Augustinian Studies 45:2 (2014) 203-225

doi: 10.5840/augstudies201411118

Complex Authorial Intention in Augustines Hermeneutics

Brett W. Smith
The Catholic University o f America

A bstract: Augustine held that scripture could have multiple true meanings, and
scholars of Augustine have given this topic considerable treatment. Some have
recognized the importance of divine authorial intention in this matter, but the rel
evance of ancient semantics to Augustines hermeneutics has not received sufficient
attention. Ancient speakers would often explain a concept in varied ways that could
all be considered true. This practice created the possibility that an author could
intend for certain terms to be understood in multiple ways. I call this a complex
authorial intention. After describing some of the prominent views on Augustines
multiple meanings of scripture, I will establish the concept of complex authorial
intention from ancient semantic practice. In the light of these first two sections I
will proceed to analyze three key texts in Augustines corpus: Confessions 12.30.41
and 13.24.37, as well as De Doctrina Christiana 3.2.2. I will argue that Augustine
saw complex divine authorial intention as a theoretical justification for the multi
plicity of meanings in scripture and that this view sets objective limits on the range
of possible meanings.

Introduction
A ugustines view that scripture can have m ultiple m eanings has been variously
understood. Som e scholars have appreciated the significance o f dual authorship
(hum an and divine) for this phenom enon,1 but the relevance o f ancient sem antics
1. One scholar who relates dual authorship to authorial intention in Augustines hermeneutics is Tarmo
Toom. In Tarmo Toom Was Augustine an Intentionalist? Authorial Intention in Augustines
Hermeneutics, SP 70 (2013): 186-189, Toom shows that Augustine agreed with the rhetorical
manuals that uoluntas auctoris (the will or intention of the author) was preferable to the scriptum

SMITH: COMPLEX AUTHORIAL INTENTION IN AUGUSTINES HERMENEUTICS

has not received sufficient attention. Ancient speakers would often explain a term
or concept in different ways that could all be considered true. This expansive ap
proach to semantic usage created the possibility that an author could intend for
certain terms to be understood in multiple ways. I call this a complex authorial
intention.*2 This concept, when considered along with dual authorship, may be the
key to understanding this difficult aspect of Augustines hermeneutics.
I will concentrate on three key texts in Augustines corpus: Confessions (conf.)
12.30.41-12.32.43 and 13.24.37, as well as De doctrina Christiana (doctr.: chr.)
3.2.2. After describing some of the prominent views on Augustines multiple mean
ings of scripture, I will provide some background on ancient semantics to establish
the concept of complex authorial intention. Then I will analyze the three key texts
in light of the foregoing sections. I will argue that Augustine saw complex divine
authorial intention as a theoretical justification for the multiplicity of meanings in
scripture and that this view sets objective limits on the range of possible meanings.

Prominent Views on Augustines Hermeneutics

No one can doubt that Augustine allowed for multiple valid meanings to be at
tributed to a text of scripture, but beyond this datum, interpretations of Augustine
diverge throughout the whole spectrum of the larger debate on textual interpretation
in general.3 At one end of the spectrum are those who consider Augustine to be a
(the lexical/syntactic meaning) if ever the two happened to disagree. Augustine also held that
the intention of the divine author was more important than that of the human author if they were
not identical. For a theory very similar to the one I defend in this paper, minus the discussion of
ancient semantics, see Richard A. Norris, Jr., Augustine and the Close of the Ancient Period of
Interpretation, in A History of Biblical Interpretation Volume 1: The Ancient Period, ed. Alan J.
Hauser and Duane F. Watson (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003), 397-399.
2. The term complex authorial intention is my own. Nevertheless, Gerald Downing, Ambiguity,
Ancient Semantics, and Faith, New Testament Studies 56 (2009): 150, seems to affirm the pos
sibility of such a phenomenon in his discussion of conf. 12: Moses can be taken to invoke an
idea or a plurality of ideas.
3. Recent and contemporary discussions of textual interpretation in general have often addressed
authorial intent, and scholars have arrived at differing answers. Some, like E. D. Hirsch, have
argued that the meaning of a text is the authors meaning, and that a valid interpretation there
fore requires the re-cognition of what an author meant. See E. D. Hirsch, Jr. Validity in In
terpretation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), 25, 126. Others, like Jacques Derrida,
have argued that texts cannot mediate the presence of their authors. See Jacques Derrida, Of
Grammatology (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 141-145. It would
follow from this that texts are isolated from their authors, who thus have no right to restrict their
possible meanings unless readers choose to grant it. See Robert Morgan and John Barton, Bibli
cal Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 6-8. For a discussion of this problem
that focuses upon Gadamer and his opponents, including Hirsch, see Burhanettin Tatar, Inter-

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proto-intentionalist in that he makes it the interpreters task to seek the intention

of the human who wrote the biblical text. They would explain his allegorical inter
pretation as a last resort if everything else fails.**4
Pamela Bright
Toward the other end of the spectrum are those who read Augustine as support
ing multiplicity of meaning throughout scripture with little limitation to the range
of possible meanings. Within her essay, Augustine: The Hermeneutics of Conver
sion, Pamela Bright addresses the multiplicity of meanings in scripture through
book 12 of conf., where Augustine discusses the Gen. 1 creation account. Here
Bright finds that the abyss of the scriptures, with all its diversity and multiplicity
. . . is the special focus of Book XII.5Yet for Bright it is not only the character of
scripture, but also the relationship of humans to truth itself that leads to multiplicity.
Concerning conf. 12.27.37, she states, The point is that truth cannot be grasped
or possessed in a single unfaltering glance (at least in the human condition); neither
can it be possessed by the individual interpreter.6
In a passage about how different authors find divergent but true meanings in
the words of Gen. 1, she notices the phrase truthful diversity and Augustines
plea for humility and love among interpreters.7 She further observes that Augustine
sees diverse interpretations as potentially good. After a long quotation from conf.
12.30.41-12.31.42, she explains, From such a perspective, hermeneutics in the
ecclesial community is to be governed by the scope of scripture which is to build up
the ecclesial community in love (not to divide by hubris), and to welcome diversity
of opinion as a richness.8 Here Bright offers some limitation to the range of pos
sible meanings: they must promote love in the church. While this, like several of
Brights observations, is correct, it is rather vague as a limit to the range of possible

4.

5.

6.
7.
8.

pretation and the Problem of Authorial Intention (PhD diss., Catholic University of America,
1997), 47-105.
A. D. Fitzgerald, ed., AttA (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1999), s.v. Hermeneutical
Presuppositions by Karla Pollmann, 427; See also Frances Young, Augustines Hermeneutics
and Postmodern Criticism, Interpretation 58, no. 1 (Jan. 2004): 50.
Pamela Bright, Augustine: The Hermeneutics of Conversion, in C. Kannengiesser, Handbook of
Patristic Exegesis, Volume 2, The Bible in Ancient Christianity, ed. D. J. Bingham (Leiden: Brill,
2004), 1226.
Ibid.; See quotation from conf. 12.27.37 (n.80).
Conf. 12.30.41 (CCSL 27:240); Bright, Hermeneutics, 1225 (n.5); See my comments on this
passage in the subsection dedicated to it below.
Bright, Hermeneutics, 1233 (emphasis hers) (n.5); cf. my comments on this passage in the
subsection dedicated to it below.

