul
the
that
the
ship
of
and captain

Constantinople,
Embassy
Agent,
July 3,1902,
Basra
to
FO 406/16:
Consul,
105
F8218/E1/R170/IV p. 105-106.
106Ibn Rashid was granted the 'Order of Iftikhar'. See Agent, Embassy Constantinople to
SSFA, July 16,1902, FO 406/16: F8218/R157/IV p. 96.
107Consl, Basra to Ambassador, Constantinople, July 31,1902. FO 406/16: F8218/R174/IV.
India,
Government
September
to
(Hamilton)
22,1902,
of
FO
iosSSFI
406/16: F8218/E1/R192/IV.

109Ambassador, Constantinopleto SSFA,November 20,1902,FO 406/16:F8218/R234/IV.

74

ABEDIN-TWO

Arab
110
He
keen
patronage
over
an
sheikh.
also
establishing
on
was
brother
Abdul
Aziz,
Muhammad
Al-Saud
for
to
the
of
younger
arranged
be sumptuously

entertained by captain of the French cruiser Infernet.

Subsequently, a meeting was arranged for Abdul Aziz with Commander

Kemp of the British warship Sphinx on 8 March 1903 with Mubarak in
had
Mubarak
became
A
It
clear
what
planned.
request
soon
attendance.
but
Kemp
had
for
Russians
British
told
that
the
was
also
support
was made
for
fight
ibn
Rashid.
Perhaps
the
against
support
and
as
offered money
Mubarak expected, the British officer immediately tried to dissuade Abdul
Aziz from taking up the Russian offer:
I pointed out to Abdul Aziz that it was undesirable that
foreign European countries should interfere in the affairs of
Najd, and suggested that he should refuse any offers made to
him on behalf of the Russian Government, and that, as Great
Britain was the predominant power in the Persian Gulf and
,
intended to remain so it would not, in the end, pay him to
,
do anything of which she disapproved. "'
Playing along with the plan Abdul Aziz complained that his enemy Ibn
Rashid was receiving support form the Ottoman authorities and that he too
his
forces.
in
Commander
financial
to
order
maintain
support
required
Kemp was anxious to prevent another power from bidding for Arab
loyalty but he could not offer any assurances except that he would forward
higher
to
authorities.
the request
In any case Abdul Aziz did not have much time in Kuwait to play
his
foreign
During
from
Riyadh,
Ibn
powers.
absence
with
games
political
father
His
Abdul Rahman led a
the
launched
Rashid
city.
an attack on
forced
invaders
leaving
defence
the
to
their
were
retreat
and
capable
behind.
Abdul
Aziz
112
horses
the
chased
after
attackers and
and
supplies
between
band
Rashid
ibn
Kuwait
men,
to
of
al-Hasa
a
and
with
up
caught
followed
by a series of skirmishes
This
for
their
was
them
assault.
punish
Agent,Kuwait to Resident,Gulf, March8,1903,FO406/17:F8238/E3/R43/V.
110
in Commander
F8238/E1/R42/V.

Kemp,

(Sphinx)

to Admiral

Drury,

Admiralty,

March

14,1903,

75

ABEDIN-TWO

throughout

the spring and summer of 1903 between Saudi and Rashidi

forces. In late July, the British Ambassador in Constantinople,

Nicolas

O'Connor, learned that Mubarak was rallying Sheikhs of the Anayza tribe
to join the Al-Saud in another attack on Ibn Rashid. 113O'Conor knew that
he could expect another round of protests from the Ottoman Foreign
Minister. It was a constant and tiresome exercise to calm Ottoman fears
Kuwaiti
for
Britain's
defend
Al-Saud
the
then
position.
support
was
and
Porte.
Despite
he
the
that
with
repeated
relations
claims
complicating
was
funding
Mubarak
it
involved,
that
the Al-Saud against
was
was
clear
not
ibn Rashid. O'Conor wanted to reign in Mubarak's activities. He sent a
for
Agent
be
Office
British
Foreign
Kuwait
to
to
to
the
to
a
assigned
request
114
Mubarak's
ambitions.
control
Although

the Viceroy of India was supportive

of the idea, the

Government administration preferred to have the Consul at Mohammerah

(on the Gulf) appointed responsible for Kuwait, but this was rejected by the
Foreign Office. 115As far as HMG was concerned Kuwait was officially part
Ottoman
the
of

empire. The subject of Kuwait's

status as a semi-

independent entity was never formally discussed. The Foreign Office had
Porte.
The
the
Kuwait
with
appointment
of
an
agent
at
understanding
an
from
departure
Foreign
be
the
Office
had
the
status
quo
and
a
no
would
desire to go down that route. 116
Britain and the Establishment of an Independent Saudi Entity
In January 1904, Ibn Rashid would try again to make a decisive move
foes.
He
Saudi-Kuwaiti
to
his
the
Kuwait
marched
outskirts
of
and
against
because
for
Mubarak
had
Porte
to
"given
the
enter
permission
proof
asked
112Mubarak Al-Sabah to Resident, Gulf, April 14,1903, F8238/E2/R51/V.
113Thesewere Sheikhs who had taken refuge in Kuwait after being expelled by Ibn Rashid
from their territory. Consul, Basra (Crow) to Ambassador, Constantinople, July 20,1903,
F8238/R69/V.
July
India,
21,1903, F8238/E1/R57/V.
Government
to
Hamilton
Lord
114
I's Foreign Office to India Office, August 13,1903, F8238/R65/V. The Government of India
Consul-General at Bushire should be made
in
the
term
the
that
short
suggested
Kuwait.
frequent
for
to
visits
responsible
116Foreign Office to India Office, November 25,1903 FO 406/17 F8238/R90/V

76

ABEDIN-TWO

English"117
The
his
to,
the
subjection
and
with
authorisation
relations,
of
did,
fact
it
from
in
Hail turned
the
to
never
and
party
arrive,
was slow
back. 118 Ironically,

while Ibn Rashid was waiting

for his reply from

Constantinople, the British Ambassador in that city had cabled the British
Foreign Secretary to complain of the Sheikh's duplicity:

"The Sheikh of

Kuwait readily assures us that he is the warm partisan and faithful subject
but
he
Government,
if
Majesty's
His
gives
equal,
not more fervent,
of
119
in
Sultan
to
the
a
contrary
sense".
assurances
Meanwhile, Ibn Saud was preparing to move further into central
Arabia. In March he entered al-Qassim and attacked a force of 400 strong
Rashidi loyalists. One of Ibn Rashid's top lieutenants, Hussein Jarrad, was
killed in the battle and over 150 camels and a money bag of 1000 silver
leader
had
been
120
Jarrad
in
trusted
was
a
who
captured.
charge
were
riyals
his
death
blow
defence
Al-Rashid.
to
and
was
the
a
severe
of
al-Qassim
of
Ibn Saud now faced a much less well-led

group. Emboldened by his

Aneyza
March
22.
he
The
Rashidi
town
the
of
on
entered
success,
killed
houses
the
town
the
of
was
shot
and
and
of
appointed governor
Rashidi loyalists plundered. 121Thus, by the end of April, Ibn Saud had
Arabia
Najd,
Aneyza
his
into
with
al-Qassim
and
central
under
reached
control.
Although

flushed with success Ibn Saud soon received reports of

Ottoman reinforcements being massed near Sammawa. 122The Porte had

Kuwait,
Rashid
to
Ibn
bring
permission
attack
which
would
given
not
forces
but
had
instead
Britain,
Ibn
Rashid
to
back
sent
take
aid
with
conflict

117Intercepted telegram from Ibn Rashid to Sultan dated January 4,1904 FO 406/18
F8420/E1/R14/VI.
I18Ambassador, Constantinople, to SSFA, February 29,1904, FO 406/18 F8420/R23/VI.
119Ambassador, Constantinople to SSFA, January 11,1904, FO 406/18 F8420/R2/VI.
FO 406/18
120 Consul, Basra to Ambassador, Constantinople, March 15,1904
F8420/E1/R30/ VI.
121Letter of Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud to Sheikh Mubarak al Sabah, 10th Muharram 1322 (27
March 1904) cited in Consul, Jeddah to Ambassador, Constantinople, April 22 1904, FO
406/18 F8420/E3/R45/VI.
FO 406/18
122 Consul, Basra to Ambassador, Constantinople, April 27,1904,
F8420/R51/VI.

77

ABEDIN-TWO

2,1904
May
Ibn
Saud
123On
for
Arabia.
sent
an
urgent
central
request
British protection. 124However, within a week the contingent of Ottoman
troops with heavy artillery was already on the move. The force consisted of
(totalling
2400
some
soldiers
men), artillery, guns, and
eight regiments of
by
Ibn
Rashid
joined
levies
from
lti
They
tribal
the Harb,
and
were
money.
Utayba and Shammar. Ibn Saud was forced to meet the advancing army
battles
in
Bukhayri;
the
ensued
area
of
of
series
a
and

the
town
near
of
,

Buraydah. 126
Casualties were heavy on both sides but Ibn Saud suffered a serious
personal wound

during one of the battles. The heat and harsh desert

its
Ottoman
toll
took
on
soldiers unaccustomed to such
also
environment
heat
died
Many
Reaching
thirst
of
and
exhaustion.
a stalemate
conditions.
both sides retired to rest and regroup. However, disagreements between
Ibn Rashid and Ottoman officers on strategy and the lack of reinforcements
further demoralised the Ottoman forces.

The British Foreign Office had been viewing these events with a
There
confusion.
was no clear consensus on what
mixture of alarm and
October
1901
An
in
done.
be
Ottoman
the
agreement
was
place
with
could
Government which was drawn up to prevent hostilities between Ibn
Rashid and Sheikh of Kuwait but no stipulation had been made that either
Government should intervene between Ibn Rashid and Ibn Saud. London
felt that all that could be done was to instruct Mubarak not to get involved
Porte
to
the
to
also
not encourage anything that would
request
and
"disturbed
127The
British
the
the
condition"
of
area.
ambassador
exacerbate
had been forced on a number of occasions to explain that HMG had tried to

123Consul, Damascus to Ambassador, Constantinople, January 11 1905, FO 406/20

F8472/I.
124Ibn Saud to Resident, Gulf, May 2 1904, cited in Government India to SSFA, May 20
1904, FO 406/18 F8420/E1/R46/VI.
lu See William Ochsenwald, Religion, Society and the State in Arabia: The Hijaz Under
Ottoman Control 1840-1908, Columbus: Ohio University Press, 1984, p. 204. Also
Government India to SSFI, April 28,1904 FO 406/18 F8420/E1/R37/VI.
126Political Intelligence Report, Consul, Baghdad to Government of India, 26 December
1904, FO 406/20 F8472/E2/R55/I.
127SSFA to Ambassador, Constantinople, May 10,1904, FO 406/18 F8420/R42/VI.

f-

78

ABEDIN-TWO

do
Ibn
Porte
had
the
to
the
Mubarak
same
with
expected
and
restrain
Rashid. 128But O'Conor could not insist that the Ottomans refrain from
looking
like
The
Saud.
Ibn
Rashid
Ibn
a
supporter
of
without
supporting
frustration of the British ambassador can be seen in the tone of his
correspondence:
It must be borne in mind that the Emir of Najd (Ibn Rashid) is
the party attacked and I confess I cannot see with what
I
Ottoman
the
grounds
can
press
on
what
or
arguments
Government from assisting him, without appearing to
directly espouse the cause of Ibn Saud 129
,
There were certainly

some in the Foreign Office that viewed

harmful

Ibn Saud as potentially

till that time, been steadily

Government
the
of
view
British

friend,
his
the success of
from

was prevented

had actually

helping

Ibn Saud it would

allow

that if Mubarak
the Turks

this would weaken Mubarak's

would

with

to gain

position

and

bring Britain

into

Empire. That was more objectionable

than

132Lord Curzon was keen to revive the idea of an Agent at

Mubarak
that
so
politics

Government

worried

that

of a Wahabbi dynasty, which was seen as less fanatical

the re-establishment

Arabian

"increased concurrently

Bin Saoud"131 Curzon

direct conflict with the Ottoman

Kuwait

A new

by
year
year130 Yet this was not the

Kuwait-which
lead
to
on
attack
an
even

than territorial.

in Kuwait.

of India. The Viceroy, Lord Curzon believed

in Najd. Ultimately,

supremacy
might

growing

over Mubarak

influence

interests

in Arabia could threaten British influence which had, up

dynasty

Wahabbi

to British

the success of

did

could be kept in line and to ensure that central

not spill

into

the Gulf. 133 Relations

becoming
Office
Foreign
India
the
were
and
of

Office
Foreign
But
the
issue.
reluctantly
this

between
strained

the
over

gave in and Curzon appointed

Captain S.G. Knox as the first Political Agent in Kuwait.

Shortly thereafter,

May
FO
SSFA,
16,1904,
406/18
F8420/R49(No.
Constantinople
to
373)/VI.
12BAmbassador,
129Ambassador, Constantinople to SSFA,May 23,1904FO 406/18 F8420/R49(No.93)/VI.
May
SSFA,
16,1904,
FO
406/18
F8420/R49/VI.
Constantinople
to
Ambassador,
130

F8420/El/R54/VI.
FO
406/18
May
29,1904,
SSFA,
India
to
131Viceroy of
F8420/E1/R54/VI.
FO
406/18
May
29,1904,
SSFA,
India
to
132Viceroy of

79

ABEDIN-TWO

Curzon selected Colonel Percy Cox to play the larger co-ordinating role of
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf. 134
Following

.}
,
the battles near Bukhayr^ya there was little appetite for

by
Ibn
However,
August,
during
the
months.
summer
scorching
conflict
Rashid was bolstered by further supplies and men from the Ottoman
his
foe.
Although
for
looking
to
challenge
another chance
garrison and was
he began another round of attacks, the effectiveness of his forces were
hampered by disagreements with the Turkish soldiers, low morale and a
lack of unit cohesion. Ibn Rashid was also known to be abusive to his
135
harsh
Turkish
Food
the
and
with
regulars.
soldiers and was particularly
rations were withheld

to ensure obedience. He sought glory but did not

front
lines.
On
Ibn
Rashid
in
the
many
occasions,
wish to use own men
forces.
front
beduin
his
in
Ottoman
to
of
march
soldiers
ordered the
forced
Turkish
to comply and in one
Generally reluctant
officers were
instance when a Turkish captain refused to march his men in front, Ibn
136
him
in
killed
anger.
Rashid shot and
On the night of September 27,1904, Ibn Rashid attacked the village
Uqayyil,
Ibn
Qasr
ibn
Saud
the
Shunayna
where
of
was
oasis
near
of
fled the battle and Ibn
Turkish
However,
the
137
soldiers
reportedly
camped.
Ibn
Saud
them.
to
pursued the party and
chase after
Rashid retreated
decisive
battle.
lot.
Among
Shunayna
the
the
was
a
routed
completely
four
lieutenants
losses
two
six
captains
and
majors,
as well
Ottoman
were

F8420/E1/R46/VI.
FO
406/18
1904,
May
20
See
Graves,
SSFA,
India,
to
also
13SViceroyof
The Life of Sir Percy Cox, p. 102.
FO
23,1904,
406/18
F8420/R73/VI.
Office,
July
And
Howarth,
India
Office
to
Foreign
134
The Desert King, p. 48.
135Anscombe, The Ottoman Gulf, p. 156.
in
Ottoman
to
front
the
in
the
troops
march
then
command
second
Rashid
ordered
136Ibn
killed
battle
by
these
'friendly
fire'.
See
During
the
soldiers
of
were
many
Beduin.
the
of
Constantinople,
Ambassador,
(Newmarch)
August
to
10,1904,
Arabia
Turkish
in
Resident
losses
ibn
Rashid
huge
The
and the mass chaos of joint Rashidof
F8420/E1/R89/VI.
Diary
August
10
the
in
detailed
is
the
forces
of
extract
of Political Resident of
Ottoman
F8420/E1/R103/VI.
406/18
FO
1904,
August
15
Arabia,
Turkish
Gulf,
October
Resident,
17,1904
Kuwait
FO 406/19
to
Agent,
137Political
battle
details
Goldrup,
further
this
Saudi
For
Arabia, p. 61;
see
on
also
F8503/E2/R2/VII.
Al-Rasheed,
59;
Politics in an Arabian Oasis,
Saudi
Arabia
Policy
Foreign
p.
of
Goldberg,
pp. 156-157.

ABEDW-TWO

80

138
Ottoman
The
hide
thousand
tried
to
their
soldiers.
authorities
over
a
as
defeat by spreading false rumours of Ibn Saud's demise and Turkish
victory. 139Attempts to placate its soldiers were made by announcing that
all those who fought in Arabia would get medals while the officers would
be promoted. However, the Porte could not hide the fact that Ibn Rashid
had himself contributed to his own failure and that Saudi prestige had
increased. It became obvious to the Porte that Ibn Saud was on the rise and
the downfall of Ibn Rashid was a matter of time. Ibn Saud was fortunate
that a revolt

in Yemen reduced Constantinople's

appetite

for

long

Central
Arabia.
140
in
entanglements
The vali of Basra sent a message to Mubarak that if Ibn Saud were to
he
be
left
Porte
his
to
the
would
alone to rule Najd without
allegiance
give
interference from Constantinople. 141This overture alarmed the ruler of
Kuwait. The establishment of direct political relations with Ibn Saud would
Najd
Kuwait's
Porte
to
the
completely.
absorb
position would then
allow
become precarious and her independence threatened. 142 Mubarak did not
inform
to
rush

Ibn Saud of this opportunity

but rather conveyed his

British
in
Agent
Kuwait,
Captain
Knox.
to
the
In
appointed
newly
concerns
he
Mubarak
that
Ibn
Saud
trust
claimed
candour
could
not
surprising
238Acting Consul, Basra (Monahan) to Ambassador, Constantinople October 7,1904, FO
406/18 F8420/R107/VI.
139Vice-Consul, Karbala to Resident, Turkish Arabia, Baghdad, August 25 1904, FO 406/18
F8420/E2/R95/VI
Garrison
Ottoman
1904
in Hafash, Yemen was attacked by rebels
the
November
8
On
140
lead by Imam Muhammad Yahya. This was the latest in a series of minor uprisings against
Ottoman rule. This incident was a serious blow to Ottoman prestige because it resulted in
the complete destruction of the fort and the loss of 400 soldiers. As rebellion spread,
frequency,
leading
Sanaa
in
the
to
increased
the capital city. Between late
seizure
of
attacks
November to early December, Ottoman resources and attention focused more on Yemen
from
The
decided
Arabia.
Porte
to
central
mend relations with Ibn Saud
away
shifted
and
for
Al-Rashid.
See
'Memorandum
its
the
support
of Yemen Insurrection of
and withdraw
1904-1905', Military Attache, Embassy, Constantinople March 14,1905, FO 406/21
F8482/E1/R52/II.
141Nuri Pasha, the vali of Basra (1901-1904), hoped to send the message via Mubarak,
knowing that Ibn Saud would certainly receive it. He still required the assistance of
Kuwait,
however,
to
the
individuals
three
to
message
all
pass
who were
someone
do so. Yet all three did subsequently relay the incident to
declined
to
approached
Mubarak. Resident Kuwait (Knox) to Resident Gulf (Cox) September 3,1904, FO 406/18
F8420/E/2/R127/VI.

81

ABEDIN-TWO

to the Turks

linked

and feared his own political

future

could be

jeopardised. 143Mubarak sought the Agent's advice. It seemed that Ibn

Saud's successes were straining relations with his old mentor. However,
learned
India
discussions
Government
the
the
that were
of
of
candid
when
taking place, alarm bells went off. Officials were furious that Knox was
talking so freely and intimately with Mubarak about Najd. The Viceroy
instructed Knox to "abstain from offering advice to Sheikh Mubarak on
Nejd affairs". 144India wanted their man to talk sense into Mubarak and get
him to stop "rocking the boat" but not to entertain discussions on policy.
The political fallout however, had already begun. In London, the
Turkish

Ambassador

complained

to the Foreign Secretary about the

Mubarak's
British
The
Ambassador
official
at
court.
of
a
accused
presence
Knox of interfering

in the administrative

matters of Kuwait, fraternising

hoisting
Union
Jack
his
the
local
These
and
over
notables
residence.
with
Making
the
status
quo145
as
altering
seen
matters worse was
were
actions
by
German
in
Turkey
by
the press in
agents
and
propaganda
anti-British
Germany.

Rumours

circulating

in Constantinople

were

that

Britain

in
Yemen
the
as part of a scheme to gain supremacy in
revolt
orchestrated
the Arabian Peninsula and would eventually proclaim a protectorate over
Kuwait and central Arabia146 The Foreign Office had already been highly
diffuse
by
tried
to
the
to
and
quickly
situation
criticism
ordering
sensitive

142Resident, Kuwait (Knox) to Resident, Gulf (Cox) September 3,1904, FO 406/18

F8420/E/2/R127/VI.
243Salwa Alghanim, The Reign of Mubarak Al-Sabah, p. 123. Alghanim portrays Mubarak as
fearful but it is also likely that he was using the incident to manoeuvre for greater British
had recently been appointed to Kuwait clearly meant
Resident
fact
that
the
The
support.
keen
interest
in
this country. Mubarak had always boasted about
taking
Britain
a
was
that
his intimate relationship and sought to cement his ties allowing him to rely less on his
Porte.
loyalty
to
the
of
protestations
144 Government of India to Resident, Gulf (Cox), October 9 1904, FO 406/18
F8420/E5/R127/VI.
145SSFA to Councillor, British Embassy, Constantinople, November 2,1904, FO 406/18
F8420/R111/VI. Also SSFA to Government of India November 18,1904 FO 406/18
F8420/E1/R140/VI.
1'6 Memorandum Respecting the State of Affairs in Arabia, prepared by General Staff, War
Office for the Director of Military Operations, Foreign Office, May 23,1905, FO
406/ 22/ F8548/ El/R57/ III.

82

ABEDIN-TWO

the Government

of India to withdraw

their man from Kuwait 147The

Viceroy, Lord Curzon, refused and was displeased with the attitude of the
Foreign Office. Inter-departmental tensions rose considerably and relations
between the Government of India and the Foreign Office hit a low point. In
bitterly
Curzon
Secretary,
Foreign
the
the
to
complained
against
a memo
disguised
his
displeasure
language
in
the
that
Couched
polite
policy.
Viceroy asserted that the Sheikh of Kuwait already had doubts about the
Knox
friendship,
that
Britain's
withdrawing
would alienate
and
value of
Mubarak completely. Both Mubarak and Ibn Saud might then be forced to
Ottomans
Gulf
the
Turkey
the
a
presence
along
coast.
to
providing
submit
148 Eventually this would also allow other powers, notably Germany,
France and Russia, to gain long sought after access to the Gulf, which
India.
British
lines
The
to
to
threat
in
communication
turn
of
pose a
would
Agent in Kuwait was seen to perform a vital role, serving as point man in
the Gulf, reporting on nefarious activity-whether

gun running, piracy or

Withdrawing
keeping
activity.
on
political
a watch
slavery as well as
Gulf.
for
harmful
the
the
be
of
security
extremely
would

Knox

After the Viceroy's strong protest the Foreign Office backtracked.

Reassurances were given to India that the withdrawal
temporary.

was meant to be

The Agent would not be removed suddenly or change his

function in such a way as to imply any alteration in the British attitude to

Kuwait. 149However, officials in London were still perturbed by what was
"complete
Government's
Indian
the
misapprehension
the
of
as
seen
died
down. Months later
In
15
the
slowly
matter
case
any
circumstances".
"not
he
did
declared
that
Secretary
that
there would
Foreign
consider
the
147The Foreign Office had assumed the appointment of Knox was temporary and had
in
Foreign
Office
be
India Office, October
he
to
any
case.
withdrawn
that
would
expected
SSFA
(Broderick)
Also
Government
F8420/R101/VI.
to
406/18
FO
of India,
20,1904
November 11,1904 FO 406/18 F8420/E1/R125/VI.
November
(Broderick),
SSFI
India
19,1904,
FO 406/18
to
Government
of
148
between
India and the Foreign Office see
details
the
For
of
row
more
F8420/E1/R129/VI.
Howarth The Desert King, p. 47.
India
November
Government
21,1904
FO 406/18
to
(Broderick)
of
SSFA
149
Government
India,
Office
November
Foreign
to
25,1904, FO
of
F8420/E1/R132/VI,
406/18 F8420/R136/VI.

ABEDIN-TWO

83

be any advantage in further pursuing the discussion of the subject" 151

Knox was never recalled but the incident marked one of the last times that
the Foreign Office would defer to the Government of India over Kuwait.
Saudi-Ottoman Political Relations
Ibn Saud did not wish to rely on Mubarak as his only conduit for contacts
He
Sharif
Porte.
tried
to
the
the
also
use
of Mecca, Awn al-Rafiq
with
whom

he addressed as the "recognised

leader of Arab

tribes and

Saud
Sharif
Ibn
"the channel of all
152
to
the
sought
make
sheikhs".
him
between
and the Sublime Porte". Claiming that there
correspondence
had been a misunderstanding,

Ibn Saud asserted that he had no intention

Imperial
Porte,
disobeying
the
nor
against
of
any order of the
of revolting
Sultan. He apologised for fighting Ottoman soldiers but claimed that this
Saud
Ibn
booty,
to
including
in
the
promised
return
all
self-defence.
was
belonging
Ottoman
to
the
soldiers that were taken in battle.
rifles
guns and
He had simply been defending his territory from the usurper Al-Rashid as
the lawful ruler of Najd. Out of the desire to resolve matters Ibn Saud was
"any
imposed
terms"
to
reasonable
accept
upon him by the
willing
Sultan. 153Little however was achieved by this tactic because the Sharif had
intermediary
for
Ibn
Saud
intention
as
an
acting
of
and rebuffed this
no
approach.
Refusing to give up, another appeal was made, this time by Abdul
Rahman directly to the Ottoman Sultan. Submitting himself and his family
Abdul Rahman claimed that the Al-Saud had always been vassals of the
Ottoman Sultan:
I am one of the faithful servants of the Shadow of God, whose
family from father to son, has lavished its blood and treasure
in the glorious service of the Caliphate. I have no thought or
aspiration save that of meriting the approbation of my
250Foreign Office to India Office November 25,1904 FO 406/18 F8420/R136/VI.
is, Foreign Office to India Office March 18.1905, FO 406/21 F8482/R48/II.
152Ibn Saud to Sharif of Mecca, December 1904. A copy of Ibn Saud's letter was obtained
by the British Vice-Consul Jeddah and was reported to the Foreign Office. See ViceConsul, Jeddah to SSFA, January 31905, FO 406/20 F8472/E1/R54/I.

153Ibid.

84

ABEDIN-TWO

Sovereign... am submissive to every order and command of

.1
the shadow of god. I neither follow instigations of any
foreigner, nor am I the means of communication with any
foreigners. In fact, under the protection of His Imperial
Majesty there is no seditious agent or medium of foreigner in
154
these
regions.
all
He also accused the Al-Rashid of poisoning relations between themselves
had
fact
Al-Rashid
the
that
This
the
Porte.
also asked
request and
and the
for Ottoman mediation prompted the dispatch of 3000 men to prevent
further escalation of hostilities in the area. 155
Matters were suddenly complicated by an innocuous request to
late
In
for
December
1904
British
the
officers.
travel
permits
obtain
Government of India had requested the Embassy in Constantinople to

Basra
for
the
to
team
vilayets
visit
of
and
a survey
arrange permits
Baghdad. J.G. Lorimer, the famous compiler of the Gazetteerof the Persian
Gulf, was to lead the team. The purpose of the mission was to collect data
In
Porte
Gazetteer.
January
for
the
the
an
audience
at
on
and other material
5 1905, Embassy officials were shocked when they were accusedof trying
156
to organise an espionage mission.
The source of the accusation was the new vali of Basra, Ahmad
deny
Porte
had
to
He
the
Pasha.
permission to Lorimer and
urged
Mukhlis
Grand
Vizier,
28
January
Ottoman
Al-Saud
1905, enclosure
to
Rahman
Abdul
Letter of
SSFA,
January
31,1905,
FO
406/20 F8472/E2/R71/I.
It
Constantinople,
to
in Ambassador
Saudi
248,
Arabia
it
Philby,
Ottomans
that
the
be
that
p.
asserts
was
while
noted
,
should
Rahman, other such as Lacey, The Kingdom, p. 79,
Abdul
to
the
offer
who made
Saudi
Arabia,
32
Safran,
30
Saud,
Ibn
p.
suggest that it was Abdul Aziz
and
p.
McLoughlin,
However, it seems clear from the record that
initiative.
father
the
take
his
who made
behind
knew
Porte
incident
the
the
in
the
was
whole
and the vali of
region
British officers
Ottoman
It
the
instigator.
official who sent messages through
was
the
chief
Basra was
be
Al-Saud
that
Porte in
to
the
the
to
a
submission
suggesting
made
channels
secondary
Gulf
(Cox)
See
Resident,
Government
be
India,
to
to
for
resolved.
of
matters
order
Also,
Acting
Consul,
F8420/E2/R103/VI.
Basra, (Monahan)
FO
406/18
5,1904,
September
Constantinople,
Embassy,
February
British
24,1905,
FO
406/21
(Townley),
Councillor
to
doubt
"I
have
first
that
from
the
Consul
that
The
no
overtures
came
states
F8482/R47/II.
Pasha".
Fakhri
(Basra)
Vali
Acting
the
Vizier
Grand
(Sultan)
from
Ottoman
Minister
Interior,
to
telegram
of
Intercepted
iss
Constantinople,
Embassy
SSFA,
November,
Councillor,
to
8
1904,
FO
in
17,1904,
October
Saudi
Arabia,
Goldrup,
63.
See
p.
also
F8420/E1/R122/VI
406/18
156 Memorandum,
F8472/E1/R30/I

British

Embassy Constantinople,

January

5 1905, FO 406/20

85

ABEDIN-TWO

his team because on their previous visit to Kuwait they had conducted
"suspicious operations". 157Mukhlis believed that the real purpose of the
Saud
him
Ibn
to rebel against the
to
and
encourage
meet
mission was
Porte. Such an interpretation was likely the result of Ottoman frustration
in
Kuwait
Knox
British
interference
in
the
and
with
of
presence
with
territory

that the Porte considered its own. It took vehement denials and

by
British
Ambassador
in
Constantinople
the
and the
many attempts
Foreign Secretary in London before the matter was finally smoothed
high,
Foreign
Secretary
With
the
158
tensions
also reiterated to the
over.
Government of India the need to ensure that Knox did not interfere in
Arabian
politics:
central
His Majesty's Government wish it to be clearly understood
that their influence and interest are to be strictly confined to
the coast-line of Eastern Arabia, and that nothing is to be said
in
done
to
them,
even
connect
an indirect way, with the
or
fighting now going on in the interior. 159
Nevertheless, this incident raised concerns among Ottoman officials about
became
Arabia.
It
in
imperative
interests
British
to settle the
the extent of
dispute between the Al-Rashid and the Al-Saud to avoid providing
with an opportunity

Britain

to take advantage of the situation. A meeting was

Ibn
Saud.
Pasha
Mubarak
Mukhliss
between
and
organised the
arranged
discussions.
be
left
The
he
the
that
of
out
not
would
meeting was
venue so
held in Safwan on the border between Kuwait territory

and the Basra

district. 160Unsure of how events would unfold, Mubarak brought along a

157Secretary, Embassy Constantinople to SSFA, January 10,1905, FO 406/20 F8472/R30/I.

from
Basra
1904-1906.
Pasha
Mukhlis
vali
of
was
Ahmad
London
in
Ambassador
Ottoman
also made complaints to the British Foreign
The
158
Constantinople January 11,1905,
FO 406/20
Secretary, see SSFA to Embassy
F8472/R22/I. In the end Lorimer did not visit, Najd or Hasa. To avoid inciting Ottoman
Coast
Trucial
his
to
the
he
and Oman. Government of India
displeasure
surveys
confined
F8472/E1/R60/I.
FO
406/20
291905,
Janaury
SSFI,
to
India
December
Government
30 1904, FO 406/19
to
(Broderick)
of
SSFA
159
F8503/E1/R4/VII.
SSFA,
Constantinople,
January
Embassy
to
(Townley),
24 1905, FO 406/20
16oCouncillor
F8472/R56/I.

86

ABEDIN-TWO

161
The
British
Resident,
1,000
to
provide
security.
men
private escort of
Percy Cox also took precautions. He made sure that a British warship, the
Sphinx was in Kuwait harbour to provide Mubarak with protection. There
8
Ibn
Saud
did
but
13.
February
and
two
not
attend
was
on
meetings,
were
represented

by his father, Abdul

Rahman. 162 During

the meetings,

Mukhliss Pasha indicated that he wag ut orised to offer Abdul Rahman

the position

'gaimaqam'
of

(administrator)

of Najd if he recognised

Ottoman suzerainty. 163Moreover, Ottoman forces would withdraw

to the

lay
between
Najd
Hail,
buffer
in
and
and
act
as
a
area of al-Qasim, which
between the two sides. Abdul Rahman had to seriously consider the
before
164
However,
had
He
an agreement could
no other choice.
proposal.
be completed a revolt in Yemen overshadowed these discussions. The
Porte was forced to reassess its presence in central Arabia and decided to
bow out and reassigned its garrisons for duty in the south. 165The Ottoman
withdrawal

Saud's
him
Ibn
prestige
and
provided
with
greatly enhanced

him
his
It
to return to
freedom
to
also allowed
position.
consolidate
the
for
Britain
aid.
actively
court
David Howarth narrates an incident that occurred in 1905 which
in
Gulf.
British
Ibn
Saud
the
the
impression
two
officers
on
sent
made an
long,
One
telegraph
the
Bahrain.
office
at
where
arrived
a
to
expensive
men
FO
406/19/F8503/E1/R7/VII.
January
23,1905,
SSFI,
India
to
Government
161
162Acting Consul Basra, to Councillor, British Embassy, Constantinople, February 24 1905,
Goldrup,
Saudi
Arabia
See
F8482/R47/11.
also
p. 63.
FO 406/21
(Townley),
Councillor
Embassy
in
Constantinople,
Basra
Consul,
from
to SSFA,
Report
163
It
is clearly indicated in this report that Abdul
F8472/R96/I.
FO
406/20
17,1905,
February
in
However,
the
terms
the
contrast to this Goldrup writes that
vali.
of
Rahman accepted
demands",
but
defiant
"did
these
was
proudly
Rahman
accept
and cleverly
not
Abdul
See
Goldrup,
Saudi
Ottoman
Arabia, p. 63. This
the
conditions.
around
manoeuvred
discrepancy could be attributed to Goldrup's citation of a more romanticised version of
Hidhlul, Tarikh Muluk al-Su'ud, Riyadh: Matabi al-Riyadh, 1961, p. 74.
ibn
Saud
in
events
"total
this
to
a
reversal of his hitherto anti-Ottoman
as
marking
event
164Lacey refers
fact Ibn Saud had not been anti-Ottoman as much as a political
in
However
policy".
doctrinally he may have been against their conduct, he was politically
While
opportunist.
Najd.
he
fact
long
In
his
to
take
over
them
able
to
as
was
so
own family had
indifferent
in the 1890's upon the stipend provided to his father by
bleak
of
exile
the
years
survived
Lacey
Abdul
Aziz
Government.
credits
mistakenly
also
Ottoman
with accepting the
the
Rahman.
Lacey,
The
fact
Abdul
Kingdom, p. 79.
it
in
was
Ottoman title, when

87

ABEDIN-TWO

telegram was sent to the Ottoman Sultan expressing Ibn Saud's loyalty and
his wish to remain a faithful servant. The second man went to the British
Political Agent with a telegram that offered Ibn Saud's submission to
Britain. In it the Saudi ruler stressed that he was confident of his ability to
defeat Ottoman forces. However, he sought a treaty with Britain that
from
him
Ottoman
launched
from
the Gulf
counter
an
attack
would protect
dutifully
Political
Agent
British
The
coast.

transmitted the message but

subsequently obtained a copy of the message sent to the Porte, and

discovered the trickery. The Agent was highly amused. Howarth

states

that : "such whole hearted duplicity always seemed to delight the British
indeed
Gulf;
in
there
the
something charming about it". It was
was
officials
"disarming
innocence
Arabs".
166
Officials at the
the
the
of
of
an example
Foreign Office were amused but did not take the request seriously and
ignored.
King
the
was
again
With finances and supplies running low, Ibn Saud looked eastwards
to find some relief. In the history of the Al-Saud his ancestors had extracted
Trucial
Sheikhs
from
the
the
along
coast, not to mention from
tribute
With
taxable
in
that
traders
substantial
possessed
who
sums.
mind
wealthy
launched
Trucial
It
towards
the
coast.
was
would also allow
an expedition
his men to show off the weapons and equipment captured from Ibn Rashid
However,
Saudi
forces
Ottomans.
this
the
movement
of
spread alarm
and
Appeals
British
Resident,
towns.
to
the
Percy
the
were
made
coastal
across
Cox, to restrain the marauding
warning

Muwahhidun

forces. Subsequently, a

Ibn
Saud
issued
to
that any attacks on Britain's Trucial
was

displeasure.
be
forces
Saudi
with
viewed
were told not
protectorates would
hope
in
Trucial
the
the
of extracting money, for that
states
to approach

165'Memorandum of Yemen Insurrection of 1904-1905', Military Attache, Embassy,

Constantinople March 14,1905, FO 406/21 F8482/E1/R52/II. Also Philby, Arabian Jubilee,
p. 19.
166Howarth, The Desert King, p. 54.; Lorimer, Gazetteer, Part I, Vol. II, Chapt. VII1, pp. 11571159.

88

ABEDIN-TWO

British
167
Knowing
a
reaction.
provoke
when to extricate
certainly
would
himself from complicated situations, Ibn Saud heeded the warning and his
forces retreated.
The End of a Rival
It would become unnecessary for Ibn Saud to worry about the long term
financing of his battles with Al-Rashid. In April

1906 his agents found

Abdul Aziz Ibn Rashid's main camping ground at Rawdat al-Muhanna.

Mustering his forces Ibn Saud led a dawn attack on an unsuspecting army.
In the ensuing battle Ibn Rashid was shot and killed thus bringing to a
dispute
168
His
Saudi-Rashidi
Mite'b,
in
the
successor,
was a
an
era
close
boy of eighteen and he quickly

agreed a truce with

Ibn Saud.169 To

his
former
Ibn
Saud
foe.
his
the
As
widow
of
married
position
strengthen
Ibn

Saud was triumphant

the house of Al-Rashid

squabbling causing turmoil within

descended into

the family for decades to come.170

By this time it was clear to the British Resident, Percy Cox, that Ibn
Saud was an established force in central Arabia and a major player in Gulf
politics.

In the past Britain's

dominance had been achieved through

fostering rivalry among Arab leaders, tribal chiefs and the maintenance of
the integrity

of the Ottoman empire. However, with the emergence of a

Arabia,
Cox
leader
in
British
that
central
realised
powerful
policy
single
Formal
the
have
to
to
ground.
on
to
realities
relations
adjust
would
needed
be established with Ibn Saud. With this in mind Cox sent detailed letter
Government
India
16,1906
in
to
the
he
September
of
which
advocated
on
Saud:
Ibn
with
reaching an agreement

167Resident, Gulf (Cox) to Agent, Kuwait (Knox), January 17,1906, FO 206/27. Knox was
forces.
Saudi
See
in
Graves,
job
the
The Life of Percy Cox.,
the
of
reigning
also
tasked with
p. 104.
168al-Rasheed, Politics in an Arabian Oasis,p. 62, and Goldrup, Saudi Arabia, pp. 74-75.
169Agent, Kuwait to Resident, Gulf, October 13 1906, PRO FO 371/345 #10143, Enc. 9,
p397.
170Thefirst successor was eldest son Mit'eb but he along with his two brothers were
leadership. That man was also killed within a year by his own
for
by
a
rival
murdered
brothers in a dispute over power. Philby Saudi Arabia, pp. 250-251;Philby, Arabian jubilee,
pp. 20-21.

89

ABEDIN-TWO

I am at the same time aware that it has been a recognised principle

become
Office)
(Foreign
to
themselves
to
their
policy
not
allow
of
in the tempestuous politics
involved
of Central Arabia.
Nevertheless, it must be conceded that we have principles and
interests to consider other than the pursuit of the purely negative
doctrine of aloofness above mentioned, and I cannot see that these
by
doctrine
in
that
to an extreme
our
carrying
any way served
are
by
Arab
Najd
in
the
treating
predominant
our
element
point and
in
only
places
which
not
us
an unnecessarily
neglect
active
with an
for
safeguarding the other interests referred
position
unfavourable
to but which, if persevered in, may be mistaken for hostility on our
part and may engender a reciprocation of that sentiment on the part
171
Chief.
Wahhabi
the
of
To continue to ignore Ibn Saud could turn him into an enemy and
in
him
treaty
the
a
area
would
make
an ally
stability
undermine
-whereas
hand
British
in
Sultan
With
the
Britain.
treaty
allies
such
other
as
a
of
of
Muscat and the Trucial chiefs would be less fearful of attacks from Najd.
Britain might also be able to enlist help of Ibn Saud to reduce piracy in the
had
Cox
tribes
Gulf.
that
the
many
united
warned
under
ruler of
northern
Najd and if Britain did not support him some other power might do so to
interests.
172
Majesty's
His
detriment
the
of
To understand how the report of the Resident reached London
how
description
British
of
colonial administration was
requires some
divided. Reports from eastern Arabia, the Persian Gulf and Mesopotamia
Government
India
in
Bombay
Calcutta
the
to
of
of
offices
and
sent
were
India
Office
in
their
to
the
London.
173
making
way
eventually
copies
with
Policy decisions for these areas rested with the Secretary of State for India.
However, the Hijaz and western Arabia, were considered to be under the
jurisdiction

in
Egypt
Sudan
British
and
officials
who reported directly to
of

London.
British
in
in
Egypt
Office
Foreign
officials
were anxious to
the
between
Europe
Suez
through
Canal
the
Red
the
the
routes
sea
and
secure
17IResident, Gulf (Cox) to Government of India, September 16,1906,
#10143/Enc. 2, p. 391.
172Graves,Life of Sir Percy Cox, pp. 104-105.

FO 371/345

ABEDIN-TWO

90

Sea to the Indian Ocean. Policy decisions regarding this region were made
by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in London. 174Sir George
Rendel was to comment: "It was hardly

surprising

that we should

therefore find ourselves with one policy toward the Hashemite rulers of
the Hijaz in Western Arabia, another toward the Saudis of Najd in the
"175
east.
Inevitably it was a matter of some time before Percy Cox's report
his
However,
forwarded
London.
comments
were
reached
along with a
thirteen point memo by his colleagues in the Government of India. 176While
the memo agreed with some of what Cox said in principle, it did not
The
Government
believed
his
India
that Britain had
of
conclusions.
support
the upper hand vis a vis Najd because Ibn Saud would always need her
Ottomans
The
would
assistance.

certainly

not be granting

him total

independence and he would never be satisfied being a vassal of the Porte.

Moreover, it was anticipated that if left to their own devices the Ottomans
would withdraw

their forces from eastern Arabia. Only then would it be

decide
to
on what policy to maintain toward Ibn Saud. There
necessary
little
him.
be
Thus
in
to
risk
of
alienating
contrast to Cox's urgent
appeared
tone, this memo was quite relaxed. In any case the onus of decision was
Office:
Foreign
the
placed on
The question is one primarily for decision by His Majesty's
Government, and we hesitate to offer our advice in a mater in
which India is only interested in a secondary degree and
merely because a disturbance of the position on the Arabian
coast might adversely affect Indian trade and our political
Gulf.
in
177
the
arrangements

173The Government of India took almost 5 months to forward Cox's report to London for
A
comprehensive memorandum with numerous enclosures was sent on
consideration.
February 211907. See PRO FO 371/345 #10143, pp. 384-388.
174Howarth Desert King, p. 42175George Rendel, The Sword and the Olive: Recollectionsof Diplomacy and the Foreign Service,
1913-1954, London: John Muray, 1957, p. 57. Rendel was a career British Foreign Service
head
Eastern
Department.
become
the
to
of
rose
official who
176Government of India to Foreign Office, February 21 1907, PRO FO 371/345 #10143,
pp. 384-388.

177Ibid.

91

ABEDIN-TWO

The Government of India suggested that Ibn Saud be told of Britain's desire
to maintain friendly

relations with him, so long as he respected their

interests and those of the Trucial chiefs. However, it was not deemed
into
to
a treaty which might very well incite Ottoman
enter
appropriate
him.
178
moves against
Yet even this was deemed too much by the Foreign Office. In their
Saud
if
Ibn
Najd
to
take
was
able
over
all
even
of
and expel the
estimation,
Ottomans there was every possibility

that the Ottoman empire would

Ottoman
Saud
Ibn
British
Arabia.
the
was
still
an
subject
and
could
retake
The
into
treaty
such
relations
with
a
rebel.
supporters of the
not enter
'Ottoman first' policy at both the Government of India and the Foreign
Office forced the subject to be dropped. This view was also held by Sir
Nicholas O'Conor, the British Ambassador to Constantinople, who was
very

involvement
any
against
much

with

Ibn Saud.179 This did not

dissuade Cox. His persistence kept the issue circulating among officials
both in India and Britain. Finally, the India office sent instructions to the
Government of India: after consultation with the Foreign Office there was
have
Ibn
Saud
18
to
or
any
communication
reply
any
with
give
need
no
This was another blow to Saudi hopes, but despite facing severe challenges
he
from
British
by
his
to
initiatives.
the
his
was
surprise
within
to
authority

178Viceroy to Foreign Office, February 15th1907, PRO FO 371/345 #5937, p.380.

179Ambassador, Constantinople to Foreign Office April 1 1907, PRO FO 371/345 #11067,
between
O'Conor
India
Office,
See
February
1904,
in
IOR
and
411-417.
correspondence
pp.
For details of other British officials opinions see H. V. F. Winstone, The
L/P&S/18/B200.
Illicit Adventure: The Story of Political and Military Intelligence in the Middle Eastfrom 1898 to
1926, Maryland: University Publications of America. 1987, pp. 13-15. And Graves, The Life
107.
Cox,
Percy
Sir
p.
of
180India office to Government of India, May 3,1907, PRO FO 371/345 #14856, p.423.

ABEDIN-THREE

92

Chapter 3
Rivals and Rebels: Ibn Saud and Sharif Hussein
Following

the 1841 Treaty of London, European powers stripped

the

Egyptian ruler, Muhammad Ali, of all territories he had conquered at the

Constantinople.
of
expense

As a result the western region of Arabia,

known as the Hijaz, was returned to Ottoman jurisdiction. Separated from

the interior of Arabia by a range of mountainous hills, the importance of
Hijaz lay in the presence of the two holy cities of Islam; Mecca and
Medina. 1 Once again the leadership of Hijaz was passed to the family of
Banu Hashim which counted Prophet Muhammad among its descendants.
In November 1908 Hussein ibn Ali was selected as the Grand Sharif of
Mecca. 2 At one time it had been a tradition to send the young sons of the
Sharifian family to live among the bedouin for a period of time. This
to
promote strength and endurance as well as teach some
was
experience
degree of humility

for
appreciation
simple desert life. Relations
and an

family
be
lifelong,
their
would
sometimes closer to those
adoptive
with
family
their
own consanguine
with
.3

1 Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, p. 121 & pp. 131-132; Troeller, Birth of Saudi
Arabia, p. 38. Also Lawrence Goldrup, Saudi Arabia 1902-1932: The Development of a Wahhabi
Society, Ph.D Thesis, UCLA, 1971 p. 110
2Sharif Aoun al-Rafiq died in 1905 leaving no sons to succeed him. There were several
but
Sharif
Hussein
for
title
the
of
was chosen with the help of well placed
contenders
bribes. Hussein was descended from a branch of the family that would not have ordinarily
been chosen for accession to the Sharifate One of the other candidates was Ali Haidar who
Sharif
Ghalib
(1786-1815)
believed
he was the rightful
of
the
and
great-grandson
was
choice. A detailed account of the circumstances surrounding Hussein's appointment can
be found in the diaries of All Haidar, published as George Stitt, ed., A Prince of Arabia: the
Emir ShereefAli Haidar, London: Allen & Unwin, 1948, pp. 92-110. This was the same year
in which military officers under the name of the Committee for Union and Progress (or
Young Turks) rose to challenge the authority of the Caliph. For a British perspective on the
Sir
Andrew
Ryan
The
Last
the
of
autobiography
of the Dragomans, London:
see
period
Geoffrey Bles, 1951, p. 259. The Young Turks were primarily students from the military
Ottoman
Ryan
he
law
experience
of
gained
wide
politics
colleges.
when
served at the
and
British Embassy in Constantinople, 1899-1914,and he later knew Ibn Saud when he served
1930-1936.
in
Jeddah,
Minister
British
as
3Swiss traveler, Charles Didier observed this custom being practised during the late
1800's. Didier, Sojourn with the Grand Sharif of Makkah, p. 88.

ABEDIN-THREE

93

Hussein had a different experience. He spent many years enjoying a

life of self-indulgence

and intrigue in the palaces of Constantinople. 4

However, shortly after he assumed office in the Hijaz, a constitutional crisis

in Constantinople

arose which

resulted in the Sultan reforming

the

'bloodless
With
in
this Hussein sought to take
revolution'.
a
government
advantage

of the opportunity

to broaden his powers in the Hijaz. 5

Financing his ambitions would require more than the revenues he derived
from the pilgrimage trade. He had no qualms about demanding increased
taxes from the beduin tribes .6 He also sought out new areas from which to
extract wealth.
Until 1910 there was little contact between Ibn Saud and Sharif
Hussein. However, Hussein was eager to expand his own power-base and
from
tribute
to
surrounding
obtain
anxious

tribal groups. Among these

lay
frontier
Utaybah,
Hijazi
territory
in
the
the
the
at
whose
eastern
of
were
In
Hussein
1910
sent men across the mountains into
al-Qassim.
of
plains
the dira (tribal territory) of the Utayba to add their tribute to his coffers.
However, Utayba lands were also astride the Najd-Hijaz caravan routes
which

were strategically

important

to Ibn Saud. In fact, Ibn Saud

his
Utayba
He
had
his
brother
Sa'ad
the
as
subjects.
to
sent
considered
for
Najd.
The
Sharif
Hussen
tribute
taxes
men
of
and
arrested
gather
4George Antonius, The Arab Awakening, London: Hamish Hamilton, 1938, p. 103. Also
Gerald DeGaury, Rulers of Mecca London: Harrap, 1951, p. 264
5 Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid was pressured by'Young Turks', primarily students from
the military and law colleges to institue reforms and constitutional rule. This also saw the
increase of Turkish identity or 'Turkification' among ruling elites. Ryan, The Last of the
Dragomans, pp. 52-78
'Hasan Kayali, Arabs and Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire
1908-1918, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997, pp. 158-160. Despite being
Ottoman
intrigue
internal
the
by
political
government was very interested in
consumed
Arabia.
Medina
In
1910
in
the
influence
city
of
was promoted from being a
maintaining
independent
its
Hijaz
This
to
the
an
sanjak
of
vilayet
own.
extended the influence
sanjak of
Hijaz
into
important
directly
watch
Istanbul
trade routes, the
and
maintained
over
of
Hail.
Hussein
Al-Rashid
felt
the
this a threat to his authority
of
of
activities
and
pilgrimage
Istanbul
He
to
to
complained
autonomously.
and argued that Ottoman
act
and ability
in
Hijaz
inexperienced
for
local
were
and
service
unfamiliar
with
sent
customs.
officials
There was admittedly a problem in finding qualified people that wanted to serve in the
living
Hijaz
in
conditions were harsh and Hussein made life
where
towns and outposts
frequent
for
his
Nevertheless,
difficult
them
it
quarrels.
with
was Istanbul's
more
even
desire to watch Hussein rather than remove him, since his lineage was important.

94

ABEDIN-TI-IREE

Sa'aad and brought him back to Hijaz. Hussein demanded that Ibn Saud
his
he
brother
Though
Hijaz
if
to
tribute
wished
released.
pay annual
humiliated and embarrassed Ibn Saud agreed. But, as soon as his brother
duress.
the
the
on
was
repudiated
grounds
of
pledge
was safely returned
He would have led a campaign against the Sharif himself had it not been
for the sudden revolt from within his family. 7
The revolt was led by Saud ibn Faisal, (the elder brother of Ibn
Saud's father, Abdul Rahman) who was joined by several of his uncles and
line
Although
Saud
the
They
with
of
succession.
unhappy
were
nephews.
ibn Faisal had supported

the struggle to regain 'ancestral lands', the

denial
his
his
forfeiting
the
of
power
and
position
of
sons
own
prospect of
did
him.
the
succession
not
sit
comfortably
of
with
chance
and grandsons
Saud ibn Faisal and his sons along with disgruntled beduin (mainly from
base
left
Riyadh
to
Ajman
tribe)
set
a
rival
power
up
south of the city
the
Hazzani
found
the
tribe
they
among
support
where
.8
This challenge to his authority could not go unpunished-Ibn

Saud

lending
him
blow
his
to
tribes
as
weak,
a
serious
perceiving
risked other
from
Hail
immediate
AlMore
threats
the
emanating
were
as
credibility.
Rashid were active once again. In fact it was not until over a year later that
his
divert
Afterwards,
to
the
Aziz
the
subdue
Abdul
attention
rebels.
could
Hazzani chiefs who had supported the rebels were executed, but Saud ibn
Faisal was offered the choice of exile or a pledge of loyalty. Choosing the
fold
back
into
his
the
Saud
and
latter,
as
welcomed
a
symbol
was
of
reNoura.
Not
Saud's
Ibn
the
he
sister,
all
rebels surrendered
married
entry
however. Several brothers of Saud ibn Faisal and their sons refused to

his
the
of
paternal uncle, Saud ibn Faisal who sought to
grandsons
7These were
sons and
fully
line,
into
their
situation
which
a
was
own
not
resolved until 1916.
take power
Ibn
McLoughlin,
Saud,
38,
Arabia,
Saudi
Birth
The
p.
p.32.
of
Troeller,
Succession
Royal
in the House of Saud in the Twentieth
To
King:
Prince
From
Bligh,
BAlexander
The
Hazzani's
17.
Press,
1984,
NYU
York:
New
p.
main base was the town of
Century,
Laiyla in south central Arabia. Philby, Arabian Jubilee,p. 27.

95

ABEDIN-THREE

found
Sharif
Hussein
in
Hijaz
loyalty
refuge
with
and
where they
pledge
9
intrigues.
their
to
continue
were
It became increasingly clear that to rely solely on his sizeable family
to provide the backbone of his forces had dangerous implications. The long
distances involved and his frequent absences required trustworthy

souls

for
His
themselves.
of
power
own children were still too
without ambitions
born
barely
his
Turki
in
1900,
in
Ibn
Saud
his
teens.
was
son,
eldest
young,
force,
fierce
its
determination
loyalty
independent
with
own
and
an
needed
for
Saud
Ibn
Najd
to
his
also
needed
expand
to
economic
reasons.
cause.
had no outlets to the sea and relied on bringing

supplies in through

Kuwaiti ports. Although Ibn Saud had benefited from the friendship of the
levied
imports
high.
Al-Sabah,
Other
taxes
Mubarak
on
were
port
ruler
by
Gulf
imports.
The
Saudi
taxing
the
revenue
also
gained
cities along
for
Gulf
important
to
had
two
to
waters
access
establish
reasons.
polity
First, supply routes would be secured and would not be subjected to
harassment and taxation from the shaykhs whose territory

straddled

Second,
Gulf
inland.
the
the
a
presence
on
shores
of
would
caravan routes
Najd
in
Britain
force
her
deal
the
to
the
eyes
of
and
of
would
stature
raise
Gulf
10
the
Saud
Ibn
player
on
coast.
major
a
as
with
Due to the fact that Britain had close ties to the Sheikhs of the
Trucial Coast, and had defence treaties with them, it would be have been
fool hardy for Ibn Saud to attempt an assault there. Instead, he cast his eye
Gulf
bordering
large
Najd
the
known
of
coast
the
portion
as alupon
Hasa. ll Though the region was under Ottoman control, military setbacks
due to war with Italy and conflicts in the Balkans forced Ottoman forces to
be recalled to reinforce troops nearer to Constantinople. Moreover, al-Hasa
just
few
forts
the
contained
empire
and
of
region
vital
a
a
with
was not
9Philby, Saudi Arabia, p. 258 and McLoughlin, Ibn Saud, pp. 32-33.
Saudi
Creation
Arabia
The
Linabury,
of
and the Erosion of Wahhabi
1George
Conservatism', Middle East Review Vol. XI, No. 1, Fall 1978, pp. 5-12. Also Goldrup, Saudi
Arabiai, p. 135.
u
"Jubran Shamiyah, al-Saud: Madihim wa MustagbalAhum,London: Riad Rayyes, 1986, p. 119.
Also Goldberg, The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia, pp. 81-82.

96

ABEDIN-THREE

local
had
The
the
tribes
was
poorly
administered
area
and
small garrisons.
from
12
Istanbul.
With
hold
Ottoman
Ibn
for
love
the
their
weak
rulers
no
Saud took the opportunity to strike.
On the morning of May 9,1913, a band of men scaled the walls of
Hofuf, the capital city of al-Hasa. Catching the Ottoman guards by surprise
they were able to take control quickly forcing the garrison to retreat into
the main mosque. With a guarantee of safe passage out of the area, the
Ottoman commander agreed to surrender. 13 The departing soldiers left
behind stocks of rifles, ammunition,

several artillery

guns and several

thousand dollars worth of treasure. With the capture of the capital Ibn
Saud effectively

had control over the whole province and he quickly

Qatif
Ugair.
14
Within
he
towns
the
and
of
port
weeks
would
secured
base,
his
increase
his
taxable
revenues, and guarantee
population
enlarge
that his supplies of goods, arms and provisions would

arrive without

having to pay taxes to any local chieftain. The attack on Hofuf had utilised
a combination

forces
with
of

the bulk consisting of townsmen

Bedouin forces acting as backup. It would

with

be the last time a major

be
force.
Ibn
Saud
had
begun
such
undertaken
with
a
would
engagement
his
independent
forming
own
army which was to be known
the process of
infamously as the'Ikhwan'.
Mobilising New Forces: The Ikhwan
Ibn Saud and his father, Abdul Rahman, spent much of the period from
1902 up until the conquest of al-Hasa in a series of battles for territory and
booty. Philby maintains that "in the rough and tumble of these fighting
little
is
the
special
emphasis
of
any
there
record
on
religious aspect of
years

from
Basra,
Baghdad
been
had
forces
Ottoman
recalled
and Hofuf to reinforce troops
12
detailed study of this period see Jacob Goldberg, The 1913
For
Constantinople.
a
nearer
Eastern
Middle
Studies, Vol. 18, No. 1, January
Hasa
Reconsidered'
Occupation
Saudi
of
1982, pp. 21-29.
fi
Abd
Shibh
Aziz
Beirut
Zirkili,
1970, part 1, pp. 204ahd
al-Malik
al
Khair
al-Jazira
23
al-Din
205. Shamiya, al-Saud pp. 108-109.
Saud',
January
Ibn
'Relations
12,1917, IOR L/P&S/18/B251;
Report,
Bureau
with
14Arab
Troeller, The Birth of Saudi Arabia, pp. 43-44.

ABEDIN-THREE

97

their activities" 15 The members of the Saudi forces came from various
tribal

backgrounds

but were composed mainly

After

of townsmen.

in
territory that required administration
the
rise
successful campaigns

put

became
They
Saud's
increasingly
Ibn
townsmen.
on
reluctant to
a strain
leave their homes, livestock, fields and commercial activities for long
battle
difficult
it
16
to
maintain
a
ready
standing
army.
making
periods
To switch to beduin forces was risky since they were known for
their fickleness and had an almost mercenary like quality of being available
to the highest bidder. The beduin lifestyle was fiercely independent. Eager
to plunder and gain booty, they could turn and loot their own allies if the
fight was not going in their favour, making them dangerous friends, as
saw
history
Al
in
foes.
The
the
the nineteenth century,
of
particularly
well as
forces
defeats
beduin
by
17
when
switched
several
allegiance.
marked
was
Ibn Saud nevertheless had to find a solution to this problem and it was this
formation
led
force.
to
the
that
of
a
new
military
practical need
Traditionally

the beduin maintained

their relationships

on the

forces
fear
joining
feared
those
that
they
prosperity,
or
of
or that
premise
booty
This
them
and
material
gain.
great
was part of the survival
promised
for
lifestyle
fittest
like
their
which
accounted
the
mercenary
quality. By
of
basic
beduin
their
food
the
and
placing
needs
of
shelter,
and
settling
forcing
by
develop
them
them
to
to
and
relationships and
clothing near
dependency on non-tribal members it would make them less likely to
to
towns
18
Ibn
to
problems
other
cause
and
and
raid
civil
order
attack,
Saud would also have greater control over their movements and actions.
Nor was it simply based on the premise that the beduin was primitive and
unpredictable.
1sPhilby, Saudi Arabia, p. 261.
16 Turki al-Hamad, Political Order in Changing Societies, Saudi Arabia: Modernization in a
Traditional Context, unpublished Ph.D thesis, University of Southern California, 1985, p.77.
17During the reign of Faisal many beduin defected or abandoned their positions in the face
Egyptian
Abdul
Aziz
forces
ibn
Saud
the
had
himself
army.
of
the
superior
experienced
of
beduin fickleness when trying to gather a force to assault Riyadh in 1901.

98

ABEDIN-THREE

Using Muwahhldun

principles

Ibn Saud would

weaken tribal

loyalty
God
He
to
the
them
with
and
amir.
sought
allegiances and replace
by
identity
beduiri
s sense of
to expand each
extending tribal links and
integrate
into
tribes
to
various
a new communal
relations
social
expanding
Those commitments were "religious yet secular". 19
identity of 'Ikhwan
.
Western observers like Howarth were awed by the ability of a man with no
formal education living in harsh desert conditions to conceive of such
ideas. Lacking worldly

experience, or an education from one of the great

Cairo
Baghdad,
in
learning
and studying only some religious
or
seats of
texts and being confined
(Muwahkidun)

to "fanatically

narrow

limits

of Wahhabi

doctrine", it was considered amazing that the concept of

force
be
by
Ibn
Saud.
He
independent
conceived
could
was
creating an
considered

"genius"whose
a

"spontaneous

thoughts"

revealed

the

desert
Howarth
dweller
Yet
for
that
still
surprised
was
a
success.
methods
like Ibn Saud came up with any system of government at all 20

Much of the literature on Saudi Arabia assumes that the Ikhwan

Saud.
However,
'Ikhwan'
Ibn
is
the
term
the
of
creation
a
were solely
'brotherhood'
in
Arabic
label,
this
means
and
a
group
which
using
generic
This
in
British
the
was
certainly
existence.
view
of
already
was
name
intelligence officer, Gilbert Clayton, who reported that the Ikhwan
by
Harb
Mutayr
in
tribesmen
to
and
order
started
revive
was
movement
Wahhabi tenets and that it was Ibn Saud who chose to associate himself
later
he
"and
leadership.
"
the
21
assumed
of
which
spiritual
them
with
is For a good Ikhwan vs. townsman comparison see Joseph Kostiner, The Ikhwan of Najd
State',
Middle
Eastern
Studies,
Saudi
Vol.
No.
15,
July
the
3,
1985,
Emergence
of
the
pp.
and
298-323.
19Howarth, The Desert King, p. 68; also al-Hamad, Political Order in Changing Societies,Saudi
Arabia: Modernization in a Traditional Context, pp. 78-80.
20Howarth, The Desert King, p. 68.
University
Diary,
Berkeley:
Arabian
An
Clayton,
of California Press, 1969 p. 18.
F
21G.
General Gilbert Clayton was a powerful and influential military intelligence officer. He
Agent
in
Sudan.
Intelligence
Military
His
him
Director
into
and
of
position
put
as
served
British
influential
in
Middle
East.
Clayton
the
the
officials
most
with
was a
close contact
intelligence officers. He was promoted to Chief
Lawrence
E.
T.
and
other
to
mentor
by
Force
Expeditionary
General Allenby and effectively
Egyptian
the
to
Officer
Political
its capture in 1917 until April 1918 when Sir Arthur Money
Palestine
after
administered
Egyptian
became
Clayton
Ministry
to
the
Afterwards
advisor
of Interior tasked
took over.

99

ABEDIN-THREE

H. V. F. Winstone also argued that the Ikhwan pre-existed Ibn Saud and
22
Saud
Ibn
"enlisted
to
their
cause"
that they
It was Philby, the closest western advisor to Abdul Aziz, who did
the most to advocate the view that the Ikhwan were recruited and settled
into fixed communities by Ibn Saud to give substance to his political and
military

his
including
3
Later
argument,
picked
up
writers
ambitions?

Howarth and al-Yassini, who claim that it was Ibn Saud who had the idea
fixed
locations
involving
in
beduin
into
them
bringing
and
agriculture,
of
for
in
the
need
a strong ruler.
a stable government and
giving them a stake
This was because, as Al-Yassini contends, that "Ibn Saud realised that no
be
in
structure
could
established
an
central authority and modern political
24
tribal
society".
unstable

This author would contend that some semblanceof the Ikhwan was
by
is
Najd.
The
in
evidence
provided
strongest
research
already present
1960's,
Ikhwan
Habib
in
by
John
the
the
when
some
of
original
conducted
Habib's
interviews
Najd
with survivors
still
alive25
were
and al-Hasa
of
found
beginnings
had
Saud
Ibn
the
of the Ikhwan movement
indicates that
"weld
disruptive
hostile
together
to
them
many
and
means
as a
and used
long existed in Najd". 26Notions of religious reform and
had
that
elements
in
Islamic
history
false
in
traceable
recurrent
are
and
practices
abandoning
Peninsula.
Arabian
the
heritage
of
the
British officers in the field at the time, such as H. R. Dickson, the
Political

Agent in Kuwait,

information

were also hard pressed to find

accurate

himself
Saud
Ibn
Ikhwan.
help
in
the
that
was
not
of
about

from
he
himself
distancing
them
British
to
when
spoke
regard, often
In
he
1925
lead
to
sentiments.
and
anti-British
was
appointed
nationalism
a
with curbing
for the purpose of agreeing a settlement with the Saudi ruler. (note:
Saud
Ibn
to
mission
Education
Antonius
George
the
Department
Palestine
of
was
of
secretary
the mission's
Government who later wrote the book Arab Awakening).
Quartet,
London:
1978,
Shakespeare,
151.
Captain
Winston,
p.
F.
V.
22H.
23Philby, Saudi Arabia, p. 298.
Saudi
Arabia,
Kingdom
State
in
51.
the
Religion
of
p.
and
24A1-Yassini,
Development,
Its
Rise,
Najd:
Decline,
Movement
35.
Ikhwan
The
of
and
p.
Habib,
2S

ABEDIN-THREE

100

be
V
He
Ikhwan
in an effort
to
there
the
uncertainty
over
preferred
officials.
to conceal the extent of his relationship with them. Nevertheless there were
for
Saud's
for
Ibn
the Ikhwan. Though he
support
practical considerations
had managed to win battles with his band of townsmen, those forces
would

be
enough to extend conquests elsewhere. They had been
not

Muwalih
to
supportive

eaun ideals of religious reform and revivalism but

were not prepared to give up their commercial and agricultural activities. 28

Moreover, he had to be wary of his large extended family in which
there were supporters as well as rivals to his authority. The rebellion of his
in
1910
ibn'Faisal,
Saud
and the revolt of the Ajman the following
uncle,
family
how
indiciative
of
and tribal aspirations posed a threat.
year were
He also faced challenges from a belligerant Sharif Hussein who could,
field
Hail,
Al-Rashid
In
tremendous
the
of
manpower.
addition,
with
along
Hussein had the advantage of being able to obtain fresh supplies and
he
Damascus-Medina
through
the
wished
whenever
railway
equipment
line. Thus for Ibn Saud it became important to establish a fighting force
family
based
tribally
or
and that could not be neutralised by
that was not
Ottoman largesse. Such a force would be the key to greater expansion of
the Saudi realm. Indeed the Ikhwan were to become an essential tool for
legitimacy
Saud's
his
Ibn
and
maintaining
political survival. 29
preserving
Ikhwan Settlements
The Ikhwan were those beduin who left their nomadic life for settled
dwellings. This was known as hijra and mirrored the migration of the first
Muslim community from Mecca to Medina. The settlements of the Ikhwan

Z6Ibid. However, even in Habib's research it was clear that it was not possible to trace one
infidel or defining moment that caused the Ikhwan to be launched. That was still "clouded
in mystery, confusion and contradiction".
27Dickson reported to London that Ibn Saud distanced himself from Ikhwan and little
information could be gleaned about them. Report on the Operation of the Najd Mission,
November 29,1918, PRO FO 371/4144/4390. See also Habib, p. 30.
28There was also the problem of the consistency and experience of the townsmen. Turki
Al-Hamad, Political Order in Changing Societies,Saudi Arabia: Modernization in a Traditional
Context, pp. 78-80.
29Goldberg. The 1913 Saudi Occupation of Hasa Reconsidered', pp. 21-29.

ABEDrN-THREE

101

1
devoted
life
Inside
hujjar.
to religious study and worship
was
were called
as well as preparation

for battle. Ibn Saud's long time advisor Harry

Philby, commented that the settlement of the Ikhwan was:

an attempt to reform the Badawin elements of the country
bring
line
into
them
to
with the settled towns and
and
land
in
the
assured their general loyalty
villages, whose stake
to any central administration. This in turn involved a partial
land
Badawin
the
the
to give them a similar
on
settlement of
interest in peace, subject to the corollary that such settlement
should be on a mixed rather than a tribal basis.30
However,

the organisation and settlement of the Ikhwan communities

had
been
by
forces
Najd
already
subdued
of
composed
came after most
from
It
desire
towns
the
to expand the
villages.
and
was
men
mainly of
brought
the
that
creation of a standing army that was self
about
realm
sustaining

31
battle
Though
ready
and

Abdul

Aziz

had successfully

band
Ottomans
his
from
to
townsmen
throw
the
out
of
al-Hasa
employed
keeping
his
in
men mobilized. Townsfolk were tied to
there were problems
family
business
commitments and were anxious to
and
their property,
battle.
in
Abdul
Aziz
have
home
to rotate
serving
would
after
return
keep
balance
forces
fighters.
his
to
a
of
veteran
and
novice
continually
More importantly,

the promise to spread Islam made by Ibn Saud

had
be
fully
Riyadh,
to
decade
his
yet
of
realized,
even
a
capture
upon
later. The majority of beduin still needed to be educated and led away from
their

ignorant

ways. ' Sending teachers, or ulema

directly

to

tribal

likely
local
to
the
cause
umbrage
would
chief's sense of
campgrounds
dispatch
lead
Nor
the
Ibn
to
Saud
of
quick
visitors.
a
could
and
authority
beduin
individual
join
with
to
an
offer
of
a
approach
stipend
a
effectively
blood feuds, and old quarrels
because
force,
tribal
animosities,
conscripted
for
to
tribes
impossible
together
long.
it
of
certain
put
members
very
made
be
broken
had
to
tribal
and a unifying glue had to be
Ideas of
affiliation
30Philby, Arabian jubilee, pp. 22-23.
Ikhwan
in
functioning
develop
to
fighting force. With the
the
to
a
311ttook several years
first settlements established in 1912-1913, they really came into play after 1916. See Joseph

ABEDIN-THREE

102

found to bring various beduin together. This was the job of the Ikhwan
hujjar.
The first Ikhwan

settlement was established at al-Artawiyya

in

December 1912.32The earliest to arrive were members of the Mutayr tribe

followed by a group of Harb. Known for their aggressive raiding, and their

dislike of outsiders, the Mutayr were gradually taught the ways of the
Ikhwan. Around two hundred hujjar were established, mostly in Najd, but
borders
located
Hijaz
the
on
with
and
with many

Syria. Inside the

found
different
from
tribes
themselves mixed together but
settlements men
Hujjar
located
identity.
in
diras,
kept
tribal
the
tribal
their
were
often
still
dominant
tribe,
the
the
with
chief selecting the area near good
of
grounds
land and water.

Many chiefs stayed in Riyadh as 'guests' where their

fealty
Ibn
Saud.
In
their
tribes
to
symbolised
spite of this the
presence
few
1920
beduin
1913
joining
hujjar.
between
It
saw
and
relatively
period
1921
that
steady numbers migrated and particularly
after
only
was

from

1925-1928 when the Ikhwan were at their peak. 33

As he had done with the townsfolk, Ibn Saud would first meet with
bring
fold.
into
Only then could groups
them
the
try
to
and
the tribal chiefs
be
having
obtained the chief's promise of safe
sent,
teachers
ulema
and
of
beduin
Ibn
Saud
fact
tribes
In
the
summoned all the chiefs to
with
passage.
Riyadh, inviting them to enroll in a school set up by the ulema where they
for
benefit
the
be
themselves
guided
of
correctly
and their people.
could
Their stay was of course subsidized by their host. One of the most
hijra,
to
the
taught
that
chiefs
was
of
concepts
or migration. In
significant
Islam 'the Hijra' is known as the migration of Prophet Muhammad from
Mecca to Medina, symbolizing the move from the land of unbelief to the
land of Islam. With the invitation to become Ikhwan and true Muslims the

had
too
to make hijra from ignorance
that
they
told
Najd chiefs were
Kostiner, 'On Instruments and their Designers: The Ikhwan of Najd and the Emergence of
3,1985,
Studies
21
Eastern
Middle
State'
Saudi
vol.
no.
p. 299.
the
32Ibid., pp. 298-323. Also Goldrup, Saudi Arabia, p. 136.
33Helms, The Cohesionof Saudi Arabia, pp. 136-137.

