D08T Form No.

9A-1

TERMINAL REPORT

Project Summary

Title:

Hazards Characterization for Decommissioning of the PRR-1

Leader:

Mr. Leonardo S. Leopando

Philippine Nuclear Research Institute

Commonwealth Avenue, Diliman

Quezon City 1101, Metro Manila

Tel: +(63-2)-929-6011 to 6019, Local 231

Fax: +(63-2)-920-1646

Email: lsleopando@gmail.com.lsleopando@pnri.dost.gov.ph

Implementing Agency:

Philippine Nuclear Research Institute

Cooperating Agency:

International Atomic Energy Agency

Funding Agencies:

DOST (GIA) and IAEA (Technical Assistance)

Site of Implementation:

PNRI, Quezon City, Metro Manila, NCR

Start Date:

1 December 2007 (DOST-GIA)

26 June 2006 (IAEA R2D2P First Workshop)

Completion Date:

30 November 2010 (DOST-GIA)

Continuing (IAEA)

Duration:

36 months (DOST-GIA)

Continuing (IAEA)

Funding:

PhP 4,512,098 (DOST-GIA)

US$ 221,580 (2007-2010 IAEA TC Project PHI3009)

Report Prepared By:

1-

AJ

Leonardo YLeopando
Project Leader

Noted:

Date:

28 February 2011

Executive Summary
In 2005, the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute (PNRI) decided to decommission its 42-year-old
Philippine Research Reactor (PRR-1). The PNRI had never decommissioned a large nuclear facility before.
The PNRI sought help from its parent agency, the Department of Science and Technology (DOST), and from
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA was asked to provide technical advice, training
and some equipment while the DOST was asked to support the creation of a Decommissioning Plan with a
Grant-in-Aid (GIA). IAEA assistance began in 2005 and DOST-GIA assistance began in 2007. Using only
its own people, the PNRI set up a PRR-1 Decommissioning Project and a Task Force under it to create the
decommissioning plan.
The IAEA chose the PRR-1 as the model reactor for its Research Reactor Decommissioning
Demonstration Project (R2D2P). The R2D2P sponsored a series of workshops with international participants
and lecturers which were valuable sources of decommissioning knowledge and training.
As a necessary input to creating the Decommissioning Plan, the Task Force undertook to perform a
Characterization Survey to define the hazards in the PRR-1 (primarily radiological). The Task Force engaged
in the following activities in connection with the Characterization Survey:
1.
Obtained and prepared equipment. The IAEA, through its Technical Cooperation Project PHI3009,
funded much of the equipment for the Characterization Survey. DOST-GIA funded the rest of the
equipment and their operating expenses.
2.
Prepared a comprehensive Facility Description.
3.
Performed a detailed Radiation Protection Survey.
4.
Prepared a Characterization Survey Plan.
5.
Began field measurements, sample-taking and laboratory analysis.
The Characterization Survey was not finished as scheduled at the end of the DOST-GIA period, but is
being continued by the PNRI to completion, with IAEA support to continue through 2011. The reason for the
delay is a lack of qualified manpower; PNRI people with the proper expertise can only work in the project
part-time.
The PNRI has also started a draft of the Decommissioning Plan, although it will not be in final form
until after the Characterization Survey is completed and the appropriate methodologies for decontamination
and dismantling have been chosen and detailed. The PNRI is committed to finishing the Decommissioning
Plan.
Aside from the lack of manpower, the PNRI has not found any technical impediment to finishing the
Characterization Survey and the Decommissioning Plan. However, the source of future funding to implement
the Decommissioning Plan is not yet clear.
The PNRI is paying attention to the need to preserve the safety of the PRR-1 while awaiting
decommissioning. The reactor building is being cleared of clutter and easily-removable radioactive
materials. Some major building maintenance is necessary and the remaining nuclear fuel must be safely and
securely stored, but funding for much of these is also uncertain.

Table of Contents
Project Summary.................................................................................................................................................1
Executive Summary............................................................................................................................................2
Introduction.........................................................................................................................................................4
Review of Literature...........................................................................................................................................5
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Publications..........................................................................5
United States of America (USA) Publications...............................................................................................6
European Union (EU) Publications...............................................................................................................6
United Kingdom (UK) Publications..............................................................................................................6
Scientific Basis....................................................................................................................................................7
Decommissioning and Regulatory Control....................................................................................................7
Decommissioning in the Life Cycle of Nuclear Facilities.............................................................................8
The Ideal Case..........................................................................................................................................8
The PRR-1 Case........................................................................................................................................9
Preparing For PRR-1 Decommissioning.......................................................................................................9
The Transition Phase in the PRR-1...........................................................................................................9
Preparing the Decommissioning Plan.......................................................................................................9
Doing the Characterization Survey.........................................................................................................10
Managing Decommissioning..................................................................................................................11
Results and Findings.........................................................................................................................................12
The Characterization Survey........................................................................................................................12
Equipment Obtained...............................................................................................................................12
Facility Description.................................................................................................................................15
Radiation Protection Survey...................................................................................................................15
Characterization Survey Plan..................................................................................................................16
Unfinished Characterization Survey Activities......................................................................................17
Drafting a Decommissioning Plan...............................................................................................................18
Participation in the R2D2 Project................................................................................................................18
Workshops..............................................................................................................................................18
Training...................................................................................................................................................20
Experts....................................................................................................................................................20
Other Activities and Results........................................................................................................................20
Project Organization and Management...................................................................................................20
Housekeeping..........................................................................................................................................21
Building Maintenance and Repair..........................................................................................................21
Nuclear Fuel Storage..............................................................................................................................22
Problems and Solutions.....................................................................................................................................23
Summary, Recommendations and Conclusion.................................................................................................24
Appendices........................................................................................................................................................25
Appendix A. Terminal Audited Financial Report.....................................................................................A-1
Appendix B. Project Personnel..................................................................................................................B-1
Appendix C. Equipment Obtained Under the GIA....................................................................................C-1
Appendix D. PRR-1 Facility Description Document................................................................................D-1
Appendix E. Radiation Protection Survey Reports....................................................................................E-1
Appendix F. The Characterization Survey Plan.........................................................................................F-1
Appendix G. Early and Incomplete Draft of the PRR-1 Decommissioning Plan.....................................G-1
Appendix H. Agendas and Participants in the R2D2P Workshops...........................................................H-1
Appendix I. Report on the Transfer of Co-60 Sources...............................................................................I-1
Appendix J. Fuel Storage Vault Design Requirements Document.............................................................J-1

