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SECONDDIVISION

[G.R.No.129015.August13,2004]

SAMSUNGCONSTRUCTIONCOMPANYPHILIPPINES,INC.,petitioner,vs.
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY AND COURT OF
APPEALS,respondents.
DECISION
TINGA,J.:

Calledtoforeinthepresentpetitionisaclassictextbookquestionifabankpaysouton
aforgedcheck,isitliabletoreimbursethedrawerfromwhoseaccountthefundswerepaid
out?TheCourtofAppeals,inreversingatrialcourtdecisionadversetothebank,invoked
tenuous reasoning to acquit the bank of liability. We reverse, applying timehonored
principlesoflaw.
Thesalientfactsfollow.
Plaintiff Samsung Construction Company Philippines, Inc. (Samsung Construction),
while based in Bian, Laguna, maintained a current account with defendant Far East Bank
[1]
[2]
andTrustCompany (FEBTC)atthelattersBelAir,Makatibranch. Thesolesignatoryto
[3]
SamsungConstructionsaccountwasJongKyuLee(Jong),itsProjectManager, whilethe
[4]
checksremainedinthecustodyofthecompanysaccountant,KyuYongLee(Kyu).
On 19 March 1992, a certain Roberto Gonzaga presented for payment FEBTC Check
No.432100tothebanksbranchinBelAir,Makati.Thecheck,payabletocashanddrawn
againstSamsungConstructionscurrentaccount,wasintheamountofNineHundredNinety
Nine Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P999,500.00). The bank teller, Cleofe Justiani, first
checked the balance of Samsung Constructions account. After ascertaining there were
[5]
enoughfundstocoverthecheck, shecomparedthesignatureappearingonthecheckwith
thespecimensignatureofJongascontainedinthespecimensignaturecardwiththebank.
After comparing the two signatures, Justiani was satisfied as to the authenticity of the
signatureappearingonthecheck.ShethenaskedGonzagatosubmitproofofhisidentity,
[6]

andthelatterpresentedthree(3)identificationcards.

Atthesametime,JustianiforwardedthechecktothebranchSeniorAssistantCashier
Gemma Velez, as it was bank policy that two bank branch officers approve checks
exceeding One Hundred Thousand Pesos, for payment or encashment. Velez likewise
counterchecked the signature on the check as against that on the signature card. He too
concludedthatthecheckwasindeedsignedbyJong.Velezthenforwardedthecheckand
signaturecardtoShirleySyfu,anotherbankofficer,forapproval.SyfuthennoticedthatJose
Sempio III (Sempio), the assistant accountant of Samsung Construction, was also in the
bank. Sempio was wellknown to Syfu and the other bank officers, he being the assistant
accountantofSamsungConstruction.SyfushowedthechecktoSempio,whovouchedfor
the genuineness of Jongs signature.Confirming the identity of Gonzaga, Sempio said that
thecheckwasforthepurchaseofequipmentforSamsungConstruction.Satisfiedwiththe
genuinenessofthesignatureofJong,Syfuauthorizedthebanksencashmentofthecheckto
Gonzaga.

Thefollowingday,theaccountantofSamsungConstruction,Kyu,examinedthebalance
ofthebankaccountanddiscoveredthatacheckintheamountofNineHundredNinetyNine
ThousandFiveHundredPesos(P999,500.00) had been encashed.Aware that he had not
preparedsuchacheckforJongssignature,Kyuperusedthecheckbookandfoundthatthe
[7]

lastblankcheckwasmissing. HereportedthemattertoJong,whothenproceededtothe
bank.Jonglearnedoftheencashmentofthecheck,andrealizedthathissignaturehadbeen
forged.TheBankManagerreputedlytoldJongthathewouldbereimbursedfortheamount
[8]
[9]
of the check. Jong proceeded to the police station and consulted with his lawyers.
Subsequently,acriminalcaseforqualifiedtheftwasfiledagainstSempiobeforetheLaguna
[10]
court.
Inaletterdated6May1992,SamsungConstruction,throughcounsel,demandedthat
FEBTCcredittoittheamountofNineHundredNinetyNineThousandFiveHundredPesos
[11]
(P999,500.00), with interest. In response, FEBTC said that it was still conducting an
investigationonthematter.Unsatisfied,SamsungConstructionfiledaComplainton10June
1992 for violation of Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, and prayed for the
payment of the amount debited as a result of the questioned check plus interest, and
[12]
attorneysfees. ThecasewasdocketedasCivilCaseNo.9261506beforetheRegional
[13]

TrialCourt(RTC)ofManila,Branch9.