ABEDIN-THREE

103

(jahiliyya) to the settled community life under the authority of Islam in the
hujjar. M
According to the recollections of surviving

Ikhwan in the 1960's,

their life as beduin was one of ignorance of the laws and practices of Islam.
Ancient tribal customs were followed and few knew the proper method of
Islamic prayer. Men spent their time in tribal feuds and raids. Upon arrival
in the hujjar however, the new members were given a new identity as a
'brother' or akh that substituted the tribal and family bonds of loyalty that,
in many cases, they had left behind. In dress the Ikhwan distinguished
themselves by tying a white cloth around the head instead of the usual igal
(black cord headpiece) worn by the beduin. 35 For the Ikhwan this was a
life
from
believer.
to
the
transition
purity
nomadic
of
a
settled
sign of a
Though the typical account has been to portray the Ikhwan as the most
ferocious soldiers of Ibn Saud not all the Ikhwan were hardened warriors
or intolerant
"Wahhabism

foreigners.
As
Rihani
he
noted,
met Ikhwan
of

whose

is older and therefore milder. They salaam the foreigner,

desert
in
in
do
they
the
sing
secret,
when
are
and
not
smoke occasionally
blame Ibn Sa'oud for befriending the infidel Ingliz". 36 That Rihani, a
Christian, was able to live and travel among Ibn Saud's men shows the
variety

and complexity

of the Ikhwan-a

view

which

is less one

dimensional than often portrayed. Rihani commented:

Among the men with whom I have lived two months, in my journey
from Ar-Riyadh to Al-Qasim and Kuwait, were represented three
had
I
Indeed,
Ikhwan.
with me the mad Brother, the
classes of
Besides,
latter
the
tolerant.
the
one
of
and.
was a man of
sensible,
he
lighted
his
time
every
who
pipe would take a
quips and gibes,
his
'Smoke,
hand
it
Ikhwan!
to
There
saying:
neighbour
ya
and
puff
is no smoke in al-Jannat.' ... But in times of war there is no difference
is
Every
Unitarianism,
Brother
them.
one
a
warrior
of
a
among
of
And
in
Allah.
times of peace every one is a
those who obey
34Philby, Arabian Jubilee,pp. 22-23.
bind
beduin
by
to
black
the
the feet of his camel to keep it from
used
igal
cord
35The
was a
kept
in
head.
top
the
Giving
on
igal
was
not
use
of
the
when
and
up
off
running
life.
See
Habib,
The Ikhwan Movement of Najd: Its
the
up
of
nomadic
giving
symbolized
Rise, Development, and Decline, pp. 54-56.
36Rihani, Ibn Sa'oud, p. 212.

104

ABEDIN-THREE

life;
in
the
stoic
simplest
endurance
of
philosopher
-a
37
in
in
and
poverty
piety
adversity and pain,
submission,

and

Rihani also points out that Ibn Saud used the different types of Ikhwan for
different purposes: "the sensible are for service, tht--tolerant for commerce
for
battles
"38
Though
last
foreign
the
the
of
war.
mad
class
politics,
and
difficult
were

to keep under control, Ibn Saud enforced his authority

through the withholding

of subsidies.

Problems of Subsidy
Since moving to a h_ui rmeant the abandonment of maintaining herds of
Ikhwan
the
goats,
camels and

were reliant

on outside sources for

Devoting
to
themselves
texts
studying
religious
and preparing
provisions.
for battle the Ikhwan could not engage in farming or trading. Thus they
had to be supported for their livelihood, which Ibn Saud provided through
four types of subsidy known as al-atO, at.39These were:

1. al-Sharha:Which consisted of monetary help and, or, gifts given to

14
the chief of a tribe or the amir of ahr

NP

who would approach Ibn Saud

Visitors
dine
Ibn
Saud
the
would
often
with
arose.
need
and then
when
book.
Afterwards
Saud
Ibn
in
decide
a
special
their
would
name
on
sign
be
to
assistance
given.
the type or amount of
2. al-Ca 'idah:
individuals

Was an annual gift of money given to those

in
Ibn
Saud's
name
was
register, meaning that they had
whose

fought in battle on his side. The pre-fixed amount would be received by the
individual

himself
to the treasury (bayt al-mal) to collect it.
upon presenting

The payment would only be stopped by special order of Ibn Saud which
Of
done
these
be
or
warning.
a
punishment
as
categories only alcould
Qaidah was reserved for the Ikhwan, but they took from the other three
types as well.

37Ibid., p. 213.
38Ibid.
Najd,
79-80.
Movement
Ikhwan
The
pp.
of
39Habib,

f05

ABEDIN-THREE

3. al-Barwah: A gift of food; rice, tea, coffee, sugar, etc. which would
be distributed by Ibn Saud's men in certain areas. Requests had to be made
(diwan)
in
Saud's
Ibn
to
office
order to receive al-Barwah.
each year
4. al-Ma'awnah: This was financial help given to those who wished
to get married, needed to buy livestock, horses, or help in paying back a
loan. The individual

would personally approach Ibn Saud in each instance

his
decision.
for
have
to
wait
and
Thus initially, the Ikhwan settlements devoted their time to religious
farming
labour
livelihood
from
the
and
as
commerce,
came
avoiding
study
for
In
devotion
Saud.
Ibn
themselves
they
reserving
religious
of
subsidies
shunned worldly

activities and concentrated on preparing for battle with

the mushrikeen (polytheists) 40 By supporting the hjjar, as well as several

Saud
his
Ibn
Habib
towns,
much
strain
placed
on
resources.
also
other
jealous
townspeople
that
were
and resentful of the Ikhwan
some
reports
because of what was seen as the latter's privileged

status and pride in

being the guardians and protectors of the Muwahhidun

community 41 Ibn

Saud had to balance the demands of the Ikhwan with those of village elite's
he
At
time
the
same
required self sufficient settlements
and other ulema.

that could sustain themselveswithout great external help and from which
he could obtain well fed, motivated soldiers ready to fight.
However, not all members of a tribe would join the Ikhwan. Many

families were split apart as some membersjoined while others refused. The
for
Duwasir
tribes,
example, had few in the Ikhwan, and among
Subai and

+When there was a revolt of the Ikhwan in 1929, it was led by tribal chiefs, not imams or
Saudi
had
to
however
The
preventfitna-the
rule
accepted
chiefs
ulema
were upset
ulema.
Saud
decried
Ibn
loss
their
of
and
authority
of power. The Ikhwan also
the
absolute
at
believed that Ibn Saud had violated Islamic principles by allowing innovations like the
for
'unbelievers'.
the
Furthermore, the Ikhwan
and
seeking
aid
of
motorcar,
telegraph and
(ghazw)
by
tribal
the
put
on
raiding
restrictions
especially within their
were angered
traditional stomping grounds northwest and northeast of Najd which had come under
Iraqi and Jordanian authority. Since raiding was their pastime, and as Ikhwan they raided
in name of Islam, they could not understand why they had to stop. For Ibn Saud their
Saudi state and strained relations with neighbouring
the
jeopardised
emerging
raiding
Instruments
See
Kostiner'On
Britain.
as
and their Designers' pp. 299-323.
well
territories as
Also Lacey, The Kingdom, p. 512.
41Habib, The Ikhwan Movement of Najd, p. 79.

106

ABEDIN-THREE

the tribes of Qahtan, Utayba, Harb and Mutayr there were sections that
joined and others that did not. This divided tribal families. 42 Those who
joined would give an invitation to their remaining family members to leave
the life of the mushrikeen and become a true mumm (believer). If after being
invited
'true
(the
Islam'
three
dawah
times
to
the
and
call)
path
of
given
they did not 'repent', then they were also considered mushrikeen and liable
to be fought against..
Within the hujjar some Ikwhan ulema disagreed with the policies of
encouraging

farming.
and
commerce

These were seen as dangerous

blocked
Ibn
Saud's
initial
they
attempts to make the
and
worldly practices
hujjar self sufficient. There was also growing competition among the new
links
From
Ikhwan
to
their
the
to
their clothing to
off
cast
past.
of
members
language, they attempted to purge 'un-Islamic' influences. Many gave up
had
belief
in
they
to concentrate on religious study.
livestock
that
the
their
Tensions with townspeople increased as the Ikhwan acted arrogantly and
did
join
Ikhwan
that
them.
to
those
not
would not eat
were condescending
the food of non-Ikhwan

nor would

they return

their greetings. The

"The
Wahba
Hafiz
[Ikwhan]
articulated:
people
problem was, as

had

but
they
of
education
religious
amount
and
small
principle
a
only
absorbed
the
this
that
think
to
constituted
whole of religion and that
alone
come
heresy"43
is
everything else
Ibn Saud had not supported the Ikhwan so that they could become
devotees
that
the
drain
renounced
world
spiritual
of
and
were
a
an army
between
With
Ikhwan
the
his
conflict
resources.
and nonprecious
on
Saud
Ibn
in
1916,
moved to address the problem
Ikhwan growing critical
by
from
He
hujjar
those
its
the
from
removing
ulema
started
root.
who
disagreed with his policies. He then replaced them with new religious

Habib,
The
Ikhwan Movement of Najd: Its Rise,
300,
Vol.
Arabia,
1,
Heart
and
p.
'Philby,
of
Development, and Decline, pp. 67-68.
Baker
Ltd.,
Arthur
London:
1964, p. 126-127. Wahba was one
Days,
Arabian
Wahba,
43Hafiz
Wahba
Egyptian
Of
origin
Saud's
was used to a somewhat more
close advisors.
of Ibn
Islamic teachings and was not enamoured by Ikwhan
implementation
of
sophisticated
excesses.

ABEDIN-THREE

107

instructors who would also encourage the pursuit of commerce. They were
the earth and earning wealth were also virtuous

to teach that tilling

44
pursuits

Ibn Saud attempted to bolster his influence by appointing

the

descendants of Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab as qadis (judges) in

the hujjar. 45Expanding this tactic throughout Najd, Ibn Saud ensured that
there was at least one scholar or alim, in each district. The city of Riyadh
had ix while the provinces of al-Qassim and al-Hasa each had three. In all
Ibn
Saud's
direct
twenty
authority 46 The teachings
ulema were under
about
of

the

founder

of

the

Muwahhldun

movement

were

virtually

institutionalised.
Ibn Saud also created a consultative council or majlis al-shoura made
from
families
influential
bring
to
and
men
chiefs
ulema,
of
a semblance
up
of participatory

fact
hujjar
While
in
each
was effectively run by the
rule.

hakim (coordinator) and the'amir (leader) who were directly responsible to

Ibn Saud. The environment of the hujjar channelled the traditional beduin
'ghazw'
into
tribal
raiding
or
as
attacks on the mushrikeen,
activities such
days
in
Ikhwan,
the
the
beduin
early
of
that
often,
simply
were
other
which
had refused the da'wah (call) to the fold of Islam. Tribal affiliation gradually
became less of a determinant of friend and foe. In the hujjar at least the
Ikhwan succeeded in "substituting

the brotherhood of common faith for

47
Although
ancestry".
that of a common
institutionalise

Ibn Saud had managed to

the Ikhwan and create his own private army, he was still

financial
turned
to
strain
and
more
actively
seek the support and
under
Britain.
Great
of
protection

*4mid,.The Ikhwan Movement of Najd,

p. 61.
45Habib,
46Philby, Heart of Arabia, Vol. 1, p. 297 and Habib, The Ikhwan Movement of Najd, p. 117.
+7Philby, Heart of Arabia, Vol. 1, p. 297.

108

ABEDIN-FOUR

Chapter 4
Ibn Saud and Britain's 'Ottoman First' Policy
Despite his unsteady relationship with Britain, Ibn Saud was in great need
his
Following
in
May
he
1913
her
conquest
of
al-Hasa
was
support.
of
financial
formalise
'
to
obtain
and
and
relations
security
guarantees.
eager
However, Britain was sensitive about engaging in relations with the ruler
had
been
invested
by
Foreign
More
Office in
two
Najd.
than
the
years
of
lengthy negotiations with the Porte. Issues included the delineation of
Ottoman and British interests in Persia, the completion of the Baghdad
Railway and Ottoman customs duties. London did not want to jeopardise
its hard won positions by developing formal relations with Ibn Saud so

forced
had
Ottoman
from
the
the
out
garrison
amir
al-Hasa as
soon after
Constantinople?
the
with
agreements
that might sour
However, Britain could not ignore the fact that Ibn Saud's successful
Ottoman
to
challenge

had
power
made rulers of the Trucial

states

Government
India
The
from
its
of
came
under
nervous.
pressure
extremely
Arab allies to provide protection guarantees against Saudi encroachment.
Reluctantly, two agents were dispatched to meet with Ibn Saud. The British
Political Agent, Kuwait, Captain William

Shakespeare and the Political

Agent, Bahrain, Major A. P. Trevor arranged to meet with the Saudi ruler in
Gulf
Their
Uqair
the
task was to determine:
coast.
on
the town of
he
[Ibn
Saud]
in
way
what
wanted the assistance of the
precisely
British Government, seeing that he was aware of the friendly
Turkish
British
between
Governments,
the
and
and of the
relations
former
in
differences
between
the
the
him
respect
of
of
neutrality
3
latter.
the
and
1 G. F. Clayton, An Arabian Diary Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969, pp. 19-20,
267-268.
Arabia,
Saudi
Philby,
pp.
and
2 The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Edward Grey and Ottoman Envoy in London,
Hakki Pasha would sign a provisional agreement on July 29 1913. Although al-Hasa was
deemed
it
in
be
the
to
Ottoman
was
agreement
the
mentioned
still
part
of
specifically
not
Empire. B.C. Busch, Britain, India and the Arabs: 1914-1921, Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1971, p. 231-232. Also Harry Philby, Arabian Jubilee,London: Robert Hale,
Ltd., 1952, p. 36.
December
Saud',
Bin
interview
15 & 16,1913, Political Agent,
'Memorandum
with
3
of
Bahrain to Political Resident, Gulf, December 20,1913; part of India Office to Foreign

ABEDIN-FOUR

109

The two officers found him extremely congenial. After a warm welcome a
large banquet was prepared in their honour. Performances of traditional
beduin dance were given by local tribesmen. It was only much later, after
the festivities had ended that Ibn Saud raised his concerns with the two
British agents.
He spoke of his concern over the "preservation

of his ancestral

"renew
desire
friendship
to
the
the
and
maintain
ancient
and

rights"

between his family and the British Government and to have his position
his
fact
Saud
intentions.
Ibn
In
He
quite
about
was
clear
wanted
secured" .4
him
'de
facto'
Britain
that
treaty
as
recognised
ruler of al-Hasa and
with
a
for British ships to maintain the peace along the al-Hasa shore-just

as they

did along the rest of the Gulf coast.

Ibn Saud also made it known that the Ottomans were also interested
in establishing treaty relations with him-which
Britain's position in the Gulf. Although

naturally

would

affect

Ibn Saud stated that he would

Ottomans
be
involved
he
the
to
with
nor
any
other
power,
not
prefer
have
he
to
if
had
them
conclude
an
agreement
with
nevertheless
no
would
The
Political
agents, though surprised at the
support.
of
other means
frankness of the ruler, could not respond to his request. Shakespeare was
noncommittal-pointing

highly
it
that
was
out
unlikely that Britain would

Najd
jeopardising
Anglo-Ottoman
into
and
with
risk
negotiations
enter
relations.
Refusing to be put off, Ibn Saud tried to provoke a response by
his
Ottomans.
details
the
He
with
of
negotiations
pointed out
providing
likely
him
from
having
Porte
prohibit
most
the
would
that
contacts with
This
British
threat
foreign
to
interests
veiled
representatives.
political
other
Shakespeare
informed
Agents.
lost
the
the
on
amir that:
not
was
Office dispatch of papers relating to Ibn Saud, February 9,1914, PRO FO 371/2123
F#6117/E4/R1, pp. 260-262.
4'Memorandum of interview with Bin Saud', December 15 & 16,1913, Political Agent,
Bahrain to Political Resident, Gulf, December 20,1913; part of India Office to Foreign
Office dispatch of papers relating to Ibn Saud, February 9,1914, PRO FO 371/2123,
F#6117/E4/R1, pp. 260-262.

110

ABEDIN-FOUR

if he [Ibn Saud] continues to be the de facto ruler of the Hasa

be
for
local
it
British
the
absolutely
necessary
would
coast,
direct
have
him
to
communication
with
and his
authorities
local officers for the settlement of various commercial,
disputes,
which constantly arise, not to
pearling and other
fugitive
the
apprehension of
offenders and
mention
absconding divers. The British Government, therefore, would
in all probability have to take up the question of the prejudice
to their rights and interests which the existence of any clause
excluding their representatives and subjects would entail. 5
If these statements reassured Ibn Saud it did not deter him from making
further veiled threats. In a surprise move Ibn Saud raised the subject of
Qatar and Oman:
In the course of his remarks Bin Saud pointed out that,
though he claimed the Trucial Oman and Katar (Qatar) as
dominions
his
his
felt
and
ancestral
could
of
make
power
part
there, he was quite willing to meet the wishes of Government
in regard to them. He hinted that the only reason which
from
him
overrunning Katar (Qatar), and possibly
restrained
Trucial Oman, after he had occupied Hasa and Katif, was his
desire not to alienate the sympathy of the British
Government. 6
Ibn Saud was also careful to make it clear to the British Agents that he
his
in
took
take
those
any
of
enemies
against
who
action
refuge
would

from
his
is
It
negotiating style that Ibn Saud alternated
apparent
territories.
his

tactics.

On

the

one hand

he gave the

impression

of

being

Shakespeare,
Ibn
Saud
According
"seemed
to
very much
accommodating.
in earnest and most anxious to do whatever he could to meet the wishes of

"
Government
their
He indicated "on
to
(British)
obtain
support.
and
the
for
his
Britain,
"he
preference
relations
than
occasion"
with
one
as
more
had no faith in the permanency of any arrangement made directly with

51bid.
6The discussion was detailed in a confidential memorandum sent separately from the
'Memorandum
found
but
is
the
Interview
with
along
of
reports
with Bin
previous
Saud', December 15 & 16,1913, Political Agent, Bahrain to Political Resident, Gulf,
December 20,1913; part of India Office to Foreign Office dispatch of papers relating to Ibn
Saud, February 9,1914, FO 371/2123, F#6117/E4/R1, pp. 260-262.

111

ABEDIN-FOUR

he
"7
At
he
"would
that
Turkish
one
point
even
claimed
that
government.
to consult [with]

be willing

the British Government

in all important

8
its
While,
he
if
of
assurance
protection.
obtain
on the other
could
matters"
hand, the amir had a persistent and sometimes intimidating
friendly
despite
that
the
noted

Agent Trevor

demeanour.

manner in which

the

discussions were conducted, Ibn Saud was frank about his ability to project
force and implied threats to British interests if he was hindered in his goal
to secure his 'ancestral dominions'. 9
In

their

protestations

reports,

the British

friendship,
British
of

agents noted

Ibn Saud would

that

despite

"probably

his

accept

Ottoman
tribute
to
and
even
suzerainty,
pay
a
nominal
under
autonomy"
Istanbul if pressured to do so. Their analysis of the Najdi ruler impressed
An
India.
Government
opportunity
of
the

was seen to strengthen British

interests in the Gulf. If better relations could be established with Ibn Saud
"a valuable point would have been gained by us". 10 Impressed by the
London:
Hardinge,
Lord
Viceroy,
the
cabled
possibilities
We think advantage should be taken of Bin Saud's present
friendly attitude which is doubtless due to his precarious
position, to post native agent at once to Katif. This will not
foothold
desired
us
on this coast, but will enable
only secure
Turkish
Government
to
in
to
offices
our
good
render
us
dealing with Bin Saud should they require them. "
As a result, it was decided that Captain Shakespeare should remain with
intelligence
to
in
Saud
on the growing Najdi polity and
gather
Ibn
order
improve Anglo-Saudi relations.
Shakespeare and Ibn Saud

Political
Bahrain
Resident,
to
Resident, Gulf, December 20,
Political
Trevor,
P.
A.
7Major
259-260.
F#6117/E4/Rl,
371/2123,
FO
pp.
in
1913
81bid.
by
Saud',
Report
Arab
Bureau,
Ibn
January 12,1917, IOR
'Relations
See
with
91bid.
also
L/P&S/B251.
Government
India,
Gulf
January 4,1914, FO 371/2123
Resident,
to
Political
of
loOfficiating
F#6117/E3/R1, pp. 2258-259.
Secret',
'Foreign
February
Office,
27,1914 FO 371/2124
India
entitled
to
report
"Viceroy
#48437

112

ABEDIN-FOUR

Shakespeare spent five months from February to June 1914 with the Najdi
favourable
back
London
to
which
were
exceedingly
ruler, sending reports
towards Ibn Saud. The Captain praised Ibn Saud's ability to rally beduin
forces and supplies from across Arabia 12 Shakespeare reported how on one
force
5,000-7,000
150
Saud
Ibn
to
rally
a
of
men
managed
within
a
occasion
he
In
Riyadh.
to
thousand
was
able
send
a
another,
men to
of
mile radius
the port towns of al-Hasa, in order to deter the Ottoman Navy from
launching an attack on the shore.
Throughout

this period Shakespeare would

note the alternating

tactics of Ibn Saud - from reassurance to implied threats. Ibn Saud made it
longer
delayed
her
Britain
in
Shakespeare
that
the
to
support, the
clear
his
"make
have
Porte.
In
to
he
the
own
arrangements"
with
would
sooner
Istanbul
insist
Saud
Ibn
would
certainly
claimed,
on restoring
such a case,
former garrisons in al-Hasa and demand the exclusion of all foreigners
from the area to the detriment of Britain, although he "had no intention of
long as he had any chance of
Turks
definitely
himself
the
to
so
committing
Government.
British
"13
Unfortunately,
the
with
arriving at an arrangement
Shakespeare could not promise anything, nor could he indicate what His
Majesty's Government would do. He was there to observe and report.
Shakespeare, however, did try to encourage a change in policy
detailed
British
He
Arabia.
critique
a
of
provided
policy vis-a-vis
towards
the freedom granted to the Porte in dealing with
largely
Istanbul
issues.
was accused of
neglecting Arabia-content
Arabian

the Porte, particularly

tribes
each
other
to
against
while granting support to
various
pit
simply
leadership
had
been
Ottoman
ineffectual
faction,
then
the
another.
and
one
intrigue.
by
Moreover,
losses
in
the
and
the
corruption
weakened
court
fact
Ibn
Rashid
light
in
being
that
the
of
was
This
supplied by Istanbul
12
was remarkable
line. Reports of mid-February 1914, indicated that a shipment of
Railway
Hejaz
the
via
boxes
hundreds
of ammunition and several artillery pieces was sent for Ibn
of
30,000 rifles,
Undersecretary,
Hirtzel,
Arthur
Shakespeare
India Office, 'Notes on
See
to
Rashid's men.
June
26,1914.
FO
Saud',
371/2124
Bin
Arabia
#28966. This is a lengthy
C.
in
and
Situation
impressions
Shakespeare's
during
his
Feb-June,
and
detailed
experiences
on
report
and
insight
into
Captain's
the
Arabia
in
a
valuable
and
also
personal impression of
1914 stay
Ibn Saud.
''3Ibid.

113

ABEDIN-FOUR

Balkans and defeat at Tripoli had lowered Ottoman power in the eyes of
had
Shakespeare
impact
Arab
her
the
this
remarked
subjects.
on
many of
had on local opinion;

"Throughout

the country

I was struck by the

Arabs
Turkish
Government,
its
the
the
all
regarded
which
with
contempt
"14
its
troops, and
civil officials.

Shakespearerecommended that in order to create a strong Turkey,

be
had
Porte
to
the
encouraged to change "however

unpalatable the

longer
be
by
be".
Arabia
no
could
ruled
coercion and the
process may
Foreign Office needed to realise that the Turkish Government had "no
Arabia".
15
in
Shakespeare
its
own
weakness
was convinced
conception of
"end
disaster"
in
he
hoped
Turkish
would
the
and
policy
that
prevailing
that London would undertake a more pro-active policy. 16

However, it also becameapparent that Shakespeare'sopinion of Ibn

Saud had been influenced by his stay in Najd. In his report Shakespeare
leader
"stands
head
Saud
Ibn
who
that
was
a
and shoulders above
claimed
faith".
have
implicit
17
If
Ottoman
in
star
all
policy was
whose
the rest and
likely
it
was
not altered
"independent

that Ibn Saud would

lead a charge for an

Arabia"; and rule the peninsula through a confederation of

likelihood
in
This
all
would,
tribes.

pave the way for interference from

into
large
the
throwing
turmoil.
small,
region
and
powers
outside
Despite Shakespeare's exhortations the Foreign Office had different
be
into
instead
to
action,
rushed
not
choosing
would
and
proceed
concerns
due
to
the
This
terms
Anglo-Turkish
the
was
partly
of
cautiously.
Najd
in
1914,
March,
which
was acknowledged as a sanjak
Convention of
by
Saud'
Bin
Captain
C.
Arabia
in
William Shakespeare to
Situation
report
and
la'Notes on
Office,
June
India
26,1914,
FO
371/2124 #28966.
Under-secretary,
Hirtzel,
Arthur
in
May
believed
1913 was a feat that Ibn
that
the
of
al-Hasa
capture
Shakespeare
15Ibid.
he
had
if
1908
have
as
not been involved elsewhere and that
as
early
achieved
Saud could
in
Arabia.
be
to
leader
major
player
a
Saudi
poised
was
the
Ottoman
dissatisfaction
Arab
For
with
rule see also Elizabeth Monroe,
on
16 Ibid.
more
Faber,
1973,
47-48
Faber
London:
Arabia,
pp.
and
and Bruce Westrate The Arab
Philby of
University
East,
Middle
1916-1920,
in
Park: Penn State Press, 1992,
the
Policy
British
Bureau:
pp. 12-13.
failures
despite
the
that
Shakespeare
noted
of the Porte most Arabian amirs
also
17lbid.
long
Ottoman
it
is
in
does
suzerainty-"so
as
accept
still
name
only
and
probably
would
in their affairs".
import
meddling
not

ABEDIN-FOUR

114

(district) of the Ottoman empire. To deal openly with Ibn Saud, might lead
to accusations that Britain was interfering in internal Ottoman matters 18
The Porte attached great importance to British recognition of Ottoman
over

authority

Najd.

Foreign

Office

officials

had already

received

from
Turkish
suspicious
officials who viewed British relations
complaints
divide
Ottoman
Saud
19
It
to
Ibn
territory.
a
conspiracy
as
was possible
with
that such suspicion would lead to an assault on the Najdi ruler in order to
curb his ambitions-thus

throwing Arabia's political balance into turmoil.

To pacify Ottoman concerns, reassurances were given to the Ottoman

Minister

in London, Hakki Pasha, that British approaches towards Ibn

Saud were a matter of political expediency. To ignore him

would only

Najdi
threaten
the
British
the
tribes
ruler
and
security
of
under
antagonise
20
Trucial
in
the
states.
protection
In fact the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, was not overly
believing
Saud,
Ibn
Porte
that
the
would
about
concerned

eventually

fait
Ibn
Saud
the
of
al-Hasa
as
a
accompli
and
occupation
appoint
as
accept
Ottoman
an

official. Grey's imperative

was to ensure that peace was

discourage
hostilities
interim
in
to
Ibn
the
Saud
towards
and
maintained
further
lead
to
conflict and instability in the region. 21
that might
Lord Crewe, the Secretary of State for India, did not share this
danger
in
Ottoman-Saudi
He
differences
a
a
resolution
saw
of
optimism.
22Negotiations
involvement.
be
better
British
would
supervised if
without
they

took

in
place

London

between

Hakki

Pasha and

a Saudi

both Foreign Office and India Office

This
allow
would
representative.
Ibn
in
Saud
the
feel
to
process.
participate
might
even
more
officials
18Finnie, Shifting Lines in the Sand, pp. 35-36.
39Parker, minute, March 7 1914, PRO FO 371/2123 F#10244/El/R1, pp. 273-274.
20Ibid.
n Sir Edward Grey (SSFA) to Sir Louis Mallet (Ambassador in Constantinople), March 26,
However,
298.
it
F#13135/R1,
371/2123
FO
p.
was also indicated that the Porte
1914,
Saud
Ibn
that
impose
Britain
from
dealing
on
would
conditions
exclude
not
with
should
him. Grey was reassured by Mallet that a settlement between the Saudi-Ottoman parties
hostilities
it
break
be
and
was
unlikely
would
concluded
out, Sir Louis Mallet to
would
Edward Grey, March 27 1914, FO 371/2123 F#13604/R1, p. 302.
22India Office to Foreign Office April 4,1914, FO 371/2123 F#15203/R1, p. 313.

ABEDIN-FOUR

115

indebted to Britain for her intervention. If however, the Najdi ruler was left
deal
likely
it
Porte
his
the
to
a
was
strike
own
would try to force harsh
on
for
lasting
chances
ruin
any
a
and
agreement. A rise in Saudiconditions
Ottoman tensions would only complicate Anglo-Ottoman relations.
Crewe's hopes were dashed when discussions with Hakki Pasha
failed to get off the ground. 23The Porte would now negotiate directly with
Ibn Saud. Lord Crewe however, did not give up and insisted that the
Sheikh

of Kuwait

participate

so that

'British

interests'

would

be

Office
Foreign
Crewe
The
that the British position
reassured
represented.
had been communicated

to the Porte and that his concerns were

but
had
Crewe
He
instructions
to
for
no
choice
the
relent.
gave
groundless.
Resident in the Gulf that "Bin Saud may be informed that we have put
Porte in possession of our views, and he is free to negotiate direct with the
Turks". 24
There were others who

differed

with

Lord

Crewe's views-

including Lord Hardinge, the Viceroy of India-23 He was among those who
involvement
in
Saudi-Ottoman
British
Supporting
Ibn
affairs.
any
opposed
Saud's position, even indirectly, was deemed to risk the integrity

of the

Ottoman Empire. Lord Hardinge believed that Turkey albeit "friendly and
India:
to
the
security
of
reformed", was essential
It is our strong opinion, therefore, that every effort should be made
to avoid action likely to lead to the partition, either now or in the
future, of Turkey's Asiatic possessions, and that His Majesty's
Government should pursue consistently the policy of maintaining
the Turkish empire while reforming and strengthening it 26

23Ibid.
Government
India,
April
7,1914, FO 371/2123, F#16801E1/R1,
Crewe,
to
of
24Marquess of
p. 325
25 Crewe, as the Secretary of State for India, outranked the Viceroy and could have
Hardinge to back his position, but he did not. For further details on the
instructed
Roger.
Whitehall
Adelson, The Formation of British Policy
ministers
see
of
attitudes
prevalent
Towards the Middle East:1914-1918, Ph.D Thesis, Washington University, 1972, Ann Arbor:
University Microfilms.
26Viceroy of India to Foreign Office, September 13,1913, cited in Foreign Office to India
Office April 1,1914, FO 371/2123 F#12320/R1, p. 285.

116

ABEDIN-FOUR

The British Ambassador in Istanbul, Sir Louis Mallet, was also opposed to
the position of Lord Crewe. 27In his estimation, Ibn Saud's control may not
be "permanent or indeed more than temporary". 28Therefore, openly siding
Najdi
the
ruler was premature.
with
In a detailed memorandum to the Foreign Office, Mallet called for a
'traditional'
reaffirmation of

British policy towards Najd which was limited

to three concerns. First to "secure to British subjects free access to, and
Najd,
in
in,
"
the
treatment
and
more
specifically
coastal
regions.
proper
Second, to "avert developments" that hindered British objectives or
Third,
"to
the
the
region.
and
of
most
profound
stability
was
affected
lead
least
that
Arab
to
anything
might
postpone
a
general
at
or
prevent
integrity
the
endanger
outbreak and so

of the Turkish

dominions

in

Asia"29
Mallet urged the Foreign Office to distance itself from "Bin Saood"
Britain
in
Saudi
involve
Porte.
to
the
negotiations
with
attempts
and any
Coming to the aide of an Imperial subject would only fuel speculation of
Britain's "hidden

did
Nor
there appear to be any particular
agenda".

having
Ibn
Saud
in
There
for
Britain
rule
al-Hasa.
was no clear
advantage
indication that British subjects would receive better treatment at the hands
In
Porte
had
the
Saudi
Britain's
case
any
recognised
the
authorities.
of
'special position in the Gulf'. His Majesty's interests would be far better
Ottoman
jurisdiction.
Ibn
Saud's
if
under
was
ascendancy
al-Hasa
served
Arab
lead
further
facilitate
instability
to
upheaval
and
an
only
would
within
policy

the Ottoman empire. Mallet urged the Foreign Office to adopt a

further
from
intervention
kind
for the
"refraining
of
any
of

30
present"

April
(Hardinge),
India
23,1914, FO 371/2123 F#18128/R1,
Viceroy
to
(Crewe)
of
27SSFI
p. 355.
Mallet
Sir
Edward
from
Sir
Louis
Grey, entitled 'Relations of His
to
28 Memorandum
from
View',
Turkish
Nejd
May
18,1914 in PRO FO 371/2124
Government
with
Majesty's
#22042/RI, pp. 2-8.

29Ibid.
Ibid.

ABEDIN-FOUR

117

Diverging

views from the Foreign Office and the Government of

India reflected their overlapping and often competing spheres of influence.

The failure

departmental

conflicting

the extent of Ottoman

to comprehend

views, prevented a unified

weaknesses, and
British policy

to

Captain
Shakespeare
The
that
policies
very
advocated to stabilise
emerge.
the Ottoman
turmoil.

deemed
Arabia
in
to be an invitation
were
presence

to

As a result Ibn Saud . turned towards the Porte, as he had

threatened,

in order

to 'make

his own

arrangements'.

Ottoman
ISyed
the
representative,
with
arranged

A meeting was
b
uzt-A CLV1

Talib., in the town

future
Kuwait
to
Subaiyhiya,
the
secure
near
of the, fledgling
of

Saudi

kingdom. 31
Ottoman-Saudi Treaty
Although excluded from the discussions, the Foreign Office was still
anxious

to know

details

of the Saudi-Ottoman

proceedings.

Since

Shakespeare was on assignment in Egypt, the Acting Political Agent in

Kuwait, Colonel W. Grey, was tasked with gathering information

on the

Throughout
April
May
the
negotiations.
and
of
of 1914, Grey
progress
from
local
Arab
32
Although
intelligence
Ibn Saud was
sources.
gathered
free
in
for
himself,
taxes
from
collecting
and
raising
revenue
reign
granted
discussions
became
The
demands
by
the
strained.
the Porte
on
early
quite
for the repositioning of garrisons in the towns of Qatif and Uqair as well as

the surrender of all canon and artillery guns made Ibn Saud uneasy.33

31Zirkili, Shibh al Jazira,fi ahd al Malik Abd al-Aziz, part 1, pp. 212-214. Also Shamiya, al.
Saud: Madihum wa Mustaqbalhum, p. 109.
32Although his reports were culled from various informants Grey cites Sheikh Mubarak of
Kuwait as his main source. This should indicate that the information received was biased
had
developed
jealousy and suspicion of Ibn Saud. See Lt.
Mubarak
degree.
to some
CoLW. Grey, Political Agent, Kuwait to Political Resident, Gulf, May 6,1914. FO 371/2124
#26063, pp. 63-64 and Political Agent, Kuwait to Political Resident, Gulf, April 2& April 7,
1914 in FO 371/2123 F#21167, p.402 and p.404.
33Ibid. The Porte tried to sweeten the deal with a surprising offer to grant verbal, but not
Saud
Oman
Ibn
Qatar
if
desired.
to
Ibn
Saud was unmoved.
enter
and
so
consent,
written,
However, it should be noted that in Grey's reports Mubarak can be seen to play up the
Oman-perhaps to cause the British anxiety and disrupt
Qatar
to
and
references
relations
between Britain and his former protege.

118

ABEDIN-FOUR

Ibn Saud approached Sheikh Mubarak

of Kuwait

looking

for

he
Mubarak
He
forward.
that
told
sought the same status as
another way
Kuwait, "autonomy with British protection under Turkish sovereignty" 34
Mubarak passed on this information

to Grey but did not have anything

directly
Saud
Ibn
Grey.
his
He
too
to
to
went
offer.
reiterated
concrete
35
Porte
Although
the
to
with
agreement
an
make
reluctance

uncertain

Grey's
intelligence
indicated
that
the
of
such
claims
sources
veracity
about
Ibn Saud had already sent a letter to Syed Thalib Pasha stating that he
36
into
an
agreement.
could not enter
However, His Majesty's Government had not changed its position.
With the Porte refusing British participation, the matter was not pursued.
Ibn Saud was dejected at this news. He subsequently asked whether, if he
Government
Majesty's
him
His
Porte,
to
terms
the
would
come
with
stalled
Grey
date.
Finally,
Ibn
later
such
offer
any
could
not
encouragement.
at a
Saud asked for Britain to at least guarantee that the Turks would "never be
by
37
Again,
Grey
hostile
in
take
to
sea".
action
could
offer
nothing
allowed
fact,
he
light
in
In
that
said
of the circumstance he
the way of commitment.
Saud
if
Ibn
be
he
knew
signed
an
agreement
surprised
which
not
would
British
to
the
object.
cause
would
Indeed on May 29,1914 Ibn Saud did enter into an agreement with

he
Ottoman
Najd
In
Porte.
suzerainty
retained
control
over
accepting
the
Gvve-r.,
c,

()
he
Taking
deal
directly
the
title
to
wall
of
was
and al-Hasa.
bypassing
Istanbul
in
Ministry
Interior
Basra
the
the
wali's
of
or
with
Ottoman
flag
the
the
treaty
As
of
Baghdad.
was to be flown at his
a result
be
he
during
time
asked to field a military force for
forts and
could
of war
Ibn Saud lost the right to grant concessions
Ottoman
in
the
ranks.
service

Kuwait
Agent,
in
to Resident, Gulf, April 7 1914, FO
Mubarak
Saud
to
cited
34 Ibn
371/2123 F#21167, p. 404.
Grey
Colonel
28
Ibn
Saud
April 1914. Agent, Kuwait to
between
on
and
Meeting
ss
F#24823,
FO
371/2124
29
45-46.
1914,
April
Gulf,
pp
Resident,
FO
April
29
1914,
371/2124 F#24823, pp 45-46.
Gulf,
Resident,
Kuwait
to
36Agent,
37Ibid.

119

ABEDIN-FOUR

foreign
He
his
to
treaties
powers.
was
also
channel
with
or conclude
foreign policy dealings through the Porte 38
Previous authors on this subject have presented differing opinions
Wilkinson
John
in
Arabia's
Frontiers,
Saudi-Ottoman
treaty.
asserts
the
on
Porte
Saud
Ibn
between
the
treaty
and
was secret and that Britain
the
that
had no knowledge

of it until November 22,1914 when British troops

document
Ottoman
files
found
in
39
Jacob
Goldberg
the
Basra
and
entered
Policy
Saudi
book
The
Foreign
Arabia
his
1902-1918.40
in
this
of
also asserts
Robert Lacey, while citing the meetings between Trevor, Shakespeare and
Ibn Saud during December 1913, goes on to write that it was not until "two
"41
McLoughlin
[that]
later....
this
was
agreement
unearthed.
secret
years
insists that Philby denied the existence of a treaty 42 Philby, writing in 1952,
doubted the existence of the treaty because "the archives of Saudi Arabia
have no record of any such formal agreement" 43
Yet this author's research in Foreign Office records has shown that
both Captain Shakespeare and Major Trevor had known about the Treaty
by
drafts
Ottoman
Ibn
Saud
in
1913.
the
been
had
of
proposal
shown
and
"Bin
Saud
in
Trevor:
to
volunteered
show
us
confidence the
In the words of
by
been
Turkish
had
Government
the
proposed
conditions which
future
his
for
basis
the
position". 44
settlement of
himself as a

and

The Agents were shown a document containing "eleven articles, five

himself
by
Saud
Ibn
by
been
the
had
the
and
suggested
other
six
of which
FO
June
23,1914,
371/2124
Grey,
F#28368,
Edward
Mallet
to
Louis
p. 79. Also Sir
Sir
38
FO
371/2124F#31123, p. 107. For Arabic
July
11,1914,
Mallet,
Louis
Grey
to
Edward
fi
Shibh
Jazira,
Malik
Zirkili,
Abd
1,
al
ahd
al
this
al-Aziz,
see
part
pp.
agreement
on
sources
Mustaqbalhum,
Madihum
109-110.
It
is
interesting
Shamiya,
to
wa
pp.
al-Saud:
213-214 and
Mubarak
Sheikh
Kuwait
Arabic
in
the
claim
of
sources
participated
these
that
note
Meanwhile according to Colonel Grey, Sheikh Mubarak was not involved
negotiations.
Saudi-Ottoman
See
the
Agent,
Kuwait
the
agreement.
to
of
conclusion
at
surprised
and
F#34347,
FO
371/2124
116-117.
26
1914,
June
Gulf,
pp.
Resident,
Taurus,
I.
B.
London:
1991,
Frontiers,
Arabia's
Wilkinson,
pp. 125-130.
$9John
Chapter
Arabia,
4.
Saudi
Policy
Foreign
The
of
Goldberg,
41Lacey, The Kingdom, p. 113,
be
Philby
that
did
It
45.
Saud
Ibn
noted
should
p.
not arrive in Najd until
42McLoughlin,
hand
first
to
these
events.
witness
a
1917 and was not
43Philby, Arabian jubilee, p. 37.
Gulf,
December
in
20,1913;
Resident
the
Political
PRO F0371/2123,
to
Trevor
Major
4
F#6117/E4/R1, pp. 260-262.

ABEDIN-FOUR

120

Turkish Government".

As a result of their conversations with Ibn Saud

Major Trevor concluded that Ibn Saud "would probably accept autonomy
His
Imperial
Majesty
the
the Sultan" 45 A Foreign
of
suzerainty
under
Office memorandum

of March 9,1914,

indicates that His Majesty's

Government knew in detail the nature of the discussion between the Porte
46
Another
Saud
Ibn
and

confidential

telegram from Louis Mallet

to

Edward Grey sent at the end of March also indicates that it was known that
Ibn Saud was in treaty discussion with the Porte 47 News of the SaudiOttoman agreement was also leaked by the father of one of Ibn Saud's
Agent
Bahrain
48
As
Political
the
to
such it cannot be claimed that
wives
that Britain was unaware of a treaty between the Porte and Ibn Saud before
November 1914. British officials had been intimately aware of the details of
the Saudi-Ottoman discussions from at least a year earlier.
Much of the literature about this time is focused on the period
following
written

the outbreak of the First World War. Even Philby, who has
does
delve
Saudi
Arabia,
deeply into the pre-war
not
much on

tensions between

Ibn Saud, the Porte and Britain. 49 The fact that

Shakespeare first established his links with

Ibn Saud in late 1913 is

by
the
attention given to the period after Britain declared
overshadowed
November
in
1914.50
Porte
the
war on

Outbreak of World War

With the launch of British wartime activities in Mesopotamia and the Gulf,
bringing
Arab
into
British
to
turned
the
rulers
war effort. The
attention
forces
distract
Arab
Ottoman
to
from
Europe
of
using
resources
possibility

43mid.
Foreign Office

Memorandum March 9,1914 FO 371/2123, F#10569/Ripp. 277-278.

46
47Sir Louid Mallet to Sir Edward Grey, March 31,1914, FO 371/2123 F#14280/R1, p. 305.
48Agent Kuwait to Resident Gulf, July 28 1914, FO 371/2124 F#34347, p. 119-120
49Philby, Saudi Arabia, pp. 270-272.
50The Declaration of War, signed by King George on November 5,1914, can be found in
PRO 371/2145. The political background leading up to Britain's declaration of war on the
Porte has been discussed elsewhere. See Adelson, Roger. The Formation of British Policy
Towards the Middle East 1914-1918',Ph.D. thesis, Washington University, 1972.

ABEDIN-FOUR

121

to Arabia brought a renewed interest in Ibn Saud 51 With support from

local rulers Ottoman resources could be diverted to Arabia and this would
forces
British
52
Moreover,
the position of the
elsewhere
on
relieve pressure
Najdi ruler would enable him to secure overland communications

with

Iraq as well as keep in check pro-Ottoman sheikhs on the Gulf coast. It was
did
become
he
important
that
not
an active agent of the Porte. 53
also
However, the British official who seemed to know Ibn Saud best was
back in England. Captain William Shakespeare had returned home in early
1914 and was busy training new recruits to join the battle in the trenches of
Europe. He was quickly reassigned to the Middle East and given the job of
bringing

Ibn Saud to the Allied side and to "prevent,

if possible, the

in
interior".
If
broke
he
the
war
unrest
of
out
was to make sure
outbreak
that no aid was given to Turkey. 54
London's 'Ottoman first' policy makers in the Foreign Office had
the
Arabian
they
simply
saw
usefulness
of
a
central
changed;
ally,
not
keeping Ottoman forces engaged in Arabia that would otherwise be used
Shakespeare
Ibn
Saud
just
Allied
rejoined
armies.
as campaigns
against
were mounted

against the Al-Rashid. Ibn Saud however,

would

not

Britain
without assurances and guarantees in
with
alliance
an
entertain
drew
draft
Shakespeare
treaty
that would allow the
up
a
writing.
formal
This
included
relations.
of
a promise of supportestablishment
had
Saud
Ibn
that
no relations with other powers without British
provided
Saud
impressed
Ibn
last
But
this
was
not
at
minute offer of
consent.
51See 'Relations with Ibn Saud' Arab Bureau Report, January 12,1917,
IOR
The new Secretary of State for War, Lord Kitchener was more interested
L/P&S/18/B251.
in Sharif Hussein because of his position in the Hijaz near Ottoman strongholds and the
fact that he was Sharif of Mecca and commanded prestige in the Muslim world. See
Zirkili,
130-133.
Shibh al-jazira fi ahd al-Malik Abd al Aziz,
Awakening,
Arab
The
pp.
Antonius,
pp. 219-220
52There was a concern that Ottoman propaganda could incite a jihad (holy war) against the
British in the Middle East. To counter that possibility it was thought wise to strengthen
British relations with Arab rulers. See Busch, Britain, India and the Arabs: 1914-1921, p. 8.
53Silverfarb, Daniel, The Anglo-Najd Treaty of 1915', Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 16, No. 3,
Oct. 1980. See also Philby, Arabian Jubilee,pp. 42-43.
54'Relations with Ibn Saud', Arab Bureau Report, January 12,1917, IOR L/ P&S/ 18/ B251.
pp. 193-194. According to George Antonius,
See also Winstone, Captain Shakespeare,

122

ABEDIN-FOUR

the
of
seriousness with which the offer was
unsure
was
and
assistance
been
had
Porte
An
the
agreed
already
with
and Ibn Saud
alliance
made.
British
friendship.
this
taking
offer
uncertain
of
was wary of
Despite the lack of agreement, Shakespeare remained with Ibn Saud
he
be
55
Though
to
the most travelled official in
was reputed
as an observer.
Arabia at the time and an expert on the tribes of central and eastern Arabia,
it is not clear how well Shakespeare understood

the people he was

his
belief
in
know.
A
it
for
that
to
the
case
point
was
was
possible
reported
various
unified-in

political

and tribal

interests in the Arabian

peninsula

to be

This
"confederation
or
alliance".
group would consist of Ibn
a

Saud, Imam Yahya and Sheikh Idriss of Yemen, Sharif Hussein of Mecca
Hijaz.
It
is
Sha'alan
the
that
ibn
northwest
surprising
of
such a welland
believe
that such an alliance could be
travelled official could actually
Office
Captain's
Foreign
A
the
official
who
reviewed
report
created.
"experience
despite
Shakespeare's
that
reputed
and authority"
commented
the
that
Arabian
sceptical
official
was
any such union could
matters,
on
s6
take
place.
conceivably
It was clear that the Captain admired Ibn Saud. But he did not know
His
beduin
Arab
as
well.
chief
nearly
relationships
with
other
other
any
leaders were not as extensive nor as personal. Shakespeare was made to
believe that he was privy to Ibn Saud's deepest thoughts and concerns.
Indeed the Saudi ruler revealed to him confidential correspondence with
In
Arab
Captain
time,
the
Porte
rulers.
came to identify the
and other
the
foreign
British
the
Ibn
Saud
policy
with
success
of
of
and
objectives
Ottoman
in
Arabia
57
the
policies
of
overhaul
requiring
Even though for much of the his stay in Arabia, Britain rarely if ever
came through

with

Ibn Saud's requests, the relationship

few
'foreigners'
Shakespeare
the
one
of
was
men endured.

between the two

who had earned

[Ibn
his
Saud's]
"to
try
and
secure
cooperation in the cause of the
Shakespearewas sent
Allies". Antonius, TheArabAwakening,p. 161.

w Philby, Arabian jubilee, p. 40.

Foreign
Office
handwritten
officials attached to the dispatch
minutes
of
56See
Shakespeare to Hirtzel, 26 June 1914, FO 371/2124 #28966, p. 80.

of

123

ABEDIN-FOUR

his way into the close circle around the Saudi amir. He travelled, ate and
joked with

Ibn Saud and his men; proffering

understanding

advice, information

and

about the outside world, particularly Europe. 58Often after

the end of a meal, the Captain was asked to stay behind, along with
Abdullah ibn Jiluwi, the amir's cousin, and the three of them would discuss
the most pressing issues in private. Yet there was another side to this
Shakespeare
into
By
Ibn
Saud
hoped
taking
to
confidence
well.
as
closeness
him
Britain's
through
Shakespeare's
trust,
and
respect and assistance.
gain
Ibn Saud once remarked in friendly exuberance "my trust is first in God
59
0
Shakespeare"
then
you,
and
In return, Shakespeare held Ibn Saud in high regard. The Najdi ruler
hospitality
his
for
was praised

and openness-which

was deemed to

indicate the respect with which Ibn Saud held Britain. Shakespeare hoped
Najd
to
his
assistance
would
provide
and thus see British
that
superiors
Captain's
In
Ibn
Saud
the
assessment
achieved.
simply
policy objectives
lands,
be
left
his
to
to
the
ancestral
alone and administer
rule
right
sought
Islamic law "in the old time honoured way". If fully recognised as the ruler
Saud's
Ibn
him
in
Shakespeare
Najd,
of
was
sure
contentment,
seeing
no
of
desire to become Caliph or ruler of Arabia. The Captain assured His
Majesty's Government that: "I do not think that he (Ibn Saud) would ever
himself
Sultan
Arabia"
60
to
up
as
of
set
all
campaign
a
on
embark
.
Robert Lacey argues that Shakespeare and Ibn Saud had the
"makings

have
fine
that
team",
one
could
gone on to greater conquests
of a

for Britain. 61 Shakespeare's

been influenced
in marked

own understanding

by his perception

contrast

of the nobility

to the opulence and corrupt

desire to re-claim his hereditary

Saud's
Ibn
court.
respectable

legitimate
and

goals to the English

of Arabia

seems to have

of desert life which stood

intrigue

in the Ottoman

rights seemed perfectly

Captain.

57Shakespeareto Hirtzel, 26June1914,FO 371/2124#28966,pp.80-82.

Shakespeare's

Shakespeare
29,1878
October
was also around the same age as Abdul Aziz Ibn
S8Born on
Saud whose year of birth has been variously stated as between 1876 to 1880.
pp. 20-21.
S9Comment by Ibn Saud cited in Winstone, Captain Shakespeare
60Shakespeare to Hirtzel, June 27,1914, PRO FO 371/2124 #28966.

124

ABEDTN-FOUR

deficiency
his
Ottoman
and
military
estimate of the need for
assessment of
in
divisions
Arabia
least
to
two
maintain
order
central
was perhaps more
at
Saud
did
his
Ibn
have
large territorial
that
than
assertion
not
accurate
durability
However,
the
ambitions.

of the relationship between the two

Shakespeare
be
killed
Jarrab
January
in
tested.
1915
was
at
not
could
men
during a battle between Ibn Saud's forces and the Al-Rashid 62
Several authors have noted the closeness of the British agent and the
Najdi ruler-making

the point that no other British official was as trusted

by Ibn Saud as Shakespeare and none was sent to replace him. Philby
death
Shakespeare,
Najdi
forces
largely
the
that
of
after
withdrew
noted
from open engagements and that Ibn Saud

was left to sulk in his tents,

Arabia
in
him
developments
to a position of
of
other
parts
reduced
while
relative

insignificance

as a factor in Arabian politics" 63 According

to

Gilbert Clayton, this retreat was seen as a sign of weakness. Ibn Saud was
"abandoned
having
Allied
to
the
all
attempts
support
of
campaign
accused
later
However,
in
64
Turks".
it
be
this
the
chapter
will
shown that in
against
fact Ibn Saud maintained an active role and that British officials were still
keen to maintain the relationship.
The

period

following

Shakespeare's

death

was

extremely

had
Ajman
The
Ibn
Saud
tribesman,
who
the battle of
cost
challenging.
Jarrab, joined forces with the al-Murrah and with cousins of Ibn Saud (the
him
in
1910)
in
that
against
rebelled
open revolt, casting alsame group
61Lacey, The Kingdom, p. 118
62Shakespearewas killed when supposed allies of Ibn Saud, the Ajman tribe, abandoned
flank
This
to the attacking Al-Rashid. Readily
a
vulnerable
exposed
their positions.
distinguishable in his English Captain's uniform, Shakespeare was an easy target. The
Ajman were a weak link. Though at one time supporters of Ibn Saud, since the take over of
discontented elements among the tribe. Heavy taxes
1913
in
there
were
many
al-Hasa
had been prohibited from extracting tolls from
they
them
levied
and
upon
were
passing
The
been
Ajman's
had
their
custom.
rocky relationship with Ibn Saud is
as
caravans
detailed by A. S. Al-Uthaiymeen, in Tarikh al-Mamlakah al-Arabiya al-Suudiyyah, (the History
Arabia) Vol. II, Riyadh: Dar al-Obaykan, 1416 (1996), p. 151. Also
Saudi
Kingdom
of
the
of
Philby, Saudi Arabia, pp. 271-272. Robert Lacey provides details of Shakespeare's death,
based on interviews conducted in 1979, with survivors of the battle. See Lacey, The
Kingdom, pp. 116-117.
63Philby, Saudi Arabia, p. 272. Although Philby himself later noted that Ibn Saud "lost no
for
the appointment of another officer to take Shakespeare's place", Philby,
in
time
asking
Arabian jubilee, pp. 41-42.

125

ABEDIN-FOUR

Hasa once again into turmoil 65 This succeeded in placing a severe strain on
the resources and energy of Ibn Saud. Despite the death of Shakespeare,
Percy Cox, still felt it necessary to pursue an agreement with Ibn Saud. He
himself
in
December
Saud
1915
Darin.
Ibn
the
to
at
port
of
meet
arranged

Anglo-Saudi Alliance: The 1915 Treaty of Darin

Percy Cox met with Ibn Saud at Darin on the island of Tarut in the Gulf, on
26 December, 1915.66Cox had specific concerns over the type of British
long
in
Saud
Ibn
the
term.
that
request-particularly
would
guarantees
There was also uncertainty over the durability of the Saudi dynasty. With
Arabia,
in
Cox
could not allow Britain
situation
the ever-changing political
defending
future
to
territory that
become
any
existing
and
to
committed
Ibn Saud might claim as his. Although neighbouring Kuwait and Bahrain
had long established their independence, along the rest of the Gulf coast
demarcations
Defining
the
exact
of Saudi territory
things were not as clear.
be
to
was
unlikely
take
reached quickly.
some negotiation and
would
Ibn Saud for his part, hoped for an indication of Britain's level of
commitment

to his protection. More specifically, he desired Britain to

hoped to include in his empire in the futurehe

that
territories
recognise
force.
by
did
He
he
intended
be
to
limited
to
that
capture
not
wish
territory
him.
Ironically,
imposed
led
that
this
to a
upon
was
to a static area
desired
Saud
final
Cox
Ibn
border
nor
a
neither
settlement.
situation where
In the end, Britain simply chose to acknowledge those territories which Ibn
Qatif
Najd,
Jubail.
The issue of other
time;
held
the
al-Hasa,
and
Saud
at
hoped
include
be
Saud
later.
Ibn
to
Thus
would
resolved
which
areas
Article I of the Treaty of Darin stated:

'4Clayton, An Arabian Diary, p. 23

harsh
to
the
rule of the amir of the province, Abdullah
this
a
response
partly
Though
65
was
having
local
to relinquish their authority to the
the
at
of
chiefs
anger
ibn Jiluwi, and partly
Ibn Saud' Arab Bureau Report, January 12,
'Relations
Saudi
with
polity.
ever expanding
1917, IOR L/P&S/18/B251.
26,1915,
PRO
Treaty,
December
FO 371/2769 #38086. For Saudi
Anglo-Saudi
66Report on
fi
Abd
Shibh
Aziz, p. 285.
Zirkili,
ahd
al-Malik
al-jazira
al
see
perspective

126

ABEDIN-FOUR

The British Government do acknowledge and admit that

Najd, Al-Hasa, Qatif and Jubail, and their dependencies and
territories, which will be discussed and determined hereafter
and their ports on the shores of the Persian Gulf are the
countries of Bin Saud and of his fathers before him, and do
hereby recognise the said Bin Saud as the independent Ruler
thereof and absolute chief of their tribes, and after him his
by
descendants
inheritance; but the selection of the
son and
individual shall be in accordance with the nomination (i. e., by
the living Ruler) of his successor; but with the proviso that he
shall not be a person antagonistic to the British Government
in any respect 67
However, this was not the most contentious issue. Article II of the treaty
difficulty.
created more
was an unprovoked

Britain wanted to come to Saudi aid only if there

attack by a foreign power-which

was intended to

Ibn
Saud,
However,
liberal
European
powers.
sought
a
more
mean other
definition of 'foreign power' to include his local rivals like Sharif Hussein.
Cox would not agree. Since there was no third party to the Treaty of
Darin-they

in
it
interpret
their own way. Indeed Britain could claim
could

that it would respond in the manner it "may consider most effective".

Furthermore,

Cox

was

determined

to

restrict

Ibn

Saud's

his
in
Gulf.
Article
the
VI
neighbours
upon
specifically
encroachment
from
"aggression
Saud
interference
Ibn
on,
or
with, the
prohibited
Qatar
Oman
Bahrain,
Coast, or other tribes and
Kuwait,
and
territories of
Chiefs who are under the protection of the British Government, and the
limits of whose territories shall be hereafter determined". 68 This only
Saud
Ibn
Trucial
the
to
who
regarded
many
of
annoy
chiefs as
served
fact
In
towns
Ibn
separate
of
sovereigns
political
not
entities.
mere
of
rulers
Saud suggested an alternative wording to reflect his views. He claimed a
Gulf
basis
the
the
the
By
of
on
shores
eastern
of
of
ancestral
part
rule.
great
deny
fixed
the
to
Ibn
territories
Saud
the
existence
of
wording
changing
feelings
his
importance
least
that
the
Gulf
own
satisfy
of
rulers
could at
diminished.
was
67Article I, Anglo-Saudi Treaty of Darin, December 26,1915, in PRO FO 371/2769 #38086.

127

ABEDIN-FOUR

Cox agreed to the alteration of Article VI which stated that Ibn Saud
interference
from
"all
on,
or
with, the territories
aggression
was prohibited
Sheikhs
Qatar
Oman
Coast,
Bahrain
the
Kuwait,
of
of
and
and
who are
of
Government
British
limits
the
the
their
the
of
and
of
protection
under
territories shall be hereafter determined. "69 The changes prohibited attacks
on individual

forcing
Saud
Ibn
to concede any claims to
rulers without

Qatar or Oman. On the issue of succession, Ibn Saud stated that he would
have
himself
or
a semi-public selection process.
either appoint a successor
kingship
inherited
Cox preferred
which would
reduce the
an
unpredictability

doubt
70
leader.
No
Ibn Saud appreciated this
of an elected

decision since it guaranteed his sons a role in future power.

The agreement with Great Britain provided

Ibn Saud with some

insurance against an Ottoman attack. But also he also required financial

Ottoman-backed
forces
in
Althe
to
the
repel
order
of
aid
and material
Rashid. With Rashidi encouragement the Ajman had stepped up their
Treaty
Darin
forces.
Under
Ibn
Saud
the
the
terms
Saudi
of
of
attacks on
1000 rifles and 200,000 rounds of
20,000
loaned
be
receive
and
to
was
immediate use and throughout the
to
The
put
were
arms
ammunition.
Al-Rashid
Ajman
fierce.
the
At
1915-1916
clashes
with
and
were
winter of
himself
Cox
Saud
"slight
Ibn
which
wounded,
was
reported
as
a
one point
flesh wound". But in the same battle Ibn Saud lost his full brother, Sa'ad
him.
n
further,
To
than
complicate
matters
relations with
who was younger
death
his
following
the
of
old mentor, Mubarak al-Sabah
Kuwait worsened
The
1915.
new ruler gave refuge to the rebellious Ajman and
December
in
do
by
Ibn
Saud.
72
to
them
so
asked
to
when
expel
refused
in
Wilkinson,
Treaty,
Arabia's Frontiers, p. 138.
Anglo-Saudi
VI
Article
cited
of
8Draft of
in
Saudi
Treaty,
PRO
VI,
FO
Anglo
371/2769 #38086
Article
69Final version of
January
India,
Government
10,1916,
PRO FO 371/2769
the
Secretary
to
of
"Foreign
#41504.
British
had
that
the
Cox
officials
concern
over attitudes of Arabian
showed
7lIbid.
also
the Caliphate issue. He confidently reported that in Arabia "the
towards
chieftains
for the tribes or their chiefs".
interest
has
Caliphate
serious
the
no
question of
desert
been
force
have
tradition
to
it
against
out those that had sought
would
nThough
decision
fuelled
to
Ajman
the
the
in
Kuwait.
to
allow
envy
and
remain
mistrust
protection,
Kuwait:
History
1750-1965,
Modern
The
of
pp. 132-133. Although Abu
Abu-Hakima,
See

128

ABEDIN-FOUR

British Intelligence and Ibn Saud

The revolt of the Ajman and the successesof the Al-Rashid raised concerns
Saud's
War
Office,
Ibn
The
in
the
regime.
of
particular,
permanence
about
Saud
Ibn
in
John
Keyes,
the
the
to
of
war
usefulness
effort.
evaluate
wished
Najdi
As
Intelligence
to
the
Military
sent
was
report
on
ruler.
officer,
with
a
Shakespeare and Cox before him Keyes was impressed by Ibn Saud's
"loathing

of the Turk"

and his intense "patriotism"

which drove his

it
to
that
Keyes
the
was
realise
quick
anti-Ottoman
was
conquests.
his
having
do
"the
73
to
that
of
anything
only
cause
with
us".
was
sentiment
Keyes spent a much shorter period with Ibn Saud than Shakespeare
by
impressed
Saudi
forces:
the
reported
skills
of
and was not particularly
I don't think he [Ibn Saud] has much power of military
field.
in
His
the
tribesmen are
capacity
or
much
organisation
lot;
both
his
in
independent
and
recent defeats, being
a ruly
the party of law and order, their hearts were not in it, while
the enemy on both occasions had their women with them,
Arabs
74
that
they
means
were
all
with
out
which,
favourable
Shakespeare
the
to
in
reports
This was
contrast
marked
used to

Ibn
Keyes
Saud's
London.
sceptical
of
was
to
supposed great
send
leadership and military skill. In reports Keyes obtained from local sources
little stock was given to the Najdi dynasty. 75
In direct meetings with Ibn Saud, Keyes found the amir a man of
kindness".
he
But
did
and
"extraordinary patience
not let the amir's charm
his
Keyes
Ibn Saud "would play
that
hospitality
realised
analysis.
alter
and
because
it
British
help
Ottoman
that
only
with
was
us"
with
the game
Salim
it
that
al-Sabah that granted the Ajman refuge it was actually
was
Hakima claims
See
Al-Uthaiymeen,
did
Tarikh
also
so.
who
son,
al-Mamlakah al-Arabiya
Jabir, the elder
152. The general situation around the 1915 Treaty is discussed in
Vol-II,
p.
alSuudiyyah,
152.
Treaty
1915',
Anglo-Najd
'The
of
p.
Silverfarb,
War
in
Intelligence,
Office
Military
to Foreign Office, January 10,
Director
of
73Report of
from
J.
Keyes
includes
#38981;
371/2769
to Lt. Colonel Mark Sykes of
FO
report
PRO
1916,
Military Intelligence.
74Ibid.
in
War
Office
Intelligence,
Military
Foreign
to
Office, January 10,
Director
of
75Report of
from
J.
Keyes
includes
#38981;
Lt.
Colonel Mark Sykes of
371/2769
to
FO
report
PRO
1916,
Military Intelligence.

129

ABEDIN-FOUR

domination could be ended. The fact was not lost upon the British officer
that if it became beneficial to the amir's interest to discard his relations
do
Keyes
While
"flirting
he
the
Britain
tactic
so.
saw
of
would
with

with

he
Rashid
Bin
him"
Sharif
wherever
can
the
get
at
and punching

as

did
Ibn
Saud
leader
he
in
the
not
consider
a
great
plainly
understandable,
Keyes
British
Najdi
the
of
years
past.
was
one
of
rare
rulers
as
same vein
did
Arabia
let
hospitality
through
the
travelled
who
not
officials who

of

Ibn Saud deflect his ability to criticise Saudi capabilities. He differentiated

between the charming and sociable host and the rag tag capabilities of the
loosely knit fighting forces at the amir's disposal. 76
Keyes' reports were important in reinforcing the view that Hussein
Arab
leaders,
despite
being
back,
lively
that
to
other
and
the
one
was
involved
in
tribal
time
operators,
squabbles and
small
were
characters,
having
Only
Hussein
the
was
viewed
as
religious
convenience.
of
alliances
the
military
and
pedigree

capability to offer significant assistance to the

leader
limited
Saud
the
Ibn
of
a
small
sect
of
puritans
was
with
war effort.
77
Muslim
in
the
world.
wider
appeal
While Keyes gathered reports for London on his Arabian travels,
for
his
immediate
General
Maude, the
did
Cox
the
superior,
Percy
same
British

Army

Commander

for

Mesopotamia.

Cox

had

to procure

debrief
informers,
spies and interview prisoners. The time
interpreters and
for
tribal
in
the purpose
chiefs
and
with
notables
was
Cox spent
meetings
local rivalries and tribal
intelligence
understanding
on,
and
of,
of gathering
important
latter
British
interests, as
This
to
extremely
was
role
histories.
lack
78
of
understanding
about
such
acknowledged
matters.
there was an
With his energies strained Cox sent a request in July 1916, to the Foreign
76Ibid.
77There were differences of opinion among officials as to who was the more useful leader
Govt.
felt
Egyptian
FO
that Hussein had the better
interests.
officials
and
for British
be
lower
Saud
Ibn
to
in nobility and influence.
considered
was
while
lineage and prestige,
Gulf
Saud
the
threat
to
Ibn
coast and Iraqi security and had to be
a
was
To Indian officials
believed
it
Hijazi
to
But
they
steer
clear
prudent
of
politics and not upset
dealt with.
Britain's
Moment
Monroe,
in
Elizabeth
See
the Middle East: 1914-1971,
Muslim subjects.
Westrate,
33-35
The
Arab
1981,
Windus,
Bureau,
&
Chatto
and
pp.
p. 116.
London:
Cox,
225.
Percy
Sir
Life
p.
Graves,
of
78

130

ABEDIN-FOUR

Department of the Government of India, to dispatch an assistant who could

financial
be
The
function
to
temporary
officer.
man
who
was
sent
as a
also
Philby.
John
St.
Harry
was
The attempts that were being made by Keyes, Cox and other British
Government officials to asses the role leaders such as Ibn Saud could play
in the war effort, were partly the result of pressure mounted following the
fateful campaigns in Gallipoli

and Mesopotamia.

It was hoped that

involving Arab rulers would divert Ottoman resources away from British
lines as well as maintain stability in Arabia by playing off Arab chiefs
McMahon,
British
Henry
High
Sir
Commissioner
in
other.
each
against
Egypt entered into correspondence with Sharif Hussein of Mecca between
July 1915 and February 1916 in order to obtain the latter's co-operation in
the fight against the 'Turks'.

Hussein was manoeuvring to obtain his own

independence and unlike Ibn Saud had openly declared an interest in

being the ruler of all Arabs.

McMahon however, did not wish to be too specific about British

Negotiations
France
for
Hussein
the
after
war.
with
about the
support
desire
Anglo-French
there
were
ongoing
co-operation
and
was
no
of
nature
by
discussions
those
making early promises to Hussein. At the
to prejudice
for
diversion
in
Arabia
there
need
a
to take
time,
a
military
was
same
Gallipoli.
McMahon
in
British
gave
pledges
of
soldiers
off
support
pressure
for
his
in
Hussein
assistance in the fight against Istanbul. Yet
for
return
been
has
there
the
time
controversy
over
that
nature of those
since
McMahons
letters. 79 However it is
interpretations
of
and
assurances
beyond the scope of this thesis to engage in the discussion of the Hussein80
McMahon correspondence.
Graffety-Smith,
Lawrence
because the original Arabic
argues
79Matters were complicated,
letters
Hussein
McMahon's
to
be
found
controversial
in
most
of
could
one
not
of
version
disabuse
difficult
it
Sharif's
to
the
Jeddah
Cairo
making
or
misinterpretations at the
either
October
24,1915,
letter
McMahon-Hussein
See
of
cited and commented on by
time.
24
At
time
Graffety-Smith
the
the
Graffety-Smith.
year
old
Lawrence
was a newly
Agency
in
Jeddah.
See
British
Lawrence
the
Graffety-Smith,
Bright
at
official
appointed
Levant, London: John Murray, 1970, pp. 154-156.
briefly
has
touched on the correspondence but for a more in depth
only
so This author
Labyrinth:
In
Anglo-Arab
The
McMahon-Husayn
Kedourie,
the
Correspondence
Elie
see
study

ABEDIN-FOUR

131

In any case, no official agreement between McMahon and Hussein

Sharif
from
did
having grandiose ambitions
This
the
prevent
not
occurred.
becoming
Arabs-with
dreams
the
of
ruler
all
of
and

British help. Indeed

financial and material encouragement came from the Foreign Office and
the 'Arab Bureau' based in Cairo. 81However, McMahon's deputy Ronald
Storrs did not believe Hussein exerted as much influence in the Arab world
North
Who
in
Africa,
Egypt,
Yemen
Sharif
thought.
the
or Eastern Arabia
as
'king'
Hussein
leader
their
Arabs?.
82
the
as
alone
as
of
all
would recognise
-let
Nevertheless, British officials in Egypt with encouragement from London
felt they had to support Hussein as much as possible. When they started in
November 1914 it could not have been realised how much money, and
have
be
how
into
to
Hussein's
would
many
promises
or
poured
weaponry,
cause.
In June 1916 Hussein organised an uprising against the Ottoman
administration-that

be
to
came
called the 'Great Arab Revolt'. 83Having

Cambridge:
Cambridge
Univ.
1914-1939,
Press, 1976. Also Antonius,
Interpretations
its
and
The Arab Awakeneing, especially Chapter 9; and Isaiah Friedman, Palestine:A Twice Promised
Land?, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2000.
81The purpose of the Bureau was to gather and analyse intelligence on the Arabs and to
keep the various British agencies "simultaneously informed on the general tendency of
German and Turkish policy" regarding the region, 'Report of Committee of Imperial
Defence', January 7,1916, PRO FO 882/2, ARB/16/4, cited by Westrate, The Arab Bureau,
p. 31, fn 42.
87,Storrs wrote: "When in addition we reflected that 90 per cent of the Moslem World must
Vicar
God
the
traitor
to
Husain
and
of
we could not conceal from ourselves
a renegade
call
(and with difficulty from him) that his pretensions bordered upon the tragi-comic. " Ronald
Storrs, The Memoirs of Sir Ronald Storrs, New York: G.P.Putnam, 1937, p. 168. This is the
American version of his famed book Orientations. Storrs also commented on the problems
language: "Our Arabic correspondence with Mecca was prepared by
and
translations
of
Ruhi, a fair though not profound Arabist (and a better agent than scholar); and checked,
had
by
I
Deputy,
Staff
high
no
myself.
pressure
or office, so that during my
often under
(better
by
the
but
work
carried
on
was
perhaps)
the continuity
mission
others
on
absence
letters on the other hand were written in an obscure and tortuous prose
Husain's
lost.
was
in which the purity of the Hejaz Arabic was overlaid and tainted with Turkish idioms and
Sir Ronald Storrs, p. 168.
Memoirs
The
Storrs,
of
syntax".
detail
in
the ambitions and motivations behind Hussein's
Many
cover
93
works already
'Arab Revolt' of 1916; See Efraim Karsh and Inari Karsh, Empires of the Sand:the Struggle for
Mastery in the Middle East 1789-1923, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999,
Inari
Karsh,
'Myth
Efraim
Karsh
13;
in
Desert,
the
Not
and
the Great
chapter
or
especially
Arab Revolt' in Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 33, no. 2, (April 1997), pp. 267-312; and Elie
Kedourie, England and the Middle East: the Destruction of the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1921,
Boulder: Westview Press, 1987, p. 35. Also Sylvia Haim, Arab Nationalism, Los Angeles:
Nationalism,
Arab
34-53;
Tibi,
Bassam
1962,
New York: St.Martins Press,
Press,
pp.
UCLA
Arab
The
Awakening, pp. 184-200; Winstone, The Illicit
Antonius,
George
21;
1990, p.

132

ABEDIN-FOUR

he
Mecca,
his
beyond
to
taken
was
unable
over
project
power
successfully
the city. Ottoman forces were quickly reinforced through the DamascusMedina railway. The speed of the Ottoman reaction threatened to end
Hussein 's challenge. The Arab Bureau Chief, David Hogarth, was forced to
into
Hussein's
and
money
venture. Hogarth's
supplies
more

plough

helped
E.
Lawrence
Hijazi
fight
famous
T.
train
the
to
the
rebels
an
protege
irregular war against Ottoman forces-a strategy that went against the
tactics traditionally

forces.
by
Using money, gold and weapons
British
used

Lawrence was able to entice, cajole and purchase beduin loyalties.

At the same time Hogarth did not want Hussein to become too
powerful.

It was important

to maintain a balance of power in Arabia

between Hussein, Ibn Saud and the Al-Rashid. Hogarth preferred to see
have
for
"in
to
leader
the
as
a
a
position
wholesome
such
respect
each
Arabia
For
to
r
the
the
of
controlling
was
essence
prevent
coming
other".
leaders
Britain.
This
Arab
the
against
was also the view
various
together of
Wingate,
Governor-General
Sir
Reginald
the
Hogarth's
the
of
superior,
of
Sudan. Wingate was keen to channel all support to Hussein and avoid
providing

Saud.
Ibn
85
He
believed
to
British
also
encouragement
any

interests were best served by preserving Hussein as the custodian of the

Hijaz and the holy cities.
This was seemingly consistent with the policy advocated by the
Secretary of State for India, Lord Crewe:
What we want is not a United Arabia; but a weak and
disunited Arabia, split up into little principalities so far as
Moment
in
Britain's
Monroe,
the Middle East, pp. 31-37 and Storrs,
256-268;
Adventure, pp.
Ottoman
For,
Storrs,
177-201.
Ronald
an
pp.
perspective on the Revolt and
Memoirs of
Kayali,
Arabs
Young
Hasan
Turks:
Ottomanism, Arabism and
and
see
Turkish-Hijaz relations
Los
Angeles:
UCLA
Empire,
1908-1918,
Press,
Ottoman
1997, pp. 196-200.
in
the
Islamism
FO
882/8.
PRO
31,1917,
IS/17/34,
December
in Westrate Arab Bureau,
Hogarth
84
note,
p. 119
FO,
Wingate
December
to
Reginald
28,1917,
PRO,
85Report
of
believed
Wingate
Ibn
Saud
that
exaggerated the threat
FO/371/3056/244770/99430.
Not only had Wingate supported Hussein and his revolt but he
Al-Rashid.
by
the
posed
Ottomans.
Major Reilly was dispatched to the
the
for
looked
against
supporters
other
also
25,000
Arabia
local
to
the
in
Sheikh
Idriss
Asir
entice
join
with
to
southern
ruler
of
region
Major
Reilly
See
'Report
Turks.
Visit
the
to Sheikh Idriss, PRO FO
of
the revolt against
371/3056/238536.