Introduction

The Philippine Research Reactor (PRR-1) is a small nuclear research reactor obtained about a halfcentury ago by the Philippines from the United States of America through the latter's Atoms for Peace
Program. The Philippine Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) constructed the reactor on land in the Quezon
City campus of the University of the Philippines. (The PAEC later became the Philippine Nuclear Research
Institute.) The PRR-1 commenced operation at a rated power of 1 MW thermal in 1963.
The PRR-1 was operated successfully and uneventfully for about 15 years until problems related to
aging started appearing at the end of the 1970s. A refurbishment and modernization program was started in
the early 1980s. The PRR-1 was shut down in 1984 for conversion to the use of a different type of nuclear
fuel (TRIGA) and the upgrading of the reactor's instrumentation system and cooling system. The reactor was
briefly tested up to an uprated operating power of 3 MW in early 1988 with those new components.
However, the political and economic turmoil of the 1980s took a toll on the fixed fund granted in 1982 for
reactor modernization. The refurbishment of other parts of the reactor could not be funded and those parts
continued deteriorating, preventing the resumption of reactor operation. Limited reactor repair was continued
during the 1990s using what funds could be found, but was never completed until funding completely dried
up by the 2000s. In 2005, the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute (PNRI) acknowledged that sufficient
funds will never be available for full reactor repair and decided to decommission the PRR-1.
The PNRI sought the assistance of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in preparing for
PRR-1 decommissioning. In 2005, the IAEA conducted a workshop for PNRI personnel on the first steps of
reactor decommissioning, focusing on the characterization of radiation hazards in the facility. The PNRI
learned that the IAEA would soon set up a Research Reactor Decommissioning Demonstration Project
(R2D2P), which will provide a platform for international hands-on training by adopting a reactor just
beginning decommissioning as a model. In return for accepting the application of IAEA standards and
hosting workshops for foreign participants, the facility can expect IAEA equipment, training and expert
assistance in decommissioning. The IAEA accepted the PNRI's application for the PRR-1 to be the R2D2P
model reactor in 2006. The IAEA has so far sponsored 5 R2D2P workshops in Manila and 4 abroad with
about 20 international participants in each. PNRI personnel have also been sent abroad for short training
courses and visits to facilities undergoing decommissioning. The IAEA has provided equipment and expert
assistance as expected.
The PNRI also sought the assistance of the Department of Science and Technology (DOST). In 2006,
the PNRI applied for a Grant-in-Aid (GIA) to cover primarily local expenses and some additional equipment
in conducting the hazards characterization of the PRR-1 and participating in the R2D2P. The IAEA was to
provide almost all of the imported equipment. The application was approved, and the DOST-GIA project
officially started in December 2007.
Decommissioning a nuclear facility is a complicated and expensive process. The work is just
beginning. The current activities of the PNRI will eventually produce a Decommissioning Plan that will
reliably describe the work and funding needed to implement the clean-up of the PRR-1 and the return of the
site to other use.

Review of Literature
The following is a selection of some publications that have some bearing on the work undertaken with
the assistance of the DOST-GIA project. This is not an exhaustive list of all references used in the project.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Publications

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

Safety Standards
1.

Safety Fundamentals No. SF-1. Fundamental Safety Principles. November 2006.

STI/PUB/1273.

2.

Safety Series No. 115. International Basic Safety Standards for Protection Against Ionizing
Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources. February 1996. STI/PUB/996.

3.

Safety Standards Series No. WS-R-5. Decommissioning of Facilities Using Radioactive

Material. October 2006. STI/PUB/1274.

4.

Safety Standards Series No. RS-G-1.7. Application of the Concepts of Exclusion, Exemption
and Clearance. August 2004. STI/PUB/1202.

5.

Safety Standards Series No. WS-G-2.1. Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Plants and
Research Reactors. October 1999. STI/PUB/1079.

6.

Safety Standards Series No. WS-G-5.1. Release of Sites from Regulatory Control on
Termination of Practices. November 2006. STI/PUB/1244.

Safety Reports
1.

Safety Reports Series No. 36. Safety Considerations in the Transition from Operation to
Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities. May 2004. STI/PUB/1184.

2.

Safety Reports Series No. 44. Derivation of Activity Concentration Values for Exclusion,
Exemption and Clearance. April 2005. STI/PUB/1213.

3.

Safety Reports Series No. 50. Decommissioning Strategies for Facilities Using Radioactive
Material. March 2007. STI/PUB/1281.

Technical Reports
1.

Technical Reports Series No. 389. Radiological Characterization of Shut Down Nuclear
Reactors for Decommissioning Purposes. October 1998. STI/DOC/010/389.

2.

Technical Reports Series No. 395. State of the Art Technology for Decontamination and
Dismantling of Nuclear Facilities. October 1999. STI/DOC/010/395.

3.

Technical Reports Series No. 420. Transition from Operation to Decommissioning of

Nuclear Installations. April 2004. STI/DOC/010/420.

4.

Technical Reports Series No. 446. Decommissioning of Research Reactors: Evolution, State
of the Art, Open Issues. May 2006. STI/DOC/010/446.

5.

Technical Reports Series No. 463. Decommissioning of Research Reactors and Other Small
Facilities by Making Optimal Use of Available Resources. June 2008. STI/DOC/010/463.

TECDOCS
1.

IAEA-TECDOC-1273. Decommissioning Techniques for Research Reactors. February 2002.

2.

IAEA-TECDOC-1394. Planning, Managing and Organizing the Decommissioning of

Nuclear Facilities: Lessons Learned. May 2004.

Nuclear Energy Series

1.

IAEA Nuclear Energy Series NW-T-1.18. Determination and Use of Scaling Factors for
Waste Characterization in Nuclear Power Plants. April 2009. STI/PUB/1363.