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meanings. She adds, At the same time, this dialogic mode would subject the
interpretive process to an austere critical reflection and the scriptures call for a
community of interpreters.9 In this way Bright places meaningful limitations on
the individual interpreter, but there remains no clear, objective limitation on how the
community may decide to interpret or re-interpret scripture. She conveys the overall
thrust of her view near the end of the essay: What Augustine says of the power of
memory.. . can be transposed to describe the scriptures: an awe-inspiring mystery,
my God, a power of profound and infinite multiplicity. It is characterized by diversity,
by life of many forms, utterly immeasurable (conf. X 17.26).10
Rowan Williams
Rowan Williams interprets the semiotics of doctr. chr. in a similar vein. He
quotes Geoffrey Hartman with approval: There is no absolute knowledge but
rather a textual infinite, an interminable web of texts or interpretation.*11Williams
understands the prominence of signs (signa) in Augustines theory to be moving
in this direction and to have affinities with the popular notion that everything is
language, everything is interpretation.12Although Williams says that all this does
not amount to a self-indulgent relativism, the only control he finds for the inter
pretation of scripture is that it must be directed towards caritas.13 This is the love
demonstrated by Christ in his incarnation and crucifixion, which for Williams is a
central metaphor to which the whole world of signs can be related. This metaphor
teaches that God only relates to humans in this fife through absence and deferral.14

9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Rowan Williams, Language, Reality, and Desire in Augustines De Doctrina, Journal o f Litera
ture and Theology 3, no. 2 (July 1989): 145.
12. Ibid., 145, 146.
13. Ibid., 143, 148.
14. Ibid., 148; Jeffrey McCurry, Towards a Poetics of Theological Creativity: Rowan Williams reads
Augustines De doctrina after Derrida, Modern Theology 23, no. 3 (July 2007), 423, has argued
that Williams is reading Augustine in the framework of Derridas differance to develop a scrip
tural hermeneutic in which the meaning is always future and always non-identical to a meaning
we now possess. He states with approval that in this reading Williams is not seeking after Au
gustines authorial intention (ibid.). If McCurry is correct, I will have to be content to talk past
Williams on this point of methodology. I am seeking to discern Augustines authorial intention in
the passages I analyze below. Whether Williams really is seeking Augustines authorial intention,
or whether he is only trying to offer a coherent reading of doctr. chr. as a Christian text, my inter
pretation of doctr. chr. 3.2.2 below challenges the validity of his reading by identifying a passage
that does not seem compatible with the thrust of his interpretation.

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This control rules out any theological interpretation of scripture in univocal terms,
but otherwise it seems to leave the signs of scripture open to whatever meanings
the interpretive framework of the reader may suggest.

Bertrand de Margerie
Bertrand de Margerie offers what may be a mediating position on Augustines
hermeneutics. He interprets Augustine as believing that each human author of scrip
ture had a primary meaning in mind, and possibly secondary meanings as well. 15
These intended meanings must form the biblical interpreters starting point, but ad
ditional secondary meanings may also come from the biblical text over time . 16 This
occurs due to the diachronic nature of language: different audiences at different
times inevitably understand the same written words to mean different things. 17 De
Margerie calls this phenomenon unipluralism or unified polysemy. 18 He places
no clear limitation on how or in what directions the secondary meanings of the text
may change over time, but he does imply a general limitation by recognizing that
Augustine felt that the ownership of biblical assertions is collective, ecclesial,
and divine. 19
One challenge to placing Augustine in the contemporary debate turns upon the
fact that he believed any given book in the Bible to have two authors, one human
and one divine, whose intention(s) may be relevant.20 For Augustine, the ques
tion of how authorial intent governs the meaning of a text hangs upon the further

15. Betrand de Margerie, An Introduction to the History o f Exegesis Volume III: Saint Augustine,
trans. Pierre de Fontnouvelle (Petersham, MA: Saint Bedes Publications, 1991), 59-60.
16. Ibid., 73-74.
17. Ibid., 75.
18. Ibid., 60, 73; De Margerie traces his own interpretation of Augustine through Gadamer and
Ricoeur (ibid., 74). He also builds self-consciously upon the tradition of Seraphin Zarb (ibid.,
58). According to Seraphin M. Zarb, Unite ou multiplicity des sens litteraux dans la Bible?
Revue Thomiste 15 (1932): 299, there are two kinds of literal sense, which he refers to as le sens
principal et sens adapte. Zarb explains: [L]e premier est celui que lhagiographe a eu en vue; le
second, qui nest pas necessairement compris par Thagiographe, est le sens litteral que d autres
peuvent comprendre dans les paroles inspirees (ibid., 199-300). Zarb understands both Thomas
Aquinas and Augustine to espouse this view (ibid., 298).
19. De Margerie, History o f Exegesis III, 62 (n.15).
20. See n. 1 above for references to recent scholarship on the relevance of divine authorial intention;
Hirsch, Validity, 126 (n.3), actually sees the dual authorship of scripture as consistent with his
theory in that the sensus plenior does not go beyond the willed type of the divine author. In
order to avoid violating the intention of the human author, he distinguishes the human authors
text from that of the divine author, even though they contain the same words.

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question of which authors intent is in view. He is devoted to the authorial intent

of the divine author, but he sees this as much broader than the single meaning that
a human author of scripture may have had in mind. In order to understand how
Augustine conceives of this situation, it is helpful to consider some aspects of the
ancient semantics in which he was trained.

Ancient Semantics
Scholars today are aware of the issue of ambiguity in ancient semantics.21 Am
biguity, or the phenomenon of one word having multiple meanings, was a topic of
discussion in the rhetorical manuals that Augustine studied, and he treats the topic
himself in De dialectica {dial. ) . 22 The manuals generally treated ambiguity as an
intentional feature of style used for questionable purposes.23 Aristotles statement
is noteworthy: People do this [i.e., use ambiguity] when they have nothing to say
but are pretending to say something. 24 The Stoics, who also may have influenced
dial., 25 saw ambiguity as a hindrance in language to be overcome.26 In the context
of dialectic, Augustine says, Every ambiguous word will . . . be explained by
non-ambiguous discussion . 27 Clearly, ambiguity was a problem to be solved; the
ambiguous word or phrase should receive clarification.28

21. For a discussion of how ancient authors generally described and dealt with ambiguity, see Tarmo
Toom, Augustine on Ambiguity, AugStud 38, no. 2 (2007): 407-408; For an extensive study of
Stoic thought on ambiguity, which also includes some treatment of Aristotle and Augustine, see
Catherine Atherton, The Stoics on Ambiguity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
22. Toom, Augustine on Ambiguity, 407^408 (n.21); Michael Cameron, Christ Meets Me Every
where: Augustines early figurative exegesis, in Oxford Studies in Historical Theology (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2012), 48-61.
23. See Toom, Augustine on Ambiguity, 408 (n.21), where he shows that ambiguity was used, for
example, in interpretation of legal texts, obscene entertainment, and political speeches; from the
manuals, see especially Quintilian, Inst. 8.2.
24. Aristotle, Rhetoric 3.4.5 1407a, quoted in Toom, Augustine on Ambiguity, 408 (n.21); See also
Aristotles Sophistical Refutations, where, considering them as fallacies of argument, he discusses
the various forms of ambiguity used by the Sophists. For a neat summary of the forms of ambigu
ity in the Sophistical Refutations, see Atherton, Stoics, 505-506 (n.21).
25. Atherton, Stoics, 456 (n.21): In the de dialectica he retails what may be Stoic argumentation
defending the Chrysippean thesis every word is ambiguous by nature, in which an assumption is
made of the possibility of disambiguation of single terms by context. See also 289-298.
26. Ibid., 502-504.
27. Dial. 9, quoted in Toom, Augustine on Ambiguity, 414 (n.21); the Latin is O m ne. . . ambiguum
uerbum non ambigua disputatione explicabitur (ibid.).
28. Ibid., 433.

