CT 1 Real World
CONTENTION I: THE 21ST CENTURY
QUANTUM MECHANICS CHALLENGES 5 BASIC ASSUMPTIONS OF THE WORLD
Wendt 04
[Alexander Wendt Ohio State University SOCIAL THEORY AS CARTESIAN SCIENCE: AN AUTOCRITIQUE FROM A QUANTUM PERSPECTIVE Forthcoming in Stefano Guzzini and Anna Leander, eds.
(2005), Constructivism and International Relations, Routledge]
Quantum Theory 16
Quantum theory is perhaps best introduced by the classical worldview that it overthrew. Like quantum
metaphysics, the classical worldview is an interpretation of physical theory, in this case classical physics,
and as such essentially metaphysical. It makes five basic assumptions: 1) that the elementary units of
reality are physical objects (materialism); 2) that larger objects can be reduced to smaller ones
(reductionism); 3) that objects behave in law-like ways (determinism); 4) that causation is mechanical and
local (mechanism); and 5) that objects exist independent of the subjects who observe them
(objectivism?). 17 In philosophy of mind these assumptions are shared by materialists, 17dualists, and
proponents of the linguistic turn alike, and thus by extension by most positivists and interpretivists in
social science. 18 Quantum theory challenges all five. At the sub-atomic level physical objects dissolve
into ghost-like processes; wholes cannot be reduced to parts; the world does not behave deterministically;
causation is non-local; and objects do not exist independent of the subjects who observe them.
Importantly, these findings do not necessarily invalidate the classical worldview at the macro level, since
quantum states normally decohere into classical ones above the molecular level, which is why the
everyday world appears to us as classical. Decoherence has been a barrier to developing a unified
quantum theory encompassing both micro and macro levels, 19 and is a fundamental obstacle to the
quantum consciousness hypothesis in particular (see below). But at least at the micro- level the quantum
revolution has decisively overturned the claim of the classical worldview to provide a complete description
of reality.
Although the formal structure of quantum theory is highly esoteric, its basic experimental findings are
relatively straight forward, if counter-intuitive, and clearly described in a number of good, popular books.
20 The philosophical literature is also accessible, being concerned with the theorys interpretation, not its
formalism. 21 Thus, while I can claim no understanding of quantum physics, with some hard work I think I
have gained some of its metaphysics, which is what matters here. Since understanding the quantum
consciousness hypothesis requires some physics, however, let me start with four findings from quantum
theory: wave-particle duality, wave function collapse, the measurement problem, and non-locality.18
1) Wave-particle duality refers to the fact that sub-atomic phenomena have two irreducible and nonequivalent descriptions. Under some experimental conditions they are best described as waves, in others
as particles. Importantly, these descriptions are not just different but mutually exclusive. This leads to
Heisenbergs famous Uncertainty Principle, according to which we cannot know the position and
momentum of a particle at the same time. A complete description of quantum systems must therefore
include both descriptions, standing in a relation of what Niels Bohr called complementarity, where each
is inherently partial. 22 Wave-particle duality challenges two assumptions of the classical worldview.
One is that science can achieve an integrated, unitary Truth about the world. Quantum theory seems to
be true, but its truth requires contradictory narratives much like the situation with Explanation and
Understanding in social science, as I suggest below.
The other challenge is to the materialist view of matter. To see this it is necessary to understand the
peculiar nature of waves in quantum theory. Classical waves, like ripples on a pond, are caused by the
interaction of physical objects (water molecules), and as such pose no problem for materialism. Quantum
waves, in contrast, refer to the probability of finding physical objects (particles) at various locations. These
probabilities are not determined by an underlying distribution of particles, 23 since the Uncertainty
Principle tells us that as long as an electron propagates as a wave we have no basis for saying it remains
a particle at all. Unlike classical waves, then, waves in quantum theory do not refer to actualities but
potentialities events that could happen, which is a much broader class than those that actually do.
19
2) Wave function collapse refers to the fact that the transition from wave to particle is instantaneous in
time and has no apparent physical cause. Such quantum leaps challenge the determinism of the
classical worldview, and as such have caused much angst among physicists, with Einstein famously
complaining that God does not play dice. 24 But their anomalous character also points toward a
possible solution, since wave function collapse is strongly analogous to our experience of consciousness,
which involves free will and also does not seem to have a physical cause an analogy that the quantum
consciousness hypothesis will exploit.
3) The measurement problem refers to the fact that it is impossible to measure quantum phenomena
without disturbing them: the process of measurement inevitably leads to a change in the appropriate
description of sub-atomic particles. As long as we dont measure them they appear as waves, and as
soon as we do as particles. This challenges another basic assumption of the classical worldview, the
subject-object distinction, and with it the possibility, even in principle, of true objectivity. In quantum
measurement observer and observed initially constitute a single system, rather than two as they are
classically. Far from being just a given, the subject-object distinction is now emergent from the process of
measurement itself, which makes a cut in a previously undivided whole. Within social science postmodernists, feminists, and others have made similar critiques of the subject-object distinction at the
macro-level, but generally without a quantum basis. A quantum connection would give these critiques
additional force, and point toward the necessity of a participatory epistemology in social inquiry.