F.

Nuclear Security Series

1.

IAEA Nuclear Energy Series No. 11. Security of Radioactive Sources. May 2009.
STI/PUB/1387.

United States of America (USA) Publications

A.

B.

C.

Multi-Agency Manuals of the U.S. Department of Energy, Department of Defense, Environmental

Protection Agency, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
1.

MARSSIM - Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual.

2.

MARSAME - Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Assessment of Materials and Equipment

Manual (Draft).

3.

MARLAP - Multi-Agency Radiological Laboratory Analytical Protocols Manual.

Manuals of the Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education (ORISE):
1.

Survey Procedures Manual. Rev. No. 16, 30 November 2006.

2.

Laboratory Procedures Manual. Rev. No. 28, 18 April 2006.

3.

Quality Program. Rev. No. 19, 1 March 2007.

Nuclear Regulatory Guides (NUREG) of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission:

1.

NUREG-CR-5849. Manual for Conducting Radiological Surveys in Support of License

Termination.

2.

NUREG-1501. Background as a Residual Radioactivity Criterion for Decommissioning.

3.

NUREG-1506. Measurement Methods for Radiological Surveys in Support of New

Decommissioning Criteria.

4.

NUREG-1507. Minimum Detectable Concentrations With Typical Radiation Survey

Instruments for Various Contaminants and Field Conditions.

European Union (EU) Publications

A.

B.

Guides:
1.

Radiation Protection 114. Definition of Clearance Levels for the Release of Radioactively
Contaminated Buildings and Building Rubble.

2.

Radiation Protection 122. Practical Use of the Concepts of Clearance and Exemption.
Part I. Guidance on General Clearance Levels for Practices.
Part II. Application of the Concepts of Exemption and Clearance to Natural Radiation Sources.

Reports:
1.

EUR 17624. Handbook on Measurement Methods and Strategies at Very Low Levels and
Activities. February 1998.

United Kingdom (UK) Publications

A.

Guides:
1.

Clearance and Exemption Principles, Processes and Practices for Use by the Nuclear
Industry - A Nuclear Industry Code of Practice. Issue 1.01, August 2006.

2.

Best Practice Guidance for Site Characterisation - Managing contaminated land on nuclearlicensed and defence sites. Construction Industry Research and Information Association
(CIRIA), October 2000.

Scientific Basis
Decommissioning and Regulatory Control
Just shutting down a nuclear facility is not decommissioning - decontamination and dismantling is
usually necessary. Here are some definitions from the IAEA's official glossary that together explain why:
(Nuclear) Facilities - Places where radioactive material is produced, processed, used,
handled, stored or disposed of ... on such a scale that consideration of protection
and safety is required.
Protection and Safety - The protection of people against exposure to ionizing radiation or
radioactive materials ... including the means for achieving this ...
Radioactive Material - Material designated in national law or by a regulatory body as
being subject to regulatory control because of its radioactivity.
Regulatory Control - Any form of control or regulation applied to facilities or activities
by a regulatory body for reasons relating to radiation protection or the safety and
security of radioactive sources.
Decommissioning - Administrative and technical actions taken to allow the removal of
some or all of the regulatory controls from a facility.
The PRR-1 used and produced radioactive material from which protection was required; so following
the above definition, it was obviously a nuclear facility while it was in operation. The PRR-1 remains a
nuclear facility even after it has been permanently shut down, because past operation has left a residue of
radioactive material in it from which protection is still required.
All nuclear facilities should be under regulatory control, and it is the obligation of a member state of
the IAEA with a nuclear facility (such as the Philippines) to have an effective national nuclear regulatory
control system. In countries with modern legislation, the regulatory control is imposed by a body that is
separate and independent from the body operating the facility. Under outmoded Philippine legislation, the
PNRI is the owner of the PRR-1 although it is also the Philippine nuclear regulatory body. To make it worse,
the law specifically exempts PNRI-owned facilities from licensing. There is a proposal to modernize
Philippine nuclear law. In the meantime, in order to conform with international practice, the PNRI has
imposed a form of internal regulatory control on its self-owned facilities, where the internal PNRI regulatory
division is administratively made separate and effectively independent from the PNRI divisions operating the
facilities. The PRR-1 is under the regulatory control of the PNRI's regulatory division.
In principle, regulatory control never automatically lapses - it has to be deliberately removed by the
regulatory body. Decommissioning is the taking of action to permit some or all regulatory control of a
nuclear facility to be removed. Regulatory control is linked with the presence of radioactive material in the
facility. If all regulatory control is to be removed, this means that decommissioning requires the reduction of
all radioactive material to levels below what would warrant regulatory control - which will most probably
require the actions of decontamination and dismantling.
The maximum allowable amount of residual radioactivity (called the clearance level) that will allow
the removal of all regulatory control is independently defined by national regulatory bodies. The IAEA has
set its own standards that national regulatory bodies may or may not adopt, but technical assistance is
conditional on the acceptance of the IAEA standards for any specific project that the IAEA will aid. The
PRR-1 is receiving IAEA technical assistance; therefore, PRR-1 decommissioning is obligated to clean up
radioactive materials below the clearance levels specified by the IAEA standards. Philippine regulations will
also need to be met but this should be not be a problem because Philippine regulations are generally based on
IAEA standards. Meeting any Philippine regulation that is more restrictive (which is unusual) will supersede
but automatically meet the corresponding IAEA standard.
Regulatory control will be removed at the end of decommissioning but will continue to apply during
the intermediate activities such as decontamination, dismantling, radioactive waste transport and storage, and
also during the preparatory acts such as surveys for radioactivity and the preparation and documentation of
the decommissioning plan.
7