Duringthetrial,bothsidespresentedtheirrespectiveexpertwitnessestotestifyonthe
claimthatJongssignaturewasforged.SamsungCorporation,whichhadreferredthecheck
forinvestigationtotheNBI,presentedSeniorNBIDocumentExaminerRodaB.Flores.She
testifiedthatbasedonherexamination,sheconcludedthatJongssignaturehadbeenforged
onthecheck.Ontheotherhand,FEBTC,whichhadsoughttheassistanceofthePhilippine
[14]

NationalPolice(PNP), presentedRosarioC.Perez,adocumentexaminerfromthePNP
CrimeLaboratory.ShetestifiedthatherfindingsshowedthatJongssignatureonthecheck
[15]

wasgenuine.

Confronted with conflicting expert testimony, the RTC chose to believe the findings of
theNBIexpert.InaDecisiondated25April1994,theRTCheldthatJongssignatureonthe
check was forged and accordingly directed the bank to pay or credit back to Samsung
Constructions account the amount of Nine Hundred Ninety Nine Thousand Five Hundred
Pesos(P999,500.00),togetherwithinteresttolledfromthetimethecomplaintwasfiled,and
attorneysfeesintheamountofFifteenThousandPesos(P15,000.00).
FEBTC timely appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 28 November 1996, the Special
[16]

Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision, reversing the RTC
Decision and absolving FEBTC from any liability. The Court of Appeals held that the
contradictory findings of the NBI and the PNP created doubt as to whether there was
[17]
forgery. Moreover, the appellate court also held that assuming there was forgery, it
occurredduetothenegligenceofSamsungConstruction,imputingblameontheaccountant
Kyu for lack of care and prudence in keeping the checks, which if observed would have
[18]

preventedSempiofromgainingaccessthereto.

TheCourtofAppealsinvokedtherulingin

[19]

PNBv.NationalCityBankofNewYork that,ifaloss,whichmustbebornebyoneortwo
innocentpersons,canbetracedtotheneglectorfaultofeither,suchlosswouldbeborneby
thenegligentparty,evenifinnocentofintentionalfraud.

[20]

Samsung Construction now argues that the Court of Appeals had seriously
misapprehendedthefactswhenitoverturnedtheRTCsfindingofforgery.It also contends
thattheappellatecourterredinfindingthatithadbeennegligentinsafekeepingthecheck,
andinapplyingtheequityprincipleenunciatedinPNBv.NationalCityBankofNewYork.

SincethetrialcourtandtheCourtofAppealsarrivedatcontraryfindingsonquestionsof
fact, the Court is obliged to examine the record to draw out the correct conclusions. Upon
examinationoftherecord,andbasedontheapplicablelawsandjurisprudence,wereverse
theCourtofAppeals.
Section23oftheNegotiableInstrumentsLawstates:
Whenasignatureisforgedormadewithouttheauthorityofthepersonwhosesignatureitpurportsto
be,itiswhollyinoperative,andnorighttoretaintheinstrument,ortogiveadischargetherefor,or
toenforcepaymentthereofagainstanypartythereto,canbeacquiredthroughorundersuch
signature,unlessthepartyagainstwhomitissoughttoenforcesuchrightisprecludedfromsetting
uptheforgeryorwantofauthority.(Emphasissupplied)
The general rule is to the effect that a forged signature is wholly inoperative, and
payment made through or under such signature is ineffectual or does not discharge the
[21]

instrument. Ifpaymentismade,thedraweecannotchargeittothedrawersaccount.The
traditional justification for the result is that the drawee is in a superior position to detect a
[22]

forgery because he has the makers signature and is expected to know and compare it.
Therulehasahealthycautionaryeffectonbanksbyencouragingcareinthecomparisonof
the signatures against those on the signature cards they have on file. Moreover, the very
opportunityofthedraweetoinsureandtodistributethecostamongitscustomerswhouse
[23]

checksmakesthedraweeanidealpartytospreadtherisktoinsurance.

