Africana: A Journal of Ideas on Africa and the

African Diaspora
Volume 4, Number 1

2010

Editorial Coordinator

Mr. Yilma Tafere Tasew

Editor-in-Chief

Dr. Christopher LaMonica

Board Members

Mr. Thomas Banda

Dr. Margaret Clark
Dr. Ramon Das
Dr. Mourtada Deme
Dr. Marron Maddox
Dr. Victoria Mason
Dr. Douglas Yates

IT Consultant

Ms. Mariko Hemmingsen

AFRICANA
African Studies Center
Boston University
232 Bay State Road
Boston, MA 02210
U.S.A.
www.africanajournal.org
Africana (Print): ISSN 2155-7829
Africana (On-line): ISSN 2155-7837

Vol. 4, No. 1
2010

Africana

June 2010

Africana: A Journal of Ideas on Africa and the African Diaspora. All

rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any
form without permission in writing from the publisher.

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June 2010

Disclaimer: The views expressed in the articles contained in this

publication do not necessarily represent the views of anyone affiliated
with Africana or of anyone at the African Studies Center at Boston
University.

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June 2010

CONTENTS:

Introductory Note
Christopher LaMonica
Yilma Tafere Tasew
6

De-constitutionalising? Democratic Governance in

Nigeria: Assessing executive-legislative handling of
executive-power vacuum in the fourth republic

Joseph Yinka Fashagba, PhD

44

Environmental Protection Laws and Sustainable

Development in the Niger Delta

Ibaba S. Ibaba, PhD

77

An African Success Story: Civil Society and the

Mozambican Miracle

Aaron J. Reibel, MIR

102

Globalization, New Regionalism and the Challenge of

Development in Africa

J. Shola Omotola, PhD candidate

136

Pan-Africanism and the State of Politico-Economic

Integration in Southern Africa

Lere Amusan, PhD

164

The Niger Delta of Nigeria: A World Class Oil Region

in Africa, 2000-2006

John H. Enemugwem, Senior Lecturer

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June 2010

181

The Poverty of Critical Thinking in Post-colonial

Zimbabwean Journalism
Dr. Fainos Mangena & Mr. Munyaradzi Madambi

210

Social Justice, Democracy and Cultural Renewal in

Nigeria

Kelly Bryan Ovie Ejumudo, PhD

239

Book Review, Experiments in Freedom: Explorations of

Identity in New South African Drama, by Anton Krueger,
(Cambridge Scholars, 2009).
Jamie DeAngelo

INTRODUCTORYNOTE

It is with great pleasure that we present to you the June 2010

issue(Vol.4,No.1)ofAfricana.Asbefore,wehavefoundthat
thereismuchscholarlyfermentinNigeria,andthisisreflected
in the number of contributions from Nigerian scholars to this
June 2010 issue. For those interested in the highly contentious
executivelegislative problems in Nigeria of late, the first
contributioncouldbeenlighteningandthoughtprovoking.Dr.
Joseph Yinka Fashagba is one of the few emerging scholars on
legislativeexecutive relations in Nigeria and we are very
pleasedtoincludehistimelycontribution.

Like many other African states with highly marketable

resources, Nigeria has experienced a host of challenges to both
environmental protection and sustainable development. The
second article, sent to us by Dr. Ibaba S. Ibaba, considers these
importantissuesintheNigeriancontext.WeapplaudDr.Ibaba
for tackling these issues, with thoughtful references to some of
the leading scholarly debates, official government statistics, oil
industry reports and literature of development organizations,
such as the World Bank and UNDP. Dr. Ibaba stresses the
crucial significance of good governance in his conclusion. By
contrast, in the third article, Aaron J. Reibel focuses on what
many developmental scholars consider to be the other side of
the equation: civil society. A former resident of Mozambique,
Reibel is particularly concerned with the ongoing references to
theMozambicanMiracleandhowitiscommonlyportrayedby
Vol. 4, No. 1
2010
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June 2010

Africanists, development practitioners and politicians. We

welcome this unique contribution on one of Africas important
lusophonestates.

The forth piece by Nigeria scholar, J. Shola Omotola, considers

Africasdevelopmentparadoxofexperiencingwhathetermsa
povertyofplentywithintheframeworkofglobalization.Inhis
discussion, Omotola considers the effectiveness of regional
efforts,suchastheAU,aswellastheinvolvementoflocalcivil
society amidst various forms of global support for
democratization.ReaderswillseethatOmotolaisquitecritical
ofexternalinvolvementinAfricanaffairs.Goingbytherecord
of events, he writes, it is most unlikely that the developed
worldanditsUnitedNations(UN)wouldsupportanyAfrican
initiativethatwouldchartagenuinecourseofdevelopmentand
autonomy for the continent. In contrast to many outside of
Africa who emphasize the importance of increasing African
involvementwiththerestoftheworld,Omotolaconcludes,for
example, that what is required is to ward off damaging
competition from the developed world while exploiting
knowledgeavailableelsewheretosavecost.Inaworldwhere
neoliberalismremainshighontheagendaofsomany,Omotola
suggests that Africa must be more inward looking and
focusonwhatisneededathome.

In a similar vein, Dr. Lere Amusman writes of the ongoing

challenges to the PanAfricanist initiative of W.E.B. DuBois,
among others. Following a review of regional efforts in
southernAfrica,Amusmanstates:Theneedtoopenthemarket
for international exploitation not only killed the DuBoisan
modelofPanAfricanism,italsoexposedthesubregiontowhat
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June 2010

Amechi Okolo (1986) terms as Dependency: the Highest Stage

of Capitalist Domination. For those of us who have used
traditionaltextbooksof politicalscience,internationalrelations,
orcomparativepoliticsintheclassroom,therecanbenodoubt
that there is a striking lack of African voices on this issue.
Dependency theory is often portrayed as a concern of Latin
Americanists only and Amusman most clearly demonstrates
that this is not the case. Let it be known: there are ongoing,
similar concerns on the African continent! And if there is one
peculiarity to the African take on the matter, it is that the
objectives of PanAfricanists have been challenged as a result.
Thetextbooksoftheworld,andthestudentswhoareassigned
those texts, await more African perspectives on this and on so
manyothermatters

Our sixth contribution, by John Enemugwem of the University

of Port Harcourt, is a reprint due to previous errors of
tabulation (June 2009). Because his piece deals with the oil
industryoftheNigerDeltainNigeria,wethoughtitwouldbea
good fit for this issue. Readers will get a decidedly different
perspectiveandfocusonthestatusoftheNigerianoilindustry
fromtheearlierpiece,inthisJune2010issue,byDr.Ibaba.

Dr. Fainos Mangena, of the University of Zimbabwe, has

previously published in Africana. Here he joins Mr.
Munyaradzi Madambi in contributing a seventh piece on the
lack of critical thinking in postcolonial Zimbabwean
journalism. Readers will see that the authors not only
complain about the issue but suggest that a solution is to be
foundinimprovedtrainingandeducationofjournalists.Itis
averytimelypieceandwearepleasedtoincludeithere.
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We conclude this issue of Africana with a more philosophical

piecebyDr.KellyBryanOvieEjumudoonthelinksbetween
democratization, social justice and cultural decay in Nigeria.
Forthoseofuswhoarelivingand/orfollowingnewsonthese
mattersinNigeriaandelsewhereontheAfricancontinent,itis
hardnottobemovedbythethoughtfulnessandinsightfulness
ofthisarticle.

Beyond the contents of the June 2010 issue are two events of
particularsignificancetoourjournal:

1) AfricanaisnowaffiliatedwiththeAfricanStudiesCenter
(ASC)atBostonUniversity.Accordingly,induecourse,
therewillbeawebpagelinkto
http://www.africanajournal.orgat
http://www.bu.edu/africa/.Weareespeciallygratefulto
ProfessorEdouardBustinoftheASCformakingthe
necessaryintroductionsandtoDr.MichaelDiBlassi,
ASCPublicationEditor,andtoDr.TimothyLongman,
ASCDirector.TheEditorinChief,Dr.Christopher
LaMonica,andEditorialCoordinator,YilmaTafere
Tasew,haveagreedthattheprimarypurposeofthe
affiliationistoraisetheawarenessofourjournalthrough
themanynetworksoftheASC;otherwisetheconsensus
attheASCwasthatweshouldcontinueasbefore.
Articlereviewswillremainthesoleresponsibilityofthe
EditorialBoardofAfricana;grammaticaleditingand
formalacceptanceofcontributionswillremainthesole
responsibilityofassignedcopyeditors,theEditorialCo
ordinator,andtheEditorinChief.Theviewsexpressed
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June 2010

inAfricanaare,asalways,thoseofthecontributorstothe
journal,asindicatedinourdisclaimer.

2) AwarmwelcomefromallofusatAfricanagoesouttoJ.
SholaOmotola,currentlycompletingaPhDinpolitical
scienceattheUniversityofIbadan,Nigeria,whoisnow
amemberofourEditorialBoard.Detailsregardinghis
researchinterestsandotherscholarlyactivitiescannow
beviewedathttp://www.africanajournal.org.

That said we are compelled to, once again, comment on the

tremendous rise of interest in our journal. We continue to
receive many thoughtprovoking and wellresearched
contributionsfromAfricanuniversities,inparticular,andare,of
course, thrilled about this. We encourage all readers
including,butnotlimitedto,postgraduatestudents,membersof
universityfacultyandresearcherstopassonourongoingCall
forPapers.Wewouldalsoliketoremindallthatwedoseekout
thoughtful and wellwritten book reviews. In this issue, we
haveincludedareviewofAntonKruegersbook,Experimentsin
Freedom: Explorations of Identity in New South African Drama
(2009).

A special thanks to our growing team of reviewers and copy

editors.And,forthisissueinparticular,ourspecialthanksto
Ms.CourtneyDelGiudice,forherespeciallythorougheditorial
assistance.

ChristopherLaMonica
YilmaTafereTasew
June2010
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De-constitutionalising? Democratic
Governance in Nigeria: Assessing executivelegislative handling of executive-power
vacuum in the fourth republic
JosephYinkaFashagba,Ph.D.1

Key words: Nigeria, power vacuum, Executive, Legislature,

constitutionalism,kitchencabinet,military

Abstract
Nigeriareturnedtoconstitutionaldemocracyanchoredonthe
presidential system in 1999. Under the new fourth republic
constitution, while there are three distinct institutions of
government,eachorganofgovernmentisvestedwithcertain
responsibilities. To avoid disruption in the running of the
statesaffairs,certainconstitutionalobligationsanddutiesare
giventotheexecutiveandthelegislature.Thisisparticularly
so with respect to the exercise of executivepower in the
absenceoftheelectedpresident.However,theabsenceofthe
Nigerianpresidentfromthecountrywithoutcomplying with

Dr Fashagba teaches in the Department of Political Science at

Redeemers University, Ogun State, Nigeria. He is one of the few
emerging legislative/executive scholars in Nigeria. His work on the
Nigerianlegislaturehasappearedinanumberofoutletsincludinga
recenteditionoftheBritishJournalofLegislativeStudies.

Africana

June 2010

the provisions of the 1999 constitution did not only put the
countrysdemocracyonthepathofreversalinearly2010,but
italsoexposedtheweakdispositionofthepoliticianstowards
constitutionalism. Thus, this study examines executive
legislative handling of the executivepower vacuum that was
precipitated by the absence of the ailing Nigerian president
between late 2009 and the first quarter of 2010. The study
combines both primary and secondary sources, and argues
thatwhiletheprovisionsoftheconstitutionareclearonpower
succession, the politicians have trampled the provisions for
privategainsandsectionalinterests.

Introduction

Unlike the military regime which it succeeded, the

fourth republic is anchored on the 1999 democratic
constitution which is predicated on the presidential
arrangement. The constitution created certain political
institutions; through and within which governance is
conducted. Like any other American modeled presidential
system,theconstitutionestablishedthreeseparateinstitutions
of government, namely legislature, executive and the
judiciary,forthepurposeofefficientconductoftheaffairsof
the state. Each of the institutions has distinct personnel, as
well as having certain responsibilities vested in it. Since each
institution was created and empowered by the constitution,
the observance of the provisions in the exercise of power
vested in each arm is meant to ensure not only stability in
governance,butalsotoguaranteethatofficersofgovernment
canberesponsibleandaccountablefortheiractionsunderthe
newdemocraticregime.Thisis,perhaps,wherethedifference
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liesbetweenagovernmentrulingbycoerciveforce,especially
undersuccessivemilitaryrulesinNigeria,andoneguidedby
the constitutionrule of laws (Osaghae, 1998). This explains
whyitisdifficulttotalkofdemocracywhereconstitutionalism
isnotproperlyrootedandinstitutionalized(Omotola,2008).

Indeed,democracyasapracticalpoliticalprocessanda
governance mechanism, which determines the nature of
relationships between the government and the governed on
theonehand,aswellasamongsttheorgansofgovernmenton
the other, is lubricated by some inherent principles. The
functionalefficiencyofthedemocraticelementsandprinciples
that comprise the rule of laws, competitive electoral
arrangement, free and fair contest, multiparty system,
protection of individuals rights, freedom of choice, universal
adult suffrage, constitutionalism and orderly succession to
power, among others, are facilitated when they are not only
institutionalized but also deepened as political actors to
comply with the rules of the game. In the opinion of Posner
and Young (2007), institutionalized rules are increasingly
becoming relevant in regulating the behaviors of political
actors across subsaharan Africa. This development seems
heartwarming because it aligns with the thinking of
Schumpeter who sees democracy as entailing an
institutionalized arrangement for arriving at political
decisions. However, while some states in subsaharan Africa
have deepened the institutionalization of constitutional
democracyanditsattendantprinciples,thepoliticalrealitiesin
Nigeriaappearstosuggestotherwise.

This is particularly so considering the level of

constitutional crisis that the political class, particularly
membersoftheexecutiveandthelegislativeorgans,exposed
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thenewdemocracytooverthemannerinwhichtheyhandled
the executivepower vacuum that was precipitated by the
absence of the Nigerian ailing president between November
23, 2009 and February 24, 2010. To be sure, apart from the
impeachment attempt on former president Obasanjo in 2001,
there has been no other political development that has
exposed the fourth republics democratic governance to an
evident threat of reversal other than the executivepower
vacuum caused by the unofficial vacation and the prolonged
absence from duty of the ailing president. (The Punch, 23
March,2010:p.64)

Constitutionally, the president, like any other

government official, is entitled to certain prescribed vacation.
However, in embarking on such vacation the president is
constitutionally required to inform the national assembly
through a written declaration. Such written declaration is
required to temporarily transfer executive power to the vice
president so that the ship of state will stay afloat during the
vacation of the President. By this, the political configuration
seeks to achieve horizontal accountability and institutional
responsibility under the democratic government and
presidential constitution. Despite the provisions taken for a
smooth power transfer in the 1999 constitution, during the
absence of the Nigerian president within the period
engenderedaconstitutionalcrisis,thenewdemocracydidnot
only become directionless but also enmeshed in political
tension that could have served as alibi for another military
intervention.

The constitution is the working manual and the

political compass for any democratic government. The
constitutionisconsideredessentialtosecureorderlinessinthe
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state, and constitutionality in the conduct of governmental

business. By the provisions of the constitution, the
responsibilities and powers of the institutions of government
arespeltout.Consequently,whileitmaybedifficulttocome
by a perfect constitution, particularly a constitution designed
andhandedovertopoliticiansbyadepartingmilitaryruler,as
is the case in Nigeria, compliance with the basic rules of
whateverconstitutionisoperationalinsuchanewdemocratic
state may be enough to ensure some minimum level of
political stability. However, from the first republic to the
currentfourthNigerianrepublic,themajorchallengethathas
often put democracy at risk in Nigeria is the penchant of the
political actors to disregard constitutional provisions for
personal aggrandizement and private gains. Indeed, Nwosu
(1998) and Ajayi (2007) point out that the previous republics
collapsed largely not because the constitutions were bad.
Rather, the demise of these republics resulted from the
inabilityofthegoverningelitestocomplywiththebasicrules
ofthegame.

Whiletheindiscretionofthepoliticiansoftheprevious
republics was in part a reason for the termination of those
republics,suchattitudeswereleastexpectedtoberepeatedon
the restoration of democracy after a prolonged military rule.
However, such attitudinal change appears far from being
realized.Thisisevidentbythecontroversialandunimpressive
handling of the executivepower vacuum by the Nigerian
politicians between November 2009 and February 2010. The
poor handling of the power vacuum precipitated a
constitutional crisis and political tension that, perhaps,
suggests that the political environment is still as volatile as
ever to encourage democratic sustainability and
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constitutionalism.Itisagainstthisbackgroundthatthisstudy
examines executivelegislature handling of the executive
power vacuum visvis the provisions of the 1999
constitution.

Thus,thequestionsthatthisstudyseekstoanswerare
as follows: Can the vice president perform the executive
power roles during a prolonged absence of the substantive
president? Can flagrant disobedience of the constitution
deepen democratic governance or rather erode democracy?
How constitutional is the legislative intervention and the
making of an acting president under the 1999 constitution?
Can or should extraconstitutional means be employed to
resolvepurelyconstitutionalissues?Whataretheimplications
of the legislative actions and the emergence of the acting
president on governance and constitutional democracy in
Nigeria?Toanswerthesequestions,thedataforthestudywas
derived partially from the personal observation of the
politicaldrama by the researcher. This was complimented
with data retrieved from written sources. The data was
analyzed using the descriptive and analytical methods. The
study has five sections. The next section focuses on the
provisionsofthe1999constitutiononexecutiveincumbency.

1999ConstitutionalprovisionsonIncumbency

The1999constitutionappearsnottoencouragepower
vacuum in the office of the President. This is so because the
ship of state must not be halted or go adrift due to the
unavailability or incapacitation of the occupant of the office.
Consequently, there are basically two ways by which power
vacuum is intended to be avoided in the office by the
constitution. In the first instance, under the democratic
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environment,thepresidentofNigeriamustbeelectedthrough
a universal adult suffrage. The criterion for election is one of
the universal and standard political yardstick for measuring
the level of democratization in any polity professing to be
democratic.Whereverpoliticalactorscomplywiththerulesof
the game, power transfers becomes less rancorous and the
outcome of the contest is generally accepted. While
commenting on the importance of elections, Wanyande
(1987:80) avers that election represents a way of making a
changethatisfairtoall.Whatthissuggests,therefore,isthat
the leadership that emerges in free and fair elections derives
its legitimacy from popular consent. This accounts for the
constitutionalprovisionsthatsuggestthepresidentshouldbe
electedbythepeopleunderthe1999constitution.

Thevariousconstitutionalprescriptionsfortheelection
of the president are captured by section 132, subsection 4 of
the1999constitutionwhichprovidesthatForthepurposeof
an election to the office of the president the whole of the
Federationshallberegardedasoneconstituency.Inaddition
tothis,section133providesthat:

A candidate for an election to the office of President

shallbedeemedtohavebeen

duly elected to such office where, being the only

candidatenominatedfortheelection
(a)
he has a majority of Yes votes over No votes
castattheelection;and
(b)
he has not less than onequarter of the votes
cast at the election in each of at least twothirds of all
the states in the Federation and the Federal Capital
TerritoryofAbuja,
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but where the only candidate fails to be elected in

accordance with this section, then there shall be fresh
nominations.

However, while section 133 focuses on circumstances

where only one candidate contests, section 134 focuses on
whentherearemorethanonecandidates.Bytheprovisionsof
section 134, the candidate who receives the majority of the
votes cast at the elections and who also wins in at least two
thirds of the constituent states of the federation and the
FederalCapitalTerritory,Abujawillbedeemeddulyelected.
Onceelected,theofficeholderisexpectedtoholdofficeuntila
new election is conducted and a successor emerges. This is
underlined by the provisions of section 135 (1) which states
that:
Subject to the provisions of this constitution, a person
shallholdtheofficeofPresidentuntil
(a) When his successor in office takes the oath of that
office.
(b)hedieswhilstholdingsuchoffice;or
(c) the date when his resignation from office takes
effect;or
(d)he otherwise ceases to hold office in accordance
withtheprovisionsofthisconstitution.

Although the 1999 constitution, being a presidential

constitution, only vests executive power in the president, it
nevertheless establishes the office of vicepresident. The
provisions of section 141 state that, There shall be for the
Federation a VicePresident. The vice president is jointly
electedonthesameticketwiththepresident.However,inthe
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opinion of Nwabuaze, a renowned Nigerian constitutional

lawyer, while the constitution creates the office of vice
president,theofficewasnotmadeforthepurposeofdiffusing
power among independent executive functionaries. A vice
president with constitutionally prescribed functions, as
Nwabuaze further notes, is a negation of the principle of a
singleexecutiveauthorityuponwhichthepresidentialsystem
isorganized,andwillcreatemoreproblemsthanithassolved.
In fact, the presidential constitutional arrangement, as
Nwabuaze contends, completely subordinates the vice
presidenttothepresident.

Whiletheforegoingprovisions,especiallysections133
and 134, clearly state how to elect the president and the vice
president,certainstepswerealsotakenbytheconstitutionto
ensurethatnopowervacuumresultsfromthenonavailability
or incapacitation of the chief executive to perform the
functionsoftheofficeofthepresident.Infact,thisappearsto
beaconsciouseffortfromthedesignersoftheconstitutionto
not only prevent constitutional crisis, but also to achieve a
crisisfree succession or transfer of executivepower in the
eventofavacuumintheexecutiveoffice.Irrespectiveofwhat
may account for the nonavailability of the incumbent
president or his deputy in office, governance should not
groundtoahalt;hencetheprovisionsforanactingpresident.
In the provisions of section 144, the first condition under
which a replacement is required in the executive office is
described as being when either the president or the vice
president is declared incapacitated and thereby, unable to
performthedutyofthenamedoffice.Theconstitutionvestsin
the cabinet (executive council) the responsibility of declaring
an executive incapacitated when he can no longer discharge
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June 2010

thedutyofhisofficeonmedicalgrounds.Thisisintendedto
becarriedoutthrougharesolutionpassedbytwothirdsofthe
members of the cabinet. However, such a resolution must be
verified by a duly constituted medical panel; the report of
whichmustbesubmittedtothepresidentofthesenateandthe
speaker of the house of representatives. On publishing the
notice in the official gazette of the government of the
federation by the National Assembly, the occupant of the
named office ceases to hold office from the day of the
publication. In this case, if the president is removed due to
incapacitation,thevicepresidenttakesoveraspresident.

Additionally, section 145 of the constitution requires

thepresidenttotransmitawrittendeclarationtothepresident
of the senate and the speaker of the house of representatives
when he is proceeding on vocation or is unable to discharge
thedutyofhisoffice.Untilanotherwrittendeclarationtothe
contrary is made, the functions of the office shall be
dischargedbythevicepresidentasactingpresident.Thevice
presidentmaybemadeasubstantivepresident,iftheofficeof
president becomes vacant because of death, resignation,
impeachment,permanentincapacitationortheremovalofthe
presidentfromofficeforanyotherreason.Thisisprovidedfor
insection146oftheconstitution.

Under the constitutions arrangement, the legislature

may only intervene by way of instituting impeachment
proceeding against the executive. The constitution clearly
provides in section 143 that the executive may be impeached
on the grounds of gross misconduct. However, one major
problem facing anyone interpreting the constitution is
discerning what constitutes gross misconducts. For instance,
canapresidentwholeftthecountryformedicaltreatmentina
16

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June 2010

foreign country for 93 days without complying with the

provisionsoftheconstitutiononvacation,therebyfosteringon
thenationintheprocessexecutivepowervacuum,becharged
with misconduct? Answering the question in the affirmative
may generate political tension in a highly complex and
polarizedsocietylikeNigeria.Yet,takingacontraryviewmay
raise pertinent questions about the law, constitutionality and
action.

Evident from the foregoing provisions is that the

presidentialconstitutionappearstoforeclosethepossibilityof
a power vacuum by stating in clear terms how political
successionortransferofpowershouldbeexecutedwithinthe
ambitoftheconstitution.Thisistoavertapossiblebreakdown
of constitutional order, particularly when the president is
unavailable to perform the duty of his office. Given the
positionoftheconstitutiononthetransferofexecutivepower,
to what extent have the provisions been complied during the
powervacuumtocausetheinabilityoftheNigerianpresident
toperformhisfunctionsandhisfailuretotransmitaletterto
the leadership of the national assembly as constitutionally
required?Thenextsectionseekstoanswerthisquestion.

Powervacuumandtheimperativeforexecutivepower
The deliberate refusal of the president to transmit a written
declaration to the national assembly to inform it that he was
proceedingonvacationdidnotonlycreatepowervacuumin
governance,particularlyintheexecutiveandtherebyleading
to severe political confusion and avoidable interethnic
tensions, but it also exposed the nation to the danger of
constitutional breakdown. The prolonged absence of the
president meant that administrative and political decisions
17

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June 2010

requiring executive actions remained unattended during the

period.

ThiscontravenesthethinkingofwriterslikeLaski(1967)who
see the executive as occupying a very crucial position in the
administration of a state. Laski avers that the executive in all
democraticsystemsexiststofirstandforemost,decideonthe
final choice of policy to be submitted for acceptance to the
legislativeassembly;secondly,itisitsbusinesstoseetoitthat
thepublicservicesfullyapplytothatpolicyasintendedbythe
legislature; and thirdly it ensures that it delimits and also
coordinatestheactivitiesofthedifferentdepartmentsofstate.
Bythis,theexecutiveinitiatespoliciesandprograms,executes
them when passed into laws by the assembly, and equally
coordinates government policies to ensure that policy
execution is done within the framework of the original plan
and legislatures approved policy. These enormous
responsibilities and their strategic importance to the
attainment of democratic goods, especially in a fragile
democracy like Nigeria, suggests that the office of the chief
executivecannotbeleftvacantforalongtime.

This is, perhaps, underscored by the fact that despite

the pretext among the political class that the absence of the
president did not impact negatively on governance, there is
evidence of several actions, requiring executive action or
approval, that could not be carried out. This resulted largely
fromthefailureofthepresidenttoofficiallytransferpowerto
his vicepresident in line with the dictate of the constitution.
Consequently, in the face of evidence stagnation and
imminentdemocraticreversal,itbecamemostimperativethat
urgent steps be taken to transfer executive power to the vice
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June 2010

president.Thisunderlinesthecallsandthehotdebatesabout
the necessity to transfer power. Although public agitations
and pressure from the media eventually resulted in the
transferofexecutivepower,suchtransferdidnotjusthappen
withoutsomepocketsofopposition,basedlargelyonpersonal
interest and ethnic consideration rather than the pursuit of
collectivegoods.

Thus,oneofthemajorreasonsthatmakethevestingof
executivepowerinthevicepresidenttofunctionastheacting
presidentimperativeisthefactthatthethirtysixstatesofthe
federation, which depend heavily on the central government
for funding, found the nonrelease of government funds
increasingly unbearable. Considering the distributive
character of the Nigerian state, revenue allocation to states is
usually made from the federal government to the constituent
states.Manyofthestatescannotsurviveoveralongperiodof
time without the funds (handed out) from the center. The
revenue generated from the oil wells of the Niger delta areas
of the country is thus distributed among all the states. It is
importanttopointoutthatmostofthestatesofthefederation,
particularlyinthenortherngeopoliticalzone,areunviableon
theirown.Consequently,inthefaceofthreateningcasecrunch
and the likelihood of the failure of the 2010 budgets, the
governors forum came together to mount pressure on the
legislature to make the vice president an acting president
through a house resolution. The governors forum is a
pressuregroupformedbythe36statesgovernorsinNigeria,
irrespective of their political affiliation. No single governor
elected from the opposition parties opposed the decision to
transfer power because that would have translated into
economic suicide, particularly considering that not all the
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June 2010

statesareequallyendowed.Anefforttoavoidthecripplingof
thefederatingstateseconomiespromptedthestateexecutives
to mount pressure on their representatives in the national
assembly to support the motion vesting full executive power
inthevicepresident.

Similarly, consequent of the unofficial absence of the

president,severalappointmentsintoboardsandcommissions
that should have been made could not be carried out. The
problem became more complicated because in the absence of
the president, and following the reality of the refusal of the
presidenttotemporarilytransferexecutivepowertohisvice
president, political nominations to fill certain public offices
could not be made. Similarly, some permanent secretaries
could not be sworn in after two months of being appointed
becausethepresidentwhowouldhaveadministeredtheoath
ofofficetothemwasunavailable.Evidentfromtheforegoing
is that there was also no one specifically empowered to
exercise executive power, nor was there any known official
steptakenbytheailingpresidenttopreventpowervacuumin
his absence. By this, executing and coordinating certain
strategic government programs and responsibilities was
crippled.Indeed,thescenariowascapturedbyAkunyili(2010)
(aformerfederalministerofinformation),inhermemofrom4
February,2010directedtotheFederalExecutiveCouncil(FEC)
on the imperative of making the vice president an acting
president. In the memo, she points out that: we should
rememberthatpermanentsecretarieshavebeenwaitingtobe
sworninfortwomonths,meaningsomeministersdonteven
have permanent secretaries now the vice president has no
constitutional power to take any bill to the National
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June 2010

Assembly though the VP deployed troops to quell Jos riot,

manyNigerianssaiditwasunconstitutional.

Theexecutivepowervacuumwassuchthatimportant
public offices which needed to be filled by executive
appointment could not be filled because the vice president
enjoyednorealexecutivepoweruntilcertainprovisionsofthe
constitutionaremet.Theexecutivevacuumdidnotonlyleave
certain offices unfilled, but also encouraged the pillaging of
the national resources by government office holders. (TELL,
March 8, 2010, P.27). This was possible because not only was
there nobody officially authorized to oversee the running of
governmentbusiness,buttherewerealsosomeministers,who
unsure if they would survive the likely shake up in cabinet
dissolutionthatwouldresultfromatransferofpower,feltthe
need to mop up whatever they could before they were
removedfromoffice(TELL,March8,2010,P.27).

In addition, there was controversy surrounding the

signing of the 2009 supplementary budgets in December of
that year. Despite the rising political tension due to the
executivepowervacuum,noneoftheeffortsandvisitsofthe
different groups (including the representatives of the
governors forum, selected members of the house of
representatives, selected members of the federal executive
council, as well as the leadership of the ruling People
Democratic Party) to Saudi Arabia where the president was
hospitalized yielded any results. In fact, no single person
amongthepeoplewhomadethetripSaudiArabiasightedthe
president.Thepoliticalmachinationsengagedinbymembers
of the kitchen cabinet of the president ensured that the
probably incapacitated president was shielded from the
public. Shielding the president from the public appears to
21

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June 2010

point to one possible conclusion: that the president may no

longerbeinapositiontodischargethefunctionsofhisoffice.

Yet, because of the desperation of certain members of

the cabinet, as well as the wife of the president, to remain
relevantinpoliticsuntilwhenanothergeneralelectionisheld
in 2011, the members of the kitchen cabinet of the president
placed personal interests above national interest. This line of
thinking seems justified by the unconfirmed rumors that
suggestthatthepoliticaltensioncreatedwaslargelyduetothe
calculatedeffortsofmembersofthekitchencabinettohidethe
letterwrittenbytheailingpresidenttointimatethelegislature
ofhisabsenceandequallytransferexecutivepowertothevice
president pending his arrival. Hence, shielding the president
fromthealreadyoutragedpublicfacilitatedthemanipulation
of governance and public affairs by the members of the
presidents kitchen cabinet, particularly the former Attorney
GeneraloftheFederation,MichaelAondoakaa.Evidencethat
therewasalreadyacrackintheseatofpowerwasthesudden
transformation of Aondoakaa to government a spokesman,
while there was a serving minister of information. To
underscore the eroding impact of the power struggle in
governance while the scenario lasted, the situation resulted
notonlyintheascendanceofpersonalinterestsinthenational
politics, but also degenerated into politics of alienation. By
this, not only was the crack in the cabinet widened, but also
theministerofinformationbecameirrelevanttothepowerful
kitchen cabinet largely because of her insistence that the
constitutionsprovisionsforthetransferofpowerbefollowed.

Although the federal cabinet abdicated its

responsibilitybyfailingtodeclarethepresidentincapacitated,
as stipulated by the constitution, the pressure on other
22

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June 2010

institutions of government, particularly on the national

assembly, and the tension that the constitutional crisis
engendered were sufficient to spur actions from various
directions.Forinstance,havingbeenconvincedthatallefforts
madetoseethesickpresidentprovedabortive,whichperhaps
suggests that the president was incapacitated, some
enlightened members of the public demanded that the
membersoftheexecutivecouncilshouldurgentlyensurethat
awrittendeclarationtransferringpowertothevicepresident
be transmitted for legislative processing. The demand was
anchored on the position that if the presidentactually signed
the controversial 2009 supplementary budget as claimed by
somecabinetmembers,thenwritingandsigningaletteronhis
sickbedtotemporarilytransferpowertothevicepresidentto
actinhisabsenceshouldnotbeaproblem.Withsuchamove
not only would the problem over the power vacuum be
resolved but also, a constitutional transfer of power would
havebeenachievedtodousetherisingpoliticaltemperature.

While the politics of the hide and seek game unfolds

both between the executive and the assembly, between the
members of the executive council and the public, as well as
between all formal democratic institutions and the larger
society, the political tension was reaching a disastrous point.
This is largely because the public believed that a handful of
membersoftheexecutivecouncilwerenotonlyexploitingthe
ailment of the president to control the affairs of the state for
theirselfishinterestsandprivategains,butalsothatwhatwas
happening in the presidency had turned into president by
proxy. The resultant effect was the intensification of pressure
on the cabinet to make the president transmit a written
declaration to temporarily transfer power to the vice
23

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June 2010

president, and on the legislature to intervene before the

democratic enterprise crashes (TELL, March 8, 2010: p. 2027;
March 15, 2010: pp.3234). Apart from this pressure, the
Attorney General, who all the while had courted political
resentment from the public over the way he weakened the
formalinstitutionsforfightingcorruptioninNigeria,wassued
incourtforfalsifyingthesignatureofthepresident.Evidently,
there was a clear gap in expected executive actions as the
absence of the executive translates into manipulation of the
political process by some people pursuing personal agenda.
This further necessitated the immediate need for whatever
realisticactionsthatcouldbetakentoresolvetheproblemby
appropriatelytransferringexecutivepower.

Consequently, despite the manipulations from the

kitchen cabinet, comprising the ministers of Agriculture,
Justice, Finance, Federal Capital Territory; and the National
Security Adviser as well as the wife of the ailing president
among others, the pressure from the public meant that the
presidentbyproxyfoistedonthestatewillnotsurvivefortoo
long.Tobesure,whileattemptsweremadetowipeupethnic
sentimentforpersonalgain,itbecameclearthatthetensionon
the ground could only be doused by drastic actions.
Consequently,thestagewassetandthecoastwasclearforthe
transferofexecutivepowertoensurethattheissuesrequiring
constitutionallyandpoliticallyauthorizedpersontoactcould
attend matters of the state as at when due. What form of
actionswastakeninthatregard?Thisisthequestionthatthe
nextsectionaddresses.

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June 2010

The constitutional challenge of legislative intervention and

makingactingpresident

Although there was pressure on the legislature to

intervene,itwasundersevereconstitutionalconstraint.Infact,
constitutionally, the legislature could only intervene through
impeachment, but that constitutional option was considered
inexpedient partly because of the likely negative implications
itwouldhaveonthelargelydividedsocietyandalso,because
of the existing political tension that already enveloped the
state. This was not helped by the moral dilemma and the
controversy that may be induced by interpreting the non
transmission of written declaration by a sick president as
constituting gross misconduct. The only option left to the
assemblyunderthecircumstances,whichwouldalsotranslate
into extraconstitutional instrument, was to invoke house
resolution. Although the resolution option is recognized by
theconstitution,itisspecificallyprescribedforpurposesother
than transfer of executive power. But the political tension
already enveloping thestate required drastic solution, if only
for the purpose of discouraging the desperate military from
interveninginthepoliticalprocess.Thisexplainstheprotests
andcallsbyvariousgroupsfortheinterventionofthelargely
constitutionallyandpoliticallyconstrainednationalassembly.
Indeed, the assembly was politically constrained because the
ruling party controlled more than twothirds majority in the
twochamberassembly.

Thus,whilethefirstinterventionoftheassemblytook
the form of a legislative summon of the secretary to the
government of the federation to the assembly to furnish the
legislatorswiththedetailedinformationonthehealthstatusof
the president, the second intervention of the senate was a
25

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June 2010

resolution that gave the executive council fourteen days to

declare the president incapacitated through a resolution. The
second option was prompted by the inability of the
government secretary to give any detailed information about
the health status of his boss. It is necessary to point out,
however,thatthesecretaryhadbeenoutofthekitchencabinet
because he had expressed resentment against the new tenure
policy of the government on offices of the permanent
secretariesanddirectorsinthepublicservice.

Consequently, while the legislature released different

motions in successions, the motions were perhaps meant to
testthepulseofthemembersoftheexecutivecouncilandthe
agitatedpublic.Thedevastatingblowofthehouseresolutions
seems to provide the basis for further legislative intervention
as the two resolutions appeared timely and in fact arrived
when the game of deceit employed by the members of the
kitchen cabinet was no longer strong enough to deter
legislative intervention. Indeed, legislative motions
compelling executive actions which would ordinarily have
beeninterpretedasinterferingintheactivitiesoftheexecutive
arm became an instrument that the public clamored for to
transfer executive power to the vice president. Making a
resolution then would make the vice president become an
actingpresident.

The major issue still remains unresolved. Making an

acting president with a legislative resolution is alien to the
1999 constitution, which is operational in theNigerian fourth
republic.However,theinabilityofthesubstantivepresidentto
perform his duties for weeks and the absence of any
explanation on the status of his health should not have
attractedsomuchattention,butthetendencytoputpersonal
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June 2010

interestsabovecorporateinterestsinNigeriaaccountsforthe
disregard of constitutionality. Except for when the president
wasunconsciouswhilehewastakenabroad,thereshouldnot
have been any justification for not transferring power to the
vice president on a temporary basis. This is more so
consideringtheseverityoftheailmentofthepresidentandthe
necessityofcontinuinggovernmentbusiness.

Despite this observation, perhaps due to the influence

of tribal politics in Nigeria, there are some who think that
powertransferisunconstitutional.Infact,suchthinkingdates
back to presecond republic (1979 1983) politics. During the
build up to the second republic, perhaps because of his
foresight as a constitutional lawyer, Ben Nwabusazes
proposaltotheconstituentassemblyontheneedtoincludea
clauseinthe1979constitutiontomakethevicepresidentan
acting president any time the president is out of the country
was rejected. This perhaps underlines why Nwabuaze (2004:
79) avers that the office of the vice president was not
established for the purpose of avoidance of a vacuum in
leadership during the presidents absence. Similarly, as
Nwabuaze further contends, the title of the vice president by
itself alone implies no constitutional authority to exercise the
presidents power in his absence without a specific provision
intheconstitutionauthorizingthevicepresidenttodoso.This
further raises the constitutionality of transferring executive
powertohisvicepresidentwithoutanyspecificconstitutional
provisions authorizing that or in the absence of evident
consent of the chief executive. This is more so when the
instrumentusedintransferringthepowerisnotprovidedfor
undertheconstitutionbeingoperatedbythecountry.

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June 2010

Consequently, while conferring real executive power

onthevicepresidenttoserveinactingcapacityshouldnotbe
problematic, the constitutional basis to anchor the legislative
actionswasmissing.Thiswassolargelybecauseafewofthe
42 memberfederalexecutive council held the nation to
ransomduetotheirunwillingnesstoensureconstitutionality.
Thefailureofthecounciltodeclarethepresidentincapacitated
was understandable because of the past insubordination of
somemembersofthekitchencabinettothevicepresidentwho
would have emerged the action president. While the vice
presidentofficehadbeenlookeddownuponinthepast,itwas
fearedthatthevicepresidentmightdemoteorremovethemif
he was made the acting president. Similarly, the attitudes of
the members of the kitchen cabinet also resulted from the
governmentalsysteminoperationinNigeria.