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Expansive Semantics
What scholars have not always noticed, however, is a certain way ancient au
thors often clarified the meaning of their words.29 F. Gerald Downing has argued
that, rather than defining their terms the way scholars would today, ancient authors
often explained their meaning with paraphrases, examples, and alternative expla
nations.30 Their general conviction was that the idea they had in mind could be
evoked in various ways .31 Expressions may be shorter, longer, better illustrated,
29. Downing, Ancient Semantics, 142 (n.2), writing in the field of New Testament studies, lists
several works which have failed to take proper account of ancient semantics. For these references
see his nn.14, 15.
30. Downing, Ancient Semantics, 149 (n.2).
31. Ibid., 146; One can perhaps see this view reflected in Platos preference for oral dialogue over
written discourse, as he explains it in the Pliaedrus 275d-275e (LCL [1914] 36:565-567 [trans.
Fowler]), where Socrates says of written words, [I]f you question them . . . they always say only
one and the same thing. The consequence of this feature of writing is that [E]very word, when
once it is w ritten. . . always needs its father to help it; for it has no power to protect or help itself.
A written composition is limited to conveying the meaning(s) the author wrote down, but in per
son the author can expand upon what he has in mind until the reader/interlocutor understands. See
also Phdr. 276a-277a (LCL 36:567-571). For a discussion of Platos views on oral and written
discourse generally, see Paul Friedlander, Plato: An Introduction, trans. Hans Meyerhoff (New
York: Pantheon Books, 1958), 108-115. As for why Plato thought that an idea could legitimately
find expression in different linguistic explanations, Friedlander, Plato, 108, offers an important
clue: Logos with Plato becomes a living thing, pre-existing, as it were, before particular verbal
expressions and to be realized by the speaker. For Plato, there seems to be a kind of thought
that occurs prior to language in the mind. It is only natural, then, that such thought could find
expression in multiple verbal formulae and could even require multiple formulations for its full
expression. Platos theory of recollection (avdpvqtrtq), inasmuch as it assumes knowledge that
is prior even to the acquisition of language, pushes in the same direction. For a good discussion
of the platonic texts relevant to recollection, see Charles Kahn, Plato on Recollection, in A
Companion to Plato, ed. Hugh H. Benson (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 119-132.
(Kahn, however, does not seem to see the implication of pre-linguistic thought.) The Stoics also
appear to have believed that thought could precede language in the mind. See Jeffrey Bamouw,
Propositional Perception: Phantasia, Predication, and Sign in Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2002), 282-289. Bamouw argues that A complete
lekton is the mental proposing, that is composing and affirming, of a fact (ibid., 289). This in
ner mental proposition may be put into language, but it does not have to be. Barnouw explains,
[T]his internal articulation of perception, before language enters in, makes it possible for language
to enterin (ibid., 283). If there is mental articulation before mental speech, then it makes good sense
to think that speech, when it does enter, could convey the pre-linguistic thought in various ways.
Augustine seems to have held a view not unlike those of Plato and the Stoics (trim 5.prol. 1.1 [CCSL
50:206, trans. Hill, WSA, The Trinity second ed., 1/5, 189]): From now on I will be attempting to
say things that cannot altogether be said as they are thought by a man or at least as they are thought
by me (Hinc iam exordiens ea dicere quae dici ut cogitantur uel ab homine aliquo uel certe a nobis
non omni modo possunt). Since Augustine believed he could think more (or more precisely) than
he could express in words, he must have believed that at least some thoughts were pre-linguistic.

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more elegantly expressed, more or less persuasive, but all evoked the same
idea.32 In this way, clarification could be a matter of expanding meaning, rather
than contracting it. I call this approach to explaining ones intention expansive
semantics.33
The practice of expansive semantics goes back at least as far as Plato, who used
his dialogues to explore the various meanings associated with concepts such as
justice and piety.34 For example, in the Euthyphro Plato has the characters Socrates
and Euthyphro attempt a definition of piety (to ootov). They never arrive at a final
answer. Rather, the dialogue primarily analyzes and critiques a popular conception
of piety that it is what is dear to the gods.33 In order to explain this idea, which
the character Euthyphro advances early in the dialogue, Plato engages in expansive
semantics. He has Euthyphro state, as a revised definition, that piety is what all
the gods love.36 After Socrates demonstrates the problems with this description,
Euthryphro eventually suggests that piety is the part of the right which has to do
with attention to the gods.37 With Socratess help, he gradually explains that this
is understood to include gratifying the gods through prayer and sacrifice.38 Then
he says it is a science (7n<xnjpr|)39 of such practices and soon thereafter an art

32. Downing, Ancient Semantics, 146 (n.2).

33. The term expansive semantics is my own. Downing, Ancient Semantics, 141, 146-147 (n.2),
distinguishes between semantic polyvalence and the semantic richness of ancient naming. By
expansive semantics I mean to summarize and clarify the general import o f Downings discus
sion of both issues. I disagree with Downing, however, on one pointthe question of excluded
meanings. Downing, Ancient Semantics, 146 (n.2), states that normally among the ancients
[T]here is no attempt to discriminatelet alone then to prioritise and exclude various possible
senses, connotations, of the various possible terms deployed. Platos Euthyphro, however, does
carefully exclude some notions in the process of exploring the meaning of piety, as will be clear
below. While practicing expansive semantics generally adds meaning, rather than taking it away,
this does not mean that meanings may be added without rule or limitation, as Downing could be
understood to suggest.
34. Downing, Ancient Semantics, 145 (n.2).
35. Plato, Euthphr. 6e (LCL [1914] 36:22, trans. Fowler): Eaxt xoivuv xo psv xotq 0oiq 7cpoa<pikEC
Satov.
36. Plato, Euthphr. 9e (LCL 36:34, trans. Fowler): AXX fiycyyE cpaiqv dv xobxo slvat xo oatov 6 dv
itavxEC oi 0soi (pAmoiv.
37. Plato, Euthphr. 12e (LCL 36:46-47, trans. Fowler): xo uspoq xou Succdot) slvat eiiaefiec xe Kai
6cnov, xo itepi xqv xffiv Gecov Gepajtstav.
38. Plato, Euthphr. 14b (LCL 36:52): Leyco, 5xi eav psv Ksxaptcpeva xiq Eitiaxqxai xoiq QeoTc Xeyew
xe Kai ttpaxxEtv suxopevoq xe Kai Oucov, xaux foxt xa 8aia.
39. Plato, Euthphr. 14c (LCL 36:54, trans. Fowler): LflKPATHX.. . . ouyi E7tioxf|pr|v xiva xou Gustv
xe Kai EU'/EoGat; EY0YOPDN. "EytoyB.

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(texvri) of bartering with the gods.40 Finally, Euthyphro indicates that piety is that
which is precious to the gods. 41 Socrates judges this notion as inadequate, and the
dialogue ends shortly thereafter.42 Regarding the definition of piety, Plato seems
to have gotten nowhere, but he has explained something. Beginning from what is
dear to the gods and circling back to the same definition, he has both explained
and criticized different aspects of the conception of piety held by the character
Euthyphro. This is but one way expansive semantics were used.
At least some ancient scholars recognized and understood Platos practice of
expansive semantics. Roughly three centuries after Plato wrote, one of his followers
would describe the masters method in this way:
Speaking with multiple voices (To jroA,u<pcovov) is characteristic of Plato, and
even the subject of telos is expressed by him in several ways (noXXay&q). He
uses a variety of expressions because of his lofty eloquence, but he is contribut
ing to a single concordant item of doctrine. That doctrine is that we should live
in accordance with virtue.43
Platos immediate student and greatest opponent, Aristotle, left no dialogues
that survive but seems to have had the same idea about semantics. He saw that
being is described in many ways (to 8v Myzzm no/JMyjbq) . 44 In his Metaphysics,
after showing by example some of the very different ways one can correctly speak
40. Plato, Euthphr. 14e (LCL 36:54, trans. Fowler): SI2KPATHX. EfXTtopucfi apex ziq as eft), <x>
EuOtkppov, xexvt| f| dcrtdxiv; 0sot<; Kai dvOpomoic nap' aXhjljjov. EY0YOPQN. Epropuaj, ei
oiixwq rjSiov aoi ovopdtxiv.
41. Plato, Euthphr. 15b (LCL 36:56, trans. Fowler): EGKPATHE. Touxo dp 6cmv a\>, dx; soike,
Saiov, to xou; OeoTi; tpikov. EY0YOPDN. MdXiaxa ye.
42. Plato, Eythphr. 15c (LCL 36:56-58).

to

43. Ioannes Stobaeus, Anthologium 2.7.3f. (ed. Hense and Wachsmuth [Berlin: Weidmann, 1884]
2:49-50): To 5s ye Jtokncpcovov xov nXdxcovoq (on 7tokn5o^ov). Elpr|xai 56 Kai xa repi xon
xekorn; anxqj noKKa/ptc,. Kai xr|v p6v Ttouakiav xrjc tppdaecoq sysi 8ia xo koytov Kai peya),r|yopov,
si<; 86 xanxo Kai anpcpcovov xon Soypaxoq auvxEXst. Touxo 5 sari to Kax apExf|v Cpv.; Accord
ing to Downing, Ancient Semantics, 145 (n.2), who also cites this text, Stobaeus, writing in
the fifth century AD, is here relaying the opinion o f a first-century BC Platonist; The translation,
quoted from Downing (ibid.) is G. H. Van Kooten, Pauls Anthropology in Context: The Image o f
God, Assimilation to God, and Tripartite Man in Ancient Judaism, Ancient Philosophy and Early
Christianity (Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 146.
44. Aristotle, Metaph. 4.2, 1003b5 (LCL [1933] 271:146); Metaph. 4.2, 1003b (LCL 271:147-149,
trans. Tredennick): so being is used in various senses, but always with reference to one prin
ciple. For some things are said to be because they are substances; others because they are modi
fications of substance; others because they are a process towards substance, or destructions or
privations or qualities of substance, or productive or generative of substance or of terms relating
to substance, or negations of certain of these terms or o f substance.

