SEMINAR PAPER

Rwanda Genocide
CRIMINOLOGY, VICTIMOLOGY, PENOLOGY
Faculty: S.Radhakrishna

Submitted by
GAJJALA BHASKAR
20111
SEMESTER IX

DAMODARAM SANJIVAYYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

VISAKHAPATNAM
NOVEMBER 2015

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Table of contents
Introduction

06

History of Rwanda

07

a. Colonization
b. Independence
c. Structural disadvantages
Rwanda Genocide
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

Prelude to Genocide
100 days of slaughter
Role of hate media
Role of Rwanda Patriotic Front in Genocide
Summary Execution of persons Accused of Genocide

08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
17

Role and Response of International Community

21

a. External Actors before the Genocide

b. Failure of United Nations
c. United States on Rwanda Genocide

22
23
24

Aftermath of Genocide
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.

Arusha Accords
Instituting Ethnic Norms
Juvenal Habyariman and the MRND
Justice for the Genocide: An Overview of Progress Since 1994
Trials at the International Criminal Tribunal
ICTR Transfers to Rwanda
Trials in Foreign Countries
Extradition
Human Rights Organization on Rwanda Genocide

25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
37

Conclusion

40

Bibliography

42

ACKNOWLEDGMENT
I would like to express my gratitude towards my Criminology Law Mentor, Professor S.
Radhakrishna for giving me the opportunity to work on the topic and guiding towards
completing the project in an appropriate manner. I would like to thank everyone who has
supported me and guided me towards completing this Research paper.
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Gajjala Bhaskar
201115

Introduction
Throughout history groups of people have tried to eliminate other groups for various reasons,
but these attempts have been marked by the human races refusal to allow such systematic
extermination to occur. Unfortunately in 1994 the global community collectively turned a
blind eye toward the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of innocent people. The Rwandan
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Genocide revealed the governments of the worlds ignorance and apathy, as well as their
continuing selfishness and refusal to take blame. The killings were an attempt by a radical
splinter, the Hutu Power, of the majority ethnic group, the Hutus, to eliminate a small
minority, the Tutsis. The beginning of the genocide is usually traced to April 6, 1994 when a
plane crashed with Rwandas president, Juvenal Habyarimanya on board. However, roots the
genocide were established much earlier; the Hutu Power militia was being armed and trained
for months before. Their intention was known to all; the Hutus had announced, over the radio
and through various other channels that they were going to exterminate the Tutsis. Within
hours of the crash barricades had been set up around the capital. Anyone passing through was
required to show identification papers, and all Tutsis were killed on the spot.
OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
Ethnic Conflicts between the communities, historical aspect leading to genocide, role of
international community.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The method of research which is followed for the project is a doctrinal study. The research
includes gathering the data from the existing information like referring the books related to
the topic, articles, journals and the documents relating to the topic available online.
HYPOTHESIS
Reasons behind Genocide, Pre-planned or sudden provaction led to ethnic conflict and
Genocide.

CHAPTERISATION
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.

Introduction
History of Rwanda
Genocide in Rwanda
Role and Response of the international community in the Rwandan Genocide
Aftermath of Genocide.
Conclusion
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Genocide: The deliberate killing of a large group of people, especially those of a particular
nation or ethnic group is Called Genocide.1

1 www.history.com/topics/what-is-genocide (Accessed on November 1st, 2015)

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Republic of Rwanda is a sovereign state in central and east Africa. Rwanda is

bordered by Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Rwanda
is the worlds 149th largest country with 26,338 Square Kilometers. As of 2015, the National
Institute of Statistics of Rwanda estimates Rwandas population to be 11, 26,564. At 408
inhabitants per square kilometer, Rwandas population density is among the highest in Africa.
Rwandas population had increased from 1.6 million people in 1934 to 7.1 million in 1989,
leading to competition for land. Historians such as Gerard Prunier believe that the 1994
genocide can be partly attributed to population density. Ancient Hatred First, the claim was
made that Tutsi were foreign to Rwanda and had no right to live there. This notion reverted
back to colonial beliefs about the Tutsi that held that the group in fact descended from a
caucasoid tribe of Ethiopian origin, and had migrated to Rwanda to dominate the Hutu
people. While it is challenging to establish whether the first Tutsi in Rwanda had in fact
different origins than the Hutu, it is certain that, as the groups intermarried and the ethnic
boundaries consistently changed over time, they were not genetically distinct at the time of
the genocides. In fact, by perpetuating the stereotype that the Tutsi could be distinguished
from the Hutu by their height (tall) and angular Hain. The Rwandan Genocide 12 facial
features, some Hutu that matched this description were mistakenly killed, while some Tutsi
were able to escape death because their physical appearance was seemingly Hutu. Although
the Belgians ensured a Tutsi monopoly for the next few decades, setting up future conflict
among the people of Rwanda was not their intent. They just believed that because the Tutsi
looked more European than the Hutu that it was just easier to see them as closer to true
Europeans in the cultural hierarchy. The Tutsi, of course, welcomed the idea of superiority.
Rwanda gained independence in 1962. Following gaining independence, the PARMEHUTU
decided to change the political structure. They established a one party rule system based
around Hutu nationalism. The Tutsi population that was once 17.5% of the total population
in Rwanda dropped to 8.4% during this period.
Chapter 2
History of Rawanda
For centuries, the Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda Have spoken a common language, believed
in the same religion and lived in unison, in the same areas. Through intermarriage, Hutus
have been able to become hereditary Tutsis and Tutsis have been able to become hereditary
Hutus. Prior to Rwandas colonization, the Tutsi and Hutu were characterized by an
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occupational distinction. Hutus were mainly cultivators and known as the masses in
comparison to the Tutsis who were predominantly herdsmen and therefore considered the
elite. Over time, the titles affiliated with each ethnic group became embedded in their social
status and while both were aware of their overlying differences in class, this distinction only
became a source of resentment when it was defined by an according level of power. The first
signs of preferential treatment occurred in 1860 with the rise of the tutsi king, Kigeri
Rwabugiri, and the institution of a hierarchical administration in Rwanda. This event
arguably created a division that favoured Tutsi in the upper crust of the hierarchy and
subsequently limited Hutu political involvement to the lower ranks. The impact of this
centralized administration on the distinction between the groups was minimal as it had
barely been established when colonization begun. However, it must be asked if the Tutsifavoritism that ensued during Rwandas colonization, was in part due to the political structure
that was in place when the colonizers arrived. According to folklore, Tutsi cattle breeders
began arriving in the area from the Horn of Africa in the 15th century and gradually
subjugated the Hutu inhabitants. The Tutsis established a monarchy headed by a mwami
(king) and a feudal hierarchy of Tutsi nobles and gentry. Through a contract known as
ubuhake, the Hutu farmers pledged their services and those of their descendants to a Tutsi
lord in return for the loan of cattle and use of pastures and arable land. Thus, the Tutsi
reduced the Hutu to virtual serfdom. However, boundaries of race and class became less
distinct over the years as some Tutsi declined until they enjoyed few advantages over the
Hutu. The first European known to have visited Rwanda was German Count Von Goetzen in
1894. He was followed by missionaries, notably the "White Fathers." In 1899, the mwami
submitted to a German protectorate without resistance. Belgian troops from Zaire chased the
small number of Germans out of Rwanda in 1915 and took control of the country.

a. Colonization
In 1890, Germany was awarded with control of Rwanda during a conference in
Brussels. However, until the time of World War I, there was virtually no foreign influence in
Rwanda.

Following WWI, Germany awarded Belgium with control of the country.

Immediately, the Belgians began altering the class system of Rwanda. At the time there were
three different classes: the Hutu, the Tutsi and the Twa. The Belgians decided that the Tutsi
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should rule over the Hutu who should rule over the Twa. This class hierarchy was set up
because the Belgians felt that the Tutsi looked more white because they tended to have
thinner noses and thus viewed them as superior to the blacker looking Hutu. Using force,
the Belgians installed only Tutsi into government positions. Shortly after, the Tutsi began to
feed into the belief that they were superior to the Hutu as they began oppressing the Hutu.
For decades, the Tutsi were able to secure better jobs and better education than the Hutu as
they were viewed as the privileged class. Identity cards were created for all Rwandans solely
for the purpose of distinguishing Tutsi from Hutu. Not only did the Belgians place only Tutsi
officials in power, they also changed the structure of the Rwandan government.In the 1920s,
the Belgians began to alter the Rwandan state in the name of administrative efficiency.
Always professing an intention to keep the essential elements of the system intact, they
eliminated the competing hierarchies and regrouped the units of administration into
chiefdoms and sub-chiefdoms of uniform size. They used force to install state officials in
the autonomous enclaves, destroying the power of the heads of lineages and of local small
states. They fixed and made uniform the goods and services that local officials could demand,
thusthey thoughtreducing the burdens on the population.
Rwandan officials were not helpless pawns but rather real players in the game of
administrative reform. Politically astute, they understood how to evade the intent of European
orders even while apparently conforming to them. Chiefs and sub-chiefs seemed to accept the
reduction in numbers of officials, but in fact kept on using unofficial representatives out on
the hills who continued living off the local people. As a result, the density of administration
and consequent customary burdens on the people diminished little, if at all, in the central part
of the country, while in the north and southwest, they actually increased because of the
installation of resident officials. At the same time, the chiefs and sub-chiefsand later other
administrative agentsenforced a series of wholly new demands imposed by the colonialists
as part of their effort to integrate Rwanda into the world economy. They often found ways to
turn these new requirements, such as building roads or planting cash crops, to their personal
profit. The elite profited not just from direct European backing but also from the indirect and
unintended consequences of the administrative changes. Under the old system of multiple
officials, power-holders ordinarily limited demands on subordinates, knowing that those who
felt unreasonably exploited could seek protection from rivals or could move elsewhere, even
clearing new land in the forest, if need be, to escape exactions. In the 1920s and 1930s, the
Belgians made it far harder for the weak to escape repressive officials; not only did they
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eliminate the multiple hierarchies but they also restricted changes in residence from one
region to another and they prohibited new settlement in the forests. The one avenue of escape
still possible was migration abroad and thousands took that route beginning in the 1920s. But
those who preferred not to leave Rwanda had little choice but to submit to increased
exploitation of officials now freed from the constraints that once limited their demands.2.
b. Independence
Rwanda gained independence in 1962.