UnlikeintheParliamentaryarrangement,theexecutive
councilmembersinNigeriahaveinsecuretenure,astheyare
not members of the legislature. Thus, a change in leadership
oftentranslatestothelossofseat.Inparliamentarydemocracy
a change in leadership may only cost the members of the
cabinet their position for they remain in the assembly and
continue to earn their income. It is the unwillingness of the
membersofthekitchencabinettolosetheirsourceofincome
andpoliticalinfluencethatpartlyaccountsfortheirfailureto
activate the necessary portion of the constitution. This
underscoresthedesperationofNigerianpoliticiansforpower,
aswellastheirsittightmentalityinpublicoffice.Suchactions
wereopenlydisplayedinthepublic,first,indisregardforthe
constitutionand,second,despitetheagitationsfortransferof
powertoputthenationwhichwasevidentlydriftingbackon
track.Itappearsthatwhereprivateinterestclasheswithpublic
28

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June 2010

interest, that private interest prevails among the operators of

Nigeriandemocracy.

The fear expressed by members of the cabinet seems

not misplaced as the cabinet was subsequently dissolved
followingthetransferofexecutivepowertothevicepresident
through a legislative resolution {THISDAY, March 18, 2010}.
Indeed, the last minute efforts of the members of the kitchen
cabinettomaintaintheirholdonpowerbybringingtheailing
presidentintothecountryatabout2amonFebruary20,2010
inanambulancewasnotenoughtosavethem.Thisisbecause
not only have the kitchen cabinet members made enemies
from the larger society, but also they have worked to
underminetheeffortsofthelegislaturetostabilizethepolity.
However, the preemptive efforts of the kitchen cabinet did
littletohelpthem,astheeventsthatfollowedproved.Atthe
recomposition of the cabinet, not only were less than 25
percent of the former forty two ministers returned to the
cabinet, but also none of the members of the kitchen cabinet
madethenewcabinet.Althoughthedissolutionofthecabinet
was in part the result of the evident polarization among
members,itwasnotunconnectedfromtherolesplayedbythe
members of the president kitchen cabinet to stop the
emergence of the vice president as acting president (The
Guardian,March18,2010;ThePunch,March18,2010:p.12).

However, the cabinet dissolution also generated its

own controversy. This was not unexpected in politics where
ethnic loyalty and parochial consideration take precedence
overnationalinterests.Thisunderlinesthecontroversystirred
up by Tanko Yakassai, a northern conservative. He contends
that an acting president made outside the provisions of the
constitutioncannotdissolveacabinetdulyconstitutedbythe
29

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June 2010

ailingelectedpresident.Perhaps,itwasinanticipationofsuch
controversy that some people had rejected the legislative
resolution and rather called on the legislature to impeach the
ailing president so that executive power can be validly and
constitutionally transferred to the vice president. It is clear
fromthenatureoftheNigerianpoliticsthatthelegislaturewill
finditdifficulttoimpeachthepresidentbecausenortherners,
fromtheregioninwhichthepresidentemerged,constitutethe
majorityinthetwochamberassembly.

The fear of a possible breakdown of the constitution

thereforepromptedthecallsfromtheSaveNigeriaGroup,led
by Professor Wole Soyinka, and a coalition of various civil
societygroupsthaturgentstepswereneededtosavethehard
earned constitutional democracy from collapsing (TELL,
March 22, 2010: P33). The agitation was perhaps boosted by
the fact that there were rumors that some military apologists
among the politicians were already meeting with some top
military officials and calling for their intervention. This
underlines the character and personalities of people which
constitute the political class in Nigeria. Although, through its
publicrelationsdepartment,themilitarydeniedtheallegation
ofnursingtheambitionofinterveninginthepoliticalprocess,
ifthemilitaryhadintervenedthepoliticianswhoinvitedthem
would have secured public appointment as ministers or in
other important positions in the military cabinet. It appears
that the Nigerian democracy is being operated by politicians
whoarenotonlyopposedtoconstitutionalrule,butwhoalso
fail to allow the culture of constitutionalism to flourish. This
perhaps explains why Sawyerr (2010: P33) avers that The
Presidents ailment and the failure of the National Assembly
aswellasFederalExecutiveCouncil,FEC,todowhatisright
30

Africana

June 2010

constitutionally have fired some patriotic zeal among various

civilsocietygroupsinthecountry.

The culminated tension, the imminent challenge of

possible disrupted revenue flow from the center, and the
pressure from the various groups spurred the Governors
forum, which is already seeing itself as an emerging power
broker,toconferwiththeleadershipofthenationalassembly
ontheneedtomakethevicepresidentanactingpresident.To
be sure, in the face of the thick cloud of confusion hovering
over the running of the affairs of the state, such intervention
became inevitable if constitutional democracy would not be
jeopardized.AsSoyinka(2010)avers,Nigeriansshouldrescue
the nation from the cabal of reprobate gangsters,
extortionalists, and even political murderer. Utomi (2010)
alsoaddshisvoicetothiswhenhenotesthattheonlything
thatwillsaveNigeriaisforthepeopleofNigeriatakingover
the streets of Nigeria, demanding that the constitution be
upheld;thattheruleoflawberespected.(p.33)

Thereluctanceofthemembersoftheexecutivecouncil
to activate the provisions of section 144 of the 1999
constitution resulted in the polarization of the council. The
crack and evident absence of consensus among the cabinet
memberswasunderscoredbythecrisesthatresultedfromthe
memo addressed to the council, by the minister of
information, on February 4, 2010. In the memo, the then
ministerofinformation,ProfDoraAkunyili,soughttoimplore
thecounciltotoethelineofconstitutionalitybyinvokingthe
relevant section of the constitution to empower the vice
president to become acting president, pending the full
recovery of the president. While this was meant to put the
nation on the effective path to constitutional order, the
31

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June 2010

kitchen cabinet members of the council challenged the

minister of information for daring to request that
constitutionality be adhere to. This culminated in the forced
withdrawalofthememo(THISDAY,4February,2010).

The attitude of the members of the council was in

contrast with the expectations of the citizenry and the
politiciansingeneralwhowerethegreatestbeneficiariesofthe
democratic regime. The politicodrama was captured by
TELL(March15,2010:p.20)initseditorialthus,ifYarAdua
isunabletoresignfromofficeasaresultofincapacitation,FEC
and the parliament should rise up to their constitutional
responsibilityandassisthimtodisengagefromofficesothere
canbeaseriousattemptatgovernance.Whatismostevident
from the actions of the cabinet members is that, while they
took oaths to execute and protect the constitutions, they
clearlyunderminedit,perhapswithimpunity.Thisaccounts
forwhyTELLfurtheraversthat,itisappallingthatpoliticians
would find great service and glory in the defense of party
power and aggrandizement at the expense of peace and
constitutional growth, particularly where such party power
renders impotent the succession process dictated by the
constitution(p.21).

Embolden by the support from the public, the

Governors forum and the international community, the only
possibleoptiontobeemployed,giventheunwillingnessofthe
membersoftheFECtodeclarethepresidentincapacitatedas
well as the unwillingness of the assembly to employ the
impeachment instrument, was resorting to legislative
resolution. While legislative resolution is a universal
legislative instrument, it lacks the legal bite of legislation.
Indeed, experiences have shown in Nigeria that executive
32

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June 2010

disregards for house resolutions in both states and federal

levelsareenoughjustificationofthelimitationoftheutilityof
the instrument (Fashagba, 2009a). While opting for the
legislative resolution option appears to have given the ailing
president a soft landing, as desired by the northern ethnic
group, the Governors forum and the members of the ruling
party, on a legal note the legislative instrument constitute
negation of the provisions of the 1999 constitution (TELL,
March 15, 2010: p.20). It is little surprising that the
constitutionality of the legislative resolution has become a
subjectoflitigationincourts.

Nevertheless, while the foregoing seems to suggest

thattheactions of the national assembly amount to illegality,
particularly when considered against the argument of
Nwabuaze (2004) that executive power cannot be transferred
without an explicit constitutional provisions, the fact that the
legislature represents various constituencies to which the
country is delimited suggests that the actions reflect the
wishes of the constituents. This is evidenced by the fact that
notonlyweretheearlierpocketsofcriticismsandopposition
againstthemethodadoptedinconferringexecutivepowerin
the acting president declined, but the tension that resulted
fromthepowervacuumequallysubsided.Moreimportantly,
the protests of the public, while the political tension lasted,
weredirectedtothelegislaturewhenallentreatiestomakethe
cabinetdotherightthingfailed.

Perhaps, not oblivious to the frailty of the legislative

resolution employed in vesting full executive power in the
actingpresident,andtheabsenceofspecificprovisionsofthe
constitution authorizing the use of such medium, the
legislature had to invoke the doctrine of necessity to give a
33

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June 2010

semblance of legality to an action that was alien to the 1999

constitution. This appears inevitable, particularly in the
absence of executive council resolution, as well as the failure
of the president to transmit to the assembly a written
declaration of his inability to perform the duties of his office.
Nevertheless,irrespectiveofwhatevermeansusedtoachieve
stability, the invocation of the doctrine of necessity, justified
onthebroadcastoftheBritishBroadcastingCorporationtothe
effected the president granted an interview from his sick
claimingthathewasreceivingtreatmentinSaudiArabiaand
thatthevicepresidentshouldoverseeadministrationpending
hisfullrecovery,appearednotonlytohavepulledthecountry
out of a political abyss, but also suggests that the legislature
mayinfactserveasamajoranchorforsustainabledemocracy.
This perhaps explains why Fish (2006) contends that
democracyisdeepenedwherethelegislatureisstrong.
Althoughtheneedtostabilizethesystemwasafactor
in the legislative intervention, the fear of losing their seats in
the event of military intervention appeared to be the major
reasonforthelegislativeaction.Thus,theinterventionbecame
inevitablemainlytodeependemocracy,andalsotosecurethe
sources of income of the politicians (legislators and members
oftheexecutiveorganinbothcentralandstates).

Implications of the legislative resolution and emergency of

theactingpresidentfordemocraticgovernance

While the transferring of power through a medium

that is alien to the constitution seems the easiest path to
resolve the crises in the estimation of the politicians, the
general perception that the acting president may exercise
executive power with restraint, particularly with regard to
34

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June 2010

acting as president and taking over the position of the

Commander in Chief, remains a major concern. The initial
fear has been dispelled with the removal of the National
Security Adviser to the ailing president and the appointment
ofanotheroneinhisplace.Inaddition,thedissolutionofthe
federal executive council (the cabinet) which he inherited on
March18,2010andthecompositionofanothercabinetbythe
actingpresidentpointtothefactthatthepoliticaltensionwas
givingwaytostability.

To remove the cloud of unconstitutionality hanging

over the transfer of power to the acting president, the
legislature, which has been faced with criticisms for using
extraconstitutional means to resolve a constitutional matter,
has initiated amendments to the relevant sections of the
constitution to ensure that no president ever travels or
abandonhisdutypostindefinitelyagainwhilecreatingpower
vacuum. To be sure, in the legislative amendments to the
constitution already passed by the senate, the vice president
automatically becomes the acting president if the president
travelsorisunabletoperformtheresponsibilitiesofhisoffice
for two weeks. Such amendments would not have been
considered necessary but for the vacuum created by the ill
healthofthepresidentandthefailureofthepresidentandthe
council of ministers to comply with the provisions of the
constitution on vacation and succession. The amendments
suggestthatnotonlyistheNigeriandemocracymaturing,but
they also indicate that constitutional democracy is getting
morepracticalandrooted.

Sometimes, it appears that a mature democracy must

learn from its faltering steps to improve the lapses in its
constitution. This is where the ongoing amendments of the
35

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June 2010

1999constitutionofNigeriabytheassemblyfindjustification.
Sufficeittosaythattheactionwasreminiscentofthetwenty
fifth amendment to the United States Constitution in 1967on
succession.Theamendmentwascarriedoutafterthemurder
ofPresidentJohnF.Kennedyin1963.Bytheamendment,the
vicepresidentbecomesthepresidentwhenevertheincumbent
is incapacitated or dead. Such amendments are capable of
deepening democracy and preventing power vacuum that
couldendangerdemocracyinafragiledemocracylikeNigeria.

Although the legislature sought to defuse the political

tension,themembersofthekitchencabinet,whoperhapsfelt
threatened by the imminent power shift, took a preemptive
step by rushing the sick president back to the country. This
was not only meant to rattle the acting president and the
national assembly, but also to ensure that the decision of the
legislature transferring executive/presidential power, which
hitherto had been exercised by proxy, to the acting president
wasfrustrated.Indeed,thislargelysuggeststhattheinterests
of the politicians come first whenever they have to choose
between good governance, stability and democratic
sustainability.Thisperhapsexplainswhyithasbeendifficult
for democracy to be sustained in Nigeria. This seems to
underlinethelackoffaithinthecurrentdemocraticenterprise
inNigeria.AsBurns,Peltason,Cronin,andMagleby(1995:7)
aver, New democracy often fail. It is one thing to espouse
democratic value, another to put them into practice.
Similarly, given the antecedent of the Nigerian political class
to place ethnic consideration and personal interests above
collectiveinterestsaswellastheirinsensitivityandthethreat
that their actions posed to democratic sustainability, the
United States Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs,
36

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June 2010

JohnnieCarson,duringhisinteractionwiththesubcommittee
of foreign affair notes that Nigeria is among African states
where democracyremains fragile or tenuous.The Nigerian
politicians seems not to see holding public office as a call to
service, rather it is perceived to be call to take ones share of
thenationalcake(Fashagba,2009b).

Thechallengethatpowerstrugglebetweencompeting
ethnic and political groups posed to democratic governance
and sustainability since the creation of the legislative
resolution that transferred power to the acting president is
equally evident in the attempt to undermine the political
arrangementadoptedtocalmtheragingpoliticaltension.The
sudden return of the president to the nation spurred another
roundoftension.Forinstance,thereturninthefirstplacewas
a calculated political attempt to invalidate the position of the
acting president. No point justifies this view more than the
pressaddressofthemediaassistanttothepresidentwherehe
referred to the acting president as vice president, instead of
addressinghimasactingpresident.Thissuggeststhatasfaras
the camp of the ailing president was concerned the acting
president was not recognized in that capacity. Hence, the
secret and unofficial return of the president did not only
deepen division in the cabinet, it also further increased
political tension. It is important to note that such cabinet
polarizationandmisunderstandingtookplacedespitethefact
thatallmembersoftheexecutivecouncilwereappointedfrom
therulingPeopleDemocraticParty,whichalsocontrolledboth
the executive and legislative organs. Evidently, the political
partiesunderthepresidentialdemocracyinNigeriahavebeen
very weak in controlling members elected under their
platforms. The reason for this may not be unconnected with
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June 2010

thefactthatthearmswereelectedthroughseparateelections.
Also a problem was the crippling executivelegislature
conflict.

ThedeepeningconstitutionalcrisisinNigeriaisfurther
capturedbythefactthatcontrarytotheprovisionsofthe1999
constitution,thereexistssidebysideanactingpresidentanda
president. Although the constitutionality of this has been
challenged by some members of the Nigerian public, but the
reality of extraneous consideration has overridden
constitutionalimperative.

The issue of the true status of both Jonathan and

YarAdua will be the next stage for the constitutional battle
aheadforthecountry.AministerintheYarAduagovernment
told the magazine that YarAdua had assumed the role of
president as soon as he returned last week. Considering the
factthatthemembersofthefederalcabinetwhotookanoath
to defend the constitution were subverting it in a bid to
perpetuate governance by proxy, as well as to maintain their
ministerial portfolio, it is not out of place to deduce that the
attitude is either the result of their ignorance of what
constitutional democracy entails or that they simply have a
disregard for constitutionalism. This perhaps explains why
some politicians were rumored to have consulted with the
militarytotakeoverpower.

Further evidence that some members of the cabinet

were not only bent on undermining the constitution to
maintain their hold on power, but also to prove that the
decisionofthenationalassemblytoelevatethevicepresident
to acting president was not binding was the deployment of
soldiers to the street of Abuja on the night that the president
was brought into the country. The salient fact suggested by
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June 2010

the unofficial military deployment is that of a situation of

constitutional crisis. One, the acting president was never told
that the resident would return on the said date, hence the
arrival of the president caught the acting president unaware.
Two, even though the acting president was vested with full
powerofthepresidencyaswellastheCommanderinChiefof
theNigerianarmedforces,thedeploymentoftroopswasdone
withouthisknowledgeorconsent.Infact,theresidentsofthe
FederalCapitalTerritory,Abujahadthoughtthatthemilitary
hadatlastreturnedintopolitics.

The deployment was possible because the

appointmentoftheChiefofArmyStaffwasdonebytheailing
president. Equally important is that the Chief of Army Staff,
GeneralDanbazzauisanorthernerjustlikethepresident.The
loyalty of General Danbazzau was therefore to president
YarAdua, who appointed him the Chief of Army Staff.
Because of this, he did not feel obliged to consult the acting
presidentbeforedeployingsoldierstothestreettoensurethe
security of the returning president. Thus, rather than taking
instructionfromtheactingpresident,GeneralDanbazzautook
directionsfrommembersofthekitchencabinet.Inparticular,
he took directions from the National Security Adviser to
PresidentYarAdua,GeneralMuktar.Itislittlesurprisingthat
General Muktar was the first major victim of the power
changeashewassubsequentlyrelievedofthepositionoveran
allegedintelligencefailure.

Evident in the attitudes of the operators of the new

democracy is that personal ambitions, private gains and
sectionalinterestsaremajordeterminantsofwhentoobeyor
comply with the constitutions. The operators compliance
with the simple provisions of the constitution would have
39

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June 2010

saved the country from the threatening tension that almost

crashedthefledglingdemocracybetweenNovember2009and
March 2010. It is perhaps the prevalence of such anti
democratic tendency in a new democracy like Nigeria that
makes Burns, Peltason, Cronin and Magleby (1995: 7) to say
that New democracy often fail. It is one thing to espouse
democratic value, another to put them into practice.
Similarly, it is also clear that much still needed to be done to
attunethemindofthepoliticianstothedictatesandworking
of democracy. The prolonged years of military rule has
resultedinanalmostcompleteabsenceofdemocraticculture.
This portends grave danger for the new democracy,
particularly considering the nature of ethnic politics; the cut
throatcompetitionforpoliticaloffice;andthedesperationfor
publicofficeasmeanstostatefunds.

The representative assembly is believed in modern

democracy to be the main symbol of the sovereignty of the
state. If the legislature utilizes extraconstitutional means to
achieve an expedient political objective with a broad based
support from the different segments of the public, then
politicians who subscribe to the tenets of constitutional
democracy should have no problem complying with its
decision.Itistheabsenceofsuchpoliticalwilltoactivatethe
constitution as occasions demand, playing the games
according to the set democratic rules and being observant of
constitutional provisions that translate into de
constitutionalising the democratic governance by the
operatorsoftheNigeriandemocracy.Suchattitudesmayhave
only one implication: exposing Nigerian democracy to the
danger of reversal considering the fragility of the political
terraininNigeria.
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June 2010

Conclusion

It appears the greatest threat to the survival of

constitutional democracy in Nigeria is the undemocratic
tendencies and behaviors of the politicians. The penchant of
the politicians to place extraconsideration above common
goods has had a great undermining impact on
constitutionalism in Nigeria both in the past and under the
current democratic governance. However, the fact that the
public and some members of the political class worked in
conjunction with the National Assembly to restore stability
afterthetensionsoakedmomentsuggeststhatthereishopeto
deepen democracy. However, much depends on the ability
and the readiness of the political class to imbibe democratic
tenets and comply with the rules of the gain. Nigerian
democracy will remain insecure if operators are opposed to
constitutionality. Therefore, the extent to which democracy is
deepened in Nigeria will remain a function of the degree to
which the politicians imbibe the culture of constitutionalism.
The legislature has however succeeded in using its power to
ensure the survival of democracy, starting with the way it
truncated the ambition of the former president. This it
achievedbykillingtheproposedconstitutionamendmentbill
of2006throughwhichtheformerpresidentsoughttoextend
his tenure. Thus, while the legislature has been less
impressive in lawmaking and oversight, it has intervened at
two different times to protect the Nigerian democracy. If the
legislature continues the way it has been intervening in the
critical period, as well as improve its performance in law
41

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June 2010

making and oversight, it may be able to counter balance the

divisive and subverting tendencies of public office holders
particularly, the executive arm, the political parties and the
ethnicgroups.

42

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June 2010

REFERENCES
Burns, J. M., Peltason, J. W., Cronin, T. E. and Magleby, D. B.
Fashagba,J.Y.2009.ExecutivelegislaturerelationsinKwaraandOyo
states,Nigeria (19992007).Ph.D.ThesissubmittedtothePolitical
Sciencedept,UniversityofIlorin,Ilorin,Nigeria.

2009. Legislative oversight under the Nigerian

presidentialsystem.JournalofLegislativeStudies.15(4),439459.

Fish,M.S.(2006).Strongerlegislatures,strongerdemocracies.British
JournalofPolitics,17(1),520.

Laski,H.1992.Agrammarofpolitics.London:GeorgeAllen&Unwin

Nwabuaze, B. 2004. Constitutional development in Africa. Vol. 4.

Ibadan:Spectrumpublisher
Nwosu, N. I. 1998. The military and constitutional engineering in
Nigeria.IlorinJournalofBusinessandSocialSciences,1998,vol.5,31
49.

Omotola, J. S. 2008. Democracy and constitutionalism under the

fourthrepublic,19992007.Africana,2(2),129.

Osaghae,E.E.1998Crippledgiant:NigeriasinceIndependence:London
Horstandcompany.

Wanyande,P(1987)Democracyandtheonepartystate:TheAfrican
Experience in Oyugi and A Gilolnga leds, Democracy Theory and
PracticeinAfrica,Nairobi,Heineman.

SawyerrStella(2010).NowthePeoplePower,TELLCommunication
Ltd,Lagos.

43

Africana

June 2010

Soyinka,W.2010.Anaddressduringpublicprotestoftheabsenceof
thepresidentinAbuja.

TELLcommunication,Lagos.

TheGuardian,Lagos,2010.

ThePunchnewspaper,Lagos2010.

THISDAY,Lagos.2010.

44

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June 2010

Environmental
Protection
Laws
and
Sustainable Development in the Niger Delta
Dr.IbabaS.Ibaba

Abstract
ThispaperexaminesthelinkbetweenNigerianenvironmental
protectionlawsandthesustainabledevelopmentoftheNiger
Delta. To achieve this objective, the paper highlights the
environmental challenges of the region, and critically
examines some environmental laws to determine their
usefulness and effectiveness in dealing with environmental
problems.

The paper argues that due to the privatization of the Nigeria

state, and its consequent use by those in power to promote
privategains,thestatehasnotshownseriousconcernsforthe
environment. This lack of concern is reflected in the weak
environmental laws and the lack of their enforcement. The
paperconcludesthatthelawshavefailedtoprotecttheNiger
Delta environment, and the resultant environmental
degradation has impeded the sustainable development of the
region. Good governance is suggested as the most likely
solution.

45

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June 2010

Introduction
Environmental degradation is a major cause of productivity
lossesandpoorhumanhealthintheNigerDelta(WorldBank,
1995:117). Thus, environmental degradation issues are of
topicalconcerntocommunitiesinthearea.(NDES,1995:2).A
significant feature of environmental degradation in the Niger
Delta is that it is largely the outcome of pollution and
unsustainableexploitationofnaturalresources.Significantly,
there are numerous Nigerian environmental laws which seek
to conserve, guide, control and mange the exploitation of
natural resources, along with the control and prohibition of
environmental pollution (FEPA Act, 1990). To this end, the
unsustainable exploitation of the environment in the Niger
Deltaisblamedontheinabilityorfailureoftheenvironmental
laws to correct acts as well as attitudes and beliefs, which
impact negatively on the environment. Adibe and Essaghah
(1997:7689)havenotedinthisregardthat:

Industrialoperators(otherthaninthepetroleum
subsector) are apparently not guided by any
environmental protection legislationswhere
suchlegislations exists, conformance with
them is not systematically monitored and
effectively enforced it is not surprising that
neither
industrial
establishments
nor
governmentagenciesresponsibleforoverseeing
the industrial sector and environmental matters
have a mechanism for monitoring and
evaluatingimpactsofindustrialpollutionwitha
viewtocontrollingandmanagingthem.

46

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June 2010

Equally, the isolation of the environmental laws from the

development programs and policies of the state, faults in the
implementationstrategiesortechniques,inadequatepenalties
for violation, the noninvolvement of the citizenry in the
formulationandexecutionofthelaws,andthelackofaclear
focus,arealsoseenasfactorswhichhavebecomeobstaclesto
theproperexecutionofthelaws.

In all however, the lack of enforcement of the laws standout

as the most fundamental cause of the inability of the
legislations to protect the Niger Delta environment. This is
blamed on inadequate funding, corruption, the lack of
operationalfacilities,thelowinvolvementofprofessionals,the
uncooperative attitude of the multinational corporations, and
the centralization of legislative powers in the central
government,alongwiththeprivatizationoftheNigerianstate.

This paper sets out to examine the latter view, and examines
itsimplicationsonsustainabledevelopment.Thediscussionis
guided by the United Nations view of Sustainable
Development which describes the guarantee of development
for all generations; through environmental protection and
sustainable
exploitation
of
natural
resources.
(http://www.iisd.orga/webmaster@isd;WCED,1987:43).

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June 2010

EnvironmentalChallengesofTheNigerDelta
The ecology of the Delta is characterized by sandy coastal
ridge barriers, brackish or saline mangrove, fresh water,
permanent and seasonal swamp forest, and dry land rain
forest (Okoko and Ibaba, 1997:2). The Niger Delta is
characterized by the Rainy season which lasts from April to
October, and the Dry season and Harmattan which briefly
intervenesthelatterperiod.Nearlythreequartersofthearea
iscoveredbywatermadeoflagoons,creeks,riversandlakes
(OMPADEC Report, 1993:8082). The remainder is largely
madeofswampyland,whichisusuallyfloodedforaboutfour
monthsintheyearduetotheoverflowingwatersofthelower
Niger.Theenvironmentfacesanumberofchallenges,which
constrainthedevelopmentoftheregion.

Theenvironmentalproblemsoftheareaaregroupedintotwo
broadcategories:oilrelatedandnonoilrelatedenvironmental
problems. According to the Shell Petroleum Development
Company(SPDC),themostcommonenvironmentalproblems
relatedtotheoilindustryare:oilspills,gasflaring,dredging
of canals and land for the construction of facilities.
(http:/www.ShellNigeria.com). The nonoil related
environmental challenges include: Coastal/river back erosion,
flooding, spread of exotic species, agricultural land
degradation, fisheries depletion, inadequate sanitary and
wastemanagement,andemissiondischargesfromindustries.
(www.shellnigeria.com). The table provides details on the
environmentalproblems.

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Table1
Major Causes of Environmental Degradation in the Niger
Delta

ProblemType
Landresource
degradation

Problem
Erosion
coastal

DirectCauses
Sedimentloss
infrastructure
construction

Erosion
riverbank

Heavyrainfall.
Unsustainable
farming.
Sedimentloss

Flooding

Heavyrainfall
Agricultural
expansion
reduced
upstreamwater
retention

Sealevelrise

Agricultural
land
Degradation

Climatechange

Unsustainable
farming
Decreased
sedimentation
Excessive
flooding
Increased

IndirectCauses
Upstreamdams
populationpressure
Weakenforcement
Naturalandhuman
inducedand
subsidence
Sealevelrise.
Upstreamdams
Populationpressure
Weakenforcement
Naturalandhuman
inducedand
subsidence
Sealevelrise.
Upstreamdams
populationpressure
Weakenforcement
Naturalandhuman
inducedand
subsidence
Sealevelrise.
Internationalair
emission
Populationpressure
Upstreamdams
Lackofinputs.

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June 2010

erosion.
Fishing
techniques
Fishing
intensity
Postharvest
losses
Trawling
pollution
Oilactivities
Nutrientloss.

Postharvestlosses.
Weakenforcement
Openaccess
Upstreamdams.

Forestry
deforestation
degradation

Agricultural
expansion
Infrastructure
expansion
Indiscriminate
logging

Populationpressure
Weakenforcement
Infrastructure
expansion
Openaccess(limited)

Biodiversity
loss

Hunting
Habitatloss

Incompletemarkets
Populationpressure
Infrastructure
expansion

Exoticspecies
Expansion
(1) water
hyacinth
(2)Nypapalm
water
contamination

Introduction
(1,2)Forest
degradation

Weakenforcement
Openaccess(limited)
Incompletemarkets.

Weakenforcement
Openaccess.

Inadequate
wastewater
management
Spillsandleaks

Weakenforcement
Incompletemarkets.

Renewable
Resource
Degradation

Fisheries
stock
depletion

habitat
degradation

Environmental oil
Resource
Degradation

Populationpressure
Weakenforcement
Openaccess(limited)

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June 2010

industrial

toxicand
hazardous
substances

others

Airpollution
gasflaring,
industrial
vehicular0
Solidwastes
industrial
municipal

Inadequate
wastewater
management

Weakenforcement
Openaccess.
Incompletemarkets

Inadequatewaste Weakenforcement
management
Openaccess
Inadequateurban Incompletemarkets.
infrastructure
Inadequate
Populationpressure
sewagetreatment Weakenforcement
Openaccess
Incompletemarkets
Industrial
Weakenforcement
population
Openaccess
Vehicular
Incompletemarkets
emissions.
Subsidies.
Inadequatewaste Populationpressure
management
Weakenforcement
Inadequateurban Openaccess
infrastructure
Incompletemarkets

Source:WorldBank,1995:8688.

Also, communication is very difficult and perhaps more

significantly, the cost of development (provision of social
infrastructure,etc)isexceedinglyhigh.Thecostofproviding
infrastructure in the region doubles and at times triples the
cost of infrastructural development in the other parts (South,
East, West and the North). For example, the cost of land
reclamationalonecanfundaprojectinotherareas.Thus,the
Bayelsa State government has spent a whopping 500 million
naira on land preparation alone (sandfilling) for a 500bed
hospital in the State capital. This sum can fund the entire
projectinotherareas.ItcostaboutN150milliontoconstructa
kilometerofroadintheNigerDelta,asagainstN25millionin
otherareas.(Ibaba,2004:58)
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Meanwhile,thefundsavailablefordevelopmentinregionare
grossly inadequate. The lack of infrastructure and basic
amenities as well as the high level of poverty, about 70
percent, (UNDP, 2006:69) impacts negatively on the Niger
Delta environment. On infrastructure, the impact is in two
dimensions.Theabsenceofbasicinfrastructureputspressure
onland.Forexample,thelackofroadsmakesitdifficultfor
theruralpopulacetoobtainkeroseneandwhentheydo,itis
veryexpensive.Thus,over80percentofruralpeopleusefuel
woodasenergyfordomesticuseandconsequently,contribute
totheproblemofdeforestation.

At another level, the drive to provide social infrastructure

promotesenvironmentaldegradation.Forexample,thesand
filling (land reclamation) of areas provides amenities
(buildings, roads, etc) but causes severe flooding in other
areas. On poverty, it is widely known to degrade the
environment.

A significant point to note here is that poverty promotes an

unsustainableexploitationofnaturalresources.Forexample,
povertyleadstotheoverexploitationoffarmlands.Similarly,
all kinds of fish, including fingerlings, are appropriated. In
timespast,fingerlingsandothercategoriesofsmallfishwere
selectedandthrownbackintotheriver.

Thelowleveloftechnologicaldevelopmentintheregionalso
constitutes a problem to the environment, as it makes the
taming of the environment difficult. Some environmental
problems of the state, the spread of water hyacinth for
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June 2010

example,arepotentialsourcesofdevelopment,butforthelack
of technology. Studies have shown that water hyacinth,
considered to be one of the worst weeds in the world, and
widelyfoundintheNigerDelta,hasthefollowinguses:

(i)

(ii)
(iii)

(iv)
(v)

(vi)

Water hyacinth has a high ash content of 14.3 percent and

important nutrients, which could make it a valuable
compositefertilizer.
Thefibersanddriedstemcanbeusedforstrapsofshoesand
clogsforbasketsandchairs.
Thefreshpetiolesarebasedstalksforthecutflowerindustry
(onebundlecomposedof10waterhyacinthclustercosts1.5
5.0pesosinMetroManilaoutlets).
It is a potential source of activated carbon for batteries, of
carbonblackforpaint,andforcementboards.
Water hyacinths have been used for biogas production.
From one ton of water hyacinth, a biodigester can produce
373m3ofmethanegas(5,700kcal).
Water hyacinth is used as a lowcost wastewater treatment
in which the plant absorbs nutrient and toxic residues.
(OMPADECReport,1993:4).

Also of significance is the challenge violent conflicts pose to

the environment through the destruction of infrastructure,
settlements, fishing grounds, farmlands and lives. Equally,
the sabotage of oil installations undermines environmental
qualitythroughoilspillages.

All the literature on the Niger Delta environment identifies

environmental degradation as the greatest challenge to the
regions environments. Three major challenges or problems
have been identified: land resources degradation, renewable
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June 2010

resource degradation, and environmental resource

degradation.(WorldBank,1995:8688).

State Legislations On The Environment And Sustainable

DevelopmentInTheNigerDelta
Environmental protection legislation in Nigeria dates back to
the colonial period. The numerous environmental laws
include: the Forest Ordinance (1937); the Water Works Act
(1915); the Public Health Act (1917); (1958); the Petroleum
Drilling and Production Regulation (1969); the Oil in
Navigable Waters Act (1968); the Ministry Act (1969); the
Associated Gas Reinjection Act (1979); the Federal
Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) Act (1988).
Similarly, the Federal Government created the National
Resources Conservation Council (NRCC) in 1988, and also
launched the National Policy on the Environment in 1989.
(Emeribe,2000).

Despite these legislations and policies on environmental

protection and conservation, environmental degradation has
continuedtoworsenintheNigerDelta.Thewidespreadview
blames this on the ineffective execution of environmental
protection laws in the country. The World Bank (1995),
identifies the lack of enforcement of environmental laws as
oneofthegreatestproblemsoftheNigerDeltaenvironment.
Enforcementagencieslackthemechanismformonitoringand
evaluating the impacts of industrial pollution with a view to
controllingthem.(AdibeandEssaghah,1999:7689).

Theisolationoftheenvironmentallawsfromthedevelopment
programs and policies of the state, faults in implementation
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June 2010

strategy or techniques, inadequate penalties for violation, the

noninvolvement of citizens in theformulation and execution
of the laws, and the lack of a clear focus, are also seen as
factors which have become obstacles to the proper execution
of the laws. The lack of enforcement of environment laws is
seen as the most fundamental cause of the inability of the
legislationstopromote thesustainableexploitationofnatural
resourcesintheNigerDelta.

This paper blames this on the nature of the Nigerian State.

PoliticsinNigeriaareseenasameansofaccumulatingwealth.
The consequence is the privatization of the State and its
subsequent use for the pursuit of private interests (Aaron,
2006;Ekekwe,1986;Ake,2001a,Ake,2001b;Oyovbuaire,1980).
Theresultofthisistheneglectoftheenvironment.Thus,the
provisions of environment laws create gaps which weaken
enforcement standards and regulations that could be
contravened as being loosely specified and vaguely defined
(Adibe and Essaghah, 1999:83). Some environmental
protection laws are analyzed below to demonstrate why and
howtheyhavefailedtoprotecttheenvironment.

(a)
TheEnvironmentalImpactAssessmentAct(EIA)
TheEIAAct,amongothers,setsouttheproceduresand
methodstoenablethepriorconsiderationofenvironmental
impactassessmentoncertainpublicorprivateprojects.To
achievetheobjectiveoftheact,theFederalEnvironmental
ProtectionAgency(FEPA)(nowtheFederalMinistryof
Environment)isempoweredtofacilitateenvironmental
assessmentofprojects.

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June 2010

Essentially,theEIAlawrequiresthatbeforethe
commencementofanynewproject,itsenvironmentalimpact
mustbeassessedorevaluatedwithaviewtomitigatingits
effectsontheenvironment.Accordingly,section2(i)ofthe
Act,statesthat:

Thepublicorprivatesectoroftheeconomyshall
notundertake,embarkorauthorizeprojectsor
activitieswithoutpriorconsideration,atanearly
stage,oftheirenvironmentaleffects.

Equally,section1(2)providesthat:

Wheretheextent,natureorlocationofa
proposedprojectoractivityissuchthatislikely
tosignificantlyaffecttheenvironment,its
environmentalimpactassessmentshallbe
undertakeninaccordancewiththeprovisionof
thisAct.

Theminimumcontentofenvironmentalimpactassessment
wereprescribedasfollows:

(i)
(ii)

(iii)
(iv)

Adescriptionoftheproposedactivities;
Adescriptionofthepotentiallyaffected
environmentincludingspecificinformation
necessarytoidentifyandassesstheenvironmental
effectoftheproposedactivities;
Adescriptionofthepracticalactivities,as
appropriate;
Anassessmentofthelikelyorpotential
environmentalimpactsoftheproposedactivityand
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June 2010

(v)

(vi)

(vii)

thealternatives,includingthedirectorindirect
cumulative,shorttermeffects;
Anidentificationanddescriptionofmeasuresto
mitigateadverseenvironmentalimpactsofproposed
activityandassessmentofthosemeasures;
Anindicationofgapsinknowledgeanduncertainty,
whichmaybeencounteredincomputingthe
requiredinformation;
Anindicationofwhethertheenvironmentofany
otherstateorlocalgovernmentareaorareasoutside
Nigeriaislikelytobeaffectedbytheproposed
activityoritsalternatives.

Withtheabove,thefederalministryofenvironmentevaluates
the submissions, holds wide consultations with all stake
holders and then makes a decision; it is the final arbiter on
such issues. In the Niger Delta, the law is not adhered to
strictlyintheprivatesector;onlycompaniesintheoilandgas
sector reasonably abide by the law. Even at that they
undertakeunethicalpractices,whichfloutthelaw.

Establishments in the private sector (manufacturing

companies, etc) hardly undertake EIA studies for their
activities, even though such activities impact on the
environment. This is also true of public projects undertaken
by the three tries of government (Federal, State and Local
Governments).

Oilcompanies,whoembarkonEIAstudies,violatetherules.
There are instances where they have commenced the project
before the EIA study is done. For example, the Shell
Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) commenced a
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June 2010

multibillion dollars project, the Estuary Amatu (E.A) project

which cut across communities in Bayelsa and Delta States
beforeEIAcommenced(EnvironmentWatch,15/8/2001).

Also, EIA studies are not properly done, which creates

problems for communities. For example, the construction of
theGbarainlinkroad(inBayelsaState)bytheSPDCwithouta
proper EIA study has created environmental problems and
socioeconomic difficulties for the host communities (Opolo,
Obunugha,Onopa,Gbarantoru,etc).Theidentifiedproblems
include: severe or excessive flooding of forest and farmlands
whichleadstothedestructionoffoodcrops,economictrees;a
reduction in available farmland, thus creating land
fragmentation in the affected locality; permanent flooding of
fishponds, lakes and creeks, which prevents the owners from
harvesting them; a reduction of games and wildlife
populations in the forest; and the blockage of
communication/access routes among the neighboring
communities(EnvironmentWatch,25/03/2002).

At the level of government, compliance with the EIA Act is

nearly zero. Even when done, it becomes controversial as
evidenced by the EIA report on the dredging of the River
Niger.Whilethegovernmentissatisfiedwiththereportand
is poised to commence the project, the people consider the
report to be fraudulent. Their contention is that the EIA
reportdoesnotassurethemofadequatemitigatingmeasures
to safeguard the environment from possible disasters arising
from the dredging of the river (Bayelsa State Ministry of
EnvironmentReport,2000).

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June 2010

Similarly, state governments also pay lip service to the law.

While they insist on EIA studies before projects are executed
by the oil companies, they hardly do same. Thus,
development projects of the states have impacted greatly on
the Niger Delta environment. For example, a report of the
Bayelsa State Ministry of Environment (2000) points out that
the states arelosing River Nun Forest Reserve to Niger Delta
UniversityownedbytheBayelsaStategovernment.

It is important to observe that the EIA law has some defects,

which probably account for its ineffectiveness. First, some
projectsareexcludedfrommandatoryEIAstudies.Section15,
subsection1oftheActprovidesthatwhere:

(i)

(ii)

(iii)

Intheopinionoftheagencytheprojectisinthelist
ofprojectswhichthePresident,CommanderIn
ChiefoftheArmedForcesortheCouncilisofthe
opinionthattheenvironmentaleffectsoftheproject
islikelytobeminimal;
Theprojectistobecarriedoutduringnational
emergencyforwhichtemporarymeasureshave
beentakenbythegovernment.
Theprojectistobecarriedoutinresponseto
circumstancesthatintheopinionoftheagency,the
projectisintheinterestofpublichealthorsafety.