4) Finally, nonlocality refers to the fact that when wave functions are entangled they have effects on
each other in the absence of any apparent causal connection , in what 20Einstein called spooky action at
a distance. 25 When one wave function changes as a result of measurement, the appropriate description
of the other instantaneously changes as well. This challenges the classical worldviews mechanical theory
of causation, but more fundamentally its atomism. Entangled particles do not behave as if they were
distinct objects, but rather as parts of a superposition of particles that absorbs their individual identities
into a larger whole. This makes quantum theory radically holistic, 26 and again intriguingly similar to
social life, at least on my argument in Social Theory.
and the eyes of the best microscopes; its what makes solids solid and liquids flow, and
powers chemical reactions and radioactivity; its probably playing a big role in biology that
were just starting to understand; and its sunshine and moonlight and the glowing auroras
borealis and australis. Its the foundation and fabric of your world.
And though it may be bizarre, it is by no means abstract. Maybe in the early 1930s one
could still say it was abstract; but already for many decades particle physicists have
passively observed individual particles, one at a time, behaving in quantum mechanical
ways. Today scientists can control individual quantum objects, things whose behavior can
only be predicted by accepting the odd rules and counter-intuitive implications of our
quantum world. In particular, physicists have learned to capture and manipulate individual
photons (particles of light), atoms, and ions (atoms with an electron removed or added, to
make them electrically charged see the Figure below.) It is for their work advancing these
capabilities, making possible new classes of experiments and opening up the potential for
new technologies, that Serge Haroche and David Wineland have won the Nobel Prize for
2012. Read about it here (brief press release or summary for non-technical readers) using
your preferred quantum-mechanical device.
firmly buried in the sand, at great future cost. 131 132 158 Nor indeed is it only the
invisible and unmeasurable cultural value, the value of the intellectual thrill and
astonishment of great discoveries and great leaps of the imagination, and the
spiritual value of something that transcends the individual : ; ; ; ; Then felt I like
some watcher of the skies When a new planet swims into his ken ... | John Keats 159
Of course, it is all of these. But it is also something still less visible and still less
measurable, though still more crucial and still more valuable, in a hard economic
sense, increasingly forgotten in the obsession with short-term wealth creation. It is
the value, beyond price, of respect for the scientific ideal, if such respect can be
maintained, as a moderating or countervailing force, or if you will an insurance,
against renewed cycles of social chaos and totalitarian repression in a world full of
modern weapons, biological, physical, chemical, psychological, informationtechnological, and economic 155 | an insurance against what today's politicians
might call wealth destruction on a gigantic scale, a scale incalculably greater than
the recent wealth destruction by food safety scares, itself caused in large measure
by disrespect for the scientific ideal. 139 270
This is one of the points missed by those who see wealth creation as the sole
justification of science. I am talking about an insurance against wealth destruction
on the scale of gross national products, an insurance against the breakdown of
democracy itself, of government by consent, of free trade and personal prosperity |
the breakdown of the increasingly fragile economic, technological, and
psychological infrastructures of modern human societies | an insurance whose
premiums are dwarfed by the cost of the disasters insured against. It is a long term
insurance whose value might command significant public understanding, if
explained well enough. It has not, I think, been explained nearly well enough in
recent years, because its value, though long recognized by careful thinkers, 160
now seems to be forgotten not only in popular mythology but also, I shall argue, in
today's official science policymaking, much of which powerfully discourages the
scientific ideal. This forgetfulness seems to be connected in part with the workings
of the short sighted, not to say blind, international market forces that seem to
dominate our situation today, and to which I shall also refer, the very forces whose
enormous strength makes us forget that they too are vulnerable | that the markets
themselves depend for their wealth creating potential on the avoidance of social
chaos and totalitarian repression.
But how can respect for the scientific ideal be socially stabilizing, rather than
destabilizing as some would now have us believe? As long recognized by careful
thinkers, something very fundamental is involved, something both visible and
invisible. It is something about our own human nature that we seem close to
understanding quite well, and that in any case we need to understand as well as
possible. It is a matter of ubiquitous psycho- logical realities, of our unalterable
genetic inheritance, 161 162 part of what our politicians both underestimate 163
and perilously exploit. Respect for the scientific ideal cannot solve all our problems,
but it can help with `clearing space to speak of the unspeakable ', 164 with tipping
the balance | as has already happened so remarkably in recent centuries | toward
understanding, moderating, and redirecting some of the most terrible and potent
forces that lead to social instability.
CT 2 Topicality
CONTENTION II THE TOPIC
UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE
ITS NON-MILITARY DEVELOPMENT OF THE EARTH'S OCEANS.
THE
concern, instead, the ideological import of the Newtonian imaginary, as defined and discussed in a more
general context in Chapter III, on the imaginative schematisation of political spatiotemporality: How
exactly are the space and time of international politics conceptualised through this imaginative
schematisation? Does our political imagination still correspond to this Newtonian imaginary of political
spatiotemporality?