Following gaining independence, the

PARMEHUTU decided to change the political structure. They established a one party rule
system based around Hutu nationalism. They even organized programs to rid the country of
the Tutsi. In 1964 and 1974, programs were organized by the PARMEHUTU to kill many
Tutsi and force others into exile. The Tutsi population that was once 17.5% of the total
population in Rwanda dropped to 8.4% during this period. At this same time, angered Tutsi
refugees who were forced to flee the country began attacking Rwanda. This would occur 10
times over the next 6 years. These events led to the Hutu attacking the Tutsi who still
remained in the country, accusing them of aiding the refugee invaders. The Hutu, as a means
to gain and sustain control in Rwanda, used these attacks to proclaim all Tutsi as the
enemy. They also used the attacks to encourage Hutu solidarity and patriotism. The Tutsi,
who once were seen as being the superior class because they looked more European than the
Hutu were now seen as inferior and were discriminated against by the Hutu because they
looked too European. The Hutu claimed that the Tutsi were not true Rwandans because they
looked too foreign. In 1973, the PARMEHUTU were ousted from power as Juvenal
Habyarimana gained power of a military coup. Habyarimana, however, relied on Hutu
nationalism to remain in power. In 1975, he officially made the country a single party state.
This was done under the National Revolutionary Movement for Development.

Every

Rwandan regardless of age was automatically made a member of this party.3

c. Structural disadvantages

2 http://hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno1-3-09.htm#P224_96559 , (Accessed on
November 1st, 2015)

3 www.ppu.org.uk/genocide/g_rwanda.html (Accessed on November 1st, 2015)

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Second, the claim was made that despite the 1959 revolution, Tutsi continued to enjoy
higher status and greater wealth than Hutu and were in some way responsible for continuing
Hutu poverty contents that the primary sentiment that drove people to participate in the
genocide was prejudice, maintained and institutionalized by the powers-that-be to protect
their power and privileges Interestingly, while Habyarimana ethnicised structural
disadvantages, and blamed the desperate economy on the Tutsi, the reality was that firstly,
Rwandas extreme state of poverty was largely the result of the decisions Habyarimana had
made during his time in office; secondly, by the 1990s, with the emergence of a Hutu elite,
class could no longer be defined along ethnic lines; and thirdly, the 10,000 Rwandans that
were forced to seek refuge in Burundi and Tanzania due to the Ruriganiza famine, were
primarily Tutsi

Ironically, Habyarimana actually renamed his party the Mouvement

Revolutionaire National pour le Developpement (MRND) yet by the 1990s Rwanda was
highly indebted and dependent on foreign aid. Initially, Habyarimanas fiscal reforms
attracted significant foreign investment which improved Rwandas GDP and HDI and
generated significant profits by promoting the growth of coffee for export. However, his
economic policies largely favored the Hutu elite by exploiting coffee revenues generated by
the rural farming class that was expected to be both self-sufficient and to provide increasing
amounts of national wealth. Therefore, as Rwanda prospered during the 1970s and 1980, the
gains from the coffee economy were squandered rather than being reinvested to foster
development or reduce dependency Hain: The Rwandan Genocide 13 on foreign aid. When
coffee prices plummeted in 1989, the government used foreign aid to subsidize the sector
which eventually accumulated into $1 billion worth of foreign debt. As stateowned
enterprises went bankrupt [and] health and education services collapsed...Hutus [were] most
dramatically [affected] since, under Habyarimana, they were the primary recipients of the
civil service jobs which could no longer be funded. Ultimately, the cost of conflict actually
caused Rwandas deeper decline into financial ruin. While in 1990 the war consumed 15
percent of the states operating expenses, three years later that number had risen to 70
percent. Furthermore, the conflict displaced thousands of people who subsequently were no
longer able to work in agricultural production, Rwandas economic mainstay.4
While some have claimed that Hutus and Tutsis cannot properly be called distinct ethnic
groups others have suggested that the two groups are more than socially distinct and vary
4 worldwithoutgenocide.org/genocides-and-conflicts/rwandan-genocide
(Accessed on November 1st, 2015)
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genetically as well. The alliance between the Belgians and the Tutsis could be identified as
a cause of ethnic preference. Afterall, the Tutsis appeared to be favored as an ethnic group
based on notions associated with their genetic features. However, if the physical differences
between the Hutu and Tutsi were absolute, defining features of their ethnic affiliations, why
did the colonizers require that identification cards list an individuals ethnicity. The largest
ethnic groups in Rwanda are the Hutus (about 85% of the population), the Tutsis (14%), and
the Twa (1%). Starting with the Tutsi feudal monarchy rule of the Tenth. A Hutu revolution
in 1959 forced as many as 3, 00,000 Tutsis to flee the country, making them an even smaller
minority. By early 1961, victorious Hutus had forced Rwandas Tutsi monarch into exile and
declared the country a republic. After a UN referendum that same year, Belgium officially
granted independence to Rwanda in July 1962. By the early 1990s, Rwanda, a small country
with an overwhelmingly agricultural economy, had one of the highest population densities in
Africa. About 85 percent of its population is Hutu; the rest is Tutsi.
Chapter 3
Rwanda Genocide
The Rwandan genocide is one of the heaviest moments in human history. An airplane crash in
1994 carrying the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi provided a spark for an organized
campaign of violence against the tutsi and moderate hutu civilians across the country.
Approximately 8,00,000 tutsis and hutu moderates were slaughtered in a carefully program
of genocide over 100 days, making history as the quickest killing spree the world has ever
seen. The event that sparked the genocide is death of the Rwanda president, at 8:30p.m. on
April 6, 1994, President Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda was returning from a summit in
Tanzania when a surface to air missile shot his plane out of the sky over Rwandas capital city
of Kigali. All on board were killed in the crash, Hutus began slaughtering the Tutsis after the
death of the president in the African country of Rwanda. As the brutal killings continued, the
world stood idly by and just watched the slaughter. Lasting 100 days, the Rwanda genocide
left approximately 8,00,000 Tutsis and Hutu sympathizers dead.5
The genocide spread throughout the country with intense speed and brutality, as
ordinary citizens were incited by local official and the Hutu power government to take up
5 endgenocide.org/learn/past-genocides/the-rwandan-genocide/ (Accessed on
November 1st, 2015)
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arms against their neighbours. By the time the Tutsi-led Rwandans were dead and many more
displace from their homes. The RPF victory created 2 million more refugees (mainly hutus)
from Rwanda, exacerabating what had already become a full-blown humanitarian crisis.
a. Prelude to Genocide
In 1985, the Rwandese Patriotic Front was formed and it consisted mainly of Tutsis.
Their leader was future Rwandan president Paul Kagame. The number of Rwandans that
were forced to flee the country had grown to over 600,000. Many of these refugees resided
in the neighboring country of Uganda. In 1990, they invaded Rwanda from neighboring
Uganda. They invaded the country with demands that they receive recognition of their rights
as Rwandans. The president of Rwanda responded to the invasion by repressing Tutsis and
Hutus who supported the Tutsi cause. The Hutu government used these invasions to promote
an anti-Tutsi belief across the country. The Hutu government claimed that the Tutsi were
trying to regain control in Rwanda so that they can enslave the Hutu. By 1994, the Rwandan
militia had grown to over 30,000 members. Some members were even able to acquire AK-47
assault rifles. The genocide was at least partly funded by the World Bank and the IMF under
what was called a Structural Adjustment Program. $134 million was spent on genocide
preparations. $4.6 million was spent on weapons for the militia, ranging from machetes to
hoes, axes, razors and hammers. The genocide was openly discussed in Rwandan Prime
Minister Jean Kambandas cabinet members. One cabinet member was quoted to have said
that she was personally in favour of getting rid of all Tutsi without the Tutsi all of
Rwanda's problems would be over.6