Subsectiontwoemphasizesthat:

For greater certainty, where the federal, state or

local government exercises power or performs a
duty or function for the purpose of enabling
projects to be carried out, an environmental
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June 2010

assessment may not be required if the project

has been identified at the time the power is
exercisedorthedutyorfunctionisperformed.

Withregardtothemandatorystudyactivities,theprovisions
are limited. For example, while land reclamation is a
mandatory study activity, EIA is only required if the area
under consideration is 50 hectares or more. The implication
therefore is that where the area is less than 50 hectares, EIA
studyisnotrequired.

Significantly however, the accumulation of the activities that

are exempt from EIA studies can greatly degrade the
environment. For example, as regards housing, EIA study is
required if the area is more than 50 hectares. Thus, if a
government develops houses in different locations, and the
areaislessthan50hectares,itwillnotrequirestudy.Now,if
we have 10 sites of 30 hectares, they will not require EIA
study. Additionally, it is doubtful if developments less than
50hectareswillnotcreateenvironmentalproblems.

Thepenaltyforviolatingtheprovisionsoftheactistoolittleto
deter offenders, particularly corporate bodies. Section 62 of
the Act which deals with offence and penalty provides
N100,000 fine or five years imprisonment for an individual
offender, and a minimum of N1m for corporate offenders.
Clearly, one million naira (N1,000,000) is too small a sum to
compel corporate bodies (particularly the oil companies and
governments)toobeythelaw.

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June 2010

ItissignificanttonotethattheenforcementoftheEIAlawlies
with the Federal Ministry of Environment. The states only
performperipheralfunctions.Thisisclearlyinappropriateas
it largely excludes the regulatory institutions of stakeholder
states in the projects for which EIAs are required
(Environment Watch, 15/04/1998). A complaint at the state
level is that the federal agency responds too slowly to their
inputs,complaintsandobservations.

Thelocalcommunitieswhoarethehoststoprojectsforwhich
EIA studies are undertaken are either not consulted, or not
involved effectively in such studies. Thus, the benefit of
involving the people, immense knowledge on the ecological
process that can be integrated to enrich project design, team
spirit that would elicit the commitment of stakeholders, and
cooperation, is lost (Adibe and Essaghah, 1999:1718). Thus,
the EIA Act has done very little to protect the Niger Delta
environment.

(b)
TheFederalEnvironmentalProtectionAgencyAct
The Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA), was
created by Act No.58 of 1988, as part of the attempts by the
Federal Government to implement appropriate projects
designed to ameliorate ecological problems in the country.
Section4oftheAct,definesthefunctionsoftheagencyasthe
protection and development of the environment in general
and environmental technology, including initiation of policy
inrelationtoenvironmentalresearchandtechnology.

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The specific functions of the organization are spelt out by

section4ofthelawas:

(i)

(ii)

(iii)

(iv)

(v)

Advise the federal government on national

environmental policies and priorities and on
scientific and technological activities affecting the
environment;
Prepare periodic masterplans for the development
of environment and technology and advise the
federal government on the financial requirements
fortheimplementationofsuchplans;
Promote cooperation in environmental science and
technology with similar bodies, connected with the
protectionoftheenvironment;
Cooperate with federal and state ministries, local
government councils, statutory bodies and research
agencies on matters and facilities relating to
environmentalprotection;and
Tocarryoutsuchotheractivitiesasarenecessaryor
expedient for the full discharge of the functions of
theagencyunderthisAct.

A significant feature of the FEPA law is the emphasis placed

onpollutioncontrolandprohibition.Accordingly,section20
prescribespenaltiesforthedischargeofhazardoussubstances
into the environment. Subsection 2 of section 20 prescribes
N100,000 fine or 10 years imprisonment for an individual
offender, while subsection 3 stipulates a fine not exceeding
N500,000andanadditionalfineofN10,000foreverydaythe
offencesubsistsforcorporateoffenders.

It is clear that the penalty is not stringent enough which

probablyexplainstheviolationofthelaw,asevidencedbythe
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June 2010

worsening environmental pollution in the Niger Delta area.

This is also true of the general penalties as provided in
section 35, which prescribes a maximum fine of N20,000 or a
maximum2yearimprisonmentforindividualoffenders.

TheliteratureontheNigerianenvironmentseestheFEPAlaw
as the most serious attempt by the Federal Government to
protect the Nigerian environment (Adibe and Essaghah
1999:86;Alapiki,2004:244).

Thus, it is expected that the law would adequately and

comprehensively address environmental problems in the
Niger Delta area. However, this is not the case.
Environmental issues such as indiscriminate logging,
environment unfriendly agricultural practices (such as slope
wise cultivation which promotes erosion), the use of
dangerous chemicals for fishing, etc, are not covered by the
act.

This demonstrates that the concentration of legislative power

in the federal government has led to the promulgation of
environmental laws which hardly take local condition into
account. Again, even when provisions on the petroleum
industry were made, they were not farreaching. The only
mention of the petroleum industry in section 23 of the Act
statesthat:

TheAgencyshallcooperatewiththeMinistryof
Petroleum Resources (Petroleum Resources
Department) for the removal of oil related
pollutants discharge into the Nigerian
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June 2010

environment and play such supportive role as

the Ministry of Petroleum Resources (Petroleum
Resources Department) may from time to time
requirefromtheagency.

Given the impact of the oil industry on the Niger Delta

environment,thisprovisionisclearlyinadequate.Worse,the
law created gaps that have been exploited by oil
multinationals, to the disadvantage of the Niger Delta
environment. One area where this is evident is the vague
provisionofsection36oftheAct.Accordingtothissection:

When any offence against this Act or any

regulationsmadetherehasbeencommittedbya
bodycorporateorbyamemberofapartnership
or other firm or business, every director or
officerofthatbodycorporateoranymemberof
the partnership or other person concerned with
the management of such firm or business shall,
on conviction, be liable to a fine not exceeding
N500,000 for such offence and in addition shall
bedirectedtopaycompensationforanydamage
resulting from such breach thereof or to repair
and restore the polluted environmental area to
anacceptablelevelasapprovedbytheAgency.

Having made this useful provision, the Act goes further to

makeaprovisionthatunlessheprovestothesatisfactionof
thecourtthat:

(i)

Heusedduediligencetosecurecompliancewiththe
Act;and
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June 2010

(ii)

Suchoffencewascommittedwithouthisknowledge,
consentorapproval.

Thelaterprovisioncreatesaverywidegap,whichmakesthe
law defective. It is exploited to avoid punishment to the
detriment of the environment. Oil spillages and gas flaring
that are not adequately dealt with by the law have induced
environmentaldegradation,andunderminedthedevelopment
oflocaleconomies.Seetabletwobelow:
Table2
The Impact of the oil industry on the Niger Delta
Environment
Activity

Impact

Exploration
(a) Geophysical
investigation

(b) Geologysurvey

(c) Drilling

Productionprocessing
(a) Flatandtankfarms

Destructionofvegetation,
farmlands,humansettlement.
Clearingagriculturallandand
damagingthesoil.

Disturbanceoffaunaandflora
habitat.

Accumulationoftoxicwaste
materialwiththeeffectof:
(i)
Oilpollutionofthe
land,seaorbeaches.
Pollutionof
(ii)
undergroundwaterfor
plants.

Landpollutionfromlongterm
cumulativeeffects.

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June 2010

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

Gasflaring

Tankerloading
locations

Storagedepots

Transportation

Refinery

Waterandlandpollutionfrom
sanitarywaste,used
lubricatingoilandsolidwaste.
(i)
Airpollutionfromgas
andoilprocessing
evaporationand
flaring.
(ii)
Killingofvegetation
aroundtheflarearea.
(iii) Productionofheat.
(iv) Suppressingthe
growthandflowering
ofsomeplants.
(v)
Reducesand
diminishesagricultural
production.
(vi) Destructionof
mangroveswampand
saltmarsh.

Spillageduringloading
operationswithallits
accompanyingeffectsonthe
faunaandflora.

Landpollutionfromeffluent
wasteandsolidwastesof
chemicalcansanddrumsfor
theestablishmentofthe
storagedepots.

Destructionoffarmlandsand
environmentallysensitive
areas.

Landpollutionfromeffluent
discharge,whichcontainswide
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June 2010

rangeorganicpollutantssuch
asphenolhydrogen,sulfide,
ammoniaandgas.

Source: Federal Ministry of Housing and Environment, circular,

1983.

The major and pervasive impact of oilrelated environmental

problems is the drastic decrease in the nutrient value of the
soil,thedecreaseinavailablelandmassforcultivation(which
hascontributedtoadecreaseinthebushfallowperiodfrom3
5 years to one year in many of the communities), the
destruction of food, cash crops, and marine life which
ultimately leads to a decline in agricultural output, and by
extension, its development (Ibaba, 2005: 34). Gas flaring has
equally reduced crop yield. For example, crop yields reduce
by forty five percent within six hundred meters of gas flare
site (Salau, 1993: 19). Also of significance here is the
destruction of marine life. The particular importance of this
lieswiththefactthatfishingconstitutesthemajoroccupation
inmanyofthecommunities.

Furthermore, about 80 percent of protein food in the local

communitiesissourcedthroughfish.Whatthismeansisthat
oilspillageshavehealthimplications.Ithasbeenestablished
forinstancethatthepollutedwater(whichservesnotonlyas
fishing grounds but is also as the only source of water for
drinking and other domestic use) causes diseases in the
communities. It stands to reason from the above that oil
spillages worsen the health problems of the people, who
grosslylackmedicalfacilities.Thisexacerbatesruralpoverty,
giventhatpoorhealthreducesproductivity.
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June 2010

(c)
Bayelsa State Environment and Development
PlanningAuthority
The Bayelsa State Environment and Development Planning
Authority Edict was established for the protection and
development of the environment and biodiversity
conservation and sustainable development of the States
naturalresources(Section,6/i).PartsevenoftheEdict,which
deals with offences and penalties, prohibits the following
activities:

(i)
(ii)
(iii)

(iv)

(v)
(vi)
(vii)
(viii)

Dischargeofuntreatedwaste;
Dischargeofoil,greaseorspilloil;
Discharge of injurious gas such as sulphur dioxide,
oxides of nitrogen, hydrogen, sulphides, carbon,
ammonia, chlorine, smoke, metallic dust and
particles;
Storage of chemicals, oil, lubricants, petroleum
products, cement (except for use in buildings),
radioactive materials or gases in residential and
commercialbuilding(withoutthepermissionofthe
authority);
Wastedumpingwithoutpermission;
Dumping of toxic or hazardous matter without
permission;
Indiscriminatesinkingofwellandborehole;
Use of chemical (Gamalin 20 or any herbicide or
insecticideorotherchemicals)tokillfishordestroy
marinelifeinanyriver,stream,lakeorpondwithin
thestate.(Section3039).

Whiletheaboveprovisionsarenottoodifferentfromthoseof
FEPA, the last provision (prohibition of use of chemical in
68

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June 2010

rivers, etc) is significant. Being a state government law, it

captured the local condition of the area, where chemicals are
usedforfishingintotaldisregardoftheenvironmentalcost.

However, the Edict failed to address the problem of logging,

as it was not mentioned. This probably explains the
indiscriminate logging, which has promoted deforestation in
the state. The state loses 200,000 trees and 3 percent of its
forestannually.(seetablebelow).
Table3
TimberExploitationinBayelsaState
NameofSpecies

CommonName

VolumeofWoodExploited(m3)

Cotton

528.57

167.34

71.80

Abura

40.15

30.13

Oppe

15.59

14.72

Mahogany

11.43

Ironwood

11.04

8.49

8.42

S/N
1
Ceibapentandra
2
Symphoniaglobulifera
3
Alstonialboonei
4
Mytragynaciliata
5
Pycnanthusargolensis
6
Naucleadiderishii
7
PterrocarpusOsun
8
Khayainvorensis
9
Lophiraalata
10
Daniellaogae
11
Terminaliasuperba
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June 2010

12

5.18

3.82

1.66

1.61

926.31

Xylopiaafricana
13
Terminaliaivorensis
14
Sarcoglottigabonensis
15
Euapaccaguinensis

Total

Source: Bayelsa State Ministry of Environment, Forestry

Department,2000,p.1

The edict, like the FEPA Act, is characterized by gaps, which

weaken enforcement. For example, while spillage and waste
dischargeattractsaN200,000fine,inadditiontotheoperator
orownerofthefacilitybeingliablefor:
(i)

Anycostincurredbythestate,localgovernmentor
their agents in the abatement or removal of the
discharge;

(ii)

Any cost incurred by the state or local government

inreplacinganydamagedfacilityorinrestoringthe
ecology;

TheEdictatthesametimeprovidesthattheabovewillnotbe
applicableiftheowneroroperatoroffacilitycanprovethat
awasteorspillagedischargewascausedbyanaturaldisaster
or an act of war or by sabotage (section 48/i). This may
explainwhymanyoilspillsarenowclassifiedassabotage,
bytheoilcompanies.
Alsoofnoteisthegeneralpenaltyforviolatingtheprovisions
oftheedict,whichisafineofN200,000,asagainsttheN20,000
prescribed by the FEPA law. The state authorities are more
70

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June 2010

stringent than the federal authorities; perhaps because they

(the state authorities) are close to the citizens who bear the
directburdenofenvironmentaldegradation.

It is noteworthy that the law has suffered from weak

monitoringandenforcementcapacity(WorldBank,1995:57).
The inadequate enforcement of the edict is attributable to the
factthatsomeprovisionsofthelawarenotcongruentwiththe
customs of the people. A classic example is the provision in
section39,whichprohibitstheuseofchemicalsforfishing.

In Bayelsa State, the use of chemicals for fishing was

prohibited by customary law even before the Environment
Protection Edict came into force. However, this was
predicated on a customary practice where families and
communitiesownedcreeks,lakesorrivers.Accordingly,such
ownersenforcedthelaw.However,thestateedictisbasedon
the ownership of these creeks, lakes and rivers by the state.
Becausethelawsconflictwithcustomandtradition,theyhave
beenignoredbythepeople(EnvironmentWatch,15/12/2001)

What is discernible from the above is that the Bayelsa State

EnvironmentProtectionLawhasfailedtoachieveitsobjective
sustainable development in the state. For example, the use
of chemicals for fishing is widespread in the state. The
chemicalsleadtoadestructionofmarinelife.Meaningwhile,
fishingisamajoroccupation(secondtofarming,thedominant
occupation) and about 80% of protein food in the local
communitiesissourcedfromfish.

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June 2010

(d)
Delta State Environmental Protection Agency
(DELSEPA)Edict
TheDeltaStateEnvironmentalProtectionAgency(DELSEPA)
was created for the protection and development of the
environment in general and environmental technology,
including initiation of policy in relation to environmental
researchandtechnology,planning,designandconstructionof
ecologicalandenvironmentalfacilities.
TheprovisionsoftheDELSEPAEdictwerevirtuallythesame
asthoseinFEPA.Itplacedemphasisonpollutioncontroland
prohibition. The areas it essentially focused on are
prevention of industrial pollution, onshore or offshore
dischargeofwaste,andtheuseofchemicalsforfishingand
farming.SimilartotheBayelsaStateEnvironmentalLaw,it
responded to local conditions by outlawing the use of
chemicalsforfishing.

Section34oftheedictstatesthat:exceptsuchasapprovedby
theFederalorStateauthoritiesforthepurpose,theuseofany
chemicalsubstancebyanypersonorbodywhethercorporate
or incorporate for fishing or farming purposes shall be no
offence.However,itfailedtoaddresstheproblemoflogging
anddeforestation.

Again,liketheotherenvironmentallawsearlierdiscussed,the
penaltyforviolatingtheedictistoolittle.Section41stipulates
a N24,000.00 or one year imprisonment for individual
offenders; while section 40 prescribes N500,000 for corporate
offenders. It further provides for remediation of impacted
areas.Theaboveprovisionishowevernotapplicableifthere
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June 2010

is proof that the violation was solely caused by a natural

disaster or an act of sabotage. Here again, gaps are created
which are then exploited to weaken the effectiveness of the
law.

TheDELSEPAEdictfailedtoeffectivelyprotecttheDeltaState
Environment. Its provisions are not far reaching. For
example,it didnotspelloutenvironmentalstandardsforthe
oil and gas industry. This perhaps is attributable to the fact
that it is limited by the FEPA law. In all, the evidence of its
ineffectiveness is conspicuous in the state (indiscriminate
dumpingofwastes,fishingwithoutlawedchemicals,etc).

The reasons for the ineffective execution of the Delta State

EnvironmentalProtectionLawarenotdifferentfromtheones
earlier highlighted. However, the law places too much
emphasisonrevenuederivablefromenvironmentalsanitation
offencesandeffluentdischargefees,asagainstthetacklingof
theadverseenvironmentalproblemsplaguingthestate.

Conclusion
The World Commission on Environment and Development
(WCED)broughttotheforetheneedtobalancedevelopment
and its cost to the environment; thus making sustainable
development a global concern. In Nigeria, the enthronement
of sustainable development is a national objective that is
highlyranked.

Tothisend,statelegislationontheenvironmenthasbecomea
major instrument in the quest for sustainable development.
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June 2010

Essentially, the laws seek to correct acts and attitudes which

degrade the environment, and at the same time guide and
controlnaturalresourceexploitation.Thispaperviewedand
analyzedtheimpactoftheseenvironmentallegislationsonthe
promotionofsustainabledevelopmentintheNigerDelta.

ThispapernotesthatNigeriasenvironmentalprotectionlaws
(atFederalandStatelevels)arelargelyineffective.Thispaper
blamesthisonthelackofenforcementofthelegislation,which
results from to the privatization of the State and the
consequentialneglectoftheenvironment.

The provisions of the laws create gaps, which weaken

enforcement. For example, the Petroleum Act, which
regulatesoperationsoftheoilindustry,prescribesnopenalty
for offenders. Similarly, the FEPA Act only prescribes a
N20,000fine.

Again, given the nature of Nigerian Federalism, legislative

powers are concentrated in the central government which
provides the framework for environmental legislation.
Accordingly, the environmental protection laws are largely
out of sync with local conditions. To this end, they are
ignored. It is clear that environment laws have failed to
protect the environment. Probably for this reason, the
government has just established the National Environmental
StandardsRegulationEnforcementAgency(NESREA).

Meanwhile, the effectiveness of the laws has impeded

sustainable development of the Niger Delta region. On the
way forward, this paper sees as the most likely option the
74

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June 2010

institutionofgoodgovernance(atalllevelsofgovernment)as
the most likely option: a government that is predicated on
transparency, accountability, frugality in the management of
national resources, sincerity, discipline and commitment to
nationaldevelopmentobjectives.

REFERENCES
Aaron,K.K.(2006),CanaPrivatizedStatePrivatized?Insightsand
ExperiencefromNigeriasPrivatizationProgramme,THEDI
Monograph No.1, Kemuela Publications, Port Harcourt,
Nigeria.
Adibe, E.C. and A.A.E. Essagha (1999), Environmental Impact
Assessment in Nigeria (vol.2), Immaculate Publications
Limited,Enugu.
Ake,C.(2001),TheStateinContemporaryAfrica,inH.E.Alapiki
(eds), The Nigerian Political Process, Emhai Printing and
PublishingCompany,PortHarcourt,Nigeria.
Ake, C. (2001), The Political Question, in H.E. Alapiki (eds), The
Nigerian Political Process, Emhai Printing and Publishing
Company,PortHarcourt,Nigeria.
Alapiki, H.E. (2004), The Environment and Sustainable
Development, in H.E. Alapiki (eds), The Nigerian Political
Process, Amethyst and Colleagues Publishers, Port
Harcourt,Nigeria.

BayelsaStateGovernmentOfficialGazette(1998),Environmentand
DevelopmentPlanningAuthorityEdict.

Bayelsa State Ministry of Environment (2000), Forestry Department

Report.
75

Africana

June 2010

Delta State Government Official Gazette (1997), Delta State

EnvironmentalProtectionAgencyEdict,Vol.7,No.53.

Ekekwe,E.(1986),ClassandStateinNigeria,Macmillan,Nigeria.
EnvironmentWatch,April15,1998.
EnvironmentWatch,August115,2001.

EnvironmentWatch,August1125,2002.

Environmental Impact Assessment Act (1992), Federal Ministry of

InformationandCulture,Lagos,Nigeria.

FederalEnvironmentalProtectionAgencyAct(1990),CAP131,Laws
oftheFederationofNigeria.

Ibaba S. Ibaba (2004), The Environment and Sustainable

Development in the Niger Delta: The Bayelsa State
Experience, Doctoral Dissertation, Department of
Political/Administrative Studies, University of Port
Harcourt,Nigeria.
NigerDeltaEnvironmentalSurvey(1995)BriefingNote.

Okoko Kimse, and Ibaba S. Ibaba (1997), Oil Spillages and

Community Disturbances: The SPDC and the Niger Delta
Experience, in Nigerian Journal of Oil and Politics, Vol.1,
No.1,September,pp.5669.

OMPADECQuarterlyReport,(1993),Vol.1,No.1,October.
Online,http://www.iisd.org/webmaster@isd.
Online,http:/www.ShellNigeria.com/ecology/oilprobsrhs.asp.
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June 2010

Oyovbuaire,S.(1980),TheNigerianStateasConceptualVariable,
in Cliff Edogun (eds) Nigeria: Politics, Administration and
Development, The Nigeria Political Science Association,
UniversityofPortHarcourt,Nigeria.
People and Environment (2000), Shell Petroleum Development
Company(SPDC)AnnualReport.

Salau,A.T.(1993)EnvironmentalCrisisandDevelopmentinNigeria,
InauguralLecture,UniversityofPortHarcourt,Nigeria.

UNDP (2006), Niger Delta Human Development Report, Abuja,

Nigeria.
World Bank (1995), Defining on Environmental Development
StrategyfortheNigerDelta,Vol.1.
World Commission on Environment and Development (1987), Our
CommonFuture,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford.

Dr.IbabaS.Ibaba
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
NIGER DELTA UNIVERSITY, P.M.B 071
WILBERFORCE ISLAND
BAYELSA STATE
NIGERIA
Email: eminoaibaba@yahoo.com

77

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June 2010

An African Success Story: Civil Society and the

Mozambican Miracle
AaronJ.Reibel2

Introduction
Mozambique, described by Former President Bill Clinton in
2000astheworldsfastestgrowingeconomy,(Smith,2000)
hascomealongwaysincetheendofitsfifteenyearcivilwar.
During the war, Mozambique earned its reputation as the
country with the secondhighest infant mortality rate in the
world (United Nations, 1995). What is most striking about
Mozambiques postconflict recovery is that the cessation of
hostilities and a supportive international community have
causedcivilsociety(CS)toflourish.

ThestudyofCSintheglobalNorthisnothingnew,yet,civil
society organizations and alliances have received much less
attention in Africa. Of the African countries whose Civil
Society Organizations (CSOs) have strengthened democratic
processes, demanded economic reform, and advocated for
increased freedoms, Lusophone Africa has been largely
2

Aaron J. Reibel holds a Masters in International Relations from Victoria

University of Wellington, New Zealand. A former resident of
Mozambique, Reibel is currently working as an Assistant to John Hayes,
MP, Chairperson of the Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Select Committee in
New Zealand. He presented a version of this article at the Development
Conference held at VUW in 2008.
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June 2010

overlooked. Branwen Gruffydd Jones, a lecturer in Political

EconomyattheUniversityofLondon,statesthatmainstream
IR academic thought has overlooked both Africa and its
endemicdistributiveinequality(Jones,2005).

This article examines the label of miracle applied to

Mozambiques postconflict development. Specifically, this
article looks at the role that Mozambiques CS has played in
the countrys recovery after its 15year civil war and
reconsiders both the inherent bias against nonvoluntary
associationalinstitutionsintheCSdiscourseandtheuseofthe
labelmiracletodescribeeconomicandsocietaldevelopment
inthedevelopingworld.

In order to appraise civil societys role in the countrys

rehabilitation and development, this article first briefly
summarizes
Mozambiques
historical
experience.
Understanding Mozambiques historical context explains its
tumultuouspostcolonialandcivilwarexperiences.

Secondly, the article ties Mozambiques historical experience

to the longterm effects of its recent civil war. The article
demonstrates that CSOs have been fundamental to restoring
societal confidence and normalcy to a country in which 5
millionpeopleweredisplacedandmorethan1millionpeople
werekilledoverthecourseofthe15yearconflict(Thompson,
1999).

BesidesexaminingthelongtermeffectsofMozambiquescivil
war,thisarticledefinescivilsocietyinaMozambicancontext
by first introducing Bhikhu Parekh and Chris Hanns
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June 2010

criticisms of the Western focus of CS. Furthermore, the

article explains Mozambiques CS arena in terms of Michel
Foucaults attack on civil society and Antonio Grasmcis
observationthatagovernmentmaysustainitselfbycoopting
civil society in order to provide itself greater legitimacy
amongst its populace (Harbeson, 1994). Although Peter
EkehsassertionthatmanyAfricansocietieshavetwoparallel
publicspheresthatinteractwiththeirsingularprivatesphere
is useful when analyzing civil society in varying African
states, his model does not strictly apply to the Mozambican
context.Mozambiqueselectoralsystem,thoughcriticizedby
CSOs and opposition political parties alike, invalidates the
existenceofEkehsbifurcatedpublicspheres.

Thirdly, this article examines the role of the Mozambican

tradition and spiritual beliefs in the reconciliation and peace
process. Several subsidiary questions will highlight the
importanceofauniqueMozambicanpsycheandregenerative
cultureinthecountryspostconflictprocess.

Fourthly, this article explores the importance of associational

society and CSOs in Mozambiques reconstruction and
rehabilitationprocess.DespitetheheavyUNpresence,chiefly
organized through ONUMOZ, strategic planners within the
MozambicangovernmentandmotivatedMozambicansinthe
public sphere worked to strengthen the nations communal
fabric, expand democracybuilding efforts, and better
distributeopportunitiesandservicesacrossthecountry.

Multilateral and international development organizations,

such as the UNDP, the WFP, and the UNHCR, worked to
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June 2010

rebuild roads, feed the malnourished, and resettle internally

displaced persons (IDPs). Yet, they were not the only
organizationsrebuildingthedevastatedcountry.Othershave
also worked tirelessly to restore hope in Mozambique. They
includeforprofitinternationaldevelopmentconsultingfirms,
such as RONCO; bilateral international development donors,
such as USAID and DFID; Mozambican religious
organizations, including the Catholic Church and the
Mozambique Christian Council of Churches (CCM);
transnationalcivilsocietypartnerships;smallnichenonprofit
organizationsagoodexampleisBartWeetjenssHeroRatde
mining and tuberculosis detection company; and local
grassroots Mozambican organizations, such as Feliciano dos
Santoss band Massukos and his UKpartnered Estamos
OrganizaoComunitria.

This article examines the assumptions that Mozambiques

postconflicteconomicandsocietalrecoveryhasbeenashort
termmarvelandthatinthelongrunitmayfailtobreakwith
a cycle of economic dependency and ongoing indebtedness.
Finally,thearticlepositsthatthecooptionandinvolvementof
certain CSOs in Mozambiques political process has set
Mozambique on a path of established peace and political
transparency.

TheMozambicanCivilWaranditsEffects

Background
PortugalssettlementandcolonizationofEastAfricafollowed
Vasco da Gamas landing on the shores of Mozambique in
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June 2010

1498 (Duffy, 1962). Intermittent Portuguese trade and

habitation would, at times, stretch from presentday Beira to
Mombasa.Generally,however,Portugueseinroadsalongthe
presentday Kenyan and Tanzanian coastlines were met with
resistancefromthemixedlocalpopulationswhosetradewith
Arabian,Indian,andPersianmerchantswasthreatenedbythe
Portuguesepresence.

Aprazerosystem,basedontheeconomicdominanceachieved
by Portuguese given large landgrants (prazos) by the Crown,
served to extract wealth from the native inhabitants through
exploitativemeans.Often,theprazerosignoredtheirpledgeto
theCrowntodeveloptheirlands,andinsteadamassedwealth
by exacting taxes from petty chiefs on their lands, trading in
ivory,andsellingnativesintoslavery(Duffy,1962).Theresult
preservedanunderdevelopedconditioninwhichwealthwas
generatedthroughexploitativemeans.

The prazero system entrenched a habit of developmental

neglect that continued throughout Mozambiques colonial
experience.Notonlydidthesystemimpedetheintroduction
of productive rural agricultural techniques, but it also
hampered the development of transport and communication
across the country. The location of the colonys capital,
Loureno Marques, at the territorys southernmost extremity
didnotimprovethedirestateofunderdevelopment(Newitt,
2002).

In the outlying and lesspopulated areas of the colony, the

prazero system entrenched exploitative labor practices.
Initially, exploitation was evident in the sale of slaves to
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American,Brazilian,French,andSpanishslavetraders(Duffy,
1962). Mozambican labor continued to be traded as a
commodity throughout 20th century Portuguese colonial
administration. Although no longer based on coercion and
enslavement, it developed into a pattern of labor
migrationthatsawruralMozambicanmenrecruitedtowork
in Witswatersrand Rand mines (near presentday
Johannesburg)(Newitt,2002).

Although Portugal generally failed to develop

communications and transportation infrastructure, it did
invest in various infrastructural schemes. This selective
investment, coupled with the colonys commoditization of
labor,meantthatMozambiquehadarelativelydiversified
economy with an export potential to earn foreign exchange
[and] a welldeveloped system of hydroelectric power
(Newitt, 2002, p. 188). The colonys burgeoning economic
capacity and wellendowed hydroelectric infrastructure
looked set to ensure the smooth transition from an
impoverished colony to a productive nascent state.
Unfortunately, a protracted conflict suspended the countrys
economicdevelopment.

Although African nationalism began to reify in Portugals

African colonies in the 1940s and 50s, it was not until early
1960thatnationalistsentimentevolvedintoconflict(Chicolte,
1967).TheresistancebeganinAngolain1961asachallengeto
Lisbons claim of racial harmony based on miscegenation
andcivilizingpolicy(Chicolte,1967,p.43).Duringthe1960s
Portugalfacedmountingresistancetoitscolonialrule.

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Initially, CSOs were established in Portugal to provide

Mozambicans a channel to discuss Lisbons administration of
the colony. Although some CSOs were established with the
cooperative goal of assimilating black and mulato
Mozambicans (such as the Associao Africana and the Centro
Associativo dos Negros de Moambique), most CSOs were
establishedtovoiceMozambicaninterestswerecontrolledby
Mozambicans born of European parents (Chicolte, 1967). As
these organizations began to criticize Mozambiques un
representativecolonialadministrationandtourgereforms,the
Mozambican colonial administration reacted by further
diminishingdemocraticrepresentationinthecolony(Chicolte,
1967).

Ashifttowardsunrepresentativeadministrationandacrack
downonsubversiveintellectualsinLisbonledtotheexodus
of nationalist African intellectuals to Paris and to a
strengtheningofAfricannationalistideology.RonaldChicolte
stated that, while it was unclear what the result of such a
strengthening of ideology would be, it [was] safe to
assume that circumstantial events, influenced greatly by
Portuguese intransigent policies, awakened the privileged
AfricanintelligentsiatochallengethePortuguesehegemonyin
Africa(1967,p.52).

In 1962 Mozambican intellectuals in Europe, Tanzania,

Zambia, and Malawi were invited by Julius Nyerere to a
conferenceinDaresSalaamtoformtheFrentedeLibertaode
Moambique (FRELIMO), which would become the main
Mozambicanliberationmovement(Newitt,2002).

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AlthoughmostoftheFRELIMOleadershipcadrehailedfrom
the more prosperous southern part of the country and was
distrustedintheNorthernprovinces,theinitialheavyhanded
Portuguese response toFRELIMO operations led to a growth
of peasant support. In fact, middleclass peasants, whose
ranks were both increased and frustrated by the Portuguese,
backed [FRELIMO] on the assumption that an independent
Mozambican state would eliminate the constraints that the
colonialadministrationhaderected(Bowen,2000,p.6).The
insurgency continued into the mid 1970s and considerably
sappedPortuguesemilitarymoraleasitdrewthearmyintoa
seeminglyunwinnablewar.

Malyn Newitt suggests that when Portugal suddenly cast off

its colonies in 1974, FRELIMO effectively gained power
withoutpopularsupport,therebyguaranteeinganoutbreakof
war in the nascent state. Newitt states that FRELIMO was
viewedasanillegitimategovernmentbylargeportionsofthe
population,especiallyintheNorthernprovinces,sincemostof
its leadership had been educated abroad and was native to
developedareasclosertoMaputo(2002).

Two significant events occurred in 1977, two years after

Mozambican independence. FRELIMO announced that it
would pursue a strategy based on MarxistLeninist
organisationalphilosophy(Newitt,2002)whichimmediately
made it an enemy of the Apartheid South African regime,
Southern Rhodesia, and of the United States of America. It
also effectively undermined the limited CS arena that had
existed in Mozambique during its late colonial period and
early years of independence. FRELIMO absorbed certain
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sectors of CS by creating youth, womens, and workers

organisations including the Organisao de Juventude
Moambicana (OJM) and the Organisao de Mulheres
Moambicanas(OMM)(Newitt,2002,p.198).

As FRELIMO tightened its grip on Mozambican society and

crushed dissent withinits armed forces, dissatisfaction began
to spread. After a coup attempt in 1976, FRELIMO sent
dissident military commanders to reeducation camps
(Serapiao,2004).Twocommandersthatmanagedtoescapea
reeducation camp fled to Southern Rhodesia where they
sought military support to fight the FRELIMO
government. Southern Rhodesia, only too happy to
destabilize its Marxist neighbor which provided material and
ideological support to its own homegrown freedom
movement (Robert Mugabes ZANLA), helped establish the
Resistncia Nacional Moambicana (RENAMO) headed by
AfonsoDhlakama(Serapiao,2004,p.23).

FRELIMO has been criticized for implementing increasingly

repressive tactics as RENAMO escalated the conflict.
FRELIMOstacticsofforcedfoodcultivation,limitingthefree
movementofpeasants,anditsstrategyoflimitingfundingof
basic social services caused widespread urban and rural
discontent(Bowen,2000).

As the war dragged on and the populace found itself

increasingly targeted, splinter armed factions emerged and
threatenedtodragacountryteeteringonthebrinkofcollapse
into a state of irreconcilable anarchy and depredation. The
result was that conditions in the country worsened and civil
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society groups within and without Mozambique began to

mobilize to bring about peace (Moran and Pitcher, 2004, p.
511). Mozambiques Catholic Church played an integral role
in brokering a formal agreement between FRELIMO and
RENAMO that culminated in the signing of the 1992 Rome
GeneralPeaceAccordsand,ultimately,broughtthecountrys
brutalcivilwartoanend(MoranandPitcher,2004).

Effects
Theeffectsofthecountrys15yearcivilwarweredevastating.
Whenpeacewasfinallyachieveditbecameapparentthatthe
countrys economic capability had been largely demolished
and rural economic growth had been brought to a virtual
standstill (Thompson, 1999). From a total population of 16
million,5millionpeopleweredisplacedandapproximately1
millionhadbeenkilled(Thompson,1999).Withthelayingof
over 2 million mines, large swaths of land were made
inaccessible to farmers. The result of the widespread
dissemination of landmines was 10,000 victims and perhaps
hundredsofthousandsmorevictimstofoodshortagescreated
by the elimination of arable land from the states agricultural
capacity(Thompson,1999).

Attheendofhostilities,numerousinternationalaidagencies,
UNbodies,andNGOswerealreadyoperatinginMaputoand
in some of the other major urban centers including Beira,
Nampula, Tete, Quelimane, Inhambane, and Pemba. This
allowedfortherapidmarshallinganddistributionofreliefaid
and the implementation of postconflict reconstruction
projects. The United Nations launched a peacekeeping and
postconflict rehabilitation mission, officially named the
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United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), to

guide the country from armed conflict to democratic and
peaceful elections (The United Nations and Mozambique,
1995, p. 105). ONUMOZs mandate was approved in
December of 1992 and the missionstarted to coalesce around
the following core requirements: a) the need to remain
impartial in order to fully support the peace process, b) the
need to encourage the international community to live up to
itsresponsibilitytosupporttheMozambicanrecoveryprocess,
and c) the need to secure the countrys major transportation
corridors in order to ensure that humanitarian efforts and
interstate trade could contribute to the stabilization of the
country(TheUnitedNationsandMozambique,1995).

In addition to the influx of aid organizations, international

development contracting firms, and operations run by
organizations, such as the World Bank, CSOs multiplied.
Goodwill and a domestic need to rebuild, coupled with a
massive injection of donor funding, allowed homegrown
CSOstoflourish.Severalprojectswereestablishedtoprovide
shelter, training, jobs, and food to the large number of
orphaned and homeless children that roamed the streets of
Maputo.ThesuccessfulMeninosdeMocambiqueisanexample
onesuchorganizationthatrunsaclinicformalnourishedand
ailingstreetchildren.Theorganizationreceivesfundingfrom
StreetChildAfrica,aUKbasedcharity(Mozambique,Street
ChildAfrica).

Implications
The countrys infrastructure was left in ruins and its morale
severely diminished but, positively, the countrys trauma
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allowed for a peaceful democratization and development

process. So, what are the implications of the civil war on
Mozambicancivilsociety?Toanswerthisquestion,thearticle
starts by disagreeing with Peter Ekehs assertion that post
colonial Africa has two parallel public arenas with different
types of moral linkages to the private realm which, inturn
explain how nepotism, tribalism, and ideological ties exist
within a public sphere, while statemechanisms continue to
exist in a realm governed by a seemingly nonpartisan and
independentcivilstructure(Azaraya,1994).AlthoughEkehs
observations are descriptive of many African states, they do
notaccuratelydescribethecountrysstateofcivilsocietydue
to Mozambiques particular experiences. That the FRELIMO
government is scrutinized by the RENAMO opposition party
has meant the Mozambican government has had to regularly
agree to RENAMO and civil society demands for greater
transparency.

Governmental compromises have included allowing CSOs to

monitor election centers via computer video links, unfettered
access to polling stations, and in vote counting with the
National Elections Commission (CNE) (Nvunga, 2006). Such
compromises ensure that nepotism, tribalism, and shared
identities do not interfere in the public realm as they do in
Angola,Nigeria,orZimbabwe.Perhapsafurtherchallengeto
Ekehsgeneralobservationisthefactthatthecostofpolitical
cronyism and manipulation may be much higher for
Mozambiques fledgling democracy than in Angola, Nigeria,
and Zimbawe, which suffer from a lack of transparency,
corrupt and nepotistic government, and tyrannical
dictatorship,respectively.In2005,TransparencyInternational
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June 2010

rankedMozambique97thoutof158countriesinitsperceived
level of corruption (Annual Report Transparency
International, 2005). Maputos ranking exceeded that of
Luanda,Nairobi,andHarare151,152,and107,respectively
(AnnualReportTransparencyInternational,2005).According
to the UN Supervision and Control Commission Chairman,
Colonel Segala, RENAMO and FRELIMO soldiers [have]
admitted to hiding weapons as insurance policies against
possible breaches of good faith and democratization (Vines,
1998,p.193).

CSintheMozambicanContext
ThedominantdefinitionofCSisbasedonaWesternapproach
that maintains that civil society is found in an arena of
voluntaryassociationindependentoftheeconomy,thestate,
and the domestic sphere (family life). Michael Waltzer,
following in the tradition of Western CS scholars, talks of a
realm of uncoerced human associations that include family,
unions, universities, the press, churches, professional groups,
NGOs,andsocialmovements(Parekh,2005,p.19).

Baron Bhikhu Parekh, a Centennial Professor at the London

School of Economics and current Labor MP sitting in the
HouseofLords,insiststhatthoughtheaccepteddefinitionof
CS suffices when applied to specific case studies, it is
culturally and historically specific and has obvious
limitations (Parekh, 2005, p. 23). Lord Parekh further
explains that since the current Western definition, promoted
by governments and NGOs alike, insists that coercion and
cooption in the form of state, international, or commercial
influenceresultsinthelossoflegitimacyofaCSarena,this
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definition is of limited usefulness when defining CS in non

Westerncountries(Parekh,2005).