133

ABEDIN-FOUR

incapable of coordinated
possible under our suzerainty-but
forming
buffer
in
the
us,
a
against
against
powers
action
west. 86
However, the Indian Government was deeply disturbed by the cavalier
(backed
Bureau
by
Arab
Foreign
Office)
the
the
which
with
attitude
have
Cairo
for
Arabian
to
the
officials
seemed
no
regard
policy.
conducted
adverse

effects

of

its

policies

on

Indian

political

interests.

The

his
Hussein
Muslim
to
against
revolt
suzerain would
of
encouragement
Muslim
hostility
the
in
among
suspicion
millions
of
and
subjects
only cause
India. Massive unrest in the towns and villages could result. The Indian
Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, was concerned that Arab Bureau support for
Sharif Hussein would be detrimental to the morale and affect the loyalty of
Muslim troops serving in the British Indian Army. 87
This tension between Indian and Egyptian officials was due to the
British
among
various
policy
administrations
absence of co-ordinated

and

in
Cairo
did
Officials
information
lack
sharing.
not realise the extent
the
of
did
Saud
Ibn
to
they
India
the
nor
giving
consider
was
effects of
of support
Hijaz-Najd conflict on British interests in the Persian Gulf. Ronald Storrs

noted that:
So far as we were concerned it seemed to be nobody's
business to harmonise the various views and policies of the
Foreign Office, the India Office, the Admiralty, the War
Office, the Government of India and the Residency in
Egypt. 88

for
British
Hussein's revolt as
support
Saud
saw
Ibn
meanwhile
prejudicing

his own position, and felt that Britain might expect him to

future.
in
He had spent much energy in
Sharif's
the
authority
to
submit
his own revolt of the Ajman tribe. Now, he sought
down
putting
clarification

from

Cox as to his position

in relation

to the British

Viceroy
Hardinge,
India,
November
to
telegram
12,1914, cited in
of
Crewe
86
private
62.
Arabs:
1914-1921,
the
India
p.
Britain,
and
Busch
Viceroy
India
Hardinge
in
1916, see Graves, Life of Percy Cox,
of
as
$7Chelsmford succeeded
80-81,117.
Arab
Bureau,
The
Westrate
pp.
p. 205. and

134

ABEDIN-FOUR

Government. A meeting was arranged for the two in November in the port
town of Uqair. The amir explained to Cox the strain on his resources and
that the trade of his people had suffered as a result of fighting

the Al-

Rashid. Although Cox gave assurances of British support he could not give
him honest advice. Cox hoped Ibn Saud would be more active in battle so
that his superiors would be convinced of the Saudi leaders' value. He could
Government
because
India
the
this
of
was averse to
not encourage
financing Ibn Saud's adventures nor did they want to encourage the Saudi
leader out of fear of him making aggressive moves on Hejaz. Also Hogarth
Wingate
and

at the Arab

Bureau had

philosophical

aversions

to

Wahhabism and did not want to see it spread. 89

Cox attempted to placate the amir by presenting him with the order
(KCIE).
Indian
Empire
It
have
Cross
the
Knights
to
the
seemed
of
the
of
desired effect since in his speech after receiving the award, Ibn Saud
denounced
Arabs
for
for
Porte
the
trying
to
the
Britain
unite
and
praised
its efforts to weaken and divide. He even managed to pay tribute to Sharif
Hussein for his part in the fight against the Ottoman oppressors. Ibn Saud's
final act was to pledge to cooperate with the Allied war effort. 90

Harry St. John Philby

By late 1917, the British position in the war was uncertain. Russia had
internal
that
the
the
year
with
change
overthrow
of
czar
great
undergone
her
Bolshevik
to
the
which
made
revolution,
commitment
the
war
and
Arab revolt had not been a resounding success, the
The
precarious.
between
Medina
in
Ibn Saud and
and
relations
Ottomans were still
lead
to hostilities breaking out. The
Hussein were at a stage which could
brought
for
Harry
St.John Philby to the
had
Cox
assistant
an
made
request

Storrs,
168.
Sir
Ronald
Memoirs
The
p.
of
Storrs,
88
January
Report,
Bureau
Saud'
Arab
12,1917, IOR L/P&S/18/B251.
Ibn
89'Relations with
Westrate,
The
Cox,
213-214;
Arab
Percy
Bureau, p. 118-119; Busch,
Life
Graves,
pp.
of
90See
245.
Arabs,
the
India
p.
Britain,
and

135

ABEDIN-FOUR

Gulf. Cox entrusted Philby to lead a mission to Ibn Saud in order to

more
Ibn
Rashid.
91
to
take
the
role
against
a
active
amir
encourage
The meeting between these two men was to start a relationship that
Cambridge
had,
decades.
Philby
to
three
educated
according
span
would
Howarth, a "heightened sense of his own opinion". 92 Indeed Philby
quarrelled

furiously

with

superiors

and

subordinates

alike

(his

disagreement with his deputy, Colonel Hamilton, was so great that the
latter left Riyadh within a week after arrival). Yet Philby had developed a
deep interest in the Saudi amir. Whether it was Ibn Saud's personality, or
beduin hospitality, Philby believed he had found a far more capable leader
his
Sharif
Hussein.
to
than
people,
connected
more
and one who was
Philby also found great interest in the genealogy of tribes, particularly of
hours
learning
He
family.
the
Al-Saud
with
spent
amir,
about the
the
history
Arabian
93
Saudi
the
the
and
of
peninsula
predecessors
exploits of
This was the beginning of Philby's indulgence in his personal
interests which often came at the expense of his instructions from Coxinstructions that called for action. It was important at that stage in the war
for Ibn Rashid to be distracted from the right flank of Lawrence and the
fighting
Hijaz.
The
their
the
Al-Rashid
Hussein
way
were
up
who
troops of
had been a nuisance in Mesopotamia and were involved in the smuggling
Ottoman
the
British
territory,
into
the
reducing
effectiveness
of
of arms
Ibn
Saud
instructed
20,000 to purchase
to
Philby
offer
was
blockade.
four
field
be launched
that
1,000
guns
so
an
and
assault
could
rifles
camels,
94
Rashidi
Hail,
the
capital.
on
The final deal was to be negotiated by Sir Ronald Storrs who was to
Sharif
Hussein
however,
from
95
Hijaz.
Riyadh
not wishing to see
journey to
by
Philby
later
Heart
as,
published
of Arabia, Vols. 1&2, London:
were
91The experiences
Wahhabis,
Arabia
Philby,
the
London: Frank Cass 1977.
1922,
Co.
&
of
and
also
Constable
Also
McLoughlin,
Ibn
Saud,
King,
102.
54
Desert
The
p.
p.
92Howarth,
Faber,
Faber
1973.
London:
Arabia,
Philby
and
of
93Monroe,
January
Report,
Bureau
Saud',
Arab
12,1917,
Ibn
IOR
L/P&S/18/B251.
with
'Relations
94
Arabs:
India
1914-1921,
250-255.
the
Britain,
Busch,
and
pp.
See also
for
deceased
the
Captain Shakespeare. He
be
the
to
replacement
as
appointed
95Storrs was
had
but
in
May
heatstroke
the
take
to
suffered
tried
post
up
and was forced to
had already
England
to
to
the
in
Storrs
October
offered
trip
and
make
back.
returned
again
turn

136

ABEDIN-FOUR

let
his
Storrs
Saudi
he
to
benefits
that
to
refused
rival,
go,
claiming
go
any
from
'Wahhabi
fanatics
Ibn
Saud
96
It
the
of
was
safety
could not guaranty
frustrate
Saud
British
Ibn
involved
to
to
attempts
get
more
another attempt
in the war effort. Philby saw this as an opportunity

to explore the desert

interior of Arabia for himself and to make a historic trip from one end of
the Arabian peninsula to the other.
He managed to convince Ibn Saud that he should be allowed to
venture

to Hijaz

back
bring
Storrs, proving
and

the Sharif wrong.

However, Philby was leaving Riyadh with a vital agreement between

Britain and Ibn Saud unsigned. With escorts provided by the amir, Philby
His
humiliated
incident.
Sharif.
Hijaz
the
safe
the
arrival
without
reached
Incensed, Hussein forbade Philby, let alone Storrs, from returning via the
desert. This forced Philby to take a long fortuitous route by ship first to
Cairo then all the way to Bombay where he had to travel back to the Gulf
journey
Riyadh.
It
four
that
took
to
than
a
was
more
then
overland
and
months to complete.
Philby's absence meant that Riyadh was without a British official to
Saud.
Cox
Ibn
Indian
Government
the
the
with
and
agreement
conclude
had been observing the direction of Hijazi campaigns and had not followed
did
Riyadh
They
in
Philby's
Saud.
to
Ibn
anyone
send
not
absence.
up with
had
's
forces
Hussein
achieved successesin their campaign's in
Meanwhile
Ibn Saud was neither needed nor effective. 97
that
Hijaz,
proving
northern
for
Najd
was withdrawn, much to the
The offer of money and guns
Ibn Saud. Contemplating
Philby
to
the
anger
of
and
of
embarrassment

an

been
had
Ibn
Saud,
to
the
but he was not sent.
court
made
of
yet
because no appointment
SSI
Cox
between
the
regarding this period can be found in IOR
and
Correspondence
Arabs:
India
Busch
Britain,
the
1914-1921,
Also
and
p. 248.
L/P&S/10/2182.
Arab
the
Bureau
like
Philby's
Hogarth
officials
261.
annoyed
at
self
righteousness
Ibid,
%
p.
Arab
Bureau
for
disliked
he saw them as inimical to
Philby
the
in
Wingate
return
and
and
Arab
Bureau,
120-121.
The
Westrate,
Saud,
Ibn
pp.
the interests of
January
191918,
IOR
Committee,
L/P&S/18/B280/P337
East
Middle
97Minutes of

ABEDIN-FOUR

137

Ibn
Saud
Hussein,
by
Philby who sent the
was
against
restrained
offensive
deter
Hijaz.
98
to
assault
an
on
amir some gold
Meanwhile, in London, Sharif Hussein had emerged with a positive
Allies,
Ibn
Saud
the
while
supporting
of
appeared uncommitted and
record
less important to British objectives:
As between Hussein and Saud, the choice for our military
policy is simple, and our greatest effort must be to support
the Sherif ...... Ibn Saud on the other hand has secured us
little definite military advantage beyond the moral influence
his
99
alliance.
of
It was sentiments such as these that boosted Hussein's hopes for obtaining
independence and an empire of his own. This was much to the annoyance
India,
Government
the
of
which was concerned that the promotion
of

of

Arab nationalism by the Arab Bureau would inspire similar desires among
its Indian Muslim subjects.100
However as the outcome of the war appeared to favour the Allies
the future of the Arabs was being decided in Europe. British negotiations
Russia
France
to
in
were
well
underway
and
the
create
mandates
with
Ottoman
from
taken
control. Both Lawrence in the west, and
territories
Cox, in the east were occupied by the regional considerations of their
have
been
departments
deals
being
the
not
and
would
aware
of
respective
fact
Cox
In
informed
Sykes-Picot
time.
the
the
was
not
at
of
arranged
later,
despite
fact
the
it
directly
that
year
almost
a
until
would
agreement
Officer
Chief
Political
in
Basra.
101
his
as
position
affect
The Ikhwan and Sharif Hussein
98'Report of Philby Mission to Bin Saud', Philby to Political Agent, Baghdad, December 9,
from
Philby
R/15/2/38.
IOR
gold
used
a special allotment that he had at his
1917,
discretion, Howarth, The Desert King, p. 104.

99'Reporton Ibn Saud',War Office, January21,1918,IOR L/P&S/18/B270/P337.

100Fierce disagreements raged within the Arab Bureau as well as between Bureau and the
Indian Government. Philby was a major annoyance to all because he refused to bring Ibn
Saud into line with what Hogarth wanted, which was to prevent attacks on the Al-Rashid
keep
Hogarth
the Al-Rashid as counter-weights to both Ibn
to
Ironically
wanted
Hail.
of
leader
Hussein,
that
would become all powerful.
no
one
so
For further
Saud and
discussion of these points see Westrate, TheArab Bureau, pp. 123-133.

ABEDIN-FOUR

138

Sharif Hussein ruled with a firm, autocratic hand. A workaholic

Hussein
his
in
was unwilling
seventies,
even
achieve everything

to admit that he could not

he set out to do. Practicality was secondary to the

102
He
his
taxed pilgrim
whims.
satisfaction of

visitors excessively and

though responsible for their safety left them to be fleeced further by local
Hussein
kickback
tribesmen.
ran
scams at the medical
merchants and
clinics treating pilgrims

and at one time decided to change the entire

Ottoman
the
replacing
currency with his own
overnight,
system
currency
diluted
hang
threatened
to
metal,
and
was
which
anyone who
coinage,
local
beduin
103
He
into
the
to
tried
starve
obedience rather
complained
than pay out vast subsidies by passing a law that prohibited the export of
from
bushels
the
towns
to the countryside on any
than
of
grain
six
more
far
less
This
than
the
day.
minimum
was
one

required

for

daily

by
tribes
the
and settlements outside the town walls 104
consumption
Paranoid about dissent, Hussein had spies throughout Jeddah and

Mecca. He brought great distress to foreign consuls by his flippant

hesitating
to
treaties
agreements
and
not
abrogate parts that
treatment of
he suddenly found unsuitable. He was "damnably despotic". In describing
Hussein's personality Reader Bullard, the British consul called him:
lying,
credulous, suspicious, obstinate, vain,
a cunning,
ignorant,
greedy, cruel Arab sheikh suddenly
conceited,
thrust into a position where he has to deal with all sorts of
doesn't
he
understand and where there is no power
questions
to restrain him, and you have a picture of King Hussein 105
Middle
East,
36.
in
Moment
the
Britain's
p.
1OMonroe,
Hussein
Randall
Baker,
King
Hussein
the
see
of
For
personality
102
and the Kingdom
on
more
Oleander Press, 1979.
York:
New
Hejaz.
of

&
43-45.
11
Kings,
Two
pp.
p.
1O313ullard,

in
Bullard,
November
18,1923
Two
Kings,
Letter
cited
of
204Bullard,
p. 24.
Consular
Service, 5 October 1923, Bullard Papers, St.
Levant
Ryan,
Andrew
to
1OSBullard
VI,
File
5,
in
Oxford,
Box
Lacey The Kingdom, p. 182. However,
College,
cited
Anthony's
in
Bullard
included
the
letter
compilation
of
correspondence, official and
was not
this
Arabia.
One
in
Two
Kings
in
have
been
belief
reason
the
may
published
of the
private,
Bullard's personal attempts to
Hodgkin,
that
C.
E.
candid
views
were
part
such
of
editor,
"let off steam" given the harsh conditions and many frustrations faced in Jeddah. Thus
Hodgkin did not retain some of the more colourful language used by Bullard to describe
"on
Hussain
Sharif
involving
when
the
did
occasions
steam
events
come near
certain
be
felt
"it
Hodgkin
because
would
unfair to Bullard's memory to let it curl
boiling point"
Kings,
Introduction,
Also
Two
See
66
28.
p.
xiii.
p.
and
p.
these
pages".
up

139

ABEDIN-FOUR

The inhabitants of Hijaz had numerous national backgrounds; Afghans,

Indians, Javanese, Malays, Nigerians, Syrians and Turks were among the
for
behind.
Yet
Hussein
the
and
pilgrimage
stayed
came
was
many who
from
he
the
squeeze
could
what
pilgrims and sought more
with
content
not
taxes from the outlying tribes. Among those he was to make demands on
in
between
in
Hijaz
Utayba
the
area
the
wedged
of
al-Qassim,
and
were
Najd.
This strategic region was to play an important role in the careers of
Arabian rulers. Straddling both the interior of Najd and the western Hijaz,
for
into
ground
staging
attacks
valuable
a
either region.
al-Qassim was
Important caravan routes between Hijaz and Kuwait and the Gulf Coast
through
passed
also

this region. Of particular

Khurma
settlements of

importance

were the

and Turaba, made up of several oases, and

inhabited by members of the Utayba, Subay, Buqum and Shakwa tribes,

being
Utayba
In
the
Subay
the
most
the
prominent.
and
nineteenth
with
had
brought
Arabia
locals
into
Saudi
of
western
many
conquests
century
ideals.
106
Muwahkldun
contact with
Philby was however "astonished and bewildered" at the differences
between the local inhabitants and the rest of Najd. He was amazed at the
"open handed hospitality of its people and of its complete freedom from
bigotry.
it
had
I
to
kind
that
or
sectarian
seemed
religious
me
of
any
..
barbarism
into
highly
out
of
a
civilised and even
stepped suddenly
"107
cultured society.
After being re-taken by Ottoman/ Egyptian forces, al-Qassim,
though nominally
providing

independent, was claimed by the Sharif of Mecca. By

judges
several
and
appointing
and other officials to the
subsidies

hoped to strengthen his position. The most significant

Hussein
area
ibn
Luayy,
Khalid
the
Khurma.
his
that
With
as
of
amir
was
of
appointment
felt
his
it
Hussein
to
taxes
from
right
in
was
tribute
claim
and
place,
men
date,
L/P&S/18/B334.
IOR
Arabia',
Centreal
no
106'Note on

ABEDIN-FOUR

140

the town. However,

when Ibn Saud began subsidising

local Ikhwan

settlements, 'teachers' were sent to al-Qassim to instruct

Muwahfddun

people in

principles. Many in Khurma were won over, among them

Khalid ibn Luayy. However, shrewdly, Luayy played it safe and kept his
ties to Hussein. 108Nevertheless, the Sharif learned of the mutinous events
in Kurman and launched an attack on the town to regain his authority. The
finally
broke
Luayy
and
repulsed
with Hussein declaring his
attack was
Ibn
Saud.
Though
the
townspeople,
to
that
the assault
of
and
allegiance,
failed it embittered Hussein ever more against the Najdi ruler. The stage
battle
between
Saud
Ibn
for
Hussein.
and
another
was set
Though Hussein would never meet Ibn Saud, the Sharif did not
have much regard for tribal peoples and considered the Najdi amir a lowly
his
in
British
Consul Bullard
than
own
a
capable
ruler
right.
servant rather
both
Ibn
Saud
to
"could
interacted
that
have
men
was
remark
with
who
Hussein
in
politics and probably equalled him in
completely overthrown
theology,

which

his
of
occupied much
reading and conversation". 109

Hussein was further incited against Ibn Saud for being embarrassed in
Medina. The city was the only Ottoman stronghold which Hussein had
been unable to capture and had been placed under siege. Hoping to starve
Hussein
into
was sure that supplies were being
town
surrender
the
from
Kuwait,
Najd
through
and
via al-Qassim and that Ibn
smuggled
Saud's eldest son, Turki who was in command of the forces that were to
from the east, was the cause.110Also bothering
blockade
the
maintain
Hussein were the many traders involved in blockade busting who were
from towns such as Khurma and Turaba.
Several attempts
Khurma

by
Hussein during
were made

had
been
Turaba
thwarted
which
and

Ikhwan.
the
assistance of

by locals who obtained

Once the war ended Hussein

107Philby, Arabia of theWahhabis,p.161

the war to occupy

the

was able to call

family.
Sharifian
See Kostiner, 'On Instruments
the
to
himself
was related
l08 Luayy
and
Emergence
Najd
Ikhwan
The
the
Designers:
of
and
of the Saudi State' pp. 301-302.
their
Go:
Camels
Must
An Autobiography, London, 1961, p. 137.
The
Bullard,
1O9Reader

141

ABEDIN-FOUR

forces
his
had
been
in
that
full
tied
previously
the
of
up
complement
upon
Syria and Medina. Led by Hussein 's son Abdullah, a force of four to five
thousand men equipped

with

artillery

and machine guns took the

his
11Proud
Turaba?
and
confident
as
a
result
of
victory,
settlement of
Abdullah boasted that he would move on to take all of Qassim, then Najd
did
for
"We
Turabah
the
Gulf
to
not
come
sake of
the
coast.
and reach
Turabah and Khurma only". 112
Abdullah's jubilation was short lived for his boasts ignited the anger
Khalid
tribesmen
especially
of the

ibn Luayy.

A counter-attack

was

by
in
Abdullah
the
surprise
early
caught
morning of
was
and
mounted
he
himself
down,
fled
his
in
his
26,1919,
and
sleeping
May
men were cut
from
balance
in
Hussein
the
the
In
of
power
area
shifted
one stroke
attire.
hold
back
Abdullah's
there
to
With
Saud.
routed
was
nothing
Ibn
army
to
Hijaz. The opportunity
heart
for
dash
the
of
a
of 'innovation'

to take Mecca and cleanse it

dream
been
Ikhwan
have
the
of
a
and a valued prize
must

for Ibn Saud. Yet the amir refrained from pursuing this campaign further.
British concerns were raised over the future of their 'Hussein' policy
have
Hijaz
by
Ibn
Saud
to
the
did
suddenly
overrun
wish
and
they
not
and
Peace
British
Versailles
Yet
the
conference,
officials from
Ikhwan.
at
"They
Ibn
dominated;
Saud
little
Egypt
regarded
as
more than
London and
in
far
Arabia
from
the
the
centre
of
desert
situated
remotely
chieftain
a
jeopardised
British
contradictory
claims
where
areas
strategic peripheral
his
Saud
Ibn
to
Had
113
stake
claim at that point he could
chosen
interests".
Hijaz
key
into
Charging
done
and
capturing
cities would have
have
so.
backed
had
horse.
Some authors
the
they
Britain
that
wrong
to
proved
"statesmanship
his
for
by
his
Saud
Ibn
proving
moderation"
have praised
See also Troeller, Birth of Saudi Arabia,.
IOR
L/P&S/10/2182.
Report'
'Najd
11oPhilby,
p. 103.
Hussain's
bringing
beduin
figure
10,000
the
total
with
also
men,
to
were
111Safranclaims
the
Given
that
assert
accounts
near annihilation of the Sharifs
most
14-15,000 soldiers.
been
have
dead
in
large
would
noted
of
communications or by eye
number
this
forces
It would seem that a figure of 4-5000 men is a
is
but
the
this
case.
not
witness accounts,
figure. See Safran Saudi Arabia, p. 42.
more reasonable
92-93.
Najd,
Movement
Ikhwan
The
pp.
of
112Habib,
28.
Diary
Arabian
An
p.
113Clayton,

ABEDN-FOUR

142

in his response. 114Yet his restraint in not taking Hijaz was perhaps due

more to practicality.
His lines of supply would have been stretched even further and the
task of holding and maintaining order would have been made difficult by
heightened anxiety in the world Muslim community over the fate of the
holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Groups were active in India and Egypt
fate
the
opinions
regarding
and
and status of those cities.
voicing concerns
Ibn Saud was wary

of Muslim

public

opinion

and sought

some

legitimisation
from
least,
the
the community at large.
endorsement, or at
Furthermore, it was not certain that Britain would support his holding on
to Hijaz and Ibn Saud preferred to wait until he had a better chance.
Furthermore, he was still fully funding Ikhwan settlements and could not
disbursing
burdens
the
of
subsidies and gifts in Hijaz
additional
sustain
Sharif
be
Hussein
had
been
to
order.
maintain
required
would
quite
which
his
in
deceive
tribes
the
subsidies to them and as a result many
to
willing

dissatisfied beduin raided pilgrim caravans or the Sharif's men, to extract

115
due.
their
what was
The skirmishes over Khurma took place several times and involved
defeat
inflicted
The
Abdullah's
forces
different
in
May
upon
parties.
many
1919 is perhaps the most contentious. Kostiner asserts that Khalid bin
Luayy" was operating independently

and had no allegiance to any side.

had
been
by
Sharif
Hussein as governor of
Luayy
appointed
Ironically
Khurma but afterwards Luayy rebelled and either adopted Ikwhan beliefs
114Ibid.
llSBullard, Two Kings, pp. 17-18. Meanwhile Kostiner expends some effort in challenging
Turaba
Khurma
"turning
the
the
and
were
that
at
idea
evepts
point constituting Ibn
the
Saud's first significant attempt at expansion". Kostiner asserts that the people of both
did
Ikhwan,
fit the description of Ikhwan
their
environment
since
not
not
were
settlements
implement
Saud
trying
Ibn
plans to expand his empire at that point If
was
not
hujjar and
Kosther relies on Helms, Philby or Troeller for this period this opinion is possible because
by
Helms
for
those
authors.
distinctions
clear
not
made
were
example, uses the term
the
Ikwhan liberally which could cause misunderstanding. She does not give a breakdown of
forces
Abdullah,
attacked
calling all of them Ikhwan when in
which
of
the composition
fact they were mixture of townsfolk and other tribesmen. See Kostiner, MOSA, pp. 34-43
Cohesionof Saudi Arabia, p. 200-202. McLoughlin and Lacey both mention
The
Helms,
and
Ghot-ghot,
from
300
the
of
settlement
Ikhwan
miles away while Safran and
were
that

ABEDIN-FOUR

143

of his own accord or saw political advantages in siding with Ibn Saud-this
is not clear. 116Yet in the fight with Abdullah's men Luayy was supposedly
victorious without
Saud was involved

the help of Ikhwan. Thus Kostiner concludes that Ibn

only "indirectly

and to a limited

extent" and that

"neither the people of Khurma nor those of Turaba can be defined as

While
117
Kostiner's
Ikhwan'.
the
assertion that none of the
members of
Khurma
of
people

or Turaba were Ikhwan, is technically accurate, it

from
fact
that
those towns joined the Ikhwan
the
many people
overlooks
had
in
the
tribes
the
that
area
close ties with the Utayba, and
other
and
defend
from
been
domination
have
from
the
two
towns
to
anxious
would
Hussein. The most significant point Kostiner makes is that Khalid

ibn

Luayy instigated hostilities with Hussein without Ibn Saud's involvement.

That said, Ikhwan

did become involved

and the defeat of Abdullah,

Saud's
Ibn
by
Luayy's
or
men
men, provided an opportunity
whether
Saudi move against the heart of Hijaz-an opportunity

for a

which Ibn Saud did

not take.
British officials in India were sceptical of the permanence of Ibn
Saud's regime
Cairo/London

and of the wisdom

in backing

Hussein.

Meanwhile

didn't
Ibn
Saud at all. 118According to Rendel,
want
officials

doubts about Hussein began only during the course of the war. After the
disasters at Khurma and Turaba it became clear to London that Hussein
Ibn
Saud
that
the
they
inefficient,
was
one
and
should support: "We
was
believed that he (Ibn Saud) was in fact the only authority able to bring
McLoughlin indicate that the Ikhwan that took part came from other areas. See Safran,
Saudi Arabia., p. 42, McLoughlin, Ibn Saud, p. 61-62, Lacey, The Kingdom, p. 149.
116Various authors have written about Khalid Ibn Luayy and attribute the problems at
Khurma to a 'dispute' with Hussain. The exact nature of the dispute is not clear. See
339,
Busch,
Britain,
India and the Arabs, p. 257, Westrate,
Adventure,
Illicit
The
p.
Winstone,
Kostiner
informative
121.
Bureau,
offers
a
more
Arab
p.
view by indicating that tension
The
for
Medina when Luayy had an argument with Hussein's
battle
the
back
to
dated
son
Abdullah. Later Hussein sought to remove Luayy for a more loyal chief but was
Kostiner, 'On Instruments and their Designers: The Ikhwan of Najd
See
and
unsuccessful.
Saudi
State'
301.
the
p.
Emergence
of
the
Kostiner
35.
31
is extremely detailed where
MOSA,
Kostiner,
p.
p.
and
117See
previous
descriptions
broader
have
and
more
generalised
given
of that period and it is in
authors
is
important.
his
that
so
work
this respect

144

ABEDIN-FOUR

Arabia
in
to
and
create a stable and on the whole
chaos
of
out
order
119
effectively administered state".
The events in

al-Qassim

were

a turning

point

in

Britain's

in
Arabia.
disastrous
The
to
powers
multiple
performance of
commitment
Hussein 's forces and his persistent obnoxious attitude led to Britain's
One
to
the
policy.
pro-Hussein
official
was
comment that
of
abandonment
"If the Sharif is not strong enough to maintain

himself against the

Wahhabis he will have to go under and the sooner we make up our minds
to it the better. "120However, the switch occurred gradually and had to be
backing
Cox
Harry
Philby.
the
of
through
and
strong
with
pushed
Engaged in what could be termed 'camelback-diplomacy',

Harry

St.John Philby spent much of 1918-1919 travelling between Hussein, Cox

he
thought
Saud
the
Ibn
to
was
what
proper resolution to the
ensure
and
Hijaz-Najd conflict. It was during this period that Philby's displeasure with
Saud,
Ibn
London
towards
while indulging Hussein, came
the attitude of
by
inspired
legend
Philby,
the
head.
much
was
very
of Captain
to a
William

Shakespeare and sought to be like him, perhaps envying

the

had
latter.
Ibn
Saud
Shakespeare's
the
with
affection
name
closeness and
high
honour
held
in
in
Arabia
by
he
into
"remembered
and
all
came
was
Philby
impression
himself.
to
121
make
a
similar
wanted
and
with
contact"

Philby was also influenced by the sympathy that his superior, Percy
Cox
Saud.
for
Ibn
had
was perhaps the only senior British
Cox,
It should be understood

be so concerned.

developing
who was
thinking
Arabian

more

fascination
deep
a

in strategic

peninsula

terms.

though

that Cox, unlike

with the amir and Arabian

Cox's

official

responsibility

for

to

Philby
life, was

the eastern

him
Gulf
the
made
acutely aware of the damage a
and

hostile Saudi amir could do to British interests in the east. He was also not
impressed

's
irascible
Hussein
character.
with

Yet British policy was again

Ibn
Saud',
Commitments
Political
British
to
Intelligence Department,
on
ue'Memorandum
L/P&S/18/B295.
IOR
Office,
Foreign

Olive,
58.
Sword
the
The
Rendel,
p.
and
119George
L/P&S/10/390:
IOR
July
8,1919,
Minute
E. Shuckburgh
120J.
India
Office.
Department,
Political
Secretary,
Assistant
the

P3827/1919. Shuckburgh was

ABEDIN-FOUR

145

looking from the myopic perspective of the Arab Bureau in Cairo and
The
in
London.
centre of that policy was maintaining
officials
Hussein who

could,

if necessary, at some later point

a strong

come to an

Saud.
Percy
Cox
however,
Ibn
had said that "any
understanding with
permanent understanding

between
the two
peace
or

is out of the

had
few
British
A
officials
recognised that Hussein had been
question"122
to "to

trying

Government".

cause a rift

between

Ibn

Saud and His

Majesty's

They believed that not alienating Ibn Saud was important:

"After all he appears to be the one chief in Arabia thoroughly with us". 123
Reports from the field were also full of praise for Ibn Saud. The
Political Agent in Bahrain, Harold Dickson, declared that Ibn Saud was
"without

rival throughout

Arabia..... His bluff, candid and open-hearted

for
brains
the
be
to
that
cover
one
as
of
astutest
act
serve
can
manner
found. "124Dickson observed that most Arabian sheikhs and tribal leaders
by
playing powerful neighbours off against weaker ones: "The
survived
Arab way is to exist by putting his powerful neighbours against each other.
At the same time, if he cannot do this, he must have a strong protecting
had
been
125
Saud
back
Ibn
fall
to
on".
effectively using this method
power
to rule central Arabia.
However, Dickson noticed that the nearby rulers on the Gulf coast
Ibn
Saud
to
126
tactics
The
undermine
similar
employing
ruler of
were
Kuwait, Sheikh Salem was using financial incentives to entice certain tribes,
371/4144/4370,
November
FO
2,1918,
Wilson,
to
cited in Kostiner, MOSA, p. 20.
inPhilby
I22Cited in Busch, Britain, India, and the Arabs, 1914-1921,p. 255.
123Marrs Minute, October 12,1920 IOR L/P&S/10/936/P7439.
(H. R.P. Dickson) IOR
124 Report of Political Agent, Bahrain August 12,1920
L/P&S/10/936/B349.

225Ibid.

Saud
being
believed
Ibn
fed a lot of rubbish stories from his
that
Dickson
was
Ibid.
also
226
"cut
intentions
British
from the world by post and
events;
and
world
off
about
advisors
daily
does,
he
false
exaggerated
as
and
getting
stories from all sides he
telegraph, and
he gets suspicious of our actions. " Yet Dickson himself admitted that
if
blamed
be
cannot
his own sources of information were questionable. Beduin and various major and minor
have
fears
hidden
British
to
Dickson
or
pander
often
agendas.
would
mentioned in
sheikhs
he
information
the
that
was obtaining may not be 100% true and that he
dispatches
his
his informant was telling the truth, but that this
judge
to
whether
having
or
guess
was
was
Political
Report
Agent, Bahrain August 12,1920 in
intelligence
of
gathering.
the nature of
IOR L/P&S/10/936.

ABEDIN-FOUR

146

Sheikh
Bahrain,
loyalties
to
the
of
switch
as
and turn away from Ibn
as well
Saud. The chief of the Ajman tribe, Ibn Hithlain,

refused a bribe and

informed Ibn Saud of Kuwaiti intentions. Dickson attributed this activity to

the uncertain position Ibn Saud had with Britain which was allowing the
him.
The
Political
intrigue
Agent recommended that
to
against
small states
Britain indicate its firm support for Ibn Saud and allow him to emerge as
the strong force in Arabia. This would place all the other states in greater
help
Britain's
and thus make them much more obedient and
need of
from
London.
instructions
to
amenable

An Invitation to London
Foreign Office officials wished to invite Ibn Saud to London to extend
hospitality to him and the amir of Kuwait and to hear their views. For the
invitees

it provided

an opportunity

to lodge their

complaints

and

have
Anxious
London.
but
to
that
busy
opportunity
with
grievances
with
his
Ibn
integrity
Saud
decided
territories
the
to send his
of
maintaining
distinguished
battlefield
in
Turki,
already
commands. Yet Turki,
eldest son,
died
before
he
had
influenza
the
virus
and
a chance to leave 127
contracted
The young man left behind a son and three daughters of his own. The
influenza epidemic of 1919 was devastating on the Al-Saud. At least two
Saud
Ibn
his
died
in the
and
one
of
of
sons
wives
also
young
other
outbreak.
Turki had been the one most likely to succeed his father. Next in

he
being
for
Saud,
leadership;
was
also
and
groomed
taught
was
seniority
desert
including
falconry.
Yet Saud was also
the
raiding
and
the ways of
it
is
Turki
brother
full
and
perhaps understandable that there was a
of
the

him
Turki's
death.
So
fell
it
to
so
away
soon
after
send
upon the
reluctance
boy
Faisal,
just
third
the
thirteen to represent Ibn
of
son,
a
shoulders of
Saud in London.128

127Philby, Saudi Arabia,p. 277.

128Philby, Arabian jubilee, p. 61.

147

ABEDIN-FOUR

Faisal had distinguished maternal family connections of his own.

His mother, Tarfah was from the family of Al Al-Sheikh, and a direct
descendent of Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab. Tarfah died when
Faisal was just five or six, and he was sent to live with his maternal
far
Latif,
from
ibn
Abdul
Abdullah
Sheikh
the royal
away
grandfather,
but
drilled
in
Faisal
was
child
religious principles,
sickly
a
was
court.
Islamic jurisprudence and classical Arabic. He had no full brothers of his
his
Several
him
from
half-brothers
age.
of
years
separated
own nor any
him.
had
Faisal
lonely
than
a
somewhat
older
those younger and
childhood.
Though sheltered from the responsibilities

busy
and
pace of his

father's majlis, Faisal was better educated and maturer than many of his
brothers. He also gained the tools to be a critical thinker, which would help
fondness
for
developed
He
129
life.
later
a
in
poetry, especially lilting
him
his
long
he
nights of
youth by the campfire
spent
beduin verse which
listening to and reciting. Faisal's curiosity and eagerness to learn gave him
Thus
became
his
Faisal
when
siblings.
intellectual
over
amir of
edge
an
he
Saudi
Arabia
diffusing
King
later
was
capable
of
of
Hijaz and
religious
by
in
debates
the
judicial
his
ulema
to
engaging
citing
policies
opposition
130
his
defend
positions.
texts to successfully

Faisal's mission to London was somewhat symbolic since he would

not

be

the

main

negotiator

in

meetings

with

British

officials.

Abdullah
him
two
escorts,
al-Qosaibi, a prominent alwere
Accompanying
Thunayan
from
Ahmad
the Thunayan
a
relative
and
Hasa merchant
his
had
life
in
Turkey, returning
Ahmad
family.
spent
most
of
the
branch of
had
Saud
in
his
first
Ibn
the
captured
city
Riyadh
after
conquest.
only
to
Thunayan's
it
French
Turkish
both
was
role to advise young
and
Speaking
he
'foreigners'
deal
how
to
and
was to take up the issue of
with
Faisal on

Royal Succession in the House of Saud in the

King:
To
Prince
From
Bligh,
l29Alexander
University
Press,
York
New
1984,
York:
20.
New
Century,
p.
Twentieth
his Kingdom, Tavistock, UK: University Press of
The
King
Faisal:
Sheean,
and
13OVincent
Arabia, 1975, p. 79.

ABEDIN-FOUR

148

Hussein and disputes in al-Qassim with British officials.. 131Abdullah alQosaibi was entrusted in obtaining needed supplies and equipment from
Europe.
It was the first time a member of the Al-Saud was to travel to
Europe. The teenage son of the amir of Najd met King George V at
Buckingham

Palace; toured the House of Commons and Lords; saw

Cambridge University; met Harry Philby's young son Kim (who was later
to become a famous Soviet spy), and visited over a dozen battlefields in
his
Faisal
France.
time,
much
spent
of
experiencing and exploring
northern
the sights of Europe while his escorts fulfilled

their missions. Al-Qosaibi

busied himself in procuring various equipment and supplies to take back

to Riyadh. In talks with British officials in Paris, Ahmad Thunayan who
for
in
the
Saudi-Hussein
being
to
need
realise
moderation
pressed
was
behalf
"I
Ibn
Saud,
my
word
you
on
give
of
my
stated
master,
relations,
that no matter what the provocation,

there shall be no war for three

had
Thunayan
Faisal
Ahmad
ibn
Hussein,
132
also
a
meeting
with
years".
This
by
British
Sharif's
in
the
sons.
was
arranged
other
officials
of
an
one
like
the
Khurma
towns
to
some
of
conflicts
over
al-Qassim
resolve
attempt
led
blows
both
The
to
Turaba.
nearly
meeting
as
sides traded insults
and
instead of working out any agreement 133
When the group returned to Najd in February, 1920, Ibn Saud was
his
but
distressed
hospitality
to
form
the
the
given
son
at
at
reports
pleased
hearing
He
Thunayan.
that British officials still
outraged
was
Ahmad
himself
Hussein
highly
than
of
of
and that they expected the
thought more
Ibn
Saud
Sharif.
the
Percy
this
Cox
to
complained
to
with
of
work
amir
latter
his
the
he
to
take
was
on
way
while
on the post of High
met
whom
Iraq.
134More
infuriating
in
were the suggestions that Faisal
Commissioner
be
King
Iraq.
Cox assured the amir that he
Hussein
of
made
ibn
would
but
did
Cox
such
a
measure,
of
approve
not
was unaware that
personally
Saudi
King
Arabia,
London:
Faisal:
Arthur
Barker, 1966, p. 22.
Gaury,
De
of
131Gerald
l32lbid. pp. 29-30.

133McLoughlin,Ibn Saud,pp.62-63.

149

ABEDIN-FOUR

back in London officials were about to inaugurate a new era in British

policy.

Reorganising British Administration

In February 1921, Winston Churchill

became Secretary of State for the

Colonies. He was to launch a major re-evaluation of British policy towards

the Middle

East. A month after taking

office Churchill

convened a

he
Cairo,
Middle
together
in
East
the
gathered
where
experts
on
conference
from various government departments. 135One of the objectives was reduce
the

inefficiency

responsibilities
Churchill

of

British

administration

caused

by

competing

of the various authorities in London, Cairo and Delhi.

bring
Colonial
Office. More
to
the
to
control
central
sought

importantly he looked to cut down financial expenditures in order to avoid

"demanding further sacrifices from the British taxpayer. "136As a result of
jurisdictions
dissolved
favour
in
the
Cairo
overlapping
were
the
conference
of one administrative

entity, the Middle East Department. Churchill

felt

to
that:
the
co-ordinate
policy
stating
need
about
strongly
The Arab problem is all one, and any attempt to divide it will
only reintroduce the same paralysis and confusion of action
done
harm
has
during the last two
so
much
which
Abdullah,
Feisal
whether in Mesopotamia or
or
years......
Mecca; King Hussein at Mecca; Bin Saud at Najd; Bin Rashid
Kuweit;
Sheikh
King
Samuel
Hail;
the
of
and
at
at Jerusalem
interwoven
inextricably
and no conceivable policy can
are all
have any chance which does not pull all the strings affecting
them. 137

l34Clayton, An Arabian Diary, p. 28.

3,1924,
IOR
March
Minute,
L/P&S/10/938/P989
Department
Office,
13sIndia
outlines the
Busch,
See
1921.
Britain,
India, and the Arabs, 1914Cairo
also
the
of
conference
of
purpose
1921, p. 467
Government
'Middle
East
Policy' in the House of
Churchill,
on
speech
Winston
Winston
in
Text
S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches,
14,1921.
June
reprinted
Commons,
Chelsea
London:
James,
House
Robert
Publishers, 1974. p. 3096.
III,
Vol.
ed.
1897-1963,
from
Minister
Nice,
Prime
12 January, 1921 cited in Aaron
Churchill
to
the
from
137Letter
Arab
in
World:
Policy
British
The
the
Cairo Conference of 1921,
Foundations
of
Klieman,
Press,
1970.
Hopkins
Johns
The
Baltimore:

150

ABEDIN-FOUR

The Middle East Department was to enable policy making to be centralised

in London where it was based. This meant that issues between His
Majesty's Government

and Ibn Saud were to be handled by the new

department and involve only the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and
However,
Political
Resident
Office.
138
in the Persian
India
the
the
since
not
Gulf was also responsible for the local administrative issues of the Arabian
littoral

(Trucial

Government

states) he would

still

consult

regularly

with

the

in
But
India.
matters relating to a political nature the
of

Political Resident was to have the prior approval of the Colonial Office. 139
Churchill proudly told the House of Commons that as a result of his
re-organisation,

"within

the whole

of the Arabian

Peninsula,

and

have
that
the
a single clear policy upon
throughout
great area, we
whole of
which

all the authorities,

military

and civil, are at the present time

140
agreed".
The work of the Middle East Department was to take on added
jurisdictions
by
territorial
the
created at the end of the
new
complications
First World War. The former Ottoman territories of the Middle East had
been divided amongst the Allied powers at Versailles. Britain was formally
Trans-Jordan,
Palestine,
by
Iraq
Council
the
the
over
and
mandates
granted
Syria
July
Nations
in
1922.
Lebanon
League
and
the
of
were given to
of
France. Sharif Hussein was retained as ruler of Hijaz while his sons
r -ters
YskgsTransjordan
Faisal
were
made
of
Abdullah
and Iraq
and
K; ^
Hussein was appointed r
ibn
Faisal
141
Iraq
his
t
of
and
respectively.
brother Abdullah was given Transjordan. The Hashemite family now had
Baghdad,
Mecca.
in
Amman,
Trapped
in
and
power
of
central
centres
for
his
lamented
Saud
that
Ibn
efforts to support Britain, she had
all
Arabia
"surrounded

142
British
had
been
policy
enemies".
with
me
summed up by

442-443.
Arabs,
1914-1921
India,
the
Britain,
p.
and
138Busch
March
3,1924,
IOR
Minute,
L/P&S/10/938/P989.
Departmental
Office
India
139
'Middle
East
Government
Policy' in the House of
Churchill,
on
Winston
speech
140,
in
Winston
Text
S.
Churchill:
14,1921.
His Complete Speeches,
June
reprinted
Commons,
Chelsea
House
London:
Publishers,
Robert
James,
III,
Vol.
1974. p. 3096.
ed.
1897-1963,
473.
Arabs,
1914-1921,
India,
the
Britain,
p.
and
Busch,
141
Constable
London:
Co.
Sa'oud
Arabia,
Ibn
1928, p. 65.
Ameen.
of
and
Rihani,
142

ABEDIN-FOUR

151

the Foreign

Office,

Middle

East Committee:

doles
of money, pending
small
him

not to supply

instructors"

military

"keep

developments

except very sparingly

Ibn Saud in play, by

in the military
with

situation,

arms, ammunition,

but
and

143

In fact Ibn Saud was practically ignored. To his alarm Britain had
his Hashemite

rewarded

enemies with territory

to believe that he was considered

He
clearly
chief.

not much more than just another desert

did not accept this. His family

in
Arabia,
times
of
preceding
much
and at
Ibn Saud proclaimed

and money. Was Ibn Saud

had been rulers of Najd,

centuries. On August

himself 'Sultan of Najd and its Dependencies'

22,1921,
(sultan

him
over other tribal chiefs and also
elevated
najd wa malhagatiha)144This
Sharif
Hussein
least
Mecca.
His
him
did
to
title
of
stature
equal
at
new
gave
not reduce the political
of Iraq

Faisal

threatened

financial
and

was making

to further

overtures

strain. In fact Ibn Saud learned that

to the Al-Rashid

encircle the Najdi polity.

of Hail

which

Ibn Saud was forced into

action. 145

Though Hail was four hundred miles north-west of Riyadh in the

Shammar,
it
located
Jebel
was
strategically
so that caravans
region of
from
Najd
Syria,
Egypt
between
to Kuwait, passed
well
as
and
as
travelling
through

her territory.

Great revenues could be gained from taxes and

for
Ibn
Saud
deal
there
Fortunately
was
a
great
of turmoil within
tribute.
1920-1921.146
family
itself
in
Rivalry and internal
the
Al-Rashid
year
the
divisions had led to the assassination of the ruling amir and the succession
of Abdullah

ibn Miteb Al-Rashid, an inexperienced boy of eighteen. King

Faisal was trying to use the situation to his advantage and extend Iraqi
decided
However,
Ibn
Saud
Hail.
into
to launch a pre-emptive
influence
before
Hashemites
Al-Rashid
the
the
could establish strong
strike against
Committee
Meeting,
January
East
19,1918, IOR
Middle
Minutes
143
of
L/P&S/18/B280/P337.
144Philby, Saudi Arabia, p. 281.
145Philby, Arabian jubilee, pp. 66-67.
146Howarth, The Desert King, p. 109.

ABEDIN-FOUR

152

links there. Not only would this enhance Najdi security but it would
from
be
drawn.
147
taxes
tribes
the
could
whom
enlarge
The town of Hail had solid fortifications. Taking it by force would be
Ibn
Saud
lay
hoping
in
in
to
to force
chose
siege
men and resources.
costly
a surrender. While initially

holding out, the young amir of Hail, sent an

Saud
Saud
in
Ibn
Ibn
to
to
negotiate.
order
agreed to a peaceful
meet
envoy
foreign
if
that
were
met;
control
conditions
over
certain
relations
settlement
dispute
be
be
Ibn
to
of
all
matters
should
submitted
relinquished;
would
Saud for arbitration; and though they would have the right to manage their
internal affairs, Ibn Saud would have the final decision on any issue.148The
terms were harsh and not all of the Al-Rashid agreed and were particularly
in
being
Najd.
idea
to
their
the
arch
rivals
subservient
of
galled at
Another

None
took
place.
of them were
series of skirmishes

decisive. Ibn Saud tightened the siege around Hail. With few supplies
allowed
starvation.

inside

the beleaguered capital, the inhabitants

drifted

Some relief came from smuggled goods which

into

Ibn Saud

hand
having
in.
For
Hussein
Ibn
Sharif
Saud
this
a
of
suspected
British
Political
Agent
in
Bahrain.
to
the
He
vociferously
complained
blamed the Sharif for complicating matters and prolonging

the siege by

hopes
the
towns
people.
the
of
raising
Finally,

with

conditions

unbearable in the city, the Al-Rashid

4,1921 Ibn Saud entered Hail and met with the

November
On
capitulated.
defeated Abdul Aziz Al-Rashid. The amir was certain he was to be
his surprise, he was told that himself and three other
Instead,
to
executed.
family
Al-Rashid
be
the
Riyadh
taken
to
would
of
members
senior male
'looked
be
A
treated
well
and
after'.
they
move that would
would
where

Arabia
Saudi
1925-1939:
The
Britain
Imperial
Oasis, London: Frank
Leatherdale,
and
Clive
147
The
Cohesion
Helms,
See
Saudi
f.
Arabia,
48.
31,
also
of
1983,
note
p. 67.
Cass,
p.
148These conditions were remarkably similar to the ones that the Ottomans and the British
Saud
Political
Agent,
See
Ibn
Bahrain, May 8,1920, IOR
Saud.
to
Ibn
had made on
67
Troeller,
Jubilee,
Arabian
Philby,
The Birth of Saudi Arabia,
Also
and
p.
R/15/2/40.
pp. 167-170.

ABEDIN-FOUR

153

later prove to have effectively placed them under house arrest 149The
townspeople who had feared being plundered

were surprised at the

forbid
had
forces.
Saud
his
from
Ibn
booty
Saudi
taking
men
of
restraint
food
inhabitants.
In
to
the
instead
starving
a move which
provided
and
Ikhwan,
the
orders were also given to spare the Shia
of
upset some
15
harassment.
from
minority
The capture of Hail brought the whole of north-west Arabia into Ibn
Saud's hands. 151Now he claimed all land the Al-Rashid ruled or had ruled
in the past which brought him right up to the Syrian, Trans-Jordanian and
Iraqi borders. This included the strategically important area of Wadi Sirhan
Syria.
Serving
Arabia
between
Central
between
lay
and
as
a
corridor
which
Transjordan and Iraq, Wadi Sirhan acted as a buffer between two
Hashemite territories. It was also an area where Britain had hoped to place
have
him
links.
Britain
to
would
now
recognise
as a major
rail and pipeline
force. The expansion also meant that Ibn Saud was increasingly relying on
his
dangerous
that
Ikhwan
to
reliance
and
would
position
prove
the
secure
Ibn
Saud's
leadership.
became
In
Ikhwan
and
challenged
rebellious
the
as
how
between
Ibn Saud and
the
relationship
shall
see
we
the next chapter
distrust
into
deteriorated
Ikhwan
mutual
and animosity. 152
the

See
Oasis,
245-249.
in
Arabian
Troeller,
Birth of Saudi Arabia,
Politics
pp.
also
an
149al-Rashid,
29.
Diary,
An
Arabian
Clayton,
p.
168-169
and
pp.
Wahhabis,
102
the
Arabia
p.
of
Philby,
15o
in
McLoughlin
Ibn
Saud:
Founder of a Kingdom, p. 65
Leslie
this
to
account,
151In contrast
fall of the city to a secret deal with the deputy governor of Hail who was to
the
attributes
let
Ibn
Saud's
in
the
town
the
and
of
men. McLoughlin is not clear
gates
have opened
but
does
it
information
this
in
India
not
correlate
the
with
of
accounts
the
source
about
family
Al-Rashid
history
by
the
Madawi altold
of
accounts
Records
with
as
nor
Office
Oasis,
245-246
Robert
Arabian
Lacey's
The
Kingdom. The
Politics
as
well
p.
as
in
an
of
Rashid
fact that McLoughlin's work (1993) is more recent than Madawi aldespite
the
is
omission
(1981).
Lacey's
indeed
(1991)
or
Rashid
Saud,
Ibn
120-143.
A
Portrait
Unified:
Arabia
pp.
of
152Almana,

154

ABEDIN FNE

Chapter 5
From Conquest to Rebellion: the Ikhwan Warriors of Ibn Saud 1921-1930
Expansion into the northwest of Arabia brought new tribal groups under
the jurisdiction of Ibn Saud. However, this was not, a welcome prospect for
Unwilling
tribes.
many

to conform to strict Muwahtoidun rules, wary of

high taxes and the strong-arm tactics of Ikhwan, sections of the Anaizah
defined
borders
ill
into
Iraq.
the
Shammar
tribes
porous
and
crossed
and
They hoped to continue their traditional patterns of seasonal migration and
had no desire to be under the rule of a central government. From their new
bases in Iraq these tribes raided the settlements that the Ikhwan had taken
launched
'
This
a series of raids and counter raids, completely
over.
disrupting trade and tribal migratory patterns?
A key leader of Ikhwan raids was Faisal al-Duwish, a member of the
Mutayr tribe. British officials believed that Ibn Saud was sanctioning the
by
al-Duwish.
raids

Ibn Saud denied this, but defended the Ikhwan's

defence
in
trying
they
to
that
self
and
were
acting
retrieve
claiming
actions,
livestock taken by Iraqi raiders. He argued that Mutayri tribesmen like alfrom
freely
had
one region to another throughout
Dwish
always migrated
lifestyle
to
their
traditional
On
restrictions
not
accept
the year and would
.3
March 11,1922, Faisal al-Duwish launched a major raid, with over a
deep
Iraqi
Casualties
inside
high
territory.
Ikhwan,
were
and
thousand
Camel
Corps,
local
Iraqi
desert
the
the
of
police. The
included a unit
Government

loudly
Iraq
protested
of

and requested that the High

hunt
Air
Force
down
Royal
to
units
and bomb the
Commissioner authorise
4
attackers.
The High Commissioner
been appointed

to the position

knew
Iraq
Ibn Saud well. Percy Cox had
of
following

the assumption

War
Glubb,
in
Islam,
124;
Desert,
Warriors
the
62
Saud's
p.
of
Ibn
p.
1 Habib,

of the British

174.
Saudi
Arabia,
Birth
The
p.
of
2Troeller,
PRO
July
14
1921,
Iraq,
FO
371/7711/E2566.
Commissioner
High
to
Saud
31bn
PRO
March
13,1922,
FO
SOSCO,
371/7711/E28971.
Iraq
to
Also
Commissioner
4High
Clayton, An Arabian Diary, p. 31.

ABEDIN-FIVE

155

but
did
RAF
5
Cox
the
there.
authorise
attack
not
realised steps
mandate
He
be
the
to
taken
to
situation.
was concerned that relations
resolve
needed
between Najd and Iraq should be repaired and that border demarcations be
in
Mohammera
May
5
Cox
1922 in
the
town
of
a
meeting
on
called
agreed.
Saud
boundary
issues.
Ibn
discuss
to
agreed t send a representative
order
but did not attend himself.
During the discussions Cox suggested tribal water wells and grazing
in
identify
be
to
which specific tribes could graze, the
areas
used
pastures
details of which were to be decided on a later date. A committee of experts
deciding
be
job
be
tribes
the
to
tasked
which
would
considered
of
with
was
decision
be
binding
The
both
jurisdiction.
Saudi
Iraq
would
on
and
under
The
Arabia.
Iraqi's were amenable to
Saudi
Iraq
the governments of
and
this, so was Ibn Saud's representative. Yet when the committee of experts
decided that the tribes of Muntafiq, Amarat and Dhafir should be under
Iraqi jurisdiction

Ibn Saud refused to ratify the agreement claiming that his

6
had
too
concessions.
many
given
agent
Following the failure of the Mohamemrameeting Ikhwan raids on
Transjordan increased. At one point, the raiders boldly came within fifteen
in
British
Royal
Air
Amman.
troops
Force
armoured
cars
and
of
miles
Ibn
Saud's
the
to
to
away.?
chase
attackers
out
sent
reaction
were
planes
In
British
he
defended
to
two-fold.
Ikhwan
response
protests
was
the
raids
but
it
he
the
that
time
was
provoked,
at
same
claiming
sent
the action,
for
Ikhwan
the
At
unauthorised
admonishing
raids.
messages,
other
secret
he
his
his
it
ends,
would
express
political
satisfaction at
suited
times, when
them. 8
Controlling
determination

the Ikhwan

delicate
a
was

balancing

act. Their

for
unsettling the Hashemite powers.
and zeal was useful

5Busch, Britain, India and the Arabs, 1914-1921,p.420.

hand
individuals
to
the
over
refusal
was
Saud's
objection
and tribes that had
61bn
main
Ibn
Saud
Iraqi
the
wanted to punish them as criminals, but Cox would
to
side.
'defected'
Troeller, The Birth of Saudi Arabia, p. 175.
See
that.
to
not agree
33
Diary,
Arabian
An
p.
7Clayton,
8 Habib, Ibn Saud's Warriors of Islam, p. 126

ABEDW-FIVE

156

More importantly,

Ikhwan

conquests provided

economic benefits by

bringing more tribes under Ibn Saud's authority which in turn increased
his tax base. Raids were another matter. They were not always efficient
inconvenient-occurring
times
at
and
providers of resources,

just when a

deal was being struck with British or other local rulers. His chief advisor
Hafiz Wahba described Ibn Saud's attitude:
But in spite of the Ikhwan's excesses, rashness, impetuosity
defiance
Government,
Abdul Aziz treated them
the
of
and
hitherto
forbearance
unknown in an Arab king, on
with
grounds that whatever excesses,they were a great deal better
than they had been before and that in the fullness of time this
be
harsh
intolerance
would
softened. 9
phase of
For Percy Cox the continued Ikhwan raids were causing a nuisance and
hampering efforts to create a stable government in Iraq. It was imperative
that the vague boundaries between Iraq, Najd and Kuwait were clearly
identified. 10Cox renewed his invitation to leaders from Iraq, Kuwait and
Najd to try to hammer out some form of frontier treaty. This time however,
Cox insisted that Ibn Saud himself be present.
A new meeting was called on November 21,1922 at Uqair, a town
"
Percy
Present
Cox,
Colonel
Harold
were
coast.
the
al-Hasa
eastern
on
Agent in Bahrain, Sabih Beg, Minister
Political
Dickson,
of
Communications

Works,
King
Public
Faisal of Iraq, and
representing
and

in
Kuwait,
Agent
Political
More,
C.
the
J.
Major
who was deputised to
family. Ibn Saud represented himself. Also present
Al-Sabah
the
represent
Ameen
Rihani.
Lebanese-American
traveller
He
famous
the
served as
was
for
Ibn
Saud.
hoc
12
translator
commentator
and
an observer, ad
Arthur
Baker,
London:
1964,
Days,
Arabian
Wahba,
p. 131.
9 Hafiz
27.
Saudi
Arabia
1925-1939,
Britain
p.
and
Leatherdale,
10
1IHRP, Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours,London: Allen & Unwin, 1956, pp. 270-278;
Philby
Dickson
65-71.
jubilee
Arabian
and
are consistently the most commonly
pp.
Philby,
(Saudi Arabia, pp. 357-358, fn15) writing in 1970's
Goldrup
for
this
period.
cited references
Saudi
(The
History
Arabia,
1990's
in
257 fn28. ) rely primarily
the
of
Vassiliev
p.
writing
and
following
in
is
the
Helms, The Cohesionof
This
the
case
works
as
also
well;
these
works.
on
Saudi
The
Birth
fnl9&20;
Troeller,
Arabia,
209,
of
Arabia,
pp. 179, fn87 and
pp.
Saudi
fn79.
86,
Saudi
Arabia,
Making
The
p.
of
Kostiner,
12Clayton, Arabian Diary, p. 34.

ABEDIN-FIVE

157

However, during the five day period of discussions there were

frequent disagreements between Ibn Saud and Sabih Beg over territory and
history. At one point Sabih Beg claimed that Iraqi territory extended as far
his
family
Ibn
Saud
had
Hijaz.
in
that
Medina
the
retorted
ruled up to
as
Aleppo in Syria and Basra in Iraq. Neither side was willing

to accept the

for
do
to
so would prejudice their position when it came
other's argument,
to the final deal. No matter what each man actually believed, each sought
to squeeze as much out of the occasion as possible. 13
The agenda that Cox hoped to pursue was over tribal allegiances
border
and

delineation. 14 The High

Commissioner

was particularly

Amarat
between
Dhafir
Najd
tribes
that
the
wandered
and
with
concerned
Saud
Ibn
Rihani,
Cox
According
the
Iraq.
to
was
unaware
of
agenda
and
had planned. The Saudi amir had not come to Uqair to discuss border
issues, or the Amarat and Dhafir. He had complaints of his own to raise
against

the British-for

surrounding

him

with

his old

enemies the

Hashemites. Had he known that Cox would be conspiring with the Iraqi
have
he
borders,
15
his
Tensions
fix
not
come.
to
would
were not
regime
kept the amir and his party waiting for several
Cox
fact
by
that
the
eased
days in the humid climate of Uqair, making all present quite irascible.

Once the sessionbegan, Cox introduced the parties and left it to the
details
the
Iraqi
to
work
out
Saudi and
of the agreement.
representatives
he
from
it
fixed
the
that
to
Saud
outset
was
opposed
clear
Ibn
made
and
arbitrary

borders. The tribes under his authority, especially the Ikhwan,

fi
Malik
Abd
1,
288-289.
Jazira,
Shibh
part
al-Aziz,
pp.
al
ahd
Zirkili,
al
13

Ibn
Cox
Saud
Percy
that
Uqair
realised
considered all of Qatar as
the
meetings
During
14
his
Cox
to
taxes
king
therefore
the
and
rules.
subject
reminded
and
sharply
al-Hasa
part of
did
Ibn
Saud
his
territory
and
Qatar
not press the point. An official at
of
was not part
that
later
Cox's
the
it
have
that
been a
office
of
was
opinion
report
read
India
who
would
the
bitterly
fiercely.
had
Giving
king
in so swiftly
the
if
the
and
point
argued
better sign
2,1923,
IOR
March
L/P&S/11/222/
Minute,
Simpson
P731/23.
seemed suspicious,
frequently
Qatari
insurgents
to
Saudi
refuge
gave
the
of
al-Hasa
amir
and also
Indeed
family
Qatari
the
that crossed over into Saudi
ruling
of
elements
rebellious
supported
forced
Qatar
Ibn
Saud
to
the
tribute of 100,000
Eventually,
was
pay
amir
of
territory.
R.
S.
See
Zahlan,
his
in
The
Creation
for
Qatar,
also
country.
stability
of
year
a
rupees
London: Routledge, 1979, pp. 81-83.
Arabia,
59-60.
'aoud
S
Ibn
pp.
of
is Rihani,

158

ABEDIN-FIVE

being
by
invisible
to
restricted
agree
not

would

Moreover, accepting fixed borders would

lines in the sand.

crystallise the power of the

Hashemites. If boundaries had to be discussed Ibn Saud suggested that

they be based on tribal lines and not borders that would split tribal diras
through the middle. Therefore, entire tribes should belong either on the
Iraqi or Saudi side. This was also better for security. Along with this
demand Ibn Saud sought to have the entire Dhafir tribe placed under his
jurisdiction

and since their grazing ground extended up to the Euphrates

he claimed his borders should reflect that. Percy Cox thought this idea
"ridiculous"

be
16
it
did
to
pursued.
not
allow
and

Ibn Saud was emphatic that tribes like the Dhafir were originally
from Najd and were therefore to be considered Najdi subjects. The Amarat
importantly,
from
Najd,
more
and
tribe also came

was a branch of Ibn

Saud's own tribe, the Anaizah. Therefore the Amarat were his 'cousinsnaturally

his authority

extended over them as well. Thus Ibn Saud

Najd
Iraqi
turn
tribesmen
to
to
all
the
over
renegade
authorities
expected
from
Najd
had
back
those
to
tribal
taxes
that
all
owed
to
groups
extract
and
left for sanctuary in Iraq. 17 However, both tribes had moved to Iraq
harassment
from
Najdi
Ikhwan
taxation
the
to
and
avoid
and
precisely
King Faisal firmly opposed his rival's efforts.
Trying another approach, Ibn Saud proposed to have known wells
borders.
determine
Since
the
tribe
grounds
each
tribal
would
grazing
and
historically
theirs and which were not, this would
were
know which areas
be a relatively simple solution. Any locations claimed by more than one
Ibn
Saud
However,
for
be
Najdi
still
neutral.
pressed
made
tribe, would
Euphrates.
the
Sabih
towns
Beg,
to
around
market
access
who
merchants
less
be
hundred
borders
than
two
Iraq's
that
not
miles south of the
insisted
Euphrates, rejected this. 18

274.
Neighbours,
Her
Kuwait
p.
and
16Dickson,
179
Saudi
Arabia,
Birth
The
p.
of
Troeller,
17
18Clayton, An Arabian Diary, p. 34.

159

ABEDIN-FIVE

As negotiations stalled, and with no agreement in sight, a frustrated

Percy Cox decided to intervene. During a break in the conference he took
Dickson to Ibn Saud's tent for a serious discussion. Cox reprimanded the
"childish"
his
for
arnir

tribal boundary idea. Cox declared that he would

himself decide on "the type and general line of the frontier". According to
Dickson, Ibn Saud broke down weeping and declared that "Sir Percy was
his father and mother, who had made him and raised him from nothing to
the position which he held and that he would surrender half his kingdom,
"
19
Sir
Percy
if
ordered.
the
whole,
nay
This exchange seemed to have the desired effect. When

the

let
Cox
lead.
Saud
Ibn
take
the
quiet
and
remained
conference re-convened

Using a red pencil Cox drew a line from the Gulf coast to Jabal Anaizah,
be
frontier.
This
Iraq.
In
to
Trans-Jordan
area
would
the
granted
to
close
by
Najd
had
been
large
the
territory
claimed
given
portion of
one stroke a
Cox
Saud's
forestall
Ibn
To
Feisal.
King
complaints
cut the territory
to
Najdi
jurisdiction.
by
that
Kuwait
two-thirds
under
to
placed
and
allotted
Neutral
Zone
Kuwait
Cox
and an Iraq Neutral Zone
In addition
created a
to
tribes
areas
provide
where
serve
could graze
ostensibly
would
which
border
to
relating
crossings and
and obtain water without problems
customs procedures.
Following

the boundary drawing

episode Ibn Saud asked for a

Cox
(Dickson
Percy
Ibn
Saud
was
also
present).
with
private meeting
been
had
he
"My
friend,
in
treated
the
stating;
which
way
you
protested at
kingdom.
Better
it
let
half
take
deprived
all
and
my
have
me go into
me of
retirement"

Ibn
Dickson,
Saud
"burst
into
to
then
according
out
sobs".
and

down
his
"My
friend
I know
tears
cheeks;
rolling
also
Cox replied, with
Arabist'
Cox
drafted
his
that
Lacey's
an'excellent
was
and
all
assertion
own
19Despite
Arabic
Cox's
"not
Dickson
that
too good" and that he
was
claims
Arabic correspondence,
Kingdom,
The
for
See
Lacey,
Cox.
translating
p. 80 and Dickson, Kuwait and
do
the
had to
detailed
The
Making
Kostiner's
Saudi
Even
Arabia, does not
274.
work
of
Neighbours,
p.
Her
but
incident
Dickson's
this
to
Also
relies
corroborate
on
account.
report
cite any official
know
do
We
181.
if
Arabia,
Saudi
Birth
The
not
a similar reprimand was
p.
of
Troeller,
delegates.
Iraqi
the
to
issued

160

ABEDIN-FIVE

exactly how you feel, and for this reason I give you two thirds of Kuwait
territory

I don't know how Ibn Sabah will

take the blow" 20 Dickson

help
but
be
display
He
this
could
and
not
suspicious.
of
emotion
observed
knew of Ibn Saud's reputation as a shrewd negotiator and remarked, that
in matters

of diplomacy

Ibn Saud was "without

rival

throughout

Arabia..... His bluff, candid and open-hearted manner serve to act as cover
for one of the astutest brains that can be found. "21
Unfortunately
the task of looking

for Kuwait, Major Moore, who was entrusted with

little
for
her
interests,
said
out

throughout

the

him.
dominated
had
As
Ahmad
Jabir
Cox
Percy
a
result,
clearly
conference.
Al-Sabah, the Kuwaiti amir, received a shock. He had been in power for
barely a year and within a few days lost a sizeable portion of territory
later
Cox
When
battle
in
Kuwait
fired
to
arrived
waged.
or
shot
a
without
he
had
Uqair
to
the
accords
placate a very upset
on
the
signature
amir's
get
done
been
had
to
insisted
Cox
that
was
necessary
what
satisfy a
ruler.
have
land
by
force.
taken
the
anyway
powerful neighbour who would
Ahmad Al-Sabah was still reluctant to sign an agreement about which he
he
but
Although
he
been
could
not
refuse.
had not
gave his
consulted,
demanded to know if after Ibn Saud's death the British
Al-Sabah
signature,
denouncing
him
to
the agreement and
Government would object
Cox's bemused reply was "No.... and God bless
lost
his
territory.
reclaiming
2
your efforts"?
This was a watershed event for the tribes of Najd. For centuries they
for
New
frontiers
trade
free
travel
been
to
and
supplies.
northwards
had
forced
be
life, relying on
their
to
they
change
patterns
of
that
would
meant
Saudi
developed
Qatif
Uqair
instead.
ports
of
and
under
the somewhat
Cox's
believing
did
himself
of
that an
methods,
not
approve
Dickson

Troeller,
274,
Birth
Her
Neighbours,
Saudi
the
Arabia,
Kuwait
and
p.
of
and
p. 181.
2ODickson,
being
Saud
Ibn
favour
in
in
Arabia so that
a
strong
of
player
much
21Dickson was very
for
help.
See
Dickson's
insightful
Britain
Political
Agent
to
turn
memo,
would
other chiefs
IOR
L/P&S/10/936/B349.
12,1920,
August
Bahrain,
279.
Neighbours,
Her
Kuwait
p.
and
22Dickson,

ABEDIN-FIVE

161

boundary
"serious
type
of
was
a
error"23 Many tribal
arbitrary western
chiefs could not understand the logic of the agreements and the fact that
the restrictions were imposed by a foreign power only heightened their
disapproval. The Mutayr tribe was particularly

affected by the frontier

agreements. One member of their tribe, the notorious Ikhwan raider, Faisal
determined
became
to thwart the accords.
al-Duwish,
There could also have been another factor Cox was consideringduring
The
the negotiations when one
subject
came
up
mineral resources.
Abdul
Latif
Cox
Sau'd
Ibn
al-Mandil,
urged
advisors,
not to create a
of
Neutral Zone with Kuwait. He wanted the territory to stay with Najd. Cox
insisted that it was necessary but al-Mandil pressed his point. When Cox
for
important
know
it
in
that
Najd,
to
to
area
so
why
was
stay
alwanted
Mandil's

"because
we think oil exists there".
reply was

Unfazed Cox

have
"exactly
I
it
Each
that
why
made
a
neutral
was
zone.
side
responded
24
half
have
share".
a
shall
There was another individual
Holmes-a

also interested in oil-Major

Frank

New Zealand prospector, mining engineer and businessman

Marines.
He
Royal
in
Eastern
the
had
the
represented
served
and
who
General Syndicate, a small company with big ambitions. Holmes sought an
in
bid
for
in
Saud
Ibn
to
As
put
a
the
order
oil
concessions.
with
audience
Saudis
dragged
Iraqis
between
Holmes
the
the
and
on
waited
negotiations
for five days in the company of another colourful character, Ameen Rihani.
The

Lebanese-American

traveller

had

helped

Holmes

prepare

his

him
how
for
25
to
on
and
advised
a
concession
proceed.
application
Percy Cox however, was not disposed to allowing the New
Zealander meet Ibn Saud. He pressured Ibn Saud not to entertain Holmes'
General
Eastern
that
and
was not an oil company and
requests, arguing
its
Ibn
to
Saud
interested
to
other
parties.
concessions
sell
was
seek
would
23Ibidp.276.

24Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours,p. 274-275 and Helms, The Cohesionof Saudi Arabia,
p. 211.
25Rihani, Ibn Sa'oud of Arabia, pp. 78-79.

ABEDIN-FIVE

162

in pursuing the matter, but Cox wanted none of it. He went so far as to
draft a letter of rejection for Ibn Saud to sign but the amir did not agree to
do so. Cox was insistent that the New Zealander be rebuffed. Ibn Saud
tried several times to refuse but then finally

gave in. Britain's 60,000

heavy
by
Cox.
It is perhaps this
weapon
effectively
wielded
a
subsidy was
incident which contributed to Ibn Saud's subsequent decision to negotiate
for
He
be
American
oil
concessions.
oil
companies
would
much less
with
have
they
them
the same power as Cox
and
would
not
with
constrained
had over him.
Major Holmes never had his meeting with Ibn Saud. Instead, he was
to learn from Percy Cox that his request had been turned down. The time
for
Arabia
in
British
Government
the
and
concessions
oil
was not ripe
for
be
26
It
to
such
provide
protection
operations.
able
not
seemed
would
did
like
Holmes
because
Cox
independent
Dickson
that
to
not
an
clear
"inimical
Majesty's
be
His
interests"
27
However,
to
Cox
would
operator
had ulterior motives. He had already been in touch with a close friend and
former deputy, Arnold

Wilson, who worked for the Anglo-Persian Oil

Company (APOC) with the idea of approaching Ibn Saud for a concession.
Apparently

by
Wilson
letter
was
written
and sent to Ibn Saud but the
a

issue had not developed further. Anglo-Persians

major shareholder was

keen
keep
Cox
was
Government
to
British
and
out competitors from
the
Cox
28
By
neutral
zones
creating
prevented any one country
the region.
from claiming exclusive drilling rights should oil be discovered there.
Britain would then be able to enter the area without having to apply for
by
face
imposed
local
one
restrictions
particular
or
ruler.
concessions
The Uqair conference ended on December 2,1922 with the signing of
Najd-Iraq

and Najd-Kuwait

frontier

protocols. Though Cox had known

Saud for many years and had developed

Commissioner
High
amir as

a personal relationship

of Iraq, he was looking

with

the

out for the interests of

Kuwait
Dickson,
Her
68-69;
jubilee,
Neighbours,
Arabian
and
pp.
Z6Philby,
p.276-277.