b. 100 Days of Slaughter

The killings began in Rwandas capital city of Kigali. The Interhamwe (those who strike as
one), an anti-Tutsi youth organization established by Hutu extremists, set up road blocks.
They checked identification cards and killed all who were Tutsi. Most of the Killing was done
with machetes, clubs, or knives. Over the next few days and weeks, road blocks were set up
around Rwanda. On April 7, Hutu extremists began purging the government of their political
opponents, which meant both Tutsis and Hutu moderates were killed. This included the prime
6 www.unitedhumanrights.org/genocide/genocide_in_rwanda.htm (Accessed on
November 1st, 2015)
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minister. When ten Belgian UN peacekeepers tried to protect the prime minister, they too
were killed. This caused Belgium to start withdrawing its troops form Rwanda.Over the next
several days and weeks, the vilence spread. Since the government had the names and
addresses of nearly all Tutsis living in Rwanda (rememenr, each Rwandan had an identity
card that labeled them Tutsi, Hutu, or Twa) the killers could go door to door, slaughtering the
Tutsis. Men, women, and children were murdered. Since bullets were expensive, most Tutsis
were killed by hand weapons, often machetes or clubs. Many were often tortured before
being killed. Some of the Victims were given the option of paying for a bullet so that theyd
have a quicker death. Also during the violence, thousands of Tutsi women were raped. Some
were raped and then killed, others were kept a sex slaves for weeks. Some Tutsi women and
girls were also tortured before being killed.
Thousands of Tutsis tried to escape the slaughter by hiding in churches, hospitals,
schools, and government offices. These places, which historically have been places of refuge,
were turned into places of mass murder during the Rwanda Genocide. One of the worst
massacres of the Rwanda genocide took place on April 15-16, 1994 at the Nyarubuye Roman
Catholic Church, located about 60 miles east of Kigali. Here, the mayor of the town, a Hutu,
encouraged Tutsis to seek sanctuary inside the church by assuring them they would be safe
there. Then the mayor betrayed them to the Hutu extremists. The killing began with grenades
and guns, but soon changed to machetes and clubs. Killing by hand was tiresome, so the
killers took shifts. It took two days to kill the thousands of Tutsi who were inside. Similar
massacres took place around Rwanda, with many of the worst ones Occurring between April
11 and the beginning of May. To further degrade the Tutsi, Hutu extremists would not allow
the Tutsi dead to be buried. Their bodies were left where they were slaughtered, exposed to
the elements, eaten by rats and dogs. Many Tutsi bodies were thrown into rivers, lakes, and
streams in order to send the Tutsis back to Ethiopia a reference to the myth that the Tutsi
were foreigners and originally came from Ethopia.7
c. Role of hate media
Anti-Tutsi articles and graphic cartoons began appearing in the kangura newspaper from
around 1990.In June 1993 a new radio station called Radio-Television Libre des Mille
Collines (RTLMC) began broadcasting in Rwanda. The planned campaign was led by key
7 www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/evil/etc/slaughter.html (Accessed on
November 1st, 2015)
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ethnic Hutu members of the government against the Tutsi ethnic minority. In addition to
violence by the military, attacks and massacres conducted by local militias groups and
ordinary civilians contributed to a death toll 0.5 1.0 million deaths. In a country with low
newspaper circulation and few television sets, radio station Radio Television Libre des Mille
Collines (RTLML) led the propaganda efforts by broadcasting inflammatory messages calling
for the extermination of the Tutsi minority, and its cofounders were found guilty of
instigating genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, there is no
quantitative evidence establishing whether, how and to what extent the broadcasts caused
more violence. First, there is a direct effect on participation, with violence increasing in radio
coverage in the village. A one standard deviation increase in radio coverage is associated with
a 12-13 percent increase in participation in total violence. The effect is similar for militia
violence (13-14 percent) and individual violence (10-11 percent). A battery of robustness tests
show that the effects are unlikely to be spurious due to omitted variables, outliers, or
measurement error in violence. Moreover, placebo tests show that radio reception irrespective
of content did not influence participation. We also present suggestive evidence that the RTLM
broadcasts were most effective in inducing violence in villages where the population was
relatively uneducated and illiterate, and where Tutsis made up a relatively small minority. The
broadcasts exhibited positive spillover effects in militia violence. The number of persons
engaged in militia violence in a village was significantly higher when a larger share of the
population in neighboring villages had radio coverage, consistent with the hypothesis that
social interactions determine the spatial diffusion of violence. There are no spillover effects
on individual violence, suggesting that local complementarities or information diffusion
among ordinary citizens were weak or non existent, at least relative to that among members
of organized militias.
d. Role of Rwanda Patriotic Front in Genocide
The Rwandan Patriotic Front ended the 1994 genocide by defeating the civilian and military
authorities responsible for the killing campaign. Its troops encountered little opposition,
except around Kigali, and they routed government forces in operations that began in early
April and ended in July. As RPF soldiers advanced south down the eastern side of the country
and then swept west, they even stopped the killers in the act of attacking or preparing to
attack Tutsi at several churches or camps for the displaced. More often they rescued Tutsi
with no dramatic confrontation. They drove military, militia, and other assailants from the
region and so made it possible for Tutsi to return from the swamps and bush and to emerge
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from their hiding places.8 The RPF soldiers saved tens of thousands from annihilation and
relentlessly pursued those whom they thought guilty of genocide. In their drive for military
victory and a halt to the genocide, the RPF killed thousands, including noncombatants as well
as government troops and members of militia. As RPF soldiers sought to establish their
control over the local population, they also killed civilians in numerous summary executions
and in massacres. They may have slaughtered tens of thousands during the four months of
combat from April to July. The killings diminished in August and were markedly reduced
after mid-September when the international community exerted pressure for an end to the
carnage. Carried out by soldiers who were part of a highly disciplined military organization,
these killings by the RPF rarely involved civilian participation, except to identify the persons
to be slain. In only a few cases, particularly in areas near the border with Burundi, civilian
assailants reportedly joined soldiers in attacking other civilians. Although the subject of
substantial speculation, the RPF slaughter of civilians has been poorly documented. Even
during the months when the RPF was just establishing its control, it was remarkably
successful in restricting access by foreigners to certain parts of the country. Such limitations
fed the speculation about RPF abuses but, at the same time, made it extremely difficult to
prove wrongdoing. Because this report focused on the genocide itself, we collected only
limited data on crimes committed by the RPF. The information is sufficient, however, to
demonstrate that certain kinds of RPF abuses occurred so often and in such similar ways that
they must have been directed by officers at a high level of responsibility. It is likely that these
patterns of abuse were known to and tolerated by the highest levels of command of the RPF
forces.
Virtually all persons killed by RPF forces were Hutu, but the RPF explicitly
disavowed any hostility based on ethnic distinctions and from its earliest days proclaimed a
nationalist ideology. Whether or not born of conviction, the stress on national identity made
sense politically for a group drawn mostly from the minority and aspiring to political power
in a situation where ethnic differences had been exaggerated. The RPF called itself
an umuryango, literally a lineage or kin group, suggesting that all who adhered to it were
expected to feel strong bonds and perhaps even a common origin. The group taught that
Rwandans had lived in harmony before the colonial regime introduced distinctions among
ethnic groups. As one of the most famous RPF songs related. It is the white man who has
8 www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/.../rwandagenocide.shtml (Accessed
on November 1st, 2015)
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caused all that, children of Rwanda. He did it in order to find a secret way to pillage us. When
they [the Europeans] arrived, we were living side by side in harmony. They were unhappy
that they could not find a way to divide us. They invented different origins for us, children of
Rwanda: some were supposed to have come from Chad, others from Ethiopia. We were a fine
tree, its parts all in accord, children of Rwanda. Some of us were banished abroad, to never
come back. We were separated by this division, children of Rwanda, but we have overcome
the whitemans trap....So, children of Rwanda, we are all called to unite our strength to build
Rwanda.9 Once present in Rwanda and recruiting supporters, the RPF taught new members
the same lesson. In training sessions during 1993 and early 1994, instructors presented
extensive lessons on Rwandan history which stressed the destructive impact of colonialism
on relations among Rwandans. They concluded by defining the RPF:
Inkotanyi are Rwandans who aim to lead Rwanda to development after too many years of
poverty and darkness. Inkotanyi are not Hutu, Tutsi nor Twa...the Inkotanyi party accepts
everyone who believes in its goals.10 After the genocide began, the RPF continued preaching
the need for national identity to those who came under their control. At a just-established
displaced persons camp at Rutare, north of Kigali, RPF organizer Athanasius Karisa
explained the rules to new arrivals in mid-May 1994: they would be expected to elect their
own leaders, to form work committees to build houses and gather food, to settle conflicts
peacefully and to forget who is Hutu and who is Tutsi. A resident of the Byumba camp
recalled meetings to talk about peace and living together. 11 A reporter who spoke to RPF
soldiers found that many invoked the code against ethnic bias, reciting it almost as if by
rote. In their desire to emphasize bonds between Hutu and Tutsi, Kagame and other RPF
leaders stressed the political rather than ethnic nature of the violence that began in April
1994. Even when they used the term genocide to refer to Tutsi victims, they often hastened
to add that moderate Hutu too were suffering from the killing campaign. Dr. Thogne
Rudasingwa, then secretary general of the RPF, was quoted in Der Spiegel of May 30 as
9 Chrtien et al., Rwanda, Les mdias, p. 359. See chapter one for a discussion
of precolonial divisions and the impact of colonalism on them.
10 Notes of training session by Gasingwa Kamiri, December 23, 1993 in
handwritten notebook of a recruit (Solidaire-Rwanda)
11 Mark Fritz, Rwanda-Life After Death, Associated Press, May 17, 1994;
Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview, February 23, 1997
16 | P a g e

saying, We are the only force that can put an end to the killing, and the Hutus, too, know
that; they are just as much victims as the Tutsis.
e. Summary Execution of Persons Accused of Genocide
RPF authorities insisted that both personal acts of vengeance and more general killing of
those thought to have committed genocide were prohibited. Even very young and just
recruited soldiers understood and repeated this to foreign journalists. On April 17,
Kanyarengwe asserted that the RPF priority was to stop the killings and to arrest the
criminals and hand them over to courts, so thateveryone could defend himself and be
punished according to his crime. RPF vice-chairman Denis Polisi reiterated the policy a
month later. Speaking of some 2,000 prisoners captured by RPF troops. They will be held
until a time comes when we can try them in properly constituted legal institutions. We have
no policy of killing any one of them and it is our intention that we bring them to justice. Four
months later, RPF spokesman Major Wilson Rutayisire reportedly said that there were only
about 200 detained for genocide, raising the question of the fate of the others. RPF soldiers
apparently regularly executed persons whom they thought guilty of genocide and, in contrast
to statements made to foreigners, some of them readily admitted this to other Rwandans. At
Kabuga, a RPF post just outside Kigali, an officer named Gasore assured a person who
inquired about the situation in the area south of Kigali, Dont worry. We have taken
vengeance for you in Bugesera.... In that area, where thousands of Tutsi had been killed in
and near Kanzenze, the RPF had killed 300 Hutu, he reportedly said. Another survivor of the
genocide who spent some time at an RPF post near Kizi, outside the town of Butare,
declared- I saw the the RPF soldiers bringing bodies in trucks at night and throwing them in
toilets at Mwogo, near where they had dug their trenches. They brought men already
wounded with their arms tied behind their backs. They brought no women. The soldiers were
proud to show us that they were avenging us. We were ill at ease with this. We saw them
dump bodies also in toilets of shops and houses at the little commercial center.
Another witness related that persons leaving Zone Turquoise were held in the camp
at Kizi, near the limit of the zone controlled by the French. There they were searched and
interrogated. Survivors of the genocide who were temporarily lodged in shops at the
commercial center joined in accusing those alleged to have participated in the genocide. In
late August, the RPF supposedly put into effect a regulation requiring that an accused person
had to be denounced by at least five persons before being executed. One accused person was
17 | P a g e

