• •

1 LAWRENCE M. ADELMAN, ESQ.

LAW OFFICES OF LAWRENCE M. ADELMAN
2 5850 CANOGA AVENUE, SUITE 400
WOODLAND HILLS, CA 91367-6554
3 Phone: 818-992-8005
Fax: 818-710-3844
4 State Bar No. 059058
5 Attorney for Plaintiff
6
7

8 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

9 CENTRAL DISTRICT, LOS ANGELES
10
11 MARCIA J. HOLTZMAN, an individual,
12 Date:
Plaintiff, Time:
13 vs. Dept.:
Judge:
14 CIRGADYNE, INC., etc., et aI.,
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
15 AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO
Defendants. DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE
16 PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S VERIFIED
COMPLAINT
17
Action Filed: 7-20-01
18 Motion Cutoff: Not Set
Discovery Cutoff: Not Set
19 Trial Date: Not Set
20
COMES NOW, plaintiff Marcia J. Holtzman ("Plaintiff') who responds to the motion t
21
strike portions of Plaintiffs verified complaint (the "Complaint") filed by defendants Cirgadyne, Inc,
22
ABC Escrow, Craig A. Block and Cindy Block (collectively "Defendants"), as follows:
23
INTRODUCTION
24
Defendants, by way of their motion to strike, assert that the punitive damage allegation
25 I
( contained in Paragraphs 21 of the first cause of action for common law invasion of privacy an
26 ~
i· Paragraph 24 of the second cause of action for invasion of privacy under Civil Code Section 334
27 ,~
should be stricken from the Complaint because Plaintiff has failed to plead ultimate facts showin
28\
i that Plaintiff is entitled to such relief. For the reasons specified below, Plaintiff asserts that ultimat
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PLAINTIFF'S POINTS & AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'

MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S VERIFIED COMPLAINT
 1
• •
facts, as opposed to evidentiary facts, have been sufficiently pleaded in the Complaint and tha
2 discovery, and not a motion to strike, is the appropriate procedure for obtaining the evidentiary basis
3 for Plaintiff s entitlement to an award of punitive damages.
4 Both of the above-stated causes of action arise from the alleged non-consensual use by the
5 Defendants of Plaintiff s name, identity and signature in connection with a scheme by the Defendants
6 to collect false and unearned finder's fees in purchase and sale transactions involving the Defendants,
7 third party buyers and sellers, and alcoholic beverage licenses issued by the California Department 0

8 Alcoholic Beverage Control ("ABC Licenses"). Plaintiff alleges, among other things, that the
9 Defendants used Plaintiff s name, identity and signature to charge and collect from third party buyers
10 and/or sellers of ABC Licenses false and unearned finder's fees, without Plaintiffs knowledge and
11 consent, for the sole purpose of increasing the fees collected by the Defendants in the subject sale and
12 purchase transactions. Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants were either finders, the escrow company,
13 or the principals, agents and/or employees of the same, involved in the subject transactions and tha
14 the alleged scheme was knowingly and intentionally instituted and participated in by the Defendants
15 between approximately 1993 to and including December 2000, all for the financial benefit of the
16 Defendants.
17 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, while engaging in the above-stated activities, were guilty 0

18 oppression, fraud or malice, in that said defendants engaged in the specified conduct and transactions
19 with the intent to vex, injure or annoy Plaintiff, and/or with a willful and conscious disregard 0

20 Plaintiff s rights. For the latter reasons, Plaintiff alleges that Plaintiff is entitled to seek punitive
21 damages from the Defendants pursuant to Civil Code Sections 3294 and 3344.
22 Plaintiff, in opposition to Defendants' pending motion to strike, asserts that Paragraph 21 0

23 the first cause of action for common law invasion of privacy and Paragraph 24 of the second cause 0

24 action for invasion of privacy under Civil Code Section 3344, when read in the context of the entire
25 IVomplaint, state sufficient ultimate facts to support Plaintiff's demand for punitive damages, and tha
26 !JPefendants have interposed their motion to strike solely for the purpose of further delaying the
"1'
<.
27 ;~bstantive resolution of Plaintiff's various claims, and for the purpose of increasing the cost 0
".,
28 \ljtigation to Plaintiff in an effort to obtain substantive legal and monetary concessions from Plaintif
o
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PLAINTIFF'S POINTS & AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'

MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S VERIFIED COMPLAINT
 • •
I without Defendants having to respond to the substantive allegations of the Complaint.