Her
Neighbours,
278.
Kuwait
p.
and
27Dickson,

Ibn

ABEDIN-FIVE

163

King Faisal as well as Britain. The accords signed at Uqair seemed a great
had
Ibn
Saud's
He
fixed
for
Cox.
to
obtained
agreement
a
achievement
frontier and had refused to grant free access to Najdi tribes to the interior
for
Iraqi
29
bode
Yet
Iraq
this would also
security
concerns.
well
which
of
between
Ikhwan
further
for
the
clashes
and the tribes of Arabia.
stage
set
Cox had focused on- the security of Iraq without

solving the disputes

between Ibn Saud and Sharif Hussein. Neither were the tribes of northern
Najd being taken into consideration in the delineation of borders. There
involvement
discussions
or
were no

of, the chiefs in the conference

be
the
the
terms
to
of
new
agreement
were
simply
passed
proceedings and
down to them. Ibn Saud nevertheless, gained recognition from Britain and
Iraq of his eastern borders and he proceeded to secure more advantages in
the west. 30

Ikhwan Raids and the Northwest Frontier

Having taken the city of Hail, Ibn Saud looked north-west, sending the
Ikhwan to attack and take the towns of al-lauf and Skaka in the oasis of
Wadi Sirhan. 31Several tribes, including the Bani Sakhr tribe of Transjordan
These
for
important
were
pasture.
the
animal
economic and
oasis
used
for
famous
its
Al-lauf
important
salt
production
was
and
an
strategic areas.
Syria.
Previously
Al-Rashid
Hail
had
the
to
trade
the
route
of
point along
break
Wadi
Sirhan
Taking
the
would
the
continuity of the
area.
controlled
Transjordan-Iraqi

borders, providing

territories 32 Holding

a buffer zone to the Hashemite

this area also enabled Ibn Saud to increase his tax

base.
During one particular incident in August 1922 the Ikhwan raided
within

twenty-four

miles of Amman. Hashemite complaints to London

July
26,1923,
PRO
CO
Office,
Colonial
727/
7#37402.
Minute,
2sDepartmental
Jubilee,
Philby,
Arabian
34.;
70
Diary,
Arabian
p.
p.
Clayton,
29
30Philby, Arabian Jubilee,p. 70
31Rihani, Ibn Sa'oud, p. 79.
Frontier
Northern
Saudi
'Britain
State,1922-1925" in The
the
the
Kostiner,
of
and
32Joseph,
New
Uriel
Dann,
York:
East,
Holmes
Middle
& Meier, 1988 p. 38.
in
the
ed.,
Powers
Great

ABEDIN-FIVE

were vociferous.

164

It also became apparent that the boundaries

with

Transjordan had to be fixed by treaty as well 33 Ibn Saud was less inclined
to prevent the attacks since he knew that all subsidies paid to Arab chiefs
Cox
in
March
1924.
be
then attempted to get Ibn Saud to
terminated
would
leaders,
in
Kuwait,
Hashemite
this
time
to settle frontiers with
meet with
Transjordan. But Ibn Saud's reaction was lukewarm

as there was little

incentive to conclude a treaty that might benefit his rivals 34

Nevertheless, Ibn Saud did send a representative to Kuwait,
November
in
of
meetings
attend a series

1923.35 Again

to

arguments

delegates
The
from
Iraq,
the
of
proceedings.
much
characterised
and
Transjordan were united in opposition to Ibn Saud. The British Political
Agent, S.G. Knox, who was mediating noted that the Hashemite delegates
demands
designed
inflame
to
statements
and
unreasonable
making
were
Ibn Saud. However, he was confident that the Najdi delegation could be
forced to accept an agreement. Knox cabled the Secretary of State that "Bin
Saud can be easily coerced should His Majesty's Government so decide" 36
However, Knox was overly optimistic. In fact the Saudi delegates
were particularly

upset that Iraq granted a refuge to tribes from Najd.

Many of the Shammar tribesman who did not wish to remain in Hail after
dynasty
Al-Rashid
defeat
the
and the subsequent establishment of
the
of
Saudi authority had crossed into Iraq. This denied Ibn Saud much needed
blow
his
37
from
to
Inflaming
taxes
also
a
and
was
prestige.
matters
revenue
had
Shammar
begun
fact
turned
the
that
around
the
and
raiding into
was
Najd from Iraqi territory. Thus Najdi negotiators at the Conference were
instructed to obtain the return of such tribes to Ibn Saud's authority so that
delegates
however,
Iraqi
be
punished.
refused and were
they could
Saudi
Arabia,
214-215.
Cohesion
The
pp.
of
Helms,
33
37.
Diary,,
Arabian
An
p.
34Clayton,
35'Report of the Kuwait Conference', Political Agent Kuwait (Knox) to SOSCO, March 30,
1924, IOR L/P&S/10/1034/P1992.
5,1923,
SOSCO,
December
PRO CO 727/7 #59291.
(Knox)
to
Kuwait
36Agent
The
Ikhwan
Designers:
Instruments
their
'On
and
Kostiner,
of Najd and the Emergence
37
298-323.
State'
Saudi
pp.
of the

ABEDIN-FIVE

165

Najdi's
in
to
the
their
anything
opposition
proposed. Moreover
adamant
the Transjordanian representatives wanted Wadi Sirhan returned and the
Hijazi's asked for a buffer zone to be established. 38
The conference dragged on from December 1923 to April 1924 and
due
between
high
in
to
tensions. 39Ibn Saud laid the
twice
was adjourned
blame

squarely

adamant.... wanting

on

the

Iraqis

who

he

called

"grasping

and

everything their own way" 40 Matters were further

his
Mutayr
Faisal
into
tribesman
Iraq
and
al-Duwish
raided
when
strained
in the second week of March 1924 while the negotiations were yet to be
battle
brutal
indicated
Casualty
figures
Reports
the
a
assault.
of
completed.
250.
Livestock
lost
but
at
above
estimated
numbered over
were
varied
10,000. No prisoners were taken. Men and boys that were wounded were
reportedly

killed. The occurrence of such a raid while discussions were

Knox
Kuwait
British
Political
disturbed
the
officials.
many
agent
ongoing
doubt
Sultan
"There
is
Najd
that
the
is
this
no
of
report:
a most
sent
his
inveterate
intriguer,
Ikhwan
the
and
myrmidons,
an
person,
unpleasant
even worse.

The tales I hear of their conduct during their forays are

"
41
in
the
extreme.
revolting
Other British reports of the raid which noted that women were
"treated well" and that the Ikhwan gave them food, water, and in some
42
Nevertheless,
for
because
transport,
elicited
surprise
of the
cases animals
had
believed
that
they
Hashemite
an overwhelmingly strong
officials
raid
dispatch
December
21,1923,
SOSCO
(Knox)
to
Kuwait
contained in Report on the
38Agent
CO
727/7 #62577; Helms, The Cohesionof
PRO
27,1923,
December
Conference
Kuwait
Saudi Arabia, p. 215.
39Agent Kuwait (Knox) to SOSCO, December 27,1923, PRO CO 727/7 #62424. One of the
by the Iraqi's was that Ibn Saud should first make peace
demands
made
most contentious
before any final agreements could be made with Baghdad. Ibn Saud
Hussein
Sharif
with
do by Iraq. 'Report of the Kuwait Conference', Agent Kuwait
to
be
told
to
what
refused
(Knox) to SOSCO, March 30,1924, IOR L/P&S/10/1034/P1992.
Gulf,
May
Resident,
2,1924,
Political
IOR
Saud
to
Ibn
from
Letter
Hussein
Sharif
On
March
7,1924
unilaterally proclaimed himself
L/P&S/10/1034/P2785.
Ikhwan,
incensed
the
this
(Caliph)
something Ibn Saud was able to use to his
and
Khalifa
advantage.
Kuwait
Report
Conference,
SOSCO,
(Knox)
March 30,1924, IOR
to
Kuwait
of
Agent
41
L/P&S/10/1034/1`1992
by
Captain
Driver,
April
5,1924,
Attack'
IOR
L/P&S/10/1034/P2065
Ikhwan
'u'Report on

166

ABEDIN-FIVE

demanded
They
Najd.
payment of reparations and an apology
case against
before any further discussions could continue. By being uncompromising
the Hashemites believed that they would eventually get their way 43 This
hard-line attitude did not endear them to Knox :
At the same time..... I cannot refrain from contrasting the
scrupulously correct attitude, on the surface, of the Sultan of
Najd and his delegates, their apparently earnest desire for
peace and the sacrifices that they are prepared to submit to
secure it with the childish and uncompromising attitude of
the Hashemites. And the more Najd shows its desire for
harden
Hashemites
hearts.
44
the
the
their
more
peace,
Despite further disruption the conference finally ended in April. Ibn Saud
had been loath to apologise or to pay reparations. He absolved himself of
been
had
by
the
that
to
raid
a
reaction
claiming
attacks
made
responsibility
tribes based in Iraq. He asserted that al-Duwish

"had no intention

of

but
following
her
Iraq
the
merely
of
subjects....
or
marauders who
attacking
have fled Najd. "45 In a letter to the High Commissioner of Iraq, Ibn Saud
his
had
he
tried
to
that
restrain
people, promising them that
stressed
Britain would provide justice, but their patience had run out. If he had not
been restraining his subjects, even more raids would have been conducted
he
difficulty
that
his
it
was
maintaining
great
with
calm
was
among
and
tribesmen. 46
In fact Ibn Saud was financially

and politically

drained

by

face the challenge of the Hashemites; to reassure

demands;
to
conflicting
Although
Ikhwan.
the
they were an effective tool
to
British;
satisfy
and
the
in bringing Britain to the negotiating table, the Ikhwan were unpredictable.
Despite defending al-Duwish, Ibn Saud was troubled by the lack of control
him
Ikhwan.
This
had
he
other
and
was partially
over
that

of his own

43Agent Kuwait (Knox) to SOSCO, December 5,1923, PRO CO 727/7 #59291. Knox
had been sent from Sharif Hussein to the delegates at the
instructions
that
reported
hold
their
to
position.
conference

44Ibid,

Gulf,
Saud
Political
Resident,
May
Ibn
2,1924,
HCI
in
to
IOR
to
Letter
45
L/P&S/10/1034/P2785

ABEDIN-FIVE

167

levies
had
he
increased
the
and taxes imposed upon them.
making since
Some tribes fled to Iraq to escape the financial burden. However, the rise in
levies had been necessary to offset the loss of income caused by the end of
the British subsidy in March 1924.47Ibn Saud also forced the diversion of
Jubail
to
traffic
of
and al-Qatif and away from Kuwait in
ports
caravan
from
dues
fees.
This again hit tribal
to
customs
and
port
revenue
gain
order
livelihood; the transport and smuggling of goods from Kuwait into Najd 48
The financial troubles of Ibn Saud was good news to Major Frank
Holmes. Hearing of the end of the British subsidy the New Zealand
his
back
Saud
Ibn
in
hopes
he
to
the
that
see
way
made
might
prospector
be successful in securing an oil concession for his Eastern and General
Syndicate. Holmes was offering an annual payment for the concession
be
Ibn
Saud
believed
deal
that
to
would
now
more
amenable
and
rights
Holmes'
Ibn
Saud
despite
him.
This
to
time,
Percy
agreed
proposal
with
Cox's earlier warning. Cox was right about one thing. The Eastern and
General Syndicate did try to sell the rights to other companies, but since it
interested,
having
find
the resources to
companies
and
not
other
no
could
left
for
itself,
the
Holmes
the
concession
was
oil
undeveloped.
explore
became involved

in what seemed to be more promising oil exploration

let
Bahrain
island
the
the
of
and
nation
annual payment to Riyadh
around
lapse thus suspending his concessionary rights. Had Anglo-Persian beaten
Holmes to the concession they would have had much better resources with
likely
for
is
it
that
have
they
been
to
oil
and
more
would
search
the
which
first to discover 'black gold'. This in turn would have meant greater British
attempts at controlling

Ibn Saud and would

have left little room for

46Ibid.
47Joseph, Kostiner, TheMaking of Saudi Arabia 1916-1936: From Chieftaincy to Monarchical
State, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986 p. 92. Hereafter cited as MOSA.
48Report on Ibn Saud, Barrett, Political Resident, Bahrain, March 3,1928, IOR R/15/5/90,
MOSA, p. 81. Note: This author searched India Office record
Kostiner,
by
cited
locate
but
this report.
not
could
#R/15/5/90

ABEDIN-FIVE

168

American oil companies to enter as they did in the 1930's.49This was an

example of Ibn Saud's willingness to snub Britain. He agreed to grant the
despite
Holmes
Cox's demands that he not do so.
to
oil concession
The Issue of the Caliphate
By March 1924, much more significant events had occurred which were to
change the shape of the Arab and Islamic world. Kemal Atturk, the new
Turkish leader, abolished the Caliphate and declared Turkey a secular
Van
Der
As
Dutch
Meulen pointed out; "since the death
explorer
republic.
had
been
Islam
Prophet,
the
never
without a Khalifa". 50 The Caliph was
of
the spiritual, as well as the political head of the Islamic nation (ummah).
Though weakened through the centuries, the institution

of the Caliphate

had been in existence since the beginning of Islam. This was the final end of
the Ottoman empire and the ushering in of the age of Kemalism. 51
Hussein saw this as a great opportunity to ascend to an even higher
Mecca
Sharif
King
Hijaz.
Asserting his descent from
than
of
or
of
position
the family of the Prophet and the guardian of the Holy Cities of Islam,
Mecca and Medina, Hussein soughEthe title of Caliph. Yet his reputation as
a miser and a ruthless ruler meant there was not much chance that, either
the locals, or the international Muslim community would support his
his
Abdullah
Hussein
the
sought
aid
of
son
who the British had
claim.
Amir.
Trans-Jordan
A
in
the
as
campaign was launched in the
ensconced
49Lacey, The Kingdom, p. 172. November 1923 also saw the arrival in Jeddah of Charles
Crane-a curious American who had played a small part in the post war settlements of the
Middle East. Crane was a former U. S. ambassador, millionaire and contributor to the
Democratic party. He was part of the King-Crane Commission set up by the Supreme
Council at Versailles to look into the aspirations of the people in the Arab provinces taken
from the ottoman empire after the First World War. Crane had travelled through Lebanon
for
developed
dislike
he
French.
In
the
he
Syria
this
trip
a
where
visited Sharif
and
Hussein but would later be a great friend to Ibn Saud and benefactor of the oil industry in
Saudi Arabia. See Bullard, Two Kings, p. 23. George Antonius dedicated his famous book
The Arab Awakening, to Charles Crane.
50Daniel,Van Der Meulen, The Wells of Ibn Saud, London, John Murray, pp. 90-91
51Thomas, Arnold, The Caliphate,Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924, pp. 189-200. Arnold
Caliphate.
European
into
insight
the
The Ottoman Empire fell
conceptions
of
provides
20th centuries with loss of territory, prestige,
19th
By
the
and
early
gradually.
and
had "lost sight of its true significance and
Muslims
many
problems
economic
most
Westerners had never understood it", Van Der Muelen, The Wells of Ibn Saud, p. 90-91

ABEDIN-FIVE

169

local press to support Hussein for the Caliphate. From Amman he also
his
build
in
Syria
image
Iraq
his
to
and
up
where
son Faisal, was
worked
king.
After launching

a bogus media campaign Hussein declared on

March 14,1924, that he had been asked by the ummah to become Caliph. It
his
Hussein
Sharif
ironic
that
claim
could
pure Islamic intentions when
was
he had needed the help of a Christian power to maintain his control of the
holy cities. 52 Nevertheless, Hijazi newspapers printed dozens of dubious
congratulatory

telegrams supposedly from around the Muslim world. Lists

from
Indonesia
India
were presented as evidence of the
and
of pilgrims
support

for Hussein

as Caliph,

although

Muslims

made no public

declarations in those countries. Young religious students from Malaya who

Mecca,
Hussein
in
to
oaths
of
and
who
gave
allegiance
were
were studying
hailed as proof that the five million strong Muslims of the Malay Peninsula
had accepted Hussein as Caliph. The British Minister in Jeddah, Reader
Bullard noted Hussein s trickery:
newspapers, written either by him or under his
him
lavish
in
on
every other line the title he
supervision,
loves; and when pilgrims come to Mecca from countries
where he is not recognised they are not in a position to
likely
he
him;
and
as
as
not
will get out of them
oppose
he
will call recognition and which they will
which
something
have much difficulty in disclaiming afterwards. He is an
bird,
old
clever
and he knows as well as
extraordinarily
fait
the
the
value
of
accompli. His newspapers are full
anyone
of alleged oaths of allegiance, and though many of them are
known not to be genuine it would be hard to disprove them
be
face
taken
their
they
at
may
value in some of the
and
places to which copies of the papers are sent as propaganda 53
his

S7Thedate when Hussein announced his ascension to the Caliphate varies. Lacey (p. 185)
(p. 77) and Troeller (p. 209) assert the date was March 5,1924 while Van
McLoughlin
and
der Meulen, p. 92 asserts it was March 14,1924. Troeller also claims that Hussein was
that Abdullah pushed him into it. This does not seem
the
take
and
to
role
over
reluctant
consistent with other accounts.

January
Office,
Foreign
1924, cited in Bullard, Two Kings, pp.
Report
to
Monthly
SSBullard,
H""..
6lea'141
rF
t"A'
n, 01,; q "A
j
'-,,
For
Mo. {kr o
v;
Ry, it
33-35.
of
Po.
l++rt
61
t,
c
^pL
ifN4l5
1
tw
iA
jai.
and.,
1-kt
owe.
OP
of
ur"
u
115.
taY
?r
P"
vac
Js
sw.
."u

rce4I

Eoa}

ABEDIN-FNE

170

Much of the Muslim world was surprised by these developments; first, the
dynasty
Ottoman
the
and then Hussein's bid for the Caliphate.
abolition of
Many who had been on pilgrimage to Mecca experienced the harshness of
the Sharif's corrupt system. In fact, the large Muslim population of India
was critical of Hussein, believing him to have been installed as part of a
British conspiracy to hijack the Caliphate 54 Even more incensed were the
Ikhwan of Najd. They were ready to take Hijaz and remove Hussein but
were restrained by Ibn Saud. Rumblings of dissent grew within their ranks.
In June 1924, Ibn Saud held a conference of ulema and tribal chiefs to
obtain a consensus on the type of response to employ against Hussein. 55
Instead of chairing the meeting himself, -Ibn Saud gave his ageing father,
Abdul

Rahmar

the honour, knowing

that the elderly

Sheikh would

be
and
able to maintain order amongst the angry
respect
command greater
have
been
distancing
Saud
himself
Ibn
in
could
also
case the
gathering.
favour.
his
did
in
not go
meeting

The conference resulted in a decision to send a message to the

Muslim community

at large detailing Hussein's crimes and declaring him

Khalifa
(Caliph).
It
for
the
of
was announced that the people
position
unfit
behalf
larger
Hussein
Muslim
the
Najd
of
on
remove
would
ummah. But
of
his
Saud
Ibn
the
to
Faisal
name
careful
of
was
place
second
son
again,
as
the author of the message. Many of the seventy million
community

strong Muslim

of India responded enthusiastically to the Najdi proposal. This

that
the
Najd
with
of
chiefs
and
ulema
coupled
of
gave Ibn
endorsement
Saud the support he required to move against Hussein.
The Conquest of Hijaz

The relationship between Ibn Saud and Sharif Hussein had always been
fact
Britain
Hussein
had
the
that
Ibn
of
was
resentful
subsidised
stormy.
54Viceroy, India to SOSFI, September 25,1924, IOR L/P&S/10/1124/P3890.
55Troeller states that it was Abdul Rahman who called the meeting. However, it was
Ibn
Saud
instigator
formality
the
See
the
Troeller,
Saudi
and
was
real
of
event.
a
merely
Arabia, p. 216. Van der Meulen supports the view that it was Ibn Saud who organised the
The Wells of Ibn Saud, p. 93.
der
Meulen,
Van
gathering,

171

AEEDIN-FIVE

Saud and had abandoned commitments he thought had been made to him,
for an independent Arab state. The Sharif was arrogant and condescending
towards Ibn Saud in a deliberate attempt to be insulting. 56He considered
the King of Najd little more than an ambitious desert chieftain and did
he
harass
Ibn
Saud;
humiliate
tried
to starve tribes outside
to
and
much
Hejaz who were under Ibn Saud's protection; and for several years refused
to allow Najdi's to make the pilgrimage.

While Ibn Saud would

send

him
King
Hijaz,
Hussein,
Hussein
letters
to
to
as
of
referring
respectful
deliberately
57
discourteously
tried
to
cause
and
offence.
would respond
Ibn Saud, while believing in his family's hereditary rights to Najd,
fell
Britain's
in
control
over
of
who
rose
and
cognisant
much
was very
Arabia. He did not want to risk openly breaking with Hussein in case that
British support for the Sharif. Though more cautious and

strengthened
diplomatic

than his rival, he often found Hussein meddling in his affairs.

This included
Complaints

bribe
tribal chiefs to revolt
to
attempts

against Najd.

that Ibn Saud addressed to London seemed to be ignored. It

became clear that he would have to act himself to eliminate the Sharifian
Hussein
knew
Britain's
to
Saud
that
58
Ibn
subsidy
would end on
threat
March 31,1924 but he was not sure what security guarantees had been
Hijaz would Britain rush
he
launched
59
If
Sharif.
on
the
an
assault
to
given
to Hussein s aide?.
The possibility
administration

of a move on Hijaz was not lost on the British

in India. It was feared that Indian Muslims would react

Gulf,
September
23,1924,
Resident,
Political
Saud
Ibn
to
from
56Letter
Hussein
Baker,
King
Kingdom
Randall,
Also
the
and
of Hejaz,New
L/P&S/10/1124/P4617;
York: Oleander Press, 1979, pp. 200-201.
57Bullard to Ramsay Macdonald (FO), September 21,1924 L/P&S/10/1124/P4232.
soLetter from Ibn Saud to Political Resident, Gulf, September 23,1924,
and also Bullard to MacDonald, September 21,1924, IOR
L/P&S/10/1124/P4617
by
British
Observations
various
officials noted that Hussein and
L/P&S/10/1124/P4232.
displayed
for
their
those of beduin
openly
contempt
often
Hashemite representatives
Hejaz
had
being
Centuries
the
class
of
ruling
created a superiority complex
of
background.
locally.
See
Hafiz,
Wahba,
Arabian
Days, pp. 79-81. See
them
did
endear
always
not
which
March 30,1924, IOR L/P&S/10/1034/P1992.
SOSCO,
Knox
to
also
" Philby, Arabian jubilee, p. 72.

ABEDIN-FIVE

172

Government
His
Majesty's
a
could be blamed
strongly against such move.
for any fall of the Holy Cities:
The failure of a Muslim power to protect the Holy Places
Wahabi
invader
have
a
might
against
rent Islam in twain, but
it would have meant merely a schism within Islam itself. The
failure of a Christian Power to protect the Holy Places
Wahabis
be
fraught
the
would
against
with
consequences
....
difficult to exaggerate 60
In order to assess the extent of British support
His first objective
several

was against the Hijazi summer

outside

miles

Ibn Saud moved gradually.

three groups of Ikhwan

Mecca. 61 To distract
fighting

capital, Taif, which

attention

from

was

the real plan,

forces were assembled in late August 1924.

One was to attack Iraq, the other, Transjordan,

while the main force would

hit Taif. Unable to agree as to whether Faisal or Saud (the elder sons of Ibn
lead the Taif attack neither was sent. Leadership

Saud) should
among

ibn Luayy,

Khalid

and Sultan ibn Humayd,

was split

both amirs of Ikhwan

62

settlements.

On the first day of September the Ikhwan forces fought and defeated
led
by
his
Ali
fortress.
Taff
Hussein's
Ali
the
son,
outside
army
of
unit
a
into
the
his
walled city and prevented
retreated
men
remaining
and
inhabitants from leaving while the Ikhwan lay siege to the city. Three days
later they themselves sneaked out under the cover of darkness leaving Taif
They fled without

undefended.
According

their supplies, guns and ammunition.

to most accounts, the Ikhwan forces rampaged through

town, killing

'disbelievers'

destroying
and
property.

the

Reports circulated

killing
looting
into
indiscriminately.
the
Ikhwan
city
and
the
charged
that
When

fall
Taif's
Jeddah
reached
panic ensued. The British
news of

Minister, Reader Bullard, was neither surprised nor disappointed:

SOSI,
July
India
5,1923,
IOR
L/P&S/10/938/P2733
Government
to
from
of
Letter
60
Kingdom
Hejaz.
201.
Also
Helms,
Hussein
the
The Cohesionof Saudi
King
of
p.
and
'Baker,
(,
Arabia, pp. 215-216, and Troeller, Birth of Saudi Arabia, p. 216
62Joseph, Kostiner, 'On Instruments and their Designers: The Ikhwan of Najd and the
Emergence of the Saudi State' pp. 298-323.

ABEDW-FIVE

173

It looks as though the Wahabis..... have pushed King Hussein out

of Taif..... Serves him right. He has made no attempt to come to
Wahabi
leader,
Bin Saud, and as you
the
with
agreement
an
know has not troubled to keep the loyalty of his own people. The
towns people detest him and ....he has alienated the tribes. It
he
him
if
right
were pushed out altogether. The
serve
would
Wahabis are very rigid Moslems-don't allow smoking, insist on
regular attendance at the mosque, and so on; but the Hijaz
King
Hussein
that they would welcome
of
so
sick
are
people
63
change.
almost any
In his own report to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Ibn Saud
had
by
instigated
Hussein's
that
matters
attacking the Ikhwan
men
claimed
had
defended
His
Taff.
Sharif's
themselves
the
and
men
routed
outside
forces. " When challenged with reports of Ikhwan atrocities, Ibn Saud
had
"safeguarded
lives
Ikhwan
to
their
the
the
that
utmost
and
asserted
65
the
people".
of
property
By defending his position and accusing Hussein of treachery, the
Saudi leader sought to deflect British criticism.

He was particularly

found
be
1915
lest
he
Treaty
Darin
the
in
of
violating
guilty
of
concerned
Britain
He
had
to
he
s
attack
allies.
not
agreed
sought to plead self
which
defence and convince British officials that Hussein posed a threat to him. In

fact, Ibn Saud was perhaps too concerned, for Hussein had fallen
had
Sharif
The
British
in
to
stubbornly
eyes.
refused
sign the
considerably
Treaty of Versailles, probably out of anger over the lack of support for his
pan-Arab

had
Hussein
Thus,
no solid agreements or treaties
ambitions.

did exist but Hussein had quarrelled

Treaty
Anglo-Hijazi
An
Britain.
with
66Ibn Saud however, was not aware
had
it.
details
its
signed
never
and
over
63Bullard to FO, Letter of September 9,1924, cited in Bullard, Two Kings p. 56.
P4617.
64Ibn Saud to Political Resident, Gulf, September 27,1924, IOR L/P&S/10/1124/
In the 1124 file series, there is much correspondence devoted to arguments of whether or
if
Taif
British
killed
in
how
they
Indians
few
His
were
subjects,
and
were,
the
should
not
Majesty's Government react. Hussein's losses and the implications of the defeat to
Hussein's position did not warrant as much attention.

L/P&S/10/1124/P4617.
October
4,1924.
PG,
Pol-Res.
Saud
to
65Ibn

have
forfeit
Hussein
to
the
treaty
would
the
of
all claims to Syria,
"Under
provisions
hope
that they would be granted to a Hashemite
Palestine
any
and
give
up
Lebanon and
Britain would mediate in case of a dispute between
4
Article
the
treaty
Under
of
ruler.

ABEDrN-FWE

174

He
in
issues
these
still
wary.
was
no rush to test the British, so
and
was
of
his forces took Taff and stopped there.
Meanwhile at the Colonial Office, officials were reluctant to pin the
blame for the attack on Ibn Saud. Since they could not establish the extent
that he was personally involved, there was no advantage in threatening
him; unless His Majesty's Government was actually prepared to act upon
it. The Colonial Office informed the Indian Government:

"It is in the

State,
Secretary
the
of
out of the question that His Majesty's
of
opinion
Government

hostile
in
case
embark
upon
any
should
action against Ibn

Saud, whether direct or indirect, in defence of the Holy Places." 67

This left the people of Hijaz caught in a stand-off between Sharif
Hussein and Ibn Saud. A waiting game ensued. Reader Bullard criticised
local notables for not acting to end the tension. They came "snivelling
H.
M.
G.
68
Hussein
had
them
to
the
to
out
of
pull
mess"
me
wanting
round
tried unsuccessfully to get some of the beduin tribes of Hijaz to go out and
fight against Ibn Saud but they were not interested, as for years Hussein
had forced the tribes to live on meagre rations and false promises and no
for
die
Hussein.
to
tribesmen wanted
Finally,

a group

of townsmen acted to end the stalemate. A

delegation led by Abdullah

Alireza, a prominent merchant, approached

Hussein on October 3,1924, and urged him to abdicate in favour of his son
Ali 69 It was hoped that Ali would not incite the anger of Ibn Saud and
forces
keep
Najdi
from
to
the
Yet
in
negotiate
attacking.
could
perhaps
himself
Ali
it
dispatches
that
Bullard's
was reported
called the prominent
him
Mecca
he
informed
to
Jeddah
with
whereupon
them
meet
and
men of
down
his
favour
in
if
to
help
Sharif
that
step
willing
was
the
the
would
that

Hejaz and Najd. As Ibn Saud gained more influence Hussein became willing to sign but by
L/P&S/10/1124/P4274,
interested;
Naji
Britain
not
al-Assil (Governor of Hijaz)
was
then
Helms,
Cohesion
Saudi
See
Arabia,
1924;
216;
Peter
October
Mansfield, A
15
of
SSFA
p.
to
York:
Penguin,
New
Viking
East,
1991 p. 184.
Middle
the
History of
IOR
Office,
September
23,1924,
L/P&S/10/1124/3855.
India
office
to
Colonial
67
Two
Kings,
in
Bullard,
1924,
October,
5
cited
p. 63.
6$Letter of

69McLoughlin, Ibn Saud.p. 78.

175

ABEDW-FIVE

Hussein
The
then
to
and
spoke
via telephone after
group agreed
situation.
7
Ali
in
Hussein
to
the meantime tried to negotiate
abdicate.
agreed
which
letters
leader.
Saudi
However, each
Saud,
to
Ibn
the
several
sending
with
letters
71
the
torn
and
upon
arrival
arrested
up,
unread.
was
messenger

Despite Ali 's statement, Hussein was reluctant to give up power. It

took much pressure from his son before he acquiesced and agreed to leave
Hijaz for Transjordan. On the steamer that came to take him away were
from
fleecing
loaded
takings
gold-the
with
years of
pilgrims,
containers
local merchants and skimming from British payments to finance the Arab
Revolt. 72 Although

Hussein wanted to stay with his son Abdullah

in

Transjordan, Britain was concerned that the Sharif's presence there could
incite an Ikhwan attack on the mandate. Instead Hussein was sent to Aqaba
Sea.
British
in
Red
With
the
tip
the
policy
was
a
quandary.
of
northern
on
the weakening of the Hashemite family there was a reluctance to openly
its
support.
continue
One issue was the possible backlash from Indian Muslims. They had
Ottoman
Hussein's
Sultan
favour
the
in
been
against
revolt
of
and were
not
further incensed by his claim to being Caliph. Moreover, many Indian
pilgrims

had over the years suffered under Hussein's extortion schemes

Indian
from
The
Caliphate
Committee
had
the
pilgrimage.
profiteering
and
warned

British authorities

Government

to stay out of the problem. His Majesty's

"in no case can British or other nonin the sanctuary of Islam be tolerated by Muslims of

was informed that:

Muslim intervention

India and of the world. " 73 No other issue, whether safety of pilgrim routes
be
in
Hijaz,
important
Indian
British
could
subjects
more
or of

than the

70Bullard to Ramsay MacDonald, 'Report on Taff' October 11,1924, IOR

L/ P&S/ 10/ 1124/ P4421.
n Ibid.
for
Oct.
IOR
'Report
11-20,19241,
L/P&S/10/1124/P4481.
MacDonald,
See
to
72Bullard
Ibn Saud, p. 78, and Van Der Meulen, The Wells of Ibn Saud, p. 95.
McLoughlin,
also
President
Caliphate
Committee,
Ali,
Shaukat
Delhi to British Prime
from
of
Telegram
73
P4080. This
Minister, 10 Downing St., London, 4 October 1924, IOR L/P&S/10/1125/
Government
between
Indian
the
London urging extreme
flurry
of
exchanges
and
a
created
Hejaz.
dealing
in
with
caution

ABEDAI-FIVE

"supreme

176

importance

keeping
free
from
Holy
Land
Islam
of
of
non-

Muslim interference in any shape or under any pretext. " If any one from
interfere,
be
Muslim
it
to
the
were
world
would
regarded as "an
outside
74
Anxious
Islam".
hostility
towards
officials at the Foreign Office felt
act of
it prudent for Britain to remain neutral and to wait and see what would
happen in the Najd-Hijaz conflict. It was deemed to be an internal Muslim
London
75
in
issue
wanted
no
part
which
religious
Thus, Ibn Saud's forces entered Mecca on October 16,1924 and met
fearing
Much
Taif
the
the
of
population
a
repeat
of
assault
no resistance.
had fled. However, Ibn Saud waited almost two months before arriving in
the city. He was cautiously surveying reactions to his capture of Islam's
holiest city. From India the reports were favourable, and the British found
that the Indian Khilafat Committee supported Ibn Saud's taking of Mecca,
hostility"
"deep
Hussein.
76
because
towards
their
seated
of
albeit
Meanwhile,

the people of Jeddah were still uneasy. Although

Hussein had been removed his son, Ali remained ensconced in the city
force.
British
had
The
Consul
he
"The
local
sizeable
a
wrote:
still
where
being
Ali
Wahabis,
less
I
to
the
less
think,
as
prefer
primitive
and
people,
don't
but
intend
fight
for
him;
in
they
to
matters,
religious
and as
strict
they have failed to bring about the surrender of Jeddah they are running
77
away.
In an attempt to forestall panic Ibn Saud issued a proclamation
the inhabitants

to

of the city reassuring them that their lives and property

he
disliked
that
they
that
governor
would
not
appoint
a
and that
were safe;
be
respected and not treated unjustly:
they would
We do not want to occupy your country or to exercise
is
there any hostility between us.
you,
nor
over
sovereignty
You are the inhabitants of the Holy Places and have a right to
74Ibid.

l5Leatherdale, Britain and SaudiArabia,pp.37-38.

for
(Secretary
State
India) September 25,1924, IOR
SOSFI
India
to
of
7'Viceroy,
L/ p&S/ 10/ 1124/ p3890.
77Letter of October 30,1924, cited in Bullard, Two Kings,p. 69.

177

AaEDur-FIVE

our respect and reverence. We absolutely refuse to agree that

his
Hussein
or
of
sons should exercise sovereignty
any
either
over the Hedjaz; the method of administration of the country
will be left for settlement by the Moslem world, whose
decision shall be final. 78
The port of Jeddah was still the primary source for much of the supplies
Ali
for
holy
Mecca.
food
Ibn
Saud's
the
to
of
planned
city
starve
out
and
forces by restricting the transport of grain into Mecca.79However many in
Jeddah feared an assault by the Ikhwan in reprisal and were concerned at
the possible starvation
townspeople

family
of

and friends

in the holy city. The

found
local
beduin
Jeddah
themselves caught in the
and
of

but
little
Groups
to
the
play
each
side
choice
of
with
conflict.
and
of
middle
Hijazi notables and beduin leaders would approach Ibn Saud hoping to
in
Muwahhidun
the
their
case
positions
secure

decisively took over. Then

the same people would go and visit Ali promising their support to him in

the event that he survived in power.

Suspicius of the loyalties of people in Jeddah, All had caravans
travelling

to Mecca from Jeddah raided in order to obtain the mail bags

letters
being
Ibn
Saud
80
The
to
written
were
what
main tribe
ascertain
and
20,000
Harb,
have
than
been
the
the
numbered
more
and
should
area,
a
of
decisive force in the struggle for Hijaz. But the Harb were not united and
for
Ali
in
factions
The
exchange
much-needed
supported
supplies.
some
Ikhwan had labelled them their enemies and whenever the Harb fought
defeats.
Gradually
Harb
the
tribesmen, although
they
severe
suffered
them
for
lost
Najdi
Ali,
taking
the
any
appetite
on
warriors. 81
they supported
Ibn Saud waited in Mecca and had no desire to rush an assault on
Jeddah. He was uncertain of what his Ikhwan soldiers might do in the
73Ibn Saud's Proclamation to People of Jeddah: 7th Rabi al-Awwal, 1343 (October 16,
1924), in Bullard to Chamberlain, November 8,1924 IOR L/P&S/10/1124 P4893.
See also
79Bullard to MacDonald, Report for October 11-20,1924 L/P&S/10/1124/P4481.
Letter of October 19,1924, cited in Bullard, Two Kings, p. 66.
8OBullard, Two Kings, p. 69.

178

ABEDrN-FWE

'liberal' town. Particular care would have to be taken due to the presence of
foreigners
many

and diplomatic

missions in the city. He was also

disappointed that no other community, besides some from among Indian

Muslims, was paying any attention to his call for an international Muslim
holy
had
hoped
discuss
issue
Saud
Ibn
the
the
to
to
cities.
of
conference
form
broader
Muslim
The
Indian
Caliphate
the
community.
obtain support
Committee

was favourable

independence
incorporate

to Ibn Saud only because it desired the

of Hijaz. It saw Hussein as British agent who would

Hijaz into the British Empire. Yet much of the rest of the

Muslim community at large was embroiled in their own domestic political

to
willing
or
able
and
were
not
come out to support
struggles
social
and
him. The Javanese and Malay Muslims were silent and no significant leader
in the Arab world came forth to endorse him. 82
The siege of Jeddah lasted a year. Ibn Saud had wanted to avoid the
risk

foreign
nationals that might
among
of any casualties

intervention

elicit the

of other governments. Orders were issued to his soldiers not

held
by
Ali, such as Jeddah, Medina, and
that
were
to attack main cities
Yanbu. 83 The siege strategy did involve sporadic shelling of Ali's troops,
had
Ikhwan
in
battles.
Ottoman
that
the
their
captured
canon
various
using
The siege ended with Ali bankrupt and with little choice but to retire north
father
brothers
his
Transjordan
and
were ensconced.
where
to

city

By December 25,1925, Ibn Saud had taken Jeddah, the last major
in Hijaz, putting an end to the Najd-Hijaz conflict. The citizens of

Jeddah made it easier by agreeing to open the city gates so long as the
Ikhwan did not enter into the town. With Hijaz under his control Ibn Saud
appointed

his second son, Faisal, as governor. Faisal's travels had given

him broader insights into foreign ways and the Hijaz was 'foreign' in many

al Bullard to Chamberlain, Report for Oct.31-Nov. 8, November 8,1924, IOR

P4893. Also Letter of November 18,1924, cited in Bullard, Two Kings,.
L/P&S/10/1124
p. 73.
IOR
L/P&S/10/1124/P3890
September
25,1924,
SOSFI,
India
to
82Viceroy,
83Goldrup, Saudi Arabia, pp. 382-383.

179

ABEDIN-rTWE

Hijaz
Faisal's
in
For
to
the
of
ability
converse
people
polished
respects.
Classical Arabic as well as Beduin dialect made him easier to understand.
His maternal grandfather's tutoring was paying off and foreign diplomats
freely
that
they
communicate
could
with the new amir of
were relieved
Hijaz M It was observed by those not familiar with the beduin slang of
Central Arabia that Ibn Saud was "very difficult to understand... especially
his
fast
85
he
clips
words".
and
speaks
as
Administering

Hijaz

Ibn Saud had successfully taken over the major towns of Hijaz without
86
He
local
to
the
working
convince
started
casualties.
people of
significant
his good will by a combination of appeasement and force. He brought the
in
differences
Hijaz
Najd
to
their
together
order
settle
and
and
ulema of
Hijaz
The
in
their
of
ulema
were
practical
relationship.
amicable
an
create
leadership
in
the
towards
change
political
and pledged allegiance
outlook
to Ibn Saud. A consultative council or majlis al-shura made up of merchants,
Mecca
The
for
created.
also
of
was
majlis
was
notables
a
means
and
ulema
direct
have
locals
to
access to the new ruler and a convenient tool for
the
Ibn Saud to implement rulings. 87
In light of his expanded realm Ibn Saud declared himself malik alhijaz wa sultan najd wa mulhaqatihah: King of Hijaz and Sultan of Najd and
its dependencies. 88 This immediately
Government

alarmed the India Office and the

of India. The Viceroy sent a telegram to London expressing

8Sheean, Faisal:The King and his Kingdom, p. 81.

8SClayton, An Arabian Diary, p. 128.
86Wahba Arabian Days, p. 154.
87The Hijazi ulema were quick to pledge their allegiance to the new ruler just as the Najd
Saud over a decade earlier. This was in keeping with principles of
Ibn
done
had
to
ulema
Ibn Taymiya and the justification of preventingfitna. Ibn Saud however, did not appoint
See
Bligh,
From
Hijaz.
Prince to King, p. 23; Lacey, The
in
to
Ikhwan
of
power
positions
any
Chapter
1 of this work.
194
and
Kingdom, p.
a The reasons for Ibn Saud's use of the title 'King' are unclear. Perhaps he sought to
he
because
did not want to be identified as having
Islamic
term
the
an
of
use
minimize
Islamic leadership. Thus avoiding Muslim political feuds and
for
or
pan-Arab
pretensions
his relationship with the British. McLoughlin, Ibn Saud, p. 84; Leatherdale,
complicating
Britain and Saudi Arabia, p. 59.

ABEDIN-FIVE

180

his serious distress over Ibn Saud's moves into Hijaz and proclamations of
being ruler. As far as he was concerned Ibn Saud could speak;
merely as the ruler of Nejd and not as the holder,
permanently or temporarily, of the Hedjaz. His possession of
the Hedjaz has clearly brought about a completely different
What was then appropriate is no longer
situation....
appropriate when applied to Moslem Holy Land ... 89
The Indian Government was worried about the reaction of Muslims in
India, fearing the perception that Britain was again meddling in the affairs
of Muslims

and was trying to take over Muslim holy cities. In London

Foreign Office officials viewed the Viceroy's concern as unnecessary panic

"the
Government
India
believed
that:
of
are as timid as usual". The
and
Colonial

Office, however, took matters more seriously and called an

interdepartmental

meeting

so that officers from

the Foreign

Office,

Colonial Office and India Office could meet and decide how to deal with
Foreign
Office
Louis
Mallet
Hijaz.
in
Oliphant
such
officials
as
and
events
to postpone the meeting until Clayton came back from Arabia.

wanted
However,

Clayton would be spending time in Yemen and it would

be

he
before
Shuckburgh
Colonial
the
returned.
at
month
office did
another
long
Foreign
Office's
the
to
so
and
was
annoyed
at
wait
wish
relaxed
not
attitude.
Because of the overlap that existed in departmental jurisdictions

the

Foreign Office and Colonial Office had to co-operate. This was not always
On
Foreign
to
the
Office
one
policy
making.
occasion
smooth
conducive
Colonial
it
telegram
the
of
a
office
a
copy
which
planned to send to
sent
Ibn
Saud.
The
Colonial
HMG's
to
Office
did
appreciation
not
convey
frustrated
Foreign
for
Office
figures
this
like
weeks
and
several
respond
Oliphant who remarked:
It is really very difficult to conduct affairs properly with Bin
Saoud when we have to consult I. O. or C.O. In this case it has
89Viceroy, Foreign and Political Department, Government of India, to SOSI (Secretary of
State for India) January 5,1926, PRO FO 371/11437 E/180/180/91.
90Shuckburgh Minute FO 371/11437 E/322/180.

181

ABEDIN-FIVE

C.
in
O.
to
three
concurrence
a short
obtain
weeks
required
draft telegram. Such delay must inevitably diminish the good
had
has
Arab
Chieftain
on
an
who
not
effects of our attitude
91
of
offices.
government
of
a
multitude
experience
Meanwhile

having heard no reply from London or indication as to when

his
best
he
Saud
Ibn
be
to
position
as
acted
enhance
things would
resolved
British
Consul,
Stanley
Jordan
in
in
the
Keeping
new
with
contact
could.
Jeddah, he sought to provide the British with more incentives to support
him. Ibn Saud casually mentioned in conversation to Jordan the increase in
Communist

deal
Russia
in
the
was
supplying
a
great
of
region.
activity

fact,
Saud
Consul,
he
In
Ibn
Syria.
in
told
the
the
to
revolt
money and arms
himself had been approached several times to provide assistance, but had

for
Britain.
Ibn
Saud
involved
from
of
respect
out
getting
refrained
follow British policy in all respects as
he
"intended
to
Jordan
that
reassured
flair
drama
92
With
Ibn
the
greater
even
and
that
world".
part of
regards
Saud provided a sensitive piece of information which he told the consul
for
from
British
the
sources,
and
reliable
obtained
was a great secret,
headquarters
Bolshevik
the
the
of
organisation was
government only -that
This
in
Damascus.
information and the
Persian
in
the
located
consulate

Consul:
Saud
the
Ibn
surprised
attitude of
He expressed great concern for Trans-Jordan and Palestine,
British
Government
to
the
warn
wishes
and earnestly
of
danger from that quarter where, he stated, Bolshevik money
He
influence
ground.
gaining
were
several times
and
93
this
appeared
most
and
sincere.
warning
reiterated
Having

recently

Transjordan

deep
into
made conquests

Hijaz,

which

bordered

Ibn Saud was clearly concerned about calming British fears

Jordan
friendship
his
He
towards
their
assured
of
assistance.
and securing
his
he
information.
Perhaps
hoping
the
of
was
also
accuracy
Britain and of
FO
371/11437
in
PRO
E/902/180.
February,
1926,
10
Minute,
Oliphant
In
Chamberlain
(Jeddah)
SSFA
Agency
(Sec.
State
British
to
for
Jordan,
Consul,
Acting
92
371/11437
FO
E/364/180.
PRO
29,1925.
December
Affairs).
Foreign

ABEDIN-FIVE

to involve

182

himself in northern affairs. He told Stanley Jordan he was

few
"no
Iraq
that
trouble was to be feared
see
problems,
would
confident
there". Jordan was surprised when the King offered assistance in case
trouble broke out in Transjordan. However,
for
last-that
alarming news
amir with a surprisingly

Ibn Saud kept the most

a Bolshevik envoy had approached the Saudi

generous offer of money, arms, ammunition

and

Saud
Ibn
inquired
he
When
have
do
in
to
about
what
would
aircraft.
even
"to
British"
94
trouble
the
the
stated
simply
make
with
envoy
return,
This confirmed existing suspicions among officials in London that
Russian-sponsored activity in Hijaz was increasing. It was feared that the
King might fall "under the sway of anti-British propaganda" unless there
in
Riyadh-93
The
British
the
at
court
problem was that such an
official
was a
be
have
Ibn
to
to
the
command
senior
enough
respect
would
of
officer
Saud. Yet which senior officer would be able to live in harsh conditions in
the Najdi

capital.

Moreover,

there were disagreements

over which

department would finance the posting of an official to the King's court. 96

This incident was a prime example of Ibn Saud's diplomacy. He had
hinted
loyalty
Britain
his
from
to
Russia.
It
at
and
enticements
proclaimed
British
interest
it
designed
to
and
elicit
greater
proved a successful
was
Louis
found
Foreign
Office
Mallet
Ibn
in
to
Saud's
officials.
regard
strategy
frank
for
Arab"
"evidently
"surprisingly
an
and
strongly antiattitude
Mallet believed that: "it was most advantageous that we
ibn
Saud
be
in
S.
touch
Jordan.....
through
I
with
personal
now
should
keep
interest
in
is
it
friendly
to
the
that
our
own
on
entirely
most
submit
[Ibn
97
Saud]".
him
terms with
Bolshevik".

93Ibid.

SSFA,
December 29,1925, PRO FO 371/11437 E/364/180.
Jordan,
to
Jeddah,
Consul
94
95CO to FO April 30,1925, IOR L/P&S/10/938/P1339.
10,
CO,
FO,
in
Department
between
10
Minute, March 3,1924 IOR
Disagreements
%
L/P&S/10/938/P989.

from
CO
FO,
December
Dispatch
in
16,1925,PRO FO 371/11437
Minute,
to
Mallet's
97
E/322/180.

183

ABEDIN-FIVE

The fact that Ibn Saud appeared to be cooperating in attempts to

Iraq
Transjordan
his
increased
boundary
issues
the
and
of
credibility.
settle
But in reality
neutrality

Ibn Saud hoped to push Britain out of its position of

in the Najd-Hejaz

conflict to one that would provide positive

Office
for
him.
D.
G.
It
that
worked
strategy
official
was
support
-Foreign
Osborne commented: "we should exploit Mr. Saud's friendly disposition to
the utmost. There is every indication that he will be a more reliable and
Hussein"98
friend
than
valuable
Mallet, Osborne, and others were pleased at the friendly

attitude

fact
display
Saud.
The
for
Ibn
helpfulness
that
this
of
affection
of
and
Britain came shortly after Ibn Saud made requests for a new treaty, arms
Office
Foreign
financial
the
was still at that time
support, upon which
and
debating, did not raise eyebrows. Even Louis Mallet whose Foreign Office
Ibn
frequently
Saud
face
took
sarcastic
and
pessimistic,
at
were
minutes
value 99
With it apparent that Ibn Saud was now in de facto control of Hijaz,
it became time to repair relations before his confidence encouraged him to
lead
Gilbert
Clayton
further.
to
Ibn
to
selected
was
a
mission
even
expand
Saud10 When Clayton arrived in December 1925, the King himself was
his
Under
1915
the
terms
the
Treaty
to
of
status.
previous
update
anxious
from
Saud
to
Ibn
into
Darin,
correspondence
was
refrain
or
entering
of
foreign
Britain.
He
than
other
any
power
with
was unable
treaty relations
dispose
lease
his
territories to
or
otherwise
of
any
of
mortgage,
to cede, sell,

101
Ibn
Saud
British
foreign
that
this
consent.
now
without
argued
power
a
height
during
First
World
War
the
the
of
the
made
was
when
agreement
Osborne Minute, commenting on Jordan to SSFA report of December 29,1925, PRO FO
371/11437 E/364/180/91.
99Clive Leatherdale notes that British officials could at times be patronising or
Arabs and their mentality. See Leatherdale, Britain and Saudi
towards
condescending
British
this
that
This
the
96.
of
work
point
officials often failed to
reinforces
Arabia, p.
Arab leaders like Ibn Saud employed to their advantage.
the
which
guile
appreciate
100Busch, Britain, India and the Arabs, 1914-1921,p. 72. Clayton had been the Director of
during
WWI.
Egypt,
Army,
British
Intelligence,
Military

101Mallet, Memorandum, March 8,1926, PROFO 371/11437E/1738/180/91.

184

ABEDIN-FIVE

situation

he
different.
"sincerely
Though
was
vastly
was

complete understanding

anxious for

and co-operation with Great Britain"

"sound"
a
more
required

Ibn Saud

agreement with His Majesty's Government 102

Clayton was obliging and inquired about the areas that the King wished to
have revised in the treaty.
Ibn Saud made three points. First, he sought to, have Najd formally
This
independent
state.
would
as
an
recognised

involve removing

the

from
that
with
other
powers
relations
and
prevented
ceding, selling
clauses
foreign
Second,
import
to
the
to
governments.
right
concessions
or giving
desert
life.
important
Finally,
he
because
were
an
part
of
weapons
arms
for
financial
This
was needed to compensate the
assistance.
made a request
tribes that had been ordered to stop raiding into neighbouring states. They
had to be compensated for the loss of their traditional means of livelihood.
Ibn Saud was also concerned about Hashemite intrigue against him and
firm
sought

commitments

from Britain. Already,

during

the previous

had
in
Transjordan
important
Hashemite
the
the
ruler
annexed
summer,
Hijaz.
Akaba
in
the
Maan
of
north-west
and
cities of
In London the reaction to these requests was mixed. The Foreign
Office was agreeable to the recognition of Najd's independent status but
In
the
two
the
other
requests.
case of supplying
about
enthusiastic
was not
Ibn
Saud
to
the
to
extent
as
there
which
uncertainty
was
exercised
arms,
Office
A
Foreign
tribes.
the
the
minute
expressed
concern that
over
control
"there is no regular Najdian army, and the tribes will be armed by Ibn
Saud and may then get out of hand and raid into British mandated
territories".

103On the issue of financial assistance, it was not considered

appropriate

to begin another subsidy policy, as with the capture of the

CO
Clayton
dated
FO,
including
to
December 16,1925, FO
to
dispatch
report
102CO
371/11437 E/322/180.

from
FO,
December
CO
Dispatch
16,1925,PROFO 371/11437
in
to
Minute
Mallet,
103
E/322/180.

185

ABEDM-FIVE

Holy cities Ibn Saud should gain enough revenue from pilgrimage and as
less
be
104
in
"he
of
money".
need
may
such
This was far from the truth. Ibn Saud had spent a great deal of his
Hijazi
largesse
laying
in
local
to
to
the
cities
and
siege
providing
resources
tribes. The pilgrim
situation.

traffic had slowed due to the uncertain

These factors were not at the forefront

political

of Foreign Office

found
Clayton
Nevertheless,
105
accommodation with Ibn
considerations.
Saud and reached a new agreement known as the Treaty of Jeddah. Under
this treaty, signed on May 20,1927, Britain recognised the "complete and
dominions
his
King
independence
Hijaz
the
the
of
of
majesty
of
absolute
be
106
There
Dependencies".
"peace
its
Najd
would
a
state
of
and
and
and of
friendship" between Ibn Saud and Britain. However, the pledge to come to
the defence of Ibn Saud in case of attack was withdrawn.

This was still a

he
his
had
Not
Saud.
for
Ibn
only
expanded
empire at the expense
triumph
but
he
had
British
Hashemites,
the
obtained
also
recognition
of
independent

however,
This
achievement
would
ruler.

his
own men-the
conflict with

as an

bring him into

Ikhwan.

The Ikhwan Revolt

Following

the conquest of Hijaz, Ibn Saud spent more than 18 months

from
judges
He
his
Najdi
the
appointed
position.
ulema,
consolidating
from his extended family and gave senior positions to loyal
governors
Hijazi notables in town councils and local administrations. Yet the Ikhwan
They
for
did
thanked
their
of
were
authority.
any
positions
get
not
chiefs
food
livestock
back
hijras
to
their
and
and
sent
of
cloth,
gifts
given
services,
had
For
those
interior-107
who
given up their traditional beduin life in
in the
had
beliefs
faith
Ikhwan
to
the
this was a
vowed
spread
and
of
the cause
frustrating anti-climax. Not only had their jihad been halted but the

io+Ibid.

Saudi
Arabia p. 216.
Cohesion
The
Helms,
of
105
in
IOR
Jeddah,
May
20,1927,
L/P&S/10/1166/P4518.
text
Treaty
1,
Article
of
106
The
Desert
Howarth,
jubilee,
90
King, p. 154.
Arabian
Philby,
See
and
p.
107

ABEDIN-FIVE

186

disbelivers
innovations
fact
In
the
were
still
of
present.
some of the
"
'innovations', such as the motorcar, telephone, and telegraph, system that
were in already used in the Hijaz were incorporated by Ibn Saud into his
structure and he expanded the network of telegraph

new administrative
lines to Najd as well.

These inventions topped the list of complaints of the Ikhwan. A

petition of grievances, whose chief signatory was none other than Faisal alDuwish, was sent to Ibn Saud. Besides the complaints of foreign inventions
I
such as automobiles, telegraph and telephones, taxes were too high and the
disbelieving

tribes of Iraq and Transjordan were permitted to graze their

herds in Ikhwan territory. 108In an attempt to pacify the situation Ibn Saud
defended his position by stating that the ulema had not found anything
devices.
However,
the
this was not a satisfactory response and
wrong with
several

incidents

occurred

where

telephone

wires

were

cut

and

automobiles smashed.
Dissatisfaction

with the response of the King led al-Duwish

to

increase his raids into Iraqi and Transjordanian territory to defy the treaties
he
'disbelievers'.
Iraq
In
the
attacked settlements of the Zayyad,
made with
Yajeeb and

Beni Salama tribes. From

Hail,

al-Duwish

raided

into

Transjordan and terrorised the local Ruwalla tribe. While he did not always
lead the attacks, members of his tribe, the Mutayr, were actively involved.
The frequency of the raids led Abdullah, ruler of Transjordan to note with
his
beduin
the
joining
that
of
were
on
many
verge
the Ikhwan
of
alarm
simply

to protect themselves from attack. 109 Although

he desperately

Abdullah
instructed
his
to
to
attack,
was
counter
restrain
wished
men. The
Colonial Office did not want to provide Ibn Saud with any justification for
launching more attacks into Transjordan or Iraqi territory. 11o

308Wahba, Arabian Days, p. 133; Philby, Arabian jubilee, p. 93.

109Amir Abdullah to HC (High Commissioner), Amman, February 1925, IOR
L/P&S/1125/P768.
no SOSCO to High Commissioner, Palestine, February 25,1925, JOR
L/P&S/10/1125/P585.

187

ABEDIN-FIVE

Lieutenant John Bagot Glubb was the 'Special Service OfficerIkhwan Defence' on the Iraqi frontier. He witnessed the aftermath of the
raids:
Along the whole length of the Nejed frontier from Basra to
Iraq
the
Nejef
terrified
the
of
remains
shattered and
near
back
in
the
tribes
confusion
on
and
panic
arrived
sheperd
banks of the Euphrates.... several hundred Iraqis had been
had
been
looted,
thousands
sheep
of
massacred and many
food
donkeys,
tents,
to
clothing,
utensils, and
mention
not
blow.
devastating
"'
It
a
money. was
With the loss of so many men, families were left in desperation. Women
half
destitute.
"orphaned,
naked
and
utterly
widowed,
and children were
"112
jewellery.
their
despoiled
Ikhwan
outer
garments
and
The
women of
from
"The
Baghdad
Iraq
little
be
to
since:
Yet there seemed
sympathy
government

regarded

tribes

and tribal

raiding

with

aversion

and

beduin almost as much as they did

disliked
They
their
own
resentment.

houses".
113
desired
their
Saud,
Ibn
all
on
a
plague
and
those of
As a result of these raids Iraqi tribes became disillusioned with the
British and Iraqi governments and sceptical of their promises of protection.
best
directly
decided
to
the
to
that
course
was
appeal
Some tribesmen

it
help
for
since
was assumed that Riyadh
Saudi authorities
against attack,
listener
in
Finding
the
a
sympathetic
raids.
al-Duwish's
was orchestrating
Ibn
Saud,
Iraqi
the
tribes
Hail,
of
a
cousin
were
also
was
who
amir of
from Ikhwan raids in return for the payment of tax to
immunity
offered
instead
in
to
Iraqi
Other
tribes
engage
counter-attacks
chose
Saudi coffers.
led
hostilities
Lt.
Glubb
to
and
counter
raids.
escalated
of their own which
Ibn
Saud's
British
that
of
sceptical
claims
were
officials
aland other
Ikhwan
to
contrary
operating
orders, especially
were
other
Dwish and

`terimmunity was granted to some Iraqi tribes in return for taxation.114

of
Stoughton,
Hodder
&
London:
in
Desert,
1960,
War
136-138.
the
Glubb,
pp.
Bagot
Ilijohn
did
Glubb
not report receiving any complaints of rape or assault on women which
132Ibid.
him.
surprised
113Ibid., p. 142.

114Glubb,War in theDesert,p.140.

ABEDIN-FIVE

188

Ibn Saud's responsewas to claim that Iraqi raids into Najd territory
had compelled the Ikhwan to respond in the manner which they did. In
fact he consistently maintained that it was attacks by tribes based in Iraq
his
killing
the
true
territories,
Transjordan
that
aggression,
raiding
was
and
dozens of people and capturing thousands of camels. Ikhwan raids were
the result of the injustices committed against them and because Britain did
had
Ibn
Saud
but
he
tried
the
to
attacks.
restraint
was not
prevent
nothing
longer,
intention
his
their
fault
if
and
could
wait
angry
no
were
people
at
being only to recover their property 115
Ibn Saud had successfully used the Ikhwan on the battlefield

to

defeat Sharif Hussein and his family. Having created the Kingdom of Hijaz
down
lead
lead
Ikhwan
to
Saud
Ibn
the
Najd
settle
and
a
wanted
a
and
however,
Faisal
Hijaz
life.
The
gave
of
al-Duwish no
conquest
sedentary
incentive to retire. Victory only increased his wish to settle the score
Transjordan
Iraqi
Britain
had
British
the
regimes.
and
supported
against
disrupted
had
borders
traditional
tribal migratory
which
created arbitrary
had
into
Najd,
flee
Iraqi
to
Yet
the
tribes
ability
raid
across
patterns.
invisible borders and claim sanctuary under the Hashemite regime, with
Force
(RAF).
Air
Royal
This was insulting to althe
the added protection of
Duwish who felt that having humiliated the Hashemites and run them out
be tolerant and respectful of their 'borders'
to
Hijaz
there
no
reason
was
of
in Iraq and Transjordan. Other Ikhwan chiefs such as Ibn Humayd of the
Utayba and Dhaidan Ibn Hithlain of the Ajman supported him. 116

Faisal al-Dwish believed that he was being treated unjustly. 117He

led
battles
the sieges of Hail and Medina. Months
fought
had
and
many
Its Ibn Saud to Political Resident, Gulf, September 17,1924, IOR L/P&S/10/1124/P4617.
The
Desert
King
Howarth,
155.
88;
Jubilee,
Arabian
p.
Philby,
p.
116
117Letter of Faisal al-Dwish to Amir Saud, Riyadh, June 6,1929, text in IOR R/15/2/92
Duwish complained about the prohibition on raiding and noted that he had left everything
being
Britain's
fulfilled.
Meanwhile,
Saud.
Ibn
Saud was
Ibn
for
wish
every
was
to'fight
from
keeping
"both
Ikhwan
the
with
our religion and worldly
accused of preventing
had suffered because of the restrictive policies
livelihood
tribes
The
of
many
concerns".
if
Ikhwan
letter
that
the
In
had
the
to
stated
al-Duwish
were
allowed
them.
raid
and
upon
loyalty
his
he
Ibn
Saud.
to
forgiven,
of
pledge
renew
would
their past

189

ABEDIN-FIVE

had been spent lying patiently in wait without raiding as ordered by Ibn
Saud. Yet despite his successesFaisal was not rewarded with a position of
before,
He
Artawiya.
the
chief
of
small
as
settlement
of
remained
power.
Now in the face of provocation by the British and tribes under Iraqi
fast.
he
A
to
under
orders
stand
still
proud chief of the
was
protection,
tribe, Faisal could claim just as noble a descent as Ibn Saud. It

Mutayr

1?ecame more and more difficult for him to accept that Ibn Saud had a right
over him. al-Duwish

was joined by other Ikhwan leaders with similar

but
Saud,
by
Ibn
them
the
not
all
of
were
motivated
against
grievances
for
desire
Ibn
Humayd
Utayba
the
power.
of
and
was a
same resentment
devout Ikhwan follower who saw a dilution

of Ikhwan ideals. He was

Hijaz.
leniency
Dhaidan
to
the
the
and
customs
people
of
shown
of
critical
Ibn Hithlain

had
Ajman
the
a personal grudge against Ibn Saud.
chief of

His tribe had been forced to join Ibn Saud because they were defeated in
battle and he was always looking to free himself from subservience to
Najd. 118
These leaders and their tribes were at the forefront of the rebellion
Ikhwan
Among
Saud.
feeling
there
the
Ibn
the
generally
was
also
against
been
had
favour
shown to the disbelieving 'Ingleezi'
that too much
(English)

the introduction

of innovations

such as the automobile

and

leader
All
been
had
that
their
signs
allowed.
was being swayed
telegraph
by the mushrikeen.
Tensions came to a head when in late September 1927, the Iraqi
build
Busaiya
to
Police
a
police
post
near
Border
started
wells. It was the
first of a series of posts that Baghdad wanted to build in order to extend
deter
from
Ikhwan
Najd.
119 Although
and
raids
patrols
police
the range of
kilometres
Iraqi
Faisal
inside
115
territory,
al-Duwish saw
the post was
by
'unbelievers'
insult
flagrant
the
to solidify their
attempt
and an
this as a
Mutayri tribal grounds. On November
that
in
territory
part
of
was
position
1'sHabib, Ibn Saud'sWarriorsofIslam,p. 127.

190

ABEDIN-FIVE

5, al-Duwish led an attack, destroying the police post and killing everyone
there. 'Iraq and Britain made loud protests. Ibn Saud denied that he had
but
had
Iraq
build
fort
in
that
to
the
the
claimed
raid,
no
right
authorised
the first place. Its construction violated agreements made at Uqair which
the establishment of military posts near the border. Supporters

prohibited

Saud
Ibn
to
and urged that a campaign against Iraq be
of al-Duwish came
Though this was refused, the stipends of al-Duwish and the other

initiated.

Ikhwan involved in the raid were withheld. Orders were also issued that
they remain in the settlement of Artawiya

and prohibited

them from

Najd. This did not stop the raids, as other Ikhwan took up the

leaving

The
opportunity
cause.

to inflict punishment on Iraqi tribes and gather

booty for themselves were motivating factors. 120

Meanwhile reports reached Baghdad that Ikhwan raids on Shammar
heavy
inflicting
Iraqi
inside
territory
casualties. The British
were
tribesmen
High Commission was flooded with complaints and reports indicating that
"all the desert tribes in Iraq are in a state of extreme panic" 121This placed
British officers in Iraq in a "most humiliating

position", as many of the

tribesmen were critical of Britain's inability to protect them. Some chiefs

Ikhwan
join
to
the
to
prevent attacks on them. Also
purely
pledging
were
Britain
Iraqi
be
in
letting
that
growing
were
circles
may
ruling
suspicions
"remind
Iraq
her
dependence
to
Ikhwan
occur
of
raids
the
on the
felt
British
For
that Ibn Saud's inability
122
their
officials
part
British".

to

"merely
"he
Ikhwan
fact,
that
in
be
the
a
pretence"
and
was
may,
control
conniving
disapproval

at these raids whilst

at the same time he expresses his

23
them"?
of

119Iraq Police Report of November 7,1927 on Busaiyah raid, PRO FO

371/12241/E5228/56/91.
PRO
FO
371/12241/E5228/56/91.
December
6,1927,
FO,
Office
to
Also Asad,
Colonial
120
Ibn
Saud
224-225.
Asad
during
Mecca,
these troubles; Philby,
to
was
with
Road
pp.
The
Arabian jubilee, p. 93; Howarth, The Desert King, p. 159.
12iHCI to SOSCO, December 29,1927, PRO FO 371/12241/ E5615/56/91.
122Ibid.
123The problem was that the raids took place in a territory stretching over 600 miles and it
latest
date
information
In
to
to
difficult
about
up
raids.
acquire
addition, officials were
was

191

ABEDIN-FIVE

Realising that he needed to diffuse tension with the British and put
Ibn
Saud
in
Riyadh.
Ikhwan
conference
activity,
called
a
some restraints on
He invited chiefs, ulema and amirs of towns from across Arabia. Faisal al: 4.
Duwish refused to attend as did Ibn Humayd of the Utayba and Hithlain of
I

the Ajman. This was a carefully organised event, tactfully designed to

for
He
Saud's
Ibn
would
seek
consensus
and approval
position.
reinforce
his rule and satisfy the British that he was doing something about the
Ikhwan. Those who attended were all reliant to a varying degree on the
largesse extended to them by Ibn Saud. The subsidies of food, clothing and
loyalties
by
Saud
Ibn
to
them
maintain
enabled
within
supplies provided
their own tribal areas.
In a grand gesture Ibn Saud declared that he would step down as
did
him.
lead
This
if
he
they
because
not
want
not
was of
would
ruler
fool
he
have
124
Ibn
Saud
no
and
was
would
not
course, soundly opposed.
The
he
if
the
of
outcome.
certain
not
gathered
were
made such a move
hear
Saud's
did
Ibn
but
to
they
that
of
want
resignation
not
chiefs claimed
from
innovations'
the
the
the
about
of
ulema
motor car,
clarification
rather
They
telephone.
also wanted an answer as to why there
telegraph, and
beduin
Iraq
built
in
being
forts
obstructing
were
which
migration and
were

depriving accessto water wells.

The ulema
'innovations'

defence
in
to
were
ready
answer
present
of the

declaring that there was no prohibition to these inventions in

Islam. They were being used for the benefit of people and therefore were
forts
Saud
Ibn
issue
for
the
As
the
pledged to get them removed
lawful.
of
Ikhwan leaders reaffirmed
the
With
the
answered
questions
time.
over
from
Anaizah
Trans-Jordan
tribal
the
which
grazing
ground
extended
to
about
concerned
formerly
"though
800
distance
and
miles
peaceful and well disposed
of some
Baghdad -a
6
9
have
the
or
months shown signs of coquetting with the Mutair
past
within
towards us,
"
Saud.
If
Ibn
to
that
their
transferring
allegiance
occurred then this was a
tribe and of
loss
Anaizah
Because
Ikhwan
the
to
the
the
threat.
it
of
side
would
make
security
serious
"impossible to maintain the trans desert route and the line of communications for
from Egypt, which is the whole basis of our power in Iraq. " Trenchard
reinforcements
Minute (Sir Hugh Trenchard), PRO FO 371/12241 E5615/56. See also HCI to SOSCO,
January 17,1925 IOR L/P&S/10/1125/P194.

192

wsEDIt-FIVE

their allegiance to Ibn Saud and declared that they would fight against alDuwish who had unlawfully

rebelled against his amir. 125The meeting

Saud
Ibn
his
leadership
a
with
reaffirmation
of
and
successfully provided
the condemnation of al-Duwish. It would now be safe to move against him.

Ibn Saud began raising a new force recruiting heavily from towns
instead of Ikhwan settlements. He also provided motorised transport to
him
battle
improved
that
to
take
the
to al-Duwish's
allowed
mobility
give
own

backyard-the

field

of Sabilah, just outside

the settlement

of

Artawiya. 126The advance of this new mobile force did not appear to faze
Faisal al-Duwish.
battlefield

It had been years since Ibn Saud had fought on the

large
force
have
for
that
the
assumed
was
and may
show, and

the King would negotiate his way out.

Since Ibn Saud had not previously moved against him, Duwish did
for
battle.
had
However,
King
Ibn
Saud
believe
the
the
stomach
was
not
determined to eliminate all threats to the stability of his young kingdom.
He set up an ambush for the rebel forces and lured them into a crossfire of
before
fired
them
When
they
of
many
slaughtering
a
shot.
guns,
machine
Ibn Saud sent his cavalry in to finish off the survivors the Ikhwan fled into
flee
Humayd
Ibn
to
desert.
the battlefield, but alsurvive
and
managed
the
badly
wounded
was

Duwish

with

bullet
in the stomach and was
a

127
captured.
Brought before Ibn Saud on a stretcher Faisal al-Duwish

was in

King's
The
but
did
physician
examined
al-Duwish
condition.
not
critical

live.
Feeling
Ibn
Saud
to
him
than
merciful
week
a
pardoned almore
give
Duwish,

allowing

King's

him to return to Artawiyah

to die. 128Hearing of the

leniency, Ibn Humayd came out of hiding to surrender as well.

However,

in this case Ibn Saud decided to set an example. Ibn Humayd

Saudi
Arabia
254.
Cohesion
The
p.
Helms,
of
124
125Habib, Ibn Saud's Warriors of Islam, pp. 121-135.
126Howarth, The Desert King, pp. 168-169; Philby, Arabian jubilee, p. 93.
127These accounts are told by a young Saudi official Mohammad Almana in Arabia Unified:
A Portrait of Ibn Saud, London: 1980, pp. 106-112. See also Asad, The Road to Mecca, p. 225.
12SPhilby, Arabian jubilee, p. 93.

ABEDIN-FIVE

193

he
later
into
Riyadh
jail
died. Orders
thrown
a
where
was arrested and
for
Humayd's
Ghot
Ghot
be
Ibn
issued
to
settlement
of
were
razed as an
firm,
how
be.
Ibn
Saud
well
as
merciful,
as
of
could
example
Afterwards

the King met with his men in the presence of the ulema

where he reminded

them that the religious scholars should make the

There
for
in
the individual
of
religion
only.
was
no
room
matters
rulings
interpretation

of religious texts. He was their ruler and they must obey

him. The ulema where there for guidance and he would not tolerate any
for
jihad
to
or revolt against the ruler. 129Having
call
attempts

further

Ibn
Saud
threat
the
of
a
relieved
rebellion,
went on a tour of the
removed
towns that had sent men to fight on his side in order to give thanks and
distribute largesse. Then he headed back to Hijaz to be near the holy cities.
With the Ikhwan revolt defeated there was one remaining

rebel

leader. Dhaidan Ibn Hithlain of the Ajman, had remained in al-Hasa and
had not been involved in Sabilah. 130Realising that he was now alone he
directly
Ibn
Saud.
Instead
King,
to
the
to
of
with
going
peace
make
sought
Dhaidan

approached

Fahd ibn Jiluwi,

whose father

Abdullah,

was

King,
in
hope
the
the
and
a
cousin
of
of negotiating a
governor of al-Hasa
truce. However,

the meeting went sour and Dhaidan was arrested. He

his
he
if
In
the
that
men
not
would
attack
was
released
camp.
warned
his men to execute Hithlain if any Ajman
Fahd
ordered
response,
from
Not
hearing
fearing
their
the worst
chief
approached.
and
tribesmen
ferocious
In
their
Ajman
tribesmen
mounted
assault.
a
attack the entire
the
killed
Fahd
Jiluwi
Ibn
1000
was
along
overwhelmed.
with
was
over
camp
killed
Ibn
Hithlain
131
Dhaidan
incident
this
his
was
also
and
men.
was a
of

229Jakins to Chamberlain, May 25,1929, IOR L/P&S/10/1240/P3908, cited in Kostiner,

MOSA, p. 137.
130Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighboursp. 304-305, and Habib, Ikhwan Movement of Najd,
pp. 268-270.
heavy
losses
in
Kuwait
Agent
the
Political
The
alarmed
at
was
131
reporting that the alHasa forces were "completely routed". Political Agent, Kuwait to Resident, Gulf, May 4,
Saud,
Ibn
McLoughlin,
See
R/15/2/92.
IOR
also,
p. 108.
1929,

194

ABEDIN-FIVE

blow
serious

to Ibn Saud's position

in al-Hasa, while

its governor,

Abdullah Ibn Jiluwi, was devastated by the loss of his son.

To complicate matters further, Ibn Saud learned that Faisal alDuwish had not died from his wounds but had in fact recovered and had
leaderless
had
Faisal
joined
the
his
with
now
marauding ways.
returned to
Ajman to form a Mutayr-Ajman

alliance that attacked caravans and tribes

loyal to Ibn Saud. They were joined by sections of Utayba who had been
followers of the now deceased Ibn Humayd. 132
The raids were characterised by a fierce brutality that was unlike the
booty
livestock.
beduin
the
on
was
and
emphasis
where
ghazw traditional
These raids were frenzied attacks. No quarter was given. All who were
found were slaughtered and their bodies often mutilated 133The object was
Ironically,
fear
the
al-Duwish
employed
and
panic.
spreading
revenge,
by
been
Iraqi
him.
had
He
tribes
that
tactics
hit
used
on
and run
same
he
Iraq
hide
in
into
the
then
where
could
either
cross
and
would attack
desert, or more often into Kuwait, where he could get supplies.
Ibn Saud discovered the Kuwaiti connection and was certain that the
He
British
the
to
the
Kuwait
rebels.
complained
encouraging
was
amir of
Agent that either his loyal forces be allowed the right of pursuit or the
Kuwait
into
forces
134
The High
to
entry
prevent
British should allocate
let
Ibn
Saud
have
inclined
his way and
Iraq
to
was
Commissioner of
justify
to
there
permission to cross borders in
that
were grounds
believed
free
danger
in
borders
But
135
there
allowing
access
was
a
across
pursuit.
floodgates
That
be
for
long
the
to
had
might
open
recognised.
taken
so
that
be
Saud
Ibn
to
the
to
seen
would
gain
prestige
at
will.
tribes
at
cross
other
Gulf
in
detrimental
it
The
Resident
the
thought
Britain.
to
of
expense

September
10,1929,
IOR
SOSCO,
R/15/2/92.
Also
Jeddah
to
Agent,
reports
132political
had
Harb
the
also rebelled and attacked government property.
of
Utayba
sections
and
that
look
detailed
beduin
For
King,
158.
Desert
The
a
at
p.
raiding etiquette see
1 Howarth,
Saudi
Goldrup,
Arabia,
118-132
Desert,
the
Arab
and
pp. 271-273.
p.
of
Dickson,
IOR
R/15/2/92.
6,1929,
FO,
June
Jeddah
to
Agent,
134Political
1s HCI to SOSCO June 9,1929, R/15/2/92.