reportedly hit on the head and thrown into a mass grave, but managed to escape and fled back
to the Zone Turquoise12. On June 11, RPF soldiers directed some 1,500 people of Mukingi
commune to gather in the sector of Mahembe, near the Nyagafunzo stream, where they
stayed for about two weeks. During that time Corporal Mandevu and a soldier named Andr
Pake (nicknamed Brown) were in charge. At one point, the soldiers separated the men from
the women. They questioned survivors and others aboutwho had participated in the genocide.
On the basis of that information they took away some eighty people who were never seen
again.13
In Rango, south of Butare, RPF soldiers summoned local people and displaced
persons from neighboring communes to two meetings, one on July 8 and another on July 11.
At the first meeting, they read a list of names of men, in most cases just their Christian
names. They warned that any who did not come forward would be caught later. Those taken
were locked up that night at the Rango Health Center and then disappeared. When the wife
of one man asked soldiers where he had gone, she was told that he had gone to be
interrogated and would return. She never saw him again. At the second meeting, soldiers
asked survivors to identify purported killers and they then took those named away in
vehicles. Those taken away did not return. On July 22, the hundreds of displaced persons who
had been grouped at the parish of Save were called to a final meeting before being sent back
to their homes. Soldiers asked the families of victims to point out the presumed killers. Some
two hundred persons so indicated were taken away for interrogation. Most were never seen
again but about a dozen were later released. Some of those freed, including a man named
Mugiraneza, were taken away again by soldiers a few days later.They were ordinarily
transported in two vehicles, a Volkswagen Jetta and a minibus. One evening at about 7 p.m.,
the witness and another man were summoned by soldiers and transported to a house near the
hospital. They were both questioned but were eventually permitted to return to their
lodgings. Another witness recalled his experience in Byumba. The first day, I was imprisoned
with fourteen people. They then took them all out. The same thing happened the next day and
the day after. They put people in the room with me, then took them out and they did not
return. This went on for eight days when they released me. 14 One woman recounted that she
had seen many people disappear during the three months that she was at Byumba,
12 Jef Vleugels and Guy Theunis, Socit des Missionnaires dAfrique, fax no. 23.
13 Amnesty International, Rwanda: Reports of killings, p. 7.
18 | P a g e

including women, children and household workers. She declared,On June 2, two soldiers
came to take my husband away. They came in civilian clothes, but I knew they were soldiers.
Today they work for the DMI....After several weeks I went to the authorities to ask where my
husband was. I went to Karera Denis, a captain who was the commander at Byumba. They
said my husband was working for the family, the umuryango, as they called it. They said
I should wait for him, that I might even have to wait four years before I heard from him. That
was June 28, 1994. The RPF soldiers took away the young men from the camp and, the day
after, took away some older men. One who was taken but was able to return to the camp
reported that others had been tied up, beaten on the head until dead and then thrown into the
river. When the wife of one man who had supposedly been killed in that way tried to flee, she
was caught by RPF soldiers who killed the child on her back and two other women by blows
to the head. The woman herself was beaten on the head with a nail-studded club but survived.
She showed a human rights investigator the scars of the beating.15
One person who was directed towards the site in Kacyiru reported. And then they began to
interrogate everyone there, especially the young men. To ask you what you were doing during
this massacre. What you did. Especially since there were a lot of militia left when the city
was taken by surprise. They didnt have time to get out of the city. They [the RPF] wanted to
do a triage, the innocent and then the victims and those really guilty of genocide.16
The witness, described as credible by a former high-ranking RPF official, gave
testimony that was convincing in its spontaneity and detail. Some of the practices he
described, such as the screening by interrogation, the pressure on young men to join the RPF,
and the use of the English term manpower among RPF soldiers, have been mentioned by
other witnesses. We have no direct confirmation of his most serious charges, but there is
some indirect corroboration. U.N. officials stumbled across a large number of bodies in a
Kigali stadium several weeks after the RPF took power, to the great anger of RPF soldiers,
and some U.N. officials had been told that there was a special RPF squad for disposing of
bodies by burning them. Journalists present in Kigali during July reported seeing a column of
14 Aidan Hartley, Western Doctors Toil to Save Survivors of Rwanda Killings,
15 Field notes, July 1994; Lindsey Hilsum, Rwandan Rebels Advance as French
Forces Hang Back, Guardian,
16 Human Rights Watch/Africa, The Aftermath of Genocide in Rwanda, p. 3.
19 | P a g e

young men being marched under RPF guard to an unknown destination. When they
questioned the authorities about them, they received different and not very credible
explanations of who the young men were and where they were going. 17 Four months after the
events described by the witness, several U.N. employees arrived unexpectedly by helicopter
at the Gabiro camp and observed large numbers of civilians, including women and children,
who rushed forward, apparently to try to make contact with them. Soldiers reportedly drove
the people back, beating them with sticks. The RPF commander of the camp was extremely
angry at the U.N. employees, interrogated them at length, and detained them for several
hours. Agents of the DMI interrogated the U.N. employees several times in the days after the
incident.

Chapter 4
Role and Response of International Community
From the beginning, despite claiming to be caught unaware by the killings, the United States
and international community knew of the danger and disorder in Rwanda. But no actions
were taken to stop the killings. Months before the killing began, General Romeo Dallaire, the
17 Lt. Col. Karenzi Karake to H.E. The Vice President and Minister of Defence, Re:
Act of Threat to National Security.
20 | P a g e

commander of the UN peacekeepers in Rwanda, sent a now infamous genocide fax,

warning of an anti-Tutsi extermination plot. The media covered eyewitness accounts and
direct stories from missionaries who were unable to save their Rwandan friends from
inevitable death. Stories hit the front pages of the Washington Post and the New York Times,
even with descriptions of six foot high piles of corpses. There were Defense Intlligence
Agency reports that stated the killings were directly administered by the government and
intelligence memos that reported the ringleaders of the genocide. Faced with full and
horrifying information about a genocide where the moral and legal imperative to act was
overwhelming, major actors at the U.N. and in various national governments had failed to
intervene. Burdened with the guilt of this failure, RPF confronted a more complex situation
when Gersony revealed the apparent extent of RPF killings. Gersonys conclusions seemed
solid, based as they were on a substantial body of data. Although the brief visits to the field
by U.N. and U.S. representatives and the short-lived investigative commission did not
confirm his findings, neither were they extensive enough to invalidate them. In addition, on
September 15, Human Rights Watch/Africa published a report documenting the Mukingi
massacre and other killings and reporting on the existence of mass graves at sites where RPF
troops had organized a camp for the civilian population. Leading authorities at the U.N. and
in national governments were troubled by this information. They wanted the slaughter to end
but they were reluctant to make any criticisms that might weaken the new Rwandan
government. As one U.S. policymaker described the situation.We have three choices. Support
the former genocidal government. That is impossible. Support the RPF. That is possible.
Support neither. That is unacceptable because it might result in the those responsible for the
genocide coming back to win.18
Timothy Wirth, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs, met Gersony in Kigali
in late September and found the presentation of his work compelling. Wirth discussed the
killings of civilians described by Gersony and by the Human Rights Watch/Africa report with
authorities in Kigali, but without getting any conclusive response from them. In a briefing in
Washington several weeks later, both Wirth and Assistant Secretary of State Moose rejected
the conclusion that RPF killings were systematic and Wirth suggested that Gersony had
been misled by prejudiced informants. Moose remarked, however, that the U.S., like Belgium
and Germany, was supporting the RPF with its eyes open. He added that UNAMIR forces
18 https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno15-8-03.htm (Accessed on 1st
November, 2015).
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were going to be deployed more rapidly in Rwanda, presumably in hopes that their presence
would reduce killings by the RPF.
By refusing to deal openly and firmly with accusations of killings by the RPF, the U.N. and
the international community shielded the RPF from reproach and from demands for increased
international scrutiny of its policies and practices. The pressure brought by Annan, the U.S.,
and perhaps others behind the scenes, however, strengthened the position of moderates within
the government who were seeking to end attacks on civilians. Partly in response to
international pressure, partly in response to changes within Rwanda itself, RPF authorities
ordered soldiers to stop killing civilians. The number of civilians slain diminished markedly
after late September.19

