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Dr.

Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University,


Lucknow

B.A. L.L.B. (Hons.), Semester VI


(2016-2017)
Administrative Law
Final Draft
Topic: An Overview of Administrative Tribunals in
India

Submitted to:

Submitted by:

Mr. Shashank Shekhar

Nida Fatima

Assistant Professor,
law

Section A
Roll No: 78
Enrolment no: 130101078

Acknowledgement
I hereby extend a heartfelt gratitude towards my administrative law professor Mr. Shashank
Shekhar for letting me research on the topic of my choice and also letting the submission
possible under his judicious guidance.
A token of thanks is also well deserved by all the people whose valuable advice went into the
improvement of this project. The ever helpful staff of the libraray of Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya
National Law University deserves a special mention for being overtly instrumental in completion
of this project.
I therefore humbly present this project with the best of my abilities and skills and apologise for
any mistake or discrepancy in putting together this piece of research.

Index
1. Introduction.4
2. An overview of the Tribunal System in India6
3. Tracing the Trajectory of Indian Judgements from Sampath Kumar to
4.
a)
b)
c)

5.
6.

R.Gandhi..7
The Tribunal System today: Some Issues and Concerns.11
Implications of Chandra Kumar11
Provisions for Administrative/Technical members..12
Tribunalisation13
Conclusion..15
Bibliography16

Introduction

In the current scenario of adjudication of disputes, apart from the court system, even tribunals
play a very important role. The number of tribunals has been increasing after 1947 1 especially
after the 42nd Amendment Act of 1976, which provided for the insertion of Art. 323A and Art.
323B.2 Tribunals function differently from courts, from the manner of appointment to the
procedure followed, yet they seek to achieve the same objective as that of courts- to deliver
justice. In this light, the paper proceeds to analyze the tribunal system in India.
Part I looks at the situation before the 42nd Amendment Act and the changes it brought to the
erstwhile tribunal system, and provides a description of the meaning of the term tribunal. Part
II deals with the three landmark judgments which have influenced the tribunal system to a great
extent, namely, S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India, L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and
the recent R. Gandhi v. Union of India. After Sampath Kumar, the High Courts did not enjoy the
power of judicial review with regard to matters concerning tribunals under Art. 323A which was
the position post the 42nd Amendment, but after Chandra Kumar, which brought about a massive
change and continues to be good law, the High Courts enjoyed the power of judicial review with
regard to matters concerning tribunals both under Arts. 323A and 323B. Part III analyzes some of
the issues and concerns relating to the tribunal system in India- the implications of Chandra
Kumar, the appointment of members in tribunals by the Executive the provision for members in
tribunals to comprise of persons from the Executive and the problems surrounding
tribunalisation, and provides recommendations for the same.
Administrative tribunals.- (1) Parliament may, by law, provide for the adjudication or trial by
administrative tribunals of disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of
service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the
Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the
control of the Government of India or of any corporation owned or controlled by the
Government. (2) A law made under clause (1) may (a) provide for the establishment of an
administrative tribunal for the Union and a separate administrative tribunal for each State or for
two or more States; (b) specify the jurisdiction, powers (including the power to punish for
contempt) and authority which may be exercised by each of the said tribunals; (c) provide for the
1 V. Nageswara Rao and G.B. Reddy, Doctrine of Judicial Review and Tribunals: Speedbreakers
Ahead, 39 journal of India law Institute 418 (1997).
4

procedure (including provisions as to limitation and rules of evidence) to be followed by the said
tribunals; (d) exclude the jurisdiction of all courts, except the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
under article 136, with respect to the disputes or complaints referred to in clause (1); (e) provide
for the transfer to each such administrative tribunal of any cases pending before any court or
other authority immediately before the establishment of such tribunal as would have been within
the jurisdiction of such tribunal if the causes of action on which such suits or proceedings are
based had arisen after such establishment; (f) repeal or amend any order made by the President
under clause (3) of article 371D; (g) contain such supplemental, incidental and consequential
provisions (including provisions as to fees) as Parliament may deem necessary for the effective
functioning of, and for the speedy disposal of cases by, and the enforcement of the orders of,
such tribunals. (3) The provisions of this article shall have effect notwithstanding anything in any
other provision of this Constitution or in any other law for the time being in force.