InordertolaytheframeworkforaMozambicandefinitionof
CS, it is thus necessary to see the existence of an altogether
noncoercive CS. This allows for an appreciation of
associations based on traditional allegiances, ties of blood,
inherited loyalties or the accident of birth such as castes,
clans, tribes, and ethnic and religious communities (Parekh,
2005,p.21).CSindifferentregionsandcountriesshouldnot
bepaintedwiththesamebroadstrokesnorshouldcoercion
or cooption be seen as intrinsically undesirable. In much of
the developing world, society is deeply divided along tribal,
caste, and religious lines. This is often the result of the
external process of colonialism that drew borders along neat
imaginary longitudinal and latitudinal lines. What is similar
to the Western model is the fact that CS in Mozambique has
fosteredsocialcohesion.

ChrisHannexpandsonLordParekhspreliminarydescription
of nonWestern CS by further explaining that the exportation
of CS (through the promotion of democracy or externally
funded and directed CSstrengthening projects) results in a
neoimperialist imposition of a liberal notion of CS and may
actuallyabortlocalprocessesofchangeandCSdevelopment
(Hann, 2005, p.46). He further explains that therein lies the
core of the anthropologic critique of CS exportation and
promotion.

Leonardo Avritzers discussion of the necessary role that CS

hasplayedinperipheralnonWesternwarafflictedsocietiesis
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especiallyusefulwhendefiningCSinMozambique.Although
Avritzer uses Per as an example of a case where CS has
created selfhelp structures in order to fill the void and
produce public goods that are normally provided by the
state in Western core countries (Avritzer, 2005, p. 56).
AccordingtoAvritzer,Perexperiencedeconomicconditions
thathamperedthegovernmentsabilitytocollecttaxeswhilea
prolongedcivilwarresultedinthedeathofoverhalfamillion
Peruvians(Avritzer,2005).Asaresult,by1994CSgroupshad
startedtoofferservicessuchassoupkitchens,milkproviding
groups,andmothersclubs(Avritzer,2005,p.56).

Similarly, Mozambiques civil war and the ensuing

breakdown of the governments provision of public goods
resultedintheformationofauniquelyMozambicanCS,which
inturnresultedinthedevelopmentofselfhelpstructuresfor
itspopulace.

TraditionalCultureandPractices
SergioVieradeMello,theUNDeputyHighCommissionerfor
Refugees during the ONUMOZled peacekeeping mission,
oftenpraisedMozambiqueforitsuniquecultureitsculture
ofpeace(Thompson,1999).AlthoughdeMellosstatements
are difficult to support empirically, they are significant in
explainingtheMozambicanMiracle.

DeMellosobservationsencompassedthesuccessachievedby
a variety of communal and culturallyspecific reintegration
andreconciliationapproaches.Theseapproachesincludedthe
reunificationofchildsoldierswiththeirfamilies,encouraging
familiestoholdpurificationceremoniesaimedatseparatinga
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childs experiences and actions during the war from his/her

role in the family (especially successful for the reintegration
of girls forced into sexual slavery), and the reinforcement of
social interaction as a means of reincorporating traumatized
childrenintothecommunalarena.

During the 1980s, Mozambican relief organizations realized

thattheWesternapproachtorehabilitatingthevictimsofthe
war,thattreatedthemasinfirmandinneedofacure,didnot
seem to be effective in the Mozambican context. Instead, the
Mozambican government devised a policy that a) focused on
extendingmaterialassistancetovulnerablefamiliessothey
could sustain their children and, b) reuniting separated
children with their families as expediently and inclusively as
possible (Thompson, 1999, p. 199). To achieve the latter
strategy, curandeiros (traditional healers) stressed the concept
of family strength over the Western notion of trauma as
pathology (Thompson, 1999). In this way, curandeiros
performed cleansing ceremonies in which they purified the
houses and, at times, the returning children as a way of
divorcing the inflicted trauma from the present childfamily
relations.

In addition to the role of curandeiros, programs aimed at

healing wounds at the grassroots level have proven widely
successful. Examples of such programs included the
performance of plays and dances that condemned the war,
peace marches, conciliatory soccer matches between the
opposingsides,andspecialceremoniestohealandreintegrate
victims of the war into their communities (Moran and
Pitcher, 2004, p. 511). Feliciano dos Santoss Estamos
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June 2010

Organizacao Comunitaria serves as an example of one such

NGO that focuses on educating communities about social
issues such as communicable diseases, the need to improve
sanitary health, and reconciliation through music. As dos
SantosandhisbandMassukostourthroughruralvillages,they
pausetogivedemonstrationsoflatrineconstructionandplay
theirlatestsongsthatexplainhowHIVAIDSisspread(Pryor,
2008).
In addition to reconciliation and reintegration mechanisms
and grassroots educational programs, spiritual practices and
traditions have played an important role in kickstarting the
Mozambican Miracle. In Zambzia province Manuel Antonio
began a movement that came to be known as the Naparama
(irresistible force), which managed to secure the release of
hostagesheldbyRENAMOandestablishneutralzoneswhile
the war raged on (Profiles, Conciliation Resources online).
Themovementtappedintothestronganimisttraditionsinthe
Mozambican countryside. Its members relied on magic
potions and other forms of spiritual protection to render
themselves invincible in the face of RENAMO forces
which would often voluntarily accede to Naparama demands
(Profiles,ConciliationResourcesonline,para.21).

ToborrowfromtheNeoGramscianschool,CSOsthattapped
into Mozambican societal traditions and social mechanisms
managed to restore an important social glue that has, very
likely, served to further support the countrys reconciliation
anddevelopment.NeoGramsciansstressthatsocialglue,a
cohesiveelementbetweendivergentinterests,canbefoundin
the shared negative experience of the effects of global
capitalism (Shilliam, 2008, ch. 9). Although, CSOs in the
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Mozambican context have not been brought together by a

shareddislikeforcapitalism,asharednegativeexperiencehas
allowed Mozambican CSOs and portions of the public sector
to cooperatively heal the countrys traumas. Moreover, the
trauma experienced by 15 years of brutal civil war has
produced the social glue that has helped Mozambicans
avoid a return to conflict even in the face of numerous
domesticchallenges.

EconomicDependenceandSurrogacy&CSCooptionand
Stability
Samir Amin pointed out that by integrating itself into the
international economic system, at the behest of its foreign
donor states, Mozambique may actually be undermining its
future independence and potential development (Schraeder,
2004).Byacceptingforeignloans,Maputomaybeweakening
its sovereignty (at worst) or bargaining power (at best).
Furthermore,itislikelythatifitseconomyfailstoachievethe
levelofgrowthpredictedbyitseconomists,Maputowillfind
itself caught in a cycle of debt. Periodic debt relief has
alleviatedsomeoftheseconcerns.

Furthermore, Stephen Thomas has argued that a growing

dependence on steady flows of foreign development aid
meant for CSOs has created a degree of surrogacy and
substitution of the governments role (Thomas, 1992, p. 43).
This surrogacy threatens to undermine the function of the
state. If residents of Sofala Province do not receive services
fromeitherthecentralgovernmentinMaputoortheregional
government, and instead receive assistance from the UNDP
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and WFP, they have little incentive to pay taxes or vote in

nationalelections.Furthermore,suchsurrogacymayalienate
the central government from its citizens and encourage
disassociationandcorruptioninMaputo.

In spite of the valid criticisms voiced by detractors of Neo

Liberalismwhopointtoaneconomyincreasinglydependent
onforeigntrade,loans,andexposedtoforeignpressuresand
domesticcooptionthecurrentsystemmayactuallyserveto
ensure that democracy remains a driving force in the
Mozambicanpoliticalarena.

Michel Foucaults attack on civil society is useful for

understandingCSOinvolvementinMozambicanpolitics.CS
is typically understood to inhabit an arena separate from
government involvement, but still linking the private sphere
to the public one. Foucault criticized the idea of civil society
asabridgebetweenthepublicandprivatesectors,ashe
felt that CSOs could just as easily determine the purposes
and rules of the political game (Harbeson, 1994, p. 21).
AlthoughnotallsectorsofMozambicancivilsocietyfitwithin
Foucaultsobservations,thenecessaryinvolvementofCSOsin
thecountrysCNEdoescallintoquestiontheindependenceof
those CSOs, especially when the members of civil society
organizations(suchasAroLitsurefromProtestantCCM)are
appointedtoheadtheCNE.

Gramscis perception that civil society cooption seems to

sustain [a] government supports Foucaults point that
cooptionmayprecludetheexistenceofatrulyindependentCS
(Harbeson, 1994, p. 19). Although Mozambican civil society
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June 2010

hasnotbeenentirelycooptedbythegovernment,thefactthat
CSOs are expected to play an integral role in the electoral
process does suggest that Mozambiques CS arena is best
describedbytheGramscianacknowledgementoftheutilityof
CS cooption. Despite Foucaults worries about civil society
impartiality, civil society oversight continues to reduce the
chances of a violent relapse. Although certain CSOs have
renounced a degree of objectivity and independence by
participatingintheCNEdeliberations,manyothers(including
48 local NGOs in Maputo and Nampula alone, identified by
UNESCO in a 2002 report), such as the Associao Rural de
Alvio e Combate a Pobreza (ARCAP), remain firmly outside of
the governments arena and work to alleviate the effects of
economicstagnationandinternecineconflict(Bellucci,2002).

WhatofthecriticismsoftheMozambicanMiracle?
Robert Calderisi, in his book entitled The Trouble with Africa:
WhyForeignAidIsntWorking,arguesthatMozambiqueisone
ofthefewAfricanstatesthatisdeservingofcontinuedforeign
aid as it has a developing political system, low levels of
corruption,andaselfdirectedforeignaidpolicy(Calderisi,
2006). Calderisis positive portrayal of Mozambique is
perhaps overly optimistic. In his article entitled Africa:
Living on the Fringe, Samir Amin describes Third World
miracles which are actually cases of growth without true
developmentasmisleadingmonikers(Amin,2002).

Despite Calderisis praise, the 2007/2008 UNDP Human

Development Report and its accompanying Human
DevelopmentIndicatorsrevealthatfifteenyearsaftertheend
of the civil war, Mozambique still languishes amongst the
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June 2010

groupofcountrieswiththeLowestHumanDevelopmentin
the world (UNDP, 2008). At the conclusion of the civil war,
whenitwasconsideredoneofthepooreststatesintheworld,
Mozambique also sat firmly amongst the poorest performing
states within the Low Human Development bracket. By
1992, Mozambique ranked 146th out of 160 countries (UNDP,
1992)itnowsitsat172ndoutof177countries(UNDP,2008).

It is certain that Mozambique is still in the throes of its post

conflict reconstruction and development phase. What is also
clear is that it has an ample civil society arena with widely
varyingCSOs.Despitethefactthatsomeoftheorganizations
are less independent of the government than others, the
countrys CSOs have played a significant role in
Mozambiquestransitiontoindependence,peacein1992,and
alongitspathtopostconflictrecovery.

Asgoodgovernancecontinuestobeanissue,itremainstobe
seenifthearenaforcivilsocietywillcontinuetobeamplified
and encouraged (de Renzio and Hanlon, 2007). As the
Mozambicaneconomycomesundergrowingforeignpressure
and the political arena continues to grow, the question is
whether FRELIMO will tolerate increasing civil society
scrutinyandagraduallossofsovereignauthority,orifitwill
acttounderminecivilsocietyinordertomaintainitsgripon
power.Theeffectofsuchaviolationofthecivilarenawould
undoubtedlyleadtoarenewalofhostilities.

A future study may be needed to shed light on RENAMOs

roleintheguaranteeingofthecivilarena.Thequestionis,as
RENAMO remains a powerful political force, will FRELIMO
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June 2010

hesitatetorestrainthecountrysCSOsandcompressthecivil
societalarena?IfFRELIMOssupportdiminishes,willit,like
RENAMO, rely on the countrys civil society groups to
counterbalance RENAMOs political power? Until these
questions are answered, a politicallyenfranchised and
consequently coopted civil society forms the anchor of the
MozambicanMiracle.

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deRenzio,Paolo,andJosephHanlon.ContestedSovereignty
inMozambique:TheDilemmasofAidDependence.GEG
WorkingPaper2007/25.DepartmentofPoliticsand
InternationalRelations,UniversityofOxford,2007.

Schraeder,PeterJ.AfricanPoliticsandSocietyAMosaicin
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Serapiao,LuisBenjamin.TheCatholicChurchandConflict
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Shilliam,Robbie.Jacobinism:TheGhostintheGramscian
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Smith,Russell.MozambiquesEconomicHopesWashed
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http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/655557.stm[viewed
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Thompson,CarolB.BeyondCivilSociety:ChildSoldiersas
CitizensinMozambique.ReviewofAfricanPoliticalEconomy,
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102

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Globalization, New Regionalism and the

Challenge of Development in Africa
J.SholaOmotola3

Abstract
ThispaperisacontributiontothedebateonAfricasregional
integrationandthechallengeofdevelopmentinthecontextof
globalization. It situates Africas development paradox, as
manifestly shown by its poverty of plenty within the
framework of globalization. It also examines Africas new
regionalism, epitomized by the transition from the OAU to
AU, and argues that while the effort has enabled Africa to
respondtothechallengeofglobalizationanddevelopmentin
away,theinstrumentalityofNEPADthroughwhichitsought
todosoisinastateofvacillation.Itisarguedthattheuseof
the word partnership in that context negates the basic
requirement of partnership. Not only does NEPAD proceed
fromafaultytheoreticalpremisebutalso,mostAfricanstates
lack the political will, internal legitimacy and capability to
cope with the responsibility bestowed on them by the new
initiative.Byandlarge,theactivismofthecivilsocietyandthe
globalacceptanceoftheinitiative,nomatterhowpretentious
it may be, offer new hopes. To make it realistic, African
leaders must revisit the concept of partnership to reflect its

Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Redeemers

University, Redemption City, Ogun State, Nigeria. E-mail:
sholaomotola@yahoo.com
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necessary conditions for success. It is only then that they can

struggle to bridge the ever widening gap of inequality
between the rich north and poor south through a
democratically designed development pact. This requires the
institutionalizationofgoodgovernanceandthestrengthening
ofthecurrentwaveofdemocratizationinAfrica.

Introduction
TheendoftheColdWarnodoubtmarksasignificant
watershed in theannals of world history. The postCold War
order brought with it a new phase in the globalization
phenomenon,witharenewedfaithinglobalcapitalismasthe
ultimate solution to world poverty and relatedpredicaments.
Informed by this rationalization in some quarters (the
developed world), and the helplessness of some other parts
(reference to Africa), various parts of the world have ever
sincebeguntorespondtothechallengesofglobalization.
Specifically, African countries have been urged to
adjusttotherapidglobalizationofinternationaltradeandthe
financialsystembyincreasingtheirexportsandpushingmuch
harder to integrate markets withinAfrica, lest they suffer the
riskofmarginalization(Candessus,cfGCA,1992).TheWorld
Bank(2001:1)wasoftheviewthatAfricacouldclaimthenew
century if crucial progress is made in four fronts: improving
governance and resolving conflicts, investing in people,
increasing competitiveness and diversifying economies,
reducingaiddependencyandstrengtheningpartnership.The
point must however be made that it is not the failure to
respond to this challenge that brought about the
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marginalization of Africa in the world capitalist system, as

insinuated in the above statement. Throughout its history,
Africa has always oscillated between exclusion and
marginalization (Onimode, 2000:27, 3034, 8492; 1989; Ake
1992, 1981; Adedeji, 1993). More fundamentally, and perhaps
duetotheaforementionedinformation,Africalacksthebasic
ingredients to respond effectively to the challenge of
globalization(SeeKiikpoye,2001:1935).
Nevertheless,theAfricancontinent,perhapsfollowing
the European model, has been responding in its own unique
way. This was best exemplified by the current wave of new
regionalism,epitomizedbythesuccessfultransitionfromthe
OAU to African Union (AU) in the year 2000. Indeed, the
transitionhaselicitedhighoptimismfromacrossthecontinent
inthebeliefthatanewdawnhasfinallyarrived.Surely,such
hopesandexpectationsarenotmisplaced,givingthefactthat
all previous efforts (Lagos Plan of Action, for example) have
all together failed woefully (Ake, 1996:23; Onimode, 2000:87;
Bach,1999:43).
The question therefore arises regarding how
adequately equipped the new integrative effort is to avert
falling into the pitfalls of its predecessors? What challenges
does the new phase of globalization pose for the AU and, by
extension, for the development in Africa? What are its
prospectsandlimitationsinthenewglobalorder?Themajor
thrust of this paper will be to provide insight into these and
otherrelatedquestions.
The expedition is necessitated by the fact that despite
the mounting interest and discourses which the transition
(OAUtoAU)hasgenerated,thereisstilllittleunderstanding
of the dynamics and complexities of this movement whose
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foundation is precariously laid and to that extent, weak. Yet,

the abiding faith of African leaders, and perhaps neoliberal
scholars in the project, even in the face of enduring but
inimicalforces(weshallelaboratemoreonthislater)makesit
more expedient to carry out more empirically grounded
criticalanalysis.Grantedthatsomeprogresshasbeenmadeat
the structural, formal and legal levels, a lot still need to be
doneattheimplementationlevel.Itisagainstthisbackground
that this paper calls for circumspectum in projecting the
prospectsofthenewregionalisminAfrica.
The paper is structured into six parts. Sequel to this
introduction, part two attempts to clarify the major concepts
used in the paper. While part three explicates Africas
developmentparadoxwithinthecontextofglobalization,part
four analyses the AU as new regionalism in Africa. Part five
probes into the viability of the New Partnership for Africa
(NEPAD) as an instrument of the AU in fulfilling its
challenges. The last section forms the conclusion and
recommendations.

ConceptualPerspectives
Threeconceptsarecentraltotheunderstandingofthis
paper Globalization, New Regionalism and Development. Here,
attempts are made to clarify these concepts to avoid
misrepresentation of thought and facilitate a discussion of
interrelationshipamongthemajorconcepts.

Globalization
It is important to state from the outset that no
universally acceptable definition of globalization exists. This
may not be unconnected with the fact that the concept is not
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only multidimensional, but is also value loaded.

Encompassing as much as every facet of human endeavor,
cultural, social, political, economic and environmental issues
have been employed to rationalize the development of the
advanced northern countries of North America, Western
Europe, South East Asia as well as the underdevelopment of
southern countries of Asia, Southern America, Latin America
andAfrica.Theconceptofglobalizationistherefore,likemost
othertopicalissuesinthenorthsouthdialogue,undoubtedly
an essentially contested concept. It remains an embattled
concept, yearning for more clarification and illumination to
unravel the ambivalence surrounding it and its relationship
withdevelopment.
The extensive literature on the subject is replete with
differentdefinitionsandperspectives.Fortheunderdeveloped
countries, globalization means nothing more than a re
colonization process of the third world economies. Viewed
from this perspective, globalization has been seen as a new
phase of capitalist expansion and is still about exploitation,
accumulation,inequalityandpolarization(Aina,1996:24).Itis
thereforeaseemingmanifestationofthethesisofimperialism
withoutamajorcolonialempire(SeeOsterhammel,1997:22).
ThisperhapsexplainswhyAfricasresponsehasuntilrecently
beenthatofresistanceandresignation(Kawonishe,2002).Itis
thereforeamajorfactorinthedependenceofcountriesofthe
southonthenorth.Butforthedevelopedworld,globalization
liesattheveryheartofalleffortstoredressallimbalancesin
the world system. Situated within such a liberal perspective,
globalization is considered as the driving force for the
transformation of global economy, whose implication for
development would be positive particularly for the third
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world. However, Obadan (2003) has offered a window

through which we can understand this complicated
phenomenon.Asheputsit,globalizationrefersto

thegrowinginterdependenceoftheworlds
people it is about increasing inter
connectednessandinterdependenceamong
the worlds regions, nations, governments,
business,
institutions,
communities,
families and individuals it fosters the
advancement of global mentality and
conjures the picture of a borderless world
through the use of information technology
to create partnerships to foster greater
financial and economic integration
(Obadan,2003)

The foregoing definition reveals that irrespective of

conflictingperspectivesonglobalization,particularlybetween
thenorthandthesouth,athoroughlyglobalizedworldwould
emphasize three interrelated issues: integration, inter
dependence and partnership through international trade,
investment and finance, technological advancement and
information technology. If properly managed, it harbors the
possibility of a symbiotic pattern of relations between the
developed and developing countries of the world. But when
perverted, it becomes an admixture of blessing and curse: a
weapon in the hand of the strong for the oppression and
exploitationoftheweak.Theimportofthisforouranalysisis
that globalization could be a tool for development and
underdevelopment, depending on the extent to which the
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central concepts of integration, interdependence and

partnershiparerespected.

NewRegionalism
New Regionalism in the context of this paper derives
in part from the immediate preceding perspective of
integration,interdependenceandpartnershipasintegralparts
of the globalization process. Essentially, it connotes Africas
new effort towards fostering greater integration,
interdependence and partnership among African peoples,
governments and economies, with the aim of deriving
additional leverage in its relations with the outside world,
particularlyontheeconomicfront.Thereasoningseemstobe
that a wellintegrated Africa offers the possibility for better
deals in the international economic system, and for an
enhancedperformanceoftheAfricaneconomy.
Specifically,therecenttransitionfromOAUtoAU,asa
response to the new phase of globalization, is what we have
referredtoasnewregionalism.ThisisbecausetheAfrican
Union is the inevitable historical maturation of the ideas of
PanAfricanismandPanAfricanUnity,whichgaverisetothe
establishmentoftheOAU(Agbubuzu2002).Thispositionis
supported by the basic objective of the AU, which is to
improve PanAfrican welfare and provides Africans with a
solidvoiceininternationalaffairs(Steinberg,2001).TheAU,as
ascholarputsit,hasbeentailoredtofightthenewrealitiesof
aglobalizedworld.WiththeAU,itishopedthatAfricawould
attain meaningful living standards, peace, stability, economic
growthanddevelopmentinAfrica.Thissteadfastbeliefinthe
regional effort may have been predicated on the fact that
regional groupings, whether political or economic, are the
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principal influential forces on the world scene (See Daouas

2001:5).

Development
Like the concept of globalization, the term
development has not enjoyed a universally accepted
definition. The problem is due not only to the fact that it is
bothamultidimensionalandavalueloadedconcept,butitis
alsoduetothecurrentpluralisminthedevelopmentliterature
(SeeSo,1990).
Todaro, (1985) however, conceptualizes development
as: a multidimensional process involving major changes in
social structures, popular attitudes, and national institutions,
as well asthe acceleration of economic growth, the reduction
ofinequalityandtheeradicationofabsolutepoverty(cfLane
and Ersson, 1997:19). In another work, the same scholar
identifies three core values of development (Todaro, 1989:89
90). These include the ability to provide as many people as
possible with their basic needs or the ability to acquire
adequate food, shelter, health care and protection. It also
entails the perception of individuals or groups of selfworth
andesteemasarespectedmembersofthesocietyandfreedom
in the sense that individuals and society at large have an
expanded range of choice, not only with respect to the
material necessities for self reproduction, but also in their
ability to have a say in, if not to determine, the method and
processbywhichvaluesareallocatedinthesociety(cfOgwu,
2002:1213).
The widely cited political economist, Armati K. Sen,
has offered more illuminating thoughts on the concept of
development. For him, development connotes capacity
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expansion(Sen,1990),andissynonymouswithfreedom(Sen,
1999). As a capacity expansion, development requires
adequateempowermentofthestateandthesocietysuchthat
they can adequately distil their complimentary
responsibilities.Itrequiresanenhancedstatecapacity,aswell
as institutional and governmental stability. It is only within
suchaframeworkthatindividualmembersofsocietycanfind
fulfillment in terms of the basic necessities of life. As a
freedom,developmentdemandsagreatlatitudeofautonomy
forthepoliticalcommunityanditsconstituentparts,aswellas
fortheindividualmembersofsuchcommunities.Inthatcase,
the level of popular participation, measured in terms of the
qualityandquantityofparticipationishighlydecisive.
The foregoing expedition reveals a close link among
the three concepts of globalization, new regionalism and
development. This is because one of the basic requisites of
globalization is integration and interdependence. These were
parts of the motivational ideals of the new regional effort in
Africa.Theultimategoaloftheeffortistotransformtheentire
continent from its present status of underdevelopment to
development. While the new phase of globalization offers
somepossibilities,muchofitdependsonthedispositionand
sincerityoftheadvancedcountriesoftheworldtorespectthe
sanctity that interdependence and partnership are crucial
elements of the globalization process that would mutually
beneficialtoallactorsagainstdependencyandexploitation.

GlobalizationandAfricasDevelopmentParadox
Historical records show beyond a reasonable doubt
that Africa is the cradle of civilization (See Davidson, 1964;
1991,1992;Mair,1977;Fage,1997).Infact,theearliestknown
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evidenceoftheexistenceofmanandtheemergenceofhuman
society comes from Africa (Fage, 1997:391340). Besides, the
continent is rich: it is well endowed with enormous human
and material resources (Onimode, 1989, 1981; Ake 1992;
Oyekanmi,2002,Rodeney,1972).Intermsoftechnologicaland
economic advancement, precolonial Africa was at par with
otherpartsoftheWorld(Rodney,1972:112115).Recordhasit
thatitwasAfricathatinventedwritingonpapyrusinancient
EgyptandMathematicsattheUniversityofTinbuktuinWest
Africa (Diop, 1976 cf Onimode, 2000:70). In a sense, the
continentcouldnthavebeenbetterendowed.
TherisingprofileofAfricaintheworldeconomywas
however suddenly truncated through its contact with the
outside world. This marks the beginning of the unmaking of
Africa.Infact,Africasfirstcontactwiththeoutsideworldwas
through the export slave trade as the first phase in the
globalization of the world. Unfortunately, as it later turned
out,itwasanadventurethatwasrathertoofatalandlethargic
for Africa to contain. For instance, between 14511867, a total
of 11,641,000 Africans were taken from Africa as part of the
Atlantic slave trade (Fage, 1997:254255). From Black Africa
alone, an estimated total of 14,015,000 slaves were exported
between 1650 and 1870 (Fage, 1997:258). The impact of the
slave trade on Africa is therefore mostly reflected in its
massive depopulation of the African continent, with a heavy
tollondevelopment.
By implication, Africa was already prostrate by the
time the next European onslaught in the form of colonial
invasionbegan.Thiswasbecauseithadalmostlostthewillto
fight after some 425 years of continuous slave raids, physical
destruction, depopulation, technological demobilization and
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the most unimaginable destruction in human history

(Onimode, 2000:72, 1989). But in terms of penetration and
consequences, the colonial experience was in itself more
devastating (Fage, 1997:391459; Rodney, 1972; Davidson,
1992; Ake, 1996). Apart from the retroversion, and sometime
outrightdenialofAfricanhistory,thecolonial state,beingan
illegitimate state, relied on the illegitimate use of force for its
survival(Osaghae1989:37;Ake,1978;Mamdani,2002).Amidst
the ensuing deeply entrenched legitimacy crisis, the resort to
violence became inevitable to accomplish its imperial
objectives. At every stage and at every level, as Onimode
(2000:73) has argued, colonialism was a massively violent
encounter.
Granted that the decolonization process has been
completed in Africa, the substantive legacies of colonialism
stillendure(Mamadani,2002;Osterhammel,1997;Ekeh,1983,
1975). They are manifest in the form of imported and
transformed social structures, which today remain largely
unchanged. The failure of African States to adapt these
structures into African realities or to dismantle them, even in
the face of glaring opportunities at independence, has
remained a potent force in the neocolonial enterprise. Up
until today, as shown by its attributes of dependence,
legitimacy crisis, underdevelopment, Africa remains a
continentofcrisisandcontradiction(Osaghae,1999,Onimode,
1983). All efforts to address the situation by African leaders
have so far been feckless because the neocolonial
environment has been ably accommodated and enhanced by
theenduringlegaciesofcolonialism.Thisexplainswhytoday,
Africaremainsattheverynadirofdevelopment.
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AvailablestatisticsshowthatAfricaisreallyinadeep
crisis of development. As the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Developments Least Developed Countries 2002
report has shown, the proportion of people in 29 countries
livingbelow$2perdayincreasedfrom82%inthelate1960sto
87.5%inthe1990s.Forthoseinextremepoverty(under$1per
day),theincreasewasfrom55.8%to64.9%.Inabsolutefigure,
the number of Africans living in extreme poverty rose from
89.6millionto233.5millionoverthesameperiod.Also,ofthe
49countriesclassifiedasleastdevelopedcountries,33ofthem
are in subSaharan Africa (cf Ogwu, 2002:1819). Besides,
about 186 million people are chronically undernourished,
whileoneoutofeverythreeAfricanssuffersextremepoverty
(Onitiri,2001:5).Yet,Africaspercapitalincomeislowerthan
itwasinthe1960s.WiththeexceptionofSouthAfrica,average
percapital income in 1997 was $315; making Africa the
poorestpartoftheworld.ThetotalGDPofall48countrieson
thecontinentcombinedcametolittlemorethantheincomeof
Belgium. The average GDP of subSaharan African Countries
(excluding South Africa) is at about $2 billion, no more than
theoutputofatownof60,000peopleinarichcountry(Bush
andMohan,2001:149153).
The performance of African economy is also
deplorable. For the period 199597, the investment to GDP
ratio for SubSaharan Africa (SSA) was 17.8% compared to
34.8% for Asia, excluding Japan, and 20.9% for advanced
economies.Africasshareofworldtradehasdeclinedsteadily
over recent decades and today stands at 1%. According to
world bank estimates, Africas loss of market share in
merchandise exports over the period 197093 amounts to an
annual loss of about $68 billion, equivalent to about 21% of
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GDP (Akagwu, 2002:25). In terms of global private capital

flow,Africahasnotfaredbetter.Fortheperiod199197,SSAs
share of some $570 billion in cumulative flows of Foreign
DirectInvestment(FDI)toalldevelopingcountriesamounted
to a mere $23 billion, less than 5%, much of which was
concentrated in a small number of oil mineral exporting
countries (Akagwu, 2002:25). Out of this, Africas share
amounted to only 0.06% (UNDP, 1997:191).Whereas, Africas
foreign debt service payments were $31.1 billion in 1990, a
minimum of $24.0 billion in 1994 and $33.4 billion by 1997
(Onimode,2000:95).Theseweresmallproportionsofthetotal
Africandebt,whichwas$288.3billionin1990;$309.9billionin
1994;and$325.5billionin1996(Onimode,2000:108).
Intermsofdistributionofworldincome,Africahasnot
fared any better. Out of the total world income of $23,892.0
billion in 1993, Africas share was $311.5 billion, a mere 1.3%
andthelowestincomparativetermswithotherregionsofthe
world (Onimode, 2000:164). Africas term of trade between
1991 and 1998 was at all time negative, leading to chronic
current account deficit and balance of payments crisis for
Africancountries(onimode,2000:8283).
The frequency and intensity of conflict in Africa are
equallydeplorabletotheextentthatallpartsofthecontinent
haveengagedorarestillengagedinoneformofconflictorthe
other.Liberia,SierraLeone,BurundiandRwanda,Sudanand
Ethiopia, Somalia, Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo,
Cote Dvoire etc are prominent examples (Ntalaja, 2001:34).
These conflicts have had catastrophic implications for the
continent.Apartfromthemilitarizationofthesociety,military
expenditure, though a social burden, has in almost all cases
been greater than social expenditure (Rimmer, 1995:297).
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Africa has now become a dumping ground for arms and

ammunition. For instance, while Britain was reported to be
exporting$600m(aboutN78bn)worthofarmstoAfricaevery
year,theUS,theleadingarmstrader,exportedmorethan$14b
(N1,870bn) worth of military equipments to developing
countries (Daily Trust, June 23, 2002:1). Consequently, social
expendituresarenowbeensacrificedformilitaryexpenditure.
Moreover, the impact of conflict has been
preponderantly manifested in other areas such as the
productive sector, human lives, as well as refugees and
displacedpersons.Itwassuchthatby1997,1.06%ofthetotal
African population was either refugees or displaced persons
(Annan, 1997:1). By 1998, Africa accounted for over 8 million
of the 22 million refugees worldwide (Mills, 1999:3 cf Oche,
2000:79). The case of Rwanda and Burundi seems more
dramatic. Between 196364, 3,00010,000 Tutsi were killed;
150,000Tutsibecamerefugeesinalocalizedmassacre.In1972,
80,000200,000 Hutu were killed; 150,000300,000 Hutu
became refugees. In 1988, 200,000 Hutu were killed in
MarangaraandNtega;whileabout50,000becamerefugees.In
1994, 500,000800,000 Tutsi were killed nationally and about
105,000Tutsiturnedrefugees(SeeVictor,2001:184185).
Theseandotherrelatedissuessuchaspoorgovernance
and debt crisis, among others, depict the stark realities of
Africas developmental crisis (Ogwu, 2002:20). But as it has
been pointed out earlier, Africa is a continent with great
potentials for development. The abundance of both human
andmaterialresourcesofhighqualityatteststothis.Inspiteof
these, Africa remains at the nadir of development, owing
ostensibly to its forceful integration into the world capitalist
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economy (Berger, 2001:89394). Herein lies Africas

developmentparadox.

AfricanUnionasNewRegionalism
By all standards, the recent transition from OAU to
AU,asaresponsetothenewphaseofglobalization,qualifies
as new regionalism. This is because, the challenge of
globalization and the resurgence of ethnic particularization
require a coordination of macroeconomic policies on a
regional basis, calling for a monitoring of adjustment and
donorpoliciesataregionallevel,andforthestrengtheningof
these broader bodies as a response to domestic pressure for
autonomy(Asiwaju,1999;Bach,1999).Agbubuzu(2002)also
points out that the African Union is the inevitable historical
maturation of the ideas of panAfricanism and panAfrican
unity,whichgaverisetotheestablishmentoftheOAU.
Originally proposed by the Libyan Leader, Moammar
Al Qaddafi, as a more effective institution for increasing
prosperityinAfrica,theAUwasinitiatedonJune12,2000but
was formally established in September 2001, in Sirte
(Steinberg, 2001; Constitutive Act of the AU, 2000). Its
fundamental objectives corroborate the fact that it is new
regionalism. The AUs objective is to improve panAfrican
welfare and to provide Africans with a solid voice in
international affairs (Steinberg, 2001). More elaborately, the
ConstitutiveActprovidesinitsArticle3thattheobjectivesof
theUnionshallbeto:
(a)

Achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African

countriesandthepeoplesofAfrica.

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(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

(f)
(g)
(h)

(i)

(j)

(k)
(l)

(m)
(n)

June 2010

Defend sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence

ofmemberstates.
Accelerate political and socialeconomic integration of the
continent.
PromoteanddefendAfricancommonpositionsonissuesof
interesttothecontinentanditspeople.
Encourage international cooperation, taking due account of
the charter of the United Nations and the Universal
DeclarationofHumanRights.
Promotepeace,SecurityandStabilityonthecontinent.
Promote democratic principles and institutions, popular
participationandgoodgovernance.
Promote and protect human and peoples rights in
accordancewiththeAfricancharteronhumanandpeoples
rights.
Establish the necessary conditions which enable the
continenttoplayitsrightfulroleintheglobaleconomyand
ininternationalnegotiations.
Promote sustainable development at the economic, social
and cultural levels as well as the integration of African
economies.
Promote cooperation in all fields of human activity to raise
thelivingstandardsofAfricanpeoples.
Coordinateandharmonizethepoliciesbetweentheexisting
and future Regional Economic Communities for gradual
attainmentofobjectivesoftheUnion.
Advance the development of the continent by promoting
researchinallfields,inparticularinscienceandtechnology.
Workwithrelevantinternationalpartnersintheeradication
ofpreventablediseasesandthepromotingofgoodhealthon
thecontinent.

To this end, Article 4 of the Constitute Act spells out the

guidingprinciplesoftheUnionas:

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(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)

(i)
(j)
(k)
(l)
(m)
(n)
(o)

(p)

June 2010

Sovereign equality and interdependence among Member

StatesoftheUnion;
Respectofbordersexistingonachievementofindependence;
ParticipationofAfricanpeopleintheactivitiesoftheUnion;
Establishment of common defense policies for the African
continent;
PeacefulresolutionofconflictsamongMemberStates;
Prohibition of the use of force or threat to use force among
MemberStates;
NoninterferencebyMemberStatesintheinternalaffairsof
another;
The right of the Union to Intervene in a Member State
pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave
circumstances, namely: War Crimes, genocide and crimes
againsthumanity;
Peaceful coexistence of Member States and their rights to
liveinpeaceandsecurity;
TherightofMemberStatestorestorepeaceandsecurity;
Promotion of selfreliance within the framework of the
Union.
Promotionofgenderequality;
Respectfordemocraticprinciples,humanrights,theruleof
lawandgoodgovernance;
Promotion of social justice to ensure balanced economic
development;
Respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and
rejection of impurity and political assassination, act of
terrorismandsubversiveactivities;and
Condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional change of
governments.

AsprovidedforinArticle5oftheAct,theorgansoftheUnion
include:

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2.

June 2010

(a)
TheAssemblyoftheUnion;
(b)
TheExecutiveCouncil;
(c)
ThepanAfricanParliament;
(d)
TheCourtofJustice;
(e)
TheCommission;
(f)
ThePermanentRepresentativesCommittee;
(g)
TheSpecializedTechnicalCommittees;
(h)
TheEconomic,SocialandCulturalCouncil;
(i)
TheFinancialInstitutions;
OtherorgansthattheAssemblymaydecidetoestablish.

Thespecificfunctionsofeachoftheseorgansarewelldefined
(SeeArticles622oftheConstitutiveAct).
Deriving from the foregoing, the AU is indeed a new
regional effort designed to address Africas development
paradoxwithinthecontextofglobalization.Thishasbeenthe
focus of the Africa Development Forum (ADF) and the
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) as reflected in the
themesoftheirchainofconferences(SeeOyekanmi,2002:30).
Intermsofitsobjectives,principlesandorgans,theAU
differs substantially from its predecessor: the OAU. With
respect to its objectives, it excludes the OAUs goal of
eradicating colonialism but adds new objectives, particularly
thoseinArticle3(d,g,h,jandi).Concerningtheprinciples,the
AU excludes the OAUs principle of emancipating African
territories from colonial power. It however enlists new
principles, as contained in Article 4 (c,d,k,l,m,n, and p). The
organsoftheAUalsocontainnewinnovationsthatwerenot
part of the OAUs, as seen in Article 5 (c,d, and I) (See the
Constitutive Act, 2000; Steinberg, 2001; Soderbaum, 1996).
However, the headquarters remains at Addis Ababa, in the
FederalRepublicofEthiopia.
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June 2010

The pursuit of this renewed goal of panAfricanism

anddevelopmenthasbeenhingedontheNewPartnershipfor
Africas Development (NEPAD), as well as the emphasis it
placesonAfricanPeerReviewMechanism.Thebasicquestion
toaskthereforeisthathowadequatelyequippedisNEPADto
copewiththedauntingchallengesaheadofit?

NEPADasaViableMechanism?
The New Partnership for Africas Development
(NEPAD)asamechanismforachievingtheloftygoalsofAU
came into being incrementally. Its emergence was due to the
integration of the Millennium African Ranaissan Program,
Compact for African Recovery and the Omega Plan (Melber,
2002:12). At the initial stage, it was called New African
Initiative but it renamed NEPAD following a thorough
revisionofthedocumentbytheCommitteeofHeadsofStates
andGovernments.
TheobjectivesofNEPADarecontainedinitsArticle68
andinclude:
(a)

(b)

to achieveand sustainanaverage Gross DomesticProduct

(GDP) growth rate of above 7% per annum for the next 15
years;
toensurethatthecontinentachievestheagreedinternational
development goals, which according to Ogwu (2002:1314)
are:

(i)
Toreducetheproportionofpeoplelivinginextreme
povertybyhalfbetween1990and2015;
(ii)
To enroll all children of school age in primary
schoolsby2015;
(iii)
To make progress towards gender equality and
empowering women by eliminating gender
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June 2010

(iv)
(v)
(vi)
(vii)

(viii)

disparities in the enrolment in primary and

secondaryeducationby2005;
To reduce infant and child mortality ratio by two
thirdsbetween1990and2015;
Toreducematernalmortalityratiobythreequarters
between1990and2015;
To provide access for all who need reproductive
healthserviceby2015;and
To implement national strategies for sustainable
development by 2005, so as to reverse the loss of
environmentalresourcesby2015.

According to Ogwu (2002:14), the expected overall

developmentoutcomesoftheagreementinclude:

i.
ii.
iii.
iv.