2 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

3 I
4 DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE THE PUNITIVE DAMAGE ALLEGATIONS
5 CONTAINED IN THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FOR COMMON LAW INVASION OF
6 PRIVACY SHOULD BE DENIED BECAUSE PLAINTIFF HAS PLED SUFFICIENT
7 ULTIMATE FACTS TO SUPPORT A CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES
8 1. To be legally sufficient, a complaint need only contain a statement of the fact

9 constituting the cause of action in clear and concise language.

10 California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.10 (a)

11 2. A complaint need only allege ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts or conclusions 0

12 law. The line of demarcation between a conclusion of fact and of law is not easy to draw. Th

13 allegation of an ultimate fact usually, if not always, involves one or more conclusions. A complaint i

14 sufficient if substantial facts constituting the cause of action are averred in the complaint or can b

15 inferred by reasonable intendment from the matters pleaded, even though the allegations of thes
16 facts are intermingled with conclusions of law. Courts have always discriminated betwee
17 insufficient facts and insufficient statement of facts. Where the necessary facts are shown by th
18 complaint to exist, although inaccurately or ambiguously stated, or appearing by necessar

19 implication, a complaint will be held to be legally sufficient.

20 Krug v. Meeham (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 274,277,240 P.2d 732
21 Allerton v. King (1929) 96 Cal.App. 230, 235, 274 P. 90
22 3. When determining whether sufficient facts have been pleaded, the court mus
23 distinguish between the pleading of ultimate facts and the pleading of evidentiary facts, which b

24 necessity must be supplied through discovery and at trial. Facts only must be stated. This generall
25 I means the ultimate facts, which must be distinguished from the law, from argument, fro
i
26 ~, hypotheses, and from the evidence of the facts. The facts must be carefully distinguished from th
~
27!, evidence of the facts. The latter pertains to the trial, and has no place in the pleadings,
28~ Green v, Palmer (1860) 15 Cal. 411, 414 -415
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PLAINTIFF'S POINTS & AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'

MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S VERIFIED COMPLAINT
 • •
1 4. The primary issue to be addressed by the court is whether or not the pleading, as
2 whole, apprises the adversary of the factual basis of the claim. If the adversary is so apprised, th
3 complaint should be held to be sufficient In making the foregoing determination, however, the cou
4 must be mindful that the distinction between ultimate facts and conclusions of law have no fixe
5 definition. The conclusion of law - ultimate fact dichotomy is not an absolute, and the fair import 0

6 the language used in the complaint must be reviewed to determine whether the adversary has bee
7 fully apprised of the factual basis of the claim against him.
8 Jackson v. Superior Court (Alameda) (1994) 30 CaLAppAth 936,942,36 Ca1.Rptr.2d
9 207
10 Estate of Archer (1987) 193 CaLApp.3'd 238,245,239 Ca1.Rptr. 137
11 Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Ca1.App.3d 714, 721,104 Ca1.Rptr. 897
12 5. In permitting allegations to be made in general terms the courts have said that th
13 particularity of pleading required depends upon the extent to which the defendant, in fairness, need
14 detailed information that can be conveniently provided by the plaintiff. Less particularity is require
15 where the defendant may be assumed to possess knowledge of the facts at least equal, if not superior,
16 to that possessed by the plaintiff.
17 Dino v. Boreta Enterprises, Inc. (1964) 226 Ca1.App.2d 336, 340, 38 Ca1.Rptr. 167
18 6. Alleging facts on the basis of information and belief is an acceptable form of pleadin
19 and does not violate the rule requiring the pleading of ultimate facts. It sometimes happens that
20 plaintifflacks the knowledge and the means of obtaining knowledge offacts material to the plaintiff
21 cause of action. Usually, the matters are peculiarly within the knowledge of the adverse party, and th
22 pleader can learn of them only from statements of others. In this situation, the plaintiff may plea
23 what he believes to be true as a result of information (hearsay) the plaintiff received.
24 4 Witkin, California Procedure (4th Ed., 1997), Pleading, Section 359, Pages 461-462
25 7. When considering the propriety of granting a motion to strike based on an allege
26 'failure to plead ultimate facts to support a claim for punitive damages, the court must read th
27 'iallegations of the complaint as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth. In ruling 0
,.

