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Mystics and Atheists

The Falun Gong in Relation to Civil Society and the Public Sphere in China

Tim Hagen
Caldwell
Long Essay
May 15, 2000

Over the last year, stories of the silent protests of the Falun Gong sect and the
massive governmental crackdown in response have periodically graced newspapers
around the world. After the June 4th incident in Tiananmen Square almost eleven years
ago, the world media have been hungry for any more news of popular protest against the
government in China. When in 1999 10,000 Falun Gong members surrounded Beijings
leadership compound to silently protest government persecution, the Western
democratic world looked in awe: could this event, with citizens peacefully trying speak
to power through their acts, actually be the beginnings of civil society or even the public
sphere? In light of a historical example such as the Evangelical Lutheran Churchs role in
former East Germany in nurturing and harboring the peace movement that staged massive
demonstrations for peace and human rights, which in turn led to the disintegration of the
communist leadership, the similar, sustained, peaceful, and articulate demonstrations by
large numbers of people in the Falun Gong may undermine the authoritarian government
of China and bring reform. Indeed, because of the Falun Gongs similarity to the
Evangelical Lutheran Church in the former German Democratic Republic, or the
Catholic-Church-supported Solidarity movement in Poland, the Falun Gong seems to
fulfill Richard Madsens broad definition of civil society inasmuch as it is a form of
social activity independent of the state (189). Yet the Falun Gong, although one of the
few, or perhaps even the only member of civil society in China, is not a kernel of an
incipient public sphere in China. For not only does the Falun Gong fail to meet Madsens
definition that the public sphere is characterized by rational communication with groups
different from themselves (190), but it also falls squarely into Habermass definition of
the transformed and corrupted public sphere and thus does not meet his requirements for

a true public sphere. Therefore, the Falun Gong, while a part of civil society in China, is
not the beginning of a public sphere.

The Falun Gong and Civil Society

In light of the definitions of civil society in China offered by Richard Madsen,
Heath Chamberlain, and Craig Calhoun, the Falun Gong is indeed part of Chinese civil
society, but in itself does not comprise the whole of civil society. In the aftermath of the
crushed democracy movement of 1989 in China, these three scholars sought to clarify
discussions on the emergence of civil society and the public sphere in China by offering
definitions of both civil society and differentiating it from the public sphere, the
definition of which is thoroughly explored by Jrgen Habermas.
In comparison to Madsens definition of civil society, the Falun Gong fares quite
well. Madsens broad definition of civil society encompasses not only the economic and
political aspects but also the moral and cultural dimensions of contemporary social
transformations (184). The Falun Gong, as a religious organizationalthough it denies
both labels of religion and organization (Li News Release)meets the moral aspect of
Madsens civil society. Furthermore, the Falun Gong gives religious interpretation to the
world around it, and through its demands for religious freedom and experience of
persecution has become a moral community according to Madsens definition. Madsen
says, civil society is a matter of moral ecology or the moral relationships of a certain
group (194)1. Thus the Falun Gong, which interprets the common societal symbols of
science, history, and medicine seems to fully fit the definition of a moral community, and
thus a part of civil society.

Chamberlain also would probably define the Falun Gong as part of civil society.
Chamberlain takes centrist view of civil society by saying that it is a relatively
autonomous entity, distinct from both state and society but that it nevertheless partakes
of both, and faces and constantly interacts with both (207). The Falun Gong likewise is
separate from the Chinese state and society, but interacts and appeals to both for
recognition and acceptance. Li Hongzhi, founder of Falun Gong, claims 100 millionplus Falun Gong practitioners (Li News Release), thus demonstrating the popularity of
the practice. Although Falun Gong is practiced by millions of people in China and
throughout the world, it is not itself society. The site http://ppflg.china.com.cn contains
numerous denunciations of the Falun Gong by China, using a term that apparently is
meant to imply both the Chinese government and the Chinese society. The site
demonstrates Falun Gongs separation from state and society through many articles
containing condemnations of the Falun Gong by government officials and by various
members of society such as families, scientists, and religious leaders. Falun Gongs
demonstrations in front of media and government offices around China, and then the
demonstration surrounding Beijings leadership compound in 1999 indicate an attempt to
communicate with the government as a distinctly non-governmental body (Smith 4),
further reinforcing itself as a within Chamberlains definition of civil society. Falun Dafa
another name for Falun Gongalso has many websites to argue its case before the
world in a further attempt to speak to societyalthough those reading the web pages are
more likely to be from North America or Europe than from China. Rather than working
within state channels, the Falun Gong took the radical step of appealing to the Chinese
government as an independent body and publicly disagreeing with government policy.