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of being, he says that they all express one common notion (keyovxou Ka0ev).45
Aristotle, an enemy of the sort of ambiguity that hides meaning, is a practitioner of
the sort of ambiguity (or polysemy, polyvalence, etc.) that expands it. Here, unlike
the discussions where ambiguity was a problem to be solved, the multiple meanings
of a word could help to convey an authors intention. The key difference between
these situations seems to be the presence of explanation(s) to clarify the ambiguity.
Complex Authorial Intention
Aristotles discussion of being is also an example of what I call complex autho
rial intention.46 This occurs when an author intends for a word or other linguistic
expression to be understood in multiple ways. Plato may or may not exemplify
complex authorial intention. In his dialogues, he may be exploring ideas as he writes,
rather than having multiple meanings in mind with the first (or any other) usage of
a term. Aristotle, however, states the fact of multiplicity before he gives the various
meanings. Therefore, he must already have multiple meanings of being in mind
when he writes that being can be described in many ways.47
The Stoics did not typically use complex authorial intention in Aristotles way,48
but they clearly understood that it was possible for someone to intend that his words
be understood in multiple ways. Diogenes Laertius (D.L., third century AD), report
ing on Stoic philosophy of language, writes, Verbal ambiguity (Apqn(3oMa) arises
when a word (ke^v;) properly, rightfully, and in accordance with fixed usage denotes
two or more different things, so that at one and the same time we may take it in
several distinct senses.49Aulus Gellius preserves the thesis of the Stoic Chrysippus
(d. ca. 206 BC): Every word (uerbum) is by nature ambiguous (ambiguum), since
45. Aristotle, Metaph. 4.2, 1003bl5 (LCL 271:148).
46. On this term see n.2.
47. The famous passage on being in the Metaph. 4 is by no means the only place Aristotle intends
and explains multiple meanings of a key term. In book 5 of the same work, he catalogues numer
ous terms and explains the multiple possible meanings of each. Atherton, Stoics, 102 (n.21), citing
Metaph. 5, notes that many Aristotelian terms are systematically ambiguous. She ultimately con
cludes that Aristotle came to see systematic ambiguity as an invaluable analytical and construc
tive philosophical tool (ibid., 504).
48. Atherton, Stoics, 502-504 (n.21), concludes that the Stoics primarily saw ambiguity as a hin
drance in language to be overcome. If they did not favor ambiguity or polyvalence, obviously they
would tend to avoid complex authorial intention.
49. D.L. 7.62 (LCL [1925] 185:170-171, trans. Hicks): Ap(pt[!o/.ia 8s sail
? Sno t) Kai itksiova
7tpctypara atipaivouoa Xsktik(Bi; Kai Kopicot; Kai Kara to auxo 60o<;, d>a0 fipa xa 7tXsiova
EK5saa0at koto xai>TT|v xr|v Xs^tv.; Atherton, Stoics, 131 (n.21), states that this is [t]he only
securely Stoic definition of ambiguity to survive.

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two or more things may be understood from the same word.50Chrysippus probably
did not mean that every word fits the definition of ambiguity found in Diogenes
Laetrius.51 Nevertheless, these two witnesses to Stoic thought show that at least
some Stoics understood language in such a way that a single linguistic expression
could bear more than one meaning.52 Semantic polyvalence does not by itself yield
complex authorial intention. One who is aware of polyvalence, however, could
hardly fail to perceive that multiple meanings could be intended.53
Even if it was not the norm, some Stoics did write with complex authorial inten
tion. The clearest evidence of this practice comes from reports of their teachings by
Sextus Empiricus (second century AD) and Ioannes Stobaeus (fifth century AD).
In his Aduersus Mathematicos (A/.), Sextus relays that the Stoics had three distinct
meanings for good (ayaGov). The term may indicate: (1) that from or by which
one gains benefit, (2) that according to which one happens to benefit, or (3) that
which is of such a kind as to cause benefit.54
More specifically, Stobaeus reports that Chrysippus explained the term ele
ment (oxoixstov) in three ways. It may be fire, the four elements (including fire),
or any first component that provides the origin of something.55 These examples
50. Aulus Gellius, noct. alt. 11.12.1 (LCL [1927] 200:324-325, trans. Rolfe): Chrysippus ait omne
verbum ambiguum natura esse, quoniam ex eodem duo uel plura accipi possunt.
51. The Greek original of Chrysippuss thesis does not survive, but Atherton, Stoics, 299 (n.21), sug
gests that 6vopa is the Greek word behind uerbum here.
52. These two witnesses are not alone. Atherton, Stoics, 69-71 (n.21), lists several examples of
7io7Xax<&i; AsyopEva (semantically multiple expressions) found in Stoic thought, which show
that the Stoics clearly understood semantic polyvalence.
53. Of course, all the ancient discussions of the nefarious uses of ambiguity, mentioned above, pre
suppose complex authorial (or speakers) intention on the part of an abuser, such as a sophist.
Such abuses are not the best examples for understanding the positive possibilities of complex
authorial intention, so I omit them here.
54. Sextus Empiricus, M. 11.25-27 (ed. Mau and Mutschmann [Leipzig: Teubner, 1914] 2:380381): 6v0ev Kai Kara aicoAnuGiav xptxcoc; Et7toVT8g ayaGov ttpoaayopEdsaGai, Sicacrrov xfiiv
ctqpaivopevtov kot iStav ttakiv EJtt[)oA.r|v wtoypdtpoumv. AiyExat yap ayaGov, (path, xaG 6va psv
xpojtov to dtp on i) dip on fiaxiv dxpEA-EioGat. . . xaG Sxspov 8e to xaG o aopPaivet axpsAEtaGai
. . . Kara 8s xov xpixov Kat xsAsoxatov xporcov A-syexat ayaGov to oiov te axpEAstv. ; For an ex
planation of how these meanings are related, see M. 11.30. In short, Atherton, Stoics, 105 (n.21):
The second intension/extension includes the first, and the third the other two. Under all three
meanings goodness depends upon virtue.
55. Ioannes Stobaeus, Anthologium 1.10.16c. (Hense and Wachsmuth 1:130 [n.43]): Tptxcoi; 5r|
ksyopEVOt) Kara Xpuatrorov xou axoixsiou, Ka0 eva psv xpojtov xou Jiupog . . . xaG EXEpov 8e,
KaGo ksysxai xa xscroapa oxoixsta, 7rup, df)p, I)8cop, yfj . . . Kaxa xplxov koyov ksyexai oxotxetov
filvat 6 7tpa>xov cn>veoxr|Ksv oiixtoi;, dioxe yEvsatv StSovat dtp auxoh o5& psxpt xeX.ou<; Kai
EKEivon xf|v avakucnv 8dxEtt0at Eiq dauxo xf[ opoip oScp.

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from Setxus and Stobaeus suggest that the Stoics were not always averse to using
semantic polyvalence to convey their ideas.56 When Chrysippus wrote element
(oroixetov) and then moved on, as planned, to the three meanings he wanted his
readers to associate with that word, he, not unlike Aristotle,57must have intended for
his key term to be understood in multiple ways (complex authorial intention) before
going on to explain the different meanings he had in mind (expansive semantics).
Whatever Stoic originally wrote what Sextus conveys about the good would have
done the same, as well as the authors that explained a number of the terms Atherton
lists as being multivalent in Stoic or Stoic-inspired works.58

Additional Examples
Building upon Downings work, Frank Thielman may have found an instance
of complex authorial intention and expansive semantics in the Pauline corpus of
the New Testament. In an attempt to help resolve the centuries-old debate over the
righteousness of God (5ucavocruvT| 0eot>) in the book of Romans, Thielman suggests
Paul intended the phrase to be understood in multiple ways.59The apostle introduces
the phrase as part of a programmatic statement: I am not ashamed of the gospel
. . . for in it the righteousness of God (Sucaioouvr) 0eou) is revealed from faith to
faith (Rom. 1:16-17). Then he goes on to explain the varied aspects of his idea
throughout the letter. He reveals, as it were, the righteousness of God. According
to Thielman, the righteousness of God has three different meanings for Paul. It
is Gods saving activity (what God does) as well as the gift of acquittal from
sin (what one receives from God) and Gods fairness in distributing salvation (a
quality of Gods character).60
Downing believes that the use of expansive semantics continued at least down
to the time of Augustine. In fact, he cites conf. 12.18.27 and 12.31.42 as evidence
that Augustine recognized and approved of this phenomenon in the Old Testament.61

56. Atherton, Stoics, 109 (n.21), grants that the Sextus Empiricus passage shows some Stoics did
present good as ambiguous or multivalent. She says that this fact strongly suggests that they
belonged to some later phase of the school.
57. This is not to suggest that he got the idea from Aristotle. Atherton, Stoics, 109 (n.2I), believes
Aristotle influenced the Stoics very little on the subject of ambiguity.
58. Atherton, Stoics, 69-71 (n.21), lists a total of 13 such noXkax&c keyopeva.
59. Frank Thielman, Gods Righteousness as Gods Fairness in Romans 1:17: An Ancient Perspec
tive on a Significant Phrase, Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 54, no. 1 (March
2011): 35,45.
60. Ibid., 35, 44.
61. Downing, Ancient Semantics, 150 (n.2).