ABEDIN-FIVE

195

British interests for Ibn Saud to be granted permission. To the Resident it

Saud
Ibn
that
was:
was clear
seeking opportunities either openly or secretly to interfere in
the Gulf principalities and the news that he has invaded
Kuwait territory with the permission of His Majesty's
Government because we were too weak to protect it would
have extremely bad effect on our position throughout the
Gulf. We may be sure that Nejd propaganda would stress
Bin Saud's strength and our weakness.136
However, the Resident was under the authority of the Government of India
Arabia
the
the
stability
of
whole
of
with
eastern
was
concern
and
whose
the Persian Gulf and who worried about maintaining the independence of
the Gulf Sheikhdoms. Foreign Office officials were more willing to give Ibn
Saud the benefit of the doubt and believed a strong Saudi presence would
maintain

peace in Najd and Hijaz. The British in the Iraqi Government

Ibn
Saud's
tribes
to
their
to
and
curtail
raids
on
prevent
power,
wanted
fearing that an aggressive Saudi state would interfere in the mandated
territories. At the same time the rebellion of al-Duwish was a real threat to
stability

in the whole area. The Air Ministry

proposed using Royal Air

Force planes to bomb the rebels. The RAF was agreeable but officers on the
ground

in Iraq warned about the difficulties

of distinguishing

between

from
friendly
Kuwaiti
Iraqi
Moreover,
forces
tribes
the
it
or
air.
and
rebel
British
dangerous
become
of
military power which might
extension
a
could
draw out the conflict rather than reduce it. 137

Nevertheless, despite differing opinions over the extent to which

Britain should become involved, it was agreed to provide Ibn Saud with
so that he could attempt to put down the

weapons and ammunition

This would allow the King to arm the increasing number
himself.
rebellion
of townspeople

that he was recruiting into his forces and improve

his

Ibn
Saud
had
the
the advantage
rebels.
against
already
success
of
chances
deploy
trucks
to
being
and
motor
cars, some mounted with
able
of
June11,1929,IOR R/15/2/92.
Political Resident,Gulf to SOSCO
136

196

ABEDIN-FIVE

had
between
improved
Communications
the
also
various
guns.
machine
towns loyal to the king. Using the telegraph Ibn Saud was able to keep
forces.
In
King
this
the
of
and
sightings
rebel
way
of
movements
abreast
forces
follow
the
to
of
a
group
of
rebel
moving north of
progress
was able
Najd in the direction of Hail.
The offending party was led by al-Duwish's son, Abdul Aziz, with a
large contingent

of Mutayri

tribesmen on a mission to gather booty.

Though they were initially successful in their attacks around Hail, on their
forces.
by
by
Ibn
Saud's
Caught
intercepted
they
surprise and
were
return
fought
hand
Mutayri's
hand
days
in
from
the
to
travelling
the
of
exhausted
blistering desert sun. The Saudi forces were fresh and outnumbered the
huge
Not
defeat
it
for
battle
The
rout.
only
was
complete
a
was
a
rebels.
Faisal al-Duwish but he was overcome with grief at the news that his son
fighting.
138
killed
in
the
was
Flush with success Ibn Saud went on the offensive. War parties were
forces
Travelling
in
Hail.
from
trucks
the
and
created a
al-Hasa
sent out
forces.
forces
The
Saudi
the
rebel
stalked al-Duwish,
pincer movement on
his
Sensing
from
him
that
time
to
oases.
oases
was running out
chasing
Faisal al-Duwish, the once proud Mutayri chief, Ikhwan commander, and
inveterate

British
Harold
Dickson,
the
sought
refuge
with
of
opponent

Political Agent, Kuwait. Al-Duwish

claimed that his concern was for the

fate of large numbers of women and children, numbering around 5000 as

139
30,000
He
9000
British
that
the
sheep.
asked
and
camels
as
well
Government grant protection to his women and children while he made off
for Riyadh. The British reply was firm:
It should be made clear that His Majesty's government are
further
into
discussions with
to
any
enter
not prepared
Dawish who should be warned that if he himself or any of his
frontier
Kuwait
again they will be liable to
emissaries cross
137HCI to SOSCO, June 20,1929, IOR R/15/2/92.
Lu Howarth, The Desert King, p. 167.
August
Gulf,
30,1920,
Resident,
Kuwait
IOR R/15/2/92.
to
Agent,
Political
139
Ikhwan Movement of Najd, p. 280.

Also Habib,

197

ABEDIN-FIVE

arrest or any
necessary.140
British

other

resources were committed

action

that

may

be

considered

to assist Ibn Saud in quelling

the

had
RAF
orders to chase out any of the rebels that crossed
planes
rebellion.

the borders. This allowed Ibn Saud to squeeze al-Duwish towards the
British lines. 141The rebels were rapidly running out of places to hide. alDuwish

his
remaining men and told them that no help was
gathered

forthcoming

from Iraq or Kuwait and that they should move westwards

towards Syria. However, his men were tired and fearful of a future on the
Ibn
Saud
flee
Many
to
to
than
surrender
rather
opted
with their
run.
leader. 142

decided
follow
Rather
to
than attempt to
suit.
also
al-Duwish
he
directly
into
Kuwait
King
January
10,
the
crossing
risked
on
approach
1930 and begged the Political

Agent Harold

Dickson to accept his

historian
Mohammad
Saudi
Dickson
According
to
al-Mana,
was
surrender.
but
143
However,
the
to
al-Duwish
surrender
was
adamant
accept
reluctant
Hogarth

had
Dickson
the
that
to persuade a reluctant
opposite;
asserts

Faisal to surrender to the British in order to spare his family and forces
from the men of Ibn Saud.144

Secret Funding of the Ikhwan

Ibn Saud suspected that there was a secret source of funding

for the

Ikhwan rebellion as al-Duwish always seemed to have plentiful supplies,

arms and ammunition,

and wondered whether it was possible that al-

Dwish's attacks were being funded by another power. 145Ibn Saud sent an
Kuwait
Asad,
into
investigate
Muhammad
to
the possible
emissary,
sources of al-Duwish's

funding.

Asad discovered that al-Duwish

was

140SOSCO to Resident, Gulf, November 6,1929, IOR R/15/2/92.

141Howarth, The Desert King, p. 172.
142HCI to Resident, Gulf, November 19,1929, IOR R/15/2/92.
143Almana, Arabia Unified, p. 132.
144Howarth, The Desert King, p. 175.
Political Resident, Gulf to SOSCO, March 13,1928, IOR L/ P&S/ 10/ 1235/ P1436.
14.5

198

ABEDIN-FIVE

brought
in
that
cases
of
and
money
were
receiving guns, ammunition
through Kuwaiti

he
from
But
to
was
unable
ascertain
ports.
whom the

McLoughlin
it
British
that
the
coming.
argues
actually
was
were
supplies
that had a hand in supplying arms to al-Duwish-based

on some of Asad's

146
Saud's
Ibn
suspicions.
observations and
However, the true financier of the Ikhwan rebellion was more likely
King Feisal of Iraq. British officers serving in the Iraqi Government
be
third
that
party might
giving support to al-Duwish as a
some
suspected
back
Saud.
Ibn
In
British
High
the
a
meeting
at
with
means of getting
Commissioner, Francis Humphrys, Feisal admitted supporting the Ikhwan
it
divisiveness
He
147
that
to
in
was
necessary
cause
claimed
rebellion.
he
long
Ibn
Saud
in
As
Arabia.
was
as
power
remained a threat to
central
Iraq because "the effective union of fanatical tribes of central Arabia can
only

be maintained

neighbouring
continue

by

the policy

of constant

aggression

against

states." The target of that aggression was, and would

to be, Iraq. If however, the tribes of central Arabia became

disunited and left to their traditional ways "the tribes would expend their
by
disputes".
148
Thus
local
Ikhwan
the
encouraging
on
rebellion
energies
Faisal could keep the tribes of Ibn Saud fighting amongst each other and
they would cease to be a threat to Iraq.

also

However, al-Duwish did not rely only on Hashemite largesse and

for
Kuwait
Sheikh
the
of
support, pledging in return to
approached

bring his tribe under Kuwaiti authority.

al-Duwish knew that the Sheikh

Saud
because
if
Ibn
Kuwait
be
tempted,
was
weakened,
stood a
might
lost
Najd
Uqair
territory
to
the
Trade
at
conference.
regaining
of
chance

Kuwaiti
huge
imposed
the
loss
in
on
use
of
ports
meant
a
restrictions

Ibn
Saud,
McLoughlin
Mecca,
244,
Road
to
The
p.
p. 109. McLoughlin argues that alAsad,
146
in
independent
the north east but his reference is
to
trying
an
state
set
up
Duwish was
by
Ibn
Mashur
Farhan
There
of the Ruwalla tribe who sought to use
attempt
an
was
Asad.
for
himself
in the north.
territory
out
carve
as
means
rebellion
al-Duwish's

SOSCO
HCI
Faisal
in
October
King
to
6,1929, IOR R/15/2/92.
reported
Meeting
147
with

Ibid.
148

199

ABEDIN-FIVE

Sheikhs
149
Although
hurt
income.
did
the
al-Duwish
not
which
revenue
he
he
free
blanket
the
required
support
was
allowed
passage in and
receive
In fact, despite the common assumption that the

out of the territory.

Ikhwan rebellion was a reaction to their suppression and loss of power,

there is also the possibility that al-Duwish had ambitions to create his own
kingdom

independent
ambitions.
unfaithful
unfaithful

Howarth
could

using
remarked

the Ikhwan

to fuel

that the "urge

never be satisfied"

his own

to kill

political
the

or convert

since there were always

more

to be conquered. 150

Aftermath of Rebellion
The Ikhwan rebellion was a costly affair for Ibn Saud. Large quantities of
been
had
food,
feed,
(petrol,
to
spent
and
money)
raise,
arm and
supplies
had
been
levied
both
Taxes
beduin
on
army.
an
and
compensate
townsmen

leaving

many in difficult

financial

situations.

Ibn Saud's

his
income,
the
than
and
greater
world-wide
still
was
expenditure

effects of

the Great Depression included the curtailment of the numbers of pilgrims

bring
in
to
than
ever
were
needed
revenues.
more
which now
Attempts to obtain a subsidy from Britain were rejected. Even a
bank
British
help
indifference.
for
His
to
was
met
a
with
set
up
request
Majesty's Government did not get involved in what went on between
British

banks and foreign

administrations

governments. Neither

the Hijazi

or Najdi

bank
British
credit. In fact when Ibn Saud
could get

his administration in Mecca had to

from
Najd,
Hijaz
to
travel
to
wanted
loan
Soviet
Union
long
fuel
term
the
to
for
with
obtain
enough
a
negotiate
100
The
Government
trucks.
King's
of
over
cars
and
entourage
the
of India
down
for
Ikhwan
30,000
to
the
151
put
arms
supplied
rebellion.
owed
was
SOSCO,
Gulf
June
July
13,1929
17,1929, IOR R/15/2/92.
to
Resident,
and
Political
149
See
F.
A.
Shaker
King,
Modernization
159.
Desert
The
Howarth,
p.
also
150
of the Developing
Nations: A CaseStudy of Saudi Arabia, P.h. D. Thesis Ann Arbor, University Microfilms,
1972, pp. 114-152.
151In addition the Post Office Department owed the Eastern Telegraph company 2,000
Agent, Jeddah to SSFA, Intelligence Reports for July-August, Oct. 9,
Political
pounds.

200

ABEDIN-FIVE

Meanwhile many of the Hijazi officials had not received salaries for
dwindling
high
duties
import
Merchants
under
sales
and
suffered
months.

fees.
customs
and
On top of that, the King's finance man, Abdullah Sulayman, would

have to demand loans from merchants and other wealthy families in order
to meet daily

government

expenditures. The urban populations

were

greatly under pressure:

there was acute distress almost to famine
beginning
hungry.
At
Mecca
In
to
were
people
go
conditions.
Jedda the populace was in a poor way, while the landlord
and merchant classes were exasperated almost beyond
by
Abdullah
Suleyman.
But there
the
of
extortions
measure
leader
nor the courage to rebel 152
was neither
At

Medina

To prevent people escaping to Transjordan the King ordered the Banu

Atiyya tribe to police the northern frontier and bolster troops already there.
However, the Banu Atiyya faced great hardship themselves and used their
to raid

position

into Transjordan

and neighbouring

tribes. Garrison

do
little
Shortages
them.
to
prevent
of petrol meant that
could
commanders
few vehicles were useable. Moreover, pay was in arrears and there were
problems
mutiny

with

discipline

and low morale among the troops. Fearing

if they ordered an attack on their beduin brethren the local amirs

difficulties
but
little
the
do
until
wait
passed.
could
It was disappointing to the King that Britain
supportive
limited

was not being

in his time of need. Britain's ability to fund Ibn Saud was also

by the economic strain of the Great Depression. London

had

to
the
that
were
enough
revenues
sustain
pilgrimage
needs of the
assumed
had
Hussein.
However,
Sharif
Britain
did
fully
they
not
as
consider
regime,
the higher levels of expenditures as a result of the combined territories of
Najd and al-Hasa. Pilgrimage revenue now had to stretch across the
Jubilee,
See
Philby,
Arabian
R/15/2/295.
IOR
also
p. 175-176. Philby described the
1931
King "despondent and gloomy" and seriously worried about the financial situation.
u2 political Agent, Jeddah to SSFA, Intelligence Report for September and October,
December 1,1931, IOR R/15/2/295.

ABEDIN-FIVE

201

British
known
Had
the
at the time about the vast mineral
peninsula.
be
developed
beneath
to
the desert, Ibn Saud's financial
resources waiting
been
have
so great. However, Ibn Saud was in dire need
worries would not
lamented
he
"if
financial
aid and
anyone would offer me a million
of
him
he
I
the
give
concessions
all
wanted" 153
pounds, would
It would take a small American oil company to discover the secret
United
States
the
to overshadow
subsequently
cause
wealth
and
eternal
of
Britain as Ibn Saud's closest ally and benefactor.

153Philby, Arabian jubilee, p. 176.

ABEDIN-SIX

202

Chapter 6
America Arrives in Arabia
In the period following the First World War the United States had very few
political

interests in the Middle

East. Unlike

the European powers,

Washington had no special responsibilities in regard to the Mandates, nor

did they have an imperial lifeline (such as the Suez Canal) or strategic
'
The
Middle
East was considered the traditional
to
protect.
possessions
domain of European colonial powers and did not rank high on the list of

American concerns. Few officials had experience in the region, fewer still
had language training in Arabic or knowledge of Arab culture and history.
The one department that was interested in the region consisted of a small

Division
in
Near
foreign
Eastern
the
Affairs
officers
of
service
of
group
(NEA) at the State Department?
The NEA was a relatively new creation itself, having only been
established

in 1909. With a staff of thirteen it had responsibility

overseeing

from
the coast of North
area,
a vast geographical

for

Africa

Turkey,
Arabia,
Levant,
Mesopotamia,
to
the
Persia
across
and
stretching
India. As such a key factor in deciding a country's importance to the United
States was the level of economic activity involving

American interests.

Much of the geographical areas that came under NEA's supervision had
relatively

few commercial ties to the United States Often a single officer

.3

I Kermit Roosevelt, Arabs, Oil and History: the Story of the Middle East, New York: Kennikat
for
Search
Security: Saudi Arabian Oil and American
Aaron
Miller,
225
1949,
and
Press
p.
Foreign Policy 1939-1949, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980, p. 22. For
East
Middle
Barry
Rubin,
in
The
Great
the
America's
Powers
in the Middle
see
role
on
more
East: 1941-1947, London: Frank Cass, 1980.
Middle
in
East see Phillip Baram, The Department of
Department's
State
the
For
role
the
2
State in the Middle East, 1919-1945,University of Pennsylvania Press, 1978, pp. 67-72, and
in
Policies
Middle
East, 1919-1939, Minneapolis:
American
Interests
the
DeNovo,
and
John
University of Minnesota Press, 1963, especially pp. 121-127.
American
commerce with the region but it was mainly
amount
of
modest
a
3There was
like, raisins, figs, and dates and in oriental carpets. See John
food
products
with
concerned
DeNovo, "The U. S. and the Middle East, 1919-1939" pp. 225-237 and Barry Rubin,
"America as junior Partner: Anglo-American Relations in the Middle East, 1919-1939",
The Great Powersin the Middle East, 1919-1939,ed. Uriel Dann, New York:
in
251,
238pp.
Holmes&Meier, 1988.

203

ABEDIN-SIX

would

have the task of monitoring

developments

in over a dozen

help
the
of a secretary or assistant .4
countries, usually without
In the 1920's there were virtually no American commercial interests
The
U.
had
S.
Government
Arabian
in
the
peninsula .5
consular
operating
based
in
Aden
The
Division
but
to
the
the
there
south.
was
nearest
officers
Arabian
Peninsula
Affairs
the
the
Eastern
Near
politics
observed
of
with
of
had
been
dominant,
left
Britain,
traditionally
to
which
was
mild curiosity.
deal with the rivalry between Sharif Hussein and Ibn Saud. Outside of the
division little was known about the two leaders or their historical conflict
but some American officials realised that developments in the Hijaz should
be given particular attention. A State Department memo noted:
If we are desirous of following closely events in the
Mohammedan world we cannot afford to leave out the
Hedjaz. Islam is probably today more virile and fanatic in
Arabia than anywhere else, and the developments of the next
few years may be decisive in shaping its future elsewhere as
6
well.
It was accepted by the Division of Near Eastern Affairs that the United
States was too "entirely dependent" on Britain for information about this
forward
To
for
leaders.
this
its
the
a
proposal
was
remedy
put
area and
dispatch of a consular officer to Jeddah on a survey mission which would
help determine, among other things, whether further diplomatic

contact

financial
However,
the
lack
the
cost
of
such
a
mission
and
was warranted.
State
Department
levels
the
that
of
meant
senior
at
nothing
motivation
of
Office,
Foreign
British
the
Department,
State
generally referred to the
unlike
4 The
Near
Arabian
Peninsula
East.
The thirteen staff
the
Levant
the
as
the
and
of
countries
foreign
the
of
number
service officers was far less than
actual
included clerical workers so
NEA
Afghanistan,
the
Burma, India,
the
of
were:
The
responsibility
under
countries
that.
Syria,
Transjordan,
Lebanon, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, all
Iraq,
Palestine,
Iran,
Turkey,
Greece,
South
Africa.
Algeria
Africa
Gulf
and
except
states, all of
the
The
Department
Barara,
State
in the Middle East,
for
22
Security,
Search
of
and
p.
s Miller,
American Standard Oil Company sold kerosene and
the
1927
From
34-35.
onwards
pp.
However,
it
for
in
Jeddah.
had no
the
task
a
used
middle
to
man
and
merchants
gasoline
the
on
ground.
or
representatives
offices
company
Records
November
16,1922,
Bliss,
Engert
to
of the Department of State
6 Memorandum,
Saudi
Asia:
Arabia,
Affairs
1910-1929,
Internal
Microfilm
and
the
to
of
Relating
-Lebanon
Washington,
National
Archives,
U.
S.
D. C. Hereafter cited as
Reel
17,
#M722,
Record
RDOS M722JR17.

ABEDIN-SIX

204

had
in
Americans
Middle
individual
Instead
travelled
the
it
who
came of .7
East were consulted to keep abreast of developments in the area.8
-

The State Department would not have to wait long to learn more

himself
Saud
interested
in
Ibn
Aziz
Abdul
Arabia.
was
establishing
about
his
in
Hijaz
9
After
States.
United
the
the
establishing
reign
relations with
King found that domestic troubles and parsimonious

British assistance

friends
donors.
It
for
in
that
the
and
generous
was
additional
need
created
Washington
29,1928,
September
that
that
received
notification
on
respect
formal
Dependencies'
Najd
its
Hijaz
the
'King
the
sought
and
and
the
of
10
The
King's
Government.
States
United
the
approach caught
recognition of
the State Department off guard and officials were uncertain as to how to
been recognised by Britain
had
fact
Saud
Ibn
Despite
that
the
respond.
there was still uncertainty about the stability of the regime and even the
lack
importantly,
American
Kingdom.
More
the
borders
the
of
of
exact
interests in Najd or Hijaz made it difficult to justify recognition of such a
that:
time
the
Departmental
A
reported
memo
of
ruler.
His (Ibn Saud's) country is of little commercial importance
has
few
United
States
interests;
in
it is
the
which
one
and
improbable that our relations with the Hijaz will increase to a
be
it
may
argued that recognition
noticeable extent; and
lead
to more unpleasant entanglements than real
would
benefits. 11
In an effort to learn more about the King, the Division of Near Eastern
familiar
to
with the region for their
Affairs turned
several private citizens
7 Ibid.

e This included Ameen Rihani, the Lebanese-American writer, and Dr. Samuel Zwemer,
See Barry Rubin, Secretsof State: The State Department and the
American
missionary.
noted
Oxford
University
York:
Press, 1987, Chapter 1.
New
Policy,
S.
Foreign
U.
Over
Struggle
for
For
1928
he
had
Saud.
deal
Ibn
time
to
of
most
with disgruntled
9 This was a stressful
Iraqis
delicate
British
handle
the
fighters
with
negotiations
and
over a number
Ikhwan
and
boundary disputes. Sir Gilbert Clayton had been sent by London to
including
issues
of
help put an end to the problems. The difficulties of the period can be seen in Clayton's
June
18,1928
IOR
L/P&S/10/1237,
his
in
An Arabian
his
as
well
as
mission,
on
report
Kingdom,
Ibn
Saud:
Founder
McLoughlin,
of
a
pp. 88-89.
Diary and
Secretary
State,
Fuad
Hamza
September 29,1928, RDOS,
Minister,
to
Foreign
of
10Acting
M722/R17, US-National Archives.

205

ABEDIN-SIX

be
first
Dr.
Samuel
One
to
the
consulted
was
of
analysis and views.
Zwemer, a Christian missionary with many years experience in the Middle
East. Zwemer

was very encouraging and supportive

of establishing a

his
Najd.
He
indicated
Hijaz
in
the
American
own
and
presence
greater
in
Muslim
the
in
interest
activity
expanding missionary
strong personal
American

heartland.

had
set up numerous
missionaries

schools and

Gulf.
12
Zwemer
Persian
Levant
the
the
along
and
medical missions across
hoped to establish the first mission school in Jeddah and he believed that:
"Through quiet unostentatious work over a period of years, an American
missionary

Egypt
in
that
now
existing
as
might
as
notable
organisation

Arabia.
"13
be
built
in
quite conceivably

Aware of the prohibitions on non-Muslims entering the holy cities of

he
little
in
Zwemer
could
why
operate
Hijaz,
reason
not
saw
nevertheless
"I
do
is
think
that
there
the
any religious or
not
peninsula:
other parts of
legal authority for claiming the whole of Hijaz as sacred territory in the
from
his
is
Christian
carrying
on
work as
prevented
missionary
sense that a
14
such"
Zwemer, had known colleagues who had travelled around Hijaz
without

hindrance

during

the Ottoman and Sharifian reigns and he

from
British
Foreign
Bible
the
there
and
that
a
representative
was
recalled
by
This
interest
during
1914.
Jeddah
in
an American missionary
Society
American
interest
the
of
a
significant
evidence
and
sufficient
as
seen
was
forward
for
inclined
the
to
case
granting formal
put
Division was
basis.
Saud
Ibn
that
on
recognition of
October
Memorandum,
25,1928,
Ibid,
State
Department
US-National
Saud,
Ibn
Report
11
on
Archives.
had
British
also set up several successful medical clinics
missionaries
22American and
did much to popularise modern medical treatment among the Bedouin.
Gulf
the
and
along
Wahba, Arabian Days, p. 38. Also activities of American missionaries in the fields of
in
Palestine,
been
had
Lebanon
Syria.
quite
pronounced
and
philanthropy
and
education
Philanthropy
Daniel,
American
in the Near East 1829-1960,
Robert
this
aspect see
For more on
Athens: Ohio University Press, 1970.
State
Department
Samuel
Zwemer
from
Dr.
to
the
entitled 'Sacredness of
Memorandum
13
State,
Secretary
December
from
Cairo
dispatch
17,1928, RDOS
to
in
of
Hijaz', enclosed
M722/R17.

206

ABEDIN-SDC

However, American diplomatic posts in the area advised caution.

The legation in Cairo was particularly
government

supporting

concerned over the idea of the

missionary goals in the Hijaz. Washington was

heartland
Islam
Hijaz
the
that
the
of
was
and the Government of
reminded
Hijaz and Najd had a clearly established policy towards missionaries-it
for
have
do
"never
to
which
any
reasons
permit
with the safety of
would
the country, anyone to use the sacred lands of the Hedjaz as a field for the
teachings of Christianity". 15In the view of the legation, the local authorities
in Hijaz were "puritanical
conventions
innovation".

and

and zealous in its beliefs, shunning modem

suppressing

anything

that

was

regarded

as an

They had created tensions with other members of the same

faith and this was best illustrated by an incident during the pilgrimage
Egyptian
involving
1928
pilgrims.
season of
Traditionally

there was quite an active flow

of human

and

Hijaz.
had
Egypt
between
Egypt
the
traffic
and
a varied and
commercial
heritage.
faith
Among
the
to
the
Islamic
contributions
was the
cultural
rich
kiswah,
black
Ka'ba
that
the
in
the
cloth-the
adorns
of
manufacturing
Mecca. A new cloth was sent every year with a caravan of Egyptian
pilgrims

by
revellers singing, dancing and
usually
accompanied
and was

16
In
instruments.
that
the
year
caravan procession was set
musical
playing
by
Ikhwan
incensed
The
the
by
of
mob
spectacle.
angry
an
attackers
upon
attempted
prevented

and beat the singers but were

from doing serious damage by the intervention of the King's
to destroy the instruments

Nevertheless,
local
injured
the
community.
many
and
were
close advisors
in the scuffle prompting the Egyptian Government to issue a stern
complaint

to the Hijaz authorities. Much to Cairo's surprise the response

from
ban
Egyptians
the
impose
pilgrimage ceremonies-while
to
on
a
was
14Ibid.
u Fuad Hamza, Minister, Government of Hijaz to U. S. Legation, Cairo, December 18,1927,
RDOS M722/R17.
John
Levant,
London:
Murray, 1970, p. 177. GraffteyBright
Grafftey-Smith,
Laurence
16
from
in
Jeddah
1920-1924 and then again as Minister from
Vice-Consul
Smith served as
1945-1947. Also Philby, Arabian Jubilee,pp. 89-90.

ABEDIN-SIX

207

the attackers escaped without punishment. Feeling bitter and bruised the
Egyptian Government suspended its relations with the Hijaz and this affair
soured Saudi-Egyptian relations considerably. 17
To Washington the lack of tolerance over religious differences was
for
it
concern
and
reinforced the view that American missionaries
cause
by
denied
be
the Hijaz authorities. Some in the NEA believed
access
would
that "the apparent unwillingness of that Government to admit within its
jurisdiction

American Christian Missionaries" was reason enough for the

States to refrain from according recognition to Ibn Saud? 8 But

United

favoured
broader
Division
in
took
the
a
view
and
establishing closer
others
.
leader,
Arab
a
major
regardless of the possible prohibitions
relations with
on missionary

by
They
impressed
the views of Ameen
were
activity.

Rihani, the American writer of Lebanese descent who called Ibn Saud "the
most powerful

force
in Arabia since the Prophet Muhammad". 19
unifying

Rihani painted a picture of the King as a noble and generous leader who
his
fact
In
it
in
Rihani
to
country.
a
struggle
unify
was
engaged
who
was
provided

led
in
Department
that
the
to believe that Ibn
some
evidence

Saud was "not as strict a Wahhabi as he is sometimes pictured". 20

Rihani reported that, contrary to common belief, modern technology
by
Ibn
Saud.
Telegraph
and telephone equipment were
welcomed
was
In
the
of
motor
car
was
widely
use
visible.
and
addition, reports
present
from the American Consul in Aden told of Saudi interest in setting up

1 F. M. Gunther, Minister, Cairo to Secretary of State, November 9,1928, RDOS M722/R17.

The Ikhwan saw singing and dancing and other rituals of the Egyptian pilgrims as signs of
in
In
felt
justified
American
their
legation
the
attack.
addition,
and
pointed out
apostasy
had
Ibn
Saud
de
facto
Government
Egyptian
accorded
the
recognition, not dejure,
that
fully accepted as ruler of Hijaz by all Arab
King
the
that
indicated
was
not
which
governments.
1sWadsworth, U. S. Legation Cairo to Secretary of State, December 17,1928, RDOS
M722/R17.
19State Department Memo: Report on Ibn Saud, October 25,1928, Ibid., Rihani was
for
this memo. It gives insight into the various opinions held within
indicated as a source
for
Ibn
both
Saud. See also Rihani's own work
Department
of
and
against
recognition
the
Sa'oud,
130-140.
Ibn
King,
pp.
the
on

20Ibid.

208

ABEDIN-SIX

radio

transmitters

with

American

help and gaining

access to other

technologies. The Consul dismissed the idea that the King was anything
but open to outside assistance: "Ibn Saud, in spite of his severe religious
tenets appears to have surprisingly progressive ideas and an eager desire
to secure for the Hedjaz the advantages offered by Western civilisation". 21
Given such a climate, it seemed that opportunities

for American

businesses certainly did exist and an increase in official American ties

had
United
States
Moreover,
be
justified.
the
already recognised the
could
less
Ibn
Saud
Oman,
than
Albania
were
notable
who
and with
and
rulers of
became
little
It
involvement.
had
just
America
to
them that
clear
as
whom
the "factors in favour of recognition outweigh the contrary arguments". 22
However, before the issue of recognition could be fully resolved,
fully
fledged
Washington
Ikhwan.
the
a
revolt
among
of
news reached
Details were sketchy and officials were desperate for more information.
Consular reports of the time show American diplomats at Aden, Cairo and
Jerusalem, engaged in the frustrating task of attempting to gain accurate
information

on events inside Arabia. Few reliable sources were available,

forcing most officials to sift through newspaper articles or conversations

The
local
street
out
gossip.
even
seeking
and
result was that
notables
with
Washington

was sent a mass of confusing and contradictory

reports,

including false claims of Ibn Saud's demise.23Though British officials in the

better
informed,
Americans
the
no
system
of
co-operation
with
were
region
did
little
information
The
that
in
get passed on was not very
place.
was
Jerusalem learned from his British
Consul
in
American
The
encouraging.
had
hand.
Ikhwan
Ibn
Saud's
the
the
that
upper
rebels
position
counterpart
was reportedly

"extremely precarious" and it was argued that there was

State,
Secretary
January
Aden
23,1928, RDOS M722/R17.
Vice-Consul,
to
of
Aldridge,
n
22Ibid. Also State Department Memo: Report on Ibn Saud.
23See cables from U. S. diplomatic posts in Aden, Cairo, and Jerusalem to Secretary of
State, October -December 1929 in RDOS M722/R17.

209

ABEDIN-SIX

be
King
that
the
would
able to subdue the
chance"

"fifty-fifty
only a
rebellion. 24

in the previous

As shown

successful in quelling
turned

attention

especially,

the Ikhwan revolt25 With that accomplished he

to improving

gaining

chapter, Ibn Saud was ultimately

formal

relations with

recognition.

Though

the United

States, and

the King

had many

Near
Eastern
Affairs,
Division
in
the
of
pragmatism and caution
admirers
State
Department.
The
Middle
East
in
the
the
of
echelons
upper
reigned
domain
despite
Europe
the
the
of
and
as
general
regarded
still
was
American

antipathy

towards colonial powers there was a reluctance to

become entangled in the region. As a result Secretary of State, Frank

Kellogg, did not believe that formal diplomatic recognition of Saudi Arabia
being
However,
to
time.
the
that
sensitive
possibility of
at
warranted
was
American
Secretary
instructed
Minister
in
the
Egypt
the
offence,
causing
letter
but
inform
in
Saudi
to
the
the
rather
to
an
official
response
send
not
in
Cairo
King's
Thus
invited
the
to
representative
was
authorities verbally.
he
for
informed
American
that
the
legation
was
request
where
the
recognition

Secretary
State
finds
"one
it impracticable
the
to
of
which
was

26
definitely
time".
the
present
at
to reply
Despite this set-back Ibn Saud was undeterred. He was well versed
him.
His agent in Cairo kept
to
dealing
support
in
with powers reluctant
the issue of recognition

alive by regularly

approaching

the American

legation to inquire whether American policy had changed. Meanwhile, his

admirers

in the NEA, particularly

the Division

chief Wallace Murray,

believed that since other nations such as Turkey, Germany and Persia had
Saud,
Ibn
United
States
to
the
recognition
should move
already extended
fact
State
Department
The
the
that
do
the
was considering
same.
to

State,
October
Secretary
Jerusalem
Consul
to
24,1929, RDOS M722/R17.
of
Knabenshue,
u
Muhammad
into
the
insight
this
Asad, The Road to
further
see
account
of
period
For
u
Mecca, 1980, pp. 222-231. Asad was an Austrian Jew who converted to Islam and travelled
Arabia in the 1920's and 1930's.
through
widely
26Secretary of State to Legation Cairo, January 7,1929, RDOS M722/R17.

ABEDrN-SIX

granting
compelling
reluctant

210

recognition

to Iraq and Yemen at that time also made a

for
Saudi Arabia. The Secretary of State agreed but was
case
to let the NEA handle the negotiations

on their own and

have
to
more experienced professionals involved-specifically
preferred

the

British.
The Secretary of State instructed the Ambassador in London to
for
Office
its
Foreign
The
Secretary
the
counsel.
was particularly
approach
interested to know whether there was any classified information that might
have a bearing on the recognition of Ibn Saud's government. 27Negotiations
from
indications
Foreign
Office
the
that there
with
no
amicably
proceeded
information
classified
was any

that would preclude the establishment of

diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States.28

On May 1,1931, the United States formally recognised the Kingdom
29Steps
Dependencies.
its
finalise
Najd
taken
to
Hijaz
were
and
and
most
of
favoured nation status as well as trade and navigation treaties by which
time Ibn Saud had formally unified Hijaz and Najd into one administrative
region

his
the
name
of
realm to the Kingdom
and changed

of Saudi

Arabia. 30
A variety of factors led to the successful conclusion of this first small
history
American-Saudi
input
the
American
in
the
relations;
of
of
step
Ameen
Rihani;
Ibn Saud's success in
the
to
such
as
area,
travellers
27Secretary of State to Ambassador, London, February 10 , 1931, FR US 1931:I1, pp. 547-550.
The Saudi envoy in London, Hafiz Wahba represented Ibn Saud.
2SIbnSaud made public statements to reassure Britain that he had no plans for further
harbouring
hopes
being
than
the spiritual
a
rather
content
as
ruler
was
of
and
expansion
declared
Saud
Islamic
Ibn
the
publicly
world.
after the pilgrimage and Eid
leader of
entire
he
desire
be
Caliph
had
(Khalifa)
1931
to
the
that
Muslim
the
no
of
of
ummah.
celebrations
Rather, he sought to be left alone to manage his realm as he saw fit and without critical
inspection of the greater Arab and Muslim world. Ibn Saud speech at Khuzam Palace,
Jeddah, March 31,1933, in Intelligence Report, April 1933, IOR R/15/2/295. British
be
in
Departmental
this
seen
with
much
relief
as
can
several
memos in
officials greeted
from
These
include
the Eastern Department of the
371/22004/1714.
FO
memos
PRO
from
journal
Britain
the
office
an
article
and the East entitled 'Islam Does Not
and
Foreign
Need Another Caliph'.
29Secretary of State to Ambassador, London, May 1,1931, FRUS 193111, pp. 551-552. The
American Minister in Cairo was accredited to the court of Ibn Saud as well.

211

ABEDIN-SDC

his
holy
Ikhwan
the
the
and
control
rebellion
over
cities of
suppressing
Islam; the support of NEA officials, and the move by the State Department
to recognise more countries in the Middle East. For Ibn Saud it was an
step in his effort to move beyond the reliance on Britain for

important

financial and political support. For the United States however, extending
to Saudi Arabia was of minor consequence. Washington did

recognition

in
Kingdom,
diplomatic
the
post
arguing that it was not
not establish a
financially viable. It was left to an eccentric American businessman named
Charles Crane to sow the seeds of future relations between the United
States and Saudi Arabia.

On the Path to Oil

Charles Crane was the son of a wealthy industrialist and heir to the Crane
Manufacturing

Bathroom

Company. This successful business provided

Crane with time and money to indulge his esoteric pursuits 31 Among his
hobbies were the cultivation of dates in California and breeding Arabian
horses. Crane's most avid interest however, was in the culture and history
His
interests
East.
included
desire
Middle
the
philanthropic
to
a
genuine
of
Crane
in
funded
to
the
progress.
region
states
a number of
assist new
development
Egypt
in
Yemen
projects
and
and
and was fond

agricultural

in
the
region.
travelling
of
In fact it was during one of many trips to Cairo that he came to the
Riyadh
Saud.
Word
Ibn
of this charismatic
reached
of

attention

'know

how'.

Intrigued,
1931.

was seeking

who

traveller

The King

the American
lavish

to assist local communities

sent an invitation
millionaire

feast was laid

with

American
American

for Crane to come to Jeddah.

arrived in the port city on February

out

for

him.

Ibn

Saud

was

25,

typically

3oThe Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was officially proclaimed on September23,1923.Seealso

Kostiner, TheMaking of SaudiArabia,pp.163-164.

Wildson's
Presidential
Woodrow
to
had
Crane
contributed
campaign and later served as
31
half of the King-Crane Commission which reported on Syria and Palestine. For
background on Crane see Lacey, The Kingdom, pp. 225-226, and McLoughlin, Ibn Saud, pp.
121-122.

212

ABEDIN-SIX

generous -but

first
American
had
King
the
the
this
was
ever
especially as

had
Crane
King
he
the
In
time
offered
any
assistance
may
short
met.
be
He
that
the
survey
a
geological
of
country
proposed
mounted
require.
to look for mineral deposits 32 Though Ibn Saud did not believe that there
barren
desert
he
beneath
interested
be
in
the
was
much of value
could
discovering the location of water wells. Crane was eager to oblige and at
his own expense commissioned a mining engineer named Karl Twitchell,
to survey the country.
Twitchell spent the better part of a year conducting a detailed 1500
few
found
but
signs of underground water wells.
only
a
mile survey
However, he was excited to find geological evidence indicating the
deposits
33
in
Officials
the
eastern
region
of
al-Hasa
oil
of
possible presence
had
Twitchell's
in
Jeddah
Legation
British
observed
the
movements with
at
had
London
"nothing
They
to
that
reported
confidently
much scepticism.
34
investigations"
from
Mr.
Twitchell's
much will result
In fact the Foreign Office was hoping

that oil would

not be

discovered in Saudi Arabia. British petroleum interests in the Middle East,

had
developments
in
the
in
seen
world,
record
elsewhere
as
oil
as well
Concerns
in
1920's.
drop
the
in
over
an
oil
glut
capacity
and
production
international
to
led
to
oil
companies
of
come
consortium
a
an
prices
understanding

over production quotas, transportation, and the pricing of

'Red
Line
Agreement'.
35
Under
the
the
in
called
was
conditions of
what
oil
32Harry Philby, claimed credit for introducing the idea to the King and arranging Crane's
from British service and set up an import business in Jeddah.
had
Philby
resigned
visit.
he
Islam
he
to
was appointed advisor at the court if
whereupon
Subsequently
converted
Philby,
Saudi
Jubilee,
177
Arabia,
Arabian
Philby,
See
p.
and
Saud.
p. 163. An alternative
Ibn
interpreter,
Saud's
Mohammad
by
Ibn
translator
Almana
is
and
court
chief
given
view
in
himself
Crane
it
trying
to
King
the
that
it
who
persisted
contact
that
was
and
notes
who
in Cairo that the meeting was arranged. See Almana, Arabia
King's
the
agent
through
was
Unified: A Portrait of Ibn Saud, pp. 217-221.
Karl
Twitchell,
his
Saudi Arabia, Princeton:
Twitchell's
see
of
experiences
account
33For
See
Jane
148-150.
Grutz,
1953,
Press,
Prelude to Discovery, in
Univ.
also
esp.
pp.
Princeton
WORLD,
Houston:
Aramco
ARAMCO
Centennial',
Services Corp.,
Arabia's
'Saudi

30-34.
1998,
pp.
January-February

34Foreign Office Minute, April 20,193Z PRO FO 371/ 16021, E1896/412/25.

35David Painter, Oil and the American Century: The Political Economyof U.S. Foreign Oil
Policy, 1941-1954, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1986, pp. 4-6, and Miller, The

213

ABEDIN-SIX

this agreement, the development of oil inside the boundaries of the old
Ottoman empire would be regulated so that better control over the oil
Several
be
British
companies were a party to this
maintained.
could
market
operated under

the name of the Iraq Petroleum

(IPC) and the possibility

of oil being discovered in Arabia

which

consortium,
Company

seemed unlikely
complicate

to their geologists. Twitchell's suspicions, if true, would

the IPC's carefully worked

out agreements. It was in the

interest of the Iraq Petroleum Company to prevent more oil from being
brought onto the market, especially by one of its competitors 36
However,
competitor,

Bahrain,
island
the
of
exactly one such
nearby
on

the Standard Oil Company of California (SOCAL), did strike

American
SOCAL
31,1932.
May
small
was relatively
oil company
oil on
did
It
have
large
foreign
IPC
the
not
consortium.
of
and was not part
production

fields nor did it have an established marketing

Europe. During
unsuccessful

position in

the 1920's the company had lost almost $50 million

foreign

oil ventures 37 The company

in

sought to expand

larger
become
international
increase
The
a
and
profits
player.
operations,
discovery in Bahrain excited the company but it also made them realise the
few miles across the water on the Saudi mainland.
lay
just
that
a
potential
The similar geology of eastern Arabia was indicative of the possible
38
oil.
presence of
Standard Oil rapidly sought out contacts with the Saudi government
in order to secure an oil concession. Enquiries led them to Harry St. John
Searchfor Security, pp. 12-14. For the British perspective see Leatherdale, Britain and Saudi
Arabia 1925-1939, pp. 188-219.
36Leatherdale, Britain and Saudi Arabia 1925-1939,p. 200. A comparison of Britsh and
found
be
in
Rubin,
'America
interests
can
also
as junior Partner', pp. 238American oil
251. See also Philby, Arabian Jubilee, p. 178.
Grutz,
Prelude
Century,
8.
Also
Discovery,
American
to
Oil
the
p.
Painter,
and
pp. 30-34.
37
Texas
Oil,
Jersey,
Socony-Vacuum,
did
as
such
oil
companies
Twitchell
other
ask
38
and
Gulf if they were interested in Saudi oil but at that time the major players had more oil
from
handle
existing concessions and were not interested,
coming
they
could
than
background
For
148-150.
Arabia,
Saudi
on the Bahrain oil concession see
pp.
Twitchell,
1923-1930:
A
Study
for
Bahrain,
Quest
Oil
in
in British and American
'The
Bilovich,
Yossef
East,
Middle
1919-1939,
in
Uriel
Powers
Dann, New York:
Great
the
The
in
ed.
Policy',
Holmes&Meier, 1988, pp. 252-268.

ABEDIN-SIX

214

Philby who was in London doing business on behalf of the King. Standard
Oil sent company Vice-President, Francis B. Loomis to meet with Philby for
talks. The company was seeking an advantage over other possible bidders
best
Philby
looked
them
to
to
the
provide
with
negotiating strategy.
and
The former British official advised that neither the type of contract nor its
intricacies would interest the Saudis as much as the amount of money the
front.
Philby
large
that
offering
up
suggested
was
a
cash offer,
company
life
Ibn
Saud's
into
inject
ailing coffers, would be the most
which would
likely to gain the winning concession.39What Loomis did not know was
that the almost any substantial offer would have been entertained. Saudi
finances were poor and Philby had been in London to obtain a loan of
500,000 pounds in gold from the Bank of England which had been turned
down. The Bank frankly stated that it did not believe such funds could be
London.
40
in
from
source
any
raised

Though certainly interested in making a bid for the concession,

Standard Oil needed to find out more about Saudi Arabia. The company
knew little about the nature of the government or how stable it was and it
information
the
to
its
about
get
more
country
and
essential
was
ruler
before proceeding further. Loomis turned to the State Department and
inquired about the treaties that existed between the United States and
Saudi Arabia. He was particularly interested in knowing what protection
Washington

would provide to company operations if the regime in Saudi

Arabia was overthrown.

In addition, there was the question of British

influence on Ibn Saud-would the company have to gain permission from

London prior to making an offer to Ibn Saud? 41
A prompt reply came from William Murray, of the Division of Near
Eastern Affairs, to the effect that although recognition had been granted to

39Philby, Arabian Oil Ventures, pp. 77-78, Monroe, Philby of Arabia, p. 203.
4 Ryan to Simpson, Report for May-June 1932, July 17,1932, IOR R/15/2/295.
41Loomis to Secretary of State, October 25,1932, Records of the Department of State
Relating to the Internal Affairs of Saudi Arabia 1930-1944,T1179, Reel 1, US-National
Archives. Hereafter cited as T1179/R1, RDOS-SA.

215

ABEDAI-SIX

between
Arabia,
Saudi
the two countries were
the government of
relations
had
be
fully
Commercial
infancy.
treaties
to
in
their
and
navigation
yet
still
Moreover, the establishment of diplomatic

implemented.

being contemplated

future
time
that
and
at

offices was not

moves in that direction

depended on the level of American interests in the country 42 Murray did

however, reassure Loomis that the company could negotiate directly with
Ibn Saud and that London did not control the granting of oil concessions in
Saudi Arabia. It was recommend however, that SOCAL retain the services
had
Murray
the
Twitchell,
Karl
the
surveyed
who
area,
since
engineer
of
believed that it was far better to have an American citizen on the company
loyalties
Harry
Philby.
43
the
to
than
of
on
uncertain
rely
payroll,

Driven by the need to expand its overseassourcesof production and

Standard
Oil
decided
larger
the
to
market
oil
of
world
press
share
a
gain
despite
the
the
undeveloped nature of the
concessions
with
ahead
American-Saudi

lack
U.
S.
Government
the
of
an
official
and
relationship

in
February
1933,
in
Karl
that
It
this
early
endeavour
was
presence.
by
Mr.
Jeddah
Lloyd
in
Hamilton,
Twitchell
accompanied
arrived
SOCAL's legal advisor, to begin negotiations with the King.
For his part Ibn Saud was facing a difficult situation-

the effects of

hard,
had
hit
1929-1930
the
Depression
country
starving it of trade,
the
of
discouraging

pilgrim

visitors and crippling

revenues.

With

stipends,

dole
King
largesse
infusion
funds
the
to
out,
needed
an
to
and
of
subsidies
balanced subvention system. Although he could not
delicately
his
maintain
his
financial
to
times
solve
the
concession
woes,
of
one
sale
were
rely on
desperate. Even the American Consul in Aden knew of the strain:
A succession of poor pilgrimages, culminating in the present
disastrous one, seems to have forced Ibn Saud's
hand.... neither he nor his government could be expected to
last much longer without money. He is pandering to
T1179/R1,
RDOS-SA,
October
27,1932,
US-National Archives.
F.
Loomis,
to
Murray
42
Twitchell
that
was added to the company payroll. Memorandum of
Following
advice
43
Conversation, Murray and Loomis, December 1,1932, T1179/R1, RDOS-SA, US-National
Archives.

216

ABEDIN-SIX

foreigners, offering anything upon which his hand may fall,

in return for funds 44
Despite these conditions, the negotiations between the oil company and Ibn
Saud did

not

proceed without

delay. Hamilton,

the SOCAL

legal

formally
the
through
to
contract
go
expecting
naturally
was
representative,
discussing each point in detail. But the King's advisors found this tedious.
There was also Saudi disappointment when the company offered a small
deposit up front and tried to sell the King and his advisors on the idea of
Harry
Philby
in
However,
future
for
stepped
and urged
profits.
waiting
Hamilton to forego the abstract explanations of contractual language,
Saudis
and
come
up with a sizeable
comprehend,
the
not
would
which
deposit up front 45It would not be the type of contract that was important
Philby's
it
incentives
financial
close relationship with Ibn
but the
offered.
hard
he
in
instance
this
to get the
been
has
worked
Saud
noted earlier and
discussions
initial
likely
highly
It
that
the
is
King.
for
deal
after
the
best
from
his
initiative,
instructions
Philby
Hamilton,
or
on
own
either on
with
Iraq
Petroleum
to
information
the
the
leaked
proceedings
King,
about
the
bidding
in
that
(IPC)
war might start. 46
a
Company
anticipation

In the middle of the Saudi-SOCAL negotiations a representative of

his
Jeddah
bid
for
in
to
Longrigg,
Stephen
place
company's
appeared
IPC,
Hamilton
Longrigg
The
made
of
very nervous
arrival
the concessions.
in
longer
the
the running. There was
SOCAL
company
sole
no
was
because

British
IPC
bring
the
to
controlled
what
pressures
might
also uncertainty as
have
fact,
Hamilton
Iraq
In
King.
the
not
the
need
worried
bear
about
to
on
for
bid
had
been
its
the
Company,
concession
since
a modest
Petroleum
10,000-intended

SOCAL's
hinder
to
entry into the region than
more

April
Washington,
12,1933,
T1179/R1,
State,
RDOS-SA,
Secretary
Aden
to
of
Consulate
**
Ibid.
203.
Arabia,
Philby
p.
Monroe,
of
as
bid
Philby
American
had
hoped
through
the
found
to start a
who
had
about
out
IPC
46
in
for
himself
Monroe,
the
Philby of Arabia,
process,
commissions
bidding war and make
Oil
Ventures,
Arabian
73-116.
in
Philby's
pp.
See
account
own
p. 203.

ABEDIN-SIX

217

for
itself. 47 Nevertheless, fearing that his
the
concession
actually acquire
be
disadvantage,
Hamilton
at
a
quietly hired Philby as his
company would
advisor,

with

a retainer of 1,000 pounds a month

to 'guarantee' a

favourable outcome. 48

The proposal that Standard Oil finally offered included a deposit of

50,000 pounds

with

the first

instalment

of 35,000, paid

in gold

due
The
be
signing.
at
remaining
portion
would
paid eighteen
sovereigns,
later.
SOCAL
5,000
pay
would
also
an
annual
rent
of
pounds until
months
Thereupon
100,000
be
discovered.
due
pounds
would
within one
oil was
4
Royalties
discovery.
set
at
were
shillings per ton. In addition, the
year of
Saudi Government was to be provided with 200,000 gallons of gasoline and
100,000 gallons of kerosene annually, free of charge. When news of the
American offer reached IPC directors, it was far more than anything they
5,1933
On
May
directors
decided
the
to
to
company
offer.
prepared
were
49
the
running.
pull out of
Final agreements for the American concession, which was to have a
29,193350
May
A
duration
on
were
signed
new corporate entity,
sixty year
the California Arabian Standard Oil Company (CASOC) was created to
This
the
the
establishment of a permanent
marked
concession.
operate

+7Minister Jeddah (Ryan) to SOSFA, 'Monthly Report-March 1933', IOR R/15/2/295.

43That Philby was able to take on conflicting roles was never quite understood by others in
he
hired
by
SOCAL
Philby
When
was
also took over as translator for the
the court.
King
Americans,
Mohammad
between
the
the
Almana.
and
replacing
This
negotiations
filter
be
intimately
involved
Philby
to
and
what other court officials would
more
allowed
know of the progress of the negotiations. See Almana, Arabia Unified, p. 225. Philby does
for
SOCAL.
hired
he
He
innocently
that
consultant
was
as
a
paid
claims that
not mention
he was approached by the oil company "about the possibility of seeking an oil concession
from the Saudi Arabian Government" , see Philby, Arabian Jubilee,p. 177. IPC's interest in
Saudi
be
Report
in
Arabia
for
the'Annual
1933', Minister
on
seen
can
the concession
Jeddah, Ryan to SOSFA, PRO FO 371/17941/E3126/3126/25.
Oil
Great
East,
Powers, New York: Council for
The
Middle
Shwadran,
the
and
Benjamin
49
Middle Eastern Affairs Press, 1959, p. 299.
50'Concession Agreement Between the Saudi Arab Government and the Arabian American
Oil Company, May 291933, printed in Annexe 1, Memorial of American Arabian Oil
Company: Documents on the Arbitration Betweenthe Government of Saudi Arabia and
ARAMCO, New York: ARAMCO, 1955. Note: The Arabian American Oil Company
(ARAMCO) became the successor to CASOC on January 31,1944. See also Roy Lebkicher,
ARAMCO and World Oil, New York: Russel Moore Inc., 1952, pp. 23-28.

ABEDIN-SIX

218

American presence in Saudi Arabia that would last throughout

the 20th

Century. 51

The Politics of Oil: 1935-1940

American foreign policy in the inter war period was largely based on the
"Open Door"

principle which, in its simplest form, meant the equality of

commercial opportunity

for nationals of all countries in all parts of the

States
United
52
The
opposed the negotiation of secret agreements,
world
restrictions

favour
free
in
trade and open
of
principles
of
and cartels

better
America
had
intentions,
belief
The
that
and a more noble
markets.
held
European
by
the
than
powers
was
widely
many in the State
cause,
Department.

Free trade and the 'open door' were part of a strong anti-

Thus
American
53
the
activities
of
corporations abroad were
colonial creed.
seen as promoting

the ideals of capitalism and democracy. A successful

American bid for concession rights in Saudi Arabia was seen as a victory of
free market forces.
Despite the promise of great wealth, the first few years of CASOC
Most
drilled
the
not
very
successful.
of
wells
were
produced
oil operations
just a few thousand barrels before drying up. The company had not found
four
field
long
large,
and after
years of prospecting
commercially viable
a
for
the future. 54 The King was also anxious. The
there were concerns

sl Irvine Anderson, Aramco, the United States,and Saudi Arabia: A Study of the Dynamics of
Foreign Oil Policy 1933-1950, Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1981, p. 25. Also Roy
Lebkicher, et al, ARAMCO Handbook,Netherlands: Arabian American Oil Company, 1960,
have
had
been
the
they
IPC
134-136.
got
concession
seriously interested and
could
pp.
did
however
King
British
The
the
give
company something-on July
money.
offered more
for
IPC
the Western region of Hejaz. See
he
granting
concession
rights
91936
signed a
Raymond Mikesell and Chenery Hollis, Arabian Oil: America's Stakein the Middle East,
Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1949, p. 53, and Shwadran, The Middle East, Oil
299.
Powers,
Great
the
p.
and
52Anderson, Aramco, The United Statesand Saudi Arabia, p. 15. Also see Gabriel Kolko, The
Roots of American Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Power and Purpose,Boston: Beacon Press,
1969.
State
in the Middle East, pp. 3-7.
Department
The
of
Baram,
53
54SOCAL was having better luck in Bahrain where its subsidiary BAPCO was producing
This enticed the Texas Oil Company which had a large
crude.
of
amounts
substantial
international marketing and distribution network to purchase half an interest in BAPCO.

219

ABEDIN-six

Americans

had provided

hope but he had little

to show from

the

'rent'
in
5,000
The
the
which
company
paid
annual
pounds
concession.
was insignificant

in comparison to his expenses. Moreover, the political

becoming
The
American
their
greater.
was
sight
of
presence
costs of
geologists and engineers wandering

through their desert domains had

fact
by
The
King's
that
they
the
tribesmen.
were
accompanied
upset many
inflamed
Ibn
Saud
only
protection
matters.
was
royal
men and enjoyed
felt
but
he
disgruntled
tribesmen
dealing
great unease with
with
used to
the American Government when he found that it was taking a position that
he very much opposed on the issue of Palestine 55
In Washington,
support

particularly

in Congress, there was considerable

for the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine 56 Public

pronouncements

indicated
State
Department
that the
press
releases
and

Roosevelt Administration

Palestine
57 Oil
the
partition
of
supported
also

Government
however,
the
the
that
position
of
worried
company officials
Saud
Ibn
their
and could ultimately cost
with
relationship
would prejudice
SOCAL,
James
Moffet,
The
President
of
the
articulated
them
concession.
Division
Murray,
Wallace
Near
Eastern
the
to
at
of
concerns
the company's
in
Ibn
Saud towards the
indicated
Moffet
that
attitude
of
a change
Affairs.
felt
he
detected
been
this was the result of the U. S.
had
and
Americans
Government's policy towards Palestine. The conclusion of Moffet and other

half
interest
in
CASOC
Co.
in
Texas
1936,
the
a
also
purchased
anticipation of
December
In
Oil,
Stoff,
War
American
See
Michael
figures.
Security:
The
and
healthy
future
production
New
Haven:
Yale
Oil,
Univ.
1941-1947,
Foreign
Press,
Policy
1980, p.
National
for
on
Search
a
1923-1930'
for
Oil
in
Bahrain,
252-268.
Quest
The
Bilovich,
pp.
See
36.
also
Almana,
Palestine,
Arabia
Unified,
Saudi
see
on
officials
court
pp. 154gor
the
of
ss
view
been
have
Palestine
Saud's
Ibn
also
articulated in Philby, Saudi
on
views
158,244246.
Ibn
Saud,
The
Wells
Meulen,
134;
Lacey,
Der
Van
The Kingdom,
335-337;
of
p.
Arabia, pp.
Saud,
164-165.
Ibn
McLoughlin,
pp.
p. 271;
had
Palestine
into
Mandate
during
British
1936.
in
spilled
over
the
of
rebellion
Tension
56
by
is
been
briefly
has
other
authors
and
covered
extensively
only
topic
already
This
One extensive source of material is William Roger Louis, The British
here.
mentioned
Clarendon
Press,
Oxford:
1984, pp. 383-569.
East,
1945-1951,
Middle
in
the
Empire
FRUS
October
14,1938,
1938:
II,
Department
of
release
press
pp. 953-956. For
57State
Franklin
D.
Roosevelt:
Freidel,
Frank
Rendezvous
Palestine
see
on
with
Roosevelt's views
Jim
Bishop,
594
FDR's
Last
Year.,
April
Brown,
1990,
1944Little,
and
Boston:
p.
Destiny,
1974,
444-445.
MacGregor,
Hart-Davis,
London:
pp.
April 1945,

220

ABEDIN-SIX

"competent officials" at CASOC was that if the United States Government

have
"serious
in
Palestine
it
Jewish
would
repercussions
claims
supported
Saudi
in
Arabia
in
interests
their
American
and
might
even
result
oil
on
desire
Washington
SOCAL's
King's
58
It
that
take
the
was
expulsion"
diplomatic
first
in
Saudi
step,
establish
a
post
a
attitude seriously and, as
Arabia as a sign of America's interest in his country.
Wallace Murray was well aware of Ibn Saud's opinion. The King
had not hesitated in urging the United States to resist the attempts of
'outside forces' to influence its foreign policy. In a letter to the White House
Ibn Saud claimed that the Arabs were owed the right to self determination
in Palestine:
Mr. President the Arabs of Palestine and behind them the rest
Islamic
Arabs,
the
the
the
of
world -demand
rest
or
rather
of
their rights, and they defend their lands against those who
intrude upon them and their territories. 59
from
head
first
Arab
letter
the
Saud's
Ibn
an
of state
communication
was
complaining
individuals

issue
Palestine.
Though many
American
the
on
of
policy
of
forward,
had
'stature'
the
come
no
one
of
of
and organisations

felt
State
Department
done
The
had
that the President should
Saud
Ibn
so.
King
"outstanding
The
was
considered
an
this
seriously.
complaint
take
behalf
to
the
qualified
speak
on
most
person
of the Arab
Arab ruler and as
however,
to
King.
Roosevelt
60
the
no
special
attempt
made
placate
people"
The White

House sent a polite reply along with

Department

American
Palestinetowards
policy
regarding
communique

a copy of a State

but
had,
President's own
to
the
Saud
Ibn
no
reference
made
already
which
the
matter.
on
opinion
FR
US
12,1937,
1937:11pp. 893-894.
NEA,
July
Memorandum,
Murray
58Wallace
29,1938,
FRUS
November
1938:II, pp. 994-8. The King's
Roosevelt,
President
to
Saud
59Ibn
Translator,
by
his
Chief
Almana in Arabia Unified,
Roosevelt
reprinted
was
also
letter to
Appendix 7, pp. 286-292. Raising the voice of protest was nothing new to Ibn Saud. Years
dealing with parsimonious British officials had allowed the king to
in
of experience
deal
British
had
He
for
his
to
with
support
savvy.
mortal enemiespolitical
develop some
demands
had
in
issuing
the
of
way
making
wise
Hashemites
grown
and
and
veiled
the
threats.

ABEDRJ-SIX

Murray

221

could

not take any further

steps. An

internal

State

Department report concluded that there was not sufficient evidence to

indicate a permanent long term American interest in Saudi Arabia and as a
result "did

not

warrant

the establishment

of any sort of official

CASOC's
Though
State
61
to
the
sympathetic
concerns
representation".
Department would not establish diplomatic links with a country based on
Saudi
Arabia was still in a state of
company.
private
the needs of a single
development.
had
There
been
by
not
a
serious
effort
economic
political and
importance
determine
Saudi
the
the
to
size
and
rate
of
oil
oil experts
Yet
March
1938
that
in
the
of
events
market.
would
mean
world
reserves
Saudi oil was to take on totally new dimension.
In that month, after several unproductive wells had been drilled, in
7,
CASOC
No.
depth
Dammam
field,
engineers
struck
oil
at
a
named
a new
feet-deeper
4,000
that
of more

than had ever been previously drilled. 62

Subsequently, engineers were able to locate several other large oil deposits
Suddenly,
depths.
the
promise
of great oil wealth was a
greater
at even
CASOC
their
Eager
to
search
area
maximise
management
reality again.
by 80,000
Saud
Ibn
their
to
lobbied
expand
original
concession
successfully
440,000
brought
total
to
This
the
concession
area
sq. Miles,
square miles.
in
largest
the
the
CASOC
the
concession
world
and
exclusive
paved
giving
interest
in
Saudi
Government
Arabian
63
American
for
oil.
greater
way
With new discoveries and an expanded concession the California oil
had enough proof that American interests in Saudi
believed
they
company
boasted
The
long
King
had
that
term.
the
indeed
company
Arabia were
granted

American
an

firm

the concessions, favouring

them over his

FRUS
1939:
N,
695.
Jan.
9,1939,
Roosevelt,
President
p.
60Welles to
to
State
issue
Department
the
the
company
oil
urgings
respond
to
and
desire
resolve
In
61 a
Cairo,
in
S.
Consul
U.
Saudi
Arabia
Morris,
to
the
to assess
on
a
mission
Leland
dispatched
in Fish to Secretary of State, June 21,
Morris'
Report,
See
there.
cited
interests
American
N,
826-827.
1939:
US
pp.
FR
1939,
Middle
East,
Houston:
in
Oil
Gulf
the
Publishing,
Americans
1962,
Hamilton,
and
62Charles
p. 148-149.
Stake
in
Middle
America's
East,
Oil:
the
53-54,
Stoff,
Arabian
Hollis,
pp.
and
63Mikesell and
39.
Security,
American
p.
Oil, War and

ABEDI-six

222

ally - Britain.

traditional

However,

with

the expansion came greater

fears
investment
their
the
of
security
and
of the interference
concerns over
Axis
footholds
Reports
in Saudi Arabia
to
of
attempts
gain
of other powers.
headquarters.
CASOC
Japanese and German companies
caused alarm at
were reportedly

fees
for
large
smaller oil concessions while the
offering

British minister in Jeddah was said to be still fishing for deals on behalf of
British companies. 64Such endeavours were being conducted with the full
had
diplomatic
the
the
and
governments
respective
assistance
of
of
support
Arabia.
Saudi
in
missions
More
diplomatic
California

pressure was put on the State Department

It was of the "utmost

representation.

to establish

importance

to the

Company that a legation be established so that the interests of

be
however,
65
It
be
Company
that the Axis
should
noted
the
safeguarded".
threat

to the American

representatives

concessions was exaggerated. Although

had visited

Saudi Arabia,

neither

Axis

the Japanese nor

Germans had diplomatic missions inside the country. Nor was their access
him
influence
King
their
on
as great as CASOC made it seem as
to the
or
demand
to
that the U. S. Government
the oil company continued

take

formal and concrete steps to raise the American presence in the Kingdom.

By the summer of 1939the persistenceof the oilmen paid off. 66The

State Department agreed to approach President Roosevelt for permission
Saudi
Arabia.
diplomatic
In his memo to FDR,
relations
with
to establish
fact
State
the
that the Germans and the
Secretary
emphasised
of
the
Arabia
Saudi
for
to
had
to
prospect
Japanese
already gone
oil concessions.
In an attempt to make the proposal more appealing the Secretary proposed
William
Saudi
Lenahan, was feeding information
in
Arabia,
CASOC
representative
64The
fuelled
fears
Cairo.
Lenahan
Axis
Minister
in
by
American
of
activities
the
stating that
to
had
in
Saudi
Fritz
Grobba
Iraq,
Arabia
Minister
to
to attempt to gain
German
arrived
the
favourable treatment for Axis companies and obtain valuable concessions. Minister Egypt
US
FR
1939:
W,
State,
June
21,1939,
Secretary
p. 824.
to
of
(Fish)
65Minister Cairo, (Fish) to Secretary of State, Washington, June 21,1939, FR US 1939:IV p.
826.

ABEDIN-SIX

223

that the American Minister in Cairo have his accreditation expanded to

include Saudi Arabia. This would allow American representation without
incurring

significant

additional

expense. President Roosevelt noted his

by
"excellent
idea-OK
this
scribbling
measure
of
approval
Secretary's proposal. 67 As a result,
Minister

FDR" on the

Bert Fish, the residing American

in Cairo, became the first American Envoy Extraordinary

Minister Plenipotentiary

and

accredited to the Government of the Kingdom of

Saudi Arabia 68
Even though Ibn Saud probably had little understanding
complexities
involvement

of

American

politics,

he

obtained

greater

of the

American

by virtue of CASOC's fear of losing their investment. It was a

itself
Whether
King
the
that
on
occasions.
repeat
numerous
would
pattern
because
bid
America
had
SOCAL's
the
that
of
perception
no
accepted
imperial

intentions or because of the sheer size of the American down

latter
But
be
is
the
to
to
the
argument
conjecture.
seems
open
payment
favourable.
more

SOCAL officials certainly rated themselves as having

better motives than the British and their deposit of gold provided a timely
injection of funds precisely when the King was in urgent need of it. The
American presence was ensured and it would steadily grow. However, Ibn
Saud would always be able to play on American naivete and inexperience
in the Middle East to his advantage.

Oil Company Pressure Grows: 1940-1943

Two months after Washington appointed Bert Fish as the first American
broke
in
Europe.
In
first
Arabia,
Saudi
the
out
to
war
months of the
envoy
Second World War, Axis armies made considerable headway advancing

in
Minister
Baghdad both strongly endorsed the
Cairo
in
Minister
the
American
The
and
66
lobbying
less
due
to
the
the
See
Minister
of
relations-no
of
oil
company.
establishment
FRUS
Secretary
State,
June
211939,
1939:W p. 827.
to
(Knabenshue),
of
Iraq
June
30,1939,
Roosevelt
President
FR
US,
State
to
19391V p. 827-828.
Secretary
of
67
68Secretary of State to Minister Egypt, July 12,1939, FRUS 1939:11,p. 829. The American
his
Arabia
Saudi
to
credentials to Ibn Saud on February 4,
presented
officially
Minister
1940.

ABEDIN-SIX

224

across Europe through

Africa

the unrelenting

the Balkans, Greece and Yugoslavia. In North

success of the Afrika

Corps sent British forces

in
into
Egypt,
turn placing the security of the Middle East in
retreating
jeopardy. With communications to her Eastern Empire threatened, Britain
friendly
have
Arab
in
to
the
as
many
rulers
power as possible.
saw
need
London decided to reintroduce the subsidy programme to encourage Arab
loyalty. 69 In the short term this was great news for Ibn Saud. He found
himself almost 400,000 pounds richer in 1940.7Though this was still far
his
that
to
the
was
required
cover
expenditures. Wartime
amount
short of
conditions

had severely curtailed his regimes main income earner-the

pilgrimage.

In 1938 approximately 60,000 worshipers had come to the holy

following
The
cities.

dropped
by
figure
had
half. 71Moreover, the
that
year

led
imports
foodstuffs.
in
to
shortages
curtailed
and
of
shipping
reduction
Revenues from taxes, fees and customs duties evaporated. This translated
into a substantial drop in earnings for the King and affected the livelihood
in
Hijaz.
traders,
particularly
and
of many merchants
Despite British aid the King found it difficult
subsidies

to the tribal

to maintain

chiefs or to manage burgeoning

his

government

forecast
legation
Cairo
in
American
"will
it
The
that
undoubtedly
expenses.
be a lean year financially for Ibn Saud and it would not be surprising

to

hear of his casting about for a loan". 72In fact Ibn Saud turned to the one
he
could put pressure on-the oil company and the King
source which
future
He
to
for
them
against
money
royalties.
advance
the
asked
asked

69Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951,p. 189.

from
396,582
Saud
the British subsidy. This was raised in 1941 to
Ibn
1940
In
70
received
1,111,375 pounds. By 1942 the figure had more than doubled to 2,945,550 pounds. At the
8,294,343
had
King
Figures
total
1943
the
in
Baxter
of
pounds.
a
received
cited
of
end
Minute, March 16,1944, Report on Future of Saudi Arabia, PRO FO
371/40265/E1775/128/25.
71Bert Fish, American Legation, Cairo to Secretary of State, Washington, November 11,
but
in 1939 only 32,288 arrived with 1940
in
1938
59,627
that
came
pilgrims
1940; reported
figures expected to be lower than that. RDOS-SA, T1179/R3, US-National Archives. See
American Security, pp. 41-45.
War
Oil,
Stoff,
and
also

n Fish to Secretaryof State,November 11,1940,RDOS-SA,T1179/R3, US-National

Archives.

ABEDIN-SIX

immediate

2Z

advancement

of $750,000.73Company

officials in Dhahran

full
headquarters
be
that
the
to
amount
provided and also
recommended
$3
be
to
to
advance another
million over the course of the
prepared
warned
year. However,

company directors

in California were amazed. CASOC

distribution
in
facing
production
and
major strains
was
Production

due to the war.

cut backs due to tanker shortages meant that less oil was

did
it
be
in the position of
to
transport
to
and
sell
and
not
want
available
supporting

the day to day economic needs of the Saudi government.

Senior company officials were determined to resist the pressures put

Fred
A.
Davies,
President
CASOC
increase
to
them
payments.
of
and
on
Lloyd Hamilton

(the legal advisor who had negotiated the concession in

1933) travelled to Jeddah in January 1941 to try and reason with the King.
However,

Davies found the King ready to argue his point and demanded

for
$6
Davies
that
year
of
million
alone.
royalties
calculated
on
an advance
60%
being
budget
to
the
total
the
supply
of
asked
that
was
company
of the
he
74
King
The
being
the
that
oil
men
reassured
was
not
outright.
country
he
intended
demanding
to
them
the
40%
since
obtain
on
remaining
overly
from the British Government.
Nevertheless, $6 million was almost double of what CASOC had
paid in royalty

advances the year before, and three times that paid in

193975 Davies and Hamilton were shocked at this massive increase. At the
desperately
King's
they
the
It
time
afraid
of
refusing
were
request.
same
but
had
the
two
that
they
agreed
to work
men
extortionate
seemed
King
Davies
the
that
to
the
company would pay
proposed
out.
something
$3
$500,000
(in
instalments).
Thereafter,
initial
of
million
the
amount
an
73Political Agent Bahrain to Resident Gulf, January 4,1940, FO 371/24588 E 305/205/25
p. 131.
$10
be
Million,
his
budget
testimony of Fred Davies at U. S. Senate
to
Saud
Ibn
74
estimated
National
Investigating
Defense Program; Petroleum
Committee
the
Special
Hearings,
Session),
(First
Congress
Saudi
Arabia,
80th
Part 41. Washington D. C.:
with
Arrangements
Government Printing Office 1948, (Hereafter U. S. Senate Hearings: Petroleum
Arrangements with Saudi Arabia) p. 25051.
$1.7
CASOC
1939
million above and beyond royalty payments and in 1940
advanced
75In
Ibid.
$3.5
to
million,
that rose

226

ABEDIN-SIX

$3
during
to
the course of
raise another
million
company would endeavour
the year to make up the $6 million total. 76This method of payment seemed
to satisfy the King.

Relieved at having the matter settled the two oil men

flew back to California. However, the finance department of CASOC was

in no hurry to make payments. While the King anxiously waited for the
first instalment of $500,000, the paperwork at company headquarters kept
the funds tied up. After two months had passed Fred Davies received a
Saud
Ibn
that
could play games as well.
sharp reminder
Davies received an urgent cable from the CASOC representative in
Jeddah,

William

Lenahan, stating

that the Saudi Government

was

demanding an additional $1.5 million on top of the overdue instalment of

$500,000.' The Saudi Government had also ordered 10 million riyals to be
minted

Davies
in
London
Treasury
to
HM
and
surprise, the British
at

for
American
it.
Obviously
CASOC
the
to
pay
oil company was
expected
had
financial
its
great
which
resources
corporation
a
wealthy
at
as
viewed
disposal. London already contributed 400,000 for 1941 and there was
"absolutely no hope of any other sums being advanced this year". 78 The
funds
for
to
thus
the King.
supply
any
additional
expected
was
company
When Lenahan tried to object at being forced to pay the bills of the Saudi
Government

he was informed that HM Treasury had already issued the

have
be
for
to
made.
minting and payment would
order
These tactics exasperated Lenahan who cabled this message to
California:
headquarters
in
Davies at company
you will realise were we to grant this present request it
few
be
days
but
before we should be
of
a
a matter
would
approached for another loan for ordinary running expenses

76Davies to Ohliger, January 7,1941, CASOC correspondence in U. S. Senate, Ibid.,

p. 25389.
77Lenahan to Davies, March 31,1941, CASOC cable in U. S. Senate, Ibid., p. 25390
Lenahan
in
Stanley
Jordan
to Davies, March 31,1941, CASOC
Minister
cited
78British
Ibid.,
25390.
S.
Senate,
In actuality the total amount of
in
U.
p.
published
correspondence
1.4
1941
to
Baxter
Minute,
for
million
come
the
year
would
pounds,
see
whole
aid
February 9 1942, FO 371/31451 E607/157/25.