Thus as a community separate from both state and society, yet interacting with both, the
Falun Gong fulfills Chamberlains definition of civil society.
Craig Calhoun offers a defense for the existence of civil society in China in his
work Neither Gods nor Emperors. By the very fact that he does so without including the
Falun Gong, he brings the seemingly obvious but important distinction that the Falun
Gong is only a part of civil society in China, but does not itself constitute civil society.
Madsen, although he discusses the moral interaction of individuals within a society
implies that these individuals could form civil society by belonging to only one group,
such as Solidarity, and civil society does not necessarily entail multiple smaller
communities. Calhoun, on the other hand, discusses the multiple civil society institution
small entrepreneurs, think tanks, poetry journals and role of each in the 1989 prodemocracy protests (196). He also mentions three dimensions of civil society, all of
which matter and are connected (197) thus indicating the breadth and complexity of
civil society. These three dimensions include the capitalist free market, social
movements like Solidarity, or the sort of public sphere thought to exist in cafes and
coffeehouses (197). Although Calhoun does not specifically include religious
movements in his analysis of civil society during the spring of 1989, Falun Gongs
independent nature and seemingly well-organized peaceful protests match what Calhoun
is looking for in civil society. In fact, the ability of Falun Gong practitioners to maintain
constant and peaceful pressure on the government for over a year through frequent public
protests indicates a organizational and ideological depth and commitment that would
most likely impress Calhoun, who noted the insufficient development of civil society
institutions as a reason for the pro-democracy movements failure in 1989 (196). Thus the

Falun Gong is, by the standards of Madsen, Chamberlain, and Calhoun, part of civil
society.

Falun Gong and the Public Sphere

As a part of civil societyone of many entities in China separate from both state
and society but interacting and influencing boththe Falun Gong has the potential to
participate in a public sphere. Yet despite Calhouns arguments for the existence of civil
society in China in the three dimensions he described, these various individuals and
organizationsincluding the Falun Gongin this civil society are not part of a public
sphere inasmuch as they are not in open, public rational-critical discourse with one
another. The Falun Gong, as one of the most prominent and active members of civil
society in China, would seem to have the potential to lead the development of a public
sphere in China. But if the Falun Gong is demonstrably not the public sphere or a
member thereof, then one could by extension imply the lack of a public sphere in the
greater Chinese civil society.
Calhoun, in his analysis of the existence of a public sphere in China during the
1989 pro-democracy movement claims that Tiananmen Square actually became a
genuine place of public discussion (196) and by implication, a public sphere where
people came together to form a public, engage in discussion, and speak truth to power in
a Habermasian sense. While Tiananmen Square was a public sphere only for a time it
was so in part because like the classical public sphere in which bourgeois men gathered to
represent the rest of the population, the students in Tiananmen claimed to be the
vanguard (Calhoun 262) representing that nation. Yet the Falun Gongif really 100

million practitionersis far larger than the one million involved in the 1989 Tiananmen
demonstrations. Despite this large number, however, the Falun Gong cannot be a public
sphere because it does not have the authority to represent the rest of China. As
cultivation (Li Press Release) is the unifying factor among Falun Gong practitioners,
and not public appeals to reasonintegral to a public sphere according to Habermas (54),
the Falun Gong is not a public sphere.
In addition to not being a public sphere despite its great size and membership
from almost all walks of Chinese life, the Falun Gong is also not part of a public sphere.
Even according to Madsens rather liberal interpretation of the Habermasian public
sphere2, the Falun Gong fails to live up to membership in a public sphere. Madsen,
following his discussion of moral communities as groups that go through the process of
interpreting common symbols says that the members of such a community form a public
sphere when they can interact in horizontal communication among disparate members of
a political community in rational, understandable language that is open to critical
scrutiny by all (195). Yet religions, by nature, usually do not engage in open rationalcritical interpretation of common symbols, and thus have difficulty fitting Madsens
definition of a public sphere.
Madsen further defines an ideal public sphere as a place where citizens can
safely discuss their different memories within the bounds of civility (196). In this sense,
the Falun Gong actually seems to have a chance at forming a public sphere, as it engages
in peaceful or civil demonstrations to communicate its desire for religious freedom to
society and government, and as it also has web sites offering the teachings of Li Hongzhi,