28 a motion to strike, courts doe not read allegations in isolation.

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PLAINTIFF'S POINTS & AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'

MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S VERIFIED COMPLAINT
 -
• •
3

~
I Clauson v. Superior Court (Los Angeles) (1998) 67 Cal.AppAth 1253, 1255
2 8. The terms "willful", "fraudulent", "malicious" and "oppressive" are the statuto
3 description of the type of conduct which can sustain a cause of action for punitive damages unde
4 Civil Code Section 3294. The terms themselves are conclusory; however, pleading in the language 0

5 the statute is acceptable provided that sufficient facts are pleaded to support the allegations.
6 Blegen v. Superior Court (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 959, 963
7 9. It is true that the mere allegation that an intentional tort was committed is no

8 sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. Not only must there be circumstances 0

9 oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such claim.
10 However, if a court finds that the factual basis is lacking in a complaint asserting a claim for punitiv
11 damages, the court should allow the plaintiff a fair opportunity to amend the complaint to supply th
12 missing facts and not merely strike the claim for punitive damages.
13 Grieves v. Superior Court (Orange County) (1984) 157 Cal.AppJd 159, 166, 168
14 10. Any person who knowingly uses another's name, signature or likeness in any manne
IS for purposes of selling services, without such person's prior consent is liable for any damage
16 sustained by such person. In addition, in any action brought under Section 3344 of the Civil Code, th
17 person who violated the section shall be liable to the injured party in an amount equal to the greate
18 of $750.00 or the actual damages suffered by him, and the offending party's profits, to the extent no
19 taken into account in computing actual damages. Punitive dama es rna also be awarded to th
20 injured party. The remedies provided for in this section are cumulative and shall be in addition to an
21 others provided by law.
22 Civil Code Section 3344 (a) and (g)
23 II. Turning to the first cause of action of the Complaint for common law invasion 0

24 privacy, Paragraph 21 incorporates by reference the facts pleaded elsewhere in the Complaint t
25 support Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages (Complaint, lines 13-19, page 12). In this regard,
26 Paragraph 17 of the first cause of action incorporates by reference Paragraphs I through 16, inclusive,
27 'of the general allegations of the Complaint (Complaint, lines 20-21, page 10). Paragraph 2 of th
28 IComplaint alleges the factual identity and the factual nature and scope of the business enterprise 0

.Ii
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PLAINTIFF'S POINTS & AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'

MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S VERIFIED COMPLAINT
 • •
• I "Defendant Cirgadyne" (Complaint, lines 6-23, page 2). Paragraph 2 alleges that a finder's and/o

~ 2 consulting fee is charged by "Defendant Cirgadyne" in connection with its business enterprise.
3 Paragraph 3 of the Complaint alleges the factual identity and the factual nature and scope of th
4 business enterprise of "Defendant Escrow" (Complaint, lines 24-28, page 2, lines 1-15, page 3).
5 Paragraph 4 of the Complaint alleges the factual basis upon which "Defendant Cirgadyne" and thir
6 party finders charge finder's fees in connection with purchase and/or sale transactions involvin
7 alcoholic beverage licenses and alleges the amount of the fees so charged (Complaint, lines 17-28,
8 page 3, line I, page 4).
9 12. Paragraph 5 of the Complaint alleges the factual setting III which "Defendan
10 Cirgadyne" and "Defendant Escrow" operated when escrows involving only "Defendant Cirgadyne"
11 as well as those involving both "Defendant Cirgadyne" and third party finders were established a
12 "Defendant Escrow". Paragraph 5 also alleges the factual basis for the payment offinder's fees in th
13 escrows so established (Complaint, lines 2-14, page 4).
14 13. Paragraph 6 of the Complaint alleges the factual identity, status and scope of authorit
15 of "Defendant Craig" in connection with "Defendant Cirgadyne" and "Defendant Escrow"
16 (Complaint, lines 16-25, page 4). Paragraph 7 alleges the factual identity, status and scope 0