Economic growth and development and increased

employment.
Reductioninpovertyandinequality
Diversification of productive activities, enhanced
internationalcompetitivenessandincreasedexports;and
IncreasedAfricanintegration.

Without a doubt, the foregoing reveals that NEPAD

was born out of the desire to rescue Africa from the
stronghold of underdevelopment which ravages the entire
continent. It places high premiums on trade and investment
through greater liberalization for enhanced Foreign Direct
Investment.
The viability of NEPAD as an instrument of AU has
elicited mixed reactions. While some see it in positive light,
somehavearguedtothecontrary(Animashaun,2002;Melber,
2001). For this paper, we contend that while NEPAD harbors
certain potentials for realizing the goals of AU, its prospects
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June 2010

are severely constrained by a number of factors. In others

words,itisinastateofvacillation.
For one, the use of the word partnership is
problematic.Intherealsenseoftheterm,partnershipentails:

A longterm commitment and reflects a condition of

mutual dependency where both client and
subcontractorsareinapositiontoinfluencetheother
by their behavior is a set of normative rules
determining what behavior is permissible and what
constitutesaviolationoftrust.Therulesaredesigned
tofacilitateexchangeinasituationotherwiseopento
exploitation(Lorenz,1989:189cfHarriss,2000:228)

Whatthissuggestsisthatpartnershiprequiressharing
of generalized norms of reciprocity, trust and guiding
principles. Partnership without these features may therefore
beinimicaltotheveryobjectivethatnecessitateditinthefirst
instance. Trust as we understanding it, in agreement with
Cambetta (1988:219), means believing that when offered the
chance, s/he is not likely to behave in a way which is
damagingtous(cfHarriss,2000:236).Theguidingprinciples
include congruence of mission, values and operating
principles; effectiveness; accountability; transparency;
mutuality; no hidden agenda; sustainability; minimizing
demands; maximizing distinctive competence; and realistic
timescales(Penrose,2000:24950).
Inrealistictermshowever,itisdoubtfulwhetherthese
basicunderpinningsofanysuccessfulpartnershiparepresent
intheframeworkofNEPAD.Whatwehaveseensofaristhe
desperation of a continent to go on begging. Couched in a
diplomatic language, the continent has intensified its search
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June 2010

for foreign aid in the forms of grants, debt cancellation and

rescheduling etc. The experience of African leaders in their
meetingwiththeG8bestillustratesthisfact.Ofthe$64billion
target, only $6 billion was granted in principle. Besides, the
issue of joint funding contained in the document was de
emphasized at the meeting (Omoweh, 2003:38). Instead,
emphasis was placed on trade, aid, and the development of
infrastructure which Omoweh (2003:38) referred to as the
usual position to Africas recovery. Whereas, nothing
fundamentalwasdoneaboutthelopsidednessofinternational
economic relations. As it stands today, the playing field in
international trade is not leveled. The World Trade
Organizations disposition towards Africa oscillates between
exclusionandmarginalization.
The point must be made that international economic
relations have no place for charity game. This explains why
aidattractssomeconditionality.Theassociatedconditionality
is obviously meant to ambush and neutralize the expected
benefitsfortherecipient.ApartfromthewoesoftheBreeton
WoodInstitutionsStructuralAdjustmentProgram;theGlobal
Coalition for Africa (GCA), offers another illuminating but
pathetic case. From its inception, the GCA has billed itself as
aninformalplatformforpolicydialogue,highlightingselected
issuesdeemedtomeritintensiveorfocuseddiscussionamong
policy makers than they generally occurred in that forum
(Harsh, 1996:6768; Hoeven, 2001). Indeed, empirical studies
have shown that the effects of aid on growth are not
necessarilypositive(GuillaumontandGhauvet2001:6687).
ThefactthatNEPADisbuiltaroundtheframeworkof
neoliberalismalsocallsforcircumspectionaboutitsprospect.
This is evident from its emphasis on liberalization for more
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June 2010

FDI.Thisisbecause,grantedthattheinternationaleconomyis
the framework in which the developmental process must
occur, there has not be a single case of successful
development arising from the interplay of free forces
(Bremen, 1992:99). Available evidence points to the fact that
liberalization lies at the heart of economic failings in less
developed states, (LDS) (Ogwu, 2002). While it is true that
trade liberalization could enhance the flow of FDI, as the
experienceofAfricaintheyear2002hasrevealedwhenitsFDI
reached an unprecedented rate of $17bn, nearly twice that of
2001 (Africa Recovery, (AR) Feb, 2003:8), caution must be
exercised in projecting the increase. On the surface, the
increase should be celebrated. But on a deeper reflection, it
gives cause for worry. For one, the figure amounts to
insignificantwhencomparedtoFDIflowsworldwide.Amore
fundamental concern is that its spread is not evenly
distributed,butisweightedinfavorofafewcountrieswhich
areeithermajoroilproducerslikeAngolaandNigeriaormore
industrialized nations such as South Africa and Morocco
(AfricaRecovery,Feb.2003:8).Moreover,theblanketwaveof
liberalizationinAfricalacksanysolidfoundationtoabsorbits
social,economicandpoliticalcosts.Evenatthat,Africasshare
ofworldtraderemainsatadismal2%andforeigninvestment
at1percent(seeSiddiq,2001:16;Daouas,2001:4).
Moreover, the almost immediate endorsement of the
project(NEPAD)bytheoutsideworld,inourownreasoning,
suggests the presence of internal loopholes that could be
exploited for their selfish interests. To be sure, NEPAD was
acceptedbythewestattheJune2002meetingofG8.Going
by record of events, it is most unlikely that the developed
world and its United Nations (UN) would support any
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June 2010

African initiative that would chart a genuine course of

development and autonomy for the continent. The reality is
that, as was the case with the Breeton wood Institutions (See
Campbel,2001:155),theinvolvementofextraAfricaninterests
in the new initiative would enable them to encroach on the
political terrain beyond their mandate. Signs have already
begun to manifest that the UN endorsement of NEPAD may
after all be a faade. In this sense, one wonders why the
establishmentofastructurethatwouldreviewandreporton
UN and International Support for NEPAD should be located
inNewYorkwithoutcreatingasubsidiaryofsuchstructurein
Africa.
Theforegoinghascastamajordoubtonitscredentials
as an African initiative. On the surface, such a claim may
appear credulous. But upon deeper reflection, there seems to
be more to it than meets the eye. Going by its neoliberal
framework and epitomized by its emphasis on liberalization,
deregulation, and aid, it may be correct to argue that it is
nothing more than the continuation of the Bretton Wood
InstitutionsImposedStructuralAdjustmentPrograminAfrica.
Again, the claim that it was an African initiative reveals the
hypocrisy inherent in previous claims, particularly the Lagos
plan of Action as African initiative. This amounts to self
indictment on the part of African leaders and the case of
NEPADmaynotbedifferent.Onlytimewilltell.

Most fundamentally, most African states do not have

thepoliticalwill,internallegitimacyandcapacitytocopewith
theresponsibilityimposedonthembythenewinitiative.That
somestateslackthewillhasbeenapparentlyrevealedbythe
attendant footdragging in signing the African Peer Review
Mechanism (APRM). The goal of APRM is to facilitate the
126

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June 2010

entrenchment of good governance. This was to be done by

getting African leaders to subject their governments to
ongoing examination by other Africans in such priority areas
as peace and security, democracy, political governance,
economic and corporate management. However, some feared
that it could threaten sovereignty by allowing outsiders to
pass judgment on national prerogatives (Sirleaf cf AR, Feb.
2003:1011). For some other leaders, APRM will be used by
the (nonAfrican development partners) to punish those who
fail to participate by withdrawal of assistance (AR, Feb
2003:11).Thisisaglaringmanifestationoflackoftrust,which
is detrimental to the success of any partnership. Besides,
recenteventssuggestthatAfricahasfailedthefirstlitmustest
for NEPAD. In this regard, we have in mind the indifference
orpoorresponseofAfricanleaderstotheZimbabweancrisis
over the reelection of Robert Mugabe and Land Reforms
Policy,eveninthefaceofglaringabuseofpowerandviolation
offundamentalhumanrights(seeNdulo,2002:3536).Thishas
castdoubtonwhetherAfricanleadershavethepoliticalwillto
implementtheobjectivesofNEPADfervently.
Thedimensionofinternallegitimacyismoredaunting.
ManyAfricanStateshadhadtocontendwiththeeruptionof
parallelforcescompetingwiththeStateoveritsmonopolyfor
the use of force. These were perhaps due to the economic
softness of the state and the nearcollapse of many states in
Africa. The cumulative effect is that the state in Africa is
massivelyincapacitatedtocopewiththechallengesofmodern
day government. The problem of succession remains another
potentsourceoflegitimacycrisisinAfrica.
Stemming from the foregoing, the ambitious role
placed on the state by the NEPAD initiative becomes
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June 2010

problematic. This is because most states in Africa lack the

capability to cope with such responsibilities. For it is a well
known fact that sustainable development cannot be achieved
inanenvironmentofcrippledstateswhich,paradoxically,has
been the reality of African states. The incident of poverty,
unemployment, decayed infrastructures, corruption etc. have
combined effectively to soften the economic strength of the
states in Africa. Consequently, there have been massive
explosion of violent conflicts across the continent, with
negativetollsondevelopmentandstatecapacity.Theinability
to find a peaceful solution to the crisis has made the state to
become excessively hard in the deployment of force on the
society. This has further widened the gap between the state
and societyin Africa. Rather than being partners in progress,
there is a seeming antagonism between the two. The
overarching implication of these for the success of NEPAD is
thattheyserveasdiversionaryforcesawayfromthesetgoals
asemphasiswouldbeshiftedtoconflictmanagementathigh
cost.
Moreover, one must be skeptical about the
actualization of the lofty goals of NEPAD in an environment
devoid of technological advancement, particularly in
industrial sector and information technology. This is more so
in this age of information technology, as the engine room of
globalization.
Again,theNEPADinitiativewouldappearnottohave
taken into consideration previous efforts, such as the Lagos
Plans of Action, as a precursor to identifying why such
initiative failed woefully. This is because like previous
regional development strategies, the NEPAD initiative was
unnecessarilytoostatecentric:statecentricinthesensethatit
128

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June 2010

was at the instance and prerogative of the government with

little or no consideration for the civil society. Even at the
governmental level, some governments have alleged of their
exclusion or marginalization to the initiative. Civil societies
haveprotestedvigorouslyaswell.Theimportofthesearethat
the NEPAD initiative might have not benefited from
widespreadconsultation,deliberationandconsensusandwas
tothatextentaspontaneousresponsebythepowerfulstates
in Africa to certain circumstantial incidents in the continent
and beyond. This poses a threat to its success, particularly
when one recalls the old line of division in Africa along
FrancophoneandAnglophonebases.
Yet,theenduringlegaciesofcolonialismposeaserious
threat. Not only are the social structures that were either
createdortransformedbycolonialismintact,thesocialization
process that African leaders were inducted into remains
largely unchanged (Ekeh, 1975, 1983; Ake 1978, 1981;
Mamdani, 2002). Moreover, the boundary lines inherited at
independence, though with disastrous economic, social and
humanconsequences(Bach,1999:44),hasnotbeenaltered.In
fact,oneoftheobjectivesofAUistopreservetheseboundary
lines.Aslongasthesealienstructuresconstitutetheplatform
uponwhichAfricasdevelopmentinitiativesandstrategiesare
anchored,alldevelopmenteffortsmayproveunproductive.
Bethatasitmay,thegloomypicturepresentedabove
should not be interpreted to mean the end of the road for
Africa. A number of factors obviously portend the possibility
ofarejuvenated/renaissanceAfrica,throughNEPAD.Forone,
the attention that NEPAD has generated from a wide specter
ofinterestsgivesnewhopesthatallmaynotbelostafterall.In
sharp contrast to old logic and practices, after the initial
129

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June 2010

failure, discourses and debates about NEPAD now transcend

theofficiallevelofthegovernmentsofvariousAfricanStates.
Of particular significance is the massive activism of Civil
Society Organizations (CSOs). Indeed, CSOs had never been
this active and virile in Africa save for the period of anti
colonialstruggles.Thisisahealthydevelopment.Conferences,
Seminars have constantly been organized by CSOs to assess
theviabilityofNEPADasaframeworkfortheactualizationof
Africas goal of development. Outcomes of such gatherings
havemostoftenconstitutedpolicyagendaforAfricanleaders.
The tendency for each African country to popularize
the agenda (NEPAD) in its territory is also a healthy
development.Bydoingso,opportunitiesarecreatedforfilling
the observed gap that the scheme was too formalistic and
devoid of popular participation. No matter how suspicious it
maybe, the global acceptance which NEPAD has received
strengthensitsprospect.Atleast,itconformstothegoalofthe
globalfightagainstpovertythroughthestrengtheningofgood
governance and partnership for development. This explains
whyitsemphasisongoodgovernancethroughAPRMshould
beseenasawelcomerelief,iffaithfullyimplemented.

ConcludingRemarks
In this paper, I have attempted to show that the
transitionfromOAUtoAUwasaresponsetothenewphase
of globalization, brought about by the postcold war realities
andthehelplessnessofthecontinent.Thepaperalsoattempts
to explain Africas development paradox, exemplified by her
poverty of plenty, a situation occasioned by the globalization
phenomenon. It was the effort to tackle this paradox that
necessitatedthebirthofNEPAD,asaninstrumentofAU.As
130

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June 2010

illustrated in the paper, the prospect of NEPAD is severely

constrained by forces such as the problematic of the word
partnershipinthiscontext;itsneoliberalunderpinnings;lack
ofstatecapacity,andpoliticalwillonthepartofsomeleaders
as well as the colonial legacies. Nevertheless, it has some
prospectsforsurvival.
If indeed AU must succeed through NEPAD, African
leaders would have to revisit the concept of partnership to
reflect its necessary conditions for success. Moreover, greater
emphasis must be placed on bridging the ever widening gap
between the rich north and poor south. This would require
redistribution of goods from richer to poorer parts of the
world on the basis of democratically developed/designed
development pact (Hoeven, 2001:109117; Grawforch,
2001:261266).
There is also an urgent need to revisit its neoliberal
theoreticalfoundation.Inthiscase,whatisrequiredistoward
off damaging competition from the developed world while
exploiting knowledge available elsewhere to save cost. This
must however be done with caution to avoid a deadly end.
Thus,thereisaneedtostrengthenprotectionismwithinternal
exertions towards development (Bremen, 1992:100). The
rationale is that Africa is at a different developmental
trajectorythantheadvancecountriesandtothatextent,highly
incapacitated to compete favorably with them in any entirely
openmarket.Africamustbemoreinwardlooking,ratherthan
theoverbearinglyrelyingonexternallyinduceddevelopment
strategies.Effortmustbemadetodeveloptheindustrialsector
and
information
technology.
This
requires
the
institutionalizationofgoodgovernanceandstrengtheningthe
currentwaveofdemocratizationinAfrica.
131

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June 2010

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Pan-Africanism and the State of PoliticoEconomic Integration in Southern Africa

Dr.LereAmusan4
The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the colour-line
- the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and
Africa, in America and the islands of the sea
W.E.B. Du Bois, 1900.1
Abstract
Socio-politico-cultural, economic and strategic realities of the
southern African sub-region of Africa brought about the need
for the coming together of its member states, though
amorphous in the formation, to address their common
overarching economic problem in South Africa. The
geographic, economic and colonial factors in the sub-region
prior to the 20th century, formed a series of politico-economic
and security implications. The same cemented the first
generation of the sub-region political elite together to wage
liberation war against first Portuguese colonial domination of
Angola and Mozambique, second Rhodesia (Zimbabwean)
and third, South Africa. The offshoot of this anti-colonial and
the anti-apartheid systems are linked with the zeal at which
4

Dr. Lere Amusan holds his doctorate degree from the University
of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa. He is currently with the
Department of Political Science and International Relations, Osun
State University, Osogbo, Nigeria.
P. M. B. 2008, Okuku, Osun State.
E: Mail: Lereamusan@gmail.com
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the DuBoisian prophecy affected Ghana under Kwame

Nkrumah in fighting against colonialism and racism in Africa.
The liberation of southern African Lusophone states and
Zimbabwe (the perceived economic giant in the sub-region)
brought about the formation of a politico-economic group: the
Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference
(SADCC). The germaneness of forming a united front against
white racism and an urge to foster economic development
amongst the member states against economic dependence on
the Pretoria government during the apartheid regime loomed
large in its formation. The end of the apartheid system and
eventual coming to power of the African National Congress
(ANC) in South Africa elicited another hegemonic rivalry in
the newly created Southern African Development Community
(SADC) to accommodate South Africa. Political rivalry
between Harare and Pretoria led to the incorporation of the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as a member of the
politico-economic organization. The political, economic and
strategic implications of the African Renaissance, another
fashion of Pan-Africanism that is tacitly rejected by some
SADC states as South Africas grand-design to economically
and socio-politically dominate them, is an issue that students
of southern African politics still contend with.
Introduction
Political developments in the southern African sub-region
during the colonial era could have been the main factor that
contributed to the longevity of minority regimes in the area.
Geographically and historically, the area through the East and
Central African regions is the main theater of colonial and
apartheid dominations. In terms of climatic factors, the areas
with Mediterranean like climates are conducive for the
Europeans who came to Africa for various reasons, but
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primarily for economic exploitation. There is a lot of literature

that traces the coming of the white to the shores of Africa,
mostly from the Netherlands, Germany, Portugal, Belgium,
Italy, Spain and Britain. Because of the climatic conditions of
southern Africa, the small impact of the winds of change that
blew across the continent against foreign domination were felt
in the political arrangement of the sub-region. The colonial
struggle in the Lusophone states, Namibia and Zimbabwe
prolonged liberation wars that were supported by the two
ideological and incompatible blocs of the East and the West.
The need to fight against color discrimination and political
liberation of blacks at the global level brought about the
formation of the Pan-African movement.
The Pan-African movement was formed toward the
end of the 19th century with the aim of fighting against the
color bar against blacks in America. Pan-Africanism, according
to Immanuel Wallestein (1961: 103), is a loose term and covers
several different movements. It came about to address three
major issues: first, as an avenue for the black Americans and
West Indies to fight against racial discrimination and to trace
their roots back to Africa; Second, it was used to support the
political agitation of African nationalists immediately after the
World War II; and third, it was used as a weapon to fight
against racial subjugation in the southern African states and to
establish a supranational states.2 The last point is the main
departure of our concern.
Between 1919 and 1945, five Pan-Africanist conferences
were organized by W.E.B. Du Bois, who is now regarded as
the father of pan-Africanism. The 1945 conference could be
said to be the most provoking one because some of the latter
nationalists from Africa participated in the conference and the
same continued to influence their attitudes towards
colonialism in Africa. Some of the participants from Africa,
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such as Kwame Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyata, Obafemi Awolowo

and H.O. Davies (Davies 1989: 123), went back to their
respective countries to fight against colonial domination. They
later received political independence for their states. In a bid
to forge political and economic cooperation among African
states, Kwame Nkrumah sponsored, with the help of George
Padmore, a Trinidadian, All-African Peoples Organisation
(AAPO) and the Conference of Independent of African States
(CIAS) in 1958 to further agitate for the political liberation of
Africa.
This had a direct impact upon South African politics.
South Africa was invited to the conference of Independent
African states, but it refused to attend because colonial powers
in Africa were excluded. Not attending the conference was an
attempt to continue its political and economic grip in South
West Africa (Namibia). No other region in Africa (except
perhaps, North Africa Algeria) became involved in intensive
liberation wars against the European in Africa other than
southern Africa.
The use of force against colonialists can be traced to the
fifth Pan-Africanism Congress (1945) which called for the use
of armed conflict to decolonize Africa if the European states
refused to grant political freedom to the colonial states.
Moreover, the genesis of Pan-Africanism can be traced to
events in 1887 in Philadelphia and Boston that transformed
into the Free African Society and the Free African Lodge.
These moves were solidified through the London conference
of July 1900 which called for the independence of the African
and West Indies colonies. The conference specifically
addressed a protest letter to the Queen of England, Victoria,
about the treatment of African blacks in South Africa and
Rhodesia (Ajala 1998: 63).

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The South Africa sub-region did not experience a

smooth transition to political independence. This is because of
the complex interdependent nature of the region and, in
particular, the influence of South Africa. Rhodesia, Angola,
Mozambique and South West Africa entered into wars of
liberation against their colonial metropolis. This was against
the relatively smooth transitions in Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi,
Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland (who formed core members of
the frontline states against South Africa) and the DRC. Because
guerilla warfare was occurring in these states, issues of PanAfricanism acquired a firm root as a result of the solidarity
support they received from other members of the Frontline
States. In particular, Pan-Africanism issues benefited from the
influence of Zambia and Tanzania. South Africas war of terror
against the frontline states brought about the formation of the
SADCC to monitor economic and political developments
among the member states. However, this association could not
achieve much in the area of economic development because of
Pretorias anti-liberation posture that resulted from the
economic sabotage of member states. The post-Cold War
period brought about the independence of Namibia and the
eventual democratization of South Africa. The implication of
this was the re-admission of South Africa to the comity of
nations against its pariah status. This admission had both
positive and negative impacts on the sub-region. It provided
military as well as relative political and economic stability to
the area. Pretorias intention to remain as the only credible
hegemonic power in the sub-region continues to affect the
economic development of the region. Suspicion by the other
members of the organization in terms of the holistic concept of
security is germane in their uneasy relationship. This will last
for some time to come because of the complex interdependent

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relationship in southern Africa in which South Africa and

perhaps Zimbabwe have enormous roles to play.
This paper is divided into eight parts. Part one is the
general introduction. Part two focuses on the theoretical
explanation of the problem at hand. Part three examines the
political and economic development in the sub-region during
the colonial era. Parts four and five discuss political and
economic relations between 1960 and 1990. Parts six and seven
look into SADC military, political and economic relations with
the member states. Finally, part eight is the conclusion.
2. COMPLEX INTERDEPENEDENCE THEORY
Because international politics is a parasitic discipline that
hinges on so many other subjects, in most cases, one theory is
not adequate to analyze South African international relations
(Garnett 1984:27-50). Because of this problem, this papers
intension is to employ the interdependence theory with an
emphasis on the complex interdependence theory in analyzing
the relationship between South Africa and the rest of the
southern African states.
Main futures of complex interdependence:
1. There are multiple channels of interaction such as
inter-states of realist school; trans-government
relations, where the input of different government
department and various parastatals play a vital role in
communalizing states relations; and transnational nonstate actors such as liberation movements, religious
movements, trade unions, multinational corporations
and the likes equally play vital roles.
2. There is an absence of a hierarchical system where
issues of high and low politics are less relevant. This
thesis is of the belief that the military, politics,
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3.

4.

5.

6.

June 2010

economics, society and cultural play prominent roles at

different times, depending on issue at hand.
There is what one could term as unity and inclusion.
That is, all member states in a system are sensitive to
actions and inactions of any member states either on
domestic or foreign policy issue.
The degree of vulnerability to member policies
depends on the import of goods and services
contributed by the said state to the system. It has little
to do with the level of political, economic and social
developments of the other members in question.
It erodes the notion of total autonomy and sovereignty
of different units to the whole system. More emphasis
is placed on sharing of sovereignty on three levels:
international
legal,
Westphalian/Vatellian
and
domestic (Krasner 2004:88, 1999:9-25).
Military power can be employed only as a last resort
when the leitmotif of a state is in danger. It is also
relevant when supranational organizations, such as
SADCC and SADC use it to preserve stability in a
designated area or to fight against non-members of a
system.

In social sciences, a theory may not be adequate to analyze

states relations and behaviors. For the purposes of this paper,
futures of integration theory like the absence of force and
coercion and the use of collective action to promote mutual
interests are equally prominent with complex interdependence
theory (Evans & Newnham 1998:254).
Interdependence means that changes or events in any
single part of a system will (sensitive effect) produce some
reaction from or have some significant consequence on other
actors of the system whether they like it or not (Russet & Starr
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1992:439). Keohane and Nye (1987:364) believe that the need

for interdependence could be couched from the need to
achieve all what could not be realized in isolation. It
emphasizes the links or interconnectedness among the units of
a system. Such links may affect both the opportunities of states
and the willingness of decision makers to act. These links can
be likened to economic, political or social incremental
integration. As much as this can generate stability,
predictability, regularity, unity, growth and development, it
can also breed frustration, anger, instability, competition and
conflict. It may be asymmetrical where one of the units
(usually the centre) in a system tends to benefit more than the
others (periphery states). However, when it is symmetric (an
ideal type that hardly met), it connotes that members mutually
benefit and consequently, less of conflict arises among the
members (Keohane & Nye 1987:365).
Due to the high degree of interdependence in all facet
of international relations, there are some elements of
sensitivity among states in the whole system where action or
inaction of a member state affect others, at least in the short
term. Therefore, all state in a designated system are sensitive
to changes in the rules of transaction; regardless of if they are
policy, social or economic changes. On the other hand and in
the long term, vulnerability may be the type of relationship.
This is a scenario whereby there is unequal exchange
(asymmetrical relationship) in a system under consideration.
In some cases when a state is vulnerable to others policies (the
inability of state A to absolve the cost B imposed on it due to
its internal or foreign policy) the vulnerability could lead to
conflict and the use of military power. The most vulnerable
states are not necessarily the most sensitive ones (Keohane &
Nye 1987: 368).

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Increases in the interconnectedness of states not only

bring the concept of sovereignty into question, but it also
questions the existence of international relations and causes
transnational relations to be viewed more as relations amongst
states that have gone beyond state-centric decision making.
The movement of goods, ideas and information across borders
without significant, direct participation or control by highlevel governmental actors of which states have no control
over (Russett & Starr 1992:443) signifies a need to revisit the
relevance of international relations. The permeability of state
brings into prominence the import of Non-governmental
Organizations (NGOs). Even at the government level, subnational actors (part of bureaucracy) do relate with their
counterparts from other state without the knowledge of
national government (mostly on highly sensitive security
matters).
Unlike the realists school of thought, where military
security and the use of force are important, the autonomy
dilemma scenario makes states consider the input of non-state
actors (liberation movements) in policy-making, making them
to be vulnerable to each other. Worth nothing is that the issues
that are central to the interdependence thesis are not static;
therefore, strict hierarchical system of high and low politics
believed by the realist school is not attainable in the complex
interdependence school. Military capability of a state is not
fungible in achieving socio-cultural, political and
psychological interdependence (Russett & Starr 1992:445).
Domestic politics or economics can influence international
economics and politics and vice versa, the degree of sensitivity
and vulnerability are the only things that differ.
As mentioned above, the use of military means to
achieve state objectives has changed from state-to-state
activities and has come to impact non-state actors such as
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terrorist movements, guerrilla fighters, supranational

organizations, international organizations and transnational
institutions. Although the West perceives the activities of
terrorist movements as horrendous, states continue to
recognize their importance in international relations and
therefore, have links with them through negotiation. For
instance, South Africa engaged ANC in secret talk before
Mandela was released from prison (Mandela 1994: 452-3).
Externality in the complex interdependence theory,
unlike the private goods where the law of supply and demand
determines its availability, addresses peoples choices and the
way those choices harm and benefit others (Russett & Starr
1992:451-2). This brings this study into what are termed as
collective goods. This describes when member states equally
benefit either positively or negatively on supplied goods, that
is, the unity and inclusiveness of the supply (Russett & Starr
1992:453). There is another type of interdependence termed
vulnerability or forcedrider where the cost of collective goods
supplied by a member state is forced on all members in a
system. Although there are some pockets of conflicts among
the states, there is still a need for them to come together for
collective goods. Another problem associated with
interdependence is what is called the tragedy of the common
which brings ruin to all.3 It also makes states ignore their
responsibilities as the member states will always seek to
maximize their share of the common goods, even when their
supply is limited. Having examined the theory of complex
interdependence, the next section shall address the suitability
of the theory in assessing the political economy of the southern
African states in the apartheid and the post apartheid
relationship.
Colonial Era and Politico-Economic Cooperation in Southern
Africa
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It is the belief of some scholars of African politics that the

leitmotif of pan-Africanism was the need to establish economic
cooperation among the member states. In East Africa, the
nationalists rejected federation of states imposed on them by
the colonialists because of the likely domination of the settlers
in the political arrangement of the post-colonial states. Instead
of this, they opted for the Pan-African Freedom Movement of
East and Central Africa (PAFMECA). Julius Nyerere prefers to
delay the political independence of Tangayika (Tanzania) until
the two other East African states (Uganda and Kenya) receive
their independence from Britain. This move can be viewed as
an aspect of pan-Africanism. As much as this thesis holds
water for economic integration in Africa in general, other
nationalists, such as Kwame Knrumah, did not understand it
in the same way. He instead called for political independence
first before other things will be given. In southern Africa, the
scenario is an admixture of economic and political integration.
The three High Commission Territories of Basutholand
(Lesotho), Bechanaland (Botswana) and Swaziland governed
from the United Kingdom Colonial office refused
incorporation into the Union of South Africa. As early as 1903,
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS) became members of
the Southern African Custom Union (SACU). The economic
implications of that were that member states shared a common
currency and monetary policy. The South African Reserve
Bank (SARB) was their central banker. Proceeds from exports
of member states were in the hands of South Africa, and they
imported almost all their goods for survival from the
apartheid government (Blumenfeld, 1992:109-118). Any
negative perceptions of the BLS countries by South Africa
implied starvation and political instability. Politically, South
Africa found it easy to install a trusted friend as a leader in
any of the three states. This contributed to the neutrality of
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Botswana in the power politics of and the anti-apartheid

struggle in the region (Amusan 2006: 117-8). This was a result
of the geographical peculiarity of the sub-region. For instance,
Lesotho is a landlocked state like the other two states but,
most importantly, it only shares territory only South Africa.
The same thing affected political development in the colonial
Franco-central African states where DRC, a member of the
SADC belongs geographically.
France was conscious of the African nationalists
movement towards amalgamation of colonial states. Paris
made it a policy to disintegrate these states for its economic
exploitation. This could have caused political instability
immediately after the DRC received its independence from
Belgium. Belgium had ruled DRC as a unitary state with some
administrative decentralization. The intension of the Belgian
government was to continue its economic exploitation of the
territory with the aim that the federal system of the state, with
its attendant on economic disarticulation, would plunge
Kinshasa into political instability (Ake 1981: 43-4). While
planning another fashion of Pan-African system by the Belgian
government, France was of the view that disintegration of the
states would further its economic motive therefore, Joseph
Kasavubu was encouraged to form Bakongo separatist
movement (Wallerstein 1961: 113). As much as the colonialists
differ in the unity of Africa, they did not encourage a
federation that would cut across colonial language and
demarcation spheres.
One of the lapses of the 1945 Manchester PanAfricanists movement was its concentration on political
freedom without linking the same with economic
development in the African states. This, ironically, was
corrected in the case of the southern African states because of
the South African apartheid system, which gave little room for
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independent coterminous states to develop economically

outside the tutelage of Pretoria.
The impact of liberation movements that were tied to
the apron string of the OAU Liberation Committee was
another means of cooperation among various movements.
After the 1958 conferences in Ghana and the eventual
formation of the OAU, with a united focus on decolonization
and anti-apartheid struggle by the organization, a special fund
was created by the continental political organization to
disburse funds and overlook political, social and military
developments amongst various movements in their respective
sanctuaries. Expectedly, there tends to be a conflict of interests
among the unwieldy movements. It was the duty of the OAU
Committee on Liberation to maintain unity through the use of
good offices among member states. With this, some of these
movements not only received military training in various
African states, but they also received training from the former
Soviet Union, China and North Korea. The implication of this
was that the friendships they established during their war of
liberation helped them establish common economic and
political institutions to further their general development.
Another plus in the formation of economic groupings
in the sub-region is their common cultural heritage that
straddles language and commerce. The Nguni language,
which cut across many states in southern Africa made the
coming together of the member states comparatively smooth.
The Ndebele, SeSwathi, MoSotho, SeTwana and SeZulu are
common languages in South Africa that are widely spoken
and highly interrelated. Because Swahili is spoken in the states
of Tanzania and Zambia, many of the guerilla fighters who
spent a portion of their military training in either of the two
states were well versed in Swahili. Liberation movements
turned political parties after independence, expectedly form a
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united front in fighting against apartheid system. Therefore,

the coming together of the South West Africa Peoples
Organization (SWAPO), the Zimbabwe African National
Organization Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), the Movimento
Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) and the Liberation
Front of Mocambique (FRELIMO) against South Africa was
total.
Politico-Economic Relations from 1960s
Despite the volume of economic relations between South
Africa and its neighbors, the issue of politics continues to be a
scar in their relationship. The impact of Pan-Africanism on the
leaders of the southern African states of Rhodesia and South
Africa played more of a role in determining their economic
and political interactions. Though it is well established that the
degree of interdependence between the two camps cannot be
ignored, the ideological dependence of the camps leads them
to enact harsh and irrational policies towards each other. This
is in contrast to the amount of financial, trade and labor that
flows to and from the two camps. A lack of concrete
institutional framework to regulate Pretoria and its neighbors
relationships causes instability. The involvement of extra
South Africa in the internal affairs of Pretorias system led to
massive retaliation and to an export of conflict to the whole
region. South Africas coterminous states political objective
was to promote liberation movements interest against
minority regimes in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa.
This led to a sense of responsibility as brothers keeper
according to the tenet of Pan-Africanism. This was in the form
of political, financial and military support in waging war
against South Africa and its puppets in Zimbabwe (Ian Smith),
Namibia (Uniao National para a Independencia Total de
Angola, UNITA and Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola,
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FNLA), Mozambique (Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana,

RENAMO) and Angola. The support that the neighboring
states received from the Eastern bloc allowed South Africa to
retaliate through total strategy and introduced securocratic4
government as a response to total onslaught on the rest of
southern Africa. This takes many forms such as blitzkrieg,
sponsoring opposition movements against status quo
governments and importation of the capitalist states to support
anti-communist intrusion in the sub-region.
South Africas employment of alternative movements
against her neighboring states paid off as the same movements
were used to cause internal instability and a high degree of
dependence on the South African goods and services. The
activities of the Pretoria government through its protgs,
UNITA and RENAMO, led to the closure of Lobito, Beira,
Benguela and Nacala routes, which in turn caused Zambia,
Tanzania, Mozambique and Zimbabwe to experience certain
political and economic disadvantages. The implication of this
was that South Africa would have more revenue from
unfriendly states because the perceived littoral states of
Tanzania, Mozambique and Swaziland were denied access to
their ports. It also brought about political understandings
because of the way economic and transport diplomacy was
craftily employed by South Africa. The only option, according
to the above theory of interdependence, was to rely on the
good will of South Africa for the importation and exportation
of goods and services (Green & Thompson 1986: 245-80). The
need to find a catholicon to this development was the
formation of the SADCC by the frontline states in the form of
what this paper regards as micro Pan-Africanism with the aim
of furthering the objectives of the AAPO and CIAS founded by
Kwame Nkrumah.