In the Newtonian imaginary of political spatiotemporality the space and time of international politics are
conceptualised as absolute and homogeneous, a passive and mutually exclusive arena, where human
beings, societies or states imagined as discrete, mutually exclusive entities with distinct properties act and
interact with conformity according to fixed laws against a fixed geographical, cultural and temporal
background, like physical objects interacting through force-fields . 459
Through the employment of Newtonian metaphoricity political action is visualised as taking place within
the regulating confines of a closed, mechanical and stable system, and thus imbuing political life with a
lingering sense of primordiality and physical composition, an aura of objectivity, inevitability, and
reification.460 In these spatiotemporal confines, any change and (inter-)action could not only be perfectly
measured and readily identified, but also predicted, regulated and controlled .461
More specifically, space is imagined as absolute, real and objective, existing independently of and prior to
the agents interactions, being either human beings, societies or states. It is also imagined as immovable,
implying that although the agents spatial relations may vary, it is conceptually impossible for the relations
among parts of space to vary, remaining always similar, dynamically inert. Thus, both political space and
political interaction are conceptualised as existing independently from each other. Even more
interestingly, the imaginative schematisation of political space as homogeneous and infinitely divisible
implies that, as two points in physical space separated by a spatial interval are always external one to the
other, political space is similarly demarcated, defining separate areas of political authority and interaction.
In this imaginary, time is also imagined as linear, homogeneous, spatialised, floating independently from
sociopolitical interaction, and measurable as a kind of one-dimensional continuous space .462 Political
events are thus identified as unique instances in time measured and remembered through its
embodiments in orreries, clocks, or calendars. Given the role of time in sociopolitical organisation,
constituting the standardised principle for co-ordination, regulation and control, it is perhaps not difficult to
appreciate the impact of such an understanding of time on the appreciation of sociopolitical order, stability
and change.
A good example of how such a Newtonian spatiotemporal metaphoricity has indoctrinated the imaginative
conceptualisation of the space and time of international politics is the balance-of-power metaphor,
discussed in Chapter IV. There we saw how the metaphor was employed in a Newtonian manner not only
to describe state interaction and the distribution of power in the international system, but also to provide a
closed, systemic model for obtaining stability. In the evoked imagery, state-interaction is depicted as
planetary movement in absolute space and time, regulated by gravitational forces rendering states
mutually exclusive to each other. Yet, one may suggest, the conceptualisation of international politics in
such terms is admittedly outmoded and hence any attempt to criticise contemporary political imagination
on these grounds is nothing but an oversimplification of more recent conceptualisations of state
interaction. This may be the case, but such imaginative schematisations of space, time and political
interaction are not only reflected, but actually rooted in the rather truistic asseveration that political life is
primarily located within the state as the dominant agent of international politics, as institution, container of
all cultural meaning and site of sovereign jurisdiction over territory, property and abstract space, and
consequently over history, possibility and abstract time463.
Disciplined by the Newtonian orthodoxies of perspective space and neutralised time, contemporary
political imagination still depicts states as distinct entities separated by hardened borders, inviolate
territorial spaces and defensible centres ... all dedicated to maintaining territorial control over sovereign
spaces.464 The Newtonian imaginary of political spatiotemporality as an absolute and homogeneous
container of political identification and interaction has been central to the conceptualisation of the state as
the nation-state. On the one hand, this conceptualisation has been ratified by the spatialisation of time
and its treatment as homogeneous and empty affecting the formation of collective, national memories,
histories and traditions. 465 On the other hand, it has been secured by the homogenisation,
fragmentation, and partitioning of space. In the Newtonian imaginary, state borders are not mere lines
drawn on maps, facilitating the visualisation of its spatial delimitation, but boundaries of self-realisation,
demarcating outside from inside, domestic from foreign, belonging from not belonging, us from them.
These borders are thus imagined as the easily-definable demarcations of political identification, leading to
the modern proliferation of spatially delineated identities.
With political space defined through a single fixed viewpoint, as if it were depicted in one of
Brunelleschis or Raphaels paintings, state sovereignty is similarly imagined as the mere doctrinal
counterpart of the application of single-point perspectival forms to the spatial organisation of politics ...
[between] territorially defined, territorially fixed, and mutually exclusive state formations.466 Also seen
through this single viewpoint, time is not understood as locally defined, but instead as universal,
producing regular, repetitive, and predictable events; it is the time of history and progress. This always
neutral and homogeneous time becomes the common denominator of almost every representational effort
from art to politics, the temporal medium in which all issues are contained and rationalised. It seems,
then, that our political imaginary of political spatiotemporality is still rooted especially in seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century ontological traditions467 that correspond to the Newtonian appreciations of absolute
and homogeneous space and time, where clear, distinct, absolute border lines, and territorially defined,
fixed, and mutually exclusive enclaves of legitimate dominion468 demarcate the exercise of political
power and delimit the various levels where political action takes place.