Decommissioning in the Life Cycle of Nuclear Facilities

The Ideal Case
In the ideal case, a nuclear facility goes through the following phases serially and deliberately during
its lifetime:
a.
Design, Construction and Start-Up Phase
b.
Operating Phase
c.
Transition Phase
d.
Decommissioning Phase
e.
Final Phase
Decommissioning is obviously the focus during the last three phases, but under current international
thinking, decommissioning is a consideration even during the first two phases. During the Design,
Construction and Start-Up Phase, the facility should be designed and built with decommissioning in mind:
for example, the reduction of radioactive waste would be a factor in the choice of materials and processes,
and structures would be designed with consideration of the ease of handling radioactive material during
demolition. The current trend is also to require the operator to submit a basic Decommissioning Plan even
before construction is authorized. During the Operating Phase, the Decommissioning Plan would be
continuously updated and refined to reflect knowledge gained with facility operation.
Permanently shutting down the reactor at the end of the Operating Phase begins the Transition Phase.
During the Transition Phase, the facility is put in a safe configuration that will be stable for some time and
the facility staff is reorganized to meet the needs of decommissioning rather than operations. Nuclear fuel is
unloaded from the reactor core and is often completely removed from the reactor site. Activities leading to
the elimination or mitigation of residual hazards, including their characterization, are started. The
Decommissioning Plan is finalized and should be ready for implementation by the end of the Transition
Phase.
The Decommissioning Phase begins immediately after the Transition Phase. The nature and timing of
the decontamination and dismantling activities in the Decommissioning Phase are determined by the
Decommissioning Strategy adopted. There are three basic Decommissioning Strategies: 1) Immediate
Dismantling, 2) Deferred Dismantling and 3) Entombment.
The strategy of Entombment is rarely adopted - here the remaining radioactive material is permanently
encapsulated on-site and the facility effectively is converted into a waste repository. Long-running
obligations and expenses in monitoring and maintenance are created for the operator. The site will have to
remain under regulatory control forever, albeit probably reduced in scope.
The strategy of Immediate Dismantling begins decontamination and dismantling at once, taking
advantage of having at least some of the operations staff still available to do the work, and having much of
the facility equipment still in good enough condition to be re-purposed for decommissioning. The license fee
that continues to be paid in some countries until a facility is freed from regulatory control will be saved
sooner. The disadvantage of Immediate Dismantling is that the residual radiation hazard in the facility will
not have much time to decay, such that radiation exposure of the workers can be expected to be higher and
the cost of disposal of the radioactive waste can be expected to be larger.
The strategy of Deferred Dismantling places decontamination and dismantling far into the future. In
the meantime, the facility is preserved in a stripped and static but safe state. Radioactive decay will reduce
the radiation hazard to the workers and also the amount of radioactive waste that will have to be disposed of.
The facility remains under regulatory control and continues to pay a license fee while under preservation and
has to be under continuous monitoring and surveillance. The advantage of having the operations staff and
equipment available for decontamination and dismantling is lost.
Following the Decommissioning Phase, the facility is officially released from regulatory control
during the Final Phase. A final and comprehensive characterization survey is usually undertaken during this
phase to prove to the regulator that no radioactive material remains above the clearance level.

The PRR-1 Case

Decommissioning in the life cycle of the PRR-1 has not proceeded as in the ideal case. Planning for
decommissioning was not one of the activities during the design, construction and operation of the PRR-1,
which was perhaps typical for a reactor of its generation. Even after the PRR-1 began encountering problems
related to the aging of its components during the late 1970s, all thoughts were on repairing the reactor, and
preparing for decommissioning was never seriously contemplated. The need for a Decommissioning Plan
was felt only after it was obvious beyond denial in the mid-2000s that the PRR-1 was not going to be
successfully repaired and put back into operation.
The PRR-1 was plunged unprepared into the Transition Phase in 2005, with not even the outline of a
Decommissioning Plan in hand.

Preparing For PRR-1 Decommissioning

The Transition Phase in the PRR-1
A high-priority activity during the Transition Phase is the placing of the facility in a stable and safe
configuration. Safety is greatly enhanced by having the reactor core de-fueled and by having spent fuel
shipped out of the site. Fortunately, the PRR-1 core had already been de-fueled during the previous repair
activities and all of the spent fuel had been shipped out of the site in 1999. However, reusable fresh and
nearly-fresh fuel elements remained in storage in the building. Aside from this fuel, a large amount of
extraneous radioactive material remained in the form of Co-60 rods stored in the reactor building. Those
materials need to be removed during the Transition Phase. Clutter that had accumulated inside the reactor
during its years of shutdown also need to be removed.
Another high-priority activity during the Transition Phase is the retraining and reorganization of the
reactor staff into a form better suited to preparing for decommissioning. The core of the decommissioning
staff was to be made up from what remained of the PRR-1 operations staff, but decommissioning requires a
set of skills and attitudes that is different from that in an organization originally set up for operations and
maintenance. Some of the skills are so different that they can only be put in the team by adding qualified
people from outside of the reactor group (but still from within the PNRI).
An essential activity during the Transition Phase is the preparation of a Decommissioning Plan. In the
ideal case, a basic plan needing only minor refinement and validation will already be available. In the case of
the PRR-1 a Decommissioning Plan will have to be prepared from scratch by people who have never done it
before and not yet trained in the methods.
Preparing the Decommissioning Plan
A Decommissioning Plan should have the following components (details are in IAEA Safety Reports
Series No. 45):
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Facility Description (including Radiological Status)

Chosen Decommissioning Strategy
Project Management
Decommissioning Activities
Surveillance and Maintenance
Waste Management
Cost Estimate and Funding
Safety Assessment
Environmental Assessment
Health and Safety (inc. Radiological Protection Plan, Industrial Safety, and Clearance Criteria)
Quality Assurance
Emergency Planning
Physical Security and Safeguards
Final Radiation Survey

Much work and many inputs are required to prepare a Decommissioning Plan:
A.

A clear statement of the desired end-state of decommissioning. Sometimes the desired end-state after
decommissioning is unrestricted re-use. For example, the University of the Philippines may want the
PRR-1 site to be returned by the PNRI for sale or commercial development. In that case, complete
release from regulatory control and therefore decontamination to clearance level will be needed. In a
different case, the end-state could be conversion into another facility with a different form of
regulatory control that will tolerate some residual radioactive material. For example, the PRR-1
reactor building may be converted into a radioactive waste storage building. The desired end-state
affects the degree of decontamination and dismantling that will need to be planned for.

B.