Art. 323B, The Constitution of India, 1950 reads thus: Tribunals for other matters- (1) The
appropriate Legislature may, by law, provide for the adjudication or trial by tribunals of any
disputes, complaints, or offences with respect to all or any of the matters specified in clause ( 2 )
with respect to which such Legislature has power to make laws (2) The matters referred to in
clause ( 1 ) are the following, namely: (a) levy, assessment, collection and enforcement of any
tax; (b) foreign exchange, import and export across customs frontiers; (c) industrial and labour
disputes; (d) land reforms by way of acquisition by the State of any estate as defined in Article
31A or of any rights therein or the extinguishment or modification of any such rights or by way
of ceiling on agricultural land or in any other way; (e) ceiling on urban property; (f) elections to
either House of Parliament or the House or either House of the Legislature of a State, but
excluding the matters referred to in Article 329 and Article 329A; (g) production, procurement,
supply and distribution of foodstuffs (including edible oilseeds and oils) and such other goods as
the President may, by public notification, declare to be essential goods for the purpose of this
article and control of prices of such goods; (h) offences against laws with respect to any of the
matters specified in sub clause (a) to (g) and fees in respect of any of those matters; (i) any
matter incidental to any of the matters specified in sub clause (a) to (h).

I. An Overview Of The Tribunal System In India


Tribunals, one of the bodies of administrative adjudication in India, have witnessed much debate
in the recent years. They were set up to reduce the workload of courts, to expedite decisions and
to provide a forum which would consist of both lawyers and experts in the areas falling under the
jurisdiction of the tribunal.2 The 42nd Amendment Act of 19763 brought about a massive change
in the adjudication of disputes in the country, as it provided for the enactment of Art. 323A and
Art.323B in the Constitution of India.4 Art. 323A provides for the establishment of administrative
tribunals by the Parliament and Art. 323B provides for the establishment of tribunals to
adjudicate on the matters specified in the sub-clause with regard to which the respective
Legislature had the power to make laws.5 Art. 323A was to be effective only if the Parliament
implemented a law in this regard and hence the Administrative Tribunals Act of 1985 was
enacted.6 Similarly, tribunals could be set up under Art. 323B only if the necessary legislation
was enacted7 and there are many non administrative tribunals, such as the Income Tax Appellate
Tribunal, Debt Recovery Tribunal, the Customs Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal and
the Compensation Tribunals.8 Importantly, tribunals existed prior to the 42nd Amendment Act
2 M.P. Jain and S.N. Jain, principles of administrative law,Vol. I, 713 (6thedn., 2007).
3 42nd Amendment Act, 1976.
4 Arts.323A and 323B, The Constitution of India, 1950
5 However the Supreme Court has held in Union of India v. Delhi High Court Bar Association
(AIR 2002 SC 1479) that the legislatures can establish tribunals outside the scope of Art. 323A
and Art. 323B as long as there was legislative competence under the Seventh Schedule.
6 D.D. Basu, commentary on the constitution of India, Vol. 9, 10647 (8thedn., 2011).
7 Id.6 at pg. 10700
8 Ibid 4
6