It has been widely suggested that with the end of the Cold War, the accelerating flows and complex
networks of intense political relationality characteristic of the New World Order could not be contained by
such spatiotemporal schematisations, calling for a reappreciation of political spatiotemporality. According
to Luke, for example, whereas Cold-War international politics has been conceptualised as fixed in stable
spaces and predictable times, and then mirrored in categories of comparable fixity and stability, the
centres of the post Cold-War New World Order are uncertain, its borders are indeterminate, its orders
are tangled as blocs melt into flows, crumble into disarray, or tumble into holes.469 In a similar manner,
Jameson proposes the charting of new cognitive maps, which must nevertheless not return to some
older kind of machinery, some older and more transparent national space. 470 The claim that
contemporary transformations, perplexities and complexities are hard to grasp through our outdated
schematisations is frequently made. We are still unable to understand the paradoxical effects of
contemporary globalisation, interestingly addressed by Robertson as glocalisation,471 that has led to the
creation of new universals and new particulars as diversity, heterogeneity, instability, and
heteromorphism emerge from sharing access to the same flows of symbols, capital, images,
technologies, skills, and commodities.472
Pondering on such claims brings forth two relevant sets of questions. The first concerns the reasons of
this much-acclaimed inability to grasp fundamental discontinuity and change in international politics. We
keep asking questions like: Is it because our descriptive tools have missed the changing fashion ? Is it
because our Newtonian metaphors of political spatiotemporality do not suffice to describe and contain the
contemporary transformations and accelerating mutations of political practice? Is it because we lack, as
Ruggie has suggested, an adequate vocabulary 473 or, according to Harvey, the appropriate
perceptual equipment?474 Need we not then develop a new metaphorics that could more adequately
describe and contain the paradoxes and transformations mentioned above? No matter how imperative
such questioning might seem, it could prove problematic to the extent that it implies the existence of an
autonomous realm of political reality, the meaning of which remains uninfluenced by the ways we think
and talk about it. This questioning is also misleading as what could be missed or undervalued is that this
alternative thinking and talking always already presupposes an alternative way of imagining international
politics. Once we fully recognise this, perhaps we are not far from appreciating that the political
significance of developing an alternative vocabulary, of employing a new spatiotemporal metaphoricity, is
not to be determined by its representational sufficiency or adequacy, but by its imaginative capacity to
disclose new political possibilities.
The second set of questions stems from the relationship often drawn between the conceptualisation of the
state and the imaginative schematisation of political spatiotemporality in Newtonian terms. This
questioning concerns the role and place of the state in an alternative imaginary of political
spatiotemporality: How could we conceptualise the accelerating transformations of the post-Cold War era,
when our political imagination is still framed by the Newtonian, fixed, stable and predictable
spatiotemporal delimitations associated with the state? The same question is sometimes posed in even
more dramatic terms: How can we still meaningfully talk about international politics as inter-state politics,
now that the once easily and clearly determinable lines demarcating the exercise of legitimate political
authority by the state are more uncertain than ever? One could pose here a series of relevant, more or
less dramatic, questions that would revolve, to a greater or a lesser extent, around the gradual
attenuation or even demise of the state. One could then assume that questioning the Newtonian
imaginary of political spatiotemporality necessarily involves the withering away of the state from our
imaginative depictions. The conclusion seems inescapable that reimagining political spatiotemporality in
other-than-absolute and -homogeneous terms involves an imaginary depiction of international politics
characterised by the absence of states. It is this rather agonistic conclusion that renders the questioning
even more misleading, for as Walker has pointed out:
[w]hat is at stake in the interpretation of contemporary transformations is not the eternal presence or
imminent absence of states. It is the degree to which the modernist resolution of space-time relations
expressed by the principle of state sovereignty offers a plausible account of contemporary political
practices, including the practices of states.475
SUBPOINT B EXPLORATION
Logsdon 09
(John, professor of political science at George Washington, former director of the Space Policy Institute
Fifty Years of Human Spaceflight Why Is There Still a Controversy?,
http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20100025875_2010028362.pdf)
Exploration as a Compelling Rationale Many believe that the only sustainable rationale for a governmentfunded program of human spaceflight is to take the lead in exploring the solar system beyond low Earth
orbit.20 The MIT white paper provides an insightful definition of exploration: Exploration is a human
activity, undertaken by certain cultures at certain times for particular reasons. It has components of
national interest, scientific research, and technical innovation, but is defined by none of them. We define
exploration as an expansion of the realm of human experience, bringing people into new places,
situations, and environments, expanding and redefining what it means to be human. What is the role of
Earth in human life? Is human life fundamentally tied to the earth, or could it survive without the planet?
Human presence, and its attendant risk, turns a spaceflight into a story that is compelling to large
numbers of people. Exploration also has a moral dimension because it is in effect a cultural conversation
on the nature and meaning of human life. Exploration by this definition can only be accomplished by direct
human presence and may be deemed worthy of the risk of human life.21 In the wake of the 2003
Columbia accident that took the lives of seven astronauts and the report of the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board that criticized the absence of a compelling mission for human spaceflight as a failure
of national leadership,22 the United States, in January 2004, adopted a new policy to guide its human
spaceflight activities. The policy directed NASA to implement a sustained and affordable human and
robotic program to explore the solar system and beyond and to extend human presence across the solar
system, starting with a human return to the Moon by the year 2020, in preparation for human exploration
of Mars and other destinations.23 This policy seems totally consistent with the definition of exploration
provided in the MIT white paper. The issue is whether such a policy and its implementation, focusing on
human exploration beyond Earth orbit, can provide an adequate and sustainable justification for a
continuing program of government-sponsored spaceflight that will make contributions that will outweigh
the costs and risks involved to the primary objectives of national pride and prestige, and also to some of
the several secondary objectives.