a. External Actors before the Genocide

Several outside actors carried a heavy responsibility for the events that were now unfolding.
Some were guilty of crimes of commission, others crimes of omission. But one way or
another, as they had for the entire century, outsiders had great influence on Rwanda's fate,
much of it malevolent.
Within Rwanda itself, the chief culprits were the Catholic and Anglican hierarchies and the
French government, all active supporters of the Habyarimana government. Church leaders
failed to use their unique moral position among the overwhelmingly Christian population to
denounce ethnic hatred and human rights abuse. The French government was guilty of the
same failure at the elite level. Its public backing constituted a major disincentive for the
radicals to make concessions or to think in terms of compromise. Although some French
officials knew that many of their clients at the highest echelons of the Rwandan regime were
guilty of human rights violations, they failed to use their influence to demand that such
violations stop. At the same time, they continued to act as senior political and military
advisors to the government. The radicals drew the obvious lesson: they could get away with
anything.
At the United Nations, the Security Council, led unremittingly by the United States, simply
did not care enough about Rwanda to intervene appropriately. There were no economic or
19 nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/rw050994.pdf (Accessed on November
1st, 2015)
22 | P a g e

strategic interests at play. What makes this betrayal of their responsibility even more
intolerable is that the genocide was in no way inevitable. It could have been prevented
entirely. Even once it was allowed to begin, the destruction could have been significantly
mitigated. All that was required was a relatively modest international military force, perhaps
5000 properly trained troops, with a strong mandate to enforce the Arusha agreements.
Nothing of the kind was authorized by the Security Council before the genocide, and the
force that was approved during the genocide was not permitted to intervene until the
slaughter was over.
b. Failure of United Nations
In October 1993, the first UN mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) was set up; it was notable
mostly for its weak mandate and minimal capacity.20 No amount of credible early warnings
could persuade the members of the Security Council to treat the mission seriously or the UN
Secretariat to interpret its mandate flexibly. In fact, the single occasion on which UNAMIR
was authorized to go beyond its passive observer mandate was at the very outbreak of the
genocide. Several European nations flew planes in to evacuate their nationals, and UNAMIR
was authorized not only to assist the evacuation, but also to go beyond its mandate, if
required, to assure the safety of foreign nationals. Never was such permission granted for the
protection of Rwandans. And none of the 2,500 European and American troops used in the
evacuation or on standby in the region offered to work with UNAMIR to stop the
genocide.The significance of the Security Council's action should not be underestimated: its
refusal to sanction a serious mission made the genocide more likely. The feeble UN effort
helped persuade the Hutu radicals that they had nothing to fear from the outside world,
regardless of their deeds. This assessment proved only too accurate. Once the genocide
began, the US, backed most forcefully by Britain, repeatedly and deliberately undermined all
attempts to strengthen the UN military presence in Rwanda.
Belgium became an unexpected ally in this goal. On day two of the crisis, ten Belgian
soldiers were murdered by Rwandan soldiers. As the radicals had anticipated, Belgium
swiftly decided to pull out all its troops, leaving the 2,500 Tutsi they were protecting at a
school site to be slaughtered within hours. The Belgian government decided that its shameful
retreat would be at least tempered if it were shared by others, and strenuously lobbied to
20 https://www.awm.gov.au/unit/U60680/ (Accessed on November 1st, 2015)
23 | P a g e

disband UNAMIR entirely. Although the US supported the idea, it was too outrageous to
pursue. Instead, with the genocide costing tens of thousands of lives daily, and ignoring the
vigorous opposition of the OAU and African governments, the Security Council chose to cut
the UN force by 90 per cent at the exact moment it needed massive reinforcement. For most
of the 100 days of the genocide, General Dallaire commanded a force of only 400, many of
them inadequately trained or equipped. As horror stories accelerated, the council authorized a
stronger mission, UNAMIR II, but once again the US did all in its power to undermine its
effectiveness. In the end, not a single new soldier or piece of military hardware reached the
country before the genocide ended.
c. United States on Rwanda Genocide
Despite the reports, President Clinton specifically avoided calling the massacre genocide to
avoid US involvement. The Clinton administration held on to the idea that there were no US
interests in Rwanda, so it was not their place to intervene. They also believed that US
credibility would be diminished if they deemed Rwanda acts of genocide and then did not
step it to intervene. A senior US official described the decision to not intervene in Rwanda as
a foregone conclusion. 21Military intervention was not on the table for discussion; it was
automatically concluded that the United States would not take part in stopping the Rwandan
genocide. The United States has formally apologized for its failure to prevent the genocide.
President Clinton insisted that it was a function of ignorance. The evidence shows that the
American government knew precisely what was happening, not least during the months of the
genocide. Domestic politics took priority over the lives of helpless Africans. After losing 18
soldiers in Somalia in October 1993, the US was unwilling to participate in further
peacekeeping missions and was largely opposed to the Security Council authorizing any new
serious missions at all, with or without American participation.

Chapter V
Aftermath of Genocide
Since the genocide, many countries have been providing aid to assist Rwanda in rebuilding
the nation. Among the leading contributers is the United States. The government of Rwanda
21 nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53 (Accessed on November 1st, 2015)
24 | P a g e

is also being restructured. In 2003 Rwanda had its first multiparty elections since being an
independent nation. Tutsi Paul Kagame (the former leader of the RPF) was elected as
president. Although many claimed that the elections were unfair due to some last minute
events that occurred, these elections showed that the country had still made
progress.Legislative elections were also held in 2003. Many Tutsi took office as 40 out of 53
positions were filled by former RPF members. Those responsible for the genocide have
either been killed, imprisoned or are currently awaiting trial for war crimes. Another change
in the government is that the need for a new constitution was recognized and a new
constitution was approved by the majority of the electorate. This new constitution has made
significant progress for Rwanda. It proclaims equality among men and women, removes all
references to ethnicity, makes substantial progress towards human rights for its citizens and
contains measures that are meant to prevent any future genocide. It also includes a number of
checks and balances for those in legislative positions in the government and for the president.
Although many believe that this new constitution is helping Rwanda make a lot of progress,
some in the international community are a little bit reluctant to applaud it just yet. They
believe that the constitution serves the purpose of just reinforcing the ruling RPF regimes
power. When the killing stopped, the RPF established a coalition government with Pasteur
Bizimungu (a Hutu) as president and paul kagame (a tutsi) as vice president and defense
minister. The United Nations also reinstated and revamped the UNAMIR operation in
Rwanda, which remained there until March 1996. UNAMIT provided humanitarian relief in
the aftermath of the genocide. The outflow of former genocidaires across the border into the
Democratic Republic of the Congo has had lasting effect that continues to reverberate in the
region today. The effect that the genocide posed on the people of Rwanda is immeasurable.
The people were tortured and terrorized as they saw those they love die and feared the loss of
their own life. It is estimated that nearly 100,000 children were orphaned, abducted or
abandoned. Twenty-six percent of the Rwandan population still suffers from post-traumatic
stress disorder today.22
In 1994, the United Nations created the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR), dedicated to bringing those responsible for the genocide to justice. Although slowmoving, the ICTR began trying and indicting perpetrators in 1995. The United Nations
conducted more than 70 tribunal cases and Rwandan courts have tried up to 20,000
individuals. However, trying individuals in courts proved to be a challenging process as the
22 www.unictr.org/en/tribunal (Accessed on November 1st, 2015)
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location of many perpetrators was unknown. To deal with the thousands of accused and to
foster reconciliation, the traditional community court system known as Gacaca was used,
leading to over 1.2 million cases being tried. The ICTR has also determined that the
widespread rapes committed during the Rwandan genocide may also be considered an act of
torture and genocide on their own. The ICTR closed at the end of 2014.
a. Arusha Acoords
Arusha Accords were a set of five accords signed in Arusha, Tanzania on August 4, 1993, by
the government of Rwanda and the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), under mediation, to
end a three-year Rwandan Civil war. Organized by the United States, France and the
Organization of African Unity, the talks began on July 12, 1992 and lasted until June 24, 1993
with a final week long meeting in Rwanda, July 19 to July 25, 1993.
The Arusha Accords established a Broad Based Transitional Government (BBTG),
including the insurgent Rwandese Patriotic Front and the five political parties that had
composed a temporary government since April 1992 in anticipation of general elections. The
Accords included other points considered necessary for lasting peace the rule of law,
repatriation of refugees both from fighting and from power sharing agreements, and the
merging of government and rebel armies.
A shallow description of the Rwanda genocide tends to depict it as a conflict between the
Tutsi and Hutu people. However, it is this illustration that fails to recognize the multi-layered
web of actors and their level of involvement. Understanding the various and distinct
perceptions of those involved in the atrocities allows for the analysis of particular emotions
and thoughts, what causes them to be felt and how they can trigger the onset of such a
conflict. Furthermore by doing so we can understand what the actors stakes were and
therefore not only why they wanted a conflict to occur but why they needed it to.