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Downing is correct about Augustine, but the interpretation of these particular texts
is complicated due to Augustines theory of the dual authorship of scripture. It is
better to show Augustines approval of expansive semantics from his own literary
practice and only then to relate the phenomenon to the dual authorship of scripture
that is part of Augustines hermeneutics.
In one of his earliest writings, De ordine lord.) (386-387), Augustine exhibits
this ancient mode of discourse. As Virgilio Pacioni has put it, Just as Aristotle
discovers the polysemantic character of on e on, Augustine discovers the polyse
mantic character of the term ortfo.62Augustine uses dialogue to explore the multiple
meanings of this term.63 He begins with a general statement: There is an order to
be found, within things and between them, which binds and directs this world.64
Through this order God governs all things rationally.65 There is nothing outside
Gods order.66 Augustine also treats specific aspects of ordo. There is an order of
nature and an order of the state.67 There is an order of learning the disciplines.68
In fact, the ordering of the soul through proper learning can lead one to God.69All
of these (and more) examples of order, even though very different, help to express
Augustines idea of ordo.
The practice of expansive semantics is clear in ord. It is not clear whether the
work shows complex authorial intention. The dialogue may be a device for unfolding
the multifaceted idea Augustine already has in mind (complex authorial intention
62. A. D. Fitzgerald, ed., AttA, s.v. Order by Virgilio Pacioni, trans. Matthew OConnell, 598.
63. Ibid.
64. Ord. 1.1.1 (Borruso, 3): Ordinem rerum, Zenobi, consequi ac tenere cuique proprium, turn uero
uniuersitatis quo coercetur ac regitur hie mundus, uel uidere uel pandere difficillimum hominibus
atque rarissimum est; Quotations of both Latin text and English translation are from On Order,
trans. Silvano Borruso (South Bend, IN: St. Augustines Press, 2007). Borrusos Latin text is a
reproduction of the Benedictine text translated by Russell in 1942, checked against Mignes Patrologia Latina and the 1986 Doignon text; see Borruso, Introduction, xvi.
65. Ord. 1.5.14 (Borruso, 18): Quis neget, Deus magne, inquit, te cuncta ordine administrare?;
ord. 1.10.28 (Borruso, 36): Ordo est, inquit, per quern aguntur omnia quae Deus constituit.
66. Ord. 1.6.15 (Borruso, 20): Nam quomodo esse contrarium quidquam potest ei rei quae totum
occupauit, totum obtinuit? Quod enim erit ordini contrarium, necesse erit esse praeter ordinem.
Nihil autem esse praeter ordinem uideo.
67. Ord. 2.4.12 (Borruso, 64, 66): ciuitatis ordinem . . . naturae ordo.
68. Ord. 2.5.17 (Borruso, 70): si quis temere ac sine ordine disciplinarum in harum rerum cognitionem audet irruere.
69. Ord. 1.9.27 (Borruso, 34): Ordo est quern si tenuerimus in uita, perducet ad Deum; ord.
2.19.50-51 (Borruso, 116): Haec et alia multa secum anima bene erudita loquitur atque agitat
.. . Cum autem se composuerit et ordinauerit ac concinnam pulchramque reddiderit, audebit iam
Deum uidere.

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with expansive semantics), or it may be a tool he uses to discover the multiple

meanings of ordo, with his intention growing in the discovery (expansive semantics
only). Either way, in the conf. Augustine does affirm both expansive semantics and
complex authorial intention (without using the terms, of course), and these concepts
play an important role in his hermeneutical theory.70 It is to a pair of key texts in
the conf., along with an equally important text in doctr. chr., that I shall now turn.

Three Key Texts in Augustine

The texts I have chosen to examine are conf. 12.30.41-12.32.43 and 13.24.37,
as well as doctr. chr. 3.2.2. These three texts recommend themselves as especially
relevant for four reasons. First, conceptually, they are relatively clear. Second, they
balance one another. The first two texts primarily justify multiplicity of meaning in
scripture, and the third text limits the range of possible meanings. Considering all
three together will, I hope, prevent over-interpretation in either direction. Third, these
texts map out the interpretive territory that Augustine actually inhabits (interpreting
scripture in multiple ways) while upholding the principles he articulates about the
importance of authorial intention.71 Fourth and finally, these texts are important
because they appear in major works that Augustine acknowledges as conveying
his views on the interpretation of scripture. The first three books of doctr. chr. are
expressly about interpreting the Bible, and to the end of his life Augustine sees
them as beneficial for that task.72 While the conf. cover a vast array of topics, the
last three books, by Augustines description, focus upon Gen. 1:12:2.73 Because
the key texts in conf. 12 and 13 appear in discussions of a biblical passage that
Augustine finds especially subject to multiple true interpretationsi.e., the Gen. 1
creation accountone would expect these passages to reflect Augustines stable,
considered position on scriptural polyvalence, provided he has one. The conf. 13
passage carries the added benefit of being an actual example of Augustines exegesis.

70. If complex authorial intention is absent from ord., it is not a strike against my construction of
Augustines theory. What is important here is not Augustines own discourse per se, but his un
derstanding of how discourse works. He can show this understanding through practice, as in ord.
(above), or through theory, as in conf. (below).
71. For examples of the former, see the discussion of conf. 13.24.37 and n.94 below. For an example
of the latter, see the discussion of conf. 12.30.41-12.32.43 below.
72. Retr. 2.4 (CCSL 57:92-93): quattuor libris opus illud impleui, quorum primi tres adiuuant ut
scripturae intellegantur.
73. Retr. 2.6 (CCSL 57:94): A primo usque ad decimum de me scripti sunt, in tribus ceteris de scripturis sanctis, ab eo quod scriptum est: In principio fecit deus caelum et terram, usque ad sabbati
requiem.

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Conf. 13.24.37
In conf. 13.24.37, Augustine finds biblical imagery that illuminates a key aspect
of his hermeneutical theory.74Having noticed that only two classes of creatures are
specifically told to increase and multiply (crescite et multiplicamini), sea creatures
and humans, he relates each to a particular kind of multiplication endorsed by God.
Sea creatures represent spoken signs, and humans represent intelligible concepts.
He says that the multiplication of the creatures in the waters illustrates how one
thing (res) can be explained (enuntietur) in many ways (multis modis), that is, with
multiple signs (signa) given corporeal expression. The multiplication of signs
has a parallel in the conceptual realm, where, as illustrated by the multiplication of
humans, one verbal expression (una enuntiatio) can be understood in multiple ways
(.multis modis).'75 In summary, he says to God, By this blessing I understand you
to grant us the capacity and ability to articulate in many ways what we hold to be
a single concept, and to give a plurality of meanings to a single obscure expression
in a text we have read.76
Augustines thought here is as complex as it is artful.77The statement of ability
beginning with to articulate contains the same parallel ideas he has mentioned
74. The secondary literature on conf. is vast and considers the work from multiple perspectives, such
as biography, theology, and psychology. For a standard account of Augustines biography for the
period of his life described by conf., see Peter Brown, Augustine o f Hippo: A Biography, new
edition with an epilogue (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000), 1-175. For a thor
ough, chapter-by-chapter, exposition of the text, see John M. Quinn, A Companion to the Confes
sions o f St. Augustine (New York: Peter Lang, 2002). Among other things, Quinn attends to the
theological and philosophical background and meaning of the text. For an attempt to distinguish
between the theological and biographical or historical elements of conf, see Pierre Courcelle,
Recherches sur les Confessions de Saint Augustin: Nouvelle edition augmentee et illustree (Paris:
Editions E. de Boccard, 1968), 13-39. For a collection of studies that analyze conf. from a psy
chological perspective, see Donald Capps and James E. Dittes, eds., The Hunger o f the Heart:
Reflections on the Confessions o f Augustine (The Society for the Scientific Study of Religion,
1990) .
75. Conf. 13.24.37 (CCSL 27:264, trans. Chadwick, Confessions [Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1991] , 296): In his omnibus nanciscimur multitudines et ubertates et incrementa; sed quod ita
crescat et multiplicetur, ut una res multis modis enuntietur et una enuntiatio multis modis intellegatur, non inuenimus nisi in signis corporaliter editis et rebus intellegibiliter excogitatis.
76. Conf. 13.24.37 (CCSL 27:264, trans. Chadwick, 296): In hac enim benedictione concessam
nobis a te facultatem ac potestatem accipio et multis modis enuntiare, quod uno modo intellectum
tenuerimus, et multis modis intellegere, quod obscure uno modo enuntiatum legerimus.
77. The Latin, beginning at to articulate forms an ABBA chiasm with the tenns enuntiare/intellectum / intellegere/ enuntiatum in conf. 13.24.37 (CCSL 27:264; phrase divisions mine): et multis
modis enuntiare/quod uno modo intellectum tenuerimus/et multis modis intellegere,/quod ob
scure uno modo enuntiatum legerimus.