SUBPOINT C: DEVELOPMENT
Sumner & Tribe 08
[Andrew Sumner, co-director of the Kings International Development Institute at Kings College London;
MSc, PhD, London SB University; Michael A Tribe Search Research Fellow, Badford Centre for
International Development, University of Bradford Chapter 1: What is Development? in International
Development Studies: Theories and Methods in Research and Practice]
Development is a concept which is contested both theoretically and politically, and is inherently both
complex and ambiguous ... ... Recently [it] has taken on the limited meaning of the practice of
development agencies, especially in aiming at reducing pov- erty and the Millennium Development Goals.
(Thomas, 2004: 1, 2)
The vision of the liberation of people and peoples, which animated development practice in the 1950s and
1960s has thus been replaced by a vision of the liberaliza- tion of economies. The goal of structural
transformation has been replaced with the goal of spatial integration.... ... The dynamics of long-term
transformations of econ- omies and societies [has] slipped from view and attention was placed on shortterm growth and re-establishing fi nancial balances. The shift to ahistorical performance assessment can
be interpreted as a form of the post-modernization of development policy analysis. (Gore, 2000: 7945)
Post-modern approaches... see [poverty and development] as socially constructed and embedded within
certain economic epistemes which value some assets over others. By revealing the situatedness of such
interpretations of economy and pov- erty, post-modern approaches look for alternative value systems so
that the poor are not stigmatized and their spiritual and cultural assets are recognized. (Hickey and
Mohan, 2003: 38)
One of the confusions, common through development literature is between devel- opment as immanent
and unintentional process... ... and development as an inten- tional activity. (Cowen and Shenton, 1998:
50)
If development means good change, questions arise about what is good and what sort of change
matters... Any development agenda is value-laden... ... not to consider good things to do is a tacit
surrender to... fatalism. Perhaps the right course is for each of us to refl ect, articulate and share our own
ideas... accepting them as provisional and fallible. (Chambers, 2004: iii, 12)
Since [development] depend[s] on values and on alternative conceptions of the good life, there is no
uniform or unique answer. (Kanbur, 2006: 5)
1.1. Introduction
What is the focus of Development Studies (DS)? 1 What exactly are we interested in? In this fi rst
chapter we discuss perhaps the fundamental question for DS: namely what is development? Following
Bevans approach (2006: 712), which has been outlined in our Introduction, this is the fi rst knowledge
foundation or the focus or domain of study.
In this introduction we discuss the opening quotations to this chapter in order to set the scene. The
writers who have been cited are, of course, not unique in address- ing the meaning of development, but
the selections have been made in order to introduce the reader to the wide range of perspectives which
exists.
It would be an understatement to say that the definition of development has been controversial and
unstable over time. As Thomas (2004: 1) argues, development is contested, ... complex, and ambiguous.
Gore (2000: 7945) notes that in the 1950s and 1960s a vision of the liberation of people and peoples
dominated, based on structural transformation. This perception has tended to slip from view for many
contributors to the development literature. A second perspective is the defi nition embraced by
international development donor agencies that Thomas notes. This is a defi nition of development which
is directly related to the achievement of poverty reduction and of the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs).
There is a third perspective from a group of writers that Hickey and Mohan (2003: 38) broadly identify as
post-modernists. 2 The post-modern position is that development is a discourse (a set of ideas) that
actually shapes and frames reality and power relations. It does this because the discourse values
certain things over others. For example, those who do not have economic assets are viewed as inferior
from a materialistic viewpoint. In terms of real development there might be a new discourse based on
alternative value systems which place a much higher value on spiritual or cultural assets, and within
which those without significant economic assets would be regarded as having signifi cant wealth.
There is, not surprisingly, considerable confusion over the wide range of divergent conceptualizations, as
Cowen and Shenton (1998: 50) argue. They differentiate between immanent (unintentional or underlying
processes of) development such as the development of capitalism, and imminent (intentional or willed)
development such as the deliberate process to develop the Third World which began after World War II
as much of it emerged from colonization.
A common theme within most defi nitions is that development encompasses change in a variety of
aspects of the human condition. Indeed, one of the simplest defi nitions of development is probably
Chambers (2004: iii, 23) notion of good change, although this raises all sorts of questions about what is
good and what sort of change matters (as Chambers acknowledges), about the role of values, and
whether bad change is also viewed as a form of development.
Although the theme of change may be overriding, what constitutes good change is bound to be
contested as Kanbur (2006: 5) states, because there is no uniform or unique answer. Views that may be
prevalent in one part of the development com- munity are not necessarily shared by other parts of that
community, or in society more widely.