and even prior to the date of the enactment of the Constitution, as Art. 136 provides for the term
tribunal and further, there were, inter alia, tribunals established under the Industrial Disputes
Act of 1947 and under the Life Insurance Corporation Act of 1956. Art. 323A and Art. 323B did
not provide for the setting up of the tribunals for the first time in the country, but were rather
meant to provide a fillip to the tribunal system 9 and provide constitutional authority for the
legislations.10 Further, before the insertion of Art. 323A and Art. 323B, tribunals were under the
ambit of the respective High Courts. The High Courts had appellate jurisdiction in this regard on
matters which could be heard by the tribunals. Further, a writ petition could also be maintained
before the Supreme Court and the High Court under Art. 226 and Art. 32 respectively, but after
this amendment, an appeal could be preferred only to the Supreme Court by means of a Special
Leave Petition under Art. 136 and the writ jurisdiction under both Art.226 and Art. 32 were
excluded.11
Though the term tribunal has not been defined, either in the Constitution or in any of the related
legislations, there have been cases wherein courts have laid down the requisites of tribunals. In
Jaswant Sugar Mills,12 it was held that to determine whether an authority acting judicially was a
tribunal or not, the principle incident was whether it was invested with the trappings of a court,
such as having the authority to determine matters, authority to compel the attendance of
witnesses, the duty to follow the essential rules of evidence and the power to impose sanctions.
In another judgment in the same year,13 it was held that the three essential requisites for a body to
be a tribunal were that it had to have the trappings of a court, had to be established by the state
9 M.P. Jain, Indian Constitution Law, Vol. I, 294 (5thedn., 2003); M.P.Jain and S.N.Jain, Ibid 2,at
662.
10 D.D. Basu, Ibid 6, at 10700
11 Arun Roy and Vishnu Jerome, Administrative Tribunals in India: A welcome departure from
orthodoxy? 12(1) Student Bar Review,61 63-64 (2000).
12 Jaswant Sugar Mills v. Lakshmi Chand, AIR 1963 SC 677
13 Engineering Mazdoor Sabha v. Hind Cycles, AIR 1963 SC 874.
7

and it had to be vested with the inherent judicial power of the state. However, these criteria are
illustrative and not exhaustive. With regard to the functioning of a tribunal, tribunals do not have
to follow any uniform procedure as laid down under the Civil Procedure Code 14 and under the
Indian Evidence Act of 1872 but they have to follow the principles of natural justice.

2. Tracing the Trajectory Of Indian Judgements from Sampath


Kumar to R.Gandhi
After the enactment of Art.323A and Art. 323B, there have been three landmark judgments
which have shaped the history of the tribunal system. As Art. 323A and Sec. 28 of the
Administrative Tribunals Act provided for excluding the jurisdiction of all courts except the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Art. 136, there were a catena of cases which challenged
the validity of both the legislation and the 42nd amendment. 15 The judgment of the five judge
Bench of the Supreme Court in S.P.Sampath Kumar v. Union of India 16 flagged off the debate
in this area.
The important issue raised in Sampath Kumar was whether the Administrative Tribunals Act and
the 42nd constitutional amendment (in light of Art. 323A) were unconstitutional as they excluded
judicial review. The court held that judicial review was part of the basic structure of the
Constitution but went on to state that if the constitutional amendment did not leave a void by
excluding the jurisdiction of the High Court but if it set up another effective institutional
mechanism wherein the power of judicial review was vested the Administrative Tribunal would
pass the test of constitutionality. The basic structure doctrine implies that if any there is a
legislation amending any area of law belonging to the basic structure, the amendment would be
adjudged void.17

14 S.P. Sathe, Administrative law, 297 (7th edn., 2012).


15 Arun Roy and Vishnu Jerome, Ibid 14, at 65
16 AIR 1987 SC 386
17 D.D. Basu, commentary on constitution of India, Vol. 9, 5540 (8thedn., 2011).
8

The court further held that these tribunals had the power of judicial review owing to the 42nd
Amendment Act. This was also because exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Court by
providing for effective institutional mechanisms would not bar judicial review as tribunals were
effective mechanisms as they helped in reducing the backlog of cases and assured quick
settlements of service disputes. However, it is surprising that the issue pertaining to the
constitutionality of Art. 323B(3)(d), which is similar to Art. 323A(2)(d) was not raised before the
Court.
Almost a decade later, in L.Chandrakumar v. Union of India,18 a seven judge Bench of the
Supreme Court overruled Sampath Kumaron the point of the power of judicial review of the
High Courtsand it still continues to be good law. It was a landmark decision also because the
issue of the constitutionality of Art. 323B(3)(d) was raised for the first time. The important issues
raised before the Court were

first, whether Art. 323A(2)(d) and Art. 323(B)(3)(d) violated the power of judicial review

vested with the High Court under Art. 226 and Art. 227.
Second, whether the power of superintendence of the High Courts over all tribunals and

courts situated within their territorial jurisdiction was part of the basic structure.
Third, whether the provision for a technical member would make any difference in
deciding the validity of the provision for the constitution of tribunals.