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Economic and Political Roles of SADCC

South Africas desire to create a constellation of states in
southern Africa was dashed immediately when Zimbabwe
received its political independence through liberation war. It
was the opinion of Zimbabwe that it should regain its lost
glory as a result of the Ian Smiths Unilateral Declaration of
Independence (UDI) from Britain in 1965. With the formation
of SADCC and mostly with the involvement of the perceived
liberal southern African states of Botswana, Malawi,
Swaziland and Lesotho in the anti-South Africa these moves
were considered to be unfriendly acts which needed to be met
with military might. Among the intensions of the SADCC was
the need to further the aims and objectives of the Pan-African
leaders, that is, to fight against minority rule and to abhor
racial discrimination in Namibia and South Africa.
With the need for gradual political and economic integration
of Africa pronounced, one of the cardinal objectives of the
Frontline states became to abide by the UN Economic
Commission for Africas call for sub-regional economic
cooperation with subsequent Africa Union in future. If this
was the aim of the SADCC during its formative years, the
issue of politics, which some scholars would term as
inconsistent with economic ideas should not come to fore. To
what extent this could be argued for is a matter of academic
conjecture. This paper holds that an iota of economic move has
some political undertone. This is the main departure of this
section where we are to argue that admixture of politics and
economics are involved in the formation of SADCC. Despite
the organizations political power in attracting international
solidarity and developing financial assistance against South
Africas incessant incursion to the member states territory, it
was not well equipped to serve as a hob in actualizing the
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member states foreign policy against Pretoria. This is because

of the geography of the sub-region. Lesotho, Botswana and
Swaziland (BLS) instead advocated for a reduction in their
degree of dependence on the apartheid state. Economic
dtente between BLS and South Africa is understandable
because of their geographical reality. The Lesotho Highlands
Water project with South Africa, Botswana and South Africa
Multinational Corporation (MNC) and De Beers, in
exploration of the states diamond and juicy incentives to
attract investment from South Africa by Swaziland are central
to the very survival of these states. Zimbabwe and Zambia are
two states that perceived their economic relationship as
negative interdependence in favor of South Africa. They opted
for Pan-African anti-apartheid stance.
Dissociation costs on Frontline states were so vast that
they could not survive without Pretoria government. For
many of these states, the degree of their dependency on South
Africa, in form of both visible and invisible trade, in
investment and other financial flows, in labor services and in
infrastructures and institutions, was too precious to ignore
(Blumenfeld 1992: 114). These variables put the member states
in a corner where a comprehensive sanction5 as advocated by
the organization black civil society in South Africa,
Scandinavian countries and the communist states would want
them to be. Malawi as a member of SADCC, for instance was
contradictory. Its diplomatic relations with South Africa
signified the extent to which the member states could not put
their foot down on subjecting the apartheid enclave to a pariah
status. Comparatively, the cost of their dissociation with
Pretoria was higher than South Africas. For instance, South
Africa embarked on transport diplomacy against recalcitrant
states such as Zimbabwe and Zambia. With Pretoria
sponsoring insurgencey within Mozambique and Angola
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railway systems, the major means of transportation and the

link to the international environment was disrupted. Thus,
because of sabotage (bombing) and wars in Angola and
Mozambique, the SADCC states could not make use of these
routes. This forced them to come to term with South Africa,
since it became a matter of life-or-death.
The collapse of ideological war in the international
system had a direct impact on the political arrangement of the
sub-region. This took the form of dissolution of the apartheid
system, as Mandela and his co-jailer were released
unconditionally. The liberation movements turned political
parties in South Africa were unbanned. Before this, another
political milestone was registered as Namibia received her
formal independence from South Africa. These developments
brought about a Tsunami of political changes, specifically in
southern Africa By 1992, SADCC started to revisit their stance
on its future relationship with South Africa. In August of the
same year, members of the SADCC met in Windhoek, the
Namibian capital, and signed a Treaty and Declaration of
SADC. Most important in this political and economic
calculation was the need to integrate South Africa to the
SADCC for economic development of the sub-region. In
August 1994, South Africas accession to SADC brought about
a need to focus more on the economic development of
southern Africa.
SADC as a Step away from the Pan-African Concept
The formation of SADC was not as smooth as the
establishment of SADCC for various reasons. Personality
problems between Nelson Mandela and Robert Mugabe
dictate to some extent, the degree of tardiness in actualizing
the establishment of the regional integration. Reasons for these
are not too difficult to fathom. Mugabe held that the new
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southern Africa economic and political arrangement would be

tailor-made to suit his personal hegemonic ambition in the
sub-region. At the same time, he wanted to regain the lost
glory of Rhodesia that resulted from the illegal Ian Smith UDI
government. On the other hand was South Africas to remain
the only credible power in southern Africa based upon
international relations attributes of power. This development
was not only against the initial ambition of Pan-Africanists of
the unity of Africa, but it also reflected the conservative ideas
of the ilk of Nigeria (Tafawa Balewa), francophone African
states, save Guinea Bissau (Sekou Toure), Liberia and DRC
(Mobutu Sese Seko) conception of Africa. Division of power in
the sub-region, with more emphasis on security matters, also
formed the crux of the disagreement between Pretoria and
Harare. All these are going to receive some justification in the
analysis of the post-apartheid southern African politics.
Two major schools of thought were developed from
the integration procedure in southern Africa. One championed
by the moderates was that the issue of economic and political
relationships between member states should be on the stage of
the ladder of integration on which participants progress from a
preferential trade area to a free trade area before proceeding to
a custom union. Participants then shift from a common
market to economic union, before finally achieving political
union (Bertelsmann 1998: 178). On the other hand was the
radical school that advocates for political union to be
addressed before other issues. The Pan-Africanists who were
ready to forgo their states sovereignty for a political union
maintain the second position. This position is not applicable in
southern Africa because of the way these states received their
political independence from various colonialists. Perhaps the
Lusophone states of Angola and Mozambique could venture
into this idea but South Africa and Zimbabwe, which are the
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main players in the SADC, are not ready for any arrangement
that would change the existing status quo. The politics
involved in the formation of the SADC confirm the mutual
suspicion that exists between the two giants and credible
states in maintaining balance of power and terror at the subregional level.
Admission of DRC as a member of the sub-regional
organization, despite its location in central Africa, could be
explained by Zimbabwes urge to check the perceived
preponderant power of South Africa. This was despite
Kinshasas political history in southern Africa during the Cold
War period against progressive liberation movements. South
Africa intension in admitting DRC also could not be too far
from the need to exploit the untapped natural resources of the
state to further economic dominance of Pretoria in the subregion. Therefore, DRC membership was interpreted by the
two states as a means of furthering both political and
economic objectives.
Development integration continues to be the preferred model
of the members relationships against the political intension of
the SADCC states in dislodging apartheid system in South
Africa and Namibia. Therefore, the focus on trade and
development of infrastructural amenities that eluded the
member states because of Pretoria national strategy against its
coterminous states needed special focus. As much as Maseru
Trade Protocol was drafted by the member states for
liberalization of trade, there are some cogs to the achievement
of this according to the Development Bank of Southern Africa
(c.f. Bertelsmann 1998:181):
Its failure to provide for differential treatment for least
developed countries;

156

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Its emphasis on tariff barriers to trade when they are not the
main obstacles to intra-regional trade;
The absence of provisions to address supply-side measures;
The call for the immediate national treatment of goods and
services traded within the region;
Its attempt to create policy harmonization when it is not
required from Free Trade Area (FTA);
The treatment of relationships of member states with other
regional groupings;
Inadequate provisions to foster equitable industrial
development in the region;
The absence of compensatory mechanisms; and
Its failure to address adequately prevailing trade imbalances
in the region.
Because of the inadequacies of the principle of tariff problems
to the development of the trade within the region, the
Southern African Bank further proposed some solutions to the
economic backwardness of the member states that usually
create trade diversion for other members and trade creation
for South Africa. The Bank therefore focuses on the need for
equitable industrial development in the member states after
addressing the following snags to industrialization:
Small size of domestic markets;
Poor ability to absorb new technologies;
Lack of technical skills;
Lack of product and market diversification;
Low investment;
Lack of harmonized tariff liberalization; and
Widespread poor infrastructural development in the region.
Despite the above-mentioned problems associated with the
economic integration of some of the routes that were
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sabotaged during the liberation wars and apartheids desire to

form a constellation of states.
The Beira Corridor, linking Harare with the port of Beira in
Mozambique for the transportation of mineral resources and
agricultural products;
The Benguela Corridor, linking Angola to the copper mines in
the south of the DRC and Zambia;
The Malanje Corridor with intension of developing rail system
in Angola;
The Nacala Corridor connecting Mozambique to Malawi and
Zambia for the exploitation of mineral resources such as
copper;
The Namibe Corridor to Menongue in Angola for the active
transportation of Luanda natural minerals; and
The Tazare Corridor connecting Tanzania, Zambia, DRC and
Angola
It should be pointed out that according to some political and
economic analysts, the need to develop these areas could be
linked to South Africas desire to control the mineral resources
of the SADC members. For instance, the development of the
Maputo Corridor is being viewed as an attempt to make South
Africas manufactured goods available to its coterminous
states to the east and north-east. The development of gigantic
shopping malls along the route are not to satisfy the South
African in the area, but as a means to create more jobs in the
state as long as Swathis and Mozambicans would patronize
these shopping complexes in Nelspruit and Malelane. The
Corridor was constructed by private concession on Build,
Operate and Transfer (BOT) where it would not only benefit
South African companies. Issues of security loom large in
consolidating economic development. In achieving this, the

158

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problem of security comes into prominence as discussed

below.
Holistic Approach to the Concept of Security in SADC
Region
The remaining security issues in the post-Cold War
international system continue to reverberate in the mind of
government officials, policy analysts, mass media and NGOs.
In the post Soviet Union, the issue of security has transcended
the military sphere where the size of the standing army and
weapons of mass destruction are the sine qua non to power in
international politics. Although, as this paper will latter
address, military security remains one of the contemporary
conflict problems in Africa for a variety of reasons.6 The
political mistrust between Zimbabwe and South Africa led to a
misunderstanding at the SADC, where the two should instead
acted as leaders for the other members to emulate. The initial
political problems emanated from the issue of the Organ on
Politics, Defense and Security (the Organ). Mugabe wanted the
Organ to be independent of the SADC as a security
organization. Ironically, he was the chairperson of the Organ
at the time, while Mandela was the chairperson of the SADC
at the same time (1996). Because of the security implication of
the Organ to the stability of the southern African region,
Mugabe wanted to hold onto the security, and left the political
and economic spheres to South Africa. The insistence by
Mandela that the Organ was an integral part of the whole
SADC triggered a crisis and a lack of trust between the two
states. In order for Mugabe to entrench his political influence
in the region, he formed an unholy alliance with some SADC
member states to strengthen the Laurent Kabila government in
the DRC. Angola and Namibia joined Zimbabwe in the war
against the anti- status quo in the DRC for various reasons,
which are examined elsewhere (Amusan, 1999: 27-34). Despite
159

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this, South Africa and Zimbabwe appreciated the need to

cooperate for the general development of the sub-region,
realizing that the negative effects of any unpopular policy
would have a direct effect on their respective states stability.
To curb this, spheres of influence were carved out for
themselves and probably to work towards the general
development of the sub-region and by extension Africa in
general. While South Africa was in charge of finance and
investment, Zimbabwe was asked to coordinate food,
agriculture and natural resources sectors on behalf of the
SADC (Van Wyk, 1999:79).

Conclusion
While Africa needs political and economic development, the
personal ambition of some of their leaders continues to
militate against it. This is exactly what is affecting the southern
African sub-region. The zeal at which the liberation
movements united would have moved the sub-region forward
in the form of general development despite the fact that in
some instances they failed to agree on issues because of
ideological differences. The introduction of globalization
imposed on SADC members by various international financial
institutions gave them a little room to maneuver in terms of
homegrown politico-economic development in line with the
founding fathers of Pan-Africanism. The need to open the
market for international exploitation not only killed the
DuBoisian model of Pan-Africanism, but it also exposed the
sub-region to what Amechi Okolo (1986) terms as
Dependency: the Highest Stage of Capitalist Domination.
South Africa, a capitalist state from its inception, rejuvenates
the concept of Africa Renaissance. However, the commitment
to the rebirth of Africa is not in line with the state policy
160

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June 2010

towards the SADC. This explains why the rest of the member
states continue to perceive Pretoria as an exploitative
hegemonic power that only looks after the interest of its sociopolitico-economic development at the disadvantage of the
other states. Its intension of absorbing the BLS and Namibia
economically during the apartheid era still looms large in the
Mandela-Mbeki administrations.

Notes
1.

2.

C.f. Edmondson, Locksley. 1974. Africa and the African

Diaspora: Interactions, Linkages, and Racial Challenges in
the Future World Order, in Mazrui, Ali A. and Patel, Hasu
H. Africa: the next Thirty Years. England: Davison Publishing
Ltd.
For the sake of this paper, we look into the composition of
the southern African states to have transcended the
geographical location of some states in the sub-region.
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3.

4.

5.

6.

June 2010

Tanzania, Zambia and DRC suppose to belong to another

region.
This is a term developed by Garrett Hardin (1968: 1243-8), it
centre of argument is that any resources that is available to
everybody without policy control tend to favour some and
denied others access to it. It is zero-sum game where there is
a need for either privatisation or social control as a
regulatory system (Stiglitz 2006: 162-164, 322; Greene 1997:
321-3).
President Pik Botha elevated State Security Council to
preside over intrusive bureaucratic system, known as the
National Management System, with tentacles reaching into
virtually every government department and into every
corner of the country (De Klerk 1999: 115)
For a proper understanding of the futility of sanctions
imposition on another state, see (Rienow 1961: 285-7, Russet
and Starr 1992: 171-3).
The post Cold War international politics that is expected to
bring unity, development and harmony through
democratization instead elicited crises in Africa. Some of
these crises are resulted from the need to control mineral
resources either by a handful of political elite, warlords or
MNCs. This claimed live of thousands of people in DRC,
Cote dIvore, Angola, Sudan and to a smaller scale Nigeria.
For more in-depth knowledge on this, see Reno. 1998 and
Berdal and Malone. 2000.

Bibliography
Ajala, Adekunle. 1998. Decolonization and Liberation in Africa in
George A. Obiozor and Adekunle Ajala (eds.) Africa and the UN
System: The First Fifty Years. Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International
Affairs (NIIA).
Ake, Claude. 1981. A Political Economy of Africa. Lagos: Longman.

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June 2010

Amusan, Lere. 2006. South Africa as an Object of Nigerian Foreign

Policy. DLitt. Et. Phil. Thesis. University of South Africa.
- 1999. The Great Lakes Imbroglio: analysis of the Congo Crisis, in
Nigerian Forum. 20(7-8).
Berdal, Mats. and Malone, David M. (eds.) 2000. Greed andGrievance:
Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
Bertelsmann, Talitha. 1998. Regional Integration in Southern Africa,
South African Yearbook of International Affairs 1998/9. Johannesburg:
South African Institute of International Affairs (SIIA).
Blumenfeld, Jesmond. 1992. Economic Interdependence in Southern
Africa: From Conflict to Cooperation. Cape Town: Oxford University
Press.
Davies, H. O. 1989. Memoirs. Ibadan: Evans Brothers.
De Klerk, F. W. 1999. The Last Trek A New Beginning. London: Pan
Books.
Evans, Graham. and Newnham, Jeffrey. 1998. Dictionary of
International Relations. London: Penguin Books.
Garnett, John C. 1984. Commonsense and the Theory of International
Politics. London & Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Greene, Reginald H. and Thompson, Carol B. 1986. Political
Economies in Conflict: SADCC, South Africa and Sanctions, in
Phyllis Johnson and David Martin (eds.) Destructive Engagement:
Southern Africa at War. Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House.
Keohane, Robert O. & Nye, Joseph S. 1987. International
Interdependence and Integration, in Viotti, Paul. R. & Kauppi
Mark. V. International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism.
New York: Macmillan.
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Krasner, Stephen D. 2004. Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for

Collapsed and Failing States, International Security. 29(2).
Mandela, Rolihlahla Nelson. 1994. Long Walk to Freedom. New York:
Little, Brown and Company.
Okolo, Amechi. 1986. Dependency: the Highest Stage of Capitalist
Domination in Africa, in Onwuka, Ralph I. and Aluko, Olajide (eds.)
The Future of Africa and the New International Economic Order. London
and Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Reno, William. 1998. Warlords Politics and African States. Boulder:
Lynne Rienner.
Rienow, Robert. 1961. Contemporary International Politics. New York:
Crowell.
Russett, Bruce & Starr, Harvey. 1992. World Politics: the menu for
choice. New York: W. H. Freeman and Company.
Stiglitz, Joseph. 2006. Making Globalization Work. London: Penguin
Books.
Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1961. Africa: The Politics of Independence. New
York: Vintage Books.
Van Wyk, Jo-Ansie. 1999. Beyond the Limpopo: relations between
South Africa and Zimbabwe, in Politeia. 18(1).

164

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June 2010

The Niger Delta of Nigeria: A World Class Oil

Region in Africa, 2000-2006
John H. Enemugwem5

Keywords:Oil,NigerDelta,Nigeria,AfricanWorldClass.

Abstract
Nigeria is the largest crude oil producing country in Africa,
the sixth petroleum giant in the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the eleventh in the world
(Okodudu2007:10).Butitgainedworldclassfameonlyinthe
year2000throughoilproductioninitsNigerDeltaregion.The
scholarshipofthisessayishowtheregionattainedthisfeatat
the beginning of the twenty first century. The work also
documentstheseventeengiantoilfieldsthatmadeitpossible
and the aggressive drilling campaigns in the region. Other
topicsaddressedincludetheoilandgasreservesintheNiger
Delta, crude oil production from 2000 to 2006 and its export
valuesinUSdollars.

Introduction
The Niger Delta is the southernmost region of Nigeria.
AlthoughitoccupiesninetypercentoftheNigeriancoastline,
it is specifically between the Mahin river estuary in the west
SeniorLecturerinAfricanHistory&Historiography,Department
ofHistory&DiplomaticStudies,FacultyofHumanities,University
ofPortHarcourt,PortHarcourt,Nigeria.
Email:j_enemugwem@yahoo.com

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and the Cross River estuary in the east. The region has been
producing oil since 1956. From this time to the end of the
twentieth century, it was not a world class oil region. The
majorconstraintwastheinabilityofitsgiantfieldstoproduce
oil in great quantities. On attainment of this feat at the
beginning of the twentyfirst century, it became listed as a
worldclassoilregion.

Many have conducted researched on Nigerian petroleum in

the Niger Delta. The literature that focuses on this topic is
written in the early twentyfirst century. Amongst them are
the following: Ikoku C. U. Petroleum: Mankinds Best Friend
(PortHarcourt,2000)andUdo,E.J.ImpactofOilExploration
inAkwaIbomState(Uyo,2001).Othersaretherecentworks
of Okowa, W. J. The Problems and Prospects of the Niger Delta
(Port Harcourt, 2007) and Jaja, J. M. Underdevelopment and
Conflict in the Niger Delta: The Tragedy of Oil Exploration (Port
Harcourt,2007).

These works address the problems of community

relations and the underdevelopment of the Niger Delta. The
workofOkowaevaluatedtheprospectsoftheNigerDeltain
Nigeria and how the latter marginalized her Delta region.
Noneoftheseworksexaminedhowtheregionbecameworld
class in petroleum production which this paper addresses to
fill in this gap in the petroleum history of Nigeria. First, the
aggressivedrillingcampaignsoftheearlytwentyfirstcentury
mustbeconsidered.

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The Aggressive Drilling Campaigns of the Early Twenty

FirstCentury
One of the most significant events in the history of the
Nigerian petroleum industry in the Niger Delta is the
aggressive drilling campaigns that took place between 2000
and 2006. At the beginning of the twentyfirst century, the
petroleumindustryprogressedbeyondadoubtandtheNiger
Delta became a world class petroleum region, especially in
Africa. The Nigerian Petroleum Development Company
(NPDC) and the Nigerian Agip Oil Company (NAOC) had a
joint venture agreement in the year 2000. This led to the first
opencompetitionforcrudeoilblocksaswellasthediscovery,
building,andproductionofOkonooffshorefieldin2001.Four
years later, the first marginal oil field awards to indigenous
firms were created and the second open competition for oil
blocksstartedin2005(Obiozor2005).

Anyway, between 2000 and 2003, more than fifty

onshore and deepwater oil blocks were discovered in the
NigerDelta.Thesewerelocatedintheshallowandcontinental
shelf, deep and ultradeep offshore and onshore. In the year
2000alone,thirtynewoilblockswereofferedforbiddingwith
Shell having 30% stake in the Nigerian energy sector. The
petroleum history of Ibah (2000:1718) documented some of
theseblocksfoundin2000asOilProspectingLease(OPL)135,
236, 304 and 452 in the Niger Delta onshore. Six blocks
discoveredinthecontinentalshelfareOPLs229,233,239,240,
277 and 467. The eleven blocks in the deep and ultradeep
offshore of the Niger Delta include OPLs 214, 242, 243, 249,
250, 318, 320, 322, 324 and 326. Among the deep water oil
blocks discovered in 2003 are OPLs 220, 221, 222, 246, 247,
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217,218,219,245,244,216,215,243,212,213,248,211,250,210,
209,315and316(Lawal2004:12).

In the case of OPL 222 explored by Chevron Texaco,

two reservoirs of oil were found. The first oil found on the
block and drilled was from Ukot I exploration well. But the
second that came from Usan I well produced 5000 barrels of
crude oil daily from a water depth of 750 meters. This
reservoir contributed immensely to the companys growth
(Pryor2002:19).

However,theFederalGovernmentofNigeriaallocated
these blocks to 57 multinational and indigenous petroleum
firms for exploration. Some of them are Shell Petroleum
DevelopmentCompanyofNigeria(SPDC),ExxonMobil,Agip
Energy and National Resources (AENR), Chevron Texaco,
Petrobras, Esso Exploration, Nexen Petroleum Nigeria and
Petroleum Production Company as well as the Nigerian
government owned National Petroleum Development
Company (NPDC) established in the 1980s for petroleum
exploration.

SPDC did not only use this aggressive drilling period

toupgradeheroilfieldsandflowstationsintheNigerDelta.
Theyalsoachievedamillionbarrelsofoildaily.Shellprincipal
officers,likeMr.SalimAlAlawi,Mr.OghaleIbi,DondoAhire,
Hans Flikkema and Don Boham (2003:25) clarified how the
one million barrels per day mark was reached. According to
these authorities, who were the heads of field engineering,
production geology, well operations swamp east, corporate
well engineering and external relations, respectively, their
budgetfor2003wastodrillanadditional62oilwells.Butthey
couldonlyaccomplish51thatadded136,000barrelsperdayto
their corporate holdings. As a result, in two days time 56
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June 2010

October, 2003, Shells total production increased from 1.007

millionbarrelsperdayto1.012million.

Other petroleum players in the Niger Delta ,like Agip

Energy and Natural Resources (AENR), also developed their
old and new oil fields in 2003. Ekundayo (2003:25) gave an
instanceofOkonoandOkpohoFieldswhereAgipspentmore
than US$400 million to increase the capacities as well as
commissioning a new Floating, Production, Storage and
Offloading (FPSO) Vessel called Mystras. Because of their
discovery ofmorefieldsintheNigerDeltaregion,theywere
abletoincreasetheirtotalcrudeoilproductionfrom90million
to250millionbarrelsin2003.Intheagreementtheysignedin
2000 with the Nigerian Petroleum Development Company
(NPDC), Agip provided the funding and managed the new
fieldsjointlywithNPDC.

In 2004, the Federal Government of Nigeria granted

equity shares in five offshore blocks to NPDC. According to
NPDCschairman,AbbaDabo(2004:3),theblocksOPLs214,
242, 256, 244 and 318 that are in the oilrich Niger Delta will
enable the NPDC to earn revenue for Nigerian Government
through the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
(NNPC).

With the advantage Exxon Mobil had in the Eastern

Obolo(Andoni)partoftheeasternNigerDeltaoffshore,they
were able to develop the East Area Additional Oil Recovery
Project (EAAORP) in a joint venture with the NNPC.
Ugwuanyi (2004:18) stated that theresult will increase Exxon
Mobilsproductionfrom750,000barrelsperdayin2000to500
millioninthefuture.

As for Total, then TotalFinaElf, their AmenamKpono

Projectwasexploringoveronebillionbarrelsofoilreservein
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Eastern Obolo (Andoni). The findings of Ekundayo (2004:23)

brought into focus the US$2 billion AmenamKpono Field.
This is in addition to building and monetizing Amenam
KponoOilandGasExportProject(AKOGEP)PhasesIandII
intheEasternObolooffshore.Alsowithinthisperiodof2003,
they were developing their Akpo and Usan deep offshore
projectsaswellasthesecondphaseofOfonFieldalsointhe
EasternObolo(Andoni)offshoreareaoftheNigerDelta.

Going through the frequency of these aggressive

exploration and exploitation of the petroleum industry, the
Nigerian Government came up with more Oil Prospecting
Leases(OPL).ThusinFebruary2003,thirtyoneindigenousoil
firms were awarded the OPL to explore 24 marginal
petroleum fields in the Niger Delta. Adindu (2004:12)
mentionedthetotaloilreservesinthemarginalfieldsthenas
1.36 billion barrels per day. Being handled by indigenous
firms,itisagiantsteptowardsthedevelopmentoftheNiger
DeltaregioninparticularandNigeriaingeneral.

However, the revelations of Isiwu (2004:13) put

Nigeriasoverallcrudeoilreserveatabout33.4billionbarrels
in2003.Notlessthan95%ofitwasintheNigerDeltaregion.
Before then the estimate of recoverable oil was 22.5 billion
barrels. In spite of the fact that they are processed through
seven terminals and floating production vessels, the oil came
from the 3000 kilometers of pipelines that cross the Niger
Delta. These pipelines link 275 flow stations to the existing
sevenpetroleumterminalsthatprocessitforexport.

Until the end of 2006, Nigerias petroleum deposits

were concentrated in the Niger Deltas onshore and offshore
swamps and continental shelf. Experts, like Ikoku (2000:47),
have proved that it will continue to flow for the next forty
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June 2010

years.Becauseitislightsweetcrudewithlowsulfurcontent,
itwillcontinuetobethemostpreferredworldwidesinceitcan
bemoreeasilyobtainedandrefinedthanheavycrude(Onyige
1989:176).

A close study of it depicts the position that the Niger

Delta oil has promoted Nigeria in the comity of world
petroleum producing countries. In 2003, Nigeria was the
eleventh largest oil producer in the world. The ranking were
as follows: Saudi Arabia, USA, Russia, Iran, Venezuela,
Kuwait, Iraq, United Arab Emirate, Mexico, China, Nigeria,
Libya, Canada, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Algeria, Norway, and
Britain.Asaresult,theNigerDeltaisaworldclasspetroleum
regionwithinandoutsideAfrica(Ibah2004:8).

TheNigerDeltaasWorldClassPetroleumRegioninAfrica
The strategic position of the Niger Delta as a world class
petroleumregionwaswellspeltoutwhenitwaslistedinthe
USAGeologicalSurveyWorldPetroleumAssessment(2000).Thus,
aworldclassgiantoilfieldproducesbetween500millionand
fivebillionbarrels.InthecaseoftheNigerDeltaofourstudy,
the seventeen giant petroleum reservoirs that are world class
oilfieldsmeetthecriteriaasshownonTable4below.

Table1:NigerDeltaWorldClassOilFields
S/N Operator
1.
Shell
2.

3.
4.

5.

OilFields
Bonga
BongaSouth
West
Bomu
Cawthorne
Channel
Forcados

DateDiscovered
1993
NA

Reserves(Mmbbls)
600
600

1958
1963

875
750

1968

1,23
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June 2010

Yokri
ImoRiver
JonesCreek
Nembe
Creek
Edop

1959
1967
1973

5
875
900
950

1981

733

Erha

1991

Ubit
Agbami

NA
1998

13.

Chevron
Texaco

Meren

1965

14.

NA

15.

1965

800

16.

Total
(Total
FinaElf)

Apoi
North
Funiwa
Okan

1,20
0
945
1,00
0
1,10
0
500

1990

500

17.

1964

670

6.
7.
8.

9.

Exxon
Mobil

10.
11.
12.

Amenam
Kpono
Obagi

*NA:NotAvailable.

Source:EmmanuelO.Egbogha,FiftyYearsofPetroleum
ExploitationinNigeria:PublicLecturePresentedattheFirst
EmmanuelEgbogahLectureSeriesonPetroleumPolicyandStrategy
attheUniversityofPortHarcourt,March2729,2006,pp.3536.

According to Imomoh, (2006:7) the Niger Delta oil

fields were the second largest oil fields in the world.
Supersedingthemwerethesupergiantoilfieldsfoundinthe
Middle East, especially those of the Iranian or Persian Gulf.
Simply put, it is the size of the oil wells, not the number of
wellsdiscovered,thatmatters.LikeinNigeria,theNigerDelta
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June 2010

didnotonlypioneerpetroleumproduction,butitalsohasthe
largest fields in the country and in Africa in general. This
includes the Bonga, Agbami and Okan Fields at the Escravos
in the western Niger Delta as well as AmenamKpono in the
Eastern Obolo (Andoni) part of the eastern Niger Delta
offshore(Akintunde2000:5).

BongaforinstanceisNigeriasfirstdeepoffshorefield
which was discovered by Shell in 1993 and holds the Oil
Prospecting License (OPL) 212 of the same year. It is this
pioneer Nigerian deep offshore field that is contributing
immensely to the petroleum industry. Thus, it has since 29
December 2005 been increasing Nigerias crude oil export by
200,000barrelsdaily.ThefieldwhichwasdevelopedbyShell
Nigeria Exploration and Production Company (SNEPCO) at
thecostofUS$3.6billioninajointventurewithFirstOil,Esso,
Agip and Elf covers 60 square kilometre area in the Niger
Deltawaterdepthsofover1000meters(Wihbey2006:28,30).

The Bonga field exposed the acumen of indigenous

technology in Nigeria through their offshore loading buoy.
Thelatterconstructedbyanindigenouscompany,Nigerdock,
Lagos, became reputed as the worlds first largest and most
technologically advanced polyester deepwater bouy
(Egbogah2006:2830).Thiswasmadepossiblebythesuccesses
of petroleum businessmen in deep offshore development.
Their exploration and development of the Niger Delta oil
madeNigeriatheAfricanhubofpetroleum(Ayiga2003:11).

AnotherexamplecomesfromtheAgbamiOilFieldof
ChevronTexaco. This offshore deep water field, located 70
miles or 113kilometres offshore the central part of the Niger
DeltaonOPLBlock216,wasdiscoveredin1998.Accordingto
Meze (2008), although it is in the water depth between 4,200
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June 2010

feetand5,400feet,thefieldcovered45,000acresor182square
kilometers and was given to ChevronTexaco by the Federal
Government of Nigeria as the Oil Mining Leases (OML) 127
and 128. Because of the huge petroleum deposits of not less
than900millionbarrels,theappraisalworkwascompletedin
a record time of three years after the discovery and drilling
commencedin2004(Salau,2008).

Notwithstanding the fact that ChevronTexaco is

developing the field with Petroleo Brasileiro (Petrobras) SA
andTotalSA,Agbamiisrecordedasoneofthebiggestfields
ofChevron.Itisexpectedtoproduceabout100,000barrelsof
oil daily which will boost Chevrons total output of 250,000
barrels per day. According to Ferreira, Petrobras Manager in
Nigeria,AbamialoneisestimatedtoendowNigeriawithnot
lessthanUS$2billionorN224billionyearlywheneveritisin
fulloperation.Infact,Chevronsaffiliatecompany,StarDeep
Water Petroleum Limited, who is contracted to operate
Agbami had brought a US$1.1billion Floating Production
Storage and Offloading (FPSO) vessel for the storage and
processingoftheoilfromtheAgbamiField.Infactthestorage
capacity of this vessel is said to be not less than 20,000, 000
barrels.ChevronTexacousesthefieldtopioneertheuseofa
newtechnologyofSteelCatenaryRisers(SCR)toproduceoil
fromthedeepseawells(Makoju,2008).
It is interesting that Nigeria, the country of
exploration,hashandinthefabricationofthecomponentsof
the project. The offloading buoy was done by Nigerdock Plc,
Lagos; parts of the topsides by Daewoo Limited, Warri and
both the suction piles and manifolds were the handiwork of
GrinakersLTA in Port Harcourt (Ferreira, 2008). Apart from
thefactthattheseexplorationsbroughtabouttheworldclass
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nature of these oil fields in the Niger Delta, there are other
numerous wells owned by other oil conglomerates that
increasedtheNigerianoilreserves.

NigerianOilandGasReservesintheNigerDelta
Reservesaresaidtobeestimatedvolumesofoilaccumulation
that are available for production in commercial quantity.
Nigerian oil reserves in the Niger Delta started with 0.184
billionbarrelsin1958androseto16billionbarrelsin1986.In
order to increase it, government policies in 1990 encouraged
the exploitation of several deep offshore blocks in the Niger
Deltawithwaterdepthsof3000meters(Ugwuanyi2004:10).

Nevertheless, the reserves came owing to the

effectiveness of the petroleum firms. The drilling campaigns
for the realization of effective exploration and exploitation
wereentrustedtomanyfirmsincludingStatoil,Amoco,Exxon
(nowExxonMobil),ShellandConoco.Asaresult,thereserve
increased to 33.4 billion barrels in 2003 and continued to
increase to 35.9 billion in 2005. By 2006, it was reading 36
billion barrels. For this reason, petroleum businessmen in the
NigerDeltaprojectedthatbytheyear2010,theproductionof
Nigeriancrudeoilwillreachthelandmarkof40billionbarrels
(Wihbey2006:1).

Nigeriaisalsodoingwellinprovengasreservesinthe
NigerDelta.Egbogah(2006:12)demonstratesthatgasreserves
startedwith2,260billioncubicfeetin1958.However,by2006
theNigerDeltaasworldclassoilregionhadincreasedto187
trillioncubicfeet.
Unlikeit,theactualdailyproductionofcrudeoilstood
at 1.8 million barrels per day in 1990 and 2.6 million barrels
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daily in 2005, which continued in 2006. Nigeria became the

largest oil producer in Africa, sixth in the OPEC, fifth largest
supplier to the United States of America and eleventh in the
world.However,theNNPCandtheDepartmentofPetroleum
Resources (DPR) made it possible for the Nigerian
Governmenttoknowthatabout116outof300marginalfields
in the Niger Delta are potentially productive. Interestingly,
about1.3billionbarrelsaretheoilreservesinthesemarginal
areas of the Delta. Increases in oil reserves were regularly
encouragedbytheFederalGovernmentofNigeria.TheNiger
Delta became the source of this encouragement through the
opening of its ultradeep offshore for oil blocks. These blocks
that were acquired by the Nigerian indigenous and
international petroleum firms were rapidly developed to
become a part of the Niger Delta oil fields (Indiamaowei
2004:1518).

AssoonastheNigerDeltaoffshorewasopenedupfor
exploration and exploitation, the number of petroleum firms
increasedtofiftynine.Infact,morethan46ofthemwentinto
intensive exploitation of crude oil and condensate. For this
reason, 91 of the 177 Oil prospecting Licenses (OPLs) were
convertedtoOilMineralLeases(OMLs)and22newoilblocks
weregiventobothindigenousandmultinationaloilfirmsin
the country in the year 2000 (Awajiokwaan 2004:8). The
indigenousfirmsincludeMonipuloofChiefO.B.LuluBriggs
of Rivers State, Zebra, Dubri, Consolidated Oil and not the
leastisAmniInternationalthatisoneoftheoilplayersinthe
Eastern Obolo (Andoni) platform of the Niger Delta offshore
(Daukoru,2004:2126).Theiractivitiescontributednotonlyto
theincreaseofNigerianoilproduction,butalsotomakingthe
Niger Delta a world class oil region in Africa. Between 2000
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and 2006, crude oil production in the region increased as

shownbelow.

Table 2: Nigerian Crude Oil Production in the Niger Delta

Region, 20002006 in Thousand Barrels Per Day and Its
ExportValuesinUSDollars
Year

DailyAverage

Cumulative

2000

2,250

2001

2,300

2002

2,240

22,621,167

17,083

2003

2,330

23,471,617

22,184

2004

2,500

24,384,117

33,309

2005

2,600

25,333,117

46,770

2006

2,600

26,282,117

46,770

203,344

TOTAL

20,964,067

Amountin
(US$
million)

03,567

21,8

20,040
17,188

Sources: Emmanuel O. Egbogah, Fifty Years of Petroleum

ExploitationinNigeria:PublicLecturePresentedattheUniversityof
PortHarcourt,Nigeria,in2006,(PortHarcourt:MSS,2006),pp.12
13,23.OPECStatisticalAnnualBulletin,20032006.
177

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June 2010

Conclusion
This work examined the Niger Delta of Nigeria as a world
class petroleum region. It centered on the drilling campaigns
thattookplaceinthefirstsixyearsofthetwentyfirstcentury.
The campaign stabilized the daily crude oil production to
abouttwomillionbarrels.Thisactualizationfurtherdeveloped
the capacity of the petroleum fields. Seventeen of the
petroleumfieldsbecamerecognizedworldwideasworldclass
oil fields: they contributed to the daily production of 2.6
million barrels of crude oil in the Niger Delta of Nigeria in
2006. Between the years of 2000 and 2006, Nigeria derived a
total of US$ 203,344,000,000 from crude oil sales in the world
market.

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2004).
Akintunde, Oluyinka 2000,Shell Raises Production Capacity of
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_____________,2004,NigeriaRealisesN128.4bnfromExcessCrude
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Awajiokan, Festus 2004, Nigeria Earns N1.5 Trillion from Crude
Oil,(PortHarcourt:MSS,2004).
Ayiga,Blessing2003,OldBrassLocalGovernmentAreaintheOil
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Dabo,Abba2004,FGGrantsNPDCEquityinOffshoreBlocs(Port
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Daukoru, Edmund. 2004, Niger Delta Community Crisis: Agenda

for Sustainable Peace, (Abuja: Ministry of Petroleum
Resources,2004).
Egbogha,EmmanuelO.2003,GlobalCompletionforProjectFinance
in the Energy Industry: Paper Presented at the 2003
Annual PreConference Workshop Organized by the
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Exhibition held at the Sheraton Hotel & Towers Abuja
onDecember24,2003(Lagos:MSS,2003).
Ekundayo, Kayode 2006, Amenam Kpono Deep Offshore Field
Production to Hit 125,000 bpd by April (Lagos: MSS,
2006).
Ekundayo, Kayode 2003, Agip Spends $400 million on
Okpono/OkpohoField(Lagos:MSS,2003).
Ferreira,Rudy,thePetrobrasManagerinNigeria,inanoralaccount
inearlyJuly2008.
Ibah,Louis2000,22OilBlocks:TasksbeforetheEvaluationPanel,
(Lagos:MSS,2000).
_____________ 2004, Shell Targets 140,000 bpd Crude Oil from
ForcadosField,(Lagos:MSS,2004).
Ikoku,C.U.2000,Petroleum:MankindsBestFriend(PortHarcourt:
UPHPress,2000).
Imomoh,E.U.2006,TheNigerianOilandGas,(PaperPresentedat
the Inaugural Lecture in Honour of Late Professor Chi
Ikoku on April 20th, 2006 at the University of Port
Harcourt,Nigeria.
Indiamaowei, Olaowei 2004, Oil, Gas and Energy, Environment
Watch2(45)(2004).
Isiwu, Chuks 2004, Chevron Texacos Oil, Gas Reserves Remain
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Lawal, Yakubu 2004, Government Exceeds Revenue Target: Nets
N1.5 Trillion from Oil in Five Months, (Lagos: MSS,
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Makoju,Macaulay,theBusinessDevelopmentManagerofChevron,
inoralevidenceinearlyJuly2008.
Meze,John2008,AgbamiOilFieldComesonStream(Lagos:MSS,
2008).
Meze,John2008,CanNLNGBetheNextRevenueEarner?(Lagos:
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Nigerian Petroleum Development Company/Agip Energy Arrangement,
2000,(Lagos:NNPC,2000).
Obiozor,George.2005,NigerianAmbassadortotheUSAinanoral
accountonNovember17,2005.
Okodudu, Stephen 2007, Niger Delta in the Era of Globalization,
(PortHarcourt:MSS,2007).
Onyige, P. U.2001, The Political Economy of Mexican Oil Industry:
Some Implications for the Management and Utilization
ofNigerianPetroleumIndustry(Oguta:ZimPan,2001).
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Tamuno (eds.) Lands and People of Nigeria: Rivers State
(PortHarcourt:RiversideCommunications,1989).
Pryor, Jay 2002, Fresh Reward from Deep Water: Twice, Chevron
andPartnersStrikeOilinOPL222,ChevronTexacoNews,
2(2),AprilJune2002.
Salau, S. 2008. Nigeria May Earn N224b from Agbami Oil Field
NextYear(Lagos:MSS,2008).
U. S. Geological Survey, 2000, World Petroleum Assessment (New
York,2000).
Ugwuanyi,Emeka2004,MobilBossLauds2003Operations:Targets
IncreasedOilProduction(Lagos:MSS,2004).
Wihbey,PaulMichael2006,NigeriasRiseasaGlobalOilPower
and Its Geopolitical Implications, (Port Harcourt: Institute
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180

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BiographicalNote
John Horace Enemugwem read history at the University of Port
Harcourt, Nigeria, under Professor N. C. Ejituwu and qualified in
AfricanhistoryandOralhistoriography.Hehastaughtfor15years
and is currently a Senior Lecturer and Head of Department of
History & Diplomatic Studies. Between 2006 and 2007, he was the
Associate Dean of the Faculty of Humanities, University of Port
Harcourt. Dr. Enemugwem is one of the joint editors of the book,
History Concourse 2005: The Life and Work of E. J. Alagoa, (Port
Harcourt:OnyomaPublications,2005)andhaspublishedchaptersin
refereed books and articles in national and international learned
journals.

181

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June 2010

The Poverty of Critical Thinking in Postcolonial Zimbabwean Journalism

Dr.FainosMangena
Department of Religious Studies, Classics and Philosophy,
UniversityofZimbabwe

&Mr.MunyaradziMadambi
DepartmentofStudentAffairs,UniversityofZimbabwe

Abstract
The purpose of this research is to show that until and unless
there is a paradigm shift from the method of training
journaliststoadeepereducationalparadigm,theZimbabwean
journalist will continue to lag behind in so far as the global
requirementsforcriticalthinkingandobjectivityinjournalism
isconcerned.Thepaperarguesthatthetraditionalmethodsof
training journalists which include but are not limited to the
impartation of journalism skills somewhat through
indoctrination and rote learning do not suffice. Empirical
research has shown that our journalists cannot critically
explore and penetrate issues when gathering and processing
news. Through the method of content analysis of newspaper
articles,thepaperadvocatesforachangefromthemethodof
training toa more critical and reflective method of education
thatpermeatesallformsofindoctrinationanddrilling.

Keywords:Journalism,training,educationandAfro
philosophy
182

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June 2010

Introductionandbackgroundtothestudy
While society benefits from media products; a plethora of
multicultural, axiological and epistemological problems
almost outweigh these benefits. Some influential sections of
society continue to blame the media for corrupting or
contaminating its moral fabric and stirring despondency
therebymisinformingthepublicabouteventsontheground.
In this paper we argue that, with the advent of information
technologyandthewiringoftheworldintoaglobalvillage,
the job of the journalist is becoming more andmore complex
andchallengingandtheZimbabweanjournalistshouldnotbe
left behind by this global tide. Yes, we are aware of the
positive effect of the lowering of access to enabling
technologiessuchaswordprocessors,blogsandwikiswhich
have meant that traditional gatekeepers such as The Herald,
The Chronicle, The Sunday Mail, The Standard, The Zimbabwe
Independent and The Financial Gazette which fall under the
print category and the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Holdings
(ZBH) which falls under the electronic category no longer
have monopoly on news dissemination meaning that almost
everyone who has access to these enabling technologies has
becomeajournalistinaway.Wedonothaveproblemswith
this fact. We believe that the increasing number of media
outlets while it has a positive effect on media consumers in
terms of uses and gratification; it brings with it challenges to
the journalist who is expected to produce quality news in
keepingwithacompetitivemediaenvironment.

Itisinviewofthisfactthatweadvocateforaparadigmshift
frommeretrainingtocomprehensiveeducationthatresultsin
competitive,diligentandresponsiblejournalism.Bydiligent
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June 2010

andresponsiblewemeanthatjournalistsmustbeindustrious
and accountable for their actions, that is, they must be free
moralagents.Weproposeaneducationthatfostersreflective
judgment and a sense of PanAfricanism in journalism.i This
study is motivated by the fact that most journalism schools
and colleges in Zimbabwe have produced journalists who
have failed to penetrate issues and interpret the meaning of
events as they unfold. As fiduciaries to the public, society
expects a lot from journalists and yet they seem to give very
little.

TheZimbabweanmediasceneandtheresearchproblem
Webeginthissectionbyposingacrucialresearchquestion:
Whatarethebenefitsofeducatingjournalistsascomparedtomerely
trainingthem?

AcloselookatZimbabwesmediascenewillsetthetonefora
philosophical exposition guided by the above research
question. To this end, the article seeks to unravel the
disadvantages of merely training journalists and the need to
movetowardsadeepereducationalparadigminpostcolonial
Africanjournalism.Inordertotestourthesisstatement,we
carriedoutastudyinZimbabwebetween2000and2008.The
reason for choosing this period is simply that this is the time
whenmediaoutletsincreasedwhileatthesametimepolitical
polarizationreacheditspeak.