SUBPOINT D. OCEANS
Steinberg 13
[Philip E. Steinberg Professor of Geography at Florida State University and Marie Cure International
Incoming Fellow at Royal Holloway, University of London. Of other seas: metaphors and materialities in
maritime regions, Atlantic Studies, 10:2, 156-169 29 April 2013]
Rethinking the ocean
On a childs world map (and even on many of those consulted by adults), the ocean appears as blue, flat,
and unchanging: stable in both space and time. More sophisticated maps present the topography of the
ocean floor and may even show changes in hue to represent the different depths of regional seas. Still,
however, the overall aesthetic is one borrowed from representations of land: The ocean is fundamentally
presented as a series of latitude-longitude points that can be characterized by certain constant values
across key variables, with the most salient being the categorical divide between land that is covered by
water and land that is not covered by water. This representation serves modernity well, as it reproduces
the idea that the world consists of, on the one hand, static terrestrial points on the inside that may be
settled, developed, and grouped into states and, on the other hand, aqueous points on the outside that,
due to the absence of properties that160 P.E. Steinberg enable settlement and territorialization, may be
written off as beyond society. 27 However, this representation fails to communicate the complexity of the
ocean as a mobile space whose very essence is constituted by its fluidity and that thereby is central to the
flows of modern society. 28 Of course, land is also, in a geological sense, mobile. Doreen Massey points
this out as she uses the geological mobility of land to undermine modernist notions of place as static and
amenable to development along a single trajectory. 29 However, I would assert that the mobility of water
is qualitatively different because its fluidity is inevitably experienced by anyone who actually encounters
its physicality (as opposed to observing its representation on a map). It is readily apparent to the
untrained observer that water is constituted by moving molecules and by forces that push these
molecules through space and time. By contrast, the invisibility of plate tectonic movement endows
terrestrial space with an aura of stability that is expressed in an idealization of place that transcends the
vicissitudes of time and movement; indeed, it is the power of this image on land that prompts Massey to
destabilize place by turning to the hidden mobilities of plate tectonics.
To develop ways for understanding the ocean as a uniquely mobile and dynamic space, as well as one
with depth, it is useful to turn to the tools of oceanography, a discipline rarely engaged by humanitiesoriented scholars (or, for that matter, social scientists) who adopt a regional seas perspective. In
particular, I turn here to the distinction that oceanographers make between Eulerian and Lagrangian
modeling techniques. 30 Oceanographers who work from a Eulerian perspective measure and model fluid
dynamics by recording the forces that act on stable buoys. Eulerian researchers compare the presence
and characteristics of these forces at different points in an effort to identify general patterns across space
and time. Eulerian research remains dominant in oceanography, perhaps because it mimics the terrestrial
spatial ontology wherein points are fixed in space and mobile forces are external to and act on those
points, or perhaps because the alternative is both costlier and mathematically more complex. 31 From the
Eulerian perspective, as in the modernist ontology that tends to inform our understanding of regions
(whether they are defined by a central continent or by a central ocean), matter exists logically prior to
movement. The fixed points of geography, represented in the world of Eulerian oceanography by buoys,
would persist even in the absence of the forces of movement that cross the space between and beyond
these points. Likewise, from this perspective, London and New York would exist as points on a map and,
if they were settled, they would have social dynamics and institutions, even if they did not have centuries
of linkages as nodes in a trans-Atlantic economy.
The alternative is to adopt a Langrangian perspective wherein movement , instead of being subsequent to
geography, is geography. Oceanographers working from this perspective trace the paths of floaters that
travel in three-dimensional space, with each floater representing a particle, the fundamental unit in
Lagrangian fluid dynamics. Movement is defined by the displacement across space of material
characteristics within mobile packages, not abstract forces, and these characteristics are known only
through their mobility. 32 In other words, objects come into being as they move (or unfold) through space
and time. Conversely, space ceases to be a stable background but a part of the unfolding. The world is
constituted by mobility without reference to any stable grid of places or coordinates. From this
perspective, movement is the foundation of geography. 33 To return to the previous example,Atlantic
Studies 161 London and New York exist as they are only in their continual reconstruction through flows of
connectivitity. These connections (and the space central to these connections the ocean) can be seen
only as constitutive parts/processes of the cities, not as manifestations of their external functions.
Although not specifically referencing oceanographic research, Manuel DeLanda elaborates on the
conceptual links between, on the one hand, Deleuzian philosophy and, on the other hand, the
Riemannian differential geometry that forms the mathematical basis for Lagrangian fluid dynamics. 34 In
both cases, there is an absence of a supplementary (higher) dimension imposing an extrinsic
coordinatiza- tion, and hence, an extrinsically defined unity. 35 Space, from this perspective, is less a
thing or a stationary framework than a medium that is constantly being made by its dynamic, constitutive
elements.
My point in introducing this strand of fluid dynamics is not to suggest that the world of ocean-basin
regions can be modeled in Lagrangian fashion. Rather, I discuss it to suggest an alternate route for
developing decentered ontologies of connection. This is, after all, the explicit goal of the poststructuralist
cultural studies wing of ocean region studies and it is even implicit among political economists who seek
to denaturalize the assumed primacy of the (re)production-oriented terrestrial region (e.g. the territorial
nation-state). However, as I noted in the previous section, all too often this agenda is pursued by scholars
who reduce to a metaphor the ocean that lies at the center of the ocean region or, worse yet, who simply
ignore it.
Following, but also going beyond, Blums provocation, I propose that, as part of the process of
incorporating actual, lived experiences of the ocean into the studies of maritime regions, we need also to
bring the ocean itself into the picture, not just as an experienced space but as a dynamic field that
through its movement, through our encounters with its movement, and through our efforts to interpret its
movement produces difference even as it unifies. A Lagrangian-inspired ontology may well provide a
means for doing this.