Held

First, it was held that the power of judicial review was vested with the Supreme Court
and the High Court under Art. 226 and under Art. 32 as the constitutional safeguards
which ensured the independence of the higher judiciary were not available to the lower
judiciary and reiterated that judicial review was a part of the un-voidable basic structure
doctrine.19The court also reiterated that an exclusion of jurisdiction clause enacted in
any legislation under the ambit of 323A(2)(d) and Art. 323(B)(3)(d) were
unconstitutional.

18 AIR 1997 SC 1125


19 KesavanandaBharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461
9

Second, it was held that the power of superintendence of the High Courts over the lower

judiciary within their territorial jurisdiction was part of the basic structure.
Third, it was held that the setting-up of tribunals was founded on the premise that those
with judicial experience and grass-roots experience would best serve the purpose of
dispensing speedy justice. The court also clarified that the tribunals would continue to act
as courts of first instance in respect of the areas of the law for which they have been
constituted.

Importantly, the reasons stated for this ratio decidendi was that the constitutional safeguards
which ensured the independence of the superior judiciary were not available to those manning
tribunals. Hence the judges of the tribunals can never be considered the full and effective
substitutes of the superior judiciary in discharging the functions of constitutional interpretation
and thus the power of judicial review could not be ousted from the High Court and the Supreme
Court. Interestingly, the court has only looked at independence of the judiciary in terms of, inter
alia, salaries, allowances and the retirement age of judges and not with regard to whether the
presence of administrative and technical members would be the interference of the Executive in
judicial actions.
However, when certain civil appeals came up for hearing before a three-judge Bench of the
Supreme Court, wherein it felt that Chandra Kumar had not addressed the issue of to what extent
the powers of the High Court, excepting judicial review could be transferred to the tribunals and
whether there was a demarcating line for the Parliament to vest intrinsic judicial functions
traditionally performed by courts in any tribunal. Hence the three-judge Bench directed the
appeals to be heard by a Constitution Bench, and in Union of India v. R Gandhi,20 these issues
were addressed.

Held

First, it was held that the Constitution contemplates judicial power being exercised by
both courts and tribunals (in light of Art. 32, Art. 247, Art. 323A and Art. 323B) and
hence if jurisdiction of High Courts could be created by providing for appeals, revisions
and references to be heard by the High Courts, jurisdiction can also be taken away by

20 (2010) 6 SCR 857


10

deleting the provisions for appeals, revisions or references and it also followed that the
legislature has the power to create tribunals with reference to specific enactments and
confer jurisdiction on them to decide disputes in regard to matters arising from such

special enactments.
Second, it was held that while the legislature could make a law providing for constitution
of tribunals and prescribing the eligibility criteria and qualifications for being appointed
as members, the superior courts in the country could, in exercise of the power of judicial
review, examine whether the qualifications and eligibility criteria provided for selection
of members is proper and adequate to enable them to discharge judicial functions and
inspire confidence.

Despite three landmark judgments, there are a lot of issues regarding the tribunal system in
India.

First, the reasons for the establishment of the tribunals included the delivery of speedy
justice but if the decisions of the tribunals were subject to judicial review, the High Court
would have to hear those cases when already the Supreme Court had the power to do so

and hence it would lengthen the judicial process.


Second, the independence of the tribunals is under question as administrative or technical
members, are in most instances, appointed by the Executive 21 and many tribunals consist
of members from the Executive.22 Third, increasing tribunalisation is problematic as there
is no uniformity in administration among the tribunals and the functioning of most of the
tribunals is in a very bad state.