A complete physical description of the facility and the site. This is necessary in order to plan the
hazards characterization survey as well as the decontamination and dismantling activities.

C.

A detailed knowledge of the usage history of the facility. This is necessary in order to identify where
hazards are expected to be located as well as where hazards may not be expected but were created by
past incidents (such as spills of radioactive material).

D.

A quantified characterization survey of the radiological and other hazards in the facility. The
characterization of the actual nature, amount and location of radioactive contamination in the facility
is needed for comparison with clearance levels. This will reveal the degree of decontamination and
dismantling that will be necessary and the amount of radioactive waste that will be generated, all of
which have a major effect on the cost of decommissioning.
Non-radiological hazards such as chemicals will also need to be characterized for removal planning.

E.

A knowledge of decontamination and dismantling techniques. A familiarity with various

decontamination and dismantling techniques obtained through research and training is necessary to
select the proper ones to be used in the facility.

F.

A realistic assessment of the capabilities that are locally available or may be developed. This is
necessary in order to determine which jobs could be done in-house (immediately, or trained for) or
subcontracted to outsiders.

G.

A destination for the radioactive and other waste that will be generated. Knowledge of what will be
done with the radioactive waste is essential for planning. This includes proper packaging, transport,
and off-site storage or disposal.

H.

Data for cost analysis. Knowledge of the cost of the various activities is essential for selecting among
alternatives as well as for preparing a budget estimate for the whole project.

I.

Clear regulatory requirements. Regulatory requirements such as clearance levels and radiation
protection rules affect nearly all activities and need to be known.

Some of the needed input are already available, although not yet organized and easily accessible. Most
are not difficult to obtain. The most important input however was not available at the beginning of the
Transition Phase and would need a major effort to obtain: the Radiological Characterization of the PRR-1.
Doing the Characterization Survey
Radiological characterization is the determination of the nature, amount and location of radionuclides
in the facility. The core processes of characterization are field measurements, sample collection, and
laboratory analysis.
Field measurements are done with portable battery-powered instruments containing a radiation
detector, a display, and electronics to convert signals from the former to indications in the latter. Instruments
often have a single electronics and display box to which replaceable detector wands are attached. There are
specialized detectors for alpha, beta, and gamma radiation. These instruments are used to measure and
identify radioactive contamination on the surface of materials and radiation fields in free air.
Sample collection is necessary to take measurements that are not possible or accurate enough in the
field. Material samples are taken with a wide variety of mechanical techniques and tools and taken to a
laboratory where analysis is performed. Sampling considerations include splitting samples for multiple
analysis, packaging. labeling, preserving, transportation, chain of custody, and archiving/storage.
10

Laboratory analysis is performed with equipment specialized for various measurements such as gross
alpha/beta counting, gamma spectroscopy, and alpha/beta spectroscopy (liquid scintillation counting).
Samples generally need some processing to be converted into specific mechanical or chemical forms that the
analytical equipment will accept. Some radiochemical separation may also be necessary to identify
radionuclides in a mix. These equipment are usually sophisticated and expensive, and need a stable
controlled environment to produce accurate results. These equipment can measure very low levels of
radioactivity, but quality assurance is important for reliable results.
A proper characterization survey of the PRR-1 needs a major investment in equipment and manpower,
most of which were not available at the time that the decision to decommission was made. Equipment could
be obtained with external assistance, foreign and local. Manpower could be obtained by retraining the
existing facility staff and adding qualified people from other PNRI units.
Managing Decommissioning
Reactor decommissioning is a complex undertaking consisting of many smaller activities that have to
be coordinated in order to be coherent. Also, there may be only one major objective, but there are numerous
intermediate goals that have to be met. Decommissioning also requires a major commitment in resources,
especially for a small organization like the PNRI. The PNRI has learned that PRR-1 decommissioning
should be organized as a major project and be managed in a professional way.

11

Results and Findings

DOST-GIA funding was primarily used to support the following activities: 1) Preparing for and doing
the characterization survey, 2) Drafting a decommissioning plan, and 3) Participating in the R2D2 Project of
the IAEA.

The Characterization Survey

Equipment Obtained
Most of the major equipment for the characterization survey was provided by the IAEA. DOST-GIA
funding was used to obtain the rest of the major equipment and also some accessories for the IAEA-provided
equipment such as their interface computers. A complete list of the equipment obtained through DOST-GIA
funding and the Acknowledgment Receipts for them are in Appendix C. DOST-GIA funding was also used
for operational supplies such as disposable protective clothing and liquid nitrogen for the gamma analysis
system. Some minor equipment such as laboratory devices and hand tools were already available in the
PNRI.
The equipment needed assembly and calibration by the project staff. The project staff also wrote
formal procedures for the proper use of the equipment. The PNRI personnel had sufficient experience to set
up and make operational the radiation and laboratory instruments.
The following instruments were obtained new for the project except where noted as borrowed or
already owned:
A.

Portable Radiation Detection Instruments

1.

Personal Alarm Dosimeters, Isotrak DoseGuard (10 units)

2.

Digital Survey Meters, Ludlum Model 1441 (3 units); with:

Gas Proportional Detectors, Ludlum Model 44-92 (2 units),
Alpha Scintillators, Ludlum Model 43-65 (2 units),
Gamma Scintillators, Ludlum Model 44-10 (2 units),
Pancake GM Detectors, Ludlum Model 44-9 (2 units)

3.

Ruggedized Survey Meter, Rotem Model RAM R-200 (3 units inc. 1 borrowed)

4.

Contamination Monitor with Floor Bogey, CoMet Model 17 (1 unit)

5.

Contamination Monitor, Automess Model 6150AD6 (1 unit)

6.

Planar Calibration Standards, Eckert & Ziegler (5 units, various radioisotopes)

7.

Portable Scintillation Multichannel Analyzer, Canberra Model UNISPEC-PRO (1 unit); with

5" x 5" NaI(Tl) Detector, Canberra Model 127 (1 unit)

8.

Air Sampler, Radeco Model H-810 (1 unit, borrowed)

12

B.

Laboratory Radioanalytical Instruments

1.