Brady,inhistreatiseTheLawofForgedandAlteredChecks,elucidates:
Whenapersondepositsmoneyinageneralaccountinabank,againstwhichhehastheprivilegeof
drawingchecksintheordinarycourseofbusiness,therelationshipbetweenthebankandthedepositor
isthatofdebtorandcreditor.Sofarasthelegalrelationshipbetweenthetwoisconcerned,the
situationisthesameasthoughthebankhadborrowedmoneyfromthedepositor,agreeingtorepayit
ondemand,orhadboughtgoodsfromthedepositor,agreeingtopayforthemondemand.Thebank
owesthedepositormoneyinthesamesensethatanydebtorowesmoneytohiscreditor.Addedto
this,inthecaseofbankanddepositor,thereis,ofcourse,thebanksobligationtopaychecksdrawnby
thedepositorinproperformandpresentedinduecourse.Whenthebankreceivesthedeposit,it
impliedlyagreestopayonlyuponthedepositorsorder.Whenthebankpaysacheck,onwhichthe
depositorssignatureisaforgery,ithasfailedtocomplywithitscontractinthisrespect.Therefore,the
bankisheldliable.
Thefactthattheforgeryisacleveroneisimmaterial.Theforgedsignaturemaysocloselyresemble
thegenuineastodefydetectionbythedepositorhimself.Andyet,ifabankpaysthecheck,itis
payingoutitsownmoneyandnotthedepositors.
Theforgerymaybecommittedbyatrustedemployeeorconfidentialagent.Thebankstillmustbear
theloss.Eveninacasewheretheforgedcheckwasdrawnbythedepositorspartner,thelosswas
placeduponthebank.ThecasereferredtoisRobinsonv.SecurityBank,Ark.,216S.W.Rep.717.In
thiscase,theplaintiffbroughtsuitagainstthedefendantbankformoneywhichhadbeendepositedto
theplaintiffscreditandwhichthebankhadpaidoutonchecksbearingforgeriesoftheplaintiffs
signature.
xxx
Itwasheldthatthebankwasliable.Itwasfurtherheldthatthefactthattheplaintiffwaitedeightor
ninemonthsafterdiscoveringtheforgery,beforenotifyingthebank,didnot,asamatteroflaw,
constitutearatificationofthepayment,soastoprecludetheplaintifffromholdingthebankliable.
xxx

Thisruleofliabilitycanbestatedbrieflyinthesewords:Abankisboundtoknowitsdepositors
signature.Theruleisvariouslyexpressedinthemanydecisionsinwhichthequestionhasbeen
considered.Buttheyallsumuptothepropositionthatabankmustknowthesignaturesofthose
[24]
whosegeneraldepositsitcarries.
Bynomeansistheprinciplerenderedobsoletewiththeadventofmoderncommercial
transactions. Contemporary texts still affirm this wellentrenched standard. Nickles, in his
bookNegotiableInstrumentsandOtherRelatedCommercialPaperwrote,thus:
Thedepositcontractbetweenapayorbankanditscustomerdetermineswhocandrawagainstthe
customersaccountbyspecifyingwhosesignatureisnecessaryonchecksthatarechargeableagainst
thecustomersaccount.Therefore,acheckdrawnagainsttheaccountofanindividualcustomerthatis
signedbysomeoneotherthanthecustomer,andwithoutauthorityfromher,isnotproperlypayable
andisnotchargeabletothecustomersaccount,inasmuchasanyunauthorizedsignatureonan
[25]

instrumentisineffectiveasthesignatureofthepersonwhosenameissigned.

Under Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, forgery is a real or absolute


[26]
defensebythepartywhosesignatureisforged. OnthepremisethatJongssignaturewas
indeed forged, FEBTC is liable for the loss since it authorized the discharge of the forged
check.Such liability attaches even if the bank exerts due diligence and care in preventing
such faulty discharge. Forgeries often deceive the eye of the most cautious experts and
whenabankhasbeensodeceived,itisaharshrulewhichcompelsittosufferalthoughno
[27]
onehassufferedbyitsbeingdeceived. Theforgerymaybesonearlikethegenuineasto
defydetectionbythedepositorhimself,andyetthebankisliabletothedepositorifitpays
[28]

thecheck.