3. The Tribunal System today: Some issues and Concerns


21 The Executive, as succinctly explained in Rai Sahib Ram JawayaKapur v. State of Punjab,
AIR 1955 SC 549 is the executive power connotes the residue of governmental functions that
remain after legislative and judicial functions are taken away.
22 Justice Ruma Pal, An Independent Judiciary, 5th V.M. Tarkunde Memorial Lecture, New
Delhi (November 10, 2011), available at http://www.theradicalhumanist.com/index.php?
option=com_radical&controller=article&cid=431&Itemid=56
11

1. The implications of Chandra Kumar


The judgment in Chandra Kumar has unnecessarily increased the duration of the procedure to
obtain justice when anyhow the Supreme Court has the power of judicial review. As correctly
pointed out in Sampath Kumar, it has been held in Minerva Mills 23 that the power of judicial
review cannot be dispensed with but the Parliament could, in place of the High Courts, substitute
another alternative institutional mechanism for judicial review. However, in Chandra Kumar, the
court felt that the theory of alternative institutional mechanisms as established in Sampath
Kumar was in defiance to the proposition laid down in Kesavananda Bharati 24 and Indira
Gandhi25 that only constitutional courts alone were competent to exercise the power of judicial
review. The confounding issue is that, after Chandra Kumar, despite High Courts enjoying the
power of judicial review against decisions passed by tribunals, tribunals have not been divested
of their power of judicial review. The vesting of the power of judicial review on tribunals has not
been done by the Parliament when establishing tribunals under different enactments, 26 but rather
Sampath Kumar vested the power of judicial review on administrative tribunals by holding that
another institutional mechanism could exercise the power of judicial review, and Chandra Kumar
has not overruled this aspect, but conferred the power of judicial review on non-administrative
tribunals as well. Rather, it was only held that tribunals cannot exercise the power of judicial
review to the exclusion of the High Court and the Supreme Court.
Though Chandra Kumar has created undesirable consequences, it is unfortunate that this position
cannot be changed as judicial review has been conclusively held to be part of the basic structure
of the Constitution. In light of the current situation, it is submitted that the power of judicial
review be divested from the tribunals as only constitutional courts are competent to exercise the
23 Minerva Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1789
24 KesavanandaBharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 146
25 Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 2299
26 215th Report of the Law Commission of India, L. Chandra Kumar visited by Larger Bench
of

Supreme

Court,

57

(2008),

available

at

http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/report215.pdf.
12

power of judicial review27 and it is recommended that each High Court has a separate Bench to
deal with the power of judicial review with regard to tribunals in order to expedite the process.
2.The provision for administrative/technical members
Many legislations, such as the Administrative Tribunals Act of 1985, the Income Tax Act of
1961, Consumer Protection Act of 1986 and the Competition Act of 2002, provide for
administrative or technical members to be a part of the tribunal. Administrative members are
those who have practical experience of the functioning of the services and technical members are
those who are experts in the field related to the respective tribunals. 28 These administrative and
technical members are, in most instances, appointed by the Executive. Moreover, many tribunals
also consist of members from the Executive. The issue is whether the appointment by Executive
with regard to the performance of judicial functions is a violation of the doctrine of separation of
powers and the concept of the independence of the judiciary.
The doctrine of separation of powers emphasizes the exclusiveness of the organs of the
government, namely the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. It was held in Ram Jawaya
that though the Constitution has not recognized this doctrine in absolute rigidity, it does not
contemplate the assumption of functions belonging to a particular organ of the State by another.
This doctrine is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. 29 The principle of independence
of the judiciary is the insulation of courts from any coercion attempted by forces either from
within or from outside the government.30 The makers of the Constitution were anxious that even
the subordinate judiciary be insulated from executive interference 31 and this principle is part of
27 Ibid
28 Union of India v. R. Gandhi, (2010) 6 SCR 857
29 Ibid
30 Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution, Corner stone of a nation , 175-176 (9thedn.,
2005).
31 Union of India v. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth AIR 1977 SC 2328
13