17 authority of "Defendant Cindy" in connection with "Defendant Cirgadyne" and "Defendant Escrow"
18 (Complaint, lines 27-28, page 4, lines 1-14, page 5). Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Complaint contai
19 factual allegations relating to the identity, status and scope of authority of other defendants named i
20 this action alleged to have been involved in the common law invasion of Plaintiff s privac
21 (Complaint, lines 16-28, page 5, lines 1-12, page 6).
22 14. Paragraph 10 of the Complaint alleges the factual setting under which "Defendan
23 Cirgadyne", "Defendant Escrow", "Defendant Craig", "Defendant Cindy" and the other name
24 defendants used Plaintiff's name, signature and identity, without her permission, betwee
25 . approximately 1993 and December of 2000, in Plaintiff s purported capacity as a fictitious, false an
26 i, non-existent independent third party finder for the purpose of enabling the Defendants to collec
27 I additional, unauthorized, unjustified, unearned and fictitious finder's fees for the Defendants'
28 personal, financial and commercial benefit (Complaint, lines 13-28, page 6, lines 1-3, page 7).

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PLAINTIFF'S POINTS & AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'

MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S VERIFIED COMPLAINT
 • •
1 Paragraph 10 also alleges the factual setting in which the foregoing uses of Plaintiff s name, signatur
2 and identity were made, to wit, without her knowledge, consent, authorization or participation, an
3 alleges that Plaintiff first learned of such use on or about October of 2000 (Complaint, lines 3-9, pag
4 7).

5 15. Paragraph 11 of the Complaint alleges the factual setting in which the Defendant
6 made the non-consensual and unauthorized use of Plaintiff s name, signature and identity t
7 intentionally and knowingly collect from unsuspecting and unknowing sellers and buyers additional,
8 unauthorized, unjustified and fictitious finder's fees. Paragraph 11 also alleges that the sellers an
9 buyers were fraudulently lead to believe by the Defendants that Plaintiff was actually involved as
10 finder in the sale and purchase transactions, and therefore entitled to a finder's fee. Paragraph 11
11 alleges the fact that at no time relevant to such transactions was Plaintiff ever engaged by sai
12 Defendants or any other person or business entity in the business or profession of acting as a finder i
13 sales and/or purchase transactions involving alcoholic beverage licenses (Complaint).
14 16. Paragraph 12 of the Complaint alleges the factual setting for the Defendants'
15 collection, payment and disbursement to themselves of the additional, unauthorized, unjustified an
16 fictitious finder's fees. Paragraph 12 alleges that all of such fees were used for the financial an
17 commercial benefit, gain and advantage of the Defendants, all without Plaintiff s knowledge, consen
18 and authorization (Complaint, line 28, page 7, lines 1-12, page 8). Paragraphs 13, 14, 15 and 16 0

19 the Complaint allege alter ego facts and contain fictitious defendant and/or scope of authorit
20 allegations (Complaint, lines 13-28, page 8, lines 1-28, page 9, lines 1-15, page 10). As previousl
21 indicated above, Paragraph 17 of the Complaint incorporates by reference all of the foregoin
22 paragraphs into the first cause of action for common law invasion of privacy.
23 17. Paragraph 18 of the Complaint alleges that between on or about 1993 to and includin
24 December, 2000, the Defendants ("Defendant Cirgadyne", "Defendant Escrow", "Defendant Craig"
25 land "Defendant Cindy" throughout the Complaint) invaded Plaintiffs privacy by engaging in the act
26 ipreviously specified in Paragraphs 1 through 16 of the Complaint, to wit, appropriated Plaintiff
',.
27 "~name and identity as a false and fictitious finder in sale, purchase and escrow transactions so that th
"
28 pDefendants could charge false, fictitious, unearned and additional finder's fees to their customers an
!·!i
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,...-----------------------------1
PLAINTIFF'S POINTS & AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S VERIFIED COMPLAINT
 • •
I clients (Complaint, lines 22-28, page 10, line I, page II). Paragraph 18 further alleges the fact tha
2 after receiving payment of the foregoing finder's fees, the Defendants and/or the other name
3 defendants signed and endorsed Plaintiff s name to such checks without her knowledge, consent 0