Thus,thefirstmatterofinquiryisintowhetherthecheckwasindeedforged.Adocument
formallypresentedispresumedtobegenuineuntilitisprovedtobefraudulent.Inaforgery
trial,thispresumptionmustbeovercomebutthiscanonlybedonebyconvincingtestimony
[29]
andeffectiveillustrations.
Inrulingthatforgerywasnotdulyproven,theCourtofAppealsheld:
[There]isgroundtodoubtthefindingsofthetrialcourtsustainingtheallegedforgeryinviewofthe
conflictingconclusionsmadebyhandwritingexpertsfromtheNBIandthePNP,bothagenciesofthe
government.
xxx
Thesecontradictoryfindingscreatedoubtonwhethertherewasindeedaforgery.InthecaseofTenio
Obsequiov.CourtofAppeals,230SCRA550,theSupremeCourtheldthatforgerycannotbe
presumeditmustbeprovedbyclear,positiveandconvincingevidence.
Thisreasoningispuresophistry.Anylitigatorworthhisorhersaltwouldneverallowan
opponents expert witness to stand uncontradicted, thus the spectacle of competing expert
witnessesisnotunusual.Thetrieroffactwillhavetodecidewhichversiontobelieve,and
explain why or why not such version is more credible than the other. Reliance therefore
cannot be placed merely on the fact that there are colliding opinions of two experts, both
clothed with the presumption of official duty, in order to draw a conclusion, especially one
whichisextremelycrucial.Doingsoistantamounttoajurisprudentialcopout.
Much is expected from the Court of Appeals as it occupies the penultimate tier in the
judicialhierarchy.ThisCourthaslongdeferredtotheappellatecourtastoitsfindingsoffact
intheunderstandingthatithastheappropriateskillandcompetencetoploughthroughthe

minutiaethatscattersthefactualfield.Infailingtothoroughlyevaluatetheevidencebeforeit,
and relying instead on presumptions haphazardly drawn, the Court of Appeals was sadly
remiss. Of course, courts, like humans, are fallible, and not every error deserves a stern
rebuke.Yet,theappellatecourtserrorinthiscasewarrantsspecialattention,asitisabsurd
andevendangerousasaprecedent.Ifthisrationalewereadoptedasagoverningstandard
byeverycourtintheland,barelyanyactionableclaimwouldprosper,defeatedasitwould
bebythemereinvocationoftheexistenceofacontraryexpertopinion.
On the other hand, the RTC did adjudge the testimony of the NBI expert as more
crediblethanthatofthePNP,andexplaineditsreasonbehindtheconclusion:
Aftersubjectingtheevidenceofbothpartiestoacrucibleofanalysis,thecourtarrivedatthe
conclusionthatthetestimonyoftheNBIdocumentexaminerismorecrediblebecausethetestimony
ofthePNPCrimeLaboratoryServicesdocumentexaminerrevealsthattherearealotofdifferencesin
thequestionedsignatureascomparedtothestandardspecimensignature.Furthermore,astestifiedto
byMs.RhodaFlores,NBIexpert,themannerofexecutionofthestandardsignaturesusedrevealsthat
itisafreerapidcontinuousexecutionorstrokeasshownbythetamperingterminalstrokeofthe
signatureswhereasthequestionedsignatureisahesitatingslowdrawnexecutionstroke.Clearly,the
[30]
personwhoexecutedthequestionedsignaturewashesitantwhenthesignaturewasmade.
During the testimony of PNP expert Rosario Perez, the RTC bluntly noted that
apparently,there[are]differencesonthatquestionedsignatureandthestandardsignatures.
[31]

This Court, in examining the signatures, makes a similar finding. The PNP expert
excusedthenoteddifferencesbyassertingthattheyweremerevariations,whicharenormal
[32]

deviations found in writing. Yet the RTC, which had the opportunity to examine the
relevant documents and to personally observe the expert witness, clearly disbelieved the
PNP expert. The Court similarly finds the testimony of the PNP expert as unconvincing.
Duringthetrial,shewasconfrontedseveraltimeswithapparentdifferencesbetweenstrokes
in the questioned signature and the genuine samples. Each time, she would just blandly
[33]
assert that these differences were just variations, as if the mere conjuration of the word
wouldsufficientlydisquietwhateverdoubtsaboutthedeviations.Suchconclusion,standing
alone, would be of little or no value unless supported by sufficiently cogent reasons which
[34]
mightamountalmosttoademonstration.
Themosttellingdifferencebetweenthequestionedandgenuinesignaturesexaminedby
thePNPisinthefinalupwardstrokeinthesignature,orthepointtotheshortstrokeofthe
terminalinthecapitalletterL,asreferredtobythePNPexaminerwhohadmarkeditinher
comparison chart as point no. 6. To the plain eye, such upward final stroke consists of a
verticallinewhichformsaninetydegree(90)anglewiththepreviousstroke.Ofthetwenty
one (21) other genuine samples examined by the PNP, at least nine (9) ended with an
[35]
upwardstroke. However,unlikethequestionedsignature,theupwardstrokesofeight(8)
[36]
of these signatures are looped, while the upward stroke of the seventh forms a severe
fortyfive degree (45) with the previous stroke. The difference is glaring, and indeed, the
PNPexaminerwasconfrontedwiththeinconsistencyinpointno.6.
Q:Now,inthisquestioneddocumentpointno.6,thesstrokeisdirectlyupwards.
A:Yes,sir.
Q:Now,canyoulookatallthesestandardsignature(sic)were(sic)point6isrepeatedorthe
laststrokesispointingdirectlyupwards?
[37]

A:Thereisnoneinthestandardsignature,sir.