Gamma Analysis System, containing:

HPGe Well Detector, Canberra Model GCW2523 (1 unit)
Digital Spectrum Analyzer, Canberra Model DSA-1000 (1 unit)

2.

Eu-152 Standard Reference Source, NIST Model SRM No. 4370C (1 certified vial, later
subdivided into several secondary sources for Gamma Analysis System)

3.

Alpha-Beta Low-Background Automatic Counting System, Canberra Model iMatic 2305E (1

unit); with 150 Sample Carriers and 3 50mm Calibration Standards (Am-241, Sr-90, Co-60)

13

C.

D.

Power Tools
1.

Portable Electric Powered Tools:

a.
Diamond Core Electric Drill, Hilti Model DD-EC-1 (1 set including accessories)
b.
Diamond Core Electric Drill, Hilti Model DD-200 (1 set including accessories)
c.
Diamond Electric Cutter, Hilti Model DCH-230 (1 set including accessories)
d.
Drill, Hilti Model TE-6S (1 set including accessories)
e.
Grinder, Hilti Model DG-150 (1 set including accessories)

2.

Portable Air-Powered Tools:

a.
Drill, Ingersoll-Rand Model 7802RA (2 units)
b.
Drill, Ingersoll-Rand Model 7803RA (2 units)
c.
Sander, Ingersoll-Rand Model I-R-319 (2 units already owned)
d.
Air Compressor, 10HP (1 unit)

3.

Electric Forklift (already owned, but DOST-GIA provided a new battery)

Sample Preparation Equipment

For the preparation of samples for radioanalysis (grinding, drying, some chemical treatment,
weighing, etc.), the project had been able to borrow equipment from other PNRI units. The equipment
included a new fume hood (intended for a laboratory that is not yet built), air conditioners (donated by
another PNRI unit) and various laboratory devices like an oven and an analytical balance. Minor items
such as glassware and reagents were funded by DOST-GIA. The project cleaned up one of the disused
laboratory rooms in the reactor building and installed the equipment there.

14

E.

Drawing and Presentation tools

1.

Large-Format (A0-Size) Flatbed Scanner, Deskan Model 6 Pro (1 unit)

2.

Large-Format (A0-Size) LED Printer, OCE Model TDS320 (1 unit)

3.

Digital Cameras, Canon Model SX100 (2 units)

4.

Projector, Eiki Model LC-XB42 (1 unit)

Facility Description
A comprehensive facility description is necessary to organize the Characterization Survey and to
prepare the Decommissioning Plan. The facility description was written after compiling and examining the
following information sources:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Architectural and engineering drawings

Operating and equipment manuals
Old operational records, technical reports and scientific publications
Safety analysis reports
Physical inspection of the site
Personal recollections of the reactor staff, including some retired.

The old reactor documents, especially the original drawings, were 50 years old and too fragile to be
casually handled. They were scanned into electronic form for use in this project and also for archival
preservation. A special large-format (A0-size) flatbed scanner had to be obtained for this purpose.
A copy of the finished PRR-1 facility description document is attached to this report as Appendix D.
Radiation Protection Survey
Before doing the Characterization Survey, it was necessary to first perform a Radiation Protection
Survey of the entire facility to assure safety. The Radiation Protection Survey sought to locate and identify
radiation sources, but only for the purpose of planning radiation protection measures and verifying
historically-known hot spots. The Radiation Protection Survey was quicker but not as detailed nor as
sensitive as the Characterization Survey that was to follow.
The Radiation Protection Survey produced hazard reports for the various areas of the facility, which
are attached as Appendix E. The survey showed radioactive contamination in expected as well as in some
unexpected locations. The latter are likely results of undocumented spills of radioactive material used in the
laboratories located in the Reactor Building. None of the contamination was found to be highly dangerous
and harmful exposure could be prevented with simple precautions.

15

Characterization Survey Plan

A Characterization Survey Plan was written based on the facility description and the usage history of
the spaces detailed therein. The Characterization Survey Plan also considered the nature, mode of
production, clearance levels, and method of detection of the radionuclides expected to be present in a reactor
such as the PRR-1. In order to make best use of the limited resources available, the survey methodology was
designed to systematically match the degree of effort with the degree of potential hazard.
A copy of the Characterization Survey Plan is in Appendix F.

16

Unfinished Characterization Survey Activities

The Characterization Survey has been started and is still going on. Previous DOST-GIA
accomplishment reports have identified a lack of manpower as slowing down the implementation of the task,
but the PNRI has not been able to find additional qualified people to be assigned to the project. This task is
expected to take at least one more year to finish with the present personnel complement. However, the PNRI
is committed to continue the project even after the end of DOST-GIA support.
Nevertheless, enough data has been gathered to show that the equipment and the techniques being
used do work. Radionuclides have been detected and quantified down to the clearance level in many places
in the facility, but are not yet known in enough spatial detail to write a comprehensive decontamination and
dismantling plan.

17

Drafting a Decommissioning Plan

Drafting a Decommissioning Plan started as soon as the project staff had enough training and
knowledge to begin it, but has proceeded slowly as the staff concentrated on preparing for and then doing the
Characterization Survey. The Decommissioning Plan will not be in an implementable state until the
Characterization Survey has provided enough data and certain high-level decisions are finalized (the exact
target end-state of the Reactor Building, for example).
A draft containing a tentative and broad description of the decontamination and dismantling activities
that are thought to be necessary has been available since 2008, but did not contain key sections such as
Quality Assurance and Health and Safety. A copy of this draft is in Appendix G. The project staff will be
able to concentrate on finishing and refining the draft as characterization work winds down.

Participation in the R2D2 Project

Workshops
The PNRI has participated in the following R2D2P workshops funded by the IAEA:
1.

Legal and Regulatory Aspects of Decommissioning of Research Reactors; Manila,

Philippines; 26-30 June 2006.

2.

The Basics of Decommissioning of Research Reactors; Manila, Philippines, 16-20 October

2006.

3.

Transition Phase; Sydney, Australia; 12-16 November 2007.

4.

Characterization Survey; Manila, Philippines; 3-7 December 2007.

5.