[Dimitrios Efthymiou Akrivoulis PhD International Relations, University of Kent @ Canterbury, Thesis for
PhD: The Quantum Politics Metaphor in International Relations: Revising American NewtonianismJuly
2002]
Conclusion
The present chapter discussed how political spatiotemporality could be reconceptualised
through the employment of quantum metaphors. To the extent that this alternative
imaginary would aim at destabilising our given imaginative schematisations of the space
and time of international politics, the explication of its noematic content already
presupposes the claim that we still conceptualise political spatiotemporality in Newtonian
terms, meaning that our conceptualisations are still framed by the ideological contours of a
Newtonian imaginary. In other words, questioning the Newtonian premises of these
spatiotemporal conceptualisations connotes the critique of a limited political imagination
and the urge to imagine the space and time of international politics in other ways. In that
sense, instead of directly relating our spatiotemporal conceptualisations with Newtons own
theories, or tracing how these theories survived in time in political theorising, it is more
meaningful to examine whether our political imagination still corresponds to the Newtonian
imaginary of political spatiotemporality, as described in the first section.
There it was further suggested that the Newtonian imaginative schematisations of space,
time and political interaction are both reflected and rooted in our imaginative tendency to
locate political life within the state, understood as the homogeneous container of legitimate
authority, cultural meaning, political interaction and self-realisation, demarcated by easily
defined and readily drawn lines. The crucial question here is whether it is still possible and
meaningful to imagine international politics as taking place in absolute and homogeneous
space and time, between territorially defined and mutually exclusive state-agents. It has
been often claimed that, especially after the end of the Cold War, we are experiencing an
era of intense perplexities and accelerating transformations that are hard to contain in our
Newtonian spatiotemporal conceptualisations. Such claims thus bring forth the necessity of
developing an alternative tropology that could more accurately describe and contain these
perplexities and transformations. Pointing out the problematic and misleading character of
such a way of thinking, it was suggested instead that the political significance of an
alternative metaphorical language would stem not from its alleged representational
sufficiency or adequacy, but from its metaphorical capacity, as an aspect of imagination, to
disclose new political possibilities.
This brings forth another question relating to the role and place of the state in our
reimagining of political spatiotemporality. Contrary to those who assert that such a
reimagination necessarily presupposes a certain withering away or total absence of the state
from our imaginative depictions, it was suggested that what is at stake in our spatiotemporal
reimagining is how we could successfully meet two core challenges. The first concerns our
persistence in delineating political spatiotemporality in Newtonian terms, that is, our
tendency to locate political authority, identity and action only within clear and definable
demarcating lines. Even more fundamentally it concerns our tendency to identify all
authority, identity and action as political only when thus demarcated. The second challenge
concerns our problematic projection of this imaginative schematisation onto alternative sites
of identification, forms of agency and networks of interaction. Both of these challenges were
thus further pondered upon, while explicating the specific noematic content of the quantum
imaginary of political spatiotemporality in the second section.
In this last section the central aim has been to discuss how the space and time of
international politics could be imaginatively reconceptualised through the employment of
quantum metaphoricity. We started with the assertion that the noematic content as well as
the social efficacity of the evoked quantum imaginary would depend less on what quantum
theories make of space and time than on how their spatiotemporal insights are publicly
understood and socioculturally absorbed in their dissemination and popularisation . After
presenting some aspects of this public understanding especially with respect to the so-called
Many Worlds quantum theory, we portrayed the quantum imaginary of political
CT 3 Artificial Life
CONTENTION THREE IS A-LIFE.
Artificial Life is inevitable, the question is how we'll respond.
Humanism ensures an artificial life-human divide.
de Mul 02
[Jos de Mul professor in Philosophical Anthropology and its History and head of the
section Philosophy of Man and Culture. Moreover, he is the Scientific Director of the
research institute 'Philosophy of Information and Communication Technology'
(ICT). De Mul studied Philosophy in Utrecht and Amsterdam and in 1993 he
obtained his PhD (cum laude) at the University of Nijmegen with a thesis in which
he reconstructed Wilhelm Diltheys Kritik der historischen Vernunft (Critique of
historical Reason). He has joined the Philosophy department of the Erasmus
University Rotterdam since 1988. TRANSHUMANISM The convergence of evolution,
humanism and information technology 2002/05/05] We do not endorse the
gendered or ableist language in this card.
In this framework the development of information technology and the informational
sciences is ofcrucial importance.[29] Sciences based on information technology,
such as artificial physics andartificial life, in contrast to the classic mechanical
sciences, are not so much driven by the question ofwhat reality is, but how it could
be. These 'modal sciences' are no longer primarily directed atimitating nature, but
rather at the creation of new nature.[30] With the aid of a computer simulation
ofevolution, not only can countless alternative evolutions be made into virtual
reality, but - if we wish to- we can realize these alternatives in physical nature with
the aid of genetic engineering.[31]Reciprocally, insights from evolution theory can
also be applied to the development of artificial lifeforms. One of the reasons the
classic AI research failed was because attempts were made to program artificial
intelligence top down. Because the number of possible mutual interactions between
the instructions in a software program increases exponentially as the number of
lines of code increases linearly, the program is quickly confronted with an
unmanageable complexity.[32] For this reason the bottom up approach has gained
popularity in AI and AL research in recent years. In this approach AIand AL programs
are constructed in such a way (by making use of genetic or evolutionary algorithms)
that they can develop themselves further in a process of (un)natural selection.