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above. To articulate a single concept in many ways, or to explain one thing with
many signs, is to practice expansive semantics. The parallel in the conceptual realm
is difficult. He is not saying that the interpreter of a single expression intuits the
single concept to which it refers and then proceeds to multiply it to many concepts.
The fact that the expression is obscure implies that the interpreter does not fully
grasp the idea to which it refers. Nevertheless, humans have the mental capacity to
assign multiple meanings to an expression as if it were a single concept that they
were explaining in multiple ways. Augustine is using the phenomenon of expansive
semantics to illustrate how he can see so many different meanings in an obscure
text. In the case of scripture, Augustine trusts that God can guide the interpreter to
see meanings that are true: For I do not believe I give a true exposition if anyone
other than you is inspiring me.78

Conf. 12.30.41-12.32.43
As we have seen, conf. 13.24.37 demonstrates that Augustine understands and
espouses expansive semantics, but it does not directly explain how this phenomenon
relates to the divine authorial intention of scripture. Augustine addresses this prob
lem in conf. 12.30.41-12.32.43.79 This passage appears in the context of another
interpretation of the Gen. 1 creation account. Augustine has already acknowledged
that Mosess words have been understood in different but true ways.80 Now he
addresses the implicit question of whose view is right. As it unfolds, Augustines
answer to this question shows that he believes all the true and admissible meanings
were intended by the Holy Spirit.
In 12.30.41, Augustine confesses that he does not know which view Moses
intended, but he is sure that almost all of them are true explanations; they represent
78. Conf. 13.25.38 (CCSL 27:264-265, trans. Chadwick, 296): Neque enim alio praeter te inspirante
credo me uerum dicere.
79. It is worth noticing that both 13.24.37 and 12.30.41-12.32.43 are included in the explicitly doctri
nal portion of conf. As Courcelle, Recherches, 20 (n.74), states, Lobservateur le plus superficiel
ne peut manquer detre frappe par une discordance: les trois demiers livres sont des developpements abstraits sur la doctrine, et non plus un recit biographique comme etaient les dix premiers.
This being the case, it is highly probable that the Bishop of Hippo intended his reflections in
these passages to represent his present theological views at the time he composed conf, i.e.,
ca.397-401.
80. Conf. 12.27.37 (CCSL 27:237, trans. Chadwick, 266): So also the account given by your min
ister, which was to benefit many expositions, uses a small measure of words to pour out a spate
of clear truth. From this each commentator. . . may draw what is true, one this way, another that,
using longer and more complex channels of discourse (ita narratio dispensatoris tui sermocinaturis pluribus profutura paruo sermonis modulo scatet fluenta liquidae ueritatis, unde sibi quisque
uerum . . . hie illud, file illud, per longiores loquellarum anfractus trahat.)

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a diversity of true views (diuersitate sententiarum uerarum).81 Rather than ex

cluding some true interpretations, he says to God that the scriptures are rich in
meaning contained in few words (pauca copiose)' More specifically, he states that
these texts contain various truths (in eis uerbis uera)!*2 His advice, then, is that
each reader should believe Moses to have intended that meaning which supremely
corresponds both to the light of truth and to the readers spiritual profit.83
At first, Augustines advice may seem to support Williamss interpretation of
doctr. chr.M As the passage continues, however, Augustine pulls the full, multi
faceted meaning of the text away from the reader and gives it back to Moses. He
wants to affirm that Moses did grasp the multivalent truth of Genesis 1 when he
wrote it. Augustine says that, if he were writing scripture, he would choose to
write so that my words would sound out with whatever diverse truth in these mat
ters each reader was able to grasp, rather than to give a quite explicit statement.85
Augustine would intend for his words to be understood in multiple ways, i.e., he
would have a complex authorial intention. Since he wants to believe that Moses
could only have been more, not less, sophisticated than himself, he concludes that
Moses received a gift from God such that When he wrote this passage, he perfectly
perceived and had in mind all the truth we have been able to find there, and all the
truth that could be found in it which we have not been able, or have not as yet been
able, to discover.86

81. Conf. 12.30.41 (CCSL 27:240): In hac diuersitate sententiarum uerarum . . . Et scio tamen illas
ueras esse sententias.
82. Conf. 12.30.41 (CCSL 27:240, trans. Chadwick, 270): quos tamen bonae spei paruulos haec
uerba libri tui non territant alta humiliter et pauca copiose sed omnes, quos in eis uerbis uera
cemere ac dicere fateor, diligamus nos inuicem. Chadwick appears to have suppbed various
here, and he was correct to do so. In this context, it is clear that the truths (uera) are different,
even though the emphasis is on the fact that all of them are true. The words of scripture that Au
gustine and others interpret are the same, but interpreters exposit truths (uera) instead of the truth
precisely because the true meanings they see are different.
83. Con/.'12.30.41 (CCSL 27:240, trans. Chadwick, 270): eundemque famulum tuum, scripturae
huius dispensatorem, spiritu tuo plenum, ita honoremus, ut hoc eum te reuelante, cum haec scriberet, attendisse credamus, quod in eis maxime et luce ueritatis et fruge utilitatis excellit.
84. For Williamss interpretation of doctr. chr., see the above section, Rowan Williams.
85. Conf. 12.31.42 (CCSL 27:240, trans. Chadwick, 271): Ego certe . . . si ad culmen auctoritatis
aliquid scriberem, sic mallem scribere, ut, quod ueri quisque de his rebus capere posset, mea
uerba resonarent, quam ut unam ueram sententiam ad hoc apertius ponerem.
86. Conf. 12.31.42 (CCSL 27:240-241, trans. Chadwick, 271): Sensit ille omnino in his uerbis atque
cogitauit, cum ea scriberet, quidquid hie ueri potuimus inuenire et quidquid nos non potuimus aut
nondum potuimus et tamen in eis inueniri potest.