b. Instituting Ethnic Norms

In total, the estimated 200,000 Rwandans that are said to have participated in the genocide
accounted for less than 9 percent of the Hutu male population over the age of thirteen
However while Mueller argues that the number of participants was minimal and would have
26 | P a g e

required intervening forces to protect the many from the few, he does not address the fact
that at the time of genocide, the Tutsi only represented 10% of the population. 23 Therefore,
while the majority of the Hutu people in Rwanda did not in fact participate in the slayings,
the number of those who did was perhaps half the amount of people they were targeting, and
while they were armed with weapons and a thirst to kill, the Tutsi were unarmed and
untrained. While Habyarimanas regime began preparations for the genocide in 1990, gaining
support was a slow transition. The first call for violence prompted at most 7,000 Hutu to
respond, indicating that the majority of Hutu participants did not initially conform extremist
notions that regarded the Tutsi as a significant threat that needed to be eliminated suggests
that the use of ethnic norms, rules instituted and enforced within an ethnic group to shape
the behavior of its members toward rivals caused the drastic surge in Hutu support. The
creation of threats and incentives (punished abstention from the genocide with fines,
beatings, rape and death and rewarded participation with land, crops and pillaged goods The
following question that then needs to be ask is whether supporters were mobilized because
they wanted to reap the rewards for participating or Hain: The Rwandan Genocide 15 avoid
the punishments for abstaining. Individual adherence to a behavioral norm, defined in ethnic
terms, is driven in large measure by the threat of sanctions for non-compliane.24 He goes to
suggest that without punishment, except for extremists, most members of an ethnic group
would not participate because of the cost of taking part in violence. In this instance however,
when the cost for not participating is death and violence and the cost for participating could
also be death and violence in addition to the atrocious moral implications for supporting or
actively contributing to the brutal murder of thousands of innocent people, perhaps the latter
explains why the majority of the Hutu did not in fact take part in the genocides and maybe
even fought alongside Tutsi or sheltered them from the massacres.
For those who did participate in the genocide, should it be concluded that
they had a predisposition to violence which was triggered by certain events such as the death
of President Habyarimana or the RPF invasion in 1999? Or perhaps, they were indeed
convinced by the hateful messages of propaganda that claimed the Tutsi were to blame for
their structural disadvantages or posed a threat to their security. What impact did the
opportunism have on compliance? Mueller (2000) contends that the army consisted of
23 Mueller, 1999, pp. 61).
24 (Bhavnani, 2006; Des Forges, 1999). Rather, Bhavnani (2006, pp.652)
27 | P a g e

50,000 men who were generally peasants, unemployed or drifters and took part in the in the
genocide for looting, nourishment and shelter, indicating that they were indeed motivated by
the economic gains that genocide had to offer. Yet, according to Varshney (2003, p.89) the
masses have often been much more willing to come out on the street for ethnic issues than for
economic ones. If the they did not value ethnicity, why would they respond so passionately to
ethnic appeal? Yet it was perhaps not ethnic appeal that the masses were responding to but
rather fear. Afterall, Habyarimana had portrayed the Tutsi as a danger to Rwanda and the
Hutu, going as far as to stage attacks that were portrayed as being carried out by the RPF.
People in both ethnic groups are deeply afraid of being attacked and attack first, in
"defensive attack," to avoid the fate they think is awaiting them.
c. Juvenal Habyarimana and the MRND
President Habyarimana and his political party were the primary, manipulative force in the
onset and execution of the Rwanda genocides. While their motivations appeared to be rooted
in their Hutu devotion and concern for its people, it is evident that their interest were not
merely ethnic, With the brutality they exerted towards the Tutsi, they did not hesitate to kill
their own people if they interfered, President Habyarimana and his political party were the
primary, manipulative force in the onset and execution of the Rwanda genocides. While their
motivations appeared to be rooted in their Hutu devotion and concern for its people, it is
evident that their interests were not merely ethnic. With the brutality they exerted towards
the Tutsi, they did not hesitate to kill their own people if they interfered, proving that their
concern was not limited to protecting the members or the identity of their entire ethnic group.
By targeting all Tutsis as well as the Hutus that opposed the Hutu regime, it is unquestionable
that their reasons for organizing a mass killing were not Hain: The Rwandan Genocide 9
necessarily to ethnically cleanse the Rwandan population but rather to remove ANYONE
who could pose a threat to its authority. Whenever this elite was threatened, it exacerbated
ethnic divisions to thwart democratization and power sharing By spreading hateful
messages, the Hutu regime depicted the Tutsis as a violent threat to the Hutus in order to
generate fear that would rally them to join in the killings. President Habyarimana and his
political party may have perceived the Tutsi as a threat, but it was rather one to their political
prowess than of physical violence. Rather, they viewed this genocide as an opportunity to
manipulate Rwandas population and compose it only of citizens that favored them as the
political leadership of Rwanda. Their ideals were clearly not affiliated with those presently
considered Hutu but rather with their own understanding of what that ethnic group should
28 | P a g e

embody. The genocide served to remove anyone who did not identify with their concept of
Hutu ethnicity and was there for viewed as an opposition to the group. Horowitz (1985)
attributes the participation of the elite in ethnic conflict to theories of modernization. He
explains that by making men more alike, in the sense of possessing the same wants,
modernization tends to promote conflict In this particular instance, the one thing that the
RPF, the Habyarimana regime and the moderate Hutu political parties wanted was power and
while a multi-party system appeared to be a favorable solution that would provide each group
with a portion of political control, in hindsight the Hutu elite and arguably the RPF were not
amenable to power-sharing. The military, militias, and Hutu civilians While the president and
his political partners designed the plan for the Rwanda genocides, they had many groups that
helped exercise it.
d. Justice for the Genocide: An Overview of Progress Since 1994

Trials in Rwanda: Conventional Courts and Gacaca

Delivering justice for mass atrocities is a daunting challenge in any country, and the scale of
the Rwandan genocide would have overwhelmed even the best-equipped judicial system. In
Rwanda, the task was made more difficult by the fact that many judges, lawyers, and other
judicial staff were killed during the genocide, and much of the countrys infrastructure was
destroyed. Despite these challenges, the Rwandan government embarked on an ambitious and
unprecedented approach to delivering justice, using both conventional domestic courts and
community-based gacaca courts. Compared with most other countries emerging from mass
violence, Rwanda's determination to see justice done and its progress in trying so many
alleged perpetrators in less than 20 years have been impressive. But some have paid a high
price. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, in particular, thousands of people were arbitrarily
arrested, and many were charged and tried in the absence of solid evidence against them.
Some might have been wrongly convicted. The lack of safeguards against abusive
prosecutions in a weak judicial system heightened the risk of unfair trials.
In 1996, Rwanda adopted a new law governing the prosecution of genocide-related crimes.
Genocide trials began in December the same year in a highly charged environment. The legal
framework for these prosecutions was established, but the day-to-day demands on the newly
reformed justice system were unmanageable. Numerous defendants were convicted without
legal assistance as defence lawyers were scarce and often too afraid to defend genocide
suspects. The international nongovernmental organization Lawyers without Borders (Avocats
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sans frontires) provided important assistance through a pool of national and foreign lawyers,
but the needs far outweighed their capacity. The caseload created by the huge number of
people who participated in the genocide completely overwhelmed the courts, and the prisons
began overflowing. Thousands of prisoners died as a result of extreme overcrowding and lifethreatening prison conditions as they waited year after year for their cases to be processed. In
1998, 22 people were publicly executed, many after summary trials and some without legal
assistance. These were the only formal executions carried out in connection with genocide
trials. Other defendants were sentenced to death after these executions, but their sentences
were commuted when Rwanda abolished the death penalty in 2007.
By 1998, the total prison population had reached about 130,000, but only 1,292 people had
been tried. It became apparent that it would take decades to prosecute all those suspected of
involvement in the genocide.
e. Trials at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
In response to the genocide, the United Nations Security Council set up the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in 1994,25 with a mandate to prosecute persons
responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law
committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and
other such violations committed in the territory of neighboring states between 1 January 1994
and 31 December 1994. At time of writing, the ICTR had tried 75 individuals in 55 cases; 49
individuals were convicted; 14 were acquitted; 12 were awaiting the outcome of appeals. The
ICTR is currently winding down its operations and all proceedings are expected to conclude
by the end of 2014, with the exception of one case in which the appeal is due to conclude in
mid-2015.
The ICTR was only ever expected to try a small number of suspects: primarily those who
played a leading role in the genocide. To some extent, it has performed this task, and has tried
and convicted several prominent figures, including former Prime Minister Jean Kambanda,
former army Chief of Staff General Augustin Bizimungu, and former Ministry of Defence
Chief of Staff Colonel Thoneste Bagosora. The ICTR also set important precedents in the
development of international criminal law, such as the first-ever prosecution of rape as
genocide in the case of a former bourgmestre (mayor), Jean-Paul Akayesu. However, the
25 www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007157 (Accessed on
November 1st, 2015)
30 | P a g e

tribunal has inherent limitations, as is the case with most international tribunals, and attracted
criticism, particularly by Rwandans, for the relatively small number of cases it has handled,
its high running cost, bureaucratic processes, the length of time trials have taken, and the fact
that it was located outside Rwanda.
Perhaps the most significant failure of the ICTR has been its unwillingness to prosecute
crimes committed by the RPF in 1994, many of which constituted war crimes and crimes
against humanity. Although the ICTR had a clear mandate to prosecute these crimes (its
jurisdiction covers genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity), not a single RPF case
has been brought before the ICTR for prosecution, creating a sentiment among some
Rwandans and international legal observers that it provided only victors justice. Pressure
from the Rwandan government, combined with a reluctance to offend the government and
jeopardize its cooperation with the ICTR, resulted in the ICTR focusing exclusively on
genocide-related crimes. Relations between the government and the ICTR came to a head in
2002, when, in response to indications that the ICTR may have been planning to pursue
investigations into RPF crimes, the Rwandan government refused to cooperate with the ICTR
by facilitating the travel of witnesses from Rwanda and providing access to documents. These
obstacles were later lifted, but relations between the government and the ICTR have remained
cool. The government continues to criticize aspects of the ICTR's performance, particularly
when the tribunal has acquitted defendants or reduced their sentences on appeal.
In a further demonstration of the ICTRs unwillingness to handle these politically sensitive
cases, in 2008 ICTR Prosecutor Hassan Jallow transferred the case of four RPF officers
accused of killing 15 civilians in 1994 to the Rwandan national court system, for prosecution
inside the country. Human Rights Watch monitored the trial and concluded that it was a
political whitewash (see Justice for RPF crimes below).
f. ICTR Transfers to Rwanda