4 authorization, and then negotiated said checks for the Defendants' own financial benefit and gai
5 (Complaint, lines 1-7, page 11).
6 18. Paragraph 19 of the Complaint alleges that the above-stated acts were knowingly an
7 intentionally effected by the Defendants in connection with their solicitation, sale and rendering 0

8 the specified finder and escrow services. Plaintiff further alleges that, in each instance, th
9 Defendant's use of Plaintiff s name, identity and signature was effected without Plaintiff s prio
10 knowledge, consent or authorization. Plaintiff alleges that the facts previously alleged throughout he
II first cause of action constitute an unauthorized appropriation of Plaintiff's name, signature an
12 identity because they show that such use occurred without Plaintiff s knowledge, consent 0

13 authorization, in conjunction with a scheme by the Defendants to create a fictitious finder, so that th
14 Defendants could collect additional false, fictitious and unearned finder's fees, for their financial
IS benefit. Plaintiff further alleges in Paragraph 19 that the Defendants, in so acting, created an
16 perpetuated the impression with the Defendants' customers and clients that Plaintiff was participatin
17 in the Defendants' wrongful scheme and conduct (Complaint, lines 8-23, page II).
18 19. Paragraph 20 of the Complaint alleges Plaintiff s damages in the form of shock,
19 emotional trauma and the indignity of having her name, signature and identity used by th
20 Defendants as alleged for the purpose of double charging Defendants' customers and clients in
21 scheme involving purchase and sale transactions that Plaintiff had no part or participation in, all fo
22 the Defendants' financial and commercial gain and profit. Plaintiff further alleges the diminution i
23 the value of her name, signature and identity from being included in the subject scheme (Complaint,
24 lines 24-28, page II, lines 1-12, page 12).
25 " 20. Paragraph 21 of the Complaint alleges that the above-stated facts show that th
26 Defendants acted with oppression, fraud and malice in that they were engaged in with the intent t
"
"
27yex, injure or annoy Plaintiff, and/or with a willful and conscious disregard of Plaintiff s rights. 0
•
28 ,that basis, Plaintiff seeks punitive damages (Complaint, lines 13-19, page 12).
"

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PLAINTIFF'S POINTS & AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'

MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S VERIFIED COMPLAINT
 • •
I 21. Plaintiff asserts that the ultimate facts alleged in the Complaint, as outlined above,
2 more than sufficiently establish that the Defendants engaged in "despicable conduct which is carrie
3 on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights ... of others" or "despicabl
4 conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person'
5 rights" as required by Civil Code Section 3294 (Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authoritie
6 in Support of Motion to Strike, lines 17-23, page 4). Plaintiff further asserts that Defendants have th
7 right to gather the evidentiary facts in support of Plaintiff's allegations through discovery, and that
8 motion to strike is not the appropriate procedure to effect such gathering. Therefore, Defendants'
9 motion to strike Paragraph 21 of the first cause of action for common law invasion of privacy and th
10 applicable prayer for relieffor punitive damages should be denied.
II II

12 DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE THE PUNITIVE DAMAGE ALLEGATIONS

13 CONTAINED IN THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION FOR INVASION OF PRIVACY
14 UNDER CIVIL CODE SECTION 3344 SHOULD BE DENIED BECAUSE PLAINTIFF HAS
15 PLED SUFFICIENT ULTIMATE FACTS TO SUPPORT A CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE
16 DAMAGES
17 22. Paragraph 22 of the second cause of action of the Complaint for invasion of privac
18 under Civil Code Section 3344 incorporates by reference paragraphs 17 through 21, inclusive, ofth
19 first cause of action of the Complaint (Complaint, lines 23-24, page 12). Therefore, all argument
20 presented above in connection with the ultimate factual sufficiency of said paragraphs are hereb
21 incorporated herein by reference. Paragraph 23 of the Complaint alleges the applicability of Civil
22 Code Section 3344 to Plaintiff's second cause of action based on the factual allegations contained i
23 the Complaint (Complaint, lines 25-27, page 12, lines 1-2, page 13).
24 23. Paragraph 24 of the Complaint alleges that pursuant to Civil Code Section 334
25 'plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages based on the Defendants' unauthorized use of Plaintiff'
26 ,Iname,
,.
signature and identity. Because the factual allegations of the second cause of action fo
27 .!invasion of privacy under Civil Code Section 3344 are based on and incorporate the factua
;