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Augustine immediately backpedals from this conclusion, granting the possibility

that human insight perceived less than the truth.87 He then places the meaning
of the text where he ultimately thinks it liesin the Holy Spirit who both inspired
Moses and leads the subsequent interpreters. Yet he reserves a sort of primacy for
whichever intention Moses actually had in mind, if he had only one, calling it su
perior to all others.88 This primacy implies that one cannot purposely disregard or
contradict the human authorial intent, if it is known.89Therefore, Augustines theory
must not be identified with semantic relativism or any other theory that discounts
human authorial intent.
A close look at Augustines reasoning about the Holy Spirit here will pay rich
dividends. He writes to God, [S]urely whatever you were intending to reveal to
later readers by those words could not be hidden from your good Spirit who will
lead me into the right land (Ps. 142:10).90The logic seems to be as follows: (1) All
true interpretations of Genesis 1 come to the readers through the help of the Holy
Spirit;91 (2) The Holy Spirit knew when He inspired Moses how He would lead
interpreters to see these various meanings. Therefore, (3) the Holy Spirit intended
for the text to be interpreted in these multiple true ways from the beginning.92 In
other words, the Holy Spirit had a complex authorial intention which He purposed
to expound through the use of expansive semantics, not with varied explications in
87. Conf. 12.32.43 (CCSL 27:241, trans. Chadwick, 271): si quid homo minus uidit.
88. Conf. 12.32.43 (CCSL 27:241): Quod si ita est, sit igitur ilia quam cogitauit ceteris excelsior.
89. In cases where the identity of the human author(s) is unknown, much of his (or their) intended
meaning may still be discernible within the text itself, although the number of possibly legitimate
meanings may be higher. In any case, the broader controls, discussed below, would still apply.
90. Conf. 12.32.43 (CCSL 27:241, trans. Chadwick, 271): numquid et spiritum-tuum bonum, qui
deducet me in terram rectam, latere potuit, quidquid eras in eis uerbis tu ipse reuelaturus legentibus posteris.; Augustine applies this model to himself as an interpreter: conf. 12.32.43 (CCSL
27:241): Ecce, domine deus meus, quam multa de paucis uerbis, quam multa, oro te, scripsimus!
Quae nostrae uires, quae tempora omnibus libris tuis ad istum modum sufficient?
91. The language of revelation (quidquid eras . . . tu ipse reuelaturus) indicates that the Holy Spirit
is only leading (qui deducet me in terram rectam) when the interpreter gives a true interpretation
0conf. 12.32.43, quoted above). If Augustine, or anyone else, gives a false interpretation, the Holy
Spirit is not implicated; cf. conf. 13.25.38 (CCSL 27:264265, trans, Chadwick, 296): For I do
not believe I give a true exposition if anyone other than you is inspiring me. (Neque enim alio
praeter te inspirante credo me uerum dicere.)
92. Norris, Augustine and the Close, 399 (n.l), makes essentially the same point both from this text
and from doctr. chr. 3.27.38 (for both the Latin and English of doctr. chr., see Augustine Dedoctrina Christiana, ed. and trans. R. P. H. Green [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995], 168-171);
note that I follow the older numbering given by Green in the margins; Quinn, Companion, 794
(n.74), explains these lines similarly, if tersely: What Moses may have missed seeing can be laid
bare by the Spirit that compressed the various truths in Mosess lines.

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the text of Genesis itself, but with varied explications in the successive exegetical
efforts of scriptural interpreters.93
Augustine has transformed the ancient linguistic patterns of complex authorial
intention and expansive semantics by applying them to God the Holy Spirit and
separating the performance of the expansive explanations from the original discourse
in which the terms to be explained appear. God, the ultimate author of scripture, has
the complex authorial intention. As He used human authors to write the scriptures, so
He also uses human interpreters to explain His ideas in different ways, depending
upon which aspect of the truth is applicable to a particular interpreters situation.
This is at least one way Augustine theoretically justifies the multiplicity of
meanings in scripture. This theory harmonizes Augustines emphasis on authorial
intent with his practice of finding all kinds of meanings in texts that clearly were
not intended by the human authors. It even justifies the particularly difficult cases
where Augustine finds allegorical meanings that are not typological of Christ and
the Church.94 The primary limitation of meaning on the philosophical level is that
each text can only mean one or more of the things that God intended, whether
through or independent of the human author. As I have shown, all true meanings
were intended by the Holy Spirit, so every interpretation outside Gods intention
is necessarily false. No one may interpret scripture outside of Gods intention or
contrary to the human authors intention, if the latter is known.
The question at this point is how to determine whether God intended ones
interpretation. For Augustine, it appears that no interpreter can discover all aspects
of Gods complex authorial intention. If this were all Augustine said, De Margerie
would appear to be right. It would seem that the meaning of scripture could con
tinue to expand with each successive generation with no definite limitation on the

93. Some may object to my explaining Augustines theory in terms that are not his own. To this objec
tion I reply that we only need the terms expansive semantics and complex authorial intention
today because we are not accustomed to ancient discourse in the way Augustine was. Insofar as
these terms both represent Augustines thought and describe phenomena that are unfamiliar to
most readers today, I maintain that they are important for understanding Augustine clearly.
94. For example, in lo. eu. tr. 9.6 (CCSL 36:93-94), he interprets the six water pots from the wed
ding at Cana as the six ages of human history. R. R. Reno, From Letter to Spirit, International
Journal o f Systematic Theology 13, no. 4 (October, 2011): 466, has defended Augustine by argu
ing that the evangelist actually intended to be understood symbolically. If my view is correct,
Renos efforts were not necessary, at least as they relate to the defense of Augustine. Augustine
was acting in accord with his own hermeneutical theory. Supposing that the bit about ages of his
tory is true and is not contrary to the evangelists intent, the Nicene Creed, or any clear passage of
scripture (see below), Augustines theory would suggest that the Holy Spirit intended Augustines
allegory, even if the evangelist did not.

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secondary meanings.95 Thus, to give a fair sketch of Augustines theoretical jus

tification of scriptural polysemy, I must include a third key text and indicate more
clearly how he understands the limits to the range of possible meanings.
Doctr. chr. 3.2.2
Roughly a year before beginning the conf. (397^-01), Augustine wrote books
1-3.25.35 of doctr. chr.96 In doctr. chr. 3.2.2, Augustine identifies clear, objective
limitations to what scripture may mean. The interpreter facing ambiguity should
consult the rule of faith, as it is perceived through the plainer passages of the
scriptures and the authority of the church.97 The content of the rule of faith is the
Christian belief summarized in the Nicene Creed98 and explained in book 1 of doctr.
95. De Margerie, History o f Exegesis III, 72-75 (n. 15); see also discussion of De Margeries view in
the above section, Bertrand de Margerie.
96. On the occasion and local setting of doctr. chr., see Charles Kannengiesser, Local Setting and
Motivation of De doctrina Christiana, in Augustine: Pesbyter Factus Sum, ed. Joseph T. Lienhard, Earl C. Muller, and Roland J. Teske (New York: Peter Lang, 1993), 331-336, esp. 335.
Kannengiesser argues that Augustine defines his own approach to scriptural interpretation over
against Tyconius and the Donatist exegetical tradition. For the philosophical background and
outlook of the work, see Frederick Van Fleteren, St. Augustine, Neoplatonism, and the Liberal
Arts: The Background to De doctrina Christiana, in De doctrina Christiana: A Classic o f Western
Culture, ed. Duane W. H. Arnold and Pamela Bright (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1995), 1424. Van Fleteren argues that doctr. chr. represents Augustines mature position
vis-a-vis neoplatonic philosophy and the liberal arts (ibid., 23) and suggests that the work should
be considered the charter of the Christian intellectual (ibid., 14).
97. Doctr. chr. 3.2.2 (text and trans. Green, Augustine De doctrina Christiana, 132-133): Cum ergo
adhibita intentio incertum esse perviderit quomodo distinguendum aut quomodo pronuntiandum
sit, consulat regulam fidei, quam de scripturarum planioribus locis et ecclesiae auctoritate percepit, de qua satis egimus cum de rebus in libro primo loqueremur. It has been noticed by Toom,
Augustine on Ambiguity, 423^127 (n.21), that Augustine here is specifically dealing with ambi
guities of the written text (scriptum) rather than of authorial intention (voluntas auctoris). Still, I
think it is fair to assume that Augustine means this rule to limit possible meanings in general, not
only possible resolutions of the ambiguities in the written text. P. Caelestis Eichenseer, Das Symbolum Apostolicum Beim Heiligen Augustinus mit Beriicksichtigung des Dogmengeschichtlichen
Zusammenhangs (St. Ottilien: EOS-Verlag, 1960), 120-121, explains this text as follows: Die
Glaubensregel, die also primar auf der Schrift aufruht, reguliert auch die Schriftauslegung selber,
und zwar unter Zuhilfenahme des Lehramtes, das in der lebendigen Tradition verankert ist. Als
kurze Zusammenfassung dieser Faktoren kann freilich gelegentlich auch das Symbolum genannt
werden, so dafi Augustinus neu eine lebendige Briicke zwischen diesen beiden GroBen schlagt,
deren objektive Ubereinstimmung er mehrfach hervorhebt.
98. I am using the term Nicene Creed for the sake of simplicity. Augustine rarely refers to that spe
cific formulation, but the three baptismal creeds he does use, although perhaps closer to the Ro
man creed, contain the basic Christian doctrines defined at Nicaea. For the text of these creeds see
A. D. Fitzgerald, ed., AttA, s.v. Creed, Symbolum by Joseph T. Lienhard, 254-255. If interpret-