Again, the PNP examiner downplayed the uniqueness of the final stroke in the

[38]

questioned signature as a mere variation,

the same excuse she proffered for the other


[39]

markeddifferencesnotedbytheCourtandthecounselforpetitioner.

There is no reason to doubt why the RTC gave credence to the testimony of the NBI
examiner,andnotthePNPexperts.The NBI expert, Rhoda Flores, clearly qualifies as an
expertwitness.Adocumentexaminerforfifteenyears,shehadbeenpromotedtotherank
ofSeniorDocumentExaminerwiththeNBI,andhadheldthatrankfortwelveyearspriorto
hertestimony.ShehadplacedamongthetopfiveexamineesintheCompetitiveSeminarin
QuestionDocumentExamination,conductedbytheNBIAcademy,whichqualifiedherasa
[40]
documentexaminer. ShehadtrainedwiththeRoyalHongkongPoliceLaboratoryandisa
[41]
memberoftheInternationalAssociationforIdentification. Asofthetimeshetestified,she
hadexaminedmorethanfiftytofiftyfivethousandquestioneddocuments,onanaverageof
[42]
fifteen to twenty documents a day. In comparison, PNP document examiner Perez
[43]
admittedtohavingexaminedonlyaroundfivehundreddocumentsasofhertestimony.
In analyzing the signatures, NBI Examiner Flores utilized the scientific comparative
examination method consisting of analysis, recognition, comparison and evaluation of the
writing habits with the use of instruments such as a magnifying lense, a stereoscopic
microscope,andvariedlightingsubstances.Shealsopreparedenlargedphotographsofthe
[44]
signaturesinordertofacilitatethenecessarycomparisons. Shecomparedthequestioned
signatureasagainstten(10)othersamplesignaturesofJong.Fiveofthesesignatureswere
executed on checks previously issued by Jong, while the other five contained in business
[45]

letters Jong had signed. The NBI found that there were significant differences in the
handwriting characteristics existing between the questioned and the sample signatures, as
to manner of execution, link/connecting strokes, proportion characteristics, and other
[46]
identifyingdetails.
TheRTCwassufficientlyconvincedbytheNBIexaminerstestimony,andexplainedher
reasonsinitsDecisions.WhiletheCourtofAppealsdisagreedandupheldthefindingsofthe
PNP,itfailedtoconvincinglydemonstratewhysuchfindingsweremorecrediblethanthose
oftheNBIexpert.Asathrowaway,theassailedDecisionnotedthatthePNP,nottheNBI,
had the opportunity to examine the specimen signature card signed by Jong, which was
relieduponbytheemployeesofFEBTCinauthenticatingJongssignature.Thedistinctionis
irrelevant in establishing forgery. Forgery can be established comparing the contested
signaturesasagainstthoseofanysamplesignaturedulyestablishedasthatofthepersons
whosesignaturewasforged.
FEBTC lays undue emphasis on the fact that the PNP examiner did compare the
questioned signature against the bank signature cards. The crucial fact in question is
whetherornotthecheckwasforged,notwhetherthebankcouldhavedetectedthe
forgery. The latter issue becomes relevant only if there is need to weigh the
comparativenegligencebetweenthebankandthepartywhosesignaturewasforged.
At the same time, the Court of Appeals failed to assess the effect of Jongs testimony
[47]
thatthesignatureonthecheckwasnothis. Theassertionmayseemselfservingatfirst
blush,yetitcannotbeignoredthatJongwasinthebestpositiontoknowwhetherornotthe
signature on the check was his. While his claim should not be taken at face value, any
averments he would have on the matter, if adjudged as truthful, deserve primacy in
consideration.JongstestimonyissupportedbythefindingsoftheNBIexaminer.They are
also backed by factual circumstances that support the conclusion that the assailed check
was indeed forged. Judicial notice can be taken that is highly unusual in practice for a
businessestablishmenttodrawacheckforclosetoamillionpesosandmakeitpayableto
cashorbearer,andnottoorder.Jongimmediatelyreportedtheforgeryuponitsdiscovery.

[48]

HefiledtheappropriatecriminalchargesagainstSempio,theputativeforger.