press releases, and video news releases in an attempt to civilly argue its case with all who
are willing to listen.
This area of civil appeals to public opinion does indeed seem to qualify the Falun
Gong as a participant in the public sphere. Indeed, the web-based battle by the Falun
Gong and the Chinese government for the support of world opinion seems to indicate the
existence of some form of the public sphere. But the very word battle indicates that the
argument is not pursued for the sake of reason and consensus, but for the sake of victory.
Battle is also a very apt term for the rhetorical conflict between the Falun Gong and the
Chinese state-controlled media. Yet this battle for the support of world opinion fits
Habermass definition of the transformed public sphere to such a degree that it cannot be
termed a characteristic of the ideal pubic sphere.
First of all, the Falun Gong seems to be doing a spectacular job in swaying public
opinion by their mere actions. For example, in a recent Associated Press news article,
Falun Gong members demonstrating in Tiananmen square on May 13 to commemorate Li
Hongzhis birthday were described as raising up banners and chrysanthemums and then
being punched, knocked over and dragged away by the police. The journalist also
described color contrasts, saying chrysanthemums were all yellow, a traditionally
auspicious color adopted by the Falun Gong, which after the protesters were dragged
away remained on the squares gray paving stones. The journalists descriptive style
and contrast between the yellow, delicate flowers, which seem to symbolize the
innocence of the peaceful protesters, and the hardness and bleak color of the stones,
which seem to represent the unfeeling brutality of the state, appear as obvious attempts to
sway the reader by someone trained to respect non-violent protest and religious freedom.

The Falun Gong, by using peaceful protests, reaffirms its role as a moral community and
includes much of the world in this moral community inasmuch as it uses the symbols of
nonviolence, flowers, civil disobedience, and opposition to an authoritarian regime,
which are interpreted very uniformly and sympathetically in the western world.
Li Hongzhi flatly denies or tries to explain the various criticisms and claims
brought against him by the Chinese government. According to a Falun Gong site, he has
called for a resolution of the current crisis through a dialogue with the Chinese
government, reaffirming Falun Gongs non-political, non-violent character (News
Release). This statement strongly supports the idea that the Falun Gong is open to civil
discussion, and thus quite close to Madsens interpretation of the public sphere. The
Falun Gong defines a cult as a secretive organization, and because it openly offers texts
and other learning tools on the Falun Gong on the Internet and does not keep membership
records or collect money from practitioners, it claims not to be a cult (News Release).
The Chinese government also tries to engage in apparent public argumentation
against the Falun Gong. On a page such as china.com.cn the Chinese governmentcontrolled press puts forth to its own citizens and the world accusations against the Falun
Gong. Some such accusations claim that 1,500 followers of Falun Gong have died either
from suicide or refusing medical care (china.com, AsiaWeek). One interesting article at
china.com.cn that under the title of Analysis of Falun Gong Leaders Malicious
Fallacies actually ventures beyond mere derogatory labels to indirectly present some of
Li Hongzhis ideas that man was created by gods and life and death and disease are
debts acquired in previous lives. In giving these indirect portrayals of Mr. Lis teaching
(they are in fact amazingly consistent with his teachings on karma at http://minghui.ca)

the Chinese media seems to hark back to 1989 when, according to Calhoun, they showed
amazing objectivity by hinting at two sides of a story (206).
The Chinese government and the Falun Gong, in their appeals using a semblance
of rational argumentation in the public forums of Tiananmen Square, the news media, and
the internet, seem somewhat to form a public sphere on the global level. But in reality,
these two groups fulfill Habermass definition of the transformed public sphere and thus
do not constitute a genuine public sphere.
Habermas, in his work, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere
argues that one characteristic of the modern, corrupted public sphere is that special
interest groups lobby not for consensus-making through open rational-critical debate, but
rather through the manipulation of public opinion and an acclimation-based method of
democracy in which special-interest groups, businesses, media, or political parties put
forth pre-formulated platforms and then attempt to gain public support through
advertising rather than rational-critical debate (216). The Falun Gong makes claims that it
is not a religion, by creating a shaky definition of a religion as a group with a rigid
organizational structure, a collection plate where donations are accepted at every service,
and fundraising activities (News Release). Thus the Falun Gong tries to deny almost
every charge against it, even if denials take such convoluted and almost irrational forms
such as the denial of the Falun Gong being a religion. The Falun Gong video news release
contains this denial even though the same site discusses Falun Gong beliefs such as
karma and chi, which come from Buddhism and Taoism respectively, and has many other
spiritual belief, the most striking of which is perhaps belief in the Falun, a law wheel that
is also an intelligent being and which spins in the lower abdomen and provides a