Moreover this approach, suggests Moravec in his subsequent publications to Mind
Children, has, unlike the download procedure, the advantage that it is not weighed
down by the burden of the evolutionary baggage of the human body.[33]
In the light of the previous evolution of life on earth it is not unthinkable that,
thanks to information technology, this will again result in an explosion of radically
different life forms, based on different basic forms of build (phyla), which together
will form a new kingdom (or perhaps even a variety ofkingdoms) in the taxonomy of
life, beside the existing kingdoms of the Animalia, Plantae and Fungi,Protista (singlecelled organisms with one complex cell) and Monera (simple unicellular organisms).
And if evolutionary history repeats itself, after a short period in which this
multiplicity of various new life forms has occupied all the niches in the natural,
cultural (and especially virtual) world, we can expect another decimation, after
which a small number of them will carry the torch of evolution further.
In the previous section I observed that many of the techniques required for the
realization of the three outlined alternatives (genetic engineering of the human
organism, the construction of cyborgs and the development of artificial life and
artificial intelligence) are already reality - or at least in theprocess of development.
Furthermore, if we take the exponential acceleration of evolution seriously,then
neither can we comfort ourselves with the thought that this will take ages. Even the
failure of artificial intelligence research, with its unrealistic expectations, gives no
reason for complacency. A characteristic of exponential acceleration is that we tend
to overestimate its effects in the short term,while often grossly underestimating its
effects in the somewhat longer term.
Also some of the fundamental criticism from various quarters - here I have in mind
philosophers such as Searle, Dreyfus and Lyotard[34] - which is put forward against
the presuppositions of the transhumanist program, in my opinion gives little reason
to dismiss this program as implausible. An important element of this criticism is
falsely based on the anthropocentric presupposition that[humans] man is [are] the
measure for every form of artificial intelligence and artificial life. If, for example, it is
argued that computers will never be really intelligent, never possess consciousness
or have real experiences, then it is all too easily assumed (completely setting aside
the question as to whether this criticism holdswater) that the form of intelligence
(situated in organic bodies) which has developed in Homo sapienssapiens is the
measure of intelligence berhaupt. This 'carbon chauvinism' is rather shortsighted.
Like birds, aeroplanes can fly, but they do not owe this ability to a literal imitation of
a bird's wings. Neither do artificial life and artificial intelligence need to be a literal
replica of organic life and organic intelligence in order to share its essential
characteristics (such as the ability to reproduce,creativity, and the ability to learn).
Computer viruses, for example, despite the fact that the reproductive material
differs from that of natural viruses, share a number of important characteristicswith
them. Even if artificial life forms, based on silicon, should never reach the level of
(human)consciousness, it is still conceivable that they will be more successful in
evolutionary survival than man.
From the end of the Old Stone Age (Paleolithicum) until the New Stone Age
(Neolithicum) man developed as we now know him (Homo sapiens sapiens). During
this development a form of intelligence came into being which deviated in essential
points from previous forms of organic intelligence and which gave the evolution of
life on earth a new twist. Perhaps we are standing at the threshold of the Newest
Stone Age in which intelligent life on earth will acquire a new form and direction
unrecognizable to man. And who knows whether [humans]man will then share the
fate of the innumerable species left to him as (living)fossils in lifes Odyssey through
time and space.
It scarcely needs to be argued that the transhumanistic project, which is articulated
explicitly and radically in Moravec's work, but in fact (intentionally or not) dictates
an important element of the agenda of the new information sciences, means a
fundamental challenge for humanism . 'Bad' postmodernism proclaims the end
of[human] mankind in a much more literal and radical manner than 'good'
ever new and varied syntheses. In this way, we'll not only avoid dialogical division, but
equally subvert slavery - theirs or ours - and perhaps also war; while, at the same time,
achieving our own distinctly human ends of longer life, higher intelligence, and greater
freedom. Failing to do so will only produce all the problems now faced by Galactica - and
only postpone the inevitable. In the words of President Roslin, posthumanity is "the shape of
things to come."
fully industrialized nations, wealth distribution is constantly worsening, pockets of the nation
are living under poverty level and crime rate is uprising.
Nanotechnology at its initial development stage, mostly focuses on structural
nanotechnology, is difficult to visualize its ultimate potential. When molecular
nanotechnology (MNT) has realized self-assembly capability, a world of unlimited-sum could
become possible. It can exceed IT make unlimited reproduction from virtual to real. MNT can
abundantly create food, material and energy, and makes them as free as air. This will offer
human race a historically never experienced opportunity to undergo a paradigm shift to a
totally new socioeconomic system.
CARD CONTINUES
Regardless all technology advancement, human civilizations fundamental survival mode has
not changed since the advent of human. This is the root for all wars and environmental
destructions. Seize this opportunity offered by MNT, foster a quantum jump in human
survival mode and propel humanity into a higher state of being is a major challenge for us.
To have a world organization to parent the transition to a higher socioeconomic mode is a
pressing issue. Via MNT and an evolved socioeconomic system to guarantee the
fundamental survival right of each individual and each species on earth is a goal for us to
strive.