NowfordeterminationiswhetherSamsungConstructionwasprecludedfromsettingup
the defense of forgery under Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. The Court of
Appeals concluded that Samsung Construction was negligent, and invoked the doctrines
thatwherealossmustbebornebyoneoftwoinnocentperson,canbetracedtotheneglect
or fault of either, it is reasonable that it would be borne by him, even if innocent of any
[49]
intentionalfraud,throughwhosemeansithassucceeded orwhoputintothepowerofthe
[50]
third person to perpetuate the wrong. Applying these rules, the Court of Appeals
determined that it was the negligence of Samsung Construction that allowed the
encashmentoftheforgedcheck.
Inthecaseatbar,theforgeryappearstohavebeenmadepossiblethroughtheactsofoneJoseSempio
III,anassistantaccountantemployedbytheplaintiffSamsung[Construction]Co.Philippines,Inc.
whosupposedlystoletheblankcheckandwhopresumablyisresponsibleforitsencashmentthrough
aforgedsignatureofJongKyuLee.SempiowasassistanttotheKoreanaccountantwhowasin
possessionoftheblankchecksandwhothroughnegligence,enabledSempiotohaveaccesstothe
same.HadtheKoreanaccountantbeenmorecarefulandprudentinkeepingtheblankchecksSempio
wouldnothavehadthechancetostealapagethereofandtoeffecttheforgery.Besides,Sempiowas
anemployeewhoappearstohavehaddealingswiththedefendantBankinbehalfoftheplaintiff
corporationandonthedatethecheckwasencashed,hewastheretocertifythatitwasagenuine
[51]
checkissuedtopurchaseequipmentforthecompany.
We recognize that Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law bars a party from
[52]
setting up the defense of forgery if it is guilty of negligence. Yet, we are unable to
conclude that Samsung Construction was guilty of negligence in this case. The appellate
courtfailedtoexplainpreciselyhowtheKoreanaccountantwasnegligentorhowmorecare
andprudenceonhispartwouldhavepreventedtheforgery.Wecannotsustainthistarand
featheringresortedtowithoutanybasis.
The bare fact that the forgery was committed by an employee of the party whose
signaturewasforgedcannotnecessarilyimplythatsuchpartysnegligencewasthecausefor
theforgery.Employers do not possess the preternatural gift of cognition as to the evil that
maylurkwithintheheartsandmindsoftheiremployees.TheCourtspronouncementinPCI
[53]
Bankv.CourtofAppeals appliesinthiscase,towit:
[T]hemerefactthattheforgerywascommittedbyadrawerpayorsconfidentialemployeeoragent,
whobyvirtueofhispositionhadunusualfacilitiesforperpetratingthefraudandimposingtheforged
paperuponthebank,doesnotentitlethebanktoshiftthelosstothedrawerpayor,intheabsenceof
[54]
somecircumstanceraisingestoppelagainstthedrawer.
Admittedly,therecorddoesnotclearlyestablishwhatmeasuresSamsungConstruction
employedtosafeguarditsblankchecks.Jongdidtestifythathisaccountant,Kyu,keptthe
[55]

checksinsideasafetybox, andnocontraryversionwaspresentedbyFEBTC.However,
such testimony cannot prove that the checks were indeed kept in a safety box, as Jongs
testimony on that point is hearsay, since Kyu, and not Jong, would have the personal
knowledgeastohowthecheckswerekept.
Still, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we can conclude that there was no
negligence on Samsung Constructions part. The presumption remains that every person
[56]

takes ordinary care of his concerns, and that the ordinary course of business has been
[57]
[58]
followed. Negligenceisnotpresumed,butmustbeprovenbyhimwhoallegesit. While