227

ABEDIN-SDC

for
Government
this
that
the
such
requests
purpose
and
of
79
be
throughout
the
year.
made
would

Yet the general inexperience and insecurity of company men in dealing

Ibn
Saud's
The
King
to
King
to
the
advantage.
serve
was ultimately
with

had benefited from the uncertainties of Anglo-American policy.

By

funds
he
for
for
Americans
it.
British
the
to
the
got
pay
more
pressing
Through pressure on the oil company he received official diplomatic ties
with Washington

American
Government
the
of
an
possibility
grant
and

from
his
far
been
have
mind.
could not
It was clear to Davies and Lenahan that CASOC had to come up
long-term
Saudi
Arabian
to
the
problem
of
solution
and
with a more stable
Lenahan hoped to avoid provoking "another crises in
financing.
Government-Company

but
Davies
was shocked at the turn of
relations"

$1.5
demand
by
then
the
First
80
the
the
and
million
additional
events.
for
CASOC
the minting of 10 million riyals. In
Minister
that
British
pay
Davies opinion

this was "completely

out of order". 81 In his own way

by
hoped
the
to
suggesting that the King and
situation
Lenahan
remedy
funds
be
for
fixed
to
the year.
of
provided
amount
the company agree on a
be
demands
further
tolerated. However, the
not
would
After that any
relationship

between the oil company and Ibn Saud, unlike the British

Ibn
Saud.
to
the
did
them
pressure
ability
Minister,
not afford
Jordan, had the British Government, Treasury and military

forces

behind him and despite the fiscally conservative nature of Britain's own
the oil company as a bank.
to
treat
King
the
encouraged
was
policies
felt
CASOC
it
difficult
that
in
itself
could not refuse the
position
a
Finding
in
investment
its
the concession. Moreover, the
jeopardising
King without
huge sums of aid that the monarch sought could eventually push him into
It
Axis.
judgement
the
the
Davies
was
hands
even
powers,
of
other
of
the
CASOC
in
U.
S.
Senate
Hearings:
April
1,1941,
Davies,
cable
printed
to
79Lenahan
25391.
Saudi
Arabia,
Arrangements
p.
with
petroleum

80Ibid.
in
CASOC
U.
S.
Senate,
2,1941,
Ibid., p. 25391.
April
Lenahan,
cable
published
to
In Davies

ABEDIN-SIX

228

United
States
CASOC
the
that
officials
government would
and other senior
have to be brought into the situation if the security of their concession was
to be maintained

and the fiscal solvency of Ibn Saud was ever to be

achieved. 82

'Cash for Oil'-Lobbying

for Aid to Ibn Saud

Securing the greater involvement of Washington would require backing

from senior administration
Moffet,
James
executive

officials. Davies got in touch with fellow oil

boards
the
served
on
who
of two of CASOC's

figure
known
Washington.
in
83
Moffet
a
well
was
was also a
affiliates, and
friend
Franklin
Roosevelt
President
D.
of
and it was no
close personal
surprise

that

Davies

hoped

to

get

support

directly

from

the

8,1941,
CASOC's
April
headquarters
84
In
at
a
on
meeting
administration.
in San Francisco Moffet was briefed on the situation in Saudi Arabia 85 He
dealing
Gulf
difficulty
but
in
the
with
monarchs
was amazed at
understood
the huge sum that was being demanded as an advance. Davies hoped that
March,
Lend
Lease
Act
in
funds
the
the
of
could be made
passage
with
available

to support the Saudi treasury and avoid further

depletion of

CASOC resources. 86 Moffet readily agreed and approached the White

82Davies to Ohliger (General Manager of CASOC in Eastern Saudi Arabia) April 2,1941,
in U. S. Senate Hearings: PetroleumArrangements with Saudi Arabia, p. 25392. See also Miller,
Searchfor Security, p. 37.
s3Moffet was on the board of the Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO) and the
California Texas Co. (CALTEX), both of which along with CASOC were subsidiaries of
Texas Oil Co. and SOCAL. Many oil industry executives went to work for the Government
during and after the war often on loan or for fixed periods of time; See Kolko, The Roots of
American Foreign Policy, p. 25.
s4Hoffet had worked with Roosevelt during the First World War when the future
Navy
in
Secretary
the
and
charge of oil purchases.
of
was
president
is CASOC correspondence, U. S. Senate Hearings: PetroleumArrangements with Saudi Arabia,
Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers,p. 303.
Shwadran,
The
Also
25393-97.
pp.
formulated
by President Roosevelt to
Act
Lease
Lend
was
part
of
a
programme
The
86
loans, war materiel and supplies from the United States. Previous
Britain
to
receive
allow
legislation (the Neutrality Act of 1937) prohibited the granting of loans to parties engaged
in war and required cash payments for all munitions sold. Roosevelt pushed for reform of
by
Act
these
Neutrality
restrictions
worked
and
around
allowing Britain to borrow
the
from the United States and lease war supplies. For further details on Roosevelt's efforts
Franklin D Rooseveltand American Foreign Policy 1932-1945, New York:
Dallek,
Robert
see
Oxford University Press, 1979, pp. 255-261. Also see Warren Kimball, The Most Unsordid

229

ABEDIN-SDC

House for an appointment to see the President. He obtained one the very
day.
87
next
Moffet began his briefing of the President by focusing on the war
friendly
help.
in
Arabia
Saudi
He
as
need
of
a
nation
portrayed
not oil.
Axis propaganda was looking to foment discontent among the Arab
leader
Arab
Saud
Ibn
with strong pro-Ally
major
a
was
peoples and
Moslems
Arab
in
the
"No
the
nor
among
countries,
man
other
sympathies:
his"
88
The
King's
to
support would
equal
world over, commands prestige
be important to maintain sympathy for the Allied cause in the Arab world.
While Saudi Arabia was traditionally

in the British sphere of influence,

develop
Saudi
to
their oil resources
helping
the
America was
people
(CASOC)
Company
Oil
Standard
Arabian
California
which
through the
had 160,000 American shareholders. The CASOC concession encompassed
the entire territory

Oregon.
It
California
the
and
was also the
of
states
of

had
in
to
the
sole
American
which
rights
what
region
company
oil
only
fields
Yet
in
largest
the
the
be
the
world.
continued
to
one
of
could prove
Saudi
Arabia
the
to
that
support
and
of
concession
American character of
Ibn
Saud's
depended
the
of
regime.
Allied
stability
on
cause
the
Moffet then gradually introduced the issue of the oil company.
Severe financial

lack
drought,
of pilgrimage
and
war
crises,

revenue

had
been
informed
that unless the
King
the
company
oil
the
and
plagued
financial
his
the
the
assistance
stability
of
necessary
company provided

University
Press,
Hopkins
1969,
Chapters
Johns
1-3
Baltimore:
1939-1941,
Lease,
Lend
Act:
Coming
War,
New
Haven:
the
Yale
Roosevelt
the
President
of
Beard,
and
Charles
and
University Press, 1948, pp. 159-172.
for
it
for
38
be
Security,
took
Search
Miller,
to
a
week
p.
a
meeting
to
arranged.
97According
Washington
National
Archives,
D.
C.,
the
this author
at
records
checking
However, after
to
Moffet
secure an appointment with
managed
and
that
swifter
was
much
discovered
is
This
indicative
(April
9),
day
the
the
Roosevelt
of
urgency with
next
very
President
The
informal
the
Moffet
meeting
matter.
was
a
private
and
regarded
the
and
oilmen
which
during
have
been
found
but
that
the
conversations
meeting
of
No
records
substantive
one.
few
President
days
later.
in
Davies
had
lot
the
his
to
a
did
writing
a
proposal
Moffet
send
drafting of the memo.
in
the
input
of
Records
Office
April
16,1941,
Near
the
Eastern
Roosevelt,
President
of
of
to
Moffet
as
State,
Lot
Department
File
57D
298
(Box
6),
USRONEA),
of
(Hereafter
as
cited
Affairs
National Archives.

230

ABEDIN-SIX

$10
King
danger.
Overall
be
in
the
required
million a
grave
regime would
British
He
his
the
to
to
was
expecting
provide around
expenses.
meet
year
$4 million but sought the remaining $6 million from the oil company in the
form of royalty advances.89However, CASOC had already invested large
development
had
The
Arabia.
Saudi
the
in
of
oil
concessions
cost
sums
$27.5 million

had
1939
the
company
advanced Ibn Saud $6.8
and since

With new demands for advances the figure could reach $30

million.

following
the
over

million

five years-CASOC felt unable to handle the

"It
has
it
is
Moffet
to
now
come
a
point
where
asserted:
alone.

situation

for

impossible
responsibility

the company

to continue

the growing

burden

of financing an independent country, particularly

and
under

"
90
present abnormal conditions.
The company was not only uneasy about further cash advances but
had
King
the
despite
its
the
to
felt
company
that
negligible
assistance
also
impact due, in part, to the strong historical influence of Britain. It would be
Arabia
in
Saudi
if
United
interest
States
American
the
important
sign of
an
King:
in
to,
the
to
assistance
grant
step and
government was
I sincerely trust that some way may be found under existing
legislation to provide King Ibn Saud financial assistance,
in
desperately
he
order to maintain his
needs
so
which
We
believe
in
that unless this
condition.
stable
a
government
is done, and soon, this independent kingdom, and perhaps
be
Arab
it
thrown into chaos.91
the
world,
will
entire
with
Moffet

"moderate"
Saud's
Ibn
that
requirements
were
suggested

"minimum

and a

figure for essential expenditures"92. He proposed to Roosevelt

loan
Ibn
Saud
$6
to
States
United
were
if
government
the
million
that
CASOC
deliver
five
for
the
the
could
years,
next
equivalent
annually
Government
below
US
the
to
the
at
products
market
petroleum
of
amount

Arabia,
Saudi
States,
30-31.
United
Aramco,
the
pp.
and
89Anderson,
RONEA,
16,1941,
Department
April
Roosevelt,
President
to
Moffet
of State, Lot File 57D
90
US
FR
1941:
111,
See
625.
Archives.
US-National
6),
p.
also
(Box
298

91Ibid.
92Ibid.

231

ABEDIN-SIX

for
The
it
transaction.
In
oil
oil company was also
a
cash
was
essence
rate.
that the deal would

hopeful

give the impression

to Ibn Saud that

Washington was taking direct interest in Saudi Arabia and that this would
bolster CASOC's bargaining power with the King. Moffet also thought that
the British should be urged to give more assistance themselves, but should
from
fact
In
Moffet
be
the
to
oil
concession.
obtain
any
wanted
allowed
not
Washington

to get a commitment

that Britain would

not "directly

or

take any action that would threaten the American character of

indirectly"

the concession-93
The President listened to Moffet's presentation but did not enter into
detailed discussions about Saudi oil. He had agreed to the meeting to
be
left
for
friend.
issues
The
to
would
others
old
resolve.
an
accommodate
The 'cash for oil' proposal was forwarded to the State and Navy
for comment. He also had his assistant Harry

Department's

Hopkins

inquire from the Federal Loan Administrator, JesseJones, whether a loan to

Saudi Arabia could be arranged. Ironically, Hopkins did not believe that
Saudi oil revenues would

be enough collateral for the loan and he

his royalties on oil as collateral we could

"instead
that
of
using
suggested
future
he
in
tips
the
the
his
get
will
on
on
pilgrims to
royalties
use
Mecca. "94
Meanwhile, as Davies waited in the San Francisco offices of CASOC
for news on the loan, a cable from the company
Arabia,

William

furious
was
support
tone

in Saudi

renewed anxiety. Apparently,

Ibn Saud

that Davies had asked the U. S. Government

to grant financial

to Saudi Arabia. The message from the King was "more

and

received

Lenahan, brought

representative

terminology

than

any

other

thus far. 95 The King rebuked

communication"
the company

angry in

CASOC

had

for its deception.

Petroleum
Arrangements
Senate
Hearings:
U.
S.
in
testimony
with SaudiArabia, pp.
93Moffet
24838-39.
in
Ibid.,
25415.
April
14,1941,
Jones
to
re-printed
p.
cable
Hopkins
94
,
Lenahan's
in
letter
Saud's
cable to Davies, April 19,1941,
was
summarised
of
rebuke
95Ibn
CASOC cable re-printed in Ibid. p. 25393.

232

ABEDIN-SIX

Davies had promised him personally that the company itself would
provide

the $6 million

so why had the American

government

been

he
Saud
Ibn
that
stated
approached.
from
borrow
United
States
Government if
the
money
could
he so wished and that if he did so wish he would do so
directly and not through the company and that furthermore
he would not restrict himself to requesting such an
inadequate sum. 96
If the company needed money to pay what it owed Saudi Arabia then it
itself
involve
his
borrow
from
US
the
and
not
government
country.
should
He accused CASOC of breaking its word and its written agreement on
financial assistance.
No doubt, Ibn Saud was upset by these events. However,

this

display of anger may actually have been due to the fear that the company's
his
have
Washington
to
own
plans
approach
undermined
would
actions
for aid. Ibn Saud was well aware that the oil company would be unable to
fact
he
he
In
British
funds
Minister,
to
the
said
as
much
requested.
provide
Stonehower-Bird. 97 The King had approached Bird in order to ascertain
have
him
Washington
to
for
Britain
objections
any
asking
would
whether
financial aid. When Bird reported this to the Foreign Office considerable
discussion

ensued. The report was also circulated to the Treasury for

The Treasury official who responded argued that Ibn Saud

comment.
from approaching the Americans as they were
discouraged
be
should
Moreover,
King
him
be
the
to
told to
aid.
any
should
grant
unlikely
he
had
98
Fortunately
for
Ibn
available.
resources
whatever
with
manage
Saud, the Foreign Office disagreed with that view and had no objections to
Washington.
King
contacting
the

% mid.
FO,
April
(Stonehower-Bird)
Jeddah
to
22,1941,
PRO FO
Minister,
British
97
371/27265/E2414/155
by
Mr.
Grant
handwritten
Treasury
Office on
the
These
made
comments
of
were
981bid.
the above report.

233

ABEDIN-SIX

Meanwhile

CASOC was taking Ibn Saud's anger seriously. The

job
Lenahan
into
William
the
things
of
smoothing
over.
pressed
company
Lenahan first went to Prince Faisal, the King's second son and Foreign
Minister

in order to make him understand the company position. He

had
best
in
interests
his
the
the
that
the
acted
company
of
prince
reassured
father. CASOC was truly unable to come up with the funds itself and was
borrow
from
law
Government.
American
With
to
the
under
not allowed
Lenahan's persuasion Faisal eventually endorsed the CASOC plan. As
Lenahan hoped, Faisal went to the King and was able to smooth matters
his
directly
Saud
Ibn
State
to
Soon
the
cable
own
sent
afterwards
over.
Department requesting that a loan be granted to his government. 99
At the State Department, Wallace Murray, the head of the Division
favourably
Moffet
Affairs
He
to
the
Eastern
Near
responded
proposal.
of
from
Saudi
Arabia's
income
its
that
the
analysis
pilgrim
concurred with
dried
been
"had
Furthermore,
effectively
up".
traffic and customs revenues
the $10 million
reasonable"
"influence

Saud
budget
Ibn
that
requested appeared
annual

"fundamentally
Saud
Ibn
was
and since
is great in the Arab world"

anti-Axis"

"to be
and his

Murray believed that the Moffet

100
Others
in
be
State
Department,
the
approval.
given
such
proposal should
Under
Secretary
Assistant
Special
State,
the
to
Thornburg,
Max
of
were
as
King
in
Thornburg
that
the
turn
to
out
might
pointed
any
case
sure.
not so
he
"Certainly
for
help:
have
do
Axis
to
would
probably
powers
the
so

forthcoming".
101
funds
were
unless
Though officials at the NEA were optimistic about the political and
from
loan
Saudi
Arabia,
to
benefits
the
the
reports
of
military on
economic
favourable.
The
Saudi
Secretary
so
not
oil
were
of
utility
of the
the practical
by
Navy
Knox,
that
Frank
analysis
an
Navy,
engineers showed
reported
high
low
had
sulphur content which fell below the
Saudi crude
octane and
State,
June
26,1941,
FRUS
Secretary
111,
1941:
Al-Saud
to
Aziz
of
Abdul
p. 631,fn-23a.
99
April
21,1941,
Hull,
FR
US
Cordell
State,
1941:
111
Secretary
to
Murray
of
pp. 627-629.
200
Asst.
Chief
Thornburg
Conversation,
with
Memorandum
of Division of NEA, FRUS
of
10,
1941:III, pp. 629-631.

ABEDIN-SIX

234

standards required by Navy vessels and aircraft. Saudi crude

minimum

for
Navy use.102This was followed by a note from the
thus
unsuitable
was
office of the Federal Loan Administrator,
there was no legal justification

Jesse Jones, which stated that

for allowing

federal funds to be made

available to the Government of Saudi Arabia. 103These reports made it

for the White House to proceed. President Roosevelt, although

difficult

interested in following Moffets' proposal, was left with few options. He did
force
its implementation.
have
to
the
means
not

Moreover, it was still

Arabia
Saudi
in
British
the
that
was
more
sphere and that London
apparent
would ultimately

have to deal with the issue. Roosevelt sent word to his

Secretary of State, Cordell Hull to "tell the British I hope that they can take
little
far
for
Saudi
Arabia.
is
This
King
104
the
of
a
afield
us".
of
care
Instructions were sent to the American Minister in Cairo, Alexander
Kirk, that the King should be should be informed that while the highest
for
his
for
held
it
United
States
the
was
necessary
country
was
regard
Government
involved

to concentrate on assisting those nations which were directly

in the war. It was also understood that Britain had already

from
Saudi
Arabia
the
to
considerable amount of aid
assistance
provided
that the United States had granted HM Government. 105However, Kirk was
It
leave
it
to
the
to the British to
was
unwise
state
of
affairs.
with
unhappy
because
"the
United
King
States
the
to
be
to
aid
would
appear
provide
102Secretary of the Navy, Knox to President Roosevelt, May 20,1941, FRUS 1941:111
Statesand Saudi Arabia, p. 31, fn 90.
United
Aramco,
Anderson,
See
the
635-636.
pp.
103Federal Loan Administrator, Jones to Secretary of State, Hull, August 6,1941, FR US
1941: 111p. 643. Among the provisions of eligibility for lend lease was that the recipient
be
difficult
for
democratic.
It
Roosevelt
be
the
would
administration to
nation should
justify aid to a distant desert monarchy given isolationist sentiments in the US Congress
President
Roosevelt
See
Beard,
high.
Coming
the
War,
the
also
and
very
of
still
pp. 159were
172.
104Roosevelt Memo to Federal Loan Administrator, Jones, July 18,1941, FRUS 1941:111,
Washington was asked if Britain could make available
Ambassador
British
to
The
643.
p.
$425
from
Saudi
Arabia
the
help
million loan that the United States had
to
funds
out
See
Jones
Government.
Majesty's
Hopkins,
His
to
July
22,1941,
PSF
granted
recently
Diplomatic Box, Folder: Saudi Arabia, Roosevelt Papers, cited in Miller, Searchfor Security,
p. 45.

i05Minster Egypt (Kirk) to Secretaryof State(Hull), August 21,1941, FRUS 1941:111,pp.

640-643.

235

ABEDIN-SIX

in
Near
initiative
East
British
Saudi
in
the
to
the
all
generally
and
resigning
Arabia in particular. "106From Washington came a firm reply-'the

matter

had been given much thought and the President himself had come to this
decision'. Kirk was reprimanded for his naivety and for not considering the
that the King may have been exaggerating to involve the United

possibility

States as a counter weight to Britain and in the process gain greater

However,
Secretary
State
the
of
was confident that
assistance.

financial

Britain, rather that the United States, was more susceptible to this tactic
because Saudi Arabia was "of more political and strategic importance to
the British Empire than this country". 107
Others in the State Department, particularly Wallace Murray and his
Kirk.
They
inclined
NEA,
to
with
agree
were strongly
were
colleagues at
him
be
believing
important
help
Ibn
Saud,
to
Arab
the
to
most
motivated
leader of the time. Murray did not like the prospect of disappointing

the

King and letting him feel 'abandoned' by the United States. Having served
in the U. S. Mission in Tehran during the 1920's Murray

had a greater

had
developed
Middle
East
in
the
also
and
a strong anti-British
experience
bias. 108Undaunted by the White House decision, Murray came up with
another

proposal

agricultural

to assist the King. It involved

the dispatch

of an

Saudi
help
in
the
to
of
exploration
water resources and
mission

in the cultivation of crops. This would at least indicate some official interest
on the part

of Washington. 109 To avoid

the lengthy

delays that a

funds,
it
to
authorise
entail,
would
was proposed
committee
congressional
discretionary,
Emergency
for
his
Fund
President
this purpose.
the
use
that
However, this too came to no avail as the proposal remained in the White
The
Roosevelt
for
House
administration
months without action.

was still

from the 'isolationist' Congress over its perceived

from
criticism
smarting
August
30,1941,
State,
FRUS 1941:III, pp. 647-648.
Secretary
Egypt
to
of
Minster
106
Egypt,
September
10,1941,
Minister
FR US 1941:111,pp. 648-649.
State
to
Secretary
of
107
Security,
51
American
War
Oil,
p.
Stoff,
and
108
Secretary
Under
NEA)
State
(Acting
Head
Sumner Welles,
to
Memo
of
of
Alling
209
September 27,1941, FRUS 1941:111,pp. 650-651. At the time that Murray's proposal was
finalised, Paul Ailing was temporary head of NEA.

236

ABEDIN-SD{

face
desire
little
There
to
foreign
more criticism over
was
policy.
activist
direct
in
the
to
country
which
played
no
part
war
neutral
a
aid
granting
effort.
Then on December 7,1941 aircraft of the Imperial Japanese Navy
launched a surprise attack on the U. S. Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbour,
Hawaii. America was propelled into the Second World War. Within days
the climate in Washington had changed. Murray realised that there was a
new opportunity
proposal

in

recommendation

to bring up the case of

light

of

the

war

effort,

Saudi Arabia. Couching his

Murray

reintroduced

his

for an agricultural mission. This time however, with the

added purpose of providing

cover for War Department logistics officers

facilities
for
in
Saudi
Arabia
locate
to
military
sites
possible
who wished
deployments
in
that
"It
the
is
military
as
a
result
of
possible
entirely
since
Middle East it will be necessary for our armed services to obtain sooner, or
later rather extensive facilities from the King of Saudi Arabia"110
This reformulated

request was taken up remarkably

quickly and

days. 111There seemed to be

House
White
from
the
within
arrived
approval
President's
in
to
For
in
this
the
way
authorise
assistance
case.
no obstacles
Murray

NEA
it
his
the
was a small victory
at
colleagues
and

incident

Administration
the
the
to
with
which
reluctance
prove
served

but the

Kingdom's
The
Saudi
Arabia.
in
involved
became
rich mineral resources
be
to
the
to
asset
vital
the
a
strategic
as
national
seen
security
of
yet
were
United States.
However, in Riyadh the news of the American agricultural
was not greeted with

mission

much enthusiasm. Ibn Saud had placed many

for
hoped
had
for
American
Instead
concrete
and
assistance.
aid
requests
he
have
feed
to
being
would
whom
advisors,
he was
and protect.
sent more

by
Under
forwarded
President
Secretary
to
the
Murray's
was
of State, Sumner
210
proposal
President
Roosevelt,
State
February 12,1942, FRLIS
Secretary
to
Under
See
of
Welles.
1942: IV, pp. 562-563.
Egypt,
Kirk,
Minister
Welles
February
State,
26,1942, FRLIS
to
Secretary
Under
of
111
1942: IV, p. 564.

237

ABEDIN-SIX

Meanwhile
additional

the Americans and the British did manage to put together an

1 million which made an impression on the King. 112It was far

Americans
the
the
than
that
agricultural
mission
offered,
more substantial
though it was only a fraction of the 10 million

that Ibn Saud actually

hoped for. It seemed inevitable that he would have to resume his pressure
his
financial
to
the
supply
needs.
company
oil
on
In January 1942, CASOC was asked for $500,000 to pay for motor
had
for
buying
Government
Saudi
in
the
that
ordered
and
sovereigns
cars
India. CASOC did not have access to dollars. 113CASOC wanted Britain to
have
Saudi
King
to
this
to
the
the
as
would
access
rupees
alleviate
allow
dollars.
for
need

Britain agreed to increase the subsidy by a large margin

from 250,000 to 3,000,000 pounds. However the Foreign Office did not
had
high
fear
know
Saud
to
that
they
Ibn
that
to
agreed
go
so
out of
want
Britain would be asked for the whole sum up front. Therefore, the Consul
in Jeddah was instructed only to say that Britain would be providing

further 250,000 (making total 1Stquarter of 1942 contributions to 750,000)

further
114
the
With
of
assistance
question
afterwards.
consider
would
and
being
Foreign
financial
Office
large
the
made
contributions
was also
such
considering

bank
"which
might assure some measure
state
a
establishing

finances".
115
Arabian
Saudi
the
over
However, Ibn Saud's financial situation was desperate. He needed to
from
Britain so that he could plan
total
know the
amount of aid coming
Legation.
British
In
he
the
on
put
pressure
an urgent memo on
ahead and
February 11,1942 the British Minister in Jeddah reported that the Saudi
Government

had asked for at least 200,000 gold sovereigns within

two

U2 The oil company knew that the British had sent the 1 million in June 1941 and it made
Davies
Washington
to
to
aid.
provide
worried that the King would
get
them more anxious
form
the
it
through
State
that
the
pressure
oil
constant
company
was
and
not realise
Department that Britain sent more aid. See Davies to Ohliger (al-Khobar Office) June 9,
U.
S.
Senate Hearings: Petroleum
to
the
CASOC
submitted
correspondence
1941,
Arrangements with Saudi Arabia, p.25422.
Office
January
25,1942
Foreign
FO 371/31451/E570/157/25
London
to
Embassy
S.
U.
113
FO
6
1942,
371/31451/E607/157/25
February
Consul
Jeddah,
Office
to
114Foreign

ABEDIN-SIX

238

had
Saudi
The
treasury
no riyals and no gold with
weeks.

which to buy

them. The Consul agreed that the situation was urgent but in his cable to
London reported that he thought 100,000 sovereigns would suffice. 116The
fact
despite
from
the
that
the
of
arose
out
situation
of
assistance
urgency
Britain it came in the form of bank deposits not in coinage. So there was no
Thus
difficult
it
tribal
to
to circulate
subsidies.
salaries
and
was
pay
coins
Also
did
in
into
the
the
subsidy
economy.
sterling
not allow the
money
from
from
i.
the
the United
outside
sterling
area,
e.
purchase of goods
States. 117
While Ibn Saud attempted to maintain the stability of his domestic
environment

CASOC was becoming increasingly

concerned about the

its
The
in
Arabia,
Floyd
company
concession.
manager
of
security
physical
Ohliger was worried about the repercussions of an airborne attack on oil
installations

in Dhahran and Ras Tanura and wanted to ensure the ability

of oil to reach refineries.

The company had plugged with cement those

daily
The
to
that
maintain
essential
production
not
were
needs.
wells
'velocity
These
equipped
with
chokes'.
were
wells
were valves
remaining
damage
to the well if the surface equipment
serious
that would prevent
bags
had
been
Concrete
bombed.
and
sand
walls
placed around other
was
facilities.
However,
from
there
the
was
still
oil
no
at
protection
equipment
CASOC's
own security assessment pointed out that the whole
air attacks.
installation could be wiped out with a single bombing run:

The oil and gas separating and collecting facilities in Dhahran

are the most vulnerable as well as the most essential part of
lu Foreign Office (Baxter Memo) to HM Treasury, February 5 1942, FO
371/31451/E739/157/25
116Legation Jeddah (Bird) to Foreign Office February 111942, FO 371/31451/E981/157/25
117Foreign Office officials were also frustrated that Ibn Saud refused to accept the paper
back it up. He would not go against religious principles which
to
silver
without
currency
back
have
it up. Foreign Office to Jeddah,
to
to
coinage
actual
money
paper
required
Despite
371/31451/E1393/157/25.
FO
9
1942,
all the difficulties of 1942 Ibn Saud
March
first Saudi consul to Jerusalem. This
finances
find
the
to
the
to
appoint
also managed
legation
from
Italian
Jeddah,
the
the
the consul was a man that
removal
of
saw
period also
he refused the replacement that Rome provided, choosing instead
Saud
Ibn
and
annoyed
Foreign
Office
Legation,
Jeddah
leave.
Annual
to
Report for 1941, July 22,
to
them
to ask
1942, FO 371/31460 E4326/4326/25.

239

ABEDIN-SIX

the whole producing and shipping system. If these facilities

destroyed,
Arabian
be
lost
the
entire
production
would
were
to the war effort until such time as the equipment could be
replaced. The specialized nature of this equipment makes it
be
it
less
in
that
than eight
could
replaced
much
unlikely
months and thus no crude oil could be shipped or utilized in
the interim. This particular system which is the heart of all
be
destroyed
operations,
could
with about
our producing
three fairly well placed medium sized bombs 118
CASOC approached the US military for the installation of anti-aircraft guns
for its facilities. The company felt that it was "essential" that the guns be
provided,

despite
facilities
taken,
the
the
that
precautions
were
claiming

still vulnerable

to air attack which could shut down the entire Saudi

importantly
More
operation.

the company wanted Americans to man the

foreigner
is
in
Saudi
"American
Arabia,
the
because
the
most
popular
guns
he
from
local
that
is
the
it
get
more
cooperation
will
certainty
a
and

"119
than
anyone else.
population
Ohliger emphasised that what was needed was anti-aircraft guns,
The
to
troops.
wanted
avoid a situation where the
company
not ground
Saudi Arabian Government might step in to supply ground troops as a
Saudi
last
involved
The
the
thing
wanted
company
was
soldiers
solution.
be
"The
therefore
must
in their operations.
subject
presented to the Saudi
Arabian Government in a manner that they will not volunteer or insist on
hundred
120
The
Arab
CASOC
in
soldiers".
request
of
several
was
moving
(JPC)
Staff
Committee
Planning
U.
S.
Joint
Joint
the
Chiefs
the
of
to
of
sent
Staff. Unfamiliar with the region, the JPC requested the input of their
Staff
Joint
Britain
British
the
and
whether
might supply the
counterparts on
defences.
necessary

Chiefs
Staff,
US
Joint
CASOC,
Ohliger,
to
Floyd
of
Report
no date, enclosure in
us
of
S.
Naval
U.
Operations
King,
Chief
Admiral
of
and General Marshall Chief
Memorandum,
British Joint Chiefs of Staff August 13,1942. RG 218 190/1/11/6,
Army
S.
to
U.
Staff,
of
,
Geographic
RG
218,
Staff,
file 1942-1945, #383.21, Box 3,
S.
Joint
Chiefs
U.
the
of
Records of
Folder: 'Arabia', USNA.
119 Ibid.

120Ibid.

ABEDIN-SIX

240

The British replied that they did not have the resources to provide
defence
Saudi
to
the
support
of
oil installations other
anti-aircraft
specific
than the general air defence plans for the region. The British Joint Chiefs
an American anti-aircraft

'welcomed'

expressed willingness

detachment since the Saudis had

to allow the guns to be installed and manned by

Americans, provided they trained Saudis in using them as well. 121Despite

British reluctance, it was the view of the Joint Planning Staff Committee
that Saudi oil installations were in an area of British strategic responsibility
British
the
therefore
should supply anti-aircraft
and

protection.

If the

United States were to do so it would disperse the strength of its units

elsewhere.

In any case the JPC felt it unlikely that an air attack from Axis

forces would

decided
Thus
Committee
the
against sending antioccur.

Saudi
Arabia.
122
to
personnel
or
guns
aircraft
In Washington the strategic importance of Saudi Arabia was yet to
be realised, the Arabian Peninsula was seen as far from the battlefield and
there was little concern of an overt physical threat to oilfields there. This
CASOC
to
which was extremely anxious over the
comfort
no
was of
Yet
their
it
threat
to
be
prize
concession.
of
a
possibility
would
not
slightest
long before Washington and its military planners would also come to view
hawk
like
interest.
fields
Saudi
with
the

for
Lend
Lease
Aid
Ibn Saud
Threat
British
The
and
Prior to America's entry into the war, there was little interest in foreign oil
domestic
for
63
American
accounted
production
per cent of the
reserves.
world's

crude oil output. In contrast Iraq, Iran and the Persian Gulf

Staff
Mission,
Dykes,
British
Joint
Washington
General
to General Deane, U. S.
12'Brigadier
joint Chiefs of Staff, October 13,1942. Records of the U. S. joint Chiefs of Staff, RG 218,
Geographic file 1942-1945, #383.21, Box #3, Folder: 'Arabia', USNA
Staff
(JPS),
U.
S.
Joint
Planning
October 21,1942, Records of the
Meeting
42nd
Notes
of
122
of
file
Staff,
Geographic
RG
218,
1942-1945, #383.21, Box #3, Folder:
Chiefs
Joint
S.
of
U.
'Arabia', USNA

ABEDIN-SIX

241

5
23
Once
the United States entered the
per
cent?
combined produced only
for
became
demand
however,
it
that
clear
oil and petroleum products
war
be enormous. Washington could not expect to be able to fulfil

would

domestic

fuel needs and those of the Allied

Petroleum Coordinator

government's

war effort as well. The

estimated that American reserves

few
be
depleted
in
a
matter
of
a
years, making it necessary to
could
significantly

increase the discoveries of new oil deposits. 124Exacerbating

fact
discoveries
1939
that
the
since
of new American fields had
matters was
been declining

in relation to consumption. This threatened to leave the

United States vulnerable to oil shortages.125It was in these circumstances

that

foreign

oil

deposits, especially those located

near theatres of

develop
important
to
considered
assets
and protect from
operations, were
falling into Axis hands. 126
The potential shortage of oil supplies was clearly of concern to the
State Department's

own Petroleum Advisor-Max

Thornburg.

Having

Petroleum
Bahrain
President
Company
Vice
(BAPCO)
the
of
a
as
served
before joining
Middle
abroad

government service, Thornburg was well informed

about

East oi1.127He was a strong supporter of American oil companies

foreign
that
oil corporations, backed by their
and greatly concerned

had
American
firms.
an
unfair
advantage
over
governments,
respective
These concerns stretched to include America's ally, Britain, which already
123Painter, Oil and the American Century, p. 9. Also Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic
Quest for Oil, Money, and Power, New York: Simon&Schuster1991, p. 393.
124This was the assessment of the Office of the Petroleum Coordinator (OPC). President
Roosevelt had created the Office of the Petroleum Coordinator (OPC) to analyse U. S.
that
make
recommendations
needs
and
petroleum
civilian
would ensure
and
military
United
to
States
the
supplies
were
available
secure
oil
and
at all times. The
uninterrupted
Deputy Director of the OPC was Ralph Davies (no relation to Fred Davies), a senior Vice
President of the Standard Oil Company of California (SOCAL). He recruited much of the
OPC staff from oil company personnel. See Painter, Oil and the American Century, p. 12.
lu William B. Heroy, Director of Reserves, Office of the Petroleum Coordinator cited in
States
Foreign
United
Oil
Importance
Reserves
The
to
the
in
General
of
entitled
and of
report
Saudi Arabian Reservesin Particular, December 29,1942, RDOS, RG 59, Office of
International Trade Policy: Petroleum Division, Box 6.
126Transportation of Allied oil supplies was fraught with difficulty as in the early stages of
U-Boat
lost
German
in
tankers
attacks. By May 1942 gasoline was
were
oil
the war many
United States. Miller, Searchfor Security, pp. 56-57.
in
the
rationed

242

ABEDIN-SIX

had considerable political influence in Saudi Arabia. Thornburg believed

that Britain would seek to maintain a dominant position even after the
war. 128 He recommended

to the Secretary of State that more active

foreign
deposits
be
for U. S. strategic interests.
to
taken
secure
oil
measures
In the case of Saudi Arabia, past financial and political support to Ibn Saud
gave Britain

the upper hand and could hinder

the advancement

of

American interests:
The financial assistance received from the British has
introduced a British influence in Saudi Arabia that did not
from
There
is
the study of
no
assurance
previously exist.
British policy in the past that this influence may not
be
detriment
to
the
used
of the vital American
ultimately
interests in Saudi Arabia. 129
Sharing Thornburg's concerns were officials in the NEA Division. They felt
that it was vital to establish a clear policy towards Saudi Arabia to prevent
British

influence from harming American interests in the Kingdom. 130

Although

it was recognised that the King had shown "unswerving

loyalty

to the British" he had "been careful not to permit any substantial British
fact
his
131
The
foothold
in
American
that
country".
an
company
economic
had been allowed to acquire an oil concession was seen as an indication
be
dependent
did
King
to
the
wholly
not
want
on Britain. He had
that
help
develop
States
United
to
the resources of his country.
the
to
turned
This meant that there was still an opportunity

for the United States to

benefit from the foothold established by CASOC. To leave the King to

127Anderson, ARAMCO, the United Statesand Saudi Arabia, p. 32.

128Memorandum Thornburg to Herbert Feis, State Department Economic Advisor, May
26,1943, RDOS, Office of International Trade Policy: Petroleum Division, Box 6, USNA.
Also Thornburg to Welles, January 12,1943, cited Painter, Oil and the American Century, p.
15.
129Max Thornburg cited in State Department report, The Importance to the United States of
Foreign Oil Reservesin Generaland of Saudi Arabian Reservesin Particular, December 29,1942,
RG 59, RDOS, Office of International Trade Policy: Petroleum Division, Box 6, US-National
Archives.
by
departmental
in
RDOS-Saudi
Arabia, 1930-1944, T1179,
indicated
is
This
memos
iso
USNA.
13l Memo Principle FactorsRelating to Saudi Arabia, November 25,1941, RDOS/T1179/R3.
This memo was the culmination of reports from several NEA officials.

ABEDIN-SIX

243

bode
British
the
rations
of
aid
would
not
well for American
on

survive

interests and would place Ibn Saud more firmly under London's control:
"If

the British,

alone and by themselves, get Ibn Saud through

his

they may seek a future recompense at the expense of American

difficulties

interests in that country". 132

Oil company executives were also becoming more concerned over
Britain's
fully

growing

underway

influence in the Kingdom. With the Allied war effort

Britain could move to dominate both the Saudi political

Company
system.
executives were particularly
economic
and

concerned

bank
in
Jeddah,
British
to
currency-issuing
establish
a
plans
over
which
would

be run from London by the Currency Control Board. This would

increase the leverage Britain had on the financial affairs of the Kingdom
and pull

the Saudi economy into the 'Sterling block'. 133Oil company

financial
Kingdom
transactions
the
within
and
would then have
payments
to be conducted

in British currency, draining

the company's

dollar

Secretary
Interior,
In
President
134
the
to
Texas
the
of
a
memo
of
reserves.
Oil, William

Rodgers stated: "Concern is felt over the rapidly increasing

British economic influence in Saudi Arabia because of the bearing it may

132Ibid.
3330il company representatives frequently employed the British threat in discussions with
but
is
believed
it
the
in
it. Correspondence
whether
oil
unclear
men
actually
officials
senior
U.
indicate
S.
Senate
to
that
committee
a
oil company officials did
submitted
reports
and
British
take
threat
their
fear
the
of
a
over
of
concessions. See CASOC
physical
not
Collier
Moffet,
Rodgers,
U.
S.
Senate
to
the
Hearings:
and
submitted
of
correspondence
Petroleum Arrangements with Saudi Arabia, especially correspondence of January-February
1943, pp. 25350-25386, and p. 24807.
134If Saudi Arabia converted to Sterling currency it would cause the oil company severe
financial complications since company revenues would be received in British pounds.
Wartime restrictions on currency conversion would restrict their ability to convert pounds
into dollars. This would hamper the company's ability to pay its dollar obligations (debts)
See
Rodgers
U.
testimony
S.
Senate
to
Hearings:
profitability.
affect
ultimately
and
Petroleum Arrangements with Saudi Arabia, pp. 24828-24833.Benjamin Shwadran argues that
future
"gravely
its
concerned"
over
and the security of the
was
the oil company
He
that
the oil men were afraid
as
evidence
correspondence
cites
company
concession.
be
to
was
going
revoked and taken over. This author having looked
their
concession
that
by
Shwadran
that
the
cited
argue
would
the
oil men were concerned
correspondence
at
becoming
Saudi
Arabia
Sterling
the
of
ramifications
a
currency state and did
more about
See
loss
Shwadran,
their
the
The
fear
Middle
East,
of
concession.
Oil and
actual
much
so
not
S.
Senate,
U.
Petroleum
Arrangements
308,
Powers,
Great
and
p.
with Saudi Arabia, pp.
the
25417-25435.

244

ABEDIN-six

have on the continuation of purely American enterprise there after the

waz

"135

Meanwhile

reports were coming from the American Minister

in

Cairo, Alexander Kirk, that Britain was taking all the credit for providing
Ibn Saud with financial support-which

in fact came from American Lend

Lease aid to HM Government:

after watching operation of system by which American
is
British,
have
I
through
the
channelized
assistance
gained
impression that we have hereby lost considerable prestige in
the eyes of Saudi Arabians who have been increasingly to
feel that the British were their only friends in need. 136
As

of Thornburg's

a, result

recommendations,

the NEA

and

Kirk

to the Secretary of State that Lend Lease aid be made

recommended

Cordell
With
Hull
Saudi
Arabia.
his
directly
to
on
one
of
many
available
in
Acheson
Acting
Dean
Secretary. He
the
England,
was
post
of
to
trips
found the reports from Kirk and Thornburg compelling and was inclined
dispatched
Acheson
their
a memo to the Lend
conclusions.
to agree with
Lease Administrator,

Edward Stettinius requesting that Saudi Arabia be

language
for
The
the
to
that
of
request
was
similar
aid.
used
eligible
made
James
by
CASOC
Moffet;
Saudi
the
president
earlier
year
over a
Government

was described as pro-Ally

for

sympathy
"inestimable

and loyalty

and Ibn Saud's "unswerving

to the United

Nations'

cause" was

of

value"137 Moreover the granting of aid was necessary to

"facilitate the prosecution of the war".

While anxious to comply with the request, Stettinius could not do so
without

Presidential

authorisation.

The request was forwarded

to the

U.
S.
Senate,
in
8,1943
Petroleum Arrangements
February
text
printed
M Rodgers memo,
25386.
Arabia,
Saudi
p.
with
FRUS
1943:
State,
January
18,1943,
IV,
Secretary
to
of
pp. 856-857.
Kirk
136
January
Stettinius,
Administrator,
9,1943,
FR US 1943:IV, pp.
Lend-Lease
to
Acheson
237
Saudi
have
Arabia
that
Acheson
realised
would
was the only major political
also
854-855.
Lease.
Turkey
for
Lend
had been made eligible on
that
in
eligible
the
was
not
area
entitiy
November 7,1941, Egypt on November 11,1941, Iraq on May 11,1941, Iran on March 10,
1942.

245

ABEDIN-SIX

White House on January 11,1943.138There the matter was lost in the maze
facing
139
President
issues
Roosevelt
the
chief
executive.
pressing
of more
was an enigmatic, sometimes ambiguous, and contradictory

leader and

delays in the Roosevelt White House were common. His leadership style
has been the subject of debate among presidential

historians but his

has been well-established.

Roosevelt was a

manipulative

personality

careful and calculating politician,

maintaining

control by concentrating

decision making in the White House. He ran domestic policy and dictated
foreign affairs over the heads of his cabinet secretaries and often pitted
He
would solicit the opinion of one only
each
other.
against
subordinates
biographer
One
have
the
of the President noted that:
to
response ridiculed.
"he could be devious, manipulative and at times even dishonest with the
Roosevelt did not like to delegate authority
Congress and the country-11140
hurry.
in
He
judgements
like
have
he
did
to
to
a
was
reported
make
nor
"elevated procrastination to an art form". While the hopes of CASOC had
been raised by the possibility of Presidential interest in Saudi oil, their
White
House
in
decision.
languished
the
141
awaiting
an
executive
proposal
The lack of progress in Washington only made oil company
determined
more

executives

and more active. It became clear that

have
be
to
Congressional support would
enlisted and pressure applied on
government
president

forward.
in
William
to
Rodgers,
push
matters
order
agencies

Co.
H.
D.
Collier,
Oil
Texas
and
president of SOCAL, both
of

into
CASOC,
this
They
left
pressed
were
the
mission.
of
companies
parent
headquarters
lobby
Francisco
San
Congress
to
their
corporate
of
comfort
in
Capital.
One
the
first
their
officials
administration
of
senior
and other
Secretary
Ickes,
Harold
Interior
the
the
with
of
was
meetings
FRLIS
1943:
1V,
January,
12
1943,
Acheson,
to
p. 855.
Stettinius
l3$

and the

Franklin
Dallek,
Roosevelt
D.
Roosevelt
depth
in
of
see
profile
For
and American
139
a more
The
Juggler:
Warren
Kimball,
Also
Franklin Rooseveltas Wartime
255-261.
Policy,
pp.
Foreign
Press,
University
1992,
7.
Also
John
Princeton
Charmley, G: urchill's
Princeton:
p.
Statesman,
Special
Relationship
1940-1957,
Anglo-American
London:
The
Hodder &
Alliance:
Grand
State,
Secrets
41.
Rubin,
15
1995,
of
p.
and
p.
Stoughton,
Foreign
Policy,
American
Roosevelt
548.
D.
Franklin
and
p.
140Dallek,

ABEDIN-SIX

246

Administrator

Petroleum

oil

government

for War (PAW). Ickes was in charge of U. S.

procurement

and

was

responsible

for

promoting

government cooperation with the oil industry. Collier and Rodgers raised
their concerns with Ickes over the British threat to the "biggest and richest
142They
in
British
the
that
warned
world".
companies, with the
oil reserves
support

of London,

Washington

would

"edge

in

on their

concession"

unless

provided assistance to the Government of Saudi Arabia and

did so quickly.
Ickes was urged to support a proposal for Lend Lease aid to be
forestalling
Saudi
Arabia,
thus
to
any chance that their prized oil
extended
"cancelled
be
British"143
Despite
to
the
and
given
the fact
over
concession
that it was his role to increase American oil production, Ickes listened with
interest but was non-committal. He had years of antagonistic relations with
the oil industry

and was not enthusiastic about helping a private oil

he
However,
its
further
to
certainly
problems.
was
of
willing
out
company
the involvement

of his department and secure vital resources for the war

l44
effort.
In fact Ickes was extremely interested in Saudi oil and assigned his
deputy, Ralph Davies, to look further into the concession. Davies
represented
Committee

Ickes

on

the

on International

141Kimball, Thejuggler, p. 98.

powerful

inter-departmental

board,

Petroleum Policy (CIPP). 145Comprising

the
of

142Report of meeting between Secretary of Interior, Harold Ickes, William Rodgers and H.
D. Collier, February 7,1943, in Diary of Harold L. Ickes,Secretary of the Interior File,
Harold Ickes Papers, Manuscript Division, U. S. Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.,
before
U.
S.
Ickes
Senate Hearings: Petroleum
See
testimony
of
7425-7426.
also
pp.
Arabia,
25232.
Saudi
p.
with
Arrangements
143Ibid.
144Ickes had made two unsuccessful attempts to nationalise the oil industry, first in 1935
by
Ickes
White
There
House
the
in
1940.
to restrict the
also
and
were
moves
then again
in order to stabilise the industry. As a result most oil executives
of
oil
production
distrusted him and the Roosevelt administration. See Bruce Kuniholm, The Origins of the
Cold War in the Near East, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1980, pp. 181-182
145Ironically, Davies was himself an ex-oil man who had left a post as vice-president of
Standard Oil of California (SOCAL) to join government service when the war began. See
Shwadran, TheMiddle East, Oil and the Great Powers,p. 308. The CIPP consisted of

247

ABEDIN-SIX

from

officials

the State, War and Interior

for developing

responsible

Departments,

CIPP was

long term oil policy. Davies learned that

Rodgers and Collier were seriously pursuing the matter with as many
listen
and that they were desperate for
officials as would

Government

assistance. In fact the oilmen had also arranged to give a presentation to

CIPP itself. Following the meeting with the oil men Davies noted that the
majority

favour
in
were
members
of protecting access to
of committee

Saudi concessions and providing the King with American aid.

After various discussions CIPP proposed that in return for granting
hold
Saudi
fields
States
United
the
King,
the
the
should
to
oil
as a
aid
Furthermore,
in
Committee
the
the
ground.
stockpile
reserve petroleum
recommended
California

that the United States Government take ownership of the

Arabian Oil Company (CASOC) in order to ensure that Saudi oil

United
for
States.
The
CIPP
the
the
use
of
strategic
was made available
Government
US
the
that
make an outright stock purchase which
suggested
development
Saudi
the
of
oil concessions a
protection and
would make
146
U.
S.
security.
national
matter of
Ralph Davies gave his enthusiastic backing to this proposal. It was
highly

likely that administrative control of the project would be given to

his boss, the Petroleum Administrator

for War, Harold Ickes. Indeed his

CIPPS'
in
be
the
pursuit of this strategy. Ickes was a long
hand could
seen
industry
Government
their
the
to
and
resistance
oil
of
time opponent
regulation.

He had made his reputation taking on industry leaders and

his
fix
to
Congress
to
opposed
attempts
were
who
prices and
members of
believed
Ickes
Moreover,
it
his
that
sincerely
quotas.
was
set oil production
from
"unfair
the
the
to
nation
protect
duty as a patriot
practices" of the

State,War and Interior Departments,seePainter, Oil and theAmerican

of
representatives
Century, pp. 36-37.

by
William
Bullitt,
Under-Secretary
the
made
originally
was
of the Navy.
i46This proposal
by
his
deputy
Ickes
described
Ralph
to
Davies. See entry
this
details
were
proposal
The
of
Harold
L.
Ickes,
Secretary
Diary
Interior
14,1943,
File, Harold
the
February
of
of
Sunday,
for
Congress,
Washington,
U.
S.
Library
Division,
DC, p. 7448.
Manuscript
of
Papers,
Ickes

248

ABEDIN-SIX

increasing
American
147
The
of
oil reserves at the
prospect
corporate sector.
Ickes
company
was
very
appealing.
saw the take over
expense of a private
in
Saudi
Arabia
CASOC
the
oil
concessions
as an opportunity
of
department
his
and

himself

for both

to take a leading role in securing vital

American interests. It was with this in mind that Ickes became motivated to
for
Saud.
By
Ibn
financial
ensuring the stability of the King's
aid
obtain
regime

Ickes hoped that the oil concessions could safely remain

in

American hands.
In order to gain executive support for the plan Ickes arranged to
White
House
February
in
16,1943.
Roosevelt
During
the
President
on
meet
the course of their conversation Ickes brought up the issue of oil. He
lamented the lack of a coherent policy that would adequately guarantee
petroleum

supplies

for U. S. forces. He pointed

out that American

had
"probably
Arabia
field
Saudi
the
in
greatest
and
richest
oil
companies
in all the world" and yet Washington was providing no help to the Saudi
government.

America needed to ensure the stability of the current regime

In
its
Great
to
a
valuable
commodity.
such
access
contrast,
maintain
and
Britain had provided more than $20 million in aid to the Saudi King and
"to
known
in
to
opportunity
any
overlook
never
get
where there
they were
he
believed
President
Britain
informed
that
Ickes
the
148
was
was oil".
CASOC
do
the
to
and
concession
would
continue
so unless
undermining
Washington stepped in to help Ibn Saud.
The President had already received recommendations from the State
Department
Administrator

and

for
a request

regarding

authorisation

Saudi aid. However,

from

the Lend-Lease

it took the aggressive

File,
Harold
Interior
Secretary
Ickes
Ickes,
Papers,
L.
the
MSS
Harold
of
l4lDiary of
Congress,
Washington,
U.
S.
Library
DC.
Ickes
disdain
Division),
for the oil
of
(Manuscript
Ickes
diary.
See
his
in
is
remarks cited in Stoff, Oil, War and
also
industry
articulated
American Security: 1941-1947,pp. 13-14.
U.
S.
Library
MSS,
Congress.
7462-7463.
L.
Ickes,
Harold
of
Diary
pp.
148
of

249

ABEDIN-SIX

lobbying of Ickes to push the President to act.149Within forty-eight hours of

his meeting with Ickes, Roosevelt issued Executive Order #8926, declaring
that "the defense of Saudi Arabia is vital to the defense of the United
States". This made Ibn Saud eligible to receive funds from the Lend Lease
budget. '5 It had only been eighteen months earlier that the same President
had brushed off the King as being 'too far afield' to warrant American
assistance.
Although

the issue of financial aid had concluded there was still

concern over the vulnerability

of the American concession and the long

Arabia.
domination
in
Saudi
The Division of Near
British
term effects of
Eastern Affairs (NEA) was convinced that British policies in the Middle
151
British
French
"muddle
the
area".
and
of
colonial
a
make

East would

administration
Transjordan"

had created a "jigsaw pattern of Iraq, Syria, Palestine, and

fostering numerous political and social problems. 152It was

feared that similar policies could be implemented in Saudi Arabia-with

artificial

divisions carving up the country among various factions. This was

thought

to be even more likely in the event of Ibn Saud's death. Britain

impose
Government
in
the
intervene
that
and
process
a
succession
could
long as "Ibn Saud lives the
For
interests.
American
be
inimical
to
as
might
his
153
After
death
however, there
is
secure".
American concession probably
his
take.
successor
path
what
might
about
guarantees
were no
Saudi Arabia was gradually being recognised as important
American

to

increasing
interests
and
with
concerns about British
strategic

fears
Washington
would gradually outstrip even those of the
s
interference

first
Roosevelt
to
President
to see if Britain had any
check
wanted
149Before approving aid
Roosevelt,
February
President
16,1943, U. S. Senate
Ickes
See
with
meeting
objections.
Arabia,
25233.
Saudi
Arrangements
Petroleum
p.
with
Hearings:
February
18,1943,
Administrator,
FR US 1943:IV, p. 859.
Lend-Lease
to
l50 Roosevelt
Position
in
American
in
Factors
Principle
the
the Middle East, May 26,
Memorandum
on
is'
Petroleum
Trade
Policy:
Division
International
1943-1949, Box 6, USOffice
RDOS,
of
1943,
National Archives. This memo reflected the majority viewpoint of the NEA.
152Ibid.
153Ibid.

250

ABEDIN-SIX

lm
Indeed
after expending
oilmen.
support

much effort

for Saudi Arabia the oil men would

overwhelming

to gain Washington's
be unprepared

for the

interest that would soon develop.

Petroleum Reserves Corporation: Washington Enters the Oil Business

By the middle of 1943 interest in Saudi oil had broadened to include the
logistics and supply officers in the War and Navy Departments. Estimates
from military

had
it
indicated
that
would
planners

not be possible to

from
domestic
both
of
crude
oil
requirements
and
military
civilian
satisfy
American production alone. Increased demands for petroleum products
for
in
Pacific
the
air
operations
and
naval
and new
were also anticipated
offensives
International

in Europe. Military

representatives

to the Committee

Petroleum Policy were anxious to follow

on

through on the

CASOC
Subsequently
the
take
to
the
concession.
over
earlier proposal
Committee made a formal request for the establishment of a Petroleum
Reserves Corporation
controlling

(PRC) which would have the task of securing a

interest of CASOC, as well as options on other foreign oil

followed
by
direct
by
This
s5
Chairman
the
a
request
was
of
concessions?
Staff,
Admiral
Leahy,
President
Chief's
to
the
Joint
of
recommending
the
"immediate
PRC
the
the
and
the creation of

acquisition of a controlling

interest by the U. S. Government in Saudi Arabian oil concessions". 156

i54Sensitivities about British dominance in Saudi Arabia were inflamed when it was
discovered that Ibn Saud had used the British Minister in Jeddah to obtain supplies of
American arms from the Lend Lease programme -effectively giving Britain credit for
States.
Secretary
by
United
The
State,
the
Chairman
to
the
of
protested
provided
material
William
Leahy.
Staff,
Admiral
The
Admiral
Chiefs
deal
Joint
to
of
was
the
able
with the
of
issue much quicker than the State Department because the British joint Staff had set up a
facilitate
War
Allied military cooperation. In contrast
Department
in
to
the
liaison office
have
British
to
Ambassador
the
Department
State
wait
until
would
received
the
before
Office
issues could be resolved. Secretary of State to
from
Foreign
the
instructions
Admiral Leahy, May 25,1943, FRUS 1943:IV, pp. 1-3.
State,
March
Secretary
22,1943,
RDOS, Office of International Trade
to
CIPP
of
25s
memo
Policy: Petroleum Division, CIPP Memoranda File, Box 19, US-National Archives.

156Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to PresidentRoosevelt,June 8,1943, FRUS 1943:IV,

East,
Oil
The
Middle
Shwadran,
Great
Powers,
the
See
312.
and
921.
also
p.
p.

251

ABEDIN-SIX

However, the White House did not take up the proposal right away.
The President initially asked Leahy to discuss the matter further with the
Secretary of State.157The takeover of a private American company would
from
industry
draw
the
criticism
oil
and its allies in Congress 158
certainly
.
Roosevelt sought to avoid negative publicity for his administration.
Historians

would later argue that it was also typical of the Presidents

leadership

style to put off crucial decisions. One of Roosevelt's most

"was
face
to
an
unwillingness
weaknesses
unpleasantness until
significant
there was no option but to do so" 159While another Roosevelt biographer
"lacking
noted:

a general principle

Roosevelt improvised

by which to make foreign policy,

from one situation to another. The result was a

jumble of separate and somewhat clashing policies. "160

The lethargy over the PRC matter prompted Ickes to approach the
President himself. Meeting in the White House on June 16, the Secretary of
Interior urged the President to come forward with a coherent policy on oil.
The

civilian

requirements

drawing
was
economy

on naval

and immediate action was needed

reserves to meet its

to increase the pool of

Ickes
President
To
ignorant
the
facts
these
surprise
seemed
oil.
of
accessible

domestic
the
that
be
with
suggestion
production
responded
would
and
An
American
Ickes
to
exasperated
needs.
satisfy
noted that the
enough
President "didn't

have the least conception of the oil situation

in this

left
Ickes
in
161
America's
that
argued
whatever
was
own reserves
country".
for future use and the U. S. should "buy cheap oil from
left
intact
be
should

157Memo of Admiral William Leahy,June11,1943,FRUS 1943:IV, pp. 921-922.

258Report of meeting with President Roosevelt on June 16,1943, in the Diary of Harold L.
Ickes
Division (MSS), Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.
Manuscript
7881-7882.
p.
159Charmley, Churchill's Grand Alliance, p. 12.
160James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt:The Lion and the Fox, New York: Harcourt Brace,
Roosevelt's
For
249.
works
on
personality and leadership style see Dallek,
other
1956 p.
Franklin D. Rooseveltand American Foreign Policy, and Kimball, The Juggler: Franklin
Rooseveltas a Wartime Statesman.

161Roosevelt-Ickesmeeting June16,1943,in the Diary of Harold L. Ickespp. 7881-7882

252

ABEDIN-SIX

for
162
however,
immediate
Roosevelt
lands"
needs.
was not moved
other
and did not authorise any action.
Frustrated at the lack of success with the president, Ickes mobilised
departments.
from
in
In a series of meetings held
other
colleagues
support
in June 1943 representatives of the Interior,

War, Navy

and State

Departments worked out a detailed proposal for the acquisition of foreign

(essentially Saudi) oil reserves to be submitted to the President. All parties
unanimously

agreed that the Petroleum Reserves Corporation

should be

issue
The
of control of the corporation, and the
as
possible.
soon
created as
type of interest or ownership to be acquired in Saudi reserves, could be
"left to further study". 163Almost as an afterthought it was suggested that
members

certain

1"
approval".

of

Congress

be approached

for

"their

With this broad support from both the military

informal
and the

back
for
President
doing
Ickes
in
to
the
to
the
argue
went
measure,
cabinet
Roosevelt
Petroleum
the
he
to
Reserves
the
creation
of
authorise
pushed
so
Corporation. 165
Though many in the State Department had been in favour of the
differences
PRC,
behind
the
by
there
the
were
over
method
which
principle
be
Secretary
The
State
secured.
would
of
was not enthusiastic
oil reserves
believing
better
CASOC,
for
it
PRC
the
the
to
of
purchase
outright
about
simply

in
a contractual arrangement with the oil company to
engage

supply

a fixed amount of oil per year. Of particular

possible

indication

to the Arab

world

concern was the

that the United

States had

162Ibid, Ickes was also anxious to get Presidential approval because through the PRC he
initiate
to
have
the
considerable control over oil production and distribution.
ability
would
163The meetings took place on June 17,19,21, and 24,1943. Subsequently this report was
joint
President.
to
The
the
and
sent
memorandum
of
a
part
signatories of the joint
made
Cordell Hull (State), Henry Stimson (War), James Forrestal (Navy),
Secretary
were
memo
Harold Ickes (Interior), June 26,1943, FRUS 1943:IV pp. 924-930.
164Secretary Cordell Hull (State), Henry Stimson (War), James Forrestal (Navy), Harold
Ickes (Interior), June 26,1943, FRUS 1943:1V pp. 924-930.
265Cordell Hull, TheMemoirs of Cordell Hull, Vols. I-II, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1948,
Vo1.II, p. 1520. See also Shwadran, The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers,p. 310-314.

253

ABEDIN-SIX

imperialistic

designs on the Middle East.166Ownership of CASOC would

future
its
Arabian
Saudi
resource
national
and
economic prosperity
place a
squarely

in American hands. Although

Washington

it was certainly

necessary for

to provide more active and consistent support for American

business it preferred to steer clear of overt involvement

in the domestic

CASOC
Arabia.
had
Saudi
already established a good
personnel
of
affairs
working

relationship

townsmen-in

with

the King,

his government

and the local

a culture very different from that which American officials

were accustomed to.

State Department

officials acknowledged

that it

find,
in
American
be
difficult
to
significant
numbers,
officials who
would
could

understand

and operate in an Arab environment.

CASOC had

its
it
the
that
on
concession
own and satisfy the
operate
could
shown
interests of the United States as well. 167
Ironically,

Ickes own advisory board was also against the stock

It
be
better
CASOC.
that
argued
oil
resources
would
of
managed
purchase
by
Moreover,
enterprise
and
venture
private
capitalists.
any
and marketed
business
into
find
tried
to
the
itself
that
enter
oil
could
government
believed
The
that:
advisors
overextended.
Any direct participation by the Government of the United
States in foreign oil operations, whether alone or in
discourage
with
private
corporations
will
partnership
private
enterprise and will
not only increase the political
complications but will retard the orderly development of the
worlds oil resources.168
Oil Company Take Over: A Strategy of Failure

166For State Department's opposition to a government take over of CASOC, see Hull, The
Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol. II, London: Hodder&Stoughton, 1948, pp. 1520-1522.
Alexander Kirk, the former Minister to Saudi Arabia was also very much against this. See
Kirk to Secretary of State, July 27 1943, FRUS 1943:IV, p. 935.
267Ibid.
Foreign
for
Oil
Policy
the United States' prepared by Foreign
See
entitled'A
i68
report
Operations Committee of the Petroleum Administrator for War (PAW), November 5,1943,
Secretary of Interior Files, Box 159, Foreign Oil Policy File, Harold Ickes Papers, MSS, U.S.
Library of Congress.

254

ABEDW-SIX

Ickes believed that Saudi oil would only be secure in the long

However,
run

if the United

president's

States Government

was involved.. Soon after the

PRC
initiative
the
of
approval

Ickes called in oil company

H.
D.
Collier.
William
Rodgers
They
informed
and
were
representatives,
that in the interest of national security the United States Government
CASOC
The
the
through
take
stock
purchase,
entire
operation.
over,
would
his
diary:
found
"I
in
noted
two men were stunned-Ickes
myself looking
into the faces of two surprised and shocked individuals.

I had literally

taken their breath away". 169

Rodgers and Collier

had approached Washington

in order to

between
Saudi
the
the
the
oil
company
and
relationship
regime,
stabilise
had
desire
become
They
business
CASOC
to
have
taken
no
to
over.
not
partners

with

revenues and complicate their relationships

enormous
companies
millions

do
bureaucrats.
To
so would
government

foreign
and

dollars
of

Moreover,

governments.

on exploration

be to forfeit
with

other oil

CASOC had spent

development
and

of the Saudi

S.
Government
U.
be
the
which
would
unable or
concessions---costs
Both
170
to
the
to
vehemently
objected
men
proposal
reimburse.
unwilling
Nevertheless,

Ickes aggressively

pursued

the issue and

was

determined to obtain company acquiescence. In numerous meetings with

Ickes
to
An
tried
the
ways
various
re-negotiate
proposal.
officials
corporate
CASOC
in
51
%
to
So
the
to
too
government
stake
was
rejected.
reduce
offer
Oil
SOCAL
Texas
to
bid
in
to
third
and
each
retain
allow
one
stake
was a
the remaining third held by Washington. 171After successive
CASOC-with
169Diary of Harold Ickes,pp. 8050-8051, MSS, Library of Congress, See also Painter, Oil and
Yergin,
The
Prize,
398.
42
Century,
American
p.
and
p,
the
September
Collier,
15,1943, Diary of Harold L. Ickes,p. 8185.
Rodgers
and
17oMeeting with
See also meetings on October 15,1943, Ibid., pp. 8285-8286. CASOC was offered the task of
development of the Saudi oil concession as well as a the chance to aid in
and
management
(b.p. d. ) barrel per day refinery. Rodgers
100,000
to
construct
a
plan
a government
it was unlikely that post war demand for oil would be enough to require
that
responded
35,000
b.
that
d.
large
a
refinery
and
refinery
with
a
capacity
p.
capacity was good
a
such
enough.
17lln addition, Texas Oil was demanding that the government also pay out $40 million to
for its investment in exploration and development of the Saudi
the
company
reimburse

255

ABEDIN-SIX

finally
just
that
the
Ickes
oil
company
executives
concluded
were
meetings
unwilling

to cooperate.

He still needed to obtain their consent to the

CASOC take over because despite the wartime necessity of oil, forcibly
the company over would

taking

have caused an uproar

throughout

American industry and Congress.

Officially

the negotiations between the government

and the oil

further
but
leaks
by
matters
were
complicated
companies were confidential
front
in
Wall
Street
journal
Yet
the
article
a
page
when
to the media.
Saudi
Arabian
the
trying
to
take
the
that
over
was
government
reported
largest
it
America's
in
from
two
oil
companies,
caught
of
many
concession
the oil industry
negotiations
provided

by surprise. 172 Moreover,

the article stated that the

Subsequent
amicably.
media reports
were not proceeding

further details on the difficulties surrounding

the negotiations.

On November 13,1943 it was reported that the talks had broken down.
Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, had been patiently observing these
developments. He had doubts about the wisdom of pursuing the CASOC
damage
be
Particularly
the
that
was
worrying
would
take over at all costs.
done to the prestige of the United States. The lack of progress in the
negotiations
committed

could indicate to Ibn Saud that the United States was not
to the development

of his country's

oil resources and the

be
This
in
kingdom.
his
the
turn,
to
the
might
used
advantage
of
of
welfare
British and to "serve to build up their post-war position in the Middle East
173
interests
Moreover,
American
Hull
had
there".
of
reports
at the expense
from:
Murray Memorandum to Secretary of State, December 14,1943, FR US
See
concession.
1943:IV pp. 948-949.
in Wall Street journal, of 26 October and 13 November, 1943. For the concerns raised by
IV
940-941.
FRUS
1943:
pp.
see
these reports
from
hold
Ibn
Saud
Britain's
that
the $34 million in aid that
beleived
came
Hull
over
In
State,
Hull
Secretary
Secretary
1940-1943.
between
to
Interior,
Ickes,
of
of
she provded
Nov. 13,1943, FRUS 1943:IV, pp. 941-943. Fortunately for Washington Ibn Saud was not in
fact
he
"perfectly
for
it
In
the United States
least
considered
natural"
upset.
the
business
become
involved
in
to
ventures. This was of course the common
Government
have
it
British
King.
fact
In
to
the
the
come
so
would
government
as
no
surprise
of
policy
Ibn Saud seemed to think that it might signify greater American assistance to his country.

256

ABEDIN-SIX

influences
be
that
reliability
of
unquestioned
will
sources
brought to bear upon King Ibn Saud in the not distant future
for the purpose of undermining his confidence in the
American interest in his country's petroleum resources.174
The Secretary believed it foolish to jeopardise America's

interests by

the PRC initiative to become a tool for increased British influence

allowing

in Saudi Arabia. It was more effective to approach the British directly and
a comprehensive agreement to resolve oil questions in the

negotiate

Middle East. Hull dispatched a memo to Harold Ickes urging that the PRC
because
harmful
it
having
held
in
be
the
of
effects
was
abeyance
on
plan
America's reputation and future interests. 175
Ickes however, did not see it this way. He had made it his own
for
United
States
the
to
oil
secure
reserves
and was
personal challenge
his
The
Petroleum
Reserves
the
to
crusade.
creation
of
relinquish
reluctant
Corporation

best
interest of the government, as well
his
in
in
the
eyes,
was

"strengthen
176
Ickes
the
the
to
being
of
companies".
position
means
a
as
State
indicated
Department
him
in
his
the
to
had
that
which
sources
also
Ibn Saud did not object to Washington's involvement
Britain

should

in the concession.

have no objections to the involvement

of the U. S.

Government in American corporations when she herself operated in such a

manner.

Ickes believed that it was vital that United States Government be

"approximates
the position of the British Government" in
that
in a position
Saudi
American
interests
in
Arabia.
177
Despite
leaks
the
to
maintain
order
to the media, the adverse publicity

and the potentially

unhappy

oil

determined
PRC
Ickes
the
to
see
plan go ahead.
was
corporations
See Ibn Saud's view in Minister Murray to Secretary of State, November 3,1943, FR US
1943:IV, p. 941. The animosity Hull felt towards Ickes can be seen in the Memoirs of Cordell
Hull, pp. 1515-1525.
Interior,
Ickes,
Nov.
Secretary
Hull
13,1943, FR US 1943:IV,
State,
to
of
Secretary
174
of
pp. 941-943.
Secretary
Interior,
Ickes,
Hull
January
State,
to
5 1944, FRLIS 1944:V,
of
Secretary
175
of
pp. 10-11.
Secretary
State,
Ickes
Hull, January 7 1944, FR US 1944:V,
Interior,
to
of
Secretary
of
176
13-15.
pp.
177Ibid.

257

ABEDIN-SIX

President Roosevelt, had been keeping abreast of the increased

PRC
issue.
Interior
State
Secretaries
the
between
the
over
and
of
tension
However,

the President himself was known to encourage friction among

his subordinates
arbitrator

him
final
have
to
to
the
they
that
come
as
would
so

differences
their
178
The
to
disputes.
two
resolve
were ordered
of

did
President
his
he
the
take
Although
not
cabinet
men,
chastised
quickly.
He
to
himself.
the
two
pursue separate policies,
men
allowed
a stand
be
Therefore
Ickes
the
in
to
victor.
was
would
see
who
order
perhaps
"find
just
in
to
the
talks
order
out
to
companies
oil
with
pursue
allowed
Hull
States
to
United
was
given
clearance
while
the
stands",
where
London
discussions
to
settle petroleum
with
preliminary
proceed with
179
East.
Middle
in
the
questions
As it turned out Ickes would
ground.

himself
find
on the weaker
soon

In his determined effort to get the Government

into the oil

business he expanded the PRC plan to include a proposal for the building
of a trans-Arabian
Mediterranean.

pipeline

from
stretching

The United States would

the Arabian

build,

Gulf to the

own and operate the

for
its
However,
this
use.
companies
oil
once
regional
charge
and
pipeline
from
barrage
faced
Ickes
the
of
opposition
a
across
oil
public,
went
news
industry.
funding

Many domestic producers balked at the idea of the Government

a pipeline which would

foreign
oil to flood the
allow cheap

began
Congress
look
Even
to
take
of
a
members
critical
American market.
A
Senate
Committee
Corporation.
Reserves
Petroleum
to
was
set
up
the
at
PRC.
The
the
the
of
usefulness
collapse
and
investigate petroleum policy
hostility
left
Ickes
to
the
the
pipeline
and
plan
with
of the stock purchase
Cordell
Hull
Roosevelt,
Franklin
Sumner
Welles.
Affairs:
Secret
Gellman,
and
Irwin
178
Roosevelt
kept
1995,
11-16.
his
Univ.
Press,
Hopkins
Johns
pp.
always
advisors
Baltimore:
Decision
in
his
hands
he
concentrated
making
was
guessing.
and
and cabinet members
departments
informing
the
The
cabinet
concerned.
without
policy
frequently made
foreign
know
State
what
commitments the President had
often
not
would
Secretary of
known to force individuals who he knew disliked each other to
Roosevelt
also
was
made.
work together.
Secretary
Interior,
State,
January
Secretary
10 1944, FRUS:V,
to
and
of
of
Roosevelt
179
p. 16.

258

ABEDIN-SIX

his
CASOC
to
take
the
to
efforts
offer
and
over
no more proposals
180
to
end.
an
came
concession
Meanwhile,

the Secretary of State had been working

dialogue
British
the
to
with
resolve petroleum
a
establish
bilateral

basis. He set up the Committee on Anglo-American

hard to

issues on a
Petroleum

Matters to bring together officials from both sides who would establish
the
two
the
of
governments regarding
on
responsibilities
guidelines
clear
Eastern oil. 181An invitation was extended to the Foreign Office for

Middle

talks in Washington but the response was lukewarm

and London first

to know the "precise level" at which the talks would be held-

wanted
whether

it would be senior or junior diplomats. They also requested an

before
182
to
they
the
participate.
agreed
agenda
of
advance copy
In response Hull gave London a detailed proposal on the issues he
from
for
discussion.
These
the
table
the
to
ranged
quantity of
on
put
sought
its
interests
to
be
the
concession
rights
and
to
pricing,
and
of
produced
oil
Middle
in
East.
Yet
instead of
the
that
oil
produced
the countries
Office
London
knew
Foreign
this
the
that
more
suspicion.
raised
reassuring
Washington

was trying

to take over the operations of American

oil

Arabia
Saudi
in
and questions were raised about whether there
companies
American
had
to
take
oil
companies
over
other
which
plan
a
was also
In
Iran.
those
the
Iraq
joint
in
countries
oil
operations
and
were
stakes
firms
(and
British
British
therefore
the
held
government)
where
ventures
the majority stake.
Uneasy about American intentions the British response to the talks
firm.
Government
His
Majesty's
but
be
would
willing to
was cordial
discuss oil issues in preliminary stages but the substance of any discussions

Miller,
Search
for Security, pp. 95-99.
detailed
these
events
see
For
of
account
180
a more
War:
The
Politics
The
World
United
StatesForeign Policy, 1943Kolko,
the
Gabriel
of
and
Also
House,
1968,
294-313.
Random
York:
New
pp.
1945,
1s, Secretary of State to President, December 8 1943, in Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull,
background
Cabinet
details
For
Committee
the
the
1521.
II,
of
on
that Hull
VoI.
p.
Baram, Department of State in the Middle East: 1919-1945, pp. 225-226.
see
assembled

State,
Secretary
February 7,1944, FRUS 1944:III, p.94.
Halifax
to
Ambassador
of
British
182

259

ABEDIN-SIX

had to be "world

wide in their general scope and will not be specifically

bearing
"183
Furthermore,
to
the Foreign
oil
region.
particular
any
confined
Office wanted the discussions to be held in London by junior officials.
Topics of discussion were to be limited to those of a technical nature and
any discussion of concession rights was strenuously rejected. 184There was
for
United
States
desire
the
to
to acquire rights
an
opportunity
provide
no
in the predominantly

British run oil concessions in Iraq and Iran.