the basic structure of the Constitution. Further, the separation of judicial power from executive
power is also one of the facets of the principle of the rule of law.32
In reality, tribunals are not fully independent. The Supreme Court observed that the secretary of
the sponsoring department sits in the Selection Committee for appointment. Further, when the
tribunals are formed, they are largely dependent on the sponsoring department for infrastructure
and funding. Also, legislations constituting tribunals habitually provide for the members of civil
services from the sponsoring departments to become members of the tribunal.33
Clearly, in light of the above, the appointment of administrative and technical members by the
Executive is a contravention of the doctrine of separation of powers and the principle of the
independence of the judiciary. Surprisingly, this issue was dealt with in light of the independence
of the judiciary by the Supreme Court in as late as 2010, in R Gandhi.
It is recommended that the model which was adopted in the United Kingdom in the Tribunals,
Courts and Enforcement Act of 2007 (Tribunals Act) be followed in India. The guarantee of
judicial independence is available to most tribunal members. 34 For the members of the tribunals
which are created under the Tribunals Act, appointments would be made only after the
recommendations of the Judicial Appointments Commission. The eligibility criteria for being a
member of the Judicial Appointments Commission is that the person had to be a solicitor or a
barrister or possessed a qualification awarded by the Institute of Legal Executives or by anybody
authorised to confer rights of audience or rights to conduct litigation.35 Hence, all the formal
links with the sponsoring department are severed.

iii. Tribunalisation

32 H.W.R. Wade and C.F. Forsyth, Administrative Law, 18 (10thedn., 2009).


33 Union of India v. R. Gandhi, (2010) 6 SCR 857
34 Sec. 1, Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act, 2007
35 Secs.50 and 51, Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act, 2007
14

Currently, there a lot many tribunals functioning in the country, and an exhaustive list of
tribunals cannot be prepared. The tribunal system has been growing haphazardly with the lack of
any overarching plan. There is no uniform administration of these tribunals and there is
flexibility in the norms of natural justice which have to be followed. The Supreme Court
expressed the problems related to tribunals succinctly by stating that,36
Tribunals have been functioning inefficiently ... The situation at present is that different
tribunals constituted under different enactments are administered by different administrative
departments of the Central and the State Governments. The problem is compounded by the fact
that some tribunals have been created pursuant to the Central legislations and some others have
been created by State legislations.
Even very recently, the Supreme Court has expressed its concerns over the bureaucratic attitude
in the functioning of several tribunals opining that it was very unfortunate that the court had to
interfere for the provision of infrastructure and manpower. Thus, there are a lot of issues
surrounding tribunalisation which need to be addressed. These issues are the the haphazard
growth of tribunals constituted by the Central and the State governments, inefficient functioning
of the tribunals, and the lack of a uniform procedure in adjudicating disputes.
With regard to these issues, it is recommended that

first, the Ministry of Law and Justice should prepare a list of tribunals which are currently
functioning, along with the legislations they are governed under and the places they are
located in. This would spread awareness and would help any person in the country know
which tribunal he has to approach in case of a dispute, especially because tribunals would
act as courts of first instance in respect of the areas of the law for which they have been

constituted.
Second, there should be a body which supervises the functioning of tribunals. It was
recommended in Chandra Kumar that the Ministry of Law and Justice should appoint an
independent supervisory body to oversee the working of the tribunals and also, in the
United Kingdom, the Tribunals Act provides for the establishment of the Administrative
Justice and Tribunals Council whose functions are to keep the administrative justice

36 I.P. Massey, Administrative Law, 184 (2008).


15

system under review and to consider ways to make the system accessible, fair and
efficient.37
As tribunals do not have to follow any uniform procedures but only follow the principles of
natural justice, it poses a problem as courts have not laid down even the basic guidelines of
natural justice which is applicable to the tribunals. To add to this problem, case law pertaining to
natural justice is not consistent and the person affected and the adjudicators are unable to have a
clear understanding of the procedures which have to be followed.
Flexibility may be justifiable to a certain extent as tribunals should have the freedom to decide
the procedures in accordance to the needs of the specific body but this has resulted in a
multiplicity of procedures followed by the tribunals and the law regarding procedures is
unpredictable. Hence, third, for the formulation of minimal norms of procedure to be followed,
the recommendations of the Law Commission Report of 1958 must be implemented. The
Commission recommended that there should be a legislation for the functioning of tribunals
which provides for a simple procedure reflecting the principles of natural justice.38