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practitioner with a constant balance and flow of Gong, or cultivation energy (China Falun
Gong). Thus although asking for the freedom to practice Falun Gong, the practitioners
and leaders appeal more to the common symbolsin this case idealsof religious
freedom and freedom of expression in an attempt to win public acclamation and thus
exert pressure on the Chinese government than any attempt to reason with the
government.
Although Madsens definitions of civil society and the public sphere seem to
greatly favor the Falun Gong, an experience by the New York Times writer Craig Smith
seems to contradict an argument for the Falun Gongs civil attitude toward others. After
writing an article about Mr. Lis wifes new $600,000 home, he received many
complaints from Falun Gong practitioners, and even one saying You will get paid back
for what you said and did by gods (qtd Smith 4). Thus although the group may seem
quite civil in their peaceful protests, they can be quite threatening. Also, Madsens
argument that a public sphere is formed when moral communities interpret symbols in
similar ways goes against any claim that the Falun Gong and Chinese society and
government are in the same sphere, particularly as Smith noted that the officially atheistic
Chinese government has no effective means to counter the Falun Gongs religious
arguments. As Smith says that to counter the Falun Gong the Chinese government
cannot put forward its own view of spirituality, since it hasnt got one (4). This leads to
the government using force to counter the Falun Gong, as it cannot come up with much in
the way of religious arguments except to point out Lis lack of education and scientific
knowledge (china.com.cn). Thus in the realm of religious symbols, the Falun Gong and
the Chinese government have few substantial symbols to interpret, and thus are even

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more unable to engage in discussing and reaching understanding, if not consensus on the
interpretations of the symbols.

Conclusion
The Falun Gong, as independent from state and society, yet interacting with both,
is one of Chinese civil societys leaders. As a prominent member of civil society, the
Falun Gong offers some hope for also sparking the development of a public sphere if
through rational-critical debate it can reach consensus with other members of Chinese
civil society that the interpretation of common symbols entails demanding freedoms of
expression and religion from the government. Yet this hope is currently quite distant.
Although cited in Chinese media sources, the condemnation of the Falun Gong by many
disperse members of society and government, even including the American religious
leader and president of Trinity Broadcasting Network indicates that the Falun Gong has
not succeeded in building consensus. Yet in the realm of world opinion, the Falun Gong,
with its seemingly noble stand against government tyranny evokes much sympathy.
These hints and hopes of consensus or an international-media and web-based sphere of
public opinion crumble, however, in the face of Habermass definition of the corrupted
public sphere. For inasmuch as the Falun Gong meets Habermass description of a
transformed public sphere based on public opinion manipulation and acclamation rather
than rational-critical debate, the Falun Gong is not the public sphere nor is it part of a
genuine public sphere. Thus if the Falun Gong, the current leader of Chinese civil society
fails at moving towards the formation of a public sphere, little hope remains for the
development of a public sphere in China in the near future by any means.

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Works Cited
Associated Press. Falun Gong Followers Beaten by Cops.
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/i/AP-China-Banned-Sect.html
Calhoun, Craig. Neither Gods nor Emperors: Students and the Struggle for Democracy in
China. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.
Chamberlain, Heath B. On the Search for Civil Society in China. Modern China. 19.2
(1993): 199-215.
CNN. Chinese Police Crack Down on Falun Gong Sit-in.
http://www.cnn.com/2000/ASIANOW/east/05/11/china.falun.02/index.html
Falun Gong News Release: Video Transcript. http://minghui.ca/eng.html
Habermas, Jrgen. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a
Category of Bourgois Society. Trans. Thomas Burger. Cambridge, Massachusetts:
MIT Press, 1991.
Hongzhi, Li. China Falun Gong. http://www.flaundafa.org/book/eng/flg_2.html#b1
-

- -, Press Release: Statement by Master Li: On Falun Gong and the Situation in
China. http://minghui.ca/eng.html

Madsen, Richard. The Public Sphere, Civil Society and Moral Community: A research
agenda for Contemporary China Studies. Modern China. 19.2 (1993): 183-198.
China.com.cn. Safeguard the Well-being of the People-----Further Expose and Criticize
the CultFalungong. http://ppflg.china.com.cn/indexE.html
Smith, Craig. Rooting out the Falun Gong: China Makes War on Mysticism. New York
Times. 30 April 2000, sec 4: 1+.

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Of the three scholars, Madsen would probably be most willing to call the Falun Gong civil society,

as he terms the Polish Solidarity a civil society and uses the term certain group (194) to define
civil society, thus avoiding the more common definition that civil society is composed of multiple
groups in interaction with one another and with state and society, but independent of both.
2

A stricter reading of Habermas is given later in this essay.