The whole idea was to look at the scope and aims of the
journalismcurriculaaspresentedbythesejournalismschools,
collegesanduniversitydepartmentsandseehowthecurricula
impacted on the quality of journalism in Zimbabwe. Quite
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substantially, we found that in terms of quantity, roughly

more than 150 journalists were churned out every year by
journalismcolleges,schoolsanduniversitydepartmentswhich
westudied.Thisisquiteabignumberconsideringthelimited
number of media houses in Zimbabwe. Fig.1 below gives
projected figures of the journalists that graduates from some
ofthefiveinstitutionsthattrainandeducatejournalistsevery
yearfrom2000to2008:

Institution

Number
of
Journalists
producedyearly
UniversityofZimbabwe
12
HararePolytechnic
50
Christian College of Southern 45
Africa
MidlandsStateUniversity
35
NationalUniversityofScience 40
andTechnology
Fig.1

It is important, however, to note that our study was not so

muchaboutthenumberofjournalistsproducedrelativetothe
availability of journalism jobs, rather the study was interested
inthequalityofthejournalistswhowerebeingproducedand
howmostofthesefellshortoftherequirementsforcriticaland
objective news reporting. We compared journalism graduates
from the three University departments mentioned above and
thosefromcollegesandschoolsofjournalism,intermsoftheir
critical approach to news production in sport, politics and
business in the print category. We chose sport, politics and
business because we thought these were areas that require
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June 2010

specialized writing skills. The results of our comparison will

beoutlinedanddiscussedinthefollowingsection.

Samplingandanalysisofdata
After considering the aims and objectives of the journalism
curricula, we sampled four daily newspapers and these
included;TheDailyNews(nolongerpublishing),TheZimbabwe
Mirror(nolongerpublishing),TheHeraldandTheChronicle.As
part of our sampling and analysis, we read two hundred and
thirty four feature articles written in the period between 2000
and2008.Fig.2belowrepresentsasampleofthestorieswhich
were written by degreed (media practitioners) and non
degreed(trainedjournalists)infourdailynewspapersbetween
2000and2008anditconfirmsourfindings.Wecategorizedthe
storiesintermsofwhetherweconsideredthemtobeanalytic
ordescriptive.

By non Analytic
Descriptive
Institution By
degreed
degreed
TheHerald 27
36 24
34
The Daily 9
36 6
31
Mirror
The
18
27 13
19
Chronicle
The Daily 36
45 30
39
News
Fig.2

Thetableaboveshowsthatoutofthe234(afigurewereached
afterputtingtogetherallthestorieswhichwerewrittenbyboth
degreed and nondegreed journalists in the four newspaper
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June 2010

stablesabove)featurestoriesthatwesampledforresearchina
period spanning nine years from four daily newspapers, only
73wereanalyticwhile 123weredescriptive. Thetableshows
that most of the stories which we considered to be analytic
werewrittenbydegreedjournalistswiththeexceptionofafew
whichwerewrittenbynondegreedjournalistsandconversely
mostofthestorieswhichweconsideredtobedescriptivewere
writtenbynondegreed(trained)journalistsandafewofthem
werewrittenbydegreedpractitioners.

Usingthemethodofcontentanalysisofthefeaturearticleswe
sampled above we concluded, after careful analysis of the
stories, that most of the trained journalists lacked the critical
toolsofanalysiswhilemostdegreedpractitionerswereableto
critically and objectively communicate through the print
media. We deliberately left out the electronic media as we
could not come up with a representative sample of
broadcasting channels since there is only one state controlled
televisionchannelinZimbabweandfourstatecontrolledradio
stations.

Significanceofthestudy
The study is significant in the sense that it will influence
recruitmentpoliciesandprobablypushforcurriculumreview
whichwillseeschoolsandcollegesofjournalisminZimbabwe
pedagogically adopting policies that lead to journalism
education complementing training. The study will also help
curriculum designers and instructors/lecturers to take matters
of critical news gathering and dissemination seriously as it is
our firm belief that Afrocentric educationi, just like its
Eurocentric counterpart, is valueladen. It is hypothesized in
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June 2010

this article that an educated journalist and/or media

practitioner will positively contribute to nation building than
onewhoismerelytrained.

Importanceof,andChallengesin,themediafraternity
The world in which journalists are operating today is fast
becoming more complex and sophisticated. It is because of
informationexplosionthatthecontemporaryjournalisthasto
deal with more chunks of information which sometimes
requireaxiological,ontologicaland/orepistemologicaltoolsof
analysis. But what are these axiological, ontological and/or
epistemological tools of analysis in journalism? By
axiologicalwemeanthatthejournalistmustbeableconsider
issues of value, norms and customs when gathering and
writing news (axiology). Not only that, the journalist must
alsobeabletoconsidertheexistentialnatureofhumanbeings
as beings whose nature is determined by how they
understand, interpret and appreciate the existence of other
beings in the universe (ontology). This ability involves
knowledgeofwhatisaroundthem(epistemology).

The sophisticated and multicultural nature of the global

village has also brought in challenges of unprecedented
levels. The socioeconomic and political terrain which the
journalistfindshimselfinisalsogettingrougherandtougher
by each day. In view of the evershrinking world (into a
global village) and the subsequent culture wars, the
journalist has to rise above expectations of various cultural
persuasions to disseminate news that educate, inform and
entertain.Thecallismadeinviewofthefactthatthemedia
serve as the nervecentre of society by shaping our opinions
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June 2010

and world views. Although on a negative note the media

manipulateandbrainwash.Often,themediadoesmorethan
just set the agenda, either by directly or by subtly dictating
issuesforitsaudience.

On the Zimbabwean scene, for instance, it is very easy tosee

the various motives of public media on one hand and the
independent media on the other in the socioeconomic and
political front. For instance, we have seen how the
independentmediahavenegativelyrespondedtoZimbabwes
interventionintheDRC,whilethepublicmediaontheother
handhavehailedandmagnifiedit.Wehaveseenhowissues
ofpoliticalviolencehavebeenhandledbyboththepublicand
theindependentmediaandthepolaritythathascharacterized
themediafraternityandissuesofhatespeech,sensationalism
andagendasettingthathasresultedfromthispolaritythereof.
Theperiodbetween2000and2008apartfromexperiencing
an increased number of media outlets has also seen the
public media probably playing its fourth estate role by
unwaveringly supporting all government initiated
programmes whether or not they violated democratic
principles, while the independent media has allegedly
supported the opposition agenda of regime change. This
development has led to the polarization of our society. This
point is well captured by Phathisa Nyathi, then a columnist
withTheZimbabweMirrorwhowrites:

Thepolarizationinoursocietyisbestdepictedinthepress.
Basically, the press is either progovernment or anti
government.Sometimesobjectivityissacrificedonthealtar
ofexpediencyinordertobetruetotheirchosenpositionIf
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June 2010

you buy newspapers from one divide, you will get half the
story(TheZimbabweMirror,14August2001).ii

This space is, however, not meant to discuss political

polarizationinZimbabwebutrathertodiscussthechallenges
thatfacetheZimbabweantrainedjournalistwhohastolearn
and learn very fast the art of critically processing news in
times of political and economic crisis. It is sad that some
journalists; because of their failure to understand the socio
economic,politicalandculturalimpactofnewsdissemination
tothepublic,havebecomebiasedandirresponsibleintheway
they disseminate news.iii Some have resorted to peddling
falsehoodstotheextentthatreadersandviewershavebecome
disenchanted and disillusioned by this kind of prevalent
journalism.

Itisbecauseoftheabovementionedweaknessesexhibitedby
contemporary journalists, and the central role that the media
playinsociety,thatpromptstheneedforustoreflecton the
educationofourjournaliststoday.Thepaperrecommendsa
shift from mere training to a deeper educational paradigm in
journalism. While training focuses on skills development,
deeper education prepares the journalist for greater social
responsibility. It prepares the journalist for intricate moral,
aesthetic, logical, emotional situations that require
professional judgment. This paper further argues that for
anyjournalistwhiletrainingandteachingforcriticalthought
arenecessary,theyarenotsufficient.Therearetwostrandsto
our argument, one that calls for the need to remain Pan
Africanistinourapproachandalsobeingmindfulofthefact
thatasAfricans,wedonotliveinavacuumbutwearepartof
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June 2010

theglobalvillage.AsRonaldNicolson(2008:2)aptlyputsit:

We live, it is said, in a global village where national

boundariesculturalorgeographicalhavebecomeblurred,
a world in which a single economic system is emerging,
where television and satellite telecommunications can(if
programmers and watchers choose) bring world events
wherever they occur to our homes at the moment that they
happen. None of us remains unaffected by other cultures
verydifferentfromourown.

It is against this backdrop that we seek to fuse Western with

African values in journalism pedagogy in order to promote
our cultural values at the same time as we celebrate and
appreciate cultural diversity and differences. But when all is
saidanddone,theultimategoalistoshowthedeficienciesof
trainingasamethodandaimingroomingAfricanjournalists.
Butaswerecommendjournalismeducationaheadoftraining
in Africa, we have to ask what the guiding frameworks or
principlesforthiskindofpedagogyare?Beforerespondingto
this question, it is crucial to define training and outline its
limitations and also to review African scholarship on
journalism training and education in Africa in order to give
ourargumentcontext.

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June 2010

Reviewofliterature

(a) Thelimitsofjournalismtraining:Some
philosophicalinsights
Training refers to the process of preparing someone to a
requiredstandardofefficiencyorperformancebyinstruction
andpractice.It(training)aimsatthesuccessfulperformance
of specific skills; it is directive in intent as its object is not to
produce a certain kind of child but a certain kind of
performance in the child (Akinpelu, 1995: 192). This is
precisely why training has always been condemned as a
methodofteachingbythoseinterestedinthedevelopmentof
character and personality. Trainingis often blamed for being
toospecificinpurposeandtoonarrowinscopeandcontent.

Itmustbenoted,however,thatbesidestheabovementioned
limitations,trainingremainsanessentialelementinteaching.
For one to master various elements in the learning process
there is need for instruction (initiation), and repeated
exercise. This subsequently leads to deeper understanding if
enoughintellectualeffortisexerted.Proficiencyingathering
and writing news requires serious training too. No one is
born a writer; renowned writers went through processes of
training.

However, the ability to capture juicy stories and reporting

themastheyarefromthewarzonedoesnotmakeoneagood
war reporter. Capturing sizzling pictures of horrific events
does not make one an excellent photojournalist. Good
journalism goes beyond merely taking information to the
peopleasitis.Thepointwearemakinghereisthat,training
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June 2010

onetobeaprolificinformationgathereranddynamicwriteris
not enough for good journalism. One great philosopher,
Alfred North Whitehead criticized the habit of relying on
unexamined information when he said, a merely informed
manisthemostuselessboreonGodsearth(R.S.Peters,1967:
100). But equally boring, for R.S. Peters, are those for whom
being critical is a substitute for being well informed about
anything.

Immanuel Kant expressed this point explicitly when he said,

[] content without criticism is blind, but criticism without
content is empty (1967: 100). The point is that both training
and critical thinking must complement each other. What is
required by the journalist is not just the ability to collect
information, but also the ability to reflect on why things are
thewaytheyareandwhycertaineventsneedtobepublished
thewaytheyarewhilecautionneedtobeexercisedonothers.
Training is insufficient for journalism because it fails, as a
teachingmethod,toaddressthecomprehensivedevelopment
of this aspect of judgment. Moral quagmires that transverse
the practice of journalism require more than mere training.
Deciding what to show on TV, what to present and how to
presentitonradio,inaconservativesocietyorinasocietyat
culturalcrossroadsrequiresmorethanjusttraining.

Reporting horrific events at the battlefront (war reporting)

requiresgoingbeyondtraining.Questionsastowhethertruth,
objectivity and justice are always overriding in journalism
require more of cognitive capacity and moral judgment than
mere sense perception. Issues of rights, freedom and
democracy which are current in the contemporary world
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June 2010

requiremoreofconceptualanalysis,whichcannotbefulfilled
through training. Conceptual analysis requires insight,
reflection, focus, or critical reflection of issues. But is
journalism education, therefore, all about being critical? In
answering this question, we will begin by defining being
critical.

Being critical can be understood as being inquisitive and

expressive. But is this inquisitiveness sufficient for good
journalism? Is the ability to ask questions and convince the
same as being critical? Does rejection of authority and
unpatriotic reporting signify being critical? Does being critical
imply negativism? There is no doubt that being vocal, being
resourcefulandinterrogativemaymeetthefirstviewofbeing
critical but are insufficient for good journalism. The second
viewofbeingcriticalimpliestheheightofintellectualprowess
and reflection, in line with rules or principles of reason. As
John Passmore puts it, a critical person, in this sense, must
possess initiative, independence, courage, imagination, of a
kind which may be completely absent in the skillful critic of
theperformanceofalaboratorytechnician.iv

(a) JournalismtraininginpostcolonialZimbabwe:
Pedagogicalinsightsandchallenges
ThereisnodoubtthatjournalismtraininginZimbabweisstill
influenced by colonial innuendos. This is so because the
journalism curricula in most Zimbabwean journalism schools
and colleges today still put emphasis on skills acquisition
which wasalso typical of colonial training that was meant to
equiptheblackAfricanwithmereskillstoperformhisorher
duties efficiently without question. While training is
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June 2010

necessaryandrequiredinsomesituations,wearguethatitis
merelyafirstorderactivitywhichdoesnothelpajournalistto
adequatelyengagewithandrationallydialogueissues.Thisis
so because in postcolonial Africa, journalism training has
produced a journalist who is able to hit the ground running
thatisonewhoisabletowriteastoryandnothingmore.No
emphasishasbeenputontherationalebehindthewritingofa
story.

Onthecontrary,alltheuniversitiesthatoffermediastudiesin
Zimbabwehavedoneverywellinthatscoreasdemonstrated
by the fact that most of their products have excelled and
participated in policy formulation and media research.
Commenting on the launch of the postgraduate diploma
programme in Media and Communication Studies at the
UniversityofZimbabwesDepartmentofEnglishin1993,Rino
Zhuwararastates:

We felt that for media to function effectively within the

parameters of our national and regional aspirations, they
ought to be guided by knowledge arising from constant
investigation and enquiry. The course content of the
Diplomaisdeliberatelydesignedtoarmanewgenerationof
students with the necessary theoretical, practical and
analytical competence to fit into the media industry as
potential policy makers, media managers, researchers and
communicators(Zhuwararaetal,1997:v).

Thefollowingisalistofsomeofthemediapractitionersfrom
theUniversityofZimbabwewhohaveexcelledintheircareers
andhavebeenpromotedbasedoncompetence,diligenceand
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responsible journalism: Geoffrey Nyarota, Robson Mhandu,

Lovemore Banda, Stanley Katsande, Tazzen Mandizvidza,
Henry Muradzikwa, Bill Saidi, Farai Gonzo, Tendai Chari,
Susan Makore, Laura Chiweshe and Caesar Zvayi. There is
alsoalistofmediapractitionerswho,afteracquiringtheirfirst
orseconddegrees,haveenrolledwithcollegesofjournalismin
andoutsidethecountry.Theseincludeamongothers:Fainos
Mangena, Munyaradzi Madambi, Tawanda Majoni, Sugar
Chagonda,SheuneniKurashaandEdsonMadondotomention
just but a few. But what is so special about these media
practitioners that give them an urge over journalists from
colleges and polytechnics? In responding to this question,
KimaniGecau(2010)remarks:

The conflict between journalism and media studies is the

conflict between theory and practice. While journalism
training emphasizes on skills acquisition to enable the
journalisttopracticallydothework,mediastudiesbeinga
postgraduate programme emphasizes on the theoretical
aspectofthepracticewhichgivesthemediapractitionerthe
criticaltoolsofnewsanalysisandinterpretation.vi

Media practitioners lack the practical aspect of the trade but

they make up for it through internship. It is important to
acknowledge the point that through experience and
interaction with media practitioners some trained journalists
havealsodoneverywellintheirtrade.Thefollowingnames
quickly come to mind: Joram Nyathi (political writer),
Constantine Chimakure (political writer), Robson Sharuko
(sports writer), Sandra Nyaira (political writer) and Shame
Makoshori (business writer). In fact some of our journalists
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havedoneverywellintheirareasofspecialtythattheydonot
require any further pedagogy. In this paper we argue that
education should complete the training process if the quality
of our news products is to improve. To this end and as
intimated earlier on, we argue for the integration of both
WesternandAfricanmodelsofeducationinordertoproduce
a journalist who appreciates both Pan Africanism and the
demandsoftheglobalvillage.

It is our firm belief that we must be able to chart our own

destiny as Africans rather than interpret African realities
through Eurocentric lances. What is rather disturbing is the
sinking feeling that the African educated elite and those
responsible for offering journalism tuition seem not to be
readytoembracechangethatshouldbringanewdispensation
in the teaching of the African journalist who is abreast with
the interests, needs, values and realities of Black Africa. As
Jimadaaptlyputsit:

TheeducatedAfricanshavebecomeencapsulatedandcannot
see beyond the Eurocentric walls that trap them, hence the
perpetuation of the present system of communication
education. The present system of communication education
through which the communication industry (radio,
television,newspapersandsoon)isbeingsuppliedwithits
personnelneedsonlyfurtherperpetuatestheexistinguseof
the media, which in itself is a negation and even a
destruction of societys cultural values and identity
(Jimada,1992:367).

Ascanbediscernedfromtheabovequotation,thereseemsto
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be no viable models of education which Africa can adopt in

ordertoprepareprofessionaljournalistswhoarecommittedto
nationalservice.Bynationalservicewemeantheabilityofthe
journalisttodevotehimorherselftonationbuildingthrough
objective and constructive journalism. Besides the
inadequaciesoftraining,whatevermodelsAfricahasadopted
seem to be carbon copies of the Western forms of journalism
training which puts more emphasis on individual liberalism
thanacommunitarianwayoflife.

RitaCruiseOBrien(inJimada,1992:366),arguesthatmedia
professionalism in the socalled Third World is an
incorporation oftheThirdWorldintothemetropolitanbase.
Thisistrueintwoways:First,thedirectinfluenceofforeign
consumptionpatternsandlifestylesfosteredthroughtraining
acts as an impediment to autonomous development by
limiting initiatives and originality of individuals and groups.
Second, the influence on standards and norms of training
cause various occupations to identify with their metropolitan
counterparts and ultimately draw the media away from the
culturalbaseandresourcesofpoorcountries.

InEurope,mostnotablyinBritain,thesystemoftrainingnews
people and broadcasters has been by means of highly
developed inservice training. In Europe, Africa and the rest
oftheworld,thecreativeskillsassociatedwithjournalismare
said to be innate, although technical skills are recognized as
requiringtraining[]Forexample,theThompsonnewspaper
organization and the BBC both have major training
institutions (1992: 368). It is worth noting that Third World
countries with a British colonial influence such as Zimbabwe
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have also adopted similar models and every now and then,
state and privately owned media institutions such as The
Herald, The Chronicle, The Sunday Mail and The Sunday News,
The Zimbabwe Independent, The Standard and The Financial
Gazetteprovideinhousetrainingservicestotheirownmedia
personnel.

While there seems to be nothing wrong with such initiatives,

we argue that this form of training is insufficient if it is not
aided by education, which emphasizes the why instead of
what of things. While we agree with both Domatob (1987)
andJimada(1992)ontheneedtocharttheAfricandestinyon
Journalismeducation,webelievethatitwillbefutiletoignore
some Western theoriesof education, after all,not all Western
theoriesandmodelshavecolonialinnuendos.Tothisend,we
consider some guiding philosophical injunctions in the
integration of both Afro and Western values in journalism
pedagogy.

(b)Journalismeducation:IntegratingAfricanwith
occidentalvalues
Personalfeelings,inclinations,wishesandfearsaswellasour
culturalbackgroundsdointerferewiththewaywelookatand
interpret reality. In this treatise, we discuss these issues []
under the gamut of subjectivism and cultural relativism.
Subjectivism, as an ethical world view, holds that an
individualpersonssentiments,inclinations,choices,interests,
needsanddesiresdeterminewhatisrightandwhatiswrong,
good or bad. As put by Judith Lichtenberg, [] no one can
totally escape his or her biases; no one can be completely
objective (Curran and Gurevitch, 1991: 217). If this is true,
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June 2010

thenitbecomesdifficultforajournalisttoknowwhatisright
forotherpeopleandbeabletogeneralizeitviathemedia.

Though subjectivism is not always about individualism,

randomness and chaos,we argue that good journalism is not
about boosting an individuals ego. Thus, subjective thinking
leads to rugged individualism which according to Peters is a
recipe for paranoia (1993: 109). Transposed to the journalism
fraternity it means that mere training does not liberate the
journalist from subjective thinking which does not sit well
withAfricancommunalism.So,whenajournalistchoosesto
peddle falsehoods based on his or her own interpretation of
reality, he or she reduces himself or herself to a thing that
should not belong to a community of relational beings; that
being does not deserve any respect and does not fit into the
Africanphilosophicalschemaofmunhumunhumuvanhuorits
Ndebeleequivalenceofumuntungumuntungabantu(Aperson
isapersonthroughotherpersons).vii

We are what we are because of people around us. So, when

ourjournalistsgatherandwritenews,theyshouldalwaysask
themselveswhatimpactthenewswillhavetothecommunity
at large. Will the news corrupt or enhance the communitys
moral fabric or wellbeing? When one begins to ask such
questions; he or she is now operating in the realm of
education.WebelievethatacombinationofboththeWestern
andAfricanmodelofeducationwillhelpourcause.

ByTheWesternmodelofeducationwemeanthatmodelof
education which emphasizes on liberal values such as the
freedomandautonomyoftheindividualoverandabovethose
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ofthecommunity.Itwillbeimportantinthispapertoshow
that the Western model of education is influenced by
subjective thinking while the African model is influenced by
cultural relativism. While we are aware of the challenges
posedbysubjectivismasoutlinedabove,wedonotthinkthat
there will be a misnomer in fusing Western and African
modelsofeducationinordertoproduceajournalistwhogoes
beyond knowledge of his or her locality in terms of ontology
andvaluation.

(i)
TheWesternmodelofjournalismeducation,in
brief
TheWesternmodelofeducationtakestheformoftheinsight
modelofteachingasprofferedbyIsraelScheffler(Peters,1967:
127). It looks at knowledge as a vision and stress the
importance of understanding. It advocates students own
search for reality, and vision thereof, through personal
engagement with reality. Teachers inspired by the insight
modelstrive to encourageindividualinsightintothemeaning
anduseofpublicknowledge.Whileinsightisveryimportant
and necessary, it is not sufficient for good journalism.
Construingknowledgeintermsofanintellectualinspectionof
realityisnotatallsatisfactory,unlesswerestrictourselvesto
very simple cases of truths accessible through observation or
introspection. Journalism requires powers of deliberation,
argument, judgment, weighing of evidence, appeal to
principlesanddecisionmaking.

The insight model is specifically cognitive in emphasis but

cannotbestretchedsoastocoverimportantaspectsrequired
in grooming a good journalist. Insight also fails to cover the
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concept of character and the related notions of attitude and

disposition (Peters, 1967: 128). But since this is not a paper
with a thrust on journalism ethics, we argue that journalism
training must be based on the insight model as proffered by
Scheffler because it promotes critical thinking in journalism.
But it will be unreasonable to suppose that journalism
educationshouldexcludenotionsofconductandcharacteras
thiswilldefeatthewholepurposeofcriticalthinking.

To this end, we believe that through the insight model,

individually based moral principles such as respect for
persons and the golden rule will be enhanced. A good
journalistmustbecognizantofthefactthatwhateverheorshe
writes must not violate other peoples freedoms and rights.
This is possible because the insight model of education
because of its emphasis on cognitive thinking enables the
journalisttosiftthroughthemindseyeandsummonpowers
of judgment to know what is right or wrong when
disseminating news. But some very interesting questions
emergeregardingthepracticalityofthismodelwhenapplied
to Africa: Do we have enough model mentors in our media
fraternity for this paradigm shift? Is the time given for
journalism training sufficient for this new paradigm? Is a
diplomainjournalismsufficientinviewofthechallengesand
complexities of journalism in contemporary Africa? These
questions and many others will be addressed in the next
section.

(ii)
TheAfricanmodelofjournalismeducation,in
brief
TheAfricanmodelofeducationontheotherhandrelatesto
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June 2010

education with emphasis on collective African goals of

hunhu/ubuntu. It is our firm belief that every journalism
curriculum must hammer on the importance of community,
social harmony as well as issues of restoration and
reconciliationastheseconceptsaretrulyAfrican.Indigenous
religionsandculturesmustalsobepartofthepackageofthe
journalism curriculum, for we believe that the
multidisciplinary nature of the journalism curriculum will
produce an all rounder journalist who is not only equipped
with the writing skills but who also appreciates and
understands the cultural, religious, political and social
influencehisorherstorywillimpacttothereader.
So, when all have been said and done, we are calling for a
repackaging of the journalism curriculum to combine both
Western and African models of education. There are,
however, a few challenging questions against some of our
basicassumptions.Forinstance,whatistheroleofeducation
toajournalistreportingunderthelikesofAdolfHitler?Does
education help a journalist on the verge of starvation, whose
onlylifelineisaproprietorwhodemandsunwaveringloyalty
in fightinghis cause against the government and undesirable
competitors and social groups? R.S. Peters definition of
educationassomesortofprocessesinwhichdesirablestates
ofminddevelopwouldgetusoutofthispredicament.This
is a value laden view of education which results in the
cultivationofaresponsibleanddignifiedjournalist.

Culturalrelativism,ontheotherhand,isabeliefthattruthis
not always universally valid, but should be contextualized.
This view eliminates the possibility of universal right or
wrong.Whilethisviewcutsacrossallcultures,itisanAfro
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June 2010

centric philosophy, a perspective on culture, communication

andhistorycentredontheoriginalemergingvaluesofAfrican
people(Asante,1979).iiThisphilosophyis,however,validfor
African people but becomes invalid for others if imposed as
thedominantworldview.

We argue that journalism education must hinge on the

importance of African culture, religion, politics and
philosophy. For instance, there is an interesting trend in
Africanpoliticswheretheballotboxisslowlybeingreplaced
by inter party dialogue when it comes to the election of
leaders. This is based on Africas philosophy of hunhu or
ubuntu which puts emphasis on dialogue when resolving
disputes.Thisarticleiswrittenatatimewhenthreepolitical
parties in Zimbabwe The MDCTT, the MDCM and ZANU
PF have come together to form a coalition government
following the aborted March 29, 2008 elections. The same
scenarioalsoobtainedinKenyain2007.

Against this background, a journalism curriculum based on

the African model of journalism education will equip the
journalist with the knowledge of how to conceptualize the
dynamicsofAfricanpoliticsandcultureandhowtodefinehis
or her role in the promotion of good governance. There are
some who believe that some of the economic and political
problemsthatZimbabwehasencounteredareofajournalistic
natureandsothisworkcouldnothavecomeatabettertime
than this. Repressive legislation like Public Order and
SecurityAct(POSA),AccesstoInformationandtheProtection
of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and the Broadcasting Authority of
Zimbabwe(BAZ)areoftencitedasthecauseoftheeconomic
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June 2010

andpoliticalcrisisthathasgrippedZimbabwesince2000.

ChallengesandRecommendations
While efforts can be made to introduce the African model of
educationinourjournalismschoolsandcolleges,suchefforts
are bound to hit a snag as journalism education is hampered
by shortage of experienced and knowledgeable teachers as a
resultofthebraindrainthathasseenZimbabwelosingitsbest
brains since 2000 because of political and economic crisis.
Most journalism schools and colleges now employ
inexperienced teachers to train journalists further worsening
thesituationwhichisalreadycritical.Theotherchallengehas
todowithlackofpoliticalaccountabilitygiventhatZimbabwe
is being run by a coalition government and hence efforts to
review the journalism curriculum can viewed with suspicion
fromsomequarters.

OurrecommendationisthatasZimbabweisembarkingonthe
process of formulating a new constitution, issues related to
media and journalism curriculum must be debated and
incorporated into the new constitution. We also recommend
thatjournalismschoolsandcollegesmustbeupgradedtooffer
degrees and that the duration for the diploma in journalism
must be three years with the final year being reserved for
journalismtheory.

Conclusion
The article began by giving a picture of the Zimbabwean
media scene and the research problem therein. The
observation was that approximately 150 journalists were
churned by colleges of journalism, schools and university
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departments every year from 2000 to 2008. It was also

observed that most of these practitioners lacked the critical
toolsofanalysisandthattherewasneedtofuseWesternand
African models of education to produce diligent, critical and
responsible journalists. Journalism training was considered
necessary but insufficient in a world driven by critical
thinking and close analysis of events as they unfold in the
globe. Against this background the article recommended the
upgrading of schools and colleges of journalism so that they
can also offer degrees and the need to revisit the journalism
curriculum in light of the recent developments in Zimbabwe
wheretheretalkofanewconstitution.

Endnotes

i.

ii.

As a philosophy, Pan-Africanism represents the aggregation of

the historical, cultural, spiritual, artistic, scientific and
philosophical legacies of Africans from past times to the
present. Pan-Africanism as an ethical system traces its origins
from ancient times, and promotes values that are the product
of the African civilization and the struggles against slavery,
racism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism. It (Pan-Africanism)
sets aside cultural differences, asserting the principality of
these shared experiences to foster solidarity and resistance to
exploitation (H:/Pan-Africanism Wikipedia, the free
encyclopedia.htm accessed May 2009).
The philosophy of Afrocentricity is well defended by
MolefiKeteAsanteoftheTempleschool.Accordingto
Asante, this philosophy is a way of answering all
cultural,economic,politicalandsocialquestionsrelated
to African people from a centred position. It is a
revolutionary philosophy because it studies ideas,
concepts, events, and personalities, political and
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iii.
iv.

v.

vi.

June 2010

economicprocessesfromthestandpointofblackpeople
assubjectsandnotasobjects(M.KAsante.(2009),Afro
centricity,
at
http://asante.net/articles/1/afrocentricity/
Accessed28June2009).
CourtesyoftheMediaMonitoringProjectofZimbabwe,
2005,p.87.
This is a serious challenge considering that modern
society requires journalists to be multidisciplinary in
their endeavor to gather and write balanced news.
Appreciating the sociocultural, political, religious and
economicbackgroundsofindividualsandgroupsisvital
incriticalnewsreporting.
In short, a critical journalist must go beyond the
technicalknowhowofstorywritingtoadeepreflection
of the content and its implications to the reader. Most
Zimbabwean journalists lack the critical hunch for
accuracy and objectivity and this article is timely and
relevant.
Dr. Kimani Gecau is a Senior Lecturer of Media and
CommunicationStudiesintheDepartmentofEnglishat
theUniversityofZimbabwe.Dr.Gecaubelievesthatthe
dichotomy between theory and practice leads to
animosity in the newsroom, as trained journalists feel
theyhavethebraggingrightsinthenewsroombasedon
their practical skills while degreed media practitioners
believetheyhavealottotelltheirnewsroomcolleagues
basedontheirintellectualorientation.Thisproblemhas
itshistoricalrootsdatingbacktothedaysofcadettype
inhouse training of the Rhodesian Printing and
Publishing Company that trained the crop of older
editors in the country to the establishment of the first
journalism school at Harare Polytechnic and
subsequently the introduction of Media and
Communication Studies at the University of Zimbabwe
207

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vii.

June 2010

in 1993. Nevertheless, Dr. Gecau believes that there is

no need for such animosity because the trained
journalist and the degreed media practitioner should
completeeachother.
The idea of hunhu/ubuntu as a philosophy and an overarching
ethical principle runs throughout Southern Africa and is
premised on the idea:
I am because we are; since we are
therefore I am (Mbiti, 1969:204-215). Asante, M.K. (1979),
International/intercultural relations, in M. Asante and A.
Vandi (eds) Contemporary Black thought: Alternative
analyses in social and behavioural sciences, Beverly Hills:
CA: Sage.

References
Akinpelu,J.A.(1995)AnIntroductiontoPhilosophyofEducation(London,
MacmillanEducationLtd).

Asante,M.K.(2009)Afrocentricity
http://asante.net/articles/1/afrocentricity/Retrieved28June2009.
Asante,M.K.(1979)International/interculturalrelations,inM.Asanteand
A.Vandi(eds)ContemporaryBlackthought:Alternativeanalysesinsocialand
behaviouralsciences(BeverlyHills:CA:Sage).

Domatob,J.K.(1987),CommunicationTrainingforSelfRelianceinBlack
Africa:ChallengesandStrategies,Gazette:InternationalCommunication,40:3,
pp.167182.

Gecau,K(2010)TheconflictbetweenMediaStudiesandJournalismTraining
inZimbabwe,inanInterviewheldattheUniversityofZimbabwe,
DepartmentofEnglishonthe13thofJanuary2010

Jimada,U.(1992)EurocentricMediaTraininginNigeria:WhatAlternative?
JournalofBlackStudies,22:3,pp.366379.

208

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June 2010

Kant,I.(1967)Education,inR.SPetersTheConceptofEducation(London,
RoutledgeandKeganPaul).

Litchenberg,J.(1991)InDefenseofObjectivity,inJ.CurranandM.
Gurevitch(eds),MassMediaandSociety(London:EdwardArnoldPublishers).

MediaUnderSiege(2002)ReportonMediaCoverageofthe2002Presidential
andMayoralelectionsinZimbabwe,MediaMonitoringProjectofZimbabwe.

Nicolson,R.(2008)PersonsinCommunity:AfricanEthicsinaGlobalCulture
(Scottsville,UniversityofKwaZuluNatalPress).

Obrien,R.C.(1992)EurocentricMediaTraininginNigeria:What
Alternative?JournalofBlackStudies,22:3,pp.366379.

Peters,R.S.(1993)Authority,ResponsibilityandEducation(London,Allenand
Unwin).
________(1967)TheConceptofEducation(London,RoutledgeandKeganPaul).

Scheffler,I.(1967)PhilosophicalModelsofTeaching,inR.SPetersThe
ConceptofEducation,(London,RoutledgeandKeeganPaul).

Whitehead,A.H.(1967)TheAimsofEducationandOtherEssays,inR.S
PetersEthicsandEducation(Atlanta,ScottForesman).
Zhuwarara,R,Gecau,K&Drag,M.(1997)Media,DemocratizationandIdentity
(Gweru,MamboPress).

AuthorsBiographicalnote
Dr. Fainos Mangena is a Media Practitioner and Lecturer of
Philosophy(MoralPhilosophyandAppliedethics)attheUniversity
of Zimbabwes Department of Religious Studies, Classics and
Philosophy. He wasa Post Doctoral Research Fellow at the Centre
for Leadership Ethics in Africa (CLEA), University of Fort Hare in
2009 and a Wits University Visiting Researcher in 2008. Dr.
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June 2010

MangenaisamemberofthePhilosophicalSocietyofSouthernAfrica
(PSSA), a consultant for the Zimbabwe Open University and has
written a number of articles related to Moral Education, African
FeministEthics,MediaEthicsandSocialJusticeandhismostrecent
publication is, Some Ethical Challenges in Media Advertising in
SubSaharanAfrica:AZimbabweanCaseStudy.
HecanbecontactedattheDepartmentofReligiousStudies,Classics
and Philosophy, University of Zimbabwe, P.O Box MP167, Mt.
Pleasant,
Harare,
Cell:
00263915885953.
EMail:
fainosmangena@gmail.com,
fmangena@arts.uz.ac.zw
or
fbvuma@yahoo.com

Mr. Munyaradzi Madambi is a Media Practitioner and Lecturer of

Philosophy (Philosophy of Education and Business ethics) at the
UniversityofZimbabwesDepartmentofReligiousStudies,Classics
and Philosophy. He is currently serving as Executive Dean of
Studentsat the University of Zimbabwe. He has written articles in
areasrelatedtoBusinessEthics,Education,StudentGovernanceand
theMediaaswellasPhilosophyofEducation.Mr.Madambiisalso
a consultant in areas of Business Ethics, Environmental and Media
Ethics.
HecanbecontactedattheDepartmentofStudentAffairs,University
of Zimbabwe: P.O Box MP 167, Mt. Pleasant: Harare. Cell:
00263912235154.
EMail:
mmadambi@admin.uz.ac.zw
or
mmadambi@hotmail.com

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June 2010

Social Justice, Democracy and Cultural

Renewal in Nigeria

Kelly Bryan Ovie Ejumudo, Ph.D.

DepartmentofPoliticalScience,
DeltaStateUniversity,Abraka,Nigeria
Email:drkellypaulovieejumudo@yahoo.com

Abstract
Globally, democracy is at the heart of social justice. This is
because it represents a vehicle for the actualization of the
principles of fairness, equality of opportunity, liberty, and
socialrightsandtheabsenceofsocialandclassbarriers.Inthe
ThirdWorld,socialjusticeislargelyconstrainedbythefailed
attempts to deepen and consolidate their budding and
fledgling democracy, due to poor governance, economic
mismanagement, political instability, social dislocation and
cultural decay. In Nigeria, the problem of social injustice is
accentuated by the crisis of the democratization process. This
paper therefore examines the factors that inhibit the
democratic experimentation and consolidation process in
Nigeria and explores the feasibility of social justice through
democratic reengineering and cultural change. This paper,
which also derived its data from valuable secondary sources,
concluded with useful recommendations including the
creation of a genial democratic climate that will facilitate the
reconstruction of cultural values and enhance the
enthronementofsocialjusticeinNigeria.

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June 2010

Introduction
Democracyasaninstitutionalarrangementthatguaranteesthe
preservationofindividualrightsisnotonlypredicatedonthe
principles of liberty, equality, justice, representation,
consensus and peace building, it equally provides a fertile
groundthatisgermanefortheinitiationandconsolidationof
development efforts and aspirations. At the heart of the
realization of democratic reality, is, social justice through
cultural renewal in Nigeria. And social justice ordinarily
engenders a climate that upholds and ensures the
enthronement of the responsiveness, transparency and
accountability of the state and the true empowerment of the
people that enables them to lead a live that they value and
actualize their potentials. Despite this arguable link between
democracy and social justice, the Nigerian democratic
experimentation and assumed consolidation process is not
really on course. The major problem is the negative
predisposition and poor commitment by the Nigerian
leadership to enthrone true democracy in the face of the
sundrypolitical,economicandsocialconditionsthathadand
still constrain democratic governance and sustenance in
Nigeria. The democratic illusion, notwithstanding, social
justicethroughdemocraticengineeringandculturalchangeis
feasibleandworkableinNigeria.DemocraticrealityinNigeria
musthoweverdemandandnecessitatethecreationofagenial
democratic climate that has the potency of and will actually
facilitatethereconstructionofculturalvaluesandenhancethe
enthronement of social justice in Nigeria. In this canvassed
climate, there must exist on a sustainable basis, a refocusing
ofthestatetoservethemacrointerestsofitscitizenry,rather
than the micro interest of the privileged few. This paper
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June 2010

therefore examines the sundry factors that inhibit the

democratic experimentation and consolidation process in
Nigeria and explores the feasibility of social justice through
democraticreengineeringandculturalchange.

SocialJustice:AConceptualDiscourse
The term justice implies the quality of being just, right or
reasonable. It is opposed to what is unjust, wrong o
unreasonable. It embodies an ideal that is akin to the
absolutetruthyetitisadynamicideabecauseourrealization
oftheideaandourcomprehensionofthatabsolutetruthisa
continuous process. Progress in this direction depends upon
the development of social consciousness, so that what was
regarded as just some centuries ago may not be so regarded
today. Barker (1961) has shown that justice represents a
synthesis of the principles of liberty, equality and fraternity.
Justice is the thread which runs through all these values and
makes them parts of an integrated whole. It reconciles their
conflicts and contradictions and gives them the shape of
universal principles of governance. Obviously, it is our sense
of justice that impels us to postulate that human relations in
societyshouldberegulatedbyreasonandjusticerecognizes
the dignity of the human beings as such. It is the rational
nature of man that clothes him with this dignity. It demands
thateachindividualshouldbetreatedasanendinitselfnota
means to an end. In this respect, all individuals should be
treatedasequaltoeachother.Theprincipleofjusticerequires
thatthedeprivedandunderprivilegedgroupsshouldbegiven
specialprotectioninordertosavethemfromtheexcessofthe
dominantgroups.
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It is important to note that the modern concept of justice is

differentfromthetraditionalconcept.Thetraditionalconcept
of justice focused on the just man and was primarily
concerned with the virtues befitting a man for enhancing his
moralworth.Italsoconsistedintheperformanceofhisduties
attachedtohisstatusdeterminedbytheprevalentlaw,social
customsandmodeofthought.Themodernconceptofjustice,
ontheotherhand,ismarkedbyashiftofemphasis,fromthe
ideaofajustorvirtuousmantothatofajustsociety.Inother
words,thetraditionalviewofjusticeembodiedaconservative
idea;whilethemodernviewembodiesaprogressiveidea.The
traditional view insisted on the individual conforming to a
preconceivedimageofsociety;butthemodernviewofjustice
seeks to transform society itself for the realization of certain
human values. To be sure, the traditional view of justice has
given way to the modern idea of social justice and the term
socialjusticetendstoissuefromthemouthsofreformersand
toberegardedwithsuspicionbythosewhoaresatisfiedwith
theexistingorder(Raphael1976:12).