Since 2011, the ICTR has transferred several genocide cases to the Rwandan courts. The first
was that of Jean Bosco Uwinkindi, who was sent to Rwanda in April 2012. Preliminary
proceedings in his trial, as well as in the trial of Bernard Munyagishali who was sent to
Rwanda in July 2013, have begun in the High Court in Kigali. 26 The ICTR has also agreed to
transfer several other cases to Rwanda, including those of six indicted individuals who are
26 www.trial-ch.org/.../the-international-criminal-tribunal-for-rwanda.html
(Accessed on November 1st, 2015)
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still at large. These decisions have been controversial. In order to obtain the transfer of cases
from the ICTR, as well as extraditions of genocide suspects from other countries (see below),
the Rwandan government has undertaken a number of legislative reforms aimed at meeting
international fair trial standards. Some of these have been important and positive, for example
the abolition of the death penalty in 2007 and the creation of a witness protection unit.
Nevertheless, ICTR judges turned down several earlier requests by the ICTR prosecutor to
transfer cases to Rwanda, notably in 2008, as they did not consider that the Rwandan
judiciary could guarantee a fair trial. In the face of this refusal, the Rwandan government
introduced additional reforms, which eventually paved the way for the ICTR to agree to
transfer cases to Rwanda for domestic prosecution. Human Rights Watch has documented
major legal reforms in Rwanda in the last few years, but maintains the view, on the basis of
its own trial observations and research in Rwanda, that the Rwandan justice system still lacks
sufficient guarantees of independence and that fair trials cannot be guaranteed in all cases. 27
Although Human Rights Watch and other organizations brought these concerns to the
attention of the ICTR, most recently in 2011, the tribunal ruled that it was safe to transfer
these cases to the Rwandan courts on the basis that legislative reforms in Rwanda had
addressed some of its earlier concerns.
g. Trials in Foreign Countries

Many Rwandans fled their country during and after the genocide in 1994 and sought asylum
in various countries in Africa, Europe, North America, and elsewhere. Among those claiming
to be refugees were individuals suspected of having participated in the genocide. Over the
past 20 years, national authorities in some of the countries where Rwandan genocide suspects
are living have conducted investigations into these individuals alleged involvement in
genocide-related crimes, leading to a number of trials before the domestic courts of these
countries, under the principle of universal jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction refers to the
ability of national courts to try people suspected of serious international crimes, such as
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, or torture, even if neither the suspect nor the
victim is a national of the country where the court is located and the crimes took place
outside that country.
Trials of Rwandan genocide suspects have taken place in several countries including
Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Canada, Finland, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, and
27 https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda (Accessed on November 1st, 2015)
32 | P a g e

France. Dozens of criminal investigations are ongoing against other Rwandan genocide
suspects in these and other countries. In some cases, for example in the United States,
Rwandan genocide suspects were charged and tried on immigration-related offenses for
concealing their alleged role during the genocide. In some of these countries, many years
elapsed before trials began. For example, in France, a country to which a number of known
genocide suspects had fled after the genocide, it was not until February 2014 that the first
Rwandan genocide suspectPascal Simbikangwa, a former intelligence chief under the
Habyarimana governmentwas tried. This was the first case brought to trial by a newly
created war crimes unit in France. It was a significant moment, as France had backed the
former government of Rwanda and supported and trained some of the forces which went on
to commit genocide. On March 14, 2014, a court in Paris found Simbikangwa guilty of
genocide and complicity in crimes against humanity and sentenced him to 25 years in prison.
Just one month earlier, on February 18, 2014, a court in Germany delivered a guilty verdict in
the case of former mayor Onesphore Rwabukombe and sentenced him to 14 years
imprisonment for aiding and abetting genocide. These cases are important milestones in the
demonstration of international commitment to ensuring that perpetrators of the genocide are
held accountable, wherever they are found.
h. Extraditions

Until the first ICTR transfer decision, most countries denied extradition requests from
Rwanda. Over the last few years, however, governments have increasingly tended to seek the
extradition of genocide suspects to Rwanda to face trial there, rather than prosecute them in
their own courts. Following the ICTR decision to transfer its first genocide case (Uwinkindi)
to Rwanda in 2011, courts in several countries, including Sweden and Norway, followed suit
and agreed to extraditions. A ruling by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in
October 2011 that it was safe to extradite Sylvre Ahorugeze, a Rwandan genocide suspect
arrested in Sweden, reinforced this trend. Prosecutors and judges in extradition cases in
various countries have cited the ICTR and ECHR decisions as precedents when arguing in
favor of extradition.28
Extradition proceedings and appeals are currently ongoing in several countries, including in
the case of five Rwandans in the United Kingdom. Four of them had previously faced the
28 www.trial-ch.org/en/resources/trial-watch/.../legal-procedure.html (Accessed
on November 1st, 2015)
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prospect of extradition in 2009, but the High Court of Justice had concluded that they should
not be sent back to Rwanda because of the real risk of a flagrant denial of justice. [20] Fresh
extradition hearings are proceeding in this case at time of writing. One of the most prominent
Rwandans to be extradited is Lon Mugesera, a former academic and government official
accused of publicly inciting ethnic hatred and violence against Tutsi in the period leading up
to the genocide. A resident in Canada for many years, Mugesera was extradited to Rwanda in
January 2012. His trial at the High Court in Kigali began in February 2012 and is ongoing at
time of writing. Mugesera faces several charges, including planning of and public incitement
to genocide. The trial has been complex, with Mugesera appearing to deliberately prolong
some of the initial stages, claiming he needed more time to prepare his defense. 16 out of 28
prosecution witnesses have been heard so far. In principle, Human Rights Watch agrees that it
is best for grave international crimes such as genocide and crimes against humanity to be
prosecuted where they were committed, close to the victims and the affected population.
However, in the case of countries such as Rwanda where the justice system still lacks full
independence and the government can influence the outcome of trials, especially in
politically sensitive cases, Human Rights Watch has concerns about the opportunity for
suspects to receive a fair trial in domestic courts. In contrast to progress in trying perpetrators
of the genocide, very few RPF members have been held to account for the war crimes and
crimes against humanity they committed in 1994. These killings were not in any way
equivalent to the genocide, but the victims and their families have a right to see justice done.
Human Rights Watch believes that the impunity protecting most RPF members from
prosecution for these crimes has not only led to a sense that the RPF is above the law, but
may have hindered progress toward reconciliation in the aftermath of the genocide.
After the genocide, the new government formed by the RPF admitted that its troops had
carried out killings in 1994, but sought to downplay these crimes, describing them as isolated
cases of revenge and claiming that it was bringing those responsible to justice. To Human
Rights Watchs knowledge, fewer than 40 RPF soldiers have been tried for these crimes, and
most have received comparatively lenient sentences.29 They include four officers charged
with war crimes in connection with the murder of 15 civilians, including 13 clergy and a
young boy, in 1994. In a case initially prepared by the ICTR then handed over to Rwanda by
the ICTR prosecutor, a Rwandan military court in 2008 acquitted the two most senior officers
29 www.crimesofwar.org/commentary/ictr-accused-of-one-sided-justice (Accessed
on November 1st, 2015)
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and sentenced the two lower-ranking ones, who confessed to the killings, to eight years
imprisonment; their sentences were reduced to five years on appeal in 2009.Under the
original 2001 gacaca law, gacaca courts had jurisdiction over war crimes as well as genocide
and crimes against humanity, so they could conceivably have handled cases of RPF crimes
from 1994. However, the reference to war crimes was removed from the law in 2004 and the
government let it be known publicly and unambiguously that gacaca would not cover RPF
crimes.
For the vast majority of families of victims of RPF killings, there is therefore little hope of
seeing the perpetrators prosecuted. A few have attempted to demand justice for these crimes,
but it has been a difficult struggle. There are tight restrictions on free speech in Rwanda, and
few people dare broach publicly the sensitive subject of RPF crimes. Talking about those
crimes, and effectively departing from the official version of Rwanda's recent history, can
carry serious consequences, such as charges of genocide denial, genocide ideology or
divisionism (inciting ethnic divisions). Rwanda has passed a number of laws which may
originally have been intended to prevent and punish hate speech of the kind which led to the
1994 genocide, but in practice, have restricted free speech and imposed strict limits on how
people can talk about the genocide and other events of 1994.
Accountability for the Genocide: The Rwandan genocide has had a lasting impact on some of
Rwanda's neighbors, particularly Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo, where its
consequences are still felt today. Rwandas genocide was inextricably linked with events in
neighboring Burundi, a country with a similar ethnic make-up to Rwanda and a parallel,
extremely bloody history. Not only was Burundi's president, Cyprien Ntaryamira, killed at the
same time as Rwanda's president Habyarimana on April 6, 1994, but six months earlier, on
October 21, 1993, Burundis first Hutu democratically-elected president, Melchior Ndadaye,
was also assassinated. Ndadaye's assassination unleashed a wave of ethnic massacres in
Burundi in which tens of thousands of Tutsi and Hutu were killed in late 1993 and early
1994.30
The violence in Burundi directly fuelled tensions in Rwanda, and the weak international
reaction to these massacres may have emboldened Hutu extremists in Rwanda to proceed
with their genocidal plans. In Burundi too, events in Rwanda deepened ethnic divisions and
30 www.usip.org/.../rwanda-accountability-war-crimes-and-genocide (Accessed on
November 1st, 2015)
35 | P a g e

fear: Hutu and Tutsi watched in shock as the genocide unfolded just across the border.
Remarkably, ethnic violence in Burundi has practically ceased in recent years, but has been
replaced by political violence.
On the international level, the genocide in Rwanda eclipsed events in Burundi, but the
killings and other widespread ethnic violence in Burundi continued long after the Rwandan
genocide had ended, developing into a protracted armed conflict that lasted many
years. There has been little accountability for most of the crimes committed in Burundi in the
1990s. Some Hutu and Tutsi were arrested and detained in connection with the violence, but
most of those responsible for ordering the killings at a higher level, on both sides, have not
been held accountable. The Burundian government has repeatedly promised to establish a
Truth and Reconciliation Commission to cover past crimes, but by early 2014, the draft law
establishing the commission has still not been adopted.
In November 1996, the new Rwandan army formed by the RPF, the Rwandan Patriotic
Army31 (RPA), backed by Uganda, invaded Congo to destroy the refugee camps, and,
together with a hastily constituted Congolese rebel group, the Alliance of Democratic Forces
for the Liberation of Congo-Zare (Alliance des forces dmocratiques pour la libration du
Congo-Zare, AFDL), overthrew the countrys president, Mobutu Sese Seko, who had backed
the Rwandan Hutu extremists. The attacks on the refugee camps killed thousands and forced
the return to Rwanda of many of the surviving Hutu refugees. Many were arrested on their
return to Rwanda on accusations of genocide; others were among thousands killed by the
RPA in counter-insurgency operations in northwestern Rwanda in the late 1990s.[29] Those
refugees who did not return to Rwanda, including large numbers who had not been involved
in the genocide, fled deep into the forests of Congo, where Rwandan and AFDL troops
massacred tens of thousands of them.Today, Congo remains unstable, and violence continues
in

the

east.