the complaint was lodged at the instance of Samsung Construction, the matter it had to
provewastheclaimithadallegedwhetherthecheckwasforged.Itcannotberequiredas
welltoprovethatitwasnotnegligent,becausethelegalpresumptionremainsthatordinary
carewasemployed.
Thus, it was incumbent upon FEBTC, in defense, to prove the negative fact that
Samsung Construction was negligent. While the payee, as in this case, may not have the
personalknowledgeastothestandardproceduresobservedbythedrawer,itwellhasthe
meansofdisputingthepresumptionofregularity.Provinganegativefactmaybeadifficult
[59]
office, but necessarily so, as it seeks to overcome a presumption in law. FEBTC was
unable to dispute the presumption of ordinary care exercised by Samsung Construction,
hencewecannotagreewiththeCourtofAppealsfindingofnegligence.
TheassailedDecisionreplicatedtheextensiveeffortswhichFEBTCdevotedtoestablish
thattherewasnonegligenceonthepartofthebankinitsacceptanceandpaymentofthe
forgedcheck.However,thedegreeofdiligenceexercisedbythebankwouldbeirrelevantif
thedrawerisnotprecludedfromsettingupthedefenseofforgeryunderSection23byhis
[60]
ownnegligence.TheruleofequityenunciatedinPNBv.NationalCityBankofNewYork,
asrelieduponbytheCourtofAppeals,deservescarefulexamination.
Thepointinissuehassometimesbeensaidtobethatofnegligence.Thedraweewhohaspaidupon
theforgedsignatureisheldtobeartheloss,becausehehasbeennegligentinfailingtorecognize
thatthehandwritingisnotthatofhiscustomer.Butitfollowsobviouslythatifthepayee,holder,
orpresenteroftheforgedpaperhashimselfbeenindefault,ifhehashimselfbeenguiltyofa
negligencepriortothatofthebanker,orifbyanyactofhisownhehasatallcontributedtoinduce
[61]
thebanker'snegligence,thenhemaylosehisrighttocastthelossuponthebanker. (Emphasis
supplied)
Quitepalpably,thegeneralruleremainsthatthedraweewhohaspaidupontheforged
signature bears the loss. The exception to this rule arises only when negligence can be
tracedonthepartofthedrawerwhosesignaturewasforged,andtheneedarisestoweigh
the comparative negligence between the drawer and the drawee to determine who should
bear the burden of loss. The Court finds no basis to conclude that Samsung Construction
wasnegligentinthesafekeepingofitschecks.Forone,thesettledruleisthatthemerefact
thatthedepositorleaveshischeckbooklyingarounddoesnotconstitutesuchnegligenceas
willfreethebankfromliabilitytohim,whereaclerkofthedepositororotherpersons,taking
advantage of the opportunity, abstract some of the check blanks, forges the depositors
[62]
signature and collect on the checks from the bank. And for another, in point of fact
Samsung Construction was not negligent at all since it reported the forgery almost
[63]
immediatelyupondiscovery.
It is also worth noting that the forged signatures in PNB v. National City Bank of New
Yorkwerenotofthedrawer,butofindorsers.ThesamecircumstanceattendsPNBv.Court
[64]
of Appeals, which was also cited by the Court of Appeals. It is accepted that a forged
signatureofthedrawerdiffersintreatmentthanaforgedsignatureoftheindorser.
Thejustificationforthedistinctionbetweenforgeryofthesignatureofthedrawerandforgeryofan
indorsementisthatthedraweeisinapositiontoverifythedrawerssignaturebycomparisonwithone
[65]
inhishands,buthasordinarilynoopportunitytoverifyanindorsement.
Thus,adraweebankisgenerallyliabletoitsdepositorinpayingacheckwhichbearseitheraforgery
ofthedrawerssignatureoraforgedindorsement.Butthebankmay,asageneralrule,recoverback
themoneywhichithaspaidonacheckbearingaforgedindorsement,whereasithasnotthisrightto

[66]

thesameextentwithreferencetoacheckbearingaforgeryofthedrawerssignature.

Thegeneralruleimputingliabilityonthedraweewhopaidoutontheforgeryholdsinthis
case.
Since FEBTC puts into issue the degree of care it exercised before paying out on the
forgedcheck,wemightaswellcommentonthebanksperformanceofitsduty.Itmightbeso
that the bank complied with its own internal rules prior to paying out on the questionable
check.Yet, there are several troubling circumstances that lead us to believe that the bank
itselfwasremissinitsduty.
The fact that the check was made out in the amount of nearly one million pesos is
unusual enough to require a higher degree of caution on the part of the bank. Indeed,
FEBTC confirms this through its own internal procedures. Checks below twentyfive
thousandpesosrequireonlytheapprovalofthetellerthosebetweentwentyfivethousand
toonehundredthousandpesosnecessitatetheapprovalofonebankofficerandshouldthe
amount exceed one hundred thousand pesos, the concurrence of two bank officers is
[67]
required.
Inthiscase,notonlydidtheamountinthechecknearlytotalonemillionpesos,itwas
also payable to cash. That latter circumstance should have aroused the suspicion of the
bank,asitisnotordinarybusinesspracticeforacheckforsuchlargeamounttobemade
[68]
payabletocashortobearer,insteadoftotheorderofaspecifiedperson. Moreover,the
checkwaspresentedforpaymentbyoneRobertoGonzaga,whowasnotdesignatedasthe
payeeofthecheck,andwhodidnotcarrywithhimanywrittenproofthathewasauthorized
by Samsung Construction to encash the check. Gonzaga, a stranger to FEBTC, was not
[69]
evenanemployeeofSamsungConstruction. Thesecircumstancesarealreadysuspicious
if taken independently, much more so if they are evaluated in concurrence. Given the
shadinessattendingGonzagaspresentmentofthecheck,itwasnotsufficientforFEBTCto
havemerelycompliedwithitsinternalprocedures,butmandatorythatallearnesteffortsbe
undertaken to ensure the validity of the check, and of the authority of Gonzaga to collect
paymenttherefor.
AccordingtoFEBTCSeniorAssistantCashierGemmaVelez,thebanktried,butfailed,
[70]
tocontactJongoverthephonetoverifythecheck. She added that calling the issuer or
drawerofthechecktoverifythesamewasnotpartofthestandardprocedureofthebank,
[71]