The term social justice was coined by the Jesuit Luigi

Taparelli in the 1840s, based on the teachings of Thomas
Aquinas. His basic premise was that the rival economic
theories, based on subjective Cartesian thinking, undermined
the unity of society. The concept of social justice could be
nebulous when broadly defined (Obasanjo and Mabogunje
1994:124).Asaconsequence,anyattemptatconceptualizingit
may confront the problems of exactitude, accuracy and
precision.Allthesame,itisthepromotionandapplicationof
basic human rights, basic human needs and the means of
impartially protecting and enforcing them legally in any
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society. Although the above functions can be executed by

democraciesaswellasotherformsofgovernment,democracy
has an additional merit in that it stimulates people to self
education because participation by the people in government
activitiesopenswiderhorizonsfortheindividualandtendsto
broaden his interests (Gauba 2007:423). The idea of social
justicecomprisesaforcebehindsocialchange.Thisisbecause
it is precisely when people find fault with the existing social
order,involvingoppressiveandexploitativesocialconditions,
that they raise the demand for social justice, seeking suitable
changes in social policy for determining an authoritative
allocation of values. Essentially, the ideas of liberty and
equality derive their substance from the idea of social justice
when these principles seek a transformation of the existing
socialconditionstoeliminateinjusticeinsociety.Inanutshell,
social justice is the voice of the oppressed and the
underprivilegedagainsttheexcessesofthesocialsystem.Itis
an expression of what is due to the individual from society,
especiallytotheindividualwhoiscondemnedtoawretchand
subhumanlivingbecauseofadefectivesystemofdistribution
of advantages accruing from the organized social life. The
main problem of social justice is to decide an appropriate
allocation of the benefits that are available or that can be
securedthroughtheinstrumentalityofthesocialorganization.
When the modern idea of justice is applied to the various
aspectsofsociallife,wegetlegal,politicalandsocioeconomic
notions of justice. These are by no means watertight
compartments, for they constitute a continuum within the
generalschemeofsocialjustice.

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Democracy:AConceptualUnderstanding
Democracy was derived from the Greek word Demos
meaningpeopleandKratosimplyingruleorpowerrefersto
government or rule by the people or masses (1994: 13).
According to George Orwell (cited in Mahajan 2008: 793),
democracydoesnothaveanagreeddefinitionandtheattempt
toprovideoneisresistedfromallsides.Democracycouldbe
defined as a highflown name for something that does not
exist.Inasimilarvein,Lucas(1976:29)opinedthatdemocracy
isanounbutshouldbeanadjective.Itthereforeimpliesthat
democracy is nothing but different doctrines in different
peoplesmindsorperhapsthemostpromiscuouswordinthe
world of public affairs and it could be everybodys mistress.
Burns (1935: 32) equally asserted that democracy is a word
withmanymeaningsandsomeemotionalcolour,foritisnot
an algebraic symbol, but a flag or the call of a trumpet for
some; and for others an obsolete mythology which has
undesirableconnectionswithcapitalismandimperialism,and
to Finer (1949:15) democracy has come to mean different
things, some very hostile to each other, that it needs careful
analysis if misunderstanding and idle controversies are to be
avoided.Attemptingacomprehensivedefinitionofdemocracy
appearselusiveandamirage.Thisisbecauseitisconfounded
by a wooliness of thought and usage that is characteristic of
thesocialsciences.AndasEliot(1914:17)rightlyposited,when
a word acquires a universally sacred character as the word
democracy has, one wonders whether it still means anything
at all. Expanding the frontiers of the argument, De Jourenel
(1949: 276) noted that all discussions about democracy, all
arguments whether for it or against it, are stricken with
intellectual futility because the thing at issue is indefinite.
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Thereforeeffortsbyscholarsandpoliticaltheoristsacrossage,
discipline and society to define democracy have always
founded on the rock of ambiguity and antinomy (Williams
1999: 65). The complexity in defining democracy may be due
to the fact that political systems are in a continual state of
evolution and ideas regarding what ought to be the scope of
governmentalinterventioninthelivesofindividualshavealso
changed and are continually changing. No wonder, the
complexity in providing a concise and precise definition of
democracy is compounded by the fact that historically the
concept itself has been a locus or terrain of prolonged
intellectualandideologicalcontestations.

Essentially,aftercenturiesofintellectualspeculationsastothe
originandnatureofdemocracy,thesadconclusionisthatitis
an ideal towards which many nations strive. By implication,
the democratic ideal remains an ideal, a possible explanation
for the necessity to see democracy as a continuum where
democraciescanbeplacedandgaugedinaccordancewiththe
extent oftheirdemocratizationorconformity withacceptable
democraticnormsandvalues.Onemaysimplyarguethatany
given nation, or a method or institution is democratic which
meansthatitisintheprocessofachievingtheidealorthatit
adopts some principles or processes which may be called
democratic (Ijomah 1988:65). In fact, as far back as 1849,
Guizot(1949:11)observedthatsuchisthepoweroftheword
Democracy that no government or party dares to raise its
headorbelievesitsownexistencepossible,ifitdoesnotbear
thatwordinscribedontheburner.Thedifficultiesofcapturing
the essence of democracy and of high listing its often
contradictory activities made scholars and researchers to
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resort to various devices and stratagems for coming to terms

with the above reality (William 1999: 6566). One of the most
celebrated and influential attempts in this direction are the
concept of polyarchy formulated by Dahl (1971:39). He
classified political regimes according to two criteria: the
degree of contestation of political power and the extent of
popular participation in such contestation. The two
dimensionalframeworkproposedbyDahlhasbecomewidely
adoptedbypoliticalscientiststomeasuretheextenttowhich
various states approximate the democratic ideal (Tremblay et
al2004).

It therefore follows that in a democracy, government should

notonlyberesponsibletothedemos(people),politicalpower
should alsoemanate from the popular will of the people and
the state should be guided by and bound by the same will.
Diamond (1999:19) approached democracy as a developing
process and added that consolidation is a critical step in
building democracies. He further argued that the
consolidation process involves three components namely:
decentralization that enhances the efficiency, quality and
legitimacy of democracy, political culture which is a
precondition for democracy to take root, especially as
democratic values, beliefs, attitudes, norms and means must
beembodiedinademocracyandthecreationofacivilsociety
that facilitates and enhances public participation in the
democratic process and prevents abusive power from
becomingconcentratedatthecentreofsociety.Democracyis
awayoflifethatpermitsfreedomtomakechoicespertaining
toeveryareaofhumanendeavorandsafeguardsthelibertyof
individuals and protects them against unnecessary constrains
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on their actions because it is a governance system based on

popularwill.

Atamoretheoreticallevel,democracyisapoliticalsystemin
which the eligible people in any country participate actively
notonlyindeterminingthekindofpeoplethatgovernthem,
but also actually participate actively in shaping the policy
output of the government (1994:197). Bryce (cited in Mahajan
2008:794)equallyassertedthatdemocracyhasbeenusedever
sincethetimeofHerodotustodenotethatformofgovernment
inwhichtherulingpowerofastateislegallyvestednotinany
particular class or classes, but in the members of the
communityasawhole,whileMahajan(2008:794)stressedthat
democracyisnotaparticularkindofcivilization,itisrathera
civilized way of taking political action. A parsimonious
definitionofdemocracythatcapturedtheimportantnotionof
the uncertainty of political competition is that of Przeworski
(cited in Tremblay et al 2004: 335) who contended that
democracyisquintessentiallycharacterizedbythefactthatthe
winners of political competition do not have a guaranteed
control over the power that they have won. Therefore, if the
losers of political game know that they have a reasonable
chancetowininthefuturethentheyhaveanincentivetostay
within the rules of the game and accept their long status.
When losers think this way then democracy becomes
equilibriumbecauseneitherthewinningnorthelosingsideof
thecompetitionhasanincentivetodepartfromitunilaterally.
In line with this perspective, democracy is an organized
uncertainty,apoliticalcontrivancethatisaimedatreconciling
freedom with the need for law and its enforcement and a
politicalmethodbywhicheverycitizenhastheopportunityof
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participating through discussion in an attempt to reach

voluntaryagreementastowhatshallbedoneforthegoodof
thecommunityasawhole.

Mill (cited in Mahajan 2008: 794) also viewed democracy as

that form of government in which the whole people or a
numerous portion of them exercise the governing power
through deputies periodically elected by themselves, while
Seeley opined that democracy is a government in which
everybody has a share. According to Hall (cited in Mahajan
2008:794),democracyisthatformofpoliticalorganizationin
whichpublicopinionhascontrolandMayo(citedinMahajan
2008:794)notedthatdemocracyisoneinwhichpublicpolicies
are made on a majority basis by representatives subject to
effective popular control at periodic elections which are
conducted on the principle of political equality and under
conditionsofpoliticalfreedom.Kpanneh(citedinMbah2003:
151) equally argued that democracy is a complex process of
institution building, development of a liberal political culture
and traditions, an uninhibited growth of free speech, an
unfettered development of the press and respect for not only
therule,butthedueprocessofthelaw.Itcanbesafelystated
therefore that democracy cannot exist in the absence of
fundamental human rights, whether individually or
collectively, which is in consonance with Nnolis (2003: 143)
notion that democracy is a system of government usually
involving freedom of the individual in many respects of
political life, equality among citizens, justice in the
relationship between the people and the government and the
participationofthepeopleinchoosingthoseingovernment.It
isnotonlyprimarilyameansthroughwhichdifferentgroups
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canattaintheirendsorseekthegoodofsociety;itisthegood
societyitselfinoperation(Gauba2007:22).Ratherthanamode
of governance, democracy represents a bold and rigorous
attempttoconceptualizethedemocraticprocessasafunction
of several features that include freedom of speech, and
association,thesupremacyofthewilloftheelectorate,regular
elections and accountability. These features constitute the
clustering of practice and countries can be placed on the
democracycontinuuminlinewiththepresenceorabsenceof
allorsomeofthefeatures.

The Redistribution and Recognition Dimensions of Social

Justice
Intodaysworld,claimsforsocialjusticeseemincreasinglyto
divide into two types. The two divides are the redistributive
claims that seek a more just distribution of resources and
benefits and the recognition type that has not only attracted
the interest of political philosophers, but equally seeks to
developanewparadigmofjusticethatputsrecognitionatthe
centre (Fraser 2006:27). Evidently, the discourse of social
justice, once centred on redistribution, is now increasingly
divided between claims for redistribution on one hand, and
claimsforrecognition,ontheother.Inthisnewconstellation,
thetwokindsofjusticeclaimsareoftendissociatedfromone
anotherboth theoretically and pragmatically. In some cases,
however, the dissociation has become a polarization. Some
proponents of distribution reject the politics of recognition
outright, casting claims for the recognition of difference as
false consciousness, a hindrance to the pursuit of social
justice. Conversely some proponents of recognition approve
therelativeeclipseofthepoliticsofredistribution,construing
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thelatterasanobtrudedmaterialism,simultaneouslyblindto
and complicit with many injustices (Fraser 2006:29). All the
same, both redistribution and recognition paradigms are
usefulaspectsorelementsofsocialjustice,especiallyasnone
isinitselfsufficient.Theultimatetaskisthustocollapseand
combine both paradigms into an integrated whole or
comprehensiveframework.Theoretically,thetaskistodevise
a twoway dimensional conception of justice that can
accommodate both defensible claims for the recognition of
differences and the redistribution of opportunities and
benefits. The task will entail devising a pragmatic political
orientation that integrates the best of the politics of
redistributionwiththebestofthepoliticsofrecognition.

The paradigm of redistribution and the paradigm of

recognitioncanhoweverbecontrastedinseveralkeyrespects.
First, both paradigms assume different conceptions of
injustice; while the redistribution paradigm focuses on
injustices it defines as socioeconomic and presumes to be
rootedinthepoliticaleconomysuchasexploitation,economic
marginalization,anddeprivation,therecognitionparadigm,in
contrast, targets injustices understood as cultural, which it
presumes to be rooted in social patterns of representation,
interpretation, and communication like cultural domination,
nonrecognition and disrespect. Secondly, the two paradigms
propose different sorts of remedies for injustice. In the
redistribution paradigm, the remedy for injustice is political
economic restructuring involving redistributing income,
recognizingthedivisionoflabourortransformingotherbasic
economic structures, but in the light of the recognition
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paradigm, the remedy for injustice is cultural or symbolic

change.

The above reality would involve upwardly revaluing

disrespectedidentifies,positivelyvalorisingculturaldiversity
or the wholesale transformation of social patterns of
representation,interpretationandcommunicationinwaysthat
would change everyones social identity. Thirdly, the two
approaches assume different understandings of group
differences. The redistribution paradigm treats such
differences as unjust differentials that should be abolished,
while the recognition paradigm treats differences either as
culturalvariationsthatshouldbecelebratedorasdiscursively
constructed hierarchical oppositions that should be
deconstructed. A middleoftheway approach will ultimately
entail a shift away from these extremes and tackle the two
way dimensional problem of social injustice that is rooted in
the economic structure and the status order of society and
traceable to both political economy and culture
simultaneously,

Democracy as a Vehicle for the Actualization of Social

Justice
Democracyandsocialjusticearerelatedtotheextentthatthe
former facilitates and enhances public participation and
prevents abusive power from becoming concentrated at the
centreofsociety.Moreover,democracyisattheheartofsocial
justiceinsofarasitisaninstrumentthatpermitsfreedomto
make choices pertaining to every area of human endeavour
and safeguards the liberty of individuals and protects them
againstunnecessaryconstrainsontheiractionsbecauseitisa
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governance system based on popular will. Its relevance to

social justice is evident in the vital role it plays in the
administration of common affairs and the bestowal of aid to
individuals in their quest to lead a life that they value and
cherish. Democracy is, in fact, a political contrivance that is
aimed at reconciling freedom with the need for law and its
enforcementanditisapoliticalmethodbywhicheverycitizen
hastheopportunityof participatingthroughdiscussioninan
attempt to reach voluntary agreement as to what should be
done for the collective good of society. Arguably, since
democracycannotexistintheabsenceoffundamentalhuman
rights,whetherindividuallyorcollectively,astandpointthat
is in consonance with Nnolis (2003:143) notion that
democracy is a system of government usually involving
freedom of the individual in many respects of political life,
equalityamongcitizens,justiceintherelationshipbetweenthe
people and the government. Despite the potentially strong
nexusbetweendemocracyandsocialjustice,Itisnotsufficient
forapeopleorasocietytoclaimtopracticeademocraticform
of government except there is clear and unambiguous
evidence of popular participation. Ordinarily, functional
democracycreatesanenvironmentthatisconduciveforsocial
and economic development and resultantly critical to the
enthronement and sustenance of justice in any society or
polity.Anddemocracyembodiesthewillofthegovernedand
the consent of the ruled will not only endorse and enhance
legitimacy,itwillalsounleashtheenergyofthepeopleforthe
greattransformationthatisneeded(Ajibewa2006:263264).

At its core, democracy is a state of mind, a set of attitudinal

dispositions woven into the fabric of society, the concrete
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expressionofwhichisthesocialinstitutionsandundemocratic
social institutions cannot therefore sire or sustain democratic
governments, no matter how often the ballot box ritual is
enacted (Agozimo 2005). Democracy that can affect and
impact on social justice, by implication, encapsulates liberty,
equality, fraternity, effective citizenship control over policy,
responsible and responsive government, honesty and
opennessinpolitics,informedandrationaldeliberation,equal
participation, power and virtues (Huntington 1991:6). In a
similar vein, Dahl underscored that effective participation,
equalityinvoting,gainingenlightenedunderstanding,control
of agenda and inclusion of adult are necessary conditions for
democracy (Dahl 1971). Thus democracy as a veritable tool
and instrument for the actualization of social justice,
notwithstanding, there must exists a facilitating rather than a
constrainingclimate.Afterall,ifjusticeanddemocracyareto
take firm root and thrive, there must be a sure and solid
foundation in certain shared beliefs, traditions, attitudes,
moral sense, transcendental spirit and sentiments that bind a
societytorespecthumanrightsandtobehavedemocratically.

SocialJusticeandtheCrisisofDemocratizationinNigeria
Despite the arguable fact that after centuries of intellectual
speculations as to the origin and nature of democracy, there
seem to be the sad conclusion that democracy is an ideal
towards which many nations strive (Ijomah 1988:45), in the
Nigeriancontext,democracyissomethingmuchtalkedabout,
greatlyaspiredandstrenuouslystruggledfor,becauseitisan
aspiration dearly cherished by many, but far from being
realized(Jega2007:22).Infact,democracyhasalmostbecome
anillusioninthefaceoftheplethoraofconstitutionalreforms
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and transition programmes and efforts supposedly aimed at

democratic experimentation and consolidation in Nigeria.
Although a number of former European colonies in Africa
including Nigeria became independent states adopting
democraticconstitutions(Tremblayetal2004:336)andthepre
occupation of many of the third world countries in the 1990s
was democratic consolidation, Nigeria was primarily
concerned with how to terminate military rule and ensure
credible civilian democratic rule and she is yet caught up in
web between democratic experimentation and actual
democratization. Fascinating theoretical discourses have, in
fact, attributed the Nigerian socioeconomic, political and
democratic crisis to prebendalism, predation, and
patrimonialism,theroughstate,thedynamicsofglobalcapital
expansion and class formation in the periphery and so on
(Joseph1995,Diamond1999,Ibrahim1989andGraf1988).

While it is evident that Africa requires more than the crude

variety of liberal democracy that has been foisted on it and
even more than the impoverished liberal democracy that
prevails in the industrialized countries, the crisis of
democratization in Nigeria smacks off the fact that the
problem is multidimensional. As Ake (2003:130) rightly
articulated, liberal democracy is inimical to the idea of the
people having effective decisionmaking power and as it
evolved, liberal democracy got less democratic as its
democraticelementssuchastheconsentofthegoverned,the
accountability of power to the governed and popular
participationcameunderpressurefrompoliticalelitesallover
the world. The primary issue therefore is not whether
democracy is desirable in Nigeria, but how its feasibility has
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been constrained by sundry factors such that democratic

consolidation or put more pungently, true democracy has
proved impracticable or practically a mirage. Ordinarily,
Diamond,LipsetandLinzcontendedthatfordemocracytobe
sustained,certainbroadfactorsorconditionsmustexist.These
factors include some history of democratic politics, broad
legitimacy,existingpoliticalculturethatistolerantofpolitical
freedom, opposition and competition, positive correlation
between socioeconomic development and democratic
government, the existence and functioning of mediating and
autonomousassociationalgroups(civicsociety)thatarebased
on variable categories like class, region, ethnicity, occupation
andreligion,theformationofinstitutionsthatwillacttocheck
the concentration of power in the state and the existence of
state structures that can produce economic growth, meet
distributive demands and maintain order without quashing
liberties (Held 2000). The underlying supposition that lies
embeddedintheabovecontentionisthenexusbetweensocial
justiceanddemocracy,forwhilesocialjusticeiscriticaltoand
germane for democratization and democratic consolidation,
democracy is an instrument of institutional structure for the
actualization of the ideas and principles of social justice. As
the World Bank (1997) also patently put it, democracies
conversely could make reform more feasible in several ways
and political checks and balances, a free press and open
debatesonthecostsandbenefitsofgovernmentpolicycould
giveawiderpublicastakeinreform.Theabsenceoftheabove
factors may suffice as a reasonable explanation for the crisis
thathascharacterizedthedemocratizationprocessinNigeria.
Also, despite the acknowledged fact that the decade of the
1990swillgodowninAfricaastheperiodofrenewedstruggle
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for democracy or at least a governance system based on

popular will as Olowu (1999:15) clearly underscored, the
journey toward democratic governance in Nigeria has been
tortuous and plagued with a myriad of problems that are
constitutional, structural, institutional and attitudinal in
dimensions. Olowu (1999:13) for instance, posited that the
efforttodemocratizeinvolvesmattersofconstitutionalchoice
thattranscendmultipartyelectionsorthereplacementofone
group by another in government. He noted further that a
governmental regime should evolve that provides the
opportunityforalltomakeinputintothegoverningprocesses
without compromising the integrity and effectiveness of the
processes. Such regimes must involve multiple or concurrent
constitutionalorderratherthanonesinglecentreofauthority
and power or centralization of power that has been
fashionable in Africa, particularly Nigeria that is the focus of
this study. Without tackling the problem of constituting
multiplecentresofpower,thesearchforstableandacceptable
governingstructuresisboundtobeamirage(Olowu1999:16).
It is instructive to note, at this stage, that the conduct of
elections and the emergence of other structural trappings
associated with western democracy in a country like Nigeria
are not tantamount to the existence of actual democracy. The
need for governmental structures to be fully institutionalized
with appropriate and true democratic culture embedded has
thereforebecomeadesideratuminNigeria.Thisisbecausefor
democracy to recognize the plural nature of politics and the
diversity of social forces in any political community that
presupposes and accommodates free participation and
competition, civil and political liberties, collaboration and co
operation, the relationship between the governed and the
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government must be truly servicebased. In fact, democracy

exists when the relationship between the governed and the
government abides by the principle that the state is at the
serviceofthecitizensandnotthecitizensattheserviceofthe
state;thatthegovernmentexistsforthepeoplenotviceversa.
ThesituationinNigeriaisevidentlyandarguablyopposite.

Itthereforeimpliesthatfortruedemocracyto beachievedin
Nigeria, the citizens must not only be secured from external
attacks, but more importantly, they should be relatively free
from the devastating consequences of internal upheavals,
unemployment, hunger, starvation, diseases, ignorance,
homelessness, environmental degradation and pollution and
all imaginable shades of socioeconomic injustices, especially
as true democracy and real development are inextricably
linkedtogether,yetnotwithoutinterveningvariables.Andit
is when the above are in place that democratic nurturing can
beginmeaningfullybecauseahungryandangrypopulaceare
under the yoke of bad government (Nnoli 2006:352). Thus, a
society is democratic when it progressively develops its
capacity to nurture and consolidate democratic culture and
democratic governance. The above standpoint explains the
desirabilityandinevitabilityofsocialjusticeasaveritabletool
for facilitating democratic consolidation and governance
throughculturaltransformationandrenewal.

Constraining and Inhibiting factors to Democratic

ExperimentationandConsolidationProcessinNigeria
Inwhathasbecometheclassicpieceondemocratizationinthe
modernizationschool,Lipset(citedinTremblayetal2004:338)
argued that the more well to do a nation, the greater the
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chances it will sustain democracy. In Nigeria, several factors

haveworkedtoconstraintheworkabilityandconsolidationof
democracy. The factors include lack of appropriate and
entrenched political culture and representation, electoral
fraud, injustice and political instability, elite manoeuvrings
andmanipulation,corruptionandeconomicmismanagement,
social dislocation, military regime and militarization, alien
democraticsystem,poorsocial,politicalandeconomicliberty
and cultural decay. Democracy must embody and uphold
principles that are central to its consolidation and sustenance
and the bottom line is that democracy guarantee true liberty
that allows people to lead a life that they value and realize
theirpotentialsashumanbeings.DahlandMcClosky(citedin
Protro and Grigg), for instance, contended that democratic
stability requires commitment to democratic values or rules
which is arguably apparently lacking in Nigeria. Notably,
democracycannotbeentrenchedwherethereisprevalenceof
dysfunctional political culture and political instability,
economic mismanagement, social dislocation and cultural
decay and general injustice. In the same vein, Aristotle
emphasized that freedom and equality are best realized in a
democracy and for any democratic arrangement to be
nourished and rooted, the twin values are critical. The above
enumerated factors that have constrained democratic
consolidation and governance in Nigeria can be subsumed
underthefollowingsubheads:

Political Conditions: Political conditions are necessary for

establishment,entrenchment,consolidationandsustenanceof
democracy in any society including Nigeria. The absence of
suchconditionsdoesnotonlyconstrainandmakedemocratic
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experimentationandconsolidationamirage;italsocripplesor
rendersnonexistentthepotentialandveritableinstrumentof
socialjusticethatisintandemwithdemocraticreality.Inthe
Nigerian context, entrenched dysfunctional political culture
and representation, electoral fraud, injustice and political
instability, as well as military regime and militarization and
elite manoeuvrings and manipulation have intervened in the
democratic experimentation and consolidation process, so
much so, that democracy is still very fledging and at best a
failed system. Nigeria has, for instance, had over 30 years of
military rule when juxtaposed with the period of civilian
governance.

The military system of authoritarianism, centralization and

recklessness had so permeated the governance environment
such that there is conflict between the entrenched command
system and the emerging democratic values. The above
conflict is a plausible explanation for the armed politics,
thuggery, assassination, oppression, electoral fraud, violence
and injustice, highhandedness and brazen arrogance by
successive Nigerian governments in the face of poor
governance and disservice to the Nigerian citizenry.
Essentially, the damaging role of military presence and
manipulation of the political and cultural environment of
governance in Nigeria had greatly constrained democratic
consolidationandsustenance,especiallygiventhefactthatthe
military command system and the associated oppression
mentalityunderminesdemocracyinanysocietyduetolackof
accountability,disdainforhumanrightsandpoliticalfreedom
andtheerosionoftheinstitutionsofdemocratization.Insum,
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theNigeriansituationissoperturbingthatitcanarguablybe
dubbedanonstarterornodemocracyatall

Economic Conditions: Economic conditions, especially

corruption and mismanagement, have also produced
devastating effects on the democratic experimentation and
consolidationprocessinNigeria.Infact,thetwinevilarenot
only the gateway to bad governance, they have become so
systemic, institutionalized and structural that they have a
holistic impact on democratic governance in Nigeria
principallybecausetheypollutepolitics,undermineeconomy,
bias government spending away from socially valuable
benefits that social justice guarantees and divert public
resources from infrastructure investments that are critical to
the actualization of government social programmes and
activities.Insum,corruptionandeconomicmismanagementis
Nigerias greatest problem in its quest for a sound and solid
democracy. The vices are so pervasive and rooted in Nigeria
that the important benefits accruable from a democratic
environmentarelargelynonexistent.

Social Conditions: Social conditions have the potency of

affecting democratic experimentation and consolidation. The
truism of the above assertion is evident in the fact that the
level of socioeconomic development of any society makes it
possible or difficult for it to guarantee democracy (Mbachu
1994:17). The low level of development of the material
conditions in Africa, for example, has largely hindered the
emergence and consolidation of democracy despite the
quantum of democratization programmes. In fact, Lipset
asserted that certain social and economic background
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conditions such as high per capital income, widespread

literacy and prevalent urban residence are necessary for
democraticconsolidationandstability,whileAkestressedthat
consideringthesocialandeconomicrealitiesofAfrica,suchas
Africassocialpluralism,poverty,lowlevelofliteracyandthe
emphasisinruralcommunitiesonsolidarityandcooperation,
thedemocracythatisgermaneforAfrica,istheoneinwhich
the people have real decision making power over and above
theformalconsentofelectoralchoice.

In this social context, poor social, political and economic

liberty,aliendemocraticsystem,socialdislocationandcultural
decay havebeen anachronistic anddetrimentalto democratic
reality in Nigeria. The democratic system in Nigeria, for
example,isalienbecauseofitswesternorientationandculture
andanytendencytoadopttheabovedemocraticarrangement
hook line and sinker or stock and barrel requires a critical
examination. Like Ake (2003:129) apparently noted, Africa
requires somewhat more than the crude variety of liberal
democracythatisbeingfoistedonitandevenmorethanthe
crude variety of liberal democracy that prevails in the
industrializedcountries.Andtheessenceofdemocracyshould
be its capacity to guarantee freedom, equality, self
development and participation, but the Nigerian social
environment is prone to engender contradictions that tend to
derail or trivialize democratization processes. The Nigerian
democraticdreamcanthereforebeappropriatelydescribedas
a failed one, for democratization is a term used retroactively,
after certain democratic thresholds have been crossed
(Nwankwo1999:162)andanassessmentofdemocratizationin
Africashowsthatthereexiststhetendencytocentralizepower
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to the detriment of good governance, a situation that

representstheNigerianenvironmentandreality.

The Feasibility of Social Justice through Democratic Re

engineeringandCulturalChange
Social justice and democracy are mutually supportive and
complementary in so far as they facilitate each other. This is
because while social justice is critical to and therefore a
potential vehicle for the enthronement of democracy,
democracy encourages social justice and provides a clement
atmosphere for its principles to thrive and flourish. All the
same,thefeasibilityofsocialjusticeinNigeriadependslargely
on democratic reengineering and cultural change that will
require a successful and transparent fight against corruption
and bad governance, poverty reduction, sound economic
management,citizenparticipationinthegovernanceprocess,a
cultureofdemocracythatisbasedonmutualrespect,equality
and freedom as well as reorientation that will occasion a
culture shift and promote principles of social justice so that
democratic dividends to all and sundry can be feasible.
Unfortunately, but arguably, the Nigerian state is yet to
negotiatetheroutetowardsclearcutdemocraticconsolidation
partly because there is no discernible commitment to the
creation of a democratic regime that is founded on true
principles and ideals of responsibility, accountability and
service. Such democratic ideals will undoubtedly demand
buildinginstitutions,reforminginstitutionsandinsomecases
dismantling institutions, managing the economy and dealing
withsomeofthemajorityproblemsthatsocietyconfrontsand
establishing proper institutional framework for economic
growthandgovernmentaleffectivenessasDiamond,Linzand
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Lipset (2000:55) rightly opined. Also, there has to be synergy

of genuine efforts and partnering by the state, the political
class, particularly the elite and civil society organizations to
reconstructandreengineeratruedemocraticpolitywherethe
principles of equality, freedom, responsibility, transparency
and accountability, that are central to and underlie social
justicewillbeestablishedandprevail.

ConcludingRemarks
Thatsocialjusticerepresentsavehiclefortheactualizationof
theprinciplesoffairness;equalityofopportunity,libertyand
social rights is arguably incontrovertible. All the same, the
Nigerianleadershipclass,onageneralbasis,isnotfavourably
predisposedtowardsdemocraticconsolidationandsustenance
in Nigeria. As a consequence, there is little psychological
readinessandwillingnessontheirpart.Theirblatantnegative
predispositionhasnotonlystifleddemocratizationplansand
efforts;thereisalowlevelofcommitmenttoandsupportfor
thedemocraticprojectinNigeria.Thustheleadershipclassdo
nottrulybelieveindemocracyandasaresultarenotreadyfor
it. And it is through a favourable predisposition by the
Nigerianleadershiptowardsthedemocraticventureorproject
thattruedemocracycanbeentrenched.Atleast,readinessand
willingness engenders support and commitment in any
democratization process. There is, in fact, no genuine self
awareness and realization of the value and potential benefits
ofdemocracyandthecriticalroleofsocialjusticeasaveritable
tool for democratic governance, hence their penchant for all
shadesandmanifestationsofsocialinjustice.Theopportunity
tobuildasocietyweresocialjustice,humandignityandcivil
liberties abound through democratic reengineering and
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culturalchangeisyetfeasibleinNigeria.However,thereisthe
desirability and inevitability of the creation of a genial
democratic climate that will facilitate the reconstruction of
culturalvaluesandenhancetheenthronementofsocialjustice
in Nigeria. The above climate that has several dimensions
constitutes a threat to democratic experimentation and
fulfilment if it is not favourable. Additionally, since
democratic governance and sustenance demands steadfast
leadership, unwavering commitment, accountability,
transparency and sense of justice and equity, it behoves the
Nigerian leadership to build confidence and trust so that the
NigeriancitizenrycanbelieveintheNigeriangovernmentand
the democratic project. Both social justice and democracy are
thusmutuallysupportiveandreinforcing.

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BOOKREVIEW

Experiments in Freedom: Explorations of Identity in New

South African Drama, New Edition, Anton Krueger (author),
(CambridgeScholarsPublishing,2009),245pp.,$59.99.

This book is a study of postapartheid identity

formationthroughananalysisofSouthAfricandrama.Anton
Krueger, a playwright and academic, looks at about a dozen
playswritteninEnglishandproducedbetween1994and2004.
The book is 231 pages and is divided into seven parts and
subdivided into 28 chapters of varying lengths. The books
statedintentioninitsintroductionistoexamineanumberof
play texts as cultural signs (xiii) in the interest of analyzing
their potential as a site and an agent of cultural
transformation.
In Part I: Exploring Identity, the author identifies his
theoretical approach, which he reluctantly describes as
postmodern. Krueger seeks to examine how the concept of
freedom has shifted categories and byways of belonging by
looking at characters and characterization in contemporary
drama. He argues that while South Africans have achieved a
unifiedpoliticalidentity,thefreedomtoexperiment,question,
and reinvent has meant there is no totalizing conception of a
South African cultural identity. Broadly defining identity
within his text as the way in which a person or a collective
has been framed (45), Krueger proposes to examine the
differentframesthroughwhichpeopleviewtheiridentityina
postapartheid context. He states that he will examine
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multiple overlapping micronarratives in four broad areas of

investigation: gender, political affiliation, ethnicity and
syncretism.
Part II, Gendered Identities, focuses on issues of
masculinity and exile in plays by the three South African
playwrights Athol Fugard, Anthony Akerman, and Zakes
Mda. Kruger briefly deconstructs essentialist conceptions of
masculinity that tie gender exclusively to sex, and states that
masculinitycanbebetterdescribedintermsofdisplay.While
Kruger notes a variety of behaviors that his selected
playwrights associate with masculine concerns, including
freedom from restraint, all three consistently create a
relationship between masculinity and the notion of the
homeland, which is repeated personified as female, as the
motherland.Theyexamineitfromanegativeperspective,as
masculinity lost through exile (Van der Bijl in The Bells of
Amersfoort, 2002). Kruger argues that this is because white
male identification in particular, challenged by the end of
apartheid,isnowrevealingitslackoflegitimacyasadurable
formofidentityconstruction.
Part III, AntiApartheid Identities, is a short section
which examines the replacement of agitprop and protest
theater, plays that demand freedom, with political plays that
make an appeal for transformation after freedom has been
achieved. Kruger looks specifically at plays written in
responsetotheTRC,andusesJaneTaylorsplayUbuandthe
Truth Commision as his primary example. Taylors fraught
portrayal of the character Pa Ubu as an apartheid enforcer
who ironically claims no agency in the violence because he
wasonlyanagentofthestateaskswhetherthesemeasuresof
reconciliation, aimed at translating the experiences of the
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victimtotheperpetrator,andviceversa,areeffective.Krueger
concludes that the TRC may be read as an attempt to will a
new country into existence, rather than restore a country
whichhasbeenlost.(109)
PartIV,EthnicIdentitiesandPartVI,RacialIdentities,
deal with similar material and take a similar approach; both
delineate how identity in terms of an ethnic collective is
premised on laws of exclusion, and ask in what ways South
African theater may liberate itself from the multiple ghettos
oftheapartheidimagination(114).PartIVaimstochallenge
the viability of writing purely from a single ethnic or
nationalist perspective through an examination of Greig
Coetzees Happy Natives (2003). InCoetzees play, two actors
playeightdifferentcharacterswhoseattemptstofreelyaffirm
theirownindividualidentitiesareinconflictwiththeirsense
of belonging to particular groups. While Krueger notes that
Coetzee presents contrasts in terms of a wide variety of
identity structures, including young and old, educated and
uneducated, poor and rich, etc, he ultimately admits that the
contrastofblackandwhiteidentitiesemergesmostvividly
because,whileeachactorplaysmultipleroles,theblackactor
only plays black characters, and the white actor only plays
whitecharacters(125).
The author states that he hopes to avoid talking
directly about race, which he considers an outmoded
designationbelongingtothescienceofeugenics;however,his
acknowledgement in Part IV that perceptions of identity are
stilllargelytiedtoskincolour,eveninafreesociety,seemsto
have necessitated his inclusion of a later section on racial
identities that goes beyond the scope of themes identified in
his introduction. This leads the reader to conclude that
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Krueger, over the course of his study, found that while

questionsofracialdesignationdidnotfithisdesiredanalytical
paradigm (which seeks to examine and support progressive
modes of identitybuilding in new theater) it could not be
avoided entirely in a survey of contemporary South African
theater.Thus,PartVIattemptstoprovideexamplesinwhich
a performance of race (if such a performance is even
possible) can provide a critical space for the re
conceptualization of identity. Krueger suggests that Inter
racial, a play by Mpumelelo Paul Grooboom (2005)
incorporates and challenges the question of ethnic and
specifically racial categorization through the use of parody.
InterRacialparodiesboth
PartV,SyncreticIdentities,isdenotedbytheauthoras
the most promising frame of identity formation. Krueger
characterizes syncretic plays as works that do not struggle
withidentity,butfreelyconstructitthroughapasticheofboth
European and African cultural elements, eschewing the
peeping tom mentality of mimetic realism for a more
fantastical presentation not of what is but of what could be.
Focusing primarily on the works of Brett Bailey and Reza de
Wet, Krueger examines how both authors forge identity in
terms of an amalgamation and fusion of cultural resources
Bailey through a leap into Xhosa spirituality, and de Wet
throughadepictionoftheAfrikaneridentityasaEuroAfrican
hybrid.
Toacertainextent,however,PartVsitsuneasilywith
the rest of the study. There are several reasons for this. The
first is that Kruegers approach to the plays in previous
sections revolved around the delineation of identities
embodied in and performed by specific characters. Here,
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characterstakeabackseatinKruegersanalysis,whichbegins
toforegroundelementssuchasnarrativeandpresentation.He
examineshow,forexample,BrettBaileyhasinnovatedmodes
of performance, from his use of theater in the round to his
sacrifice of a chicken onstage. Secondly, Krueger notes that a
syncretic approach is characteristic of plays by white
authors, while coloured, black, and Indian playwrights have
generally focused on reclaiming previously disenfranchised
racialidentities.(204).Whileasyncreticapproachmaybethe
most promising of the modes adopted among white
playwrights (who are, with the exception of Zakes Mda, the
onlyplaywrightsKruegerfocusesoninhisstudy)theauthor
is forced to admit that syncretism as a category of self
identification is no more or less inclusive than the other
categorieshehasoutlined.
Krueger states in his concluding section, in a chapter
entitled Accepting the paradox: learning to let go that his
original goal in the study, which was to look at the ways in
which the freedom of the postapartheid era had opened up
performance in South African drama, has shifted. He
acknowledges that, over the course of his investigation, he
increasingly found the more imperative issue in post
apartheid drama to be the way in which authors, and their
characters, continued to struggle with the types of identities
delineated by the apartheid state. It appears that despite the
bestintentionsoftheauthor,SouthAfricansintheplaysunder
study have not yet innovated approaches to identity that
transcend categories created by the past fifty years of racial
conflict.
Anton Kruegers study of identity through the lens of
postapartheid plays is a welcome addition to the field of
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cultural and performance studies. His thorough survey of

themes in postapartheid drama provides a multiplicity of
approaches to the problematic concept of freedom in a
South African context. However, certain aspects of the book
are problematic. Kruegers assertion that the play is an ideal
space to challenge old categories of South African identities
andreconceptualizenewonesisweakenedbyhisadmission
that plays continue to be seen exclusively by a middle class
(and primarily white) audience. Additionally, aspects of
Kruegersworkmakethebookadifficultreadforresearchers
hoping to glean a diachronic understanding of playwriting
anditsrelationshiptothepoliticalinaSouthAfricancontext.
Because the author does not address plays made earlier than
1980, it is difficult to get a sense of how much South African
drama has changed, and to what degree the postapartheid
period may be described as particularly innovative. Krugers
book,whichismoreofasynchronicassessmentoftheviability
of certain themes and approaches to theater, would prove
moreusefultostudentsofcontemporarydrama.

JamieDeAngelo
BostonUniversity

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