Project Planning, Management, Regulatory Review and Safety Assessment; Manila,

Philippines; 15-19 September 2008.

18

6.

Cost Estimates; Manila, Philippines; 30 March - 3 April 2009.

7.

Decommissioning Technologies; Karlsruhe, Germany; 6-10 July 2009.

8.

Release of Sites and Building Structures; Karlsruhe, Germany; 27 September - 1 October

2010.

9.

Safety Assessment for Decommissioning of Research Reactors; Riso, Denmark; 4-8 October
2010.

Copies of the agendas and lists of participants of these workshops are in Appendix H.
Five of the workshops were held in Manila, with the project staff handling local arrangements. The
PNRI had at least two official representatives and a large number of observers in each of the Manila
workshops. The PNRI sent one or two representatives to each of the foreign workshops, with their trips paid
for by the IAEA. A workshop typically had 20 participants from 10 countries, 4 lecturers and resource
persons, and featured a field trip to a facility undergoing decommissioning (including the PRR-1) and a
practical exercise.
The workshops were effective learning channels. Through the lectures, the foreign participants sharing
their experiences, the practical exercises, and the exposure to actual decommissioning work in the facilities
visited, the PNRI project staff gained decommissioning knowledge directly from its practitioners.

19

Training
The IAEA funded PNRI participation in the following non-R2D2P workshops abroad:
1.

Size Reduction of Components for Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities; Mol, Belgium; 810 October 2008.

2.

Support in Planning and Execution of the Decommissioning of Research Reactors; Sydney,

Australia; 20-24 July 2009.

3.

Regional Training Course on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Facilities;
Tokai, Japan; 29 November - 10 December 2010.

Experts
Aside from the lecturers in the R2D2P workshops, the IAEA sent the following experts on one-week
missions to the PNRI for specific help in PRR-1 decommissioning:
1.

Peter McIntyre from the United Kingdom, 31 March - 4 April 2008 . Assisted in identifying
overall strategic goals, reviewed plans and activities, gave advice on organizational
arrangements, and discussed assistance to be provided by the IAEA.

2.

Tom McCool from the United Kingdom, 20-27 May 2008. Gave advice on the preparation of a
Decommissioning Plan and presented experiences in the decommissioning of the Scottish
University Research Reactor.

3.

Vladimir Daniska from Slovakia, 2-6 February 2009. Gave advice on decommissioning
costing.

4.

Paul Dinner and Vladan Ljubenov from the IAEA, 26-29 July 2010. Reviewed progress of
decommissioning activities and gave advice on future directions.

Other Activities and Results

Project Organization and Management
The PNRI officially created a PRR-1 Decommissioning Plan Task Force in January 2007 . All the
personnel of the PNRI's Reactor Operations Section (about 10 people) were assigned to the task force, to
which were added working part-time a few persons from the Radiation Protection Section, the Analytical
Measurements Research Unit, the Health Physics Research Unit, and the Isotopes Techniques Research Unit.
The active members of the task force never exceeded more than about a dozen persons.
The PRR-1 Decommissioning Plan Task Force was given the job of doing the Characterization
Survey, writing the Decommissioning Plan, and serving as the PNRI counterpart of the DOST-GIA and
IAEA assistance projects. Since all of the reactor staff was assigned to the task force, the job of PRR-1

20

shutdown maintenance was in effect also assumed by the task force. The task force is led by the head of the
Reactor Operations Section.
A broader PRR-1 Decommissioning Project was established in April 2008 led by a Project Manager to
handle not only the preparation of a decommissioning plan but also its future implementation and related
issues such as radioactive waste management. The Project Manager was initially the head of the PNRI's
Nuclear Services and Training Division (of which the PRR-1 was a part), but later became one of the
assignments of the PNRI Deputy Director. The high PNRI rank of the Project Manager gave needed
authority to the assignment and management of the project's funding and personnel resources, which had to
be drawn PNRI-wide. An Assistant Project Manager acting like an executive assistant was assigned. The
PRR1 Decommissioning Plan Task Force continued to exist as the main tactical arm of the PRR-1
Decommissioning Project at this stage of decommissioning.
Aside from the Project Manager, all of the project personnel were assigned to various teams
undertaking specialized tasks, each led by a Team Leader. Because there were more tasks than people to do
them, all of the people (including the Assistant Project Manager, the Task Force Leader and the Team
Leaders) were members of more than one team. As would be expected, this had an impact on the timely
performance of the tasks, especially since nearly all of the personnel were assigned only part-time to this
project.
Housekeeping
In March 2009, about 500 curies of Co-60 remained in storage inside the Reactor Building. The rods
were the most intense radioactive sources in the building. This radioactive material, in the form of small rods
in lead casks, was originally part of a gamma irradiation facility that was housed in the reactor pool although
not really a part of the reactor. The rods were moved to the PNRI's Radioactive Waste Management Facility
(RWMF) in order for characterization of the PRR-1 to proceed properly. The move was done during 18-19
March 2009. A copy of the report documenting the move is in Appendix I.

The project staff has also reduced the clutter that had accumulated in the Reactor Building during its
years of disuse. Because of the possibility of radioactive contamination, all materials that were moved were
scanned for radioactivity. Materials that were contaminated or were used in any way that could have resulted
in contamination were left inside the reactor building but were re-stored in an orderly manner. Materials that
were not contaminated were moved out of the reactor building, into a temporary storage shed if it had some
scrap value, or into disposal as refuse if it had none. This work is still going on.
Building Maintenance and Repair
The Reactor Building has to be kept in reasonably good condition while awaiting decommissioning.
Physical deterioration may spread radioactivity, endanger people working in the building, and make future
decontamination and dismantling more difficult. Although the building is mostly in good physical condition,
leakage of rainwater into the building is an important concern.