One

reason

is

that

some

members

of

the

former

Rwandan

army,interahamwe militia, and other individuals suspected of having participated in the

genocide formed an armed group in eastern Congo. After using a succession of different
names, this group became known as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
(Forces dmocratiques pour la libration du Rwanda, FDLR). Many members of the FDLR
today are too young to have participated in the genocide in Rwanda; however, their leaders
and combatants still include some individuals believed to have participated in the
31 www.jstor.org/stable/161382 (Accessed on November 1st, 2015)
36 | P a g e

genocide.The FDLR, still predominantly a Rwandan Hutu armed group, conducted sporadic
attacks in Rwanda after the genocide, but these have almost ceased in more recent years as
the FDLR has become significantly weakened. However, the FDLR continues to commit
horrific violence against Congolese civilians, sometimes in alliance with Congolese armed
groups. Some of its members have returned to Rwanda through an official disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration process, overseen by the UN, but others have resisted return
and continue to keep thousands of Rwandan refugees hostage in Congo.
There has been some progress in prosecuting FDLR leaders for crimes committed in Congo.
In November 2009, two FDLR leaders, Ignace Murwanashyaka and Straton Musoni, were
arrested in Germany on charges of belonging to a terrorist organization and bearing command
responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Congo. Their trial
began in May 2011 and is ongoing at the time of writing. Several other FDLR members have
been indicted by a German court for membership of a terrorist organization engaging in war
crimes and crimes against humanity. Investigations are ongoing in other countries.
The International Criminal Court (ICC) has indicted two FDLR leaders for war crimes and
crimes against humanity committed in Congo. The first, FDLR Executive Secretary Callixte
Mbarushimana, was arrested in France in October 2010 on the basis of an ICC arrest warrant,
but pre-trial judges declined to confirm the charges against him for lack of sufficient
evidence, and he was released from the courts custody in December 2011. Mbarushimana is
also under investigation by a French war crimes unit in relation to crimes allegedly
committed during the genocide in Rwanda. The second, Sylvestre Mudacumura, military
commander of the FDLR, was indicted by the ICC in May 2012; he remains at large in
Congo at the time of writing.
i.

Human Rights organizations on Rwandan Genocide

Despite repeated warnings by Rwandan and international human rights organizations,

diplomats, UN staff and others that a genocide was being prepared, governments and
intergovernmental bodies, including the United Nations and the Organization of African
Unity (now the African Union), dramatically failed to act to prevent the genocide as it
unfolded in 1994. The UN peacekeeping force that was present in Rwanda withdrew most of
its troops at the height of the massacres, leaving the Rwandan civilian population without
defense or protection. Given that many of the killings during the genocide were carried out by
civilians using machetes and clubs, rather than by military using firearms, UN peacekeepers
37 | P a g e

could have saved many lives by intervening at an early stageall the more so if their
numbers had been increased and their mandate strengthened. Instead, most of the
peacekeepers withdrew, giving free rein to the genocidal killers.32
French troops eventually intervened in June, two months into the genocide, with UN
Security Council authorization. France's intervention, known as Opration Turquoise, was
problematic, as the French government had long supported the government of President
Habyarimana and continued supporting the interim government during the genocide. Many
observers condemned its intervention as an attempt by France to save its former allies from
defeat and slaughter by the RPF. However, Opration Turquoise did also succeed in saving
some Tutsi during the last month of the genocide.In the following months and years, as the
horror of the Rwandan genocide sank in, never again became a common refrain. A number
of world leaders acknowledged, and some apologized for, their failure to halt the genocide in
Rwanda. They included former US president Bill Clinton, former UN Secretary General Kofi
Annan (who was Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping at the time of the Rwandan
genocide), and former Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt.
Overwhelming guilt at their individual and collective failure to stop the genocide has been a
defining factor in many governments foreign policy towards Rwanda since that time. Twenty
years on, it continues to color international perceptions of and reactions to events in Rwanda
and in the Great Lakes region, especially in relation to the human rights situation in presentday Rwanda and Rwandas repeated incursions into Congo.In terms of justice, the genocide
in Rwanda, together with the wars in the Balkans, marked a turning point in international
commitment to including accountability and criminal trials as part of responses to grave
crimes under international law. The creation of the ICTR in 1994, and the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia the year before, paved the way for international
justice. One important and direct legacy of the genocide in Rwanda was the creation of the
permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) in 1998. Today, there is a fledgling system of
international justice with a court of last resort that is tasked with limiting the repetition of
horrors of the kind Rwanda experienced in 1994 and trying perpetrators where the national
courts are unable or unwilling to do so. The ICC is the first permanent international criminal
court whose mandate is not limited to a specific situation but which has broad jurisdiction

32 www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/ (Accessed on November 1st, 2015)

38 | P a g e

over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. The ICC currently has 120 state
parties and is investigating grave international crimes in eight countries.
Although international justice mechanisms have contributed to addressing some of the
crimes committed during the Rwandan genocide, the Rwandan government has been very
critical of the ICC. Rwanda, which is not a member of the ICC, has complained that the court
has disproportionately targeted African countries and described the ICC as a tool of Western
powers against developing nations. In its nearly 18 months as an elected member of the UN
Security Council, Rwanda has consistently opposed references to the ICC in thematic
resolutions and statements.33

33 https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/201/39240 (Accessed
on November 1st, 2015)
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Chapter VI
Conclusion
To fully understand the genocide that occurrend in Rwanda during 1994, one must understand
Rwandas history. The countrys beginning was plagued by unfair class structures and
hierarchies and unfair treating of group of its people during the days of it being a colony.
Division and conflict was created between its people by the country that colonized it and
these divisions remained and grew more and more evident over the years until it eventually
overflowed into genocide. These were not the only reasons, however, for the genocide.
Rwanda has historically been a rather poor nation and the decline in its economy left its
people disastisfied and frustrated. Many were willing to take any measure to see prosperity
in their lives. This even included killing their own neighbor.
The genocide that occurred was devastating not only to the people of Rwanda, but also to the
economy and government as well. And even though Rwanda has made a lot of progress in
the years following the genocide to try to make things right and to bolster its economy and
revamp its government, there is still a lot more that needs to be done in order for Rwanda to
be a prospering nation. Rwanda needs to be more democratize and more freedoms need to be
given to its citizens. Also, it needs to see economic growth. It cannot rely on one product to
be such a large percentage of its foreign trade. When the drought hit the country in 1989, it
devastated the economy because the product that accounted for 75% of its foreign trade came
from farming. The economic market of Rwanda needs to be more balanced in the future so
that this situation will not occur. Again, substantial progress has been made in Rwanda, but
there is still a lot more that needs to be done for Rwanda to see any kind of prosperity and for
its people to feel safe and free. Although it has never been determined who was truly
responsible for the assassination, Hutu extremists profited the most from Habyarimanas
death. Within 24 hours after the crash, Hutu extremists had taken over the government,
blamed the Tutsis for the assassination, and begun the slaughter. Since 1973, president
habyarimana, a hutu, had run a totalitarian regime in rwnada, which had excluded all Tutsis
from participating. That changed on August 3, 1993 when Habyarimana signed the Arusha
Accords, which weakend the Hutu hold on Rwanda and allowed Tutsis to participate in the
government. This greatly upset Hutu extremists.
Twenty years on, significant progress has been achieved in bringing some of the
perpetrators to justice, both nationally and internationally. The combination of national and
40 | P a g e

international action to end impunity for the genocide in Rwanda has also marked a turning
point in the development of justice for international crimes more broadly. Human Rights
Watch encourages the Rwandan government and other governments around the world to
pursue efforts to arrest and prosecutein fair and credible trialsother perpetrators who are
still at large. The Rwandan authorities should also bring to justice RPF members responsible
for carrying out or ordering war crimes or crimes against humanity in 1994, and ensure that
families of the victims of these crimes, as well as witnesses, are able to speak freely about
these events without fear for their security. Finally, Human Rights Watch encourages the
Rwandan government to pursue its reforms of the justice system with a view to further
strengthening its independence, and to enable those who suffered serious miscarriages of
justicewhether defendants or survivors of the genocideto seek a review of their cases
within a reasonable period. This would not only provide an opportunity for redressing these
errors, but demonstrate deeper commitment to delivering fair and credible justice for the
genocide. It would also serve as an example to other countries in the region in terms of
enforcing accountability for grave crimes.

41 | P a g e

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