Under increasing and unwanted attention from Congress and with

the media circulating rumours of an Anglo-American

disagreement over

discussions
begin
Hull
insisted
the
to
Roosevelt
that
and
also
pushed
oil,
limits.
185
He
be
the
to
thoroughly
topic
wanted
meetings
cover
off
all
no
The
State
Department
including
rights.
concession
also
petroleum matters,
Office,
Foreign
deal
bells
the
which
set
on
off
of
pressure
alarm
great
put a
in Downing Street. Winston Churchill found the aggressive conduct of the
State Department

disconcerting. The Prime Minister

cabled Roosevelt

be
"a
desire
deprive
his
to
to
seemed
concern with what
us of
expressing
Middle
East
in
the
things,
the whole
among
on
which
other
assets
oil
our
depends".
186
Churchill
Navy
pointed out that any
supply of our
discussions on oil would certainly arouse discontent in Parliament and that
key
be
low
Roosevelt
technical
discussions
of
a
and
should
nature.
as such
Prime
Minister:
direct
to
the
response
provided a
You point to the apprehension on your side that the United
States desires to deprive you of oil assets in the Middle East.

Department
State,
February
18,1944, FR US 1944:11I,pp. 97-98. For
Embassy
to
of
British
183
further British views see Ann Orde The Eclipseof Great Britain: The United Statesand British
Imperial Decline 1895-1956,London: MacMillan, 1996, pp. 149-150.
184Memo of Conversation, Petroleum Advisor with Lord Halifax, February 18,1944, FRUS
Kolko,
The
Politics
War,
301.
Also
97-98.
II1,
of
p.
1944:
pp.
185For the Secretary of State's account of that period see Hull, Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol.
II, p. 1524.
February
Roosevelt,
20,1944,
C-583,
President
to
Churchill
186
re-printed Public Record
Office material in Churchill & Roosevelt:The CompleteCorrespondence,ed., W. Kimball,
London: Collins, Vol. 11,1984,p. 734.

260

ABEDIN-SIX

On the other hand, I am disturbed about the rumor that the

British wish to horn in on Saudi Arabian oil reserves 187
Furthermore

the president

indicated

that

he firmly

believed

that

discussions had to be directed from the Cabinet level and that he could not
for
breach
As
his
the
a
major
potential
among allies
position.
change
loomed, Roosevelt assured Churchill that "we are not making sheep's eyes
188
This
by
fields
Iraq'.
in
Iran
British
the
was
reciprocated
or
oil
at your
Prime Minister who returned the assurance that Britain had no intention of
'horning

in' on American interests in Saudi Arabia. However, Churchill

was clearly concerned that the United States had post war ambitions in
Middle

East oil:
Thank you very much for your assurances about no sheeps
Iraq.
Let
Iran
in
and
me reciprocate by
eyes at our oilfields
have
fullest
that
the
we
assurance
no thought of
you
giving
trying to horn in upon your interests or property in Saudi
Arabia. My position on this is, as in all matters is that Great
Britain seeks no advantage, territorial or otherwise, as a result
hand
be
deprived
On
the
the
she
other
will
not
war.
of
of
belongs
her
having
to
after
given her
anything which rightly
best services to the good cause. 189

For Roosevelt this incident proved more than ever the need to come to a
basic

understanding

between the two 'governments.

Fortunately

his

fears
British
Foreign
Office
had
indicated
the
it
that
and
calmed
assurances
for
delegation
Washington.
in
They
be
talks
insisted
a
sending
still
would
be
discussions
that
however,
preliminary and of a technical nature, leaving
determine the final agreement 19oA series of meetings
level
to
talks
cabinet
leading to a 'Memorandum
April
1944
held
throughout
of
were

Churchill,
February
R-474/I,
22,1944,
Ibid., pp. 744-745.
Roosevelt
to
President
187
in
Stettinius
Winant,
to
Feb. 24,1944, FRUS
Roosevelt's
cited
are
also
comments
President
1944: III, pp. 101-102.
March
3,1944, FRUS 1944:111,p. 103.
Churchill,
Roosevelt
to
President
188
March
Roosevelt,
4,1944, C-601, Churchill & Roosevelt:The
President
to
Churchill
189
17-18.
Vol.
III,
Correspondence,
pp.
Complete
in
Middle
East,
Empire
British
The
the
Louis,
pp. 188-189 and Kolko, The Politics of War,
See
i90
Cold
War
Origins
in
Kuniholm,
the
the Near East, p. 184..
of
300-304
and
pp.

261

ABEDIN-SIX

Understanding'. 191It was a broad agreement and intentionally

satisfied
stipulated

both sides. The British were pleased with

that existing oil concessions would

vague but it

the clauses that

remain unchanged while

American negotiators were happy with clauses that indicated government

development
impede
be
the
to
of petroleum
allowed
restrictions would not
192
East.
Middle
in
the
resources
Yet despite Anglo-American

progress, problems on the ground

NEA
Reports
in
British
the
the
sceptical.
of
officials
making
were still
interference were still coming from Jeddah and this threatened to broaden
Arabia.
Saudi
disagreements
Allied
over
the

in
FRUS
1944:
111
Understanding,
112-115.
text
printed
pp.
Memorandum
of
191
in
July-August
level
discussions
Cabinet
an Anglo-American Petroleum
Following
192
from
However,
Congress
formally
opposition
signed.
and oil industry
Agreement was
Memorandum
the
that
ratified.
was
never
agreement
of Understanding, text
leaders meant
1944:III, pp. 112-115.
FRUS
in
printed

262

ABEDIN-SEVEN

Chapter 7
Anglo-American Rivalry
In January 1944 the State Department reorganised the Division of Near
Eastern Affairs in order to deal with the increasing demands of America's
larger
Middle
East.
A
in
interest
Office
the
the
new,
entity,
of
and
activity
Near Eastern and African Affairs was created, consisting of three subdepartments: Near Eastern Affairs (which covered Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon,
Palestine, Saudi Arabia and Arabian Peninsula, Syria, Turkey and Greece);
Middle Eastern Affairs (covering Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, India, and
Iran) and African Affairs (which dealt with all of Africa except, Algeria,
Egypt and South Africa)?
This recognition of greater American involvement

in the Middle

East was also manifested in the upgrading of the diplomatic presence in

Saudi Arabia to a full time resident Minister. The new Minister, James
Moose was based in Jeddah and found that on his first trip to Riyadh, the
King lost no time in listing grievances against the British. The complaints
his
from
the
tariffs
of
share
the
withholding
of
pilgrimage
concerned
fact
the
that
the
no
announcement
and
on
amount of aid that
year
previous
he would be receiving for 1944 had been made. British parsimony had
difficult
"ruin
his
life
if
it
and
would
country"
extremely
continued.
made
Moreover, Ibn Saud informed Moose that the only reason he kept ties with
Britain was out of concern that "they might loose their restraint on his
family".
Hashemite
2
the
as
such
enemies,

Though appreciative of past help, the King was clear in his desire to
have direct American assistance. Perhaps one day, Ibn Saud told Moose "it
for
Saudi
Arabia
look
United
be
to
States
to
the
America
necessary
of
might
for all its requirements". 3 The newly arrived Minister took Ibn Saud at face
value

and quickly

wired

Washington

with

grave predictions

of the

State
in
Department
the Middle East, p. 67.
The
of
1 Baram,
between
Ibn
Saud,
Moose
in Minister Jeddah (Moose) to
and
2 Report of meeting
Secretary of State, April 29,1944, FRUS 1944:V, p. 695. See also Minister Jeddah (Moose) to
Secretary of State, March 13,1944, FRUS 1944:V, p. 676
3 Ibid.

ABEDIN-SEVEN

263

insufficient
Britain's
aid provisions. He suggested that the
of
consequences
State Department

increase the amount of Lend Lease aid by -20 million

for
1944.4
riyals
The King was tactful in his discussions, always speckling his
for
but
Britain,
invoking
comments with praise
for
the
reason
appealing
as

people

involvement.

for

the urgent needs of his

greater American

financial

It was typical of his negotiating style, and despite his claims

Saud
financial
Ibn
woes
would not submit to terms that did not
of acute
in
British
best.
A
loan
him
half
him
to
point
case
was
a
offer
a million
suit
because
he
London
wanted the revenues from the
refused
pounds which
1944 pilgrimage to act as security. It did not seem odd to the King that he
be
complaining
should

financial
his
of
situation to James Moose at the

down
loan
from
Britain.
5
he
holding
By
turning
time
a
was
out the
same
King could get outright grants from America instead of having to worry
back
loans
6
British.
to
the
about paying
The American eagerness to please the King disturbed the British
Minister

in Jeddah, Stanley Jordan. As a seasoned Foreign Service officer,

Jordan felt he knew 'how to treat Middle East potentates'. He had been
attempting

to

implement

strict

financial

controls

on

the

Saudi

and had planned to withhold further subsidies until fiscal

administration
fully
implemented.?
This
Foreign
Office
was
part
of
was
a
general
reform

back
its
Britain
had
to
expenditures.
cut
already provided over 8
move
4 Moose to Secretary of State, April 29,1944, FRUS 1944:V, p. 695.
5 It did not seem to concern the American Minister that the King had turned down the
loan. In fact from the tone of the report it seems that the King was using the example of his
how much he desired to reduce reliance on Britain
Minister
the
indicate
to
to
and
refusal
Ibid.
States,
United
the
to
turn
6A 1944 report by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the precursor to the Central
Intelligence Agency, characterised Ibn Saud's policy as one of "cleverness, tenacity and
high
The
Ibn
Saud
for
to
gave
marks
report
managing to play off
mindedness".
open
interests and for dealing with major powers. If ever the Caliphate
Bedouin
competing
issue arose again the OSS believed that Ibn Saud was a prime candidate to take on the
beginning to classify countries in terms of their communist
OSS
The
was
already
role.
and
Strategic Services Report "The Position of Saudi Arabia
Office
leanings.
of
nationalist
February 4,1944, OSS Research and Analysis Reports 1941-1961,
World",
Arab
the
within
Report # 1652, RDOS, M1221, US-National Archives.

7Jordan to Foreign Office December31,1943PRO FO 371/40267/E364/325/25.

264

ABEDIN-SEVEN

"a
believed
Office
Saudi
Arabia.
The
Foreign
in
that
to
aid
million pounds
by
is
inefficiency
the
the
the
of
subsidy
wasted"
of
proportion
administrative

system. 8 Therefore Saudi demands for a 1944 budget of 109

deficit
be
bloated
102
accepted
when
an
already
of
not
could
million riyals
being
9
for
1943
carried:
still
was
million riyals
It is apparent that the Saudi Arabian Government have made
no effort to cut their coat according to their cloth and that
they will spend as much money as His Majesty's Government
10
to
them.
give
prepared
are
It was proposed that after June 1944 the Saudi Government should expect a
drastic reduction and should reduce its expenditures accordingly. 11
Yet Ibn Saud responded shrewdly. Lamenting his financial and
financial
Britain
King
to
to
the
provide
experts
requested
political position
his
The
King
to
train
his
expert
army.
and
a
military
administration
advise
had appointed his third son, Mansur as the commander in chief of the
formal
Ibn
Saud
had
Mansur
As
experience
military
sought
Saudi army.
no
Sunni
Muslim
instructors,
British
training,
to
preferably
with
to obtain
help establish a modern Saudi army. Adding a twist
to
immediately
come
had
Americans
Saud
Ibn
that
the
his
mentioned
already offered
to
request,
but
he
Britain
do
Jordan
to
that
training
preferred
so.
was
to provide such
by the seeming candor of the King and reported to
impressed
suitably
importance
Ibn
Saud
the
too
"I
strongly
which
stress
London:
cannot
his request.. the King neither wishes their (American)
to
attached
.
interference in internal administration of the country nor can they supply
Moslem officers". 12

Saudi
Arabia'
Baxter
Future
Minute,
March
'The
PRO
16,1944,
of
of
part
8 Report entitled
FO 371/40265/E1775/128/25.
be
deficit
37
The
for
1944
72
to
only
million
riyals.
estimated
at
expected
was
Revenue
9
Secretary
(Kirk),
State,
Cairo
January
Minister
to
See
13,1944,
FRLIS
of
million riyals.
1944:V, p. 672.
PRO
FO
16,1944
371/40267/E364/325/25.
February
Minute,
Office
Foreign
10
Jeddah,
February
121944,
FO
Minister
371/40267/E1127/325/25.
Office
to
Foreign
21
Office,
March
3
Foreign
1944,
PRO
(Jordan)
FO
to
Jeddah
Resident
12
371/40267/E1408/325/25.

265

ABEDIN-SEVEN

In a small revision of their earlier decision, the Foreign Office

decided to extend subsidy of foodstuffs to Saudi Arabia up till July 31 1944
and to provide

10,000 per month for the running

of Saudi missions

had
benefits.
Saud's
While
13
Ibn
the
ploy
garnered
some
extra
abroad.
Foreign Office wanted Jordan to inform

the American Minster of the

decision there was concern that this might lead to a sudden unilateral
increase by the Americans - something London wanted to avoid.
The American Minister disagreed with the British approach to the
budget
believed
tightening
that
the
measures were coming at
and
problem
14
King
The
his
to
time.
the
needed
strengthen
wrong
realm, and
completely
foes
Axis
his
internal
Every
the
and
spread
of
propaganda.
effort
combat
had to be made to provide for the Saudi government's needs. More
he
being
kept
dark
in
Moose
Jordan's
that
the
to
was
was
about
upsetting
during
King
issues
the
supply
which
and
economic
policy
with
meetings
Americans
The
discussed.
to
the
attempts
glean
nature of the
were
discussions were brushed off-15 When Moose made his own inquiries he
discovered that Jordan had put forward suggestions to set up a British
bank and learned of the proposed appointment

of a British financial

he
discovered
Furthermore,
Saudi
Jordan
the
that
to
court.
was
advisor
head
Operations
Mining
Public
Works,
the
the
of
of
and
removal
a
seeking
friendly
United
States
16
Moose
towards
the
who
was
official
court
senior
his
British
Washington
the
He
about
evasiveness
of
counterpart.
cabled
intervention
in
Jordan's
the
Saudi
that
administrative
operations
of
warned
like
"remarkably,
looked
an attempt to establish British influence
Arabia
here". 17 Moose strongly advocated that the United States take over the
financing
It
"with
situation.
was
and
only
assurance of such
supply
entire

March
Minister
Jeddah
16 1944, PRO FO 371/40267/E1160/325/25.
Office
to
Foreign
13
,
30,1944,
FR
US
State,
April
1944:V, p. 696. See also Moose to
Secretary
to
Moose
of
14
in
RDOS
T1179/R8,
30,1944
March
US-National Archives.
State
Secretary of

30,1944,
FR
US
State,
April
1944:
V, p.696
Secretary
to
Moose
of
is

Salha,
head
Najeeb
Mining
Operations
the
of
The
was
and Public Works who
16
official
his
duties.
in
believed
negligent
was grossly
Jordan
State,
April
FR
30,1944,
US
Secretary
1944:V, p. 696.
to
of
Moose
17

266

ABEDIN-SEVEN

it he is

help the King will be able to resist British pressure. Without

18
vulnerable".

With these fresh reports from Jeddah the Secretary of State notified
had
Jeddah
Minister
in
British
that
the
President
worked to remove
the
Saudi officials friendly to the United States and had pressured the King to
Efforts
British
the
to
a
economic
advisor.
were also
of
appointment
agree
being made for Saudi contracts with the US Army Corps of Engineers to be
diverted to British firms. 19Hull believed that British pressure might lead to
"quid
in
The
Secretary
for
demand
future
oil".
pro
quo
recommended
a
a
financial
States
United
and economic assistance to
grant additional
that the
Saudi Arabia "in order to safeguard adequately the American national
interest

in the great petroleum

importantly,

such additional

Anglo-American
fifty/fifty

"
20
More
that
country.
of
resources

be
channelled through a joint
aid should

aid programme

with

each side contributing

on a

basis. It would be necessary to conduct talks with the British to

the
the
of
programme.
parameters
establish
Presidential

approval

arrived

quickly

and

a team

of

State

begin
dispatched
London
to
to
talks. The sowere
Department negotiators
head,
its
Under
Secretary of
Mission
Stettinius
after
named
was
called
Wallace
However,
Stettinius.
the
Edward
chief
negotiator
was
State,
Near
Eastern
Affairs.
21
Division
After arriving in the
head
the
of
Murray,
of
British

delegation
learned
American
British
Army
that
the
a
capital,

detachment

Saudi
Arabia
to
on a training
was en route

mission-a

American
since
an
seemed
odd,
military mission was
development which
18Ibid.
British
by
Moose
his
in
the
threat
the
discusses
and
of
reports
nature
memoirs,
Hull
19
Hull,

1514-1515.
Hull,
Vol.
II
Cordell
pp.
Memoirs
of
The

bank
be
American
to
influence
in
that
set
up
central
ensure
a
Hull
recommended
20
also
Cordell
Memoirs
Vol.
The
Hull,
II,
Hull,
Details
1514.
Hull's
of
Saudi
pp.
of
economy.
the
President,
found
Memorandum
be
in
to
April 3,1944, RDOS,
the
a
also
can
proposal
Affairs,
Lot
Eastern
File
Near
57
D298,
Office
Box
6,
US-National
the
of
of
Records
Archives.
disagreements
during
issues
the
and
on
a
negotiations
number
of
Anglo-American
n
Enlgand can be seen in Campbell, ed., The Diaries of Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.,
in
meetings
35-71.
pp.

267

ABEDIN-SEVEN

doing
Arabia
job.
Saudi
Foreign
Office
in
that
very
same
officials
already
Muslim
be
that
they
were
sending
soldiers
explained
who
could
quickly
stationed

in Holy

cities and who would

have greater freedom

of

Americans
22However,
it
be
to
the
to
appeared
yet another
movement
Ibn
Saud.
to
on
put pressure
move
When this report reached Washington, Secretary Hull ordered the
American Minister in Jeddah to keep a close watch on British movements
in the country. Moose was instructed to take every opportunity
King.
ties
the
to
close
maintain
with
court and
of protest to the British

letter
sent a
complaining

to visit the

At the same time, Hull

Ambassador

in Washington

about British policy in Saudi Arabia. 24This was the beginning

between
Washington.
London
The
Foreign
and
communiques
of
of a series
Office believed that the Americans were over-reacting and simply did not
being
implemented
that
in
Ibn
the
corrective
measures
were
appreciate
Saud's regime. An exasperated Foreign Secretary cabled the Ambassador
in Washington:
The State Department must not overlook the fact that in Saudi
Arabia, as elsewhere in the East, temptation to play the
Americans and us off against each other is very considerable.
There is, we fear little doubt that a good deal of graft exists in
Saudi Arabian Government circles and our Minister has
been
campaigning against this. In so doing he has to
recently
our knowledge earned the enmity of various influential
persons-25
The Foreign Office laid much of the blame for the awkward relations with
Washington

on the inexperience of the American Minister in Jeddah. In

department minutes the character and integrity of James Moose was often
"second
He
had
big
taken
regarded
as
a
was
rate
man"
who
a
criticised.
London
Secretary
in
Ambassador
to
US
Winant,
of State, April 27,1944, FRUS 1944:V,
22
p. 692.
23The Secretary actually wanted a more permanent presence and sought to have an
London claimed
American officer appointed to serve at the court of the King-something
for
United
States
Britain
had
the
Muslim
since
only
practical
military officers,
not
was
Secretary of State to Moose, April 18,1944, FRUS 1944:V, p. 687.
forwarded
London.
letter
British
to
Embassy, Washington to SOSFA,
Secretary's
was
The
24
E2811.
FO
371/40265/
PRO
3,1944,
May

268

ABEDIN-SEVEN

leap from his previous posting as a junior official in Tehran and had
become overwhelmed

by his new responsibilities in Saudi Arabia. 26 He

his
had
British
jealous
that
the
of
counterpart
position
was supposedly
attained

in the Saudi court. 27 Interestingly,

Grafftey-Smith,

the memoirs of Lawrence

the British Minister who succeeded Jordan, described the

latter as an irritable man who suffered from chronic flatulence and had
formed a dismal opinion of the country in which he served. 28
Nevertheless, it frustrated the Foreign Office that Washington did
long
term
the
to
effects of unrestricted spending and a
appreciate
not seem
lack of administrative checks in the Saudi administration. 29The appetite for
largesse among the local population

was never ending and unless the

financial
the
assistance he
amount of
King's expenditures were reduced,
It
Allies
from
the
each
new
year.
was
essential
would
spiral
with
requested
fiscal
America's
limit
encourage
responsibility.
and
on subsidies
to put a
fancy
King's
the
to
whim
and
every
without
satisfy
rush
compulsive
local
for
healthy
the
administration and would ultimately
question was not
Foreign
Office
As
hard
Britain
a
memo noted:
harm
earned position.
s
The Americans are out to bribe, or buy, Ibn Saud and now
that the principle of joint interest in Saudi Arabia has been
force
to
trying
they
up the price to a point at
are
accepted
be
left
drop
30
they
will
alone.
out
and
which we will
differently.
An American company
the
very
situation
Washington viewed
investments
in
Saudi
Arabia and had been
capital
had made substantial

There
the
the
resource
of
country.
principle
could
extracting
with
entrusted
interest
in
Saudi
Arabian
"the
the
doubt
that:
preponderant
economy
be no

May
7,1944,
PRO
FO
Washington,
371/40265/
E2811/1407/G.
Ambassador
to
SOSFA
u
American
Minister
berated
in
FO
Departmental
the
the
of
conduct
a
Several
officials
26
FO
371/40265/E3105/128/25.
PRO
23,1944
May
Minute,
handle
Jordan
Moose
look
for
Office
to
Foreign
warned
carefully
also
and
out
The
27
by Ibn Saud to take advantage of friction between allies. FO to Cairo for Jordan
attempts
E2720/1407.
FO
371/40265/
PRO
7,1944,
May
(Jeddah)

255.
Levant,
Bright
p.
Grafftey-Smith,
28

25,1944,
PRO
FO
371/40265/E3105.
May
Minute,
Departmental
29FO
PRO
FO
371/40265/E3105.
25,1944,
May
Minute,
Also
SOSFA
to
Departmental
FO
30
May
PRO
FO
28
1944,
371/40265/E3105/1407.
Washington,
Ambassador

269

ABEDIN-SEVEN

American in character and will presumably remain so

is unquestionably

for many years to come" 31

Hull

Secretary
historical

position

and her interests in the East, she had primary

However,

responsibility

in the region.

responsibility.

In a gesture of compromise

a military

officer

Washington

would

that due to Britain's

to acknowledge

was willing

the United

States had political

Hull suggested that Britain send

to head an Anglo-American
select a financial

military

advisor

military

mission

while

to serve at the court of the

King. 32

That was not acceptable to the Foreign Office-Britain's

economic

and political

interests in Saudi Arabia were deemed far greater than

Washington's.

The American analysis of the Saudi economy failed to take

into account the steady rise in pilgrimage revenues. A large number of

far
British
Empire
the
than
of
and
contributed
citizens
more
were
pilgrims
the 4 million riyals the American oil company paid in royalties each year.
Foreign Office calculations indicated that even during the war, up to 40
million

from
pilgrim
riyals were earned

dues and this was expected to

increase by up to 100% after the war. Therefore, American claims to have

the

preponderant

"misconception

interest

in

the Saudi

economy

communications

from

were

simply

of the facts". 33

In looking

at official

both sides of the

being
is
it
that
great
efforts
were
made to stabilise Ibn Saud's
clear
Atlantic,
different approaches to the issue. Neither Washington nor
through
regime
London wanted to alienate the King or concede hard won influence on
him,

Saud
Ibn
to
was
able
maximise as much aid and
such
as
and

from
both
United States and Britain.
the
possible
as
assistance
Peterson,
Foreign
Maurice
Office,
State
July
to
1,1944, FRUS 1944:V,
Secretary
S.
U.
of
31
despite the desire by the U. S. Military to secure Saudi oil concessions
This
was
711-713.
p.
by
CASOC
buy
the oil companies keeping an option for
by
out
of
or
government
a
either
less
Government
than 1 billion barrels. See Memo by Army-Navy
States
of
not
United
V
FR
US
17-20.
1944:
Jan
17,1944
Board
p.
Petroleum
Legation
American
(Hull)
Jeddah,
State,
May 1,1944, RDOS, T1179/R4.
to
Secretary
of
32
U.
S.
Secretary
Office
Foreign
to
Peterson,
of State, July 21,1944, FRUS
Maurice
33
1944: Vpp"718-719.

270

ABEDIN-SEVEN

Anxious Allies
Though anxious about his financial solvency Ibn Saud could not get a
definitive

response on the exact amount of aid he could expect. It was the

food
had
dwindled.
1944
Gifts
stocks
of
and
and
supplies
of
and
summer
largesse to tribal chiefs were cut back while salaries of government workers
four
in
In
least
months
arrears.
urgent need of concrete assistance,
were at
dispatched
Ibn
Saud
of
aid,
gestures
urgent messages to the
not simply
British and American Legations. He requested immediate assistance and
he
did
if
he
that
not
receive
a
warning
positive
response
subtle
gave a
for
34
support
would go elsewhere
The veiled threat had the desired effect. Fearing the worst, British
American
and
London,

been
dragging
had
out their meetings in
officials, who

decided to conclude negotiations quickly

and settle the joint

from
London
Washington
Instructions
issue.
to
were
sent
out
and
supply
joint
Anglo-American
had
Jeddah
in
that
supply
a
programme
ministers
been agreed 35 Immediate dispatch of 40,000 tons of cereals, 4,500 tons of
dates and 3,000 tons of sugar could be expected. The King was to be
informed that a portion of the goods supplied to him should be sold on the
The
total
the
3
of
revenue.
value
of
raising
goods
means
a
was
as
market
financial
Britain
Though
the
would
not
provide
additional
aid,
million.
United States would give 10 million silver riyals on Lend Lease. In order to
King's
foodstuffs
three
be
the
subsidies
a
month
supply
of
would
maintain
36
in
Jeddah.
kept stored as a reserve

Rather than being pleased at the settlement of the Anglo-American

disappointed.
King
After
the
was
extremely
making numerous
aid package
Axis
king
Ibn
Saud
turn
to
feared
the
that
to American and British
support.
might
It
34 was
V,
FR
US
1944:
706.
June
17,1944,
p.
Governments,
be
found
joint
in
from
Secretary
the
can
supply
programme
The
of
a
memo
35
of
contents
Washington,
July
Ambassador,
1,1944, FRLIS 1944:V, p. 711-713 and
British
to
State
British Embassy aide-memoire, Ibid.
accompanying
36One of the conditions of this was that the reserve stockpiles would be managed by
This
diplomatic
British
was to prevent pilfering and embezzlement.
missions.
American/
The details of the joint supply programme were worked out in July-August, Minister
8,1944,
FR
State
September
US 1944:V, pp. 736-737.
Secretary
to
of
Jeddah

ABEDN-SEVEN
requests, which had gone unanswered for months he was offered a paltry
sum of aid. Lamenting the situation the King reiterated the dire financial
his
37
foodstuffs
The
of
quantity
government
of
situation
allocated would
for
be
let
for
the
the rest of the year.
season,
adequate
pilgrimage
alone
not
Deaths due to starvation were reported in southern Hijaz and there were
harsh conditions in Najd, as the distribution of food had been suspended
because of depleted stocks. There was also a shortage of vehicles for
transportation

and the distribution

of supplies into the interior of the

he
had
done
for
Ibn
Saud
in
times
the
appealed,
country.
as
many
past,
more substantial assistance.
As usual, Moose listened gravely to the Kings' complaints and
cabled Washington about the monarch's dissatisfaction. He also informed
the British minister about Ibn Saud's statement and was surprised when
Jordan expressed doubts about the King's sincerity. 38It was Jordan's belief
that Ibn Saud was actually satisfied with the aid received, despite what the
American minister may have heard, and that he was simply trying to get
more out of the naYve Americans. The figures of the joint supply
programme, which London had submitted, derived from Jordan's own
calculations of the annual consumption of foodstuffs and Saudi needs.
Jordan's word carried considerable weight in the Foreign Office and his
recommendations on the amount of aid that Britain should supply were
carefully followed. The King would have to learn to balance his budget and
cope with whatever amount of supplies he had.
The American approach was different and was based on the belief
that it was better to send more aid than necessary rather than less. British
estimates were seen to be too low. Secretary of State, Hull decided that: "in
37Moose to Secretary of State, August 6,1944, FRUS 1944:V, pp. 723-724.
38Reports of meetings with lbn Saud and Jordan, cited in Moose to Secretary of State, June
22 1944, FRUS 1944:V, p.710 and August 6,1944, FRUS 1944:V, pp. 723-724.Jordan was
aware of the largesse that the King handed out to maintain loyalty and supply the many
tribal chiefs living in Riyadh and that there must be extra stocks of foodstuffs kept for that
purpose. In June of 1944, food stocks were supposedly down to 1,363 tons but this was just
the amount available for general public distribution. In actual fact there were 2,105 tons
stocked but the balance was distributed at the Kings discretion.

272

ABEDIN-SEVEN

the absence of accurate statistical data to the contrary, we must accept the
King's statement that the quantities scheduled are insufficient to meet his
country's

needs" 39 Washington would unilaterally

increase aid to the

King. Moose was asked to inform the King that Washington was consulting
do
had
British
Government,
to
they
the
under the agreement of
with
which
the joint

supply programme, and would

expedite the shipment

of

additional supplies. Moose was also instructed to inform Jordan of these

developments.
The British Minister was furious upon hearing of the American
plans. He felt that Washington was violating the joint supply agreement by
increasing aid of its own accord. Moreover, Jordan could not accept that
the King's situation was as desperate as he claimed. He felt that Saudi
needs were exaggerated and that the Americans were simply indulging
them 40 It was also very embarrassing for Britain because the Foreign Office
had already firmly told the King that the amount of assistance provided in
the joint Anglo-American supply programme could not be increased for
that year 41 Though Jordan could not do anything about Washington's
move, relations between British and American officials in Saudi Arabia
worsened considerably.
In light of the tension between American and British diplomats in
Jeddah, Secretary Hull decided that it was time to withdraw James Moose.
It was important to bring in someone who could become close to Ibn Saud
and move out from the shadow of the British Minister. As a replacement
Hull selected Colonel William Eddy-a Marine Corps officer and fluent
Arabic speaker. Raised in Beirut, he understood the culture and customs of
the Middle East 42He had also served as the Naval Attache in Cairo and

39Hull to American Economic Mission, Middle East, Cairo, August 14,1944, FRUS 1944: V,
p. 727.
* Moose to Secretary of State, August 16,1944, FRUS 1944:V, p. 728.
42SOSFA (Eden) to Emir Faisal, August 22,1944, cited in FR US 1944: V pp. 731-732.
42Eddy himself was willing to be military advisor but reluctant to take on a finance role
until specific plans to increase United States aid were established. See Secretary of State to
Minister Resident, April 18,1944, FRUS 1944:V, p. 687.

ASEDR4-SEVEN

273

had been Chief of the O.S.S. in North Africa at the time of the Allied
landings.
Eddy would also be given the added advantage of having his post
promoted

to Minister Plenipotentiary-a promotion which Secretary Hull

secured from President Roosevelt just before Eddy's appointment. This was
designed to indicate to Ibn Saud the importance with which Washington
held Saudi Arabia. However, it made no difference to Stanley Jordan that a
new American minister was in place. Anglo-American relations in Saudi
Arabia

remained "a little precarious" 43 Jordan was still upset at the

disruption

that the American decision to unilaterally increase aid to Ibn

Saud caused to his plans for reform. In response Jordan had his own
unilateral declarations to make. He informed Eddy that an Indian Muslim
had been selected to act as financial advisor to the King and that he would
be followed by representatives of the British Eastern Bank which would be
setting up offices in Saudi Arabia. In addition, the British military mission
would be strengthened, which would in turn ensure adequate security for
warehouses storing food and materiel reserves to prevent local officials
from squandering them. Eddy quickly cabled Washington that the British
were clearly making every effort to assert themselves44
Ibn Saud also lost no time in nurturing the sympathies of the new
Minister. The King sent his advisor Yusuf Yassin to speak with Eddy on an
issue of the "greatest importance, in the strictest confidence"45 The King
was certain of President Roosevelt's friendship towards his country and
had high expectations of the United States. However, since America had
joined the British in providing aid the King found that the combined
supply and financial aid package was less than what the British had given
for 1943 alone. This was particularly disquieting since the British were
ceasing their financial subsidy altogether. Therefore, the net result of
*3Grafftey-Smith who replaced Jordan as Minister and got on well with Eddy and spoke
highly of the American in his memoirs. SeeGrafftey-Smith, Bright Levant, p.257.
** Eddy to Secretary of State, September 7,1944, FRUS 1944:V, p.734.
*SReport of meeting between William Eddy and Yusuf Yassin, on September 6,1944,
described in Eddy to Secretary of State, September 7,1944, FRUS 1944:V pp. 734-736.

274

ABEDIN-SEVEN

America's

her
be
half
Britain
to
of
of
relieved
participation allowed

obligations while Saudi Arabia benefited nothing and in fact lost. 46

Yassin argued that if the United States was content to have its
economic

activity

reduced and defined by its ally

then it should

understand if Saudi Arabia yielded to British wishes and interests in order

to survive: "Without arms or resources, Saudi Arabia must not reject the
hand that measures its food and drink. "47 After all the United States could
lose interest after the war, and there was no guarantee of long term
commitment to Ibn Saud. After this long build up Yassin came to the point.
The King wished to know if there was some way "on a basis that leads far
beyond the war" under which Saudi Arabia and the United States could
collaborate alone.48The King certainly was capable of employing clever
approach's to gain points with Washington and perhaps increase rivalry
among the allies.
These statements raised concern in the Department Near Eastern
Affairs

that U. S.-Saudi relations were entering a dangerous phase and that

American
machinations
government.
Arabia

interests

or from

be

compromised

the complete

financial

either
collapse

due

to

the increased involvement

British

of the Saudi

One route to achieving greater American support for

was through

Department

would

of the U. S. military.

Saudi
The

was aware that the strategic value of Saudi oil was becoming

more apparent to logistics and supply officers who were anxious to fulfil
the requirements

forces
fighting
the
of

in Europe and the Far East. It was

+6Barry Rubin states that Yassin blamed the situation on "the machinations of the British"
and advocated US: Saudi collaboration to counter Britain's threat. See Rubin, Great
Powers in the Middle East, p. 56. This author however, after reviewing the Eddy's report of
the conversation disagrees with that point. Yassin clearly stated that Ibn Saud regarded
Britain as his ally. Yassin told Eddy that it was "understood that neither (the U. S. nor Ibn
Saud) wishes a break of confidence or cooperation with the British". In looking at Eddy's
report it seems more reasonable to argue that Yassin was trying to embarrass the U. S. by
stating that Washington had let its policies be "reduced and defined" by London. The
Americans were being chiding into providing greater help. See Report of meeting between
William Eddy and Yusuf Yassin, on September 6,1944, FRUS 1944:V pp. 734-736.

*7Eddy to Secretary of State, September 7,1944, FRCIS1944:V, p. 734.This meeting may

have been a significant factor in Washington's subsequent decision to increase the amount
of cereals to 50,000tons for 1944.
48Ibid.

275

ABEDIN-SEVEN

hoped that these oil procurement needs would propel the United States
towards greater involvement in the Kingdom's affairs.

The Expansion of U.S. Military Presence

Interest in Saudi Arabia had been steadily growing in the Departments of
War and Navy, particularly among the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The CASOC
concession in Saudi Arabia

was increasingly

being recognised as

strategically important, being one of only two, wholly American operated

oil concessions in the Middle East (the other was in Bahrain) 49 While
lead
diplomatic
Department's
Interior
State
to
to
the
on
content
and
allow
desire
for
increasing
Saudi
Arabia
to
there
a more
was an
matters relating
bid
Petroleum
Reserves
in
The
the
of
active role
oil policy.
unsuccessful
Corporation made it clear to the joint Chiefs that direct involvement would
be necessary. Military planners were to include the fields of eastern Arabia
in defence and re-supply strategies of the war and Saudi oil reserves came
to be perceived as part and parcel of America's overseas strategic assets,
especially as an American company ran the Saudi concession. The
Secretary of War, Henry Stimson stated:
Both from a long and short range point of view the most
important military interest in Saudi Arabia is oil and closely
following this in importance is the right to construct airfields,
the use of air space, and the right to make aerial surveys in
connection there with. 50

49Secretary of State, Hull to Admiral William Leahy, Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 15,
1943, RDOS, Office of International Trade Policy: Petroleum Division, 1943-1949, Box 1,
US-National Archives. The majority of American ventures in the area had British partners
as the majority shareholders. This in effect meant that the British Government was in
control. The Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) was a prime example of this -American
companies had minority shares in concessions in Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar and Oman. An in
depth history and development of the IPC from the 1920's can be found in Shwadran,
Middle East Oil and the Great Powers, Chapter VIII. See especially pp. 246-248 for a
breakdown of American and British partners.

50Secretary of War to Secretary of State, October 27,1944, RDOS, Office of International

Trade Policy-Petroleum Division, 1941-49,Box 6, US-National Archives. Seealso FR US
1944:V pp. 748-749.

276

ABEDIN-SEVEN

(USAFME)
Middle
East
Forces
in
Army
S.
U.
the
the
officers of

Logistics

keen
American
Command
the
to
Air
Transport
capitalise
on
the
were
and
By
in
by
Arabia
the
Saudi
transit
in
country.
rights
air
acquiring
presence
distance
Arabia
the
shorten
could
supply aircraft
across northern

cutting

51
Not
by
212
flights
this
Karachi
Cairo
amount
to
only
would
miles.
the
on
delivery
but
it
fuel
the
would
speed
consumption
to a significant saving on
of

aircraft,

emergency

landing

Having

to the Pacific theatre.

supplies and equipment

stations in Saudi Arabia was

sites and refuelling

East
Middle
in
the
improving
travel
be
generally.
air
thought to
one way of
The

State Department

permission

approached

gladly

the Saudi authorities

for

to conduct reconnaissance flights, ground surveys and for

in
It
request
and
seemed a straightforward
clearance to set up an airfield.
for
Ibn Saud.
for
greater support
line with the war effort and an avenue
Saudi
fact,
but
in
the
response was not
Few problems were anticipated,
very enthusiastic.
The official reply was rather ambiguous: "studies and discussions to
great obstacles must

remove

behind
Yet
"52
not.

was a contentious

territory

types of surveys,

rural

passing
sensitivity

overhead

to grant

tension

of allied warplanes

issue. The King wanted

the direction

Saudi airspace and the direction

and nomadic

decision

the scenes considerable

The
prospect
request.

American

routes,

precede

from

in which

permission

or

from

the

resulted

over Saudi

crossing
to know

which

aircraft

they would

details of air
would

leave. To a largely

population,

the sight, as well

as sounds,

incite

fear and hostility.

There

could

to American

flying
planes

over certain

enter

of aircraft

was particular

populated

areas and

State,
Hull,
Secretary
October
FR
27,1944,
US 1944:V, pp.
Stimson
War,
to
of
Secretary
51
of
October
1944
in
Near
it
in
Eastern
the
Miller
that
when
officials
was
argues
748-751.
War
for
involving
Navy
departments
idea
in
the
of
and
paying
up
with
Affairs office came
for
Saudi
Arabia,
Search
for
Security,
Miller
increasing
facilities
thereby
revenue
the use of
Department had already developed an interest during March-April of
War
But
the
118.
p.
March-April
however,
frame,
Gormly
the
Gormly,
James
time
also
supports
that year.
Diplomatic
History,
Arabia',
Saudi
Vol.
Open
in
4, No. 2, Spring 1980,
Door
the
'Keeping
pp. 189-205.

277

ABEDIN-SEVEN

prohibitions

flying
Tayma
the
towns
over
of
al-Jauf,
on
and
were made

Hail. 53
Domestic critics of the King might

gain further

ammunition

to

handing
foreigners.
54
King
the
to
the
over
control
of
country
of
accuse
More

importantly

there was a great desire to avoid

the political

that would ensue if any of the American aircraft were fired

complications

Though
death
injury
to
the
crew.
or
not explicitly mentioned
upon causing
by the King or his advisors there was no doubt a healthy concern for British
The
latest
American
to
the
commitment
request.
reaction

of the United

States to Saudi Arabia was by no means assured at that point and Ibn Saud
his
to
enough
risk
upsetting
old supporter.
confident
not
was certainly
The less than immediate Saudi response came as a surprise to
Washington

British
involvement.
of
possible
were
aroused
suspicions
and

This seemed well founded after reports indicated high ranking British
military

States
United
to
the
gaining preferential air
averse
were
officers

transit rights in what was considered a traditional

British military

area.

Eddy reported:
Most authentic confidential source confirms that British told
Saudi Government to refuse aerodrome to US Army at
Dhahran. Royal Airforce Chief Cairo stated to same source
that Air Ministry London would not concur in US Army
for
55
Dhahran
aerodrome
request
The -State Department called in the Counsellor at the British Embassy,
Michael Wright, to explain the situation. In a meeting with Assistant
Secretary of State Adolf Berle, the Councillor was subjected to a barrage of

52These concerns were articulated to the American Minister by Yusuf Yassin, Ibn Saud's
Affairs. See Eddy to Yusuf Yassin, July 29,1944, FRUS 19: V,
Foreign
Minister
of
acting
p. 661.
53These were towns in the north of the country and areas where the loyalty of beduin
fully
assured.
not
tribes were

54Minister Eddy to Yusuf Yassin,July 29,1944,FRUS1944:V, p.661.

55See Eddy's cable sent via the American Legation in Egypt. Minister in Egypt to Secretary
6,1944, FRUS 1944:V, p. 663.
October
State,
of

278

ABEDIN-SEVEN

had
furious
Britain
interfered
in
American
56
Berle
that
the
was
accusations.
request:

"There was no law in heaven or earth which entitled anybody to

interfere

for
legitimate
building
in
Saudi
an
airfield
purposes
our
with

Arabia. "57 The Counsellor assured Berle that His Majesty's Government
interests
in
Saudi
Arabia
American
to
trying
and that
undermine
was not
there must be some misunderstanding.
After returning to the Embassy Wright did discover, after making
his own

inquiries, that there had indeed been complicity

Ministry

in the matter 58 He could only suggest that the American War

Department

of the Air

London,
in
its
in
the
explain
situation
counterpart
approach

for
in
Dhahran-59
However,
British
the
the
to
airfield
support
gain
order
American General Staff was reluctant to do so, fearing that the British joint
56Wright was the public relations man at the embassy and it was his job to put a positive
United
States.
See
divert
British
Anderson,
to
the
Britain
criticism
of
policy
and
on
gloss
Terry. The United States,Great Britain and the Cold War 1944-1947, London: University of
Missouri Press, 1987, p. 34.
57Memo of conversation by Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle with Michael Wright,
Counsellor, British Embassy, October 9,1944, FRUS 1944:V, p. 664. Berle was the son of a
liberal Boston minister who graduated Harvard at 18 and law school at 21. He had served
handpicked
by
Wilson
Versailles
Roosevelt
President
to
to
at
and
was
serve
adviser
an
as
in the State Department. The two men shared similar views and Berle had direct access to
indicative
British
Berles'
to
the
President.
was
official
of the general feeling of
attitude
the
State,
27.
Secrets
Rubin,
House.
White
p.
of
the
58Memo of telephone conversation between Wright and Murray Nov. 11,1944, FRUS
for
believed
it
Air
Force
that
the United
Royal
668.
V,
was
unnecessary
officials
1944: p.
States to have an airfield in Saudi Arabia since there was already an American field on
Bahrain. However, what the RAF had been unaware of was that the U. S. Army Air Force
large capacity cargo planes on the supply routes to the Pacific
introduce
to
new,
planned
land
from
Bahrain
field.
take
the
small
off
and
not
could
which
theatre
fundamental
during
differences
be
this
there
that,
period
were
noted
It should also
international
American
to
British
air transit rights. The United
approaches
between
and
States wanted air transport firms to be able to pick up and discharge cargo or passengers
freely along international routes. Britain did not wish to have free open movement but
flights-feeling
in the long run American
threatened
that
restricted
and
controlled
sought
British carriers. It was at a session of the
overwhelm
would
superiority
air
and
capitalism
International Civil Aviation Conference held in November 1944 in Chicago that America
hoped to have its proposals-termed the Fifth Freedom adopted as international policy.
However Britain strongly opposed the measure. British aviation and RAF officials had
See
Alan
Dobson,
Peaceful
issue.
Air
because
Warfare: The United
this
of
to
grind
axes
States, Britain and the Politics of International Aviation, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991. Also
Crane Brinton, The United Statesand Britain, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945,
1944 also saw a Anglo-American dispute over civil air rights
The
177-181.
of
summer
pp.
by
American
American
to
landing rights at
attempts
secure
sparked
Iran
was
in
which
Abadan. See FRUS 1944:V, pp. 486-497.

279

ABEDIN-SEVEN

Staff would demand shared use of the Dhahran base. 60 Since it had no
desire to share facilities, the War Department took matters into its own
hands. Major General Benjamin Giles, Commander of USAFME was sent to
the eastern province of Saudi Arabia to assess the situation himself. Giles
arrived

with a team of engineers who conducted surveys and took soil

Giles
Government
Saudi
It
is
clear,
whether
not
received
prior
samples.
permission

for his mission since there appeared to be no official Saudi

General's
briefly
Giles
did
the
of
acknowledgement
visit.
or
meet
welcome
but
Dhahran
in
Saudi
S.
U.
not
with
senior
officials
ones. By the time
with
he left, less than 24 hours later, the General was satisfied that he had found
build
base
American
to
an
air
near the town of Dhahran 61
a suitable site
However,

the success of the mission was clouded by the discovery that

from
in
Dhahran
Bahrain around the same
British
two
officers also arrived
time as General Giles. Dressed as civilians, the two men were on a scouting
mission of their own-to

find a suitable site for an RAF airfield in Saudi

Arabia.
The American response was angry. Secretary of State Hull sent a
Secretary,
Foreign
British
Anthony
Eden,
letter
the
to
complaining
stern
that British policy on the ground seemed the opposite of the co-operation
he
62
Hull
had
that
to
London
asserted
cultivate.
that
sought
reports from
the field implicating
Ministry

the British Minister

in Jeddah as well as the Air

in London of interfering in the matter of landing rights. It seemed

59Memo of telephone conversation between Wright and Murray Nov. 11,1944, FR us

1944: V, p. 668.
60In a Memo from the War Department to the NEA it was pointed out that "The Army Air
Forces considers that joint tenancy of the Dhahran airfield with British forces would be
John
Bowen,
War
Department
Colonel
Memo
General
Staff
NEA,
to
undesirable".
most
November 22,1944, FRUS 1944:V p. 669.
61U. S. Consulate, Dhahran to Secretary of State Oct. 12,1944, FR US 1944:V p. 665. (The
United States opened a Consulate in Dhahran March 4,1944). See Moose to Secretary of
In
discussions
659.
V,
FRUS
4
1944,
1944:
March
with ARAMCO the King
p.
State,
indicated that he had more confidence in the long term assistance of the British, rather
Saud's
Ibn
The
Americans
in
United
that
Americans.
the
worried
the
confidence
than
States was at an all time low.
62Secretary of State (Hull) to SOSFA, Foreign Office, cited in Secretary of State to US
Ambassador, London (Winant) October 17,1944, FRUS 1944:V, pp. 666-667.

280

ABEDIN-SEVEN

like "a reversion to a dog eat-dog-policy" 63 For Hull, it was clear that to
aid to ensure the financial

depend

on wartime economic and military

stability

feasible
long
Saud
Ibn
term strategy. The United
not
a
was
of

States Government would have to assist in some concrete way, not only
during

for
but
in
time
afterwards,
order to maintain the
some
wartime

do
leave
Saudi
Arabia.
To
Kingdom
the
otherwise
would
of
reliant
stability
on Britain and subject to the whims of parsimonious colonial officials.

The Changing of the Guard

The NEA devised a five year financial subsidy package that would provide
Ibn Saud with $57 million over a five year period from 1945-1950.64It was
hoped that this would cover the deficits of the Saudi administration

until

balance
budget.
The
the
that
time
oil
revenues
could
and
pilgrimage
such
$37
for
this,
million,
would
represent
some
payment
oil
majority of
for
by
be
U.
S.
Navy.
further
A
$20
the
that
use
maintained
would
reserves
for
by
be
War
Department
for
transit
the
to
air
paid
rights
and
million was
the building of airfields. The proposal was passed to the Secretary of State
"a
deemed
relatively
and was
interests in Saudi Arabia. 65

small investment"

to protect American

However, before the proposal could be fully examined Cordell Hull,

from
health,
ill
Secretary
three
and
suffering
resigned
as
of
aged seventy
State. 66The strain of wartime responsibilities had exhausted him and he no

longer felt capable of physically keeping up with the demands of the post.
Hull left office on November 27,1944 and was succeededby his long time
British
American
interests see Eddy to
Eddy's
For
obstruction
of
Ibid.
on
reports
63
Secretary of State, Nov. 24 and 28 1944, FRUS 1944:V pp. 752-753. Eddy remarked "Jordan
in resentment of King by proposing drastic reduction
to
British
lead
embroil
us
effort
will
in subsidy".
64Chief of NEA, Murray to Under Secretary of State, Stettinius, November 11,1944, in
RDOS, Office of International Trade Policy: Petroleum Division 1943-1949, Box 6, USNational Archives.

65Ibid.

diabetes
from
dual
the
of
effects
Hull
and tuberculoses. He had been
suffering
66
was
diagnosed with these problems as far back as the summer of 1932-well before becoming
from
hid
his
He
illness
the public and perhaps from the President as
State.
Secretary of
TheMemoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol. II p. 1255.
Hull,
See
well.

281

ABEDIN-SEVEN

deputy, Edward Stettinius. 67Stettinius was inexperienced in foreign affairs

for
his
known
administrative
more
and was

skills. Before the war he had

been an executive in the U. S. Steel company. His appointment to the State

in September 1943 was in part an attempt to solve the

Department
Department's

his
Among
contributions was serving
woes.
administrative

lease
lend
administrator
as

and reorganising the Department's

internal

four
This
included
including
twelve
the
of
new
offices.
creation
structure,
directly
Under
to
the
were
made
responsible
which
geographical offices
Secretary of State.
As previously

Division
the
mentioned

of Near Eastern Affairs

became part of the larger Office of Near Eastern and African

(ONEA)

director!
Murray
its
Wallace
as
new
with

appointments

methodical

Stettinius also made

State-Joseph
Under
Secretary
to
two
of
men
of

diplomat
career

fiery
Dean
Acheson
a
and

Affairs

lawyer.

Grew, a

Both men were

influence
American
greatly
policy
administrators and would

Grew
Joseph
Acting
Arabia.
to
the
Saudi
stepped
up
often
post
of
towards
Secretary of State during Stettinus' frequent trips to Europe.
Fortunately for Ibn Saud, Stettinius was already apprised of the
Arabia
Saudi
American
to
in
an
active
policy
and
pursued
protect
situation
he
American
69
First,
instructed
kingdom.
Minister
the
in
the
with
relations
Jeddah, William

Eddy to reduce information

sharing with

the British

67Hull's retirement would leave a significant gap in the administration's relations with
Congress and in dealing with foreign affairs generally. His replacement was believed to be
President
Roosevelt's
Dallek,
control
over
policy,
not
challenge
would
who
someone
Foreign
Policy, pp. 502-503. Stettinius account of his
American
Roosevelt
D.
and
Franklin
found
Campbell,
George
be
in
Thomas
Herring, eds., The Diaries of
and
can
experiences
Franklin
Watts,
York:
1975.
Jr.
New
Stettinius,
R.
Edward
68The number of State Department employees also increased. The figure had risen from
foreign
by
The
1945.
3,767
to
1939
in
of
service officers rose from 3,730 to
numbers
974
Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, p. 234, fn56.
See
7,000.
about
his
from
benefited
the
of
predecessor in developing the interest of
efforts
Stettinius
also
69
War
Department
Chiefs,
Joint
Secretary
In
to
the
the
the
and
addition
of the
the military.
Saudi
American
believe
that
to
control
of
oil was important for retaining
Navy came
bargaining
in
international
power
and
agreements. With Pacific theatre
American prestige
demands
for
increase
to
likely
post-war
to
and
petroleum
expecting
supplies
operations
be high it was "patently in the Navy's interest that no part of the national wealth be lost at
State,
Secretary
December
Navy
Secretary
to
11,1944,
V,
FRUS
the
1944:
of
of
time".
this
p. 755-756.

282

ABEDIN-SEVEN

Minister Stanley Jordan. Meetings between Eddy and the King were to be
kept confidential. 7 The nature of such discussions with the King should
Jordan
King
be
the
to
unless
specifically requested that the
relayed
not
British

be informed. More importantly,

Eddy was not to consider any

Saudi
Arabia.
Stettinius
by
Jordan
to
that
reduce
aid
would
also
proposals
informed the Foreign Office of the instructions sent to Eddy, to emphasise
the point that Jordan was hampering Allied cooperation 71
Second, Stettinius revived the NEA proposal with the White House
bill
for
Congress
to
to
a
submit
a multi-million
and sought permission
dollar aid package for Saudi Arabia. The President was amazed that an oil
producing

country could be in such financial hardship, and asked in

incredulity:

"what the hell they were doing with all the money"? 2 Stettinus

had to make a persuasive case to convey to the President the need to assist
the Kingdom :
by
help
is
this Government,
provided
not
such
by
be
it
supplied
some other nation which
will
undoubtedly
might thus acquire a dominant position in that country
inimical to the welfare of Saudi Arabia and to the national
interest of the United States73
If

However, Stettinius also realised that Congress would only grant approval
if it was assured that the subsidies to Saudi Arabia were not for the benefit
of a single private corporation-i.

e. CASOC, (which in December 1944

7 Secretary of State to Minister Jeddah, December 24,1944, FRUS 1944:V, pp. 756-757. See
Minister Jeddah, December 9,1944, Ibid., pp. 755.
State
to
Secretary
of
also
n The British Ambassador remarked that "with Hull's departure and Stettinius's
direction
foreign
State,
Secretary
by
the
taken
of
of
policy
was
as
over
what
appointment
in fact amounted to a small committee composed of members of the White House and the
State Department" in Annual Report and Political Review of the United States for the First
Quarter of 1945, Halifax (British Ambassador, Washington) to SOSFA (Eden) June 16 1945,
Confidential Dispatches:Analyses of America by the British
Hachey,
in
ed.,
re-printed

Ambassador1939-1945,p.264.

72Stettinius meeting with FDR, December 22,1944, in Campbell, ed., The Diaries of Edward
Stetinius, Jr., p. 204.
FRUS
December
22,1944,
1944:V, pp. 757-759. It should be noted
Roosevelt,
to
Stettinius
73
his
Gormly
in
Door
Open
James
the
in Saudi Arabia', Diplomatic
article'Keeping
that
that
History, Vol. 4., No. 2, Spring 1980, attributed the above cited remarks to President
Roosevelt to indicate the importance that was given to aid for Saudi Arabia. Yet as has
been shown here these words are actually those of the Secretary of State, Edward
Stettinius.

283

ABEDIN-SEVEN

became known as the Arabian American Oil Corporation-ARAMCO).

legislation.
such
Domestic oil corporations would certainly oppose any
Unwilling

to rely solely on Congressional funding Stettinius also made

development loans. It was

Bank
Export-Import
to
the
to
gain
submissions
hoped that military projects would also bring services, supplies and
equipment

to Ibn Saud's government. The King was certain to "adopt a

he
if
Britain
that
independent
towards
was
assured
attitude"
much more
basis".
long
74
In
"extend
term
the
States
United
on
a
aid
would
the
into
1945
1944
the
Stettinius
to
programme
over
carry
planned
meantime
for
funding.
long
term
the
Congress
concrete plans
approved
until
fields
from
Saudi
increase
hoped
to provide
the
to
oil
output
Stettinius also
however,
it
that
Oil
Saud.
for
Ibn
made
clear
officials
company
revenue
increases
for
to
production
significant
not
allow
would
wartime conditions
for
drilling
expanded
needed
particularly with materials and equipment
75
to
rationing.
still subject

Stettinius wanted Ibn Saud to know of the great efforts being made
his
Eddy
for
to
met privately
Washington
country.
assistance
obtain
in
financial
him
that
King
to
and
economic
a
substantial
aid
the
reassure
with
basis76
long-term
Though
be
pleased
with
on
a
provided
would
package
in
interested
Saud
Ibn
making another complaint
was more
the news,
deemed
Minister
American
While
Minister.
the
British
was
as
the
about
honour'
British
Minister
'goodness
the
was
another
and
of
someone
matter:
Jordan is our enemy and an enemy of the USA too. To the
has
he
his
to
sought
prevent our good
power
of
extent
for
his
injure
Except
to
country.
my
evil
and
relations

December
22,1944,
FR
US
V,
757Roosevelt,
1944:
(Stettinius)
State
to
pp.
74Secretary of
frequent
Britain
Europe
became
began
to
trips
Stettinius
this
and
and
more
Following
759.
His
deputy,
State
Under
Secretary
Allied
in
war
planning.
and
post
of
strategy
involved
day
day
Acting
Secretary
to
the
Grew
took
management
policy
of
as
of
role
on
Joseph
in
Grew
166
days
Acting
Secretary
State.
240
fact,
the
office,
served
were
In
as
of
of
State.
East,
Middle
in
144
Kuniholm,
State
The
Orgins
the
Department
The
p.
and
of
of
Baram,
See
235.
East,
Near
in
War
the
p.
Cold
the
December
22,1944,
Roosevelt,
FRUS
1944:
V,
757-759.
President
State
to
p.
Secretary
of
75
FR
US
December
24,1944,
V,
Eddy,
1944:
759.
State
to
p.
Secretary
of
76

284

ABEDIN-SEVEN

influence I am sure the mutual interests of Saudi Arabia and

the USA would have developed more rapidly months ago?7
Once this report reached Washington

the Secretary of State had had

despite
Office
Foreign
The
Jordan's
that
realised
sincere efforts to
enough.
follow

United
States
because
him.
with
were
strained
relations
policy,
of

Jordan was recalled and on February 7,1945, Lawrence Grafftey-Smith

him
British
Minister
in
Jeddah.
By
the time the new Minister
as
replaced
historic
Saud
Ibn
in
President
embarking
on
a
was
meeting
with
settled
Roosevelt-a

Franklin

meeting that marked the beginning of America's

Saudi
Arabia.
in
interest
close

AHistoric

Meeting

In January 1945 Allied leaders, Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin met in Yalta
to discuss the post war agenda. Among the topics discussed were the
United

Nations Organisation and trusteeship over the colonies of Axis

One
issue
of particular
powers.
East -especially

concern to Roosevelt was the Middle

Palestine. It was here at Yalta that several historians claim

the President came up with the idea enlisting the aid of the King of Saudi
Arabia

78
had
Since
United
States
issue.
the
the
provided
on

significant

had
King
State
Department
the
the
to
and
always noted the
assistance
influence that Ibn Saud had on the Arab world Roosevelt felt it time to
King.
79
desert
the
meet

77Eddy was surprised at the extent of the animosity with which the King held forth about
Report
Meeting
Ibn
Saud
in
Minister.
Eddy to Secretary of State,
British
of
with
the
January 1945, FRUS 1945:VIII, pp. 846-847.
78Dallek, Franklin D. Rooseveltand American Foreign Policy, pp. 511-512 and Freidel, Franklin
D. Roosevelt:Rendezvouswith Destiny, pp. 582-592. Details of the preparations and
discussions surrounding the Yalta Conference can be found in FR US 1945: The Conferences
GPO,
D.
C.:
US
Washington,
1955.
Yalta,
Malta
and
at
79Roosevelt had also been approached by Jewish leaders in the United States who sought
his help to pass a bill in Congress endorsing the establishment of a Jewish homeland in
Palestine. This raised concerns about the controversy it could create with Britain,
Moyne,
Lord
British
the
the
Minister
State
for
assassination
of
after
the
of
particularly
Middle East and opposition from Arab countries. However, Roosevelt's military advisors
bill
bill.
had
for
Such
the
to
the
a
potential
creating conflict in the region
were opposed
diversion
Allied
the
troops
to the Middle East when all
of
vital
require
might
which

ABEDIN-SEVEN

285

However, the idea of meeting with Ibn Saud and discussing

Palestine was in fact something the President had been thinking
80
According
time.
some
articulated

to the notes of Edward

of for

Stettinius, Roosevelt

strong personal views on the subject in a November 1944

State
Department
senior
officials:
with
meeting
The president feels confident, however, he will be able
to iron out the whole Arab Jewish issue on the ground
he
have
can
a talk. He thinks Palestine should
where
be for the Jews and no Arabs should be in it, and he
has definite ideas on the subject. It should be exclusive
Jewish territory. 81

There has been much historical

discussion about Roosevelt's personal

his
President
To
it
Palestine.
the
advisors,
made
on
appear that the
views
issue could be resolved through personal diplomacy. Presidential advisor
David Niles records that Roosevelt privately said he could "do anything
that needed to be done with Ibn Saud for a few million dollars". 82It was his
single-minded
President
Instructions

determination to accomplish the task himself which led the

to keep his intentions

secret from

were sent to the American

other leaders at Yalta.

Minister

in Jeddah to make

day
Only
last
Yalta
Conference
the
the
did
on
of
quietly.
arrangements

for the war in Europe. See Anderson, The United States,Great

required
were
resources
Britain and the Cold War, pp. 31-32.
80See also Bishop, FDR's Last Year, pp. 434-446. However, in meetings with Under
Secretary of State Edward Stettinius in November 1944 Roosevelt made clear references to
his desire of meeting Ibn Saud for the purpose of solving the Palestinian issue, 'Calendar
Notes' of meeting of November 10,1944 and November 15,1944, The Diaries of Edward R.
Stettinius, pp. 170 and 174 respectively.
81'Meeting with President Roosevelt', November 10,1944, The Diaries of Edward R.
Stettinius, p. 170. Present at this meeting were Secretary Hull and Under Secretary of State
Edward Stettinius.
82Niles Memorandum, 26 May 1946, Official File #204, Truman Papers, Harry Truman
Presidential Library, Independence, Missouri, USA, cited in Miller, Searchfor Security,
later it indicates Roosevelt's
the
that
Although
a
200.
memo
was
written
more
year
p.
Ibn Saud prior to the meeting. Roosevelt had also made plans to meet
towards
attitude
Selaisse of Ethiopia so the meeting with Ibn Saud
Egypt
Haile
Farouk
King
and
of
with
have been as unique as is sometimes portrayed.
following
pattern
not
a
and
may
was

286

ABEDrN-SEVEN

Roosevelt mention to Churchill that he was going to meet with the Saudi
83
monarch.
A warship U. S.S. Murphy was dispatched to pick up Ibn Saud in
Jeddah on February 12. From there the Murphy would rendezvous with the
President's ship-the

destroyer USS Quincy, at the Great Bitter Lake in the

Gulf of Suez.84During the two day journey aboard the Murphy the King
was

entertained

with

demonstrations

of the ships firepower

and a

deployment of depth charges. John Keating, the Captain of the vessel noted
displays
large
King
these
tired
to
to
the
and
of
chose retire
that the
quickly
deck.
The
been
Saudi
had
the
on
ships'
remaining
that
erected
party
tent
had preferred to remain above deck since most had "probably never been
before".
had
85
the
large,
boat
seen
even
sea
never
some
and
so
on a
The King had also given strict instructions to maintain contact with
Jeddah where his son Prince Faisal was in charge. It became the duty of one
frequent
to
the
that
to
room
ship's
communications
verify
all
official
court
intrigued
first
by
The
Kingdom.
in
the
the
was
operator
radio
at
was well
It
he
to
consisted of the only word in the
send.
asked
was
transmission
international

know-"OK".
Saudi
to
that
the
seemed
official
code

After a

from
"OK".
However,
intrigue
the
come
would
shore
reply
short pause

drag
had
the
that
on with arguments raging over
Roosevelt
conference
would
worried
83
he
Churchill
he
On
February
be
10
that
warned
would
of
agreements.
exact wording
leaving the following day to meet with Ibn Saud, King Farouk of Egypt and Haile Selaisse
by Roosevelt's meetings with Middle Eastern
Churchill
Ethiopia.
alarmed
so
was
of
leaders that he quickly arranged to meet them himself. See Charles Bohlen, Witness to
History, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1973, pp. 202-203.
T1179/R3/2Secretary
State,
RDOS,
February
211945,
(Eddy)
Jeddah
to
minister
of
s4
highlighted
by
Minister
Deputy
the
importance
this
The
of
was
of
meeting
2145.
Information of Saudi Arabia, Fouad Al-Farsy in a lecture given in Houston, Texas, on
October 16 1986, which was printed as 'Saudi American Relations in a Changing World' in
No.
detailed
23-27.
A
Winter
1986-87,
19,
Affairs,
pp.
account of this meeting
Arab-American
Last
Year.
FDR's
in
Bishop,
pp. 434-446, which contains interviews with a
is also provided
Secret
during
including;
Service agents, the President's
the
those
visit
present
of
number
Naval Attache-William Rigdon, members of the ships crew, Captain John C. Keating as
daughter
had
father
President's
her
Roosevelt,
the
the
Anna
who
on
accompanied
well as
FDR
William
Eddy,
for
Meets
Saud,
New
York:
Ibn
this
Other
meeting
are
sources
trip.
War,
in
War:
Churchill,
Roosevelt,
World
Kimball,
Forged
Second
Warren
the
1954;
and
AFME,
Franklin
Freidel,
318-319;
D. Roosevelt,pp. 593-594.
1997,
HarperCollins,
pp.
London:
85Bishop, FDR's Last Year, p.436.

287

ABEDIN-SEVEN

later turned to exasperation as the radio operator was tasked to repeat this
for
days.
86
hour
hour,
two
half
the
on
-day and night
exact routine every
Modern observers of the Middle East may find it fitting that the first
Saudi
States
King
United
President
the
between
a
and
of
of
a
meeting
Arabia took place on Valentines Day, February 14,1945 - given that it
intimate
beginning
and politically charged relationship
the
an
of
marked
East
in
Middle
be
this century.
the
the
to
closest
one of
that would prove
Yet during this first encounter, aboard the USS Quincy, there was a certain
American
The
King
both
leaders.
by
sought
greater
amount of posturing
keen
President
for
to
Arab
the
was
assess
causes,
while
aid and support
foreign
American
in
King
the
policy
play
achieving
might
what role
William
Eddy
for
leaders
The
two
with
sessions
several
sat
objectives.
discussions
Also
the
interpreter.
were
present, at various stages of
acting as
Presidential

Hopkins
Harry
advisor,

and Assistant Secretary of State,

Charles Bohlen.

As discussion ensued Roosevelt brought up the issue of Jewish

immigration

to Palestine. In response Ibn Saud asked why the Allies did

homes
Germans'
lands
Jews
'choicest
the
to
the
the
of
and
not turn over
for
The
King
did
their
the
aggression.
not
oppressors pay
instead-making
understand
responsibility

why

the Allies

could

force
the Germans
not

to take

for Jewish refugees. 87If in fact Germany could not support

Allied
then
the
the
them
should
absorb
war,
nations
of
the
survivors
all
from
immigrants
Europe
88
Jewish
their
were
countries.
own
within
from the Arabs of the Middle East. They also had
different
culturally
by
bewildered
the constant repetition of the same
Murphy's
so
was
operator
radio
86The
Quincy
if there was some
he
the
the
of
that
communications
officer
chief
asked
message
OK",
FDR's
Bishop,
Last
Year,
"OK?
436.
to
the
p.
phrase
greater significance
United
States
in
his
Palestine as early as
had
King
about
policy
concern
registered
87The
November
29,1938,
FR
US
11,
See
Roosevelt,
1938:
994-998.
President
letter
to
in
pp.
1938
a
Roosevelt, April 30,1943, FRUS 1943:IV, pp. 773-775. The King's letters
Saud
to
Ibn
also
Unified,
286-292
Arabia
Almana,
298-301
For
in
pp.
and
pp
respectively.
are also re-printed
discussions
Freidel,
Franklin
D. Roosevelt,p. 594; Bishop,
these
see
of
American accounts
FDR's Last Year, pp. 444-445.
been
have
in
Philby,
Saudi
Palestine
Arabia,
335Saud's
also
articulated
Ibn
on
pp.
views
88
Saud,
Lacey,
134;
Ibn
Wells
271,
McLoughlin,
The
Meulen,
Der
p.
Van
of
p.
and
pp. 164337;
165.

288

ABEDIN-SEVEN

knowledge
them
that
allow
greater
technical
would
and
skills
greater
89
Arabs.
Although
"at
the
the
no point
expense
of
at
economic prosperity
did the King become rancorous", he did complain about the granting of
build
British
immigrants
American
dollars
to
the
to
and
aid
of
of

millions

farms and cities. 90Such funds and proper training could be given to the
local Arabs to build those things. Ibn Saud argued that Jewish forces were
"armed to the teeth, not to fight Germans but to fight Arabs". 91
According to Bohlen, "Ibn Saud's calm and reasoned statement had a
profound

92
William
Roosevelt"
on
effect

Eddy also reported

that the

President was caught off guard by the candour of Ibn Saud. He was
surprised

determination
the
and
confidence
at

with

which

the King

do
he
boast
being
his
despite
to
However,
93
what
able
wanted
of
spoke.
King to support American
did
Roosevelt
the
Saud,
Ibn
not
pressure
with
link
did
he
issue
American
the
to
Palestine-nor
in
with
aid.
attempt
policy
United
States
Ibn
Saud
the
that
President
fact,
would not
the
In
reassured
King
be
Arabs
that
the
the
hostile
and
would
moves against
make
discussed
Also
final
the
to
was
settlement.
post war
any
prior
consulted
benefit
by
joining
Arabia
how
Saudi
the
could
new
and
situation
international

Nations
Organisation.
United
94
The King
the
system under

delegation
Saudi
head
Faisal
his
Amir
to
a
of
to
as
attend
son
send
agreed
in
San
Francisco
United
Nations
95
the
inaugural
of
ceremony
the
Although
immigration

Roosevelt

had

not

obtained

into Palestine he nevertheless felt

support

for

Jewish

that he had met a noble

203
History,
Witness
to
p.
Bohlen,
89
during
Advisor,
Presidential
in
the
Hopkins,
was
who
present
meeting,
Harry
cited
90
445.
Year,
Last
FDR's
p.
Bishop,

91Ibid.

Bohlen
Charles
State,
Secretary
was also present aboard the Quincy.
of
Assistant
92
Bohlen, Witness to History, p 204.
State,
March
3,1945,
Secretary
RDOS,
(Eddy)
T1179/R3/3/345.
Jeddah
to
of
Minister
93
For
Ibn
Saud,
29-31.
Meets
FDR
Eddy,
pp.
accounts of this meeting taken from the
Also
Secret
Service
Naval
Attache
Agents, see Bishop, FDR's
President's
the
and
interviews of
Last Year, pp. 434-436.
Eddy,
FDR
Meets
318-319,
Ibn
Saud,
War,
in
Forged
also
pp.
Kimball,
pp. 29-31. In order to
94
founding
becoming
United Nations
the
a
of
member
the
of
requirements
satisfy
declare
formally
had
Arabia
Saudi
to
war on Germany.
Organisation,
Saud,
168.
Ibn
McLoughlin,
p.
95

289

ABEDIN-SEVEN

had
Roosevelt's
Saud
Ibn
leader.
Arab
changed
views on
not
and respected
Palestine but the King believed that he had received assurances that Arab
Washington
President
When
be
honoured.
to
the
returned
wishes would
he instructed the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers to assist in the building of
infrastructure

to
and
provide other necessary
airfields
works,
road
projects,

96
Arabia
Saudi
to
services
Soon after, in a speech to Congress on March 1,1945 Roosevelt
had
he
The
President
Saudi
that
the
remarked
ruler.
praise on

lavished

learned more about the Middle East in a five minute conversation with Ibn
Saud than in the exchange of two or three dozen letters 97 Roosevelt was
for
funding
Saudi
Arabia.
Following
Congressional
keen
to
support
also
his speech to Congress, Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson and the
House
the
NEA
of
members
of
with
the
several
meetings
organised
of
staff
for
discuss
leaders
Senate
to
more aid to Saudi
plans
Representatives and
Arabia 98

On March 8, Acheson and his staff, along with officers from the
Army

Sam
House,
Rayburn;
Speaker
the
Navy
the
the
of
met with
and

chairman
majority

Committee,
Carl
Vinson,
Affairs
Naval
House
the
and the
of
floor leader, john McCormack. During the course of the meeting

Saudi
importance
Arabia
the
briefed
the
of
and
strategic
Acheson
group on
United
Though
States
the
its
in
oil
producer.
and
a
major
as
capacity
Britain

had provided assistance through Lend Lease, there was still an

$50
least
five years. If
deficit
Saudi
the
million
over
next
at
of
anticipated
Saudi
be
the
the
deficit
government
of
would
stability
not
met
was
this
compromised

hold
American
the
threaten
on oil concessions.
and would

detailed
Saudi
Arabia
in Acting Secretary of
final
were
Roosevelt's
concerning
actions
96
FR
23
1945,
US
VIII,
May
1945:
Truman,
President
Grew)
to
(Joseph
pp. 900-901. In
State
President
American.
Secretary
the
the
the
despatch
new
on
status
was
updating
of
this
Bohlen,
Witness
by
See
Roosevelt.
to History, p. 204
also
conducted
Saudi relations as
March
F.
D.
Roosevelt,
by
1,1945, text printed in The
Congress
President
to
Address
97
D.
Roosevelt,
Volume
Franklin
4,1944-1945, New York: Harper
Addresses
Papers
of
and
Public
Bros., 1950, p. 584.
March
Conversation,
8,1945 Participants: Acheson,
Memorandum
Department
of
State
98
RDOS,
McCormack,
T1179/R3/3-845, See also FRUS
Drewry
Vinson,
Bard,
and
Kane,
1945:VIII, pp. 861-863.