but an extra effort. Even assuming that such personal verification is tantamount to
extraordinarydiligence,itcannotbedeniedthatFEBTCstillpaidoutthecheckdespitethe
absenceofanyproofofverificationfromthedrawer.Instead,thebankseemstohaverelied
heavily on the sayso of Sempio, who was present at the bank at the time the check was
presented.
FEBTC alleges that Sempio was wellknown to the bank officers, as he had regularly
transacted with the bank in behalf of Samsung Construction. It was even claimed that
everytime FEBTC would contact Jong about problems with his account, Jong would hand
[72]
thephoneovertoSempio. However,theonlyproofofsuchallegationsisthetestimonyof
[73]
GemmaVelez,whoalsotestifiedthatshedidnotknowSempiopersonally, andhadmet
[74]

Sempioforthefirsttimeonlyonthedaythecheckwasencashed. In fact, Velez had to


inquirewiththeotherofficersofthebankastowhetherSempiowasactuallyknowntothe
[75]
employees of the bank. Obviously, Velez had no personal knowledge as to the past
relationshipbetweenFEBTCandSempio,andanyavermentsofhertothateffectshouldbe
deemed hearsay evidence. Interestingly, FEBTC did not present as a witness any other
employee of their BelAir branch, including those who supposedly had transacted with

Sempiobefore.
EvenassumingthatFEBTChadastandinghabitofdealingwithSempio,actinginbehalf
of Samsung Construction, the irregular circumstances attending the presentment of the
forged check should have put the bank on the highest degree of alert. The Court recently
emphasizedthatthehighestdegreeofcareanddiligenceisrequiredofbanks.
Banksareengagedinabusinessimpressedwithpublicinterest,anditistheirdutytoprotectinreturn
theirmanyclientsanddepositorswhotransactbusinesswiththem.Theyhavetheobligationtotreat
theirclientsaccountmeticulouslyandwiththehighestdegreeofcare,consideringthefiduciarynature
oftheirrelationship.Thediligencerequiredofbanks,therefore,ismorethanthatofagoodfatherofa
[76]

family.

Given the circumstances, extraordinary diligence dictates that FEBTC should have
ascertainedfromJongpersonallythatthesignatureinthequestionablecheckwashis.
Still,evenifthebankperformedwithutmostdiligence,thedrawerwhosesignaturewas
forgedmaystillrecoverfromthebankaslongasheorsheisnotprecludedfromsettingup
thedefenseofforgery.Afterall,Section23oftheNegotiableInstrumentsLawplainlystates
thatnorighttoenforcethepaymentofacheckcanariseoutofaforgedsignature.Sincethe
drawer,SamsungConstruction,isnotprecludedbynegligencefromsettinguptheforgery,
the general rule should apply. Consequently, if a bank pays a forged check, it must be
consideredaspayingoutofitsfundsandcannotchargetheamountsopaidtotheaccount
[77]
[78]
ofthedepositor. Abankisliable,irrespectiveofitsgoodfaith,inpayingaforgedcheck.
WHEREFORE,thePetitionis GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
28November1996isREVERSED,andtheDecisionoftheRegionalTrialCourtofManila,
Branch9,dated25April1994isREINSTATED.Costsagainstrespondent.
SOORDERED.
Puno,(Chairman),AustriaMartinez,Callejo,Sr.,andChicoNazario,JJ.,concur.
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]

LateracquiredbyormergedwiththeBankofthePhilippineIslands.
Rollo,p.35.
Ibid.
Id.at28.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Rollo,p.35.
SeeTSNdated25June1993,p.10.
Id.at9.

[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]

SeeTSNdated15June1993,p.26.
Ibid.
ActNo.2031.
PresidedbyJudgeE.G.Sandoval,nowJusticeoftheSandiganbayan.

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