Conclusion
The tribunal system in India has come a long way, since independence to the present day. The
changes in the tribunal system have been visible, as can be seen from the pre-independence era
and the post-independence era to the 42nd Amendment Act, the 42nd Amendment Act to
SampathKumar, and from Sampath Kumar to Chandra Kumar. Though the reasons for setting up
tribunals are very relevant, the system faces a lot of issues. As tribunals occupy an important
sphere in both administrative law as well as constitutional law, these issues form a vital part of
the discourse in these areas.
It is hoped that in the way forward, there would be a separate Bench at all High Courts which
would hear matters pertaining to the judicial review against the orders of the tribunals. This
37 Schedule 7 Part 1, Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act, 2007
38 14th Report of the Law Commission of India, Reforms of the Judicial Administration (1958).
16

would greatly help in reducing the unfortunate effects of Chandra Kumar. The problem of
administrative/technical members, wherein most of these members are appointed by the
Executive and that many tribunals consist of members from the Executive, may be resolved by
following a system which similar to the one provided for by the Tribunals Act of the United
Kingdom. The issues surrounding tribunalisation may be addressed by providing for a list of the
tribunals across the country, setting up of a body which supervises the working of tribunals and
enacting a legislation which deals with a simple procedure which embodies the principles of
natural justice.
Thus, as tribunals have come to stay, 39 and the basic premise of the establishment of tribunals is
sound, resolving the current issues will help in improving the tribunal system in India, and
hopefully, will make the process of litigation easier for those who wish to approach the tribunals.

Bibliography
Primary Sources
Books:

M.P. Jain and S.N. Jain, principles of administrative law,Vol. I, 713 (6thedn., 2007).
D.D. Basu, commentary on constitution of India, Vol. 9, 5540 (8thedn., 2011).
M.P. Jain, Indian Constitution Law, Vol. I, 294 (5thedn., 2003)
S.P. Sathe, Administrative law, 297 (7th edn., 2012).
I.P. Massey, Administrative Law, 184 (2008).
H.W.R. Wade and C.F. Forsyth, Administrative Law, 18 (10thedn., 2009).
Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution, Corner stone of a nation , 175-176
(9thedn., 2005).

Statutes and Bare Acts:

Arts.323A and 323B, The Constitution of India, 1950


42nd Amendment Act, 1976

39 215th Report of the Law Commission of India, supra note 35, at 68, available at
http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/1-50/Report14Vol1.pdf.
17

215th Report of the Law Commission of India, L. Chandra Kumar visited by Larger
Bench of Supreme Court, 57 (2008), available at

http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/report215.pdf.
14th Report of the Law Commission of India, Reforms of the Judicial Administration

(1958).
Schedule 7 Part 1, Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act, 2007
Secs.1, 50 and 51, Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act, 2007

Secondary Sources
Articles

Doctrine of Judicial Review and Tribunals: Speedbreakers Ahead, V. Nageswara Rao

and G.B. Reddy, 39 journal of India law Institute 418 (1997).


Arun Roy and Vishnu Jerome, Administrative Tribunals in India: A welcome departure

from orthodoxy? Student Bar Review,63-64 (2000).


Justice Ruma Pal, An Independent Judiciary, 5th V.M. Tarkunde Memorial Lecture, New
Delhi (November 10, 2011), available at http://www.theradicalhumanist.com/index.php?
option=com_radical&controller=article&cid=431&Itemid=56

Websites

http://www.archive.india.gov.in/knowindia/profile.php?id=36
http://cgat.gov.in/act.htm
https://www.academia.edu/4614327/ADMINISTRATIVE_TRIBUNALS_OF_INDIA_A

_Study_in_the_light_of_decided_cases
http://www.ebc-india.com/lawyer/articles/92v4a4.htm
http://admis.hp.nic.in/himpol/Citizen/LawLib/C37.htm

(all sites have been accessed before 27th march, 2016)

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