290

ABEDIN-SEVEN

The immediate response of the Army and Navy representatives was to

the construction of an airfield at Dhahran and to maintain Saudi

propose

oil to relieve the drain on American reserves.99

Acheson indicated that if Congress was inclined to offer support,
there

by
be
could
were several methods
which aid
channelled: by an
grant; a government loan that would be secured by oil deposits; or

outright

by an unsecured loan that would be repaid from revenues derived from the
looked
favourably
Speaker
House
Rayburn
the
of
sale of oil.

upon the

as did the other members. Nevertheless they advocated that the

proposal,

State Department

take an indirect approach in dealing with Congress

because "if the entire matter were stated at some length in a bill this would
require

be
hearings
in
taken by
strong
attitudes
might
which
extensive

various

private interests". 100It was recommended that proposed legislation

should

funds,
in
the
the
the most general
of
except
purpose
not specify

dispose
funds
be
left
State
Secretary
The
to
the
through
of
should
terms.
of
the State Department but would be accountable to relevant Congressional
committees.

Furthermore any proposal for aid would stand a better chance

if it were on a quid pro quo basis, with Saudi oil being provided to the U. S.
military

Senate
leaders
In
with
consultation
rate.
a plan was
at a reduced

formulated
left

to fund Saudi Arabia through Export Import Bank loans. It was

to Acheson to draw up detailed proposals before proceeding with

drafting

legislation. 101

Acheson was also advised to watch out for opposition from Senators E.H.
Moore of Oklahoma and Tom Connally of Texas who, along with friends in
did
favour
lobby,
Washington
domestic
not
petroleum
the

subsidising

991bid.

lOOStateDepartment Memorandum of Conversation : Acheson, Kane, Bard, Vinson,

Drewry and McCormack, March 8,1945, RDOS, T1179/R3/3-845. Also FRUS 1945:VIII,
861-863
pp.
101The response from Senate leaders was also favourable. The Senate Majority Leader,
Barkley informed Acheson that they were "unanimous in their opinion that some action
Saudi
hold
American
the
Memo
to
the
on
concessions.
ensure
of meeting
required"
was
George
Walsh
(Barkley was Senate Majority
Senators
Barkley,
Acheson
and
between
and
Leader; George was Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee and Walsh was Chairman
Committee), May 17,1945, FRUS 1945:VIII, pp. 895-896.
Naval
Affairs
Senate
the
of

291

ABEDIN-SEVEN

foreign oil operations-nor

be
long
they
term postsupportive of
would

They
interference
in
foreign
to
opposed
government
governments.
war aid
believed
investment
in
in
that
industry
and
petroleum
general
private
deposits within the United States should be the focus. 102Even the Lend
Lease Act which provided a lifeline to Allied forces during the war had
been opposed by such hard line politicians and their lobbyists. 103
With complications looming in Congress the feeling among senior

failure
With
the
Department
State
of the
officials was pessimistic.
Petroleum Reserves Corporation venture officials were:
develop
that
against any
similar opposition will
quite certain
foreign
by
for
the
the
of
a
oil
either
purchase
reserve
proposal
Navy, or the use of U. S. Government funds to keep King Ibn
Saud favourably disposed towards the private American
104
holding
the
concession.
oil
company now

keep
to
Acheson
Dean
options open and continued to work on
attempted
Bank.
105
Export-Import
the
other channels,especially
The Death of Roosevelt
The sudden death of President

Roosevelt on April

12,1945

His
Harry
derail
Truman
the
to
successor,
aid
process.
entire
threatened

days
from
for
Cabinet
Vice
President
been
and apart
had only
eighty-two

102Memo of meeting between Acheson and Senators Barkley, George and WalshChairman
George
Leader,
Majority
Senate
was
of the Senate Finance
(Barkley was
Committee and Walsh was Chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee), May 17,
1945, FRUS 1945:VIII, pp. 895-896.
103For background on the Lend Lease Act see Warren Kimball, The Most Unsordid Act:
LendLease,1939-1941,Baltimore, 1969, particularly chapters 1-3; Beard, PresidentRoosevelt
War, pp. 160-172. For an account of Congressional reluctance to grant
Coming
the
of
andthe
foreign aid, which was written during the war. See Brinton, The United Statesand Britain,
Ambrose, and Douglas Brinkley, Rise to Globalism: American
Stephen
Also
163-164.
pp.
Foreign Policy Since 1938, New York: Penguin, 1993. pp. 6-8.
Secretary
State,
Clayton
Asst.
State
Dunn, April 7,1945, FRUS
to
Secretary
Asst.
of
of
104
1945:VIII, pp. 869-871.
loans
involved
The
getting approval to take Saudi oil as
with
problem
105
subsequent
Memo of meeting between Acheson and Senators Barkley,
loan
for
security.
collateral
George and Walsh (Barkley was Senate Majority Leader, George was Chairman of the
Chairman
Walsh
Committee
Finance
was
of the Senate Naval Affairs
and
Senate
Committee), May 17,1945, FR US 1945:VIII, pp. 895-896.

292

ABEDIN-SEVEN

knew
in
106
Truman
Roosevelt
twice
that
had
period.
only
met
meetings,
little of foreign affairs and less still about Roosevelt's policies but found
himself thrust suddenly into the Presidency at a crucial time. Moreover,
Truman had not been privy to many of his predecessor's decisions and he
leant heavily on Roosevelt's advisors to guide him. Truman had not been
involved in the discussions on Saudi oil nor was he familiar with details of
Corporation.
Reserves
Petroleum
debate
the
the
over
Nevertheless, the State Department

was anxious for the new

President to take action on Saudi oil. Joseph Grew, then Acting Secretary of
State, briefed Truman on the importance of Saudi oil. Grew noted that
from
Congress
had
been
of
who
members
available
there was support
further
Kingdom
that
they
issue
to
the
the
and
required
of aid
consulted on
cultivation:
All agreed that, because of Saudi Arabia's strategic position
in relation to the Pacific War, and even more importantly,
because of its vast oil resources now under concession to
American nationals the United States has a vital interest in
the stability of Saudi Arabia. 107
Additional

briefings were given to the President by the Under Secretary of

the Navy,

Ralph Bard and Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson.

from
hear
Wallace Murray, one of the
did
Truman
to
However,
not get
State Department's strongest supporters of Ibn Saud. Murray

had left

Washington to become Ambassador to Iran. His replacement as head of the

Division was Loy Henderson, an Eastern European specialist who had only

106Truman became Vice President on January 20 1945 when Roosevelt was sworn in for a
fourth term. He was appointed to replace Henry Wallace. Though he had been a Senator,
Truman did not have experience, nor did he show any interest, in foreign affairs. He was
by not knowing Winston Churchill and the relationship between
handicapped
particularly
See
Special
John
Dickie,
No
More:
Anglo American
to
start.
off
a
strained
two
men got
the
Weidenfeld
&
Nicolson,
London:
Reality,
1994, pp. 28-29. For full
Rhetoric
and
Relations,
biography of Harry Truman see David McCullough. Truman, New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1992.
President
Truman,
(Grew)
May 23,1945, FRUS 1945:VIII,
State
to
Secretary
Acting
of
107
900-901.
pp.
See also Miller, Searchfor Security, pp. 136-137.

293

ABEDIN-SEVEN

brief experience in Iraq and knew little about Saudi Arabia. 108Henderson
did not have the same fiery temperament as Murray. Nevertheless, Truman
for
Congress
Saudi
Arabia.
to
the
aid
of
approaching
necessity
could see
Grew was given the green light to propose legislation for a comprehensive
financial

for
Arabia.
That
Roosevelt
Saudi
was
what
assistance package

had endorsed and Truman, seeking to continue his predecessor's policies,

followed through. 109
However, the process of approval on an aid package would be long
had
from
Saud
increased
Ibn
drawn
since
appeals
out and urgent
and
Roosevelt's death, partly out of concern that the United States might forget
from
Secretary
the
110
Reassurance
friend.
of State that the
its new
came
delays were administrative in nature and that the United States was very
much committed to supporting
Anglo-American

his government. It was hoped that the

be
finalised
and provide much
soon
would
aid package

One
111
King.
that
for
the
was
encouraging
of
news
piece
was
relief
needed
for
Dhahran
had
Staff
the
the
Chiefs
joint
go
ahead
given
of
that the
airfield

bring
military
project which would

assistance to the Kingdom.

for
He
Ibn
Saud
despite
this
the
was
still
waiting
However,
was unhappy.
full aid package that would bring foodstuffs, materials and supplies which
largesse
Eddy
distribute
to
the
tribes.
to
desperately
cabled
he
as
needed

S.
in
Moscow
in
1930's
later
U.
Mission
in the
the
had
the
and
Henderson
at
served
108
Henderson,
like
State
Department.
Joseph
Affairs
European
the
Eastern
at
Division of
Grew, had strong anti-Communist sentiments. So much so that in the early days of the
Henderson
Director
in
Washington.
took
the
he
officially
over
as
of
unpopular
an
was
war
Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs on April 17,1945. See Kuniholm, Origins of the
Cold War in the Near East, p. 237
109President Truman to Secretary of State, May 29,1945, FR US 1945:VIII, pp. 902-903.
110Eddy to Secretary of State, April 16,1945, FRUS 1945:VIII, p. 873.
April
Eddy,
17,1945, FRUS 1945:VIII, pp. 874-875. The
(Stettinius)
State
to
Secretary
III
of
had
had
their
Chiefs
and
previous
reticence
approached the British Chiefs
overcome
Joint
Saud
Ibn
for an American airfield
in
to
the
for
their
approve
Staff
getting
plan
support
of
in Dharhan. The British agreed providing that the Royal Air Force had equal fly over and
landing privileges. The Americans were satisfied that there would not be any permanent
field
British
the
the
there
forces
use
of
and
would be in case of emergency.
RAF
stationed
be
hoped
had
this
State
that
news
would
Secretary
well received by the King but he
of
The
did not get the anticipated reaction.

294

ABEDIN-SEVEN

"troubled,
King
State
the
that
Secretary
was
the
of

indignant, convinced

delay was unnecessary". 112

More bad news came when the British Ambassador informed the
Secretary of State that London intended to make drastic reductions to its
for
British
1945
The
for
Arabia.
Saudi
the
to
proposal
year
was
subsidies
$3
(1.4
King
the
million
million pounds)with a maximum of
provide
half

of what was provided

Department

in 1944.113This was a time when State

be
felt
Saudi
Arabia
it
to
that
assistance
crucial
officials

increased. The Foreign Office however, argued that their original subsidy
had been intended only as a temporary "compensation for the fall in Ibn
Saud's
improved

from
revenues

the pilgrimage". 114 Since pilgrim

traffic

had

in 1944 and also because the oil company was expected to

be
in
Saud
Ibn
to
to
a
position
expected
was
activities,
normal
resume
large
his
If
Britain
to
the
was
maintain
account.
on
own
purchase goods
increase for 1945 it would mean that the King's income would be "at least
four

times higher than it was immediately

before the war"

Majesty's Government felt that there was "no justification

and His

for continuing

"
London
115
Moreover,
its
argued that Ibn Saud
recent scale.
the subsidy on
foreign
benefit,
his
his
for
subventions
off
and
manage
get
own
should,
fact
disposal.
his
In
Foreign
he
had
Office
the
the
at
resources
affairs with
foreign
from
because
Treasury
to
the
reduce
subsidies
was under pressure
drain
British
impoverished
116
the
the
economy.
on
already
severe
of
More disturbing to American officials was London's insistence that
Washington also follow suit and cut American aid so that the 50/50 basis
felt
be
17
The
Foreign
Office
"very
joint
the
maintained?
aid
programme
of
112Eddy to Secretary of State, April 20,1945, FRUS 1945:VIII, pp. 878-879.
113Moreover much of that aid would be in the form of foodstuffs such as cereals, sugar
Washington,
Ambassador,
Secretary
State,
British
April
17,1945,
to
tea,
of
cash.
not
and
FR US 1945:VIII, pp. 875-877.
114Ibid.
I's British Ambassador, Washington, to Secretary of State, April 17,1945, FRUS
1945:VIII, pp. 875-877.
116Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951, p. 190.
117This meant that the combined British and American assistance would drop to $10
million.

295

ABEDIN-SEVEN

the
indeed
the
that
of
principle of equal partnership
abandonment
strongly
Anglo-American
impression
inevitably
the
rivalry which on
of
give
would
118
This
to
both
was a
anxious
avoid".
are
governments
political grounds
Governments.
Allied
The
differing
two
the
the
of
position
clear sign of
American position was that Saudi Arabia could not go back to pre-war
levels

King
because
the
income
needed substantially
subsidy
of

develop
the country
to
assistance
Merriam,

more

his
119
Gordon
regime.
and stabilise

the chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs was convinced

by
Ibn
Saud
British
government
effective
that
meanness was preventing
in
American-Saudi
interference
British
relations.
and was annoyed at
Merriam and others believed that the King should be left to administer his
like
120
It
be
best
he
colonial
vassal.
a
about
ordered
not
and
saw
affairs as
his
Saud
to
to
for
Ibn
to
continue
and
prestige
maintain
was necessary
distribute

largesse to his subjects. American officials were convinced that

In
Saudi
American
facts
the
have
the
did
needs.
British
about
all
not
the
beyond
levels
1944
$16
Saud
Ibn
and
above
million
would require
estimate
"meet
that
the
his
only
would
and
properly
government
to sustain
minimum

both
budgetary"
121
that
supply
and
country,
essential needs of

by
figures
American
however,
Office
Foreign
and
was not convinced
The
Washington
to
There
its
objection
giving
no
was
to
estimates.
own
stuck

State,
April
FR
US
VIII,
17,1945,
1945:
Secretary
Ambassador
to
of
pp. 875-877. It
British
118
Washington,
British
Ambassador
in
that
the
to
later,
pacify
order
made
perhaps
was only
Ibn
Saud
had
informed
Britain
that
there
that
Department
was no
State
aware
the
See
Acting
Secretary
base
Dhahran.
State
American
the
at
of
to
air
of
an
creation
objection
VIII,
26,1945,
FRUS
1945:
885.
This
(Eddy)
April
Arabia
Saudi
Minister
p.
was
to
(Grew)
Saud had hesitated granting permission to the United States
Ibn
because
significant
British
approval.
prior
without
119Report entitled Supplemental United States Supply Programfor Saudi Arabia in 1945,
in
Memo,
July
31,1945,
RDOS-SA,
1945-1949, US-National
Henderson
Loy
with
enclosed
Archives.
120Ibid.
Eddy,
FR
US
April
18,1945,
1945:VIII p. 877. Of the $16
(Stettinius)
State
to
Secretary
In
of
for Saudi needs the'supply' portion would cost $13 million. In
thought
necessary
million
half of that it would need to contribute 1,652,000, sterling
Britain
for
to
provide
order
her
figure of 1,250,000 pounds.
375,000
than
just
This
more
original
pounds
was
pounds.
Washington thought that London should not make an issue over that amount of extra
Embassy,
April
British
25,1945, FR US 1945:VIII, pp. 882Department
to
State
See
funds.
884.

296

ABEDIN-SEVEN

form
but
in
in regard
the
or
cultural
projects
road
construction
of
more aid
to the joint aid programme London held firm. 122
Realising that haggling with the British would delay matters further,
Joseph Grew arranged for alternative means, independent

of the joint

King.
123
Grew
to
the
to
channel
assistance
approached
supply programme,
the Foreign Economic Administration

to make plans to fund Ibn Saud

1945
British
joint
in
the
the
pulled
out
of
case
subsidy programme
entirely
for
State
124
But
British
the
to agree to
at
were
anxious
officials
altogether.
becoming
The
in
increase
the
situation
supply programme.
was
serious.
an
Food shortages in Saudi Arabia had been exacerbated by locust plagues
drought.
and

The American Minister

in Jeddah was inundated

with

foodstuffs
for
for
to
the
cereals
and
other
compensate
additional
requests
losses. 125
Moreover, the King complained that he had heard nothing about the
amount

of aid that would

improvements
electricity

be given for 1945 or for 1946. Plans for

in irrigation, water supply to the cities, transport services

but
the
services
were on
cards
needed development
and other

loans -the type supplied by the Export-Import Bank. Further delays might
force Ibn Saud to 'bleed' ARAMCO for money to stabilise his regime. Eddy
help
King
but
the
that
could
not
recent
events
given
wonder if "the
warned
machinery

of

[the]

American

government

will

permit

long

range

Saudi
Arabia"
harmful
to
this
to the prestige and
and
was
commitments
interests of the United States.126
Grew could not offer any answer except to urge the King to be
financial
long
The
desired
the
type
assistance
range
programme
of
patient.
by Ibn Saud was "without

precedent in United States history" and it was

122BritishAmbassadorto Secretaryof State,May 16,1945,FRLIS1945:VIII, p. 895.

123Reports from Jeddah were that Ibn Saud was incredibly upset over the delays in aid
Secretary
State,
April
Eddy
20,1945,
him.
FR
US
to
1945:
VIII,
of
p. 878.
reaching
124Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to Foreign Economic Administrator (Crawley),
February 14,1945, FRLIS 1945:VIII, pp. 850-851. See also Grew to Crawley, March 23,1945,
Ibid.
866,
p.
125Eddy to Secretary of State, June 21,1945, FRUS 1945:VIII, pp. 911-913.
126Ibid.

297

ABEDIN-SEVEN

finance
V
The
find
the
timetable
to
to
endeavour?
ways
creative
necessary
for aid was uncertain. Congress was not due to have hearings on foreign
June
take
that
to
the
approval
would
weeks
after
and
of
middle
until
aid
filter through. All that could be done was to assure the King that the
his
interest
in
States
taking
United
welfare and the stability of
strong
was
his country. Grew hoped that at least the Dhahran airfield project and
benefits
tangible
Army
certain
on
would
provide
mission
accompanying
the ground.
Meanwhile
American

new developments

priorities

Department's

on the ground

troop re-deployment

in the war, brought

and the alteration

changes to
to the War

plans. Instead of transferring

forces

from the European theatre to the Pacific via the Dahran base in Saudi
Arabia, they would be routed through the United States. Suddenly, the
into
base
Saudi
called
was
question. It
of operations
immediate need of a
Dhahran
due
the
the
to
the
that,
war,
of
pace
airfield
rapid
also appeared
War
The
Department
be
finished
in
be
time
to
use.
of
much
now
might not
funds for the construction of an airfield in
the
that
of
expenditure
realised
Dhahran on the basis of military necessity "would be of doubtful legal
128
validity".

The Secretary of War however, was willing to go ahead with the

deemed
be
if
it
in
interestto
the
the
was
national
airfield
of
construction
for
Again
Presidential
this
authorisation.
crucial
require
would
which
decision Stettinius was not in town and Grew was Acting Secretary of
State. A methodical man, Grew was not apt to make recommendations
This
to
the
the
great
weight
gave
arguments
experts.
of
consulting
without
for
Truman
Grew
129
NEA.
approval after thoroughly
would only ask
In
Department's
President
to
the
the
a
specialists.
memo
with
checking
dated June 25,1945, Grew pointed out that:

Eddy,
June
(Grew)
18,1945,
State,
FRUS1945:VIII, pp. 908-910.
to
Secretary
Acting
of
127
Eddy,
June
25,1945,
FRLIS1945:VIII, p.915.
(Grew)
State
to
Secretary
Acting
of
i28
Near
Cold
War
in
East, p. 235.
Origins
The
the
the
Kuniholm,
of
129

298

ABEDIN-SEVEN

The Saudi Arabian oil fields, which promise to be among the

in
the world, are now under concession to an
most valuable
American company. The continuance of that concession in
American hands holds the out the best prospect that the oil of
Saudi Arabia will be developed commercially with the
greatest rapidity and upon the largest scale, producing
betterment
to
the
will
contribute
revenues which
of the
in
Saudi
Arabia,
in
condition
and
consequence, to
economic
its political stability...... The immediate construction by this
be
Dhahran,
for
to
of
an
airfield
at
country
used
military
but
destined
for an ultimate civil
initially
purposes
be
a strong showing of American
would
utilization,
interest 130
As it happened, the matter would have been Grew's decision anyway since
the day after this recommendation
Stettinius

was put to the President, Edward

Within
Secretary
State.
of
as
resigned

Presidential

for
building
the
authorisation

four

hours

of the Dhahran airfield was

State
Department
Subsequently
131
the
granted
Export-Import

twenty

received news that the

Bank had approved a loan to Saudi Arabia-"provided

for
be
132
could
made".
repayment
security
adequate
Britain and the Emergence of a New American Policy

Though the State Department believed that an increased American

for
Saud
Saudi
Arabia
Ibn
in
the
added
stability,
growing
presence
America
Hashemite
was
causing
with
problems.
propaganda
relationship
form
Transjordan
Iraq
Saudi
the
'selling
and
accused
ruler
of
emanating
Muwahhidun
Internally,
hard-liners
America.
Europe
to
and
were
out'
130Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to President Truman, June 26,1945, FRUS 1945:Vlll,
p. 915-917.
131Truman gave his approval in a memo directly to the joint Chiefs of Staff. See President
Truman to Admiral Leahy, Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 28,1945, FRUS 1945:VIII, In 43,
Secretary of State on June 27,1945.
Stettinius
Edward
as
917.
resigned
p.
132The difficulty lay in the fact that world currencies were not easily convertible at that
Saudi
the
which
of
countries
purchased
majority
oil did so in sterling pounds or
time and
The
it
had
that
oil
company
estimated
after
currencies.
met other dollar
other
U. S income taxes, and the purchase of
of
employees,
salaries
such
as
expenditures
dollar exchange from the sale of Saudi oil to
it
make
enough
not
would
equipment,
dollars to meet the repayments of the loan. Acting
Saud
Ibn
enough
with
provide
Secretary of State (Grew) to Eddy, June 27,1945 FRUS 1945:VIII, pp. 917-918.

299

ABEDIN-SEVEN

becoming increasingly vocal about their opposition to the influx of foreign

had
King
Previously
his
the
to
managed
personnel.
and
neutralise
goods
detractors through a combination of subsidies for tribal leaders, gifts of
food and clothes and the use of house arrest for persistent critics. His
ability

to maintain those policies had been seriously hampered by the

delays in the aid and supply programmes placing him in an uncomfortable

situation.

Thus when the State Department came up with a plan to dispatch a

U. S. Army military mission to Saudi Arabia the King was cautious. He
but
with each shipment came potential criticism and it
aid
certainly needed
he
Meanwhile,
to
the
the
accept
needed
aid
prudent
most.
only
seemed
State Department was anxious, in light of delays in other aid programmes,
to save face and send something to the King. The Army had drawn up
plans to train pilots, ground crews, and technicians and provide medical
Saudi
locations
Arabia.
Since
different
it
be
around
would
at
a
services
military

operation no prior Congressional approval would be required and

the Saudi Government could gain access to materials that were restricted
by war-time rationing. 133
However,

American
the
when

Minister

went

to finalise

these

interested
found
King
he
in
that
the
Ibn
the
was
not
offer.
arrangements,
Saud listed three reasons for declining to accept the mission. The first was
due to the criticism by "fanatical reactionary subjects" who opposed any
foreign presence and would only be further inspired against the King.
Second, Ibn Saud wanted to deflect accusations made in the Arab press that
he was a puppet
occupation.

of the non-believers

and under

foreign

military

Third, was the possible objection by the British. 134 Eddy

133Ibn Saud wanted to know if the building of the Dhahran airfield was contingent on his
When
he
United
the
that
the
States
mission.
military
was
reassured
of
was
acceptance
it
believed
Saudi
Arabia
which
sought and that there was no
services
providing
king
declined.
the
the
Report
to
Eddy
military
mission,
accept
of
meeting with
compulsion
Ibn Saud in Vice Consul Dhahran, (Sands) to Secretary of State, July 4,1945, FRUS
1945:VIII, pp. 920.
134Vice Consul Dhahran, (Sands) to Secretary of State, July 4,1945, FRUS 1945:VIII, pp.
920. Sands was conveying the content of Eddy's discussions with the King. Ibn Saud was

300

ABEDIN-SEVEN

that
the
the
the
that
also
a
sign
mission
was
military
of
refusal
suspected
by
hold
him
from
Britain's
break
to
King was reluctant
on
and was a
away
Minister
"the
image.
The
America's
that
tarnished
reported
of

product
King

belief
however
be
the
that,
to
to
powerful
reverting
seems

the United States may be, Britain continues to dominate the

friendly
Middle

and

East". 135

News of the King's refusal was received with incredulity at the State
Department: "The King has for over 2 years pressed this Govt. to have US
Army

frustrating
136
Especially
he
that
was
now rejects"
provide services

Ibn Saud's seeming failure to understand the importance of the Army

U.
S.
Government
branch
the
Army
the
The
of
capable of
only
was
mission.
King.
The
to
the
in
this
independently
cost
without
case,
and,
acting
infrastructure
to
have
projects
provide
of
number
set
up
a
mission would
vital

bolster
the
to
and
people
services

communications

the King's

transport

capability. It was also a necessary component

and
of the

back
Cancellation
the
could
set
mission
plans
of
Dhahran airfield project.
for the airfield as well as delay the building

of necessary infrastructure

such as roads, services and utilities.

The King would still be reliant on foreign aid and under the
distinct
Again
there
anti-British sentiment
was
influence of outside powers.
further
if
Department
that
State
even
assistance was
concern
and
in the
benefit:
"the
US
Govt. might
Britain
Saud,
the
Ibn
to
would
reap
given
build an airfield in the center of great American oil reserves only to find it
controlled

Saudi
Arabia".
137
by
It
than
other
nation
some
and operated

American
King's
"a
to
the
the
that
proposal
reaction
was
seemed clear
be
in
British
terms
that
explained
can
only
apparently
of
reversal of policy

having
the
the
of
military
personnel
moving
about
repercussions
about
concerned
Dhahran
because the personnel
the
There
about
airfield
much
worry
so
was
not
country.
base
be
far
from
the
Holy cities.
the
be
to
around
and
area
way
a
small
confined
would
US
FR
VIII,
1945:
8,1945
July
923-926.
State,
Secretary
to
pp.
Eddy
of
135
State
in
See
the
at
was
apparent
officials
correspondence.
Frustration
senior
among
136
July
13,1945,
FR
US
Eddy,
(Grew)
VIII,
State
1945:
to
Secretary
of
pp. 928-929.
Acting
Eddy,
(Grew)
July
FR
State
13,1945,
US
VIII,
to
1945:
Secretary
Acting
of
pp. 928-929.
137

301

ABEDIN-SEVEN

American
in
London
138
opposing
viewed
as
any
was
activity
pressure".
Saudi Arabia which gave even the appearance of political
superiority.

or military

Eddy confirmed this on the ground: "I am convinced [the]

British do not want [the] United States to build [a] Saudi army or air force,
preferring

themselves to 'rescue the land' if disorder arose as they have

139
Lebanon".
Syria
and
rescued
Eddy felt strongly that the United States should deal with Ibn Saud
hope
"I
British
join
in
its
terms
strings
attached:
we
without
never
own
on
joint subsidy or supply again". 140However, he was to be disappointed. In
in
British
Foreign
hour
Office
the
the
caved
and
move
agreed
an eleventh
to settle the joint supply programme. A combined figure of $10 million was
British
forward
the
contribution
with
put

being 2.5 million pounds (the

$5
141
million).
of
equivalent
The finalising

of the subsidy programme

did not reduce State

Department worries. Still smarting from the King's refusal over the military
lose
did
to
to
more
ground
and
rushed
not
want
conclude
officials
mission,
August
5,
General
On
Dhahran
Benjamin
Giles,
the
airfield.
on
negotiations
Commander of the USAFME, flew to Saudi Arabia to finalise the
by
he
King
This
American
the
time
the
was
received
and
agreement.
Minister

with

At
the negotiating
ceremony.
great

table matters were

desire
for
long
lease,
American
by
King
the
the
a
which
was
complicated
Giles
for
Failing
American
that,
to
sought
access
give.
commercial
reluctant
138Ibid.
139The British had also been reluctant to approve American civil aviation to use Saudi
facilities and also had been less than helpful when the US wanted to install direct
Eddy to Secretary of State, July 14,1945, FRUS
Washington.
to
cables
communication
1945:VIII, pp. 929-930.
140Ibid.
$10million
did
Department
State
think
that
Since
the
not
was enough for Ibn Saud it
141
$6
Part
supply
program
worth
supplemental
million.
separate
a
of this would
organised
be made up by minting 10 million riyals for the Saudi Government (equivalent to $1.4
be sent in further supplies, including: 287 Trucks$1.6
Another
would
million
million).
Farm
Radio
$1,400,000;
equipment-$134,000;
equipment-$37,000; Distillation
valued at
Plant- $34,000; Garage equip: $30,000; Writing paper-$7,500; Passenger cars-$5,000. A
further $3 million would be sent in silver riyal coins. Secretary of State to Eddy, July 4 and
July 5,1945, FRUS 1945:VIII, pp. 918-922. Also Secretary of State (Grew) to Eddy July 16,

302

ABEDIN-SEVEN

to
the
and
rates,
use
airport after the war.
rights
access
with
special
carriers
As an incentive the Army would build a hospital, a road from Dhahran to
Riyadh over 350 miles of the toughest dessert terrain-all

without charge.

Giles thought it was "a neat little gift which would especially delight the
king" and assumed it would be an offer the king could not refuse. 142
However, during the negotiations Ibn Saud was not as impressed as
the General had hoped and was more concerned with the appearance of
his sovereignty

retaining

construction

and jurisdiction.

While

he agreed to the

of the base he insisted that it would remain the property of the

flag
fly
Saudi
Saudi
Arabia,
the
that
should
over the airfield,
of

Kingdom

landing
fields,
inland
posts,
emergency
and stations
as well as over any
himself
Saud
Ibn
admitted that
where navigational equipment was set up.
the presence of the flags would camouflage the American presence at the
likelihood
Bedouin
Ikhwan
the
or
of
attacks on the 'the
reduce
sites and

King's property'.

143

Furthermore,

the King made the stipulation

that only civilian

be
build
to
the three projects and that the men
allowed
personnel could
be
in
General
Giles
the
airport
should
not
uniform.
constructed
was
who
Army
the
the
as
all
of
request
at
amazed
workmen

engineers, technicians and

be
in
in
involved
the
construction
were
who would
uniform. It

demobilise
into
them
to
convert
and
civilians while a war
possible
not
was
fact
build
in
The
just
King
however,
to
what
was
an
army
project.
on,
was
insisted and Giles could not convince him otherwise. Even a request from
Washington
without

did no good. Giles had no choice but to leave in frustration

resolving the issue. The King maintained his position and did not

1945, FRUS 1945:VIII, pp. 930-931 and Secretary of State to U. S. Ambassador in London,
August 8,1945, FRUS 1945:VIII, pp. 940-941.
142Memorandum on "U. S. Relations with Saudi Arabia" May 15 1946, by Nils E. Lind,
Legation Jeddah, RG59/250/49/32/7,
Lot File 57/D/298,
Box 10,
Attache,
RDOS/RONEA 1941-1961 USNA. The discussions surrounding the Dhahran agreement
detail
in
Lind
Eddy's
in
the
memo.
some
was
subordinate deputy at the
covered
are
Legation.
143Eddy to Secretary of State, August 8,1945, FR US 1945:VIII, pp. 943-945.

303

ABEDIN-SEVEN

take
their
the
simply
off
uniforms
could
not
workers
army
why

understand

during the construction period.

In the meantime, the war with Japan ended, putting

to rest the

problem

fact
In
finding
the question arose again as to
civilian workmen.
of

whether

building
the
with
the military should still continue

projects. The

War Department decided to go ahead, but only with the airfield, not the
discussions
by
final
Minister
In
hospital.
conducted
the
of
a
round
road or
Eddy an agreement was reached that provided the United States
operational control of the airfield

Government
Following

this period, administrative

for up to three years.

control would

be handed to the

Saudi Government, with the proviso - which the joint Chiefs had insisted
field
144
to
third
the
turn
Saudis
a
power.
the
over
that
not
could
uponEddy had expected there to be specific prohibitions placed on the conduct
Christian
of

bring
did
but
King
the
not
worship,

up the subject. 145

had
harmed
United
felt
Minister
the
that
episode
Nevertheless, the
whole
States prestige.
The end of negotiations marked the first official U. S. Government
project

beginning
Arabia
in
Saudi
the
the
and
ground
on

of a long

It
State
Department
the
provided
co-operation.
military
of
relationship
American
indication
to
the
it
commitment
country
of
an
was
as
with relief
for
American
the
it
because
aid
as
presence
of
an
channel
established a
and
installation in the country made all the difference when soliciting aid from
Congress. The Dhahran airfield agreement came at a time when priorities
The
in
Europe
Washington.
in
the
beginning
to
war
end
of
was
shift
were
funding
for
Saudi
Arabia
become
justification
the
would
approaching and
itself was slated to expire in
Lease
Lend
The
difficult.
programme
more
deal
influx
foreign
3,500
the
immediate
the
the
was
of
One
over
effects
of
workers to
144
of
build the field. This included 1500 Italians, 500 Iraqis and Iranians, 1000 Yemenis, 25
first
be
It
Americans.
time that such large numbers of
500
the
would
Egyptians and
Saud
kept
far
Ibn
them
the
and
foreigners entered
country
away from major cities to avoid
inciting criticism from the Ikhwan and other conservative elements.
145However, the King was concerned that American servicemen not abuse a provision for
Eddy
import
Secretary of State, August
to
to
prostitutes,
an
as
excuse
recreation
personal
8,1945, FR US 1945:VIII, pp. 943-945.

304

ABEDIN-SEVEN

December 1945. Existing State Department methods of letter writing

playing

and

up America's anti-colonial reputation were deemed "hopelessly

inadequate".

146

Moreover, there was a feeling that it was unrealistic to continue to

Congressional
appropriations
on
rely

when in many circumstances it

difficult
be
"embarrassing
justify
to
and
publicly".
would

A case in point

United
States was proposing
to
that
the
the
publicly
admit
reluctance
was
to grant a large aid package to a relatively insignificant

Middle Eastern

in
Nevertheless,
the
no
active
role
war
played
effort.
while
country which
behind
formulate
legislative
NEA
bills
the
to
the
scenes
worked
at
officials
loans,
Import
Export
Bank
Saudi
Government
the
negotiate
and

faced

147
Yet
indication
of
when
relief
was
expected.
at the same
no
crises with
time there was a growing concern over the ascendancy on the Soviet Union
fears
in
Middle
East.
the
expansion
communist
of
and

The Spectre of Communism

Many senior officials at the State Department and within the Division of
Near Eastern Affairs, had long held strong anti-Communist views. 148As an
Allied victory became assured the expansion of Soviet forces caused great
Grew,
Joseph
Gordon
Merriam,
Loy
such
officials
as
among
concern
Henderson, and Wallace Murray. There was a general belief among these
American
interests
free
from
that
the taint of
were
noble
and
officials
domination
United
had
States
the
that
to assert itself and play
and
colonial
in
raising the economic and social conditions of the
role
active
a more
146Under Secretary of State (Acheson) to Secretary of State, Oct. 9,1945, FRUS
1945:VIII, pp. 43-44
147One of the main delays in the latter had been the lack of dollars to meet repayments.
This was due to Saudi oil primarily being sold in countries where payments were made in
A
dollars
in
lack
world
other
currencies.
wide
or
shortage
pounds
and
of
sterling
between
how
that
currencies
meant
regardless
of
much oil Saudi Arabia
convertibility
be
dollar
it
to
able
requirements to pay off interest, let alone the
not
meet
would
sold,
fact
loan.
This
American
bankers
any
made
of
reluctant to approve loans to Ibn
principle,
Saud.
148See Bruce Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1980; Stephen Ambrose, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since
1938, New York: Penguin, 1993.

305

ABEDIN-SEVEN

in
East
to
Middle
that
the natural resources of
the
order
ensure
peoples of
the region remained "in the hands of people following

the paths of

democratic civilisation rather than those of Eastern dictatorships" 149

The head of NEA, Loy Henderson was particularly keen to employ a
East.
His
Middle
in
in
Iraq
dynamic
the
only
experience
was
policy
more
but he brought his concerns about Soviet expansion into the department.
Many of his colleagues at the European desk, including Acheson, were not
initially

interested in the Middle East. However, there was a strong ally in

sentiments and believed

Joseph Grew. Both men shared anti-Communist

Eastern
Europe, but were
Soviets
over
the
control
that
would not give up
Far
East150
Near
into
the
to
and
encroach
seeking
The State Department policy, according to the NEA, was that the
United States should assist countries in the region to improve economically
local
for
living
higher
to
of
people
and
standard
encourage
a
create
and
be
democratic
ideals.
Barriers
foster
to
trade
should
trade and
reduced and
an orderly
discrimination

development

be
encouraged without
should
of resources

and restriction. Yet throughout

the Middle East the State

Department could see that democracy and free enterprise was under threat
from the authoritarian regime of the Soviet Union. According to one report:
The policy of the Soviet Unions in the Middle East appears to
direct
two
objectives; achievement of security along
possess
its Middle East frontiers and the prevention of a coalition of
the capitalist countries in the Middle East against the Soviet
Union. An indirect policy of the Union may be the extension
of its social and economic systems throughout the Middle
East. Consequently, the area is a fertile field for friction and
Middle
East security and world
threaten
may
activities which
peace.151
With the war in Europe over there was no need to continue to provide aid
to the Soviet Army. President Truman signed an executive order that
149NEA Memorandum prepared for President Truman, no date, FRUS 1945:VIII, pp. 45-48.
15oSee Kuniholm, Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, p. 237 and p. 241
151Report by the Coordinating Committee of the Department of State, May 2,1945
American EconomicPolicy in the Middle East, in "Aspects Department of State Thinking on

306

ABEDIN-SEVEN

led
However,
152
Russia.
this
that
to
to
concerns
shipments
ended all aid
Russia might be encouraged to move into the Middle East 153One reason
Red
Army
40,000
the
fact
that
soldiers
of
were already
over
was the
had
been
Iran-originally
this
part of a wartime
occupying northern
Anglo-Russian bid to neutralise an Iranian government with pro-German
lines.
The
Soviet
154
to
measure was
supply
secure
sympathies and also
but
Anglo-Russian
be
the
temporary,
to
war
on
and
as
went
supposed
became
Soviet
155
intentions
troops
deteriorated
the
of
suspect
relations
Poised near the frontiers of the Persian Gulf, Soviet intervention in the
been
had
It
East
Middle
acknowledged as
possible.
seemed entirely
greater
1944
that:
as
early
the Russians would like to expand their influence and gain
foothold,
long-term
through the concession of a
some sort of
free port or by some other means, upon the shores of the
Persian Gulf. This, of course, would place the Russians within
fields
distance
in
the
only
of
oil
not
southern
short
a very
Iran, Iraq and Kuwait, but also of those in Bahrein and
156
Saudi
Arabia.
eastern
Russia could also threaten British lines of communication

to the Gulf

likely
Russia
India.
Moreover,
it
that
to
was
would use any
emirates and
for
intervention.
Economic
Gulf
in
the
crises
as an excuse
signs of unrest
Political and Economic Polices if the United States in the Near and Middle East for the
Postwar Period", FRUS 1945:VIII, p. 33-48.
152Ambrose, Rise to Globalism:American Foreign Policy Since 1938, pp. 62-63. On May 8 1945,
President Truman ordered that aid to the Soviet Union be suspended.
Struggle
Over U.S. Foreign Policy,
State
Department
State:
The
the
Secrets
and
Rubin,
153
of
pp. 42-43.
154On August 25,1941 in a combined effort 40,000 Soviet troops entered Iran from the
from
The
designed
British
the
19,000
to
south.
occupation
was
soldiers
entered
and
north
Iranian
fields
from
largest
forces
Axis
the
of
control
oil
achieving
and
world's
prevent
Origins
Cold
War
See
Kuniholm,
in
Near
East,
Abadan.
the
the
140-14
8.
of
pp.
at
refinery
iss Moscow embroiled itself in Iranian politics and had close links with the Iranian
Communist Party (Tudeh). Soviet attempts to influence domestic policies and support for
Oil
Company
Anglo-Persian
Britain.
Russian
the
concerned
of
the nationalisation
Minister
Prime
Iran
intense
See
the
that
at
one
point
so
of
resigned.
was
pressure
dispatches from the American Ambassador, Tehran to Secretary of State, November 1,
1944, FR US 1944:V, pp. 464-465 and Memo by Secretary of State (Stettinius) to President
Roosevelt, December 6,1944, FRUS 1944:V, pp. 482-483. For more on Anglo-Russian
in
East,
Great
Middle
Powers
Rubin,
the
Iran
in
pp. 73-109 and Kolko, Te Politics
see
tension
298-299.
War,
pp.
of
156Murray to Stettinius October, 27,1944, FRUS 1944: V, pp. 624-626.

307

ABEDIN-SEVEN

by
domestic
danger
followed
"a
Arabia
that
Saudi
in
unrest
posed
erupting
Saudi
into
Soviet
Russia
Britain
Great
to
attempt
would
move
or
either
Arabia to preserve order and thus prevent the other from doing so" 157
America already had "heavy commitments" elsewhere but the British were
20,000
East.
There
British
Middle
in
troops
the
were
over
well established
in the Suez Canal Zone fully equipped for war. Furthermore, Britain had
installations and naval facilities throughout the area in Khartoum,

military

Haifa, Transjordan, Iraq, Bahrain and Aden. 158The war strengthened the
British desire to retain her power in the Middle East. The region was a vital
link between parts of her empire and it was an area where British interests
Union
Soviet
The
by
Russian
directly
might see
activities.
affected
were
be
therefore
Greece
threat
Turkey
in
Iran,
and
a
as
British positions
and
feasible
if
Britain
became
159
It
'defence'.
in
retained
more
to
act
mobilised
her position in the area and Washington maintained primary military
Britain.
East
Middle
under
security
responsibility of
While recognising the need to maintain Britain's position in the area,
it was clear that the United States would
American

have to encourage Anglo-

interests
and minimise excessive
over
economic
collaboration

competition.

American officials believed that British could not implement

knew
help
London
American
that
this
and
her economic policy without
fact. 160Britain too, understood that she could not face a major war in the
Middle

East without American assistance. Both countries recognised the

Government:
Saudi
the
to
strengthen
need
A strong and independent Saudi Arabian Government in the
Near East, where two great world powers come into contact,
is less likely to fall victim to war breeding aggression than a

isr Wallace Murray to Dean Acheson, January 27,1945, RDOS-SA, T1179, US-National
Archives.
States,
United
Britain,
Ritchie,
the
Ovendal,
and the Transfer of Power in the Middle East,
159
Press,
University
1996, pp. 2-3.
Leicester
London:
1945-1962
United
States
The
Great
Britain:
Eclipse
The
and British Imperial Decline, p. 163.
Orde,
of
159
American
Positions in the "Pentagon Talks of 1947"
British
Memo
Department
and
State
160
Between the U. S. and U. K. Concerning the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean, FRUS
1947:V, p. 516.

308

ABEDIN-SEVEN

week and disintegrating state vulnerable to economical and

political penetration. 161
It was for this purpose that NEA deputy chief, Gordon Merriam proposed
that Congress create a special fund with an annual budget of $100 million,
to be used at the discretion of the President, for the "purpose of furthering
and strategic interests of the United States in the Middle

the political

East". 162The fund would be used to make loans and subsidies on a nonbasis-to

commercial

socio-economic

Middle East countries to develop infrastructure and

standards. This was essentially similar to the pre-war

policy of providing grants and subsidies to Middle East rulers to

British

engender

loyalty. In this case the intention was to prevent Soviet inroads

163
weak
potentates
prop
up
and
While
reluctant

that Congress, already

to commit resources abroad, would give approval. With the war

to a conclusion there would be little enthusiasm to provide up to

coming

$100 million
Lend

a worthy

doubtful
it
was
plan,

foreign
for
the
government. Even the
annually
expenses of a

Lease Bill itself had taken the forceful personality

and wartime

be
legislature.
Roosevelt
President
Lend
through
the
to
passed
of
pressure
Lease was scheduled to be terminated the day after the Japanese surrender.
Truman

was unlikely to take on the Congress and was viewed as being

incapable of such a task.164

161Wallace Murray to Dean Acheson, January 27,1945, RDOS-SA, T1179, US-National
Archives. Murray summarised for Acheson the importance of Saudi Arabia to the United
States. Acheson was to use the information to lobby Congressmen for their support of
State Department measures to grant post-war aid for Ibn Saud.
162Under Secretary of State (Acheson) to Secretary of State, Oct. 9,1945, FRUS 1945:VIII,
pp. 43-44
163There were fears that the Soviet Union could, within a few years, re-enter the world
States.
United
A
State
Department
become
to
the
challenger
a
serious
report of
stage and
July 1945 claimed: "the potential of the Soviet system in world trade is actually great and
East
Middle
Report
in
and
world
markets
markets
generally".
us
entitled
slay
could
American EconomicPolicy in the Middle East, prepared by A. B. Calder, July 14,1945,
RONEA-DOS, Subject File 1941-1951,Lot File 57 D298, Box 6, US-National Archives.
Calder was former 15'Secretary at the U. S. Embassy in Moscow and then later posted to
Cairo. Concern over Soviet expansion is also articulated in a memo by Loy Henderson to
Acheson, Dunn, Hickerson, FRUS 1946:VII, pp. 1-6.
164Within the State Department there were concerns that Truman's lack of experience in
foreign affairs would hamper his ability to conduct an effective foreign policy. See Under-

309

ABEDIN-SEVEN

However, with encouragement from Dean Acheson and Joseph

Grew, Truman did take the bold step of granting an extension of Lend
Lease to Saudi Arabia. In an unprecedented move Truman signed a special
order which exempted the Kingdom

Presidential
conditions
provide

Bill
Lease
War
Lend
Department to
the
the
and
allowed
of

Saudi Arabia with both military

Congressional
Division

from the termination

and civilian

supplies without

scrutiny. 165 At the same time, the State Department's

Affairs
funds
for Ibn
Financial
came
with
also
up
additional
of

Saud. They proudly informed the NEA that with some creative thinking
they

had formulated

a plan for a development

loan of $25 million

distributed over a five year period and which could be repaid out of future
1
oil royalties

With American aid in hand and royalties from oil flowing,

Ibn Saud's financial crises had ended.

It could be said that Truman's extension of lend lease for the sole
benefit of Saudi Arabia was highly ironic-given

that the rest of the nations

that had sacrificed much for the Allied war effort were suddenly cut off.
Saudi Arabia was not a democracy nor had it contributed troops to the war
faced
Axis
However,
indicative
this
armies.
was
of the growing
effort nor
importance placed on Saudi Arabia in light of the emerging threat from
Soviet Russia and the beginning of the Cold War.

Secretary of State (Acheson) to Chief of NEA (Merriam), October 18,1945, RONEA-DOS,

Subject File 1941-1951,Lot File 57 D298, Box 6, US-National Archives. Charles Bohlen,
Head of the Division of Eastern European Affairs at the State Department (and later
Ambassador to the Soviet Union) also shared this view. See Bohlen, Charles. Witness to
History, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, pp. 211-212. See also Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt
Policy,
548-549
Foreign
American
pp.
and
165Acting Secretary of State (Acheson) to Eddy, September 11,1945, FRUS 1945:VIII, p.
952. See also Secretary of State (Byrnes) to Secretary of Treasury (Vinson) October 22,
1945 RDOS T1179/R3; Baram, The Department of State in the Middle East, p. 236
166Financial Affairs official estimated that in the period 1946-1950 the Saudi government
$25
be
it
it
balance
time
to
its budget. In the
million
after
which
would
need
able
would
least
$20
had
it
that
be
to
at
was
specified
million
print
spent on the purchase of
small
American goods and the remainder on development projects. So Ibn Saud would not have
free control of his expenditure. See Director of Office of Financial and Development Policy
(Collado) to President of Export-Import Bank (Taylor), October 19,1945, FRUS
1945:VIII, pp. 960-963. See also Memo of conversation between members of NEA, Financial

310

ABEDIN-SEVEN

Prelude to the Cold War

In the period following the end of the war the focus of the United States
in
Arabia
from
British
to peace making on two
the
presence
shifted away
Japan
Germany.
hampered
This
the
and
of
was
administration
continents;
by the fact that Truman's policies were slow to develop and the new
President lacked the confidence and the experience of his predecessor to
develop his own policies. Roosevelt had controlled policy himself while the
State Department's

influence

"remained

limited". 167 Truman

tried

to

fully
how
Roosevelt's
without
perhaps
understanding
policies
old
maintain
he
divide
been
intended
had
the
to
could
employ
same
work,
nor
and
they
from
his
Although
his
to
tactics
subordinates.
predecessor
get results
rule
had been able to pit one cabinet member against another, in the case of
Ickes and Hull for example, this was not Truman's style.
Moreover, Truman did not enhance his ability to form coherent
Secretary
State.
Byrnes
former
James
F.
A
he
as
of
selected
policy when
judge who had served a brief term in the House of Representatives Byrnes
had no experience in foreign affairs. Neither it seems did he have much
for
lessons
in
international
patience

affairs from his State Department

first
in
Byrnes
the
six
months
of
spent
most
office outside
advisors.
Washington. When he did come to foreign policy meetings, Byrnes was
frequently

his
'shoot
from
hip'
the
chose
own
strategy.
unprepared and

The long absences and private decision making process alienated senior
officials

"produced
and

disorientation

and dissension"

in the State

Department. 168
Changes were also occurring in Britain with the election of a new
labour Government and Clement Attlee as Prime Minister. With the death
defeat
Churchill
diplomacy
had
the
the
Roosevelt
that
of
personal
and
of

Affairs Division and officers from British Embassy, Washington, November 30,1945,
FRUS 1945:VIII, pp. 973-974.
167Rubin, Secretsof State, p. 33.
268Byrnes was appointed on July 3 1945; Anderson, The United States, Great Britain and the
Cold War, pp. 88-89.

311

ABEDIN-SEVEN

had
169
The
to
Anglo-American
come
an
end
new
relations
characterized
first
American
"the
in
found
the
two
administration:
groups
government
ignores us altogether or regards us as a hindrance to American interest.
The second accepts us as a valuable junior partner in an Anglo-American
in
Britain
170
a considerably weaker economic situation.
was
also
concern".
In fact London was seeking a massive financial aid package of $4.4 billion
from the United States.
Prime Minister Attlee was more concerned in resolving domestic
in
Saudi
dominance
Arabia.
The
British
than
enforcing
economic crises
Foreign Office resolved to inform Ibn Saud that as far as His Majesty's
Government was concerned he "should make arrangements to secure all
supplies

for 1946, through

commercial

ln
channels".

There was little

interest in engaging in another joint subsidy programme with the United

States:
The chaos in Saudi Arabian Government finances, indeed,
defies description..... After years of British (later AngloAmerican)
of
unfailingly
generous
and
subsidy,
Oil
Company
by
American
the
and the
accommodation
United States Government in the matter of advances and
is,
if
Government
the
not pauperised, completely
credits,
flickering
demoralised,
no
sense of financial
and
responsibility remains-172
in the immediate post war period Italy, Germany and France

Ironically,

had been removed from the scene and as such Britain was unchallenged in
the Middle
Arabia).

East (the exception being the American presence in Saudi

Yet Britain's

own weakness meant

that her presence was

169Attlee disliked the limelight and did not have the flamboyant personality of Churchill.
He preferred to work by committee rather than take direct charge himself. See Anderson,
The United States,Great Britain and the Cold War, p. 82
170Balfour to SOSFA, August 18,1945, FO AN 2505/4/5, cited in Anderson, The United
States, Great Britain and the Cold Warp. 88
171British Embassy to State Department, November 21,1945, FR US 1945:VIII, pp. 969-969.
172Grafftey-Smith to Bevin 'Annual Report on Saudi Arabia 1946', February 5,1947, in FO
371/60295B E1095/1095/25. Oil royalties for 1946 were to be $8 million while for 1947
had
from
Also
$14
taken
ARAMCO $11 million in
at
million.
they were estimated
Saudi
time
Government
At
from
the
$2
the
for
same
royalties.
owed
million
advances
5
Department
War
supplied
years credit.
on
material
surplus

312

ABEDIN-SEVEN

independence
India
fact
in
1947
In
hollow.
the
the
of
whole
after
somewhat
East
defence
in
Middle
for
British
d'etre
strategic
would
of
routes
raison
independent
issue
Iraq
the
Egypt
polities
and
one
remaining
were
and
end.
in the Middle East was the question of Palestine. It was here that the role of
Ibn Saud could be useful but both the Labour Government in Britain and
differed
Saud
Ibn
Truman
on that issue.
with
the
administration
With Truman still developing his own 'doctrine' the joint Chiefs and
light
looking
Middle
East
in
the
the
at
of
activities
were
strategists
military
Saudi
Chiefs
Arabia
Joint
increasingly
173The
Union
Soviet
saw
as
the
of
Mediterranean:
"If
British
between
Russia
the
buffer
the
and
zone
part of a
have
Russia,
impact
East
Middle
this
the
to
turn
the
would
same
peoples of
by
this
the Soviets" 174
of
area
in many respects as would military conquest
Within this zone existed the oil reserves of Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The
Joint Chiefs classified them as "absolutely

vital"

to the security of the

United States and were determined that if the Soviets made any move to
deny America accessto these reserves to ensure they did not succeed.175
Scholars such as Rubin have argued that after the war the United
States did

not

want

British

assistance in

supporting

the

Saudi

keen
Washington
British
involvement-but
Yet
176
on
was
government.
historic attitude had been extremely
leadership.
Britain's
American
under
Gulf,
her
in
by
the
with
and
an
economy
weakened
position
of
protective
had
American
Britain
Washington
to
the
give
on
assistance,
reliant
war and
its
in
hand,
to
there.
position
retain
order
upper
173The military was also looking into wholesale conversion of energy sources from coal to
importance.
Ritchie
Ovendale,
Saudi
Britain,
United
the
of
great
reserves
made
which
oil
States,and the Transfer of Power in the Middle East, 1945-1962, London: Leicester University
Press, 1996, p. 27. See also FRUS 1947:III, pp. 485-514
174Memo from JCS to the State,War, Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), June 21,
1946, FRUS 1946:VII, pp. 631-633. This committee was created in December 1944 to
from
State
Department
the
advice
on
with
political
and
military
affairs
other
provide
departments, which would be helpful in the development of foreign policy. The records
RG
be
found
RDOS,
353,
Microfilm
in
M1195
SWNCC
USthe
the
can
reference
at
of
National Archives in Washington D. C.
l75SWNCC memo, October 12,1946, FRUS 1946:VII, pp. 529-532. See also Henderson to
Acheson, October 8,1946, FRUS 1946:VII, pp. 523-525. Henderson was conveying to
Acheson at State the views of the joint Chiefs.
176Rubin, The Great Powers in the Middle East, p. 66.

313

ABEDIN-SEVEN

With this new power dynamic, Anglo-American policy focused

177
The
by
Soviet
threat
world entered
the
expansion.
increasingly on
posed
Soviet
interests
American
the
to
War
Cold
prevent
worked
an era where
Union from gaining a foothold in the oil rich Arabian peninsula and
provide

Saudi Arabia with the financial

and security guarantees that

dynasty.
family
178
Al-Saud
legacy
the
the
of
would ensure

Positions
American
in
"Pentagon
Talks
British
Memo
the
Department
and
State
of 1947"
177
East
Eastern
Middle
Mediterranean,
Concerning
FRUS
U.
K.
the
S.
U.
and
the
and
Between
focusing
Soviet
Union. The
Washington's
the
511-521.
was
V,
concern
on
primary
1947: pp.
George
light
F. Kennan who in his
in
the
Union
of
of
explanations
Soviet
was seen more
famous long telegram of 22 February 1946 analysed Soviet policy as one which the United
Soviet
Russian
and
motivations
paranoia about security and
States could not cooperate.
See
George
F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925cooperation.
preclude
ideological expansion would
1950, Boston: 1960, pp. 583-598.
Eastern
African
Near
(Murray)
Affairs
Secretary
Office
to
Director
the
and
Memo
of
of
178
V, pp. 485-486.
FRUS
1944:
19,1944,
December
State,
of

314

ABEDIN-CONCLUSION

Conclusion

Abdul

Aziz Al-Saud is a remarkable figure in the history of the Arabian

Peninsula. Despite his beginnings as the ruler of a seemingly insignificant

desert polity he rose to international attention and was courted by the great
Russia,
Turkey
Britain,
twentieth
the
century,
and
and
nineteenth
powers of
he
his
few.
All
time
the
States,
to
United
successfully
navigated
a
name
the
fledgling

polity

into the modern

world

maintaining

his power through

ideological
the
of
religious
and
manipulation
political expediency and
faith
loyalty
between
link
to
the
and
state
and
thus
a
maintaining
symbols,
limiting the extent that the message of social and religious reform interfered
burgeoning
his
political power.
with
In the wake of such feats descriptions of this man have ranged from a

in
Arabia
Islam
leader
the
name
of
with
conquered
brilliant, charismatic
who
depictions
Ikhwan
to
band
of a simple ruler
fiery
romanticised
his
warriors
of
bed
his
his
the
stored
under
chest
of
a
money
realm using
who managed
l
finance.
minister of

This thesis has attempted to separate the myth of Ibn Saud from the
his
help
about
outlook
to
misconceptions
and
previously
correct
and
reality
has
been
in
it
the
this
For
course
of
clearly
shown
work
example,
motives.
that the challenges of maintaining

his rule, supplying his soldiers, granting

family
Saudi
that
the
thrust
his
meant
of
extended
and
largesse to
supporters
Wahhabism
less
do
ideological
than
the
to
with
with
often
was
expansion
for
security?
and
economic
political
need
practical
East
in
Middle
Empire
1945-1951,Oxford: Clarendon Press
The
British
the
Louis,
Roger
1 William
Abdul
Aziz
"shrewd
bin
Sayeed
to
Khalid
176.
of
policies
as
and
referred
1984, p.
Khalid bin Sayeed, Western Dominance and Political Islam, Albany: State
See
unsentimental".
University of New York Press, 1995, p. 78.
direct
Saud
Ibn
for
a
subsidy to over half a million people
1941
was
providing
example
2 In
daily
basis.
The
form
largesse
feeding
thousand
thirty
to
a
subsidies
on
were
a
of
was
and
Ibn
Hundreds
Saud's
the
to
Riyadh
beduins
in
came
quarters
others.
alone
and
tribal chiefs,

315

ABEDIN-CONCLUSION

Equally important

in the development

in Saudi strategy was the

Mubarak

Al-Sabah. Mubarak

primary

Kuwaiti
by
the
role played

nurtured

the young Abdul Aziz and gave political and economic support for

ruler

less
is
Alfact,
In
Najd.
than
that
the
the
glamorous
reality
the conquest of
Saud began the twentieth century as pawns in a larger political chess game
between Kuwait, the British Indian Government
Although

and the Ottoman Porte.

Abdul Aziz later emerged from the shadow of his Kuwaiti mentor

latter's
the
of
encouraging
conflict
and
strategy
employed
successfully
and
Mubarak,
Abdul
Like
Aziz
took
between
the
powers.
great
confusion
infighting
bureaucratic
Ottoman,
insecurities
the
among
and
advantage of
British and American governments departments.
Previous scholarship has underestimated

just how early Ibn Saud

degree
Porte
British
the
to
the
which
treaty
and
with
relations
established
Saud's
Ibn
his
knowledge
had
gregarious and
activities.
of
intelligence
gained
impression
British
him
to
on
a
memorable
cast
generous nature allowed
Philby,
Dickson,
Shakespeare,
he
to
and at
wished
charm.
officials whom
has
It
been
for
full
Najdi
the
the
Cox,
ruler
shown
of praise
were
times
.3
degree to which Ibn Saud was able manipulate these otherwise intelligent and
manipulative

individuals.

Despite several authors noting the closeness of

had
Najdi
British
Agent
the
Shakespeare
to
the
ruler,
so completely
Captain
he
his
Saud
Ibn
that
that
confidently
assured
superiors
at
one
point
misread

his
4
intentions
It
had
to
Najdi
realm
whatsoever.
expand
was the
no
ruler
the
had
little
like
Keyes,
figures
John
the
contact
who
with
of
voices
minority
for their daily meals. See Memorandum on Saudi Arabia, October 28,1941, Records of the
Saudi
Internal
Affairs
Arabia,
1930-1944, Microfilm
Relating
State
the
to
of
Department of
C.
Washington,
D.
Archives,
US-National
3,
Reel
#T1179,
declared
Dickson,
Ibn
Saud
Harold
that
Bahrain,
Agent,
Political
was "without rival
3 The
bluff,
for
His
Arabia.....
to
and
open-hearted
manner
candid
serve
act
as
cover
one
throughout
"
See
Report
Political
found.
be
Agent,
Bahrain
brains
August
12,
that
of
can
the
astutest
of
1920 (H. R.P. Dickson) IOR L/P&S/10/936/B349.
PRO
FO
371/2124/28966.
June
27,1914,
Hirtzel,
to
4 Shakespeare

316

ABEDIN-CONCLUSION

his
Ibn
Saud
had
and
the
of
and
realistic
assessments
more sceptical
ruler, that
intentions.
As demonstrated in this thesis, British policy during the First World
War was divided by the tensions between officials in Cairo, Delhi, and
London. Much of the literature regarding this period focuses on the years
following

the outbreak of the First World War. Even Philby, who has written

delve
deeply
does
into
Arabia,
the
tensions
Saudi
pre-war
not
much on
between Ibn Saud, the Porte and Britain. 5 The fact that Shakespeare first
by
late
1913
Saud
in
is
Ibn
links
his
the
overshadowed
with
established
declared
Britain
Porte
in
the
the
to
war
on
after
period
attention given
November 1914.6
Previous writers, such as Jacob Goldberg, have noted with surprise that
Ottoman
Sultan
forsake
instead
the
the
Muslim
of
support
and
ruler could
a
fact,
focus
India.
In
Muslim
the
Britain,
the
of
colonial conqueror of
turn to
Islam-the
internal
doctrine
the
of
Wahhabi
enemy
was

muslirikeen, (those

It was the mission of the

from
Islam').
'true
the
had
turned
away
who
Wahhabi movement to reverse the rise of so called 'deviant' practices and
focus
Ibn
Saud
life.
This
to
in
the Ikhwan on
enabled
innovations
religious
fellow tribesmen in the Arabian interior.?
This thesis has also examined the origins of the Ikhwan and questioned
the common assumption

that Abdul

Aziz was entirely

responsible

for

founding the movement himself. Moreover, it has questioned the assumption

by
1929
the
Ikhwan
caused
curtailment
was
of
the
rebellion
that

of their

because
Britain's
fight
'infidel'
Ibn
Saud
the
to
to
of
warning
religious mission
Kostiner,
MOSA,
See
270-272,
Arabia,
Saudi
which, for example, focuses on the
pp.
5 Philby,
1916-1936 period
George
November
by
King
5,1914,
be
found
in
PRO
War,
on
Declaration
signed
can
of
The
6
leading
declaration
background
Britain's
has
to
Porte
The
the
up
of
war
on
political
371/2145.
been discussed elsewhere. See Adelson, Roger. 'The Formation of British Policy Towards the
Middle East 1914-1918', Ph.D. thesis, Washington University, 1972.

Arabia,
Saudi
40-41.
Policy
Foreign
The
pp.
of
Goldberg,
7

317

ABEDIN-CONCLUSION

Iraq
Transjordan.
In fact, the Ikhwan
the
to
of
and
mandates
attack
not
Saud
Ibn
to
was more political than religious.
challenge
The three leaders of the Ikhwan

revolt of 1929, although publicly

for
betrayal
his
Wahhabi
Saud
Ibn
of
principles, were in fact
of
critical
dissatified

at the lack of power granted to them. The most notorious, Faisal

al-D} wish was clearly out to gain political

power

for himself.

As a

descendant of a noble tribe he also had equal claim to political authority and
him.
denial
his
For
its
to
all
condemnation of Ibn Saud's close
was resentful of
relations

with the disbelieving

British, al-Dwish

approached the British

.J

Agent in Kuwait, Harold Dickson for support to establish his own political
Nfrom
Ibn
Saud,
Dickson
Later
the
to take
al-Dwish
asked
on
run
while
entity.
his family

under his protection. And ultimately,

the 'fanatical .. /
Ikhwan' chose to surrender himself to the British rather than to Ibn Saud.
al-Drish

It is true that raised in cosmopolitan Kuwait, Ibn Saud was far better
diversity
Hijaz
than many of the
to
cultural
and
religious
of
appreciate
able
Ikhwan and religious ulema that came from Najd.
surprising

Yet it was nevertheless

to many at the time just how shrewdly Ibn Saud handled the

Hijaz.
in
situation

Aware of the potential threat from the Ikhwan Ibn Saud

had always been careful not to provide them with positions of power. Thus in
the Hijaz he was careful to minimise the involvement, despite their key role in
he
his
territory,
Faisal
the
and
appointed
son
as amir to ensure
conquering
the
with
population.
relations
smooth

Ibn Saud also found in Hijaz a pre-existing bureaucracy as well as a set

interactions
in
Arabia.
than
There were
socio-political
complex
central
more
of
Hijazi
an
organised
government
guilds,
structure
and
society was
merchants'
familiar
the
telegraph
telephone.
Contrary
with
motorcar,
and
to
already
did
Ibn
Saud
introduce
these
not
perception
modern inventions, they
common

318

ABEDIN-CONCLUSION

but
he
did
Hijaz,
in
ensure that such technology was
were already present
harnessed and used elsewhere in the kingdom.
Ibn Saud also strengthened his relations with local businesses and Hijaz
became a source of capital for the newly established Saudi government.
Merchant families were approached for loans and in return were able to gain
fact
8
In
Hijaz
Ibn
Saud
the
and
contracts.
after
conquest
agencies
of
exclusive
become
increasingly
to
was

reliant

on the settled urban and business

for
Kingdom.
A
the
to
support
process which continues
provide
communities
today.

This work has also shown the slow pace of development in SaudiAmerican relations. Despite his attempts to engage Washingtons

attention it

full
1943,
February
ten years after the opening of American oil
a
was not until
United
States
Government
interest
in
took
Saudi
the
that
active
operations,
Arabia. This was the result of intense personal lobbying by senior oil company
levels
highest
including
President
Roosevelt
the
of
government,
at
executives
diplomacy
Ibn
Saud
However,
the
the
this
of
shrewd
of
result
early
and not
.9
involvement of the White House in Saudi affairs provided Ibn Saud with an
his
in
relations with
advantage

America over Britain. The British Prime

Minister had seldom taken an active interest in his country and it wasn't until
Roosevelt met Ibn Saud in 1945 that Churchill made the effort to establish
King
1
the
with
rapport

8 Many of his early benefactors were wealthy merchant families of non-tribal origin who had
long established commercial links such as the families of Alireza and al-Qusaibi. This would
later expand to include the Kamel, Ka'ki, Jameel, Bin Mahfouz, and Al-Zamil families among
others.
9 Barry Rubin, 'America as junior Partner: Anglo-American Relations in the Middle East, 19191939' in The Great Powersin the Middle East, 1919-1939, ed. Uriel Dann, New York:
Holmes&Meier, 1988, pp. 238- 251. Also Miller, Searchfor Security, p. xvi.
10Prior to 1939 not even senior officials at Whitehall had much information about Ibn Saud
despite the historic relationship Britain had with him, See Leatherdale, Britain and Saudi
Arabia, p. 332.

319

ABEDIN-CONCLUSION

Nevertheless, officials in the State Department and the oil company

lacked confidence when dealing with Arab rulers. Their lack of experience
meant

that they could not always read 'between the lines' and were

Saud
Ibn
to
to
carefully
over-react
susceptible

contrived

statements. Any

dissatisfaction with American policy registered by the King was assumed to

be a general dislike of things American. The oil company worried that they
dollars
it
invested.
Their
lose
their
of
already
millions
and
concession
would
imperative
it
fear
in
to
to
translated
circles
making
government
concern was
improve Saudi-American relations-even if that was at the expense of AngloAmerican relations.
Although

American

officials

Britain's
respected

experience in the

Middle East, they were deeply suspicious of her possible colonial intentions li
Disagreement with Britain over the nature and scope of assistance to Ibn Saud
Anglo-American
to
plague
was

12
Ibn
Saud
the
throughout
war.
was
relations

his
to
tensions
to
these
and
was
able
convince
advantage
to
off
play
able
Washington that Britain was starving him of vital resources and promulgated
Saudi
bring
leading
the
to
British
fear
to
that
economy
ruin
policy would
the
his
13
destabilisation
regime.
of
the
The period 1944-1945 saw the greatest tension between the United

States and Britain over Saudi Arabia. Rivalry extended to the point where
Churchill was competing with President Roosevelt to out do generosity to Ibn
Saud. 14This subsequently led to a presidential'order

that gave Saudi Arabia

11Kuniholm, p. 243 and Rubin Secrets of State p. 37

Policy:
Foreign
An Analysis of Power and Purpose, Boston:
American
The
Roots
Gabriel.
Kolko,
of
12
Beacon Press, 1969, pp. 50-51. Mikesell, Raymond, 'Oil and Foreign Policy' in Encyclopediaof
U. S. Foreign Relations,B. Jentleson and T. Patterson ed., New York: Oxford University Press,
1997, pp. 303-308
13Miller, Searchfor Security, p. 125.
14When he learned that Roosevelt had given him a wheelchair as a gift Churchill tried to out
do this by presenting the King with a Rolls Royce motor car. Howarth p. 108. Also Interview
Ambassador Hermann Eilts, London, May 25 2000.

320

ABEDIN-CONCLUSION

Lend
Lease
the
to
end of
aid,
even
after
coveted
receive
rights
exclusive
hostilities with Japan. Saudi Arabia was the only country in the world to be
having
fired
despite
in
never
a
shot
support of the
an
exception
granted such
Allies. 15The United States gained the advantage and by 1946 had supplanted
Britain as the main guarantor of political and financial stability of Saudi
Arabia and the Al-Saud. 16Britain suspended her subsidy altogether bringing
Saudi
Arabian
American
Cold
in
its
affairs.
position
to a close
pre-eminent
War interests began to dominate relations with the founding father of Saudi
Arabia.
The notion

benevolent
Saud
Ibn
the
as
of

father was typically

Saud
he
Ibn
by
Philby
that
was :
noted
when
represented
for
his
the
proper guidance of
personal
responsibility
of
conscious
so
his people that he has never been able to delegate authority, even in the
breakdown
The
the
a
guest,
of a motor car, a
of
arrival
smallest matters.
family,
incidents
trivial
in
illness
the
apparently
and
other
claim
minor
his personal attention side by side with State problems of the highest
importance. 17
The sons of Abdul Aziz continue to draw on the symbolism of their founding
father to inculcate a sense of national solidarity. They seek to enforce loyalty to
in
family
identity
Saudi
the
faith
the
elements
crucial
of
ruling
as
the
and
Arabians. When the current ruler, King Fahd, attained power he referred to
by
link
noting that the principle
this
Kingdom

aims of his father in creating the

based
"monotheism
to
on
state
a
and the Islamic
establish
were

Sharia and to revive the ancestral way [the rule of the Al-Saud]". 18 Crown
Prince Abdullah also stated unequivocally that King Abdul Aziz was "a man
September
Eddy,
(Acheson)
11,1945, FRUS 1945:VIII, p. 952
State
to
Secretary
Acting
of
15
16Orde, The Eclipseof Great Britain: The United Statesand British Imperial Decline, p. 150.
17Philby, Arabian jubilee, pp. 224-225.
18Speech by King Fahd given on 3 Shawwal 1402, cited in Mohyiuddin Al-Qabesi, ed., The
and Interviews by King Abdul Aziz Al-Saud,
Holy Quran and the Sword: SelectedAddresses,Speeches
Riyadh: Saudi Desert House Publishing, 1998, p. 32.

321

ABEDIN-CONCLUSION

in
is
ideal
the
the
turn
nation,
a
nation
which
who stands as a symbol of
embodiment
unifying
Abdullah

This
is
This
is,
God
our
reality.
after
our
symbol.
a
of such

leader". 19 Alongside the portraits of King Fahd and Crown Prince

that hang in government

buildings,

schools, universities

and

thousands of private sector offices and numerous public places, is one of

Abdul Aziz, the noble father of the nation. 20
Although new economic realities and challenges to the socio-economic
fabric of Saudi society are forcing change to take place, the sheer size of the
Al-Saud, numbering some 7000 members, means that the ability of the family
to affect change remains significant. Their network of inter-relationships with
business and tribal families is complex and diverse and very much
for
the
They
to
same reasons as
powers
court
western
continue
entrenched.
desire
interests,
father;
to
founding
the
economic
and
security
maximise
their
Abdul
Aziz
has
house
Al-Saud.
indeed
longevity
the
the
of
of
and ensure
future,
his
he
has
inheritance
their
immense
to
sons
and
whatever
provided an
left his indelible legacy on the politics, people and history of the Arabian
Peninsula.

19Message of Crown Prince Abdullah Al-Saud, on the Occasion of the National Day of Saudi
Arabia, September 23,1998, cited in Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: SpecialReport 1993, London: First
Magazine, Winter 1998.
20Patriotic fervour reached a peak in 1998-1999 when a series of festivals, conferences and
Aziz to mark the centenary (according to the
held
dedicated
Abdul
to
where
events
cultural
Arabic, Hijri calendar) of the capture of Riyadh. The nation-wide celebrations were, according
January
22nd
1999 (5th of Shawwal 1419), to
Information
Ministry
of
statement
of
of
to a
bounty
Assert
Allah. "Proclaim and rehearse the bounty of
functions:
1.
the
of
several
perform
2. Honor the founder of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, King
93:
11)
(Qur'an
"
Lord.
your
Abdulaziz Ibn Abdul Rahman Al-Saud 3. Deepen national pride and loyalty to the lofty
based
Saud
Arabia
is
Kingdom
Affirm the aims of the State
4.
the
of
which
upon
principles
legitimacy
5.
Reflect
the
6.
100
Islamic
the
its
on
advancements
achieved
over
past
years.
and
Establish the importance of this occasion through works, and programs, and participation
from government agencies and Saudi nationals.

322

Appendix I
Abbreviated Genealogy of Rulers of Al-Saud
Muhammad Al-Saud
d. 1765

Abdullah
1814-1818

Abdul Aziz
1765-1803

Abdullah

Saud
1803-1814

Turki
1824-1834

Mishari
1820

Abdallah
1865-1871
1871-1873

Faisal
1834-1837
1843-1865

Khalid
1838-1841

Saud
1871
1873-1875

Muhammad

Abdul Rahman
1875-1876

Abdul Aziz
1902-1953

Saud
1953-1964

Faisal
1964-1975

Khalid
1975-1982

Fahd
1982-

From
Prince
King,
106.
Bligh
279,
to
Saudi
Arabia,
Winder,
p.
and
and Saudi Information Resource,Ministry of
p.
Sources:
Information Bulletin, 'Kings of Saudi Arabia'.

323

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