21

The dome of the Reactor Building has to be periodically repainted not only for cosmetic reasons but
also to keep it intact. The dome is made of reinforced concrete only about 10 cm thick, and corrosion of the
steel reinforcement could seriously damage the dome. Rainwater could cause corrosion given the thin
concrete cover of the dome's reinforcing bars, but paint provides a water-repellent skin over the concrete.
The dome was to have been repainted in 2010, but a problem with the original contractor has moved the job
to 2011.
The roof of the West Wing of the Reactor Building is in specially poor condition. A botched repair job
in the 1990s (by a contractor) ruined the waterproofing over much of the concrete roof, causing extensive
water damage in the top floor of the West Wing. Funding is not yet available to restore the waterproofing.
Nuclear Fuel Storage
There are still 130 fuel rods containing almost 11 kg of U-235 stored in the reactor building. These
fuel rods have not been returned to the U.S.A. as nuclear waste because they are only slightly-irradiated and
could be used in a new reactor. However, the fuel rods have to be removed from the reactor building in order
for decommissioning to proceed. A safe and secure fuel storage vault that can be built elsewhere in the PNRI
compound is being designed. A formal Design Requirements document has been drafted, a copy of which is
in Appendix J. A conceptual design has been prepared that will meet the Design Requirements, and detailed
design engineering has been started. A copy of the conceptual design is not included in this report for
security reasons.
The design of a nuclear fuel storage system requires some sophisticated calculations related to nuclear
criticality and shielding in order to assure safety. Using its own funds, the PNRI has obtained the computer
software necessary to do the calculations. There is sufficient expertise in the reactor staff to use the software.
A proper nuclear fuel storage system is not inexpensive. No funding has been available up to the
present time to actually construct the fuel storage vault, but the PNRI is hoping that it may be successfully
included in its future regular budget or that an alternate funding source may be found.

22

Problems and Solutions

At the time that the DOST-GIA project was proposed, the PNRI intended to proceed to
decontamination and dismantling of the PRR-1 as soon as funds were available. Doing the characterization
survey and writing the decommissioning plan (the objectives of the DOST-GIA project) were viewed as
necessary first steps towards justifying and obtaining the funding. These first steps were supposed to be
completed quickly, then the project will move on immediately to decontamination and dismantling. The
strategy at that time was therefore Immediate Dismantling.
As the project progressed, the PNRI realized that:
a)

The usual reason for not being able to do a sophisticated technical task - lack of equipment - had been
overcome with IAEA and DOST-GIA assistance and was no longer a showstopper, but doing the
characterization survey and writing the decommissioning plan could not be done quickly anyway.
There were just too few capable PNRI people that can be assigned to the project. Also, because of the
wide range of new skills that those people must learn, training and practice to be comfortable with
their new tasks were taking more time than expected.

b)

Obtaining funding for the implementation of the decommissioning plan was not assured. There was no
telling how long the PNRI will have to wait. Even funds for the shutdown preservation of the facility
were hard to come by.

In mid-2010, the PNRI re-examined its strategy at about the same time that an IAEA expert mission
was also reviewing the progress of the project. The PNRI and the IAEA came to the same conclusion: The
project needed to shift its emphasis to the longer-term safe preservation of the facility given the uncertainty
on when the decommissioning plan will be completed and when funding for its implementation will become
available. The characterization survey and the writing of the decommissioning plan will continue, but in the
interest of continuing safety, more effort and resources had to be put towards preventing further deterioration
of the facility. The strategy had changed to Deferred Dismantling.
Thereafter, the PNRI raised the priority of doing building repair in the PRR-1 work plan. The IAEA
extended its technical assistance program supporting the preparation of a decommissioning plan by another
two-year cycle from 2009 to 2011, retroactively redefining the assistance period up to 2009 as an equipment
procurement and training phase.
These actions were adaptations to the problems and not real solutions. The basic problems of too few
capable people and too little money have no solutions within the PNRI alone.

23

Summary, Recommendations and Conclusion

In summary, the project has discovered or validated that:
A.

The international consensus is that decommissioning is an unavoidable stage in the life of a nuclear
reactor like the PRR-1 and must be properly implemented to assure public safety. The methodology of
decommissioning has been well developed in countries that pioneered nuclear technology and is being
shared world-wide.

B.

Hazards characterization and the preparation of a decommissioning plan are the first steps in the
decommissioning of the PRR-1. These have been found to be very complex technical tasks but are
nevertheless within the capability of the PNRI now that proper equipment and training have been
provided by the IAEA and DOST-GIA.

C.

Hazards characterization and the preparation of a decommissioning plan could not be completed
within the original schedule of the DOST-GIA and IAEA assistance projects because not enough
capable people can be assigned to the tasks. However, enough progress have been made to be
confident that there is no technical impediment to completing them. The tasks can still be finished but
it will take longer.

D.

There are no funds for the implementation of the decommissioning plan, not even for necessary
preliminary steps like removing nuclear fuel from the reactor building. The PNRI has abandoned the
idea that the decommissioning plan will be implemented as soon as it is finished. Therefore, the PNRI
must take steps to keep the PRR-1 safely preserved until the funds become available.

It is recommended that:
A.

The PNRI continue with its commitment to finish hazards characterization and complete the
decommissioning plan, using its own resources if necessary although IAEA assistance will continue in
the short term.

B.

The PNRI continue to seek funding for the implementation of decommissioning, starting with the
preliminary tasks like the provision of a fuel storage vault and repair of the reactor building.

C.

The PNRI not neglect to keep the PRR-1 in a safely preserved state until decontamination and
dismantling can proceed.

In conclusion:
A.

Decommissioning the PRR-1 is a complex and technologically challenging task but it can be done to
international standards by our own people.

B.

Nevertheless, a strong commitment of resources (manpower and funding) will be necessary to finish
the full task within a reasonable amount of time.

24

Appendices

25

Appendix A. Terminal Audited Financial Report

A-1

Appendix B. Project Personnel

B-1

Appendix C. Equipment Obtained Under the GIA

C-1

Appendix D. PRR-1 Facility Description Document

D-1

Appendix E. Radiation Protection Survey Reports

E-1

Appendix F. The Characterization Survey Plan

F-1

Appendix G. Early and Incomplete Draft of the PRR-1 Decommissioning Plan

G-1

Appendix H. Agendas and Participants in the R2D2P Workshops

H-1

Appendix I. Report on the Transfer of Co-60 Sources

I-1

Appendix J. Fuel Storage Vault Design Requirements Document

J-1