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chr." Elsewhere, Augustine affirms that the Creed (1) legitimately comes from
scripture100 and (2) is truth from God.101 These two beliefs taken together suggest
a correspondence between Gods intention as the author of scripture and the inter
pretations summarized in the Creed. The Creed states explicitly and in summary
some essential doctrines that God intended to convey through the Bible. If God
did not have such an intention, either 1 or 2 would have to be false. Therefore, we
can positively state that the Creed outlines the most important portion of Gods
complex divine authorial intention.
By giving this rule in doctr. chr., Augustine does not say how to find Gods full
authorial intention, but he does explain how to discover what demonstrably lies out
side Gods intention, what interpretations are inadmissible.102 He gives an example

ers wish to utilize Augustines theory today, they should use the Nicene Creed rather than the Ro
man because Augustine clearly follows the more precise Nicene doctrine (among other places, in
doctr. chr. 1.5.5 [Green, Augustine De doctrina Christiana, 16]: et simul omnes una substantia.)
and explains the Symbolum accordingly. Citing j. 186, 2.2 (PL 38:1000), Eichenseer, Das Symbolum, 119 (n.97), observes, Der Text zeigt, daB das richtige Verstandnis des Symbolumsatzes
durch den Ruckgriff auf die Glaubensregel zu gewahrleisten ist, so wenn wie hier die rechte Sicht
der Person Christi bezuglich seiner gottlichen und menschlichen Natur auf dem Spiele steht.
99. Doctr. chr. 3.2.2 (Green, Augustine De doctrina Christiana, 132): de qua satis egimus cum de
rebus in libro primo loqueremur ; Concerning the regula fidei in doctr. chr., James A. Andrews,
Hermeneutics and the Church: In Dialogue with Augustine (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre
Dame Press, 2012), 136, has observed that throughout the work, he continually points back to
book one in order to aid (or, indeed, to correct) interpretation.; It is clear that Augustine regards
the Nicene Creed as a summary of the regula fidei, not only because the definition of the Trinity
he uses in doctr. chr. 1.5.5 (Green, Augustine De doctrina Christiana, 16) clearly depends upon
the conciliar definition, but also because he says as much about a similar creed elsewhere: s. 59,
1.1 (CCSL 41:221): ideo prius symbolum didicistis, ubi est regula fidei uestrae breuis et grandis:
breuis numero uerborum, grandis pondere sententiarum. See also s. 213, 2 (MA 1:442^143):
symbolum est ergo breuiter conplexa regula fidei. Eichenseer, Das Symbolum, 188 (n.97), ob
serves from the latter passage, Wenn das Symbolum als kurzgefaBte Glaubensregel zu verstehen
ist, ergibt sich daraus, daB das Glaubensbekenntnis nur ein Auszug, namlich eine kurze Fassung
der weiter zu denkenden Glaubensregel ist.
100. Symb. cat. 1.1 (CCSL 46:185): Accipite regulam fidei, quod symbolum dicitur . . . Hoc est
enim symbolum, quod recensuri estis et reddituri. Ista uerba quae audistis, per diuinas scripturas
sparsa sunt, sed inde collecta et ad unum redacta, ne tardorum hominum memoria laboraret, ut
omnis homo possit dicere, possit tenere quod credit.
101. S. 362, 7.7 (PL 39:1614): Camis autem resurrectionem habemus in regula fidei, et earn confitentes baptizamur. Et quidquid ibi confitemur, ex ueritate et in ueritate confitemur, in qua uiuimus et mouemur et sumus; Cf. Acts 17:28; c. Max. 2.14.8 (CCSL 87A:582): sic teneres rectam
regulam fidei, ut non contradiceres ueritati ; Cf. symb. cat. 1.1 (CCSL 46:185) and en. Ps. 115.1
(CCSL 40:1652).
102. Augustine gives other rules in doctr. chr. that also help in this regard, but I am focusing upon the
regula fidei because it most effectively limits the possible meanings of scripture in the face of

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of an inadmissible interpretation from John 1:1. The bishop notes that different
punctuation could change the meaning: The well-known heretical punctuation
In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and there was God,
giving a different sense in what follows (this Word was in the beginning with God)
refuses to acknowledge that the Word was God.103 This meaning would be based
on the canonical text, in accord with Williamss approach.104Yet Augustine says,
This is to be refuted by the rule of faith, which lays down for us the equality of
the members of the Trinity.105 One can be sure that nothing contrary to the Creed
could be an aspect of Gods complex authorial intention.
Furthermore, nothing contrary to any clear scripture passage could be an aspect
of Gods complex authorial intention. Augustines description of the rule of faith
shows that he believes there are some passages of scripture which are plain enough
(the planiores loci) that their meanings can serve as norms for interpreting other
passages. It would seem that for such texts Augustine assumes the human authors
intent is relatively simple and accessible to the reader, conveying a clear portion
of the divine authorial intent. Something similar must be true of the Creed. Other
wise, it is hard to see how the Creed and the clear passages could serve as norms
for interpreting the difficult passages of scripture. For Augustine, then, it simply is
not true that everything is interpretation.106 Some human languagethat of the
Creed and the clear passages of scripture, at leastis both unambiguous (enough
for the task at hand) and divinely authoritative.
This does not violate Augustines theory of complex divine authorial intention;
rather, it completes it. It is safe to allegorize the obscure passages precisely because
the clear passages ensure that one does not contravene the divine authorial intent
of scripture. One may also allegorize clear passages, such as historical narratives,

the expansive interpretation theories of De Margerie, Bright, and Williams. The rule of love also
deserves consideration. See doctr. chr. 1.36.40 (Green, Augustine De doctrina Christiana, 48).
103. Doctr. chr. 3.2.3 (text and trans. Green, Augustine De doctrina Christiana, 134135): Ilia haeretica distinctio in principio erat uerbum, et uerbum erat apud deum, et deus erat, ut alius sit
sensus: uerbum hoc erat in principio apud deum, non uult deum uerbum confiteri.
104. See McCurry, Rowan Williams, 429 (n.14); See also the discussion of Williamss interpreta
tion of Augustine above.
105. Doctr. chr. 3.2.3 (text and trans. Green, Augustine De doctrina Christiana, 134-135): Sed hoc
regula fidei refellendum est qua nobis de trinitatis aequalitate praescribitur, ut dicamus, et deus
erat uerbum, deinde subiungamus, hoc erat in principio apud deum. ; Here, too, Augustine
goes beyond the Roman creed to the Nicene Creed, at least in doctrine.
106. The quoted phrase is from Williams, Language, 146 (n.l 1). See discussion of Williamss in
terpretation of doctr. chr. above.

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provided one only adds to and does not contradict the known meaning . 107 Thus,
although Williams and Bright are right to point out the importance of love and the
ecclesial community for limiting the possible meanings of scripture, they should
adjust their accounts to allow the Nicene Creed and the plain passages of scripture
to serve as clearer limits. 108 For Augustine, these are norms that neither individual
interpreters nor the church are free to violate.

Conclusion
I have shown that Augustine sees complex divine authorial intention as a theo
retical justification for the multiplicity of meanings in scripture. God inspired each
word and phrase in the Bible with full knowledge and approval of the true meanings
that interpreters would later draw from them. In this way, Augustine sees Gods
intention as analogous to the complex authorial intention that he knows human
authors can have. Since this theory is arguably the only one that Augustine both
articulates clearly and follows consistently, I suggest that it may be his ultimate
theoretical justification for the multiplicity of meanings in scripture. 109 At the same
time, Augustine believes God has provided objective limits for the range of possible
meanings. Although the number of possible meanings is practically limitless, their
scope is circumscribed. They must remain within the bounds of the Nicene Creed
and the clear passages of scripture.

107. In such a case, one moves beyond the human authorial intention but may remain within the
divine. For an example of this in Augustine, see n.94 above.
108. See above for Williamss and Brights accounts of multiplicity of meaning in Augustines
hermeneutics.
109. Augustine repeats the basic ideas of conf. 12.32.43 (CCSL 27:241) (see above) some 25-30
years later in doctr. chr. 3.27.38 (Green, Augustine De doctrina Christiana, 168-171), on which
see Norris, Augustine and the Close, 399 (n.l).

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