28 "allegations of Plaintiff s first cause of action for common law invasion of privacy, Plaintiff hereb
I
I ~

PLAINTIFF'S POINTS & AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'

MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S VERIFIED COMPLAINT
 • •
1 refers to and incorporates herein by reference Plaintiff s argument under Paragraph 21, above, of thi,
2 Memorandum of Points and Authorities pertaining to Plaintiff's having sufficiently pleaded ultimate
3 facts entitling Plaintiff to seek punitive damages from the Defendants.
4 24. Although Plaintiff has used the conc1usory terms "oppression", "fraud" and "malice"
5 throughout the Complaint, Plaintiff has supported such terms with sufficient ultimate facts to appris(
6 the Defendants of the allegations against them. That is all that Plaintiff is required to do. If th(
7 Defendants seek evidentiary facts, then they should utilize discovery for such purpose, and not 2

8 motion to strike. Therefore, Defendants' motion to strike Paragraph 24 of the second cause of actior
9 for invasion of privacy under Civil Code Section 3344 and the applicable prayer for relief fo
10 punitive damages should be denied.
11 25. Defendants argue parenthetically that the court should strike Plaintiff s punitiv(
12 damage allegations from both Paragraphs 21 and 24 of the Complaint because Plaintiff alleges such
13 allegations based on information and belief (Defendants' Memorandum of Points and Authorities i~

14 Support of Motion to Strike, line 27, page 3, lines 1-9, page 4). Pleading on the basis of informatio~
15 and belief is an acceptable form of pleading in California, especially where, as here, the actions
16 alleged to have been perpetrated by the Defendants were done without Plaintiff's knowledge. At the
17 pleading stage, such facts are more fully known by the Defendants and Plaintiff should not be
18 prejudiced and denied a potential remedy merely because the Defendants have superior knowledge 0

19 the facts and have previously been so successful at hiding the facts from Plaintiff.
20 CONCLUSION
21 For all of the above reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests the court to deny the Defendants'
22 motion to strike and to order the Defendants to answer the allegations of the Complaint.
23 Dated August 29, 2001 ~I Ir, ~
24
( l[ ,,~'/iJ
\"'JJ/.~'"f11-~;==o=~----=--=--=----:-=--
Lawrence . Adelman, Attorney for Plaintiff
25

26
27 ,i
28

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PLAINTIFF'S POINTS & AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'

MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S VERIFIED COMPLAINT
 • •
I PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL (CCP §§ 1013 (a), 2015.5)
2 STATE OF CALIFORNIA )
3 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES)
4 I am a citizen of the United States and a resident of Los Angeles County, California. I a
5 over the age of eighteen years and I am not a party to this action. My business address if 585
6 Canoga Avenue, Suite 400, Woodland Hills, California 91367-6554.
7 On August 29, 2001, I served the within document(s) entitled PLAINTIFF'S
8
MEMORANDUM OR POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
9
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S VERIFIED COMPLAINT, on th
10
interested parties in this action, by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope, wit
II

12 postage thereon fully prepaid, addressed as follows:

13 Ronald Jason Palmieri, Esq. For: Defendants, Cirgadyne, Inc., d.b.a.

Robert P. Wargo, Esq. Liquor License Specialists and Alcohol
14
Law Offices of Ronald Jason Palmieri Licensed Properties; ABC Escrow; Craig A
15 911 Linda Flora Drive Block; Cindy Block
Los Angeles, CA 90049
16
17 Robert N. Rigdon, Esq. For: Defendants Louis Fuentes Cano, Jr.,
18 1019 Pier Avenue Amy Kwak and Kimberly Abels
Santa Monica, CA 90405
19
I am readily familiar with the practice of this office for collecting and processlll
20
correspondence for mailing. Under that practice, the above-described document(s) would b
21
deposited with the US. Postal Service on the same day as the document(s) were enclosed in thei
22
envelope(s). I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if th
23
postal collection date or postage meter date is more than one day after the date of mailing set fort
24
in this declaration.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that th
foregoing is true and correct. Executed on this 29th day of August, 2001, at Woodland Hills,

c.lifomi,. eU===::::::===-----
LaWl-ence M. Adelman

PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL