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It is because Thomas and I agree with the tenants of impartial peacekeeping, we negate the
resolution Resolved: United Nations peacekeepers should have the power to engage in offensive
operations.
We observe that the negative doesnt need to defend the status quo and for the affirmative to
deviate from the status quo, they must prove the willingness of the UN to support their advocacy.
Contention 1: Offensive force requires peacekeepers to become biased occupiers instead of
impartial protectors
When UN peacekeepers have to decide who is right and who is wrong, they are often mistaken.
The Foreign Intervention Brigade (FIB), a UN force, has gotten the situation totally wrong.
The News Record1 writes about how the FIB fails to be impartial by fighting with the
government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. They are being manipulated to fight
against the rebel group M23.

1 The News Record2013

http://www.newsrecord.co/united-nations-authorizes-offensive-operations-in-the-democraticrepublic-of-the-congo/
. U.N. peacekeepers have
historically been deployed as impartial protectors, present to prevent conflict in order for
peace to come about through negotiations. By specifically targeting one side, the U.N. may
appear partial towards the DRC government.
On another level entirely is the issue of the United Nations authorizing a force to use offensive operations

the formation of FIBhas challenged many of the

principles of peacekeeping, including impartiality, the consent of parties in the conflict, and
the non-use of force except in self-defense.
In the International Peace Institutes report, Cammaert and Blyth write that

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Phil Moore2 explains how M23 is actually preferred by the locals over their government. He says
that locals cheer and applaud the M23 fighters, with some locals saying that the national
government in Kinshasa is responsible for creating the conflict. In fact, M23 only mutinied after
the Army failed to uphold their end of a peace deal. This shows how the UN force is on the
wrong side of the issue

2Phil Moore2012
http://www.modernghana.com/news/431610/1/dr-congo-rebels-capture-goma-accused-ofatrocities.html
Locals however cheered and applauded two vehicles full of rebels as they drove around the city
centre after fighters of the M23 movement marched into the city facing little resistance.
In Gisenyi, people seemed relieved at the rebel takeover.
"They welcomed them with cheers because the government soldiers had fled," leaving a
security vacuum, said a man who had fled Goma and who gave his name only as Alain.
Rwandan Jean-Bosco said: "We can only be happy, because it is over.... It was the
(Kinshasa) authorities who stirred up the hatred" of Congolese Tutsis, sometimes branded
as "foreigners" in the DR Congo.
The M23, formed by former members of an ethnic Tutsi rebel group, mutinied in April after the failure of a 2009
peace deal that integrated them into the regular army.

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And while they fight M23, they have been supporting a different rebel group, the FDLR
The News Record3 explains how Rwanda has evidence that the UN force was cooperating with
the FDLR, one of the groups the UN force was sent to neutralize. This included senior
commanders integrating FDLR groups into Congolese army units. Powell4 writes that after the
defeat of M23, FDLR had a 6 month grace period to disarm, instead, the group has continued
their human rights abuses and recruiting. And this is a big problem, because the FDLR has a long
history of atrocities and war crimes.

3The News Record2013

http://www.newsrecord.co/united-nations-authorizes-offensive-operations-in-the-democraticrepublic-of-the-congo/
,
Rwanda has credible, reliable and detailed information that various forms of tactical and
strategic collaboration with the FDLR were discussed. Rwanda believes that FIB is collaborating
with one of the rebels groups they were sent to neutralize, the FDLR.
In a letter to acting president of the U.N. Security Council, United States Ambassador Rosemary DiCarlo, Rwandan Ambassador Eugene-Richard Gasana wrote

Their actions, implicating senior United Nations commanders picking

sides among the very armed groups whose military activities they are meant to deter, are of
serious concernWe have reliable information that indicates several instances
of FDLR units or commanders being integrated in FARDC commando units near the
border with Rwanda. In some instances, certain Force Intervention Brigade commanders are aware
and supportive of such instances.
Ambassador Gasana continues,

4 Anita Powell January 14, 2015 10:38 AM, http://www.voanews.com/content/un-military-action-in-drc-inevitable-after-

military intervention by its contingent of United

Nations peacekeepers is now inevitable after Rwandan rebels in the Eastern Democratic
Republic of Congo did not comply with a January 2 deadline to disarm.
So far, voluntary disarmament of the various armed groups in the area has had miserable
results, provoking top U.N. officials to declare in a statement that: The FDLR has used this six-month grace period to
continue to commit human rights abuses against innocent people in Eastern DRC, recruit
combatants, and champion its illegitimate political agenda.
rebels-refuse-to-disarm/2596158.html South Africa says

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The European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights5 explains how the FDLR is primarily
made up of soldiers fleeing prosecution for their roles in the Rwandan Genocide. They have been
responsible for large numbers of rape, forcible recruitment of child soldiers, and sexual violence.
Several among their leadership have been prosecuted for these crimes against humanity, but the
crimes continue to this day. Now4, the FDLR has had 6 months to recruit and gain strength, with
the UN saying confrontation is now inevitable.
The only modern instance of offensive force by UN Peacekeepers has been a dismal failure, with
the FIB fighting against the locally favored faction while working with seasoned war criminals.

5European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights2012

http://www.ecchr.de/kongo-war-crimes-trial.html
For several years now, the FDLR has been carrying out attacks on the Congolese civilian population in eastern Congo. The FDLR is principally
made up of Hutu refugees who fled to eastern Congo from Rwanda in 1994 and over the
years that followed. From there, the FDLR have since been fighting the Rwandan Government led
by Paul Kagame. Attempts by the UN and the DRC to disarm the FDLR have continually been met
with reprisals against the Congolese civilian population. Huge numbers of women have
been subjected to rape, among other things. In spring 2009 the FDLR once again intensified its attacks on the civilian population
in eastern Congo.

. He also faces
accusations of war crimes, particularly the killing, cruel or inhumane treatment, sexual
coercion or rape of a person protected under international humanitarian law, as well as
forcibly recruiting child soldiers and perpetrating war crimes against property. The FDLR
are alleged to have utilized sexualized violence against the Congolese civilian population as part of
their battle strategy, and to have in numerous cases plundered, killed and inflicted grievous
bodily injuries. In many cases women are said to have been brutally abused, injuries which
in some cases were fatal. Murwanashyaka is not accused of committing these acts himself, but of failing to take action to prevent his subordinates
Murwanashyaka is accused of being responsible for crimes against humanity, particularly killing and sexual coercion or rape

from carrying out the acts in question (so-called command responsibility).

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Contention 2: Alternatives to UN Peacekeepers conducting offensive operations

The ASF (African Standby Force) is better suited to offensive operations.
Subpoint A. UN Peacekeepers have historically failed in this region
Even if UN peacekeepers, on paper, seem like the better option, the UN doesnt assign enough
resources for the missions to be effective
Festus Aboagye6 writes that African countries have recognized the disparity between the UN
Security Councils high intentions and the actual realities and resources on the ground. This
failure to properly support missions was actualized in the Rwandan genocide and the failure of
UN Missions to protect civilians in Sudan and South Sudan. These UN missions have failed to
fulfill their basic mandates.

6 Festus Aboagye

2012

http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/ASFPolBrief.pdf

African countries therefore took note of the findings by the UNs Panel on UN Peace
Operations that the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda
had not been planned, deployed or
instructed in a way that would have enabled it to stop the genocide
(UNAMIR)

and that UNAMIR was also the victim of a lack of political will in the Security

Council and by other member states, including Africans.

In essence, AU members resolved to demonstrate political will in finding African solutions to African problems, seeking to establish structures capable of interventions, to create conditions necessary for, and allow time for, the transfer of mandates to the better resourced UN.

UN missions continue to show disparities between the higher intent expressed in UNSC
mandates and the political security realities and missions resources on the ground. In Sudan in
2011, these disparities resulted in the failure of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to fulfill its
mandate in protecting civilians. In early 2012, the same gaps contributed to the lack of firm
action by the UN Mission in South Sudan
during the tragic cycle of conflicts
Operationally, some

(UNMISS)

for instance, and the north south conflagration over Heglig in mid April 2012.

between the Muerle and Lou Nuer Dinka,

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Subpoint B. Benefits of the African Standby Force

The ASF could have been used, successfully, in several crises where others forces fell short.
Festus Aboagye7 explains that the ASF should be the main force behind the African Unions
missions. Had the ASF become operational in 2010, it would have been the impetus behind the
hunt for Joseph Kony, and the replacement to the ailing AU Mission in Somali

7 Festus Aboagye

2012

http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/ASFPolBrief.pdf

Had the efforts of the AU gained sufficient critical mass by 2005, the ASF would have become
operational in 2010.
, the ASF would have been the instrument of choice for
hunt for Joseph Kony, the leader of the Lords Resistance Army
, the mandate
of the AU Mission in Somali (AMISOM, 2007) would also have been transferred to the ASF in
2007. The projected deployment of an AU force to the eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC) to deal with the pervasive civilian insecurity would also have been a job for the
ASF.
Had that been the case

the PSC in its intervention to

(LRA), in the Great Lakes region. In addition

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Furthermore, the ASF is a better alternative to UN forces in Africa

The ASF would possess the same capabilities8 as European counterparts, but in operate in areas
that the UN is unwilling to venture or lack the capabilities for robust mandate implementation,
such as Somalia
The ASF can specifically be used to replace UN Peacekeepers in situations where offensive force
is necessary,
In fact, the ASF has more support in its operational area that will allow it to be successful.
Oscar Nkala9 writes that 10 East African nations have pledged to contribute resources to the
cause, enough for the Eastern ASF to enable rapid deployments, at any time.
So, because peacekeepers using offensive force leads to ineffective peacekeeping, and there are
better options when offensive force is necessary, we negate the resolution.
Meh stuff that is necessary here:
FIB first mission?

8 On the other hand, it should have dawned on the AU that in practical terms, the ASF should possess such backstopping capabilities

as those deployed by EU forces,

in areas where the UN is not willing to go, such as Somalia,

or where its deployed missions lack the capacities and capabilities for robust mandate
implementation, such as the DRC. These backstopping capabilities will include coherent rapid
deployment capabilities,
.
including the French led Operation Artemis, in the DRC (2004, 2006) and in Chad/CAR (20072009),

which the AU should coordinate

Oscar Nkala2014

http://defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=35999:east-african-nations-pledge-5-000-troops-for-regional-stand-by-force&catid=56:diplomacy-a-peace&Itemid=111

Ten East African nations have pledged to contribute three motorized battalions, one mechanised battalion, one light
infantry battalion and three squadrons/companies
towards the setting up of the Eastern Africa Standby Force
(EASF) which is set to become operational by December
Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) spokesman General Joseph Nzabamwita told the Rwandan daily New Times that member countries have already pledged significant troop
and material contributions to make the force a reality.
The regional defence, intelligence and security services chiefs from Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda who met in Kigali also agreed that each country
would contribute four special police units of between 140 and 170 officers each to support the civilian peacekeeping
component during active deployments. Other combat support services pledged include two hospitals, combat engineers
and special forces.
"From the pledges made, we got all the troops and the police officers we needed to put at the disposal of the force to
enable it to do rapid deployments, at any time,"
of 850 men each

under the auspices of the African Union (AU).

Nzambamwita said.

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FRONTLINES TO PROVE ASF CAN DO THING

Zinurine Abiodu Alghali
2008
(On Computer) file:///C:/Users/Thomas/Downloads/Chapter+5.pdf

Contemporary PSOs are mandated to assist countries with the implementation of a ceasefire
and/or Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), aimed at managing the transition from a state of
conflict to a future state of sustainable peace. The ASF is expected to be Africas peacekeeping
capacity, and will undertake peace operations with complex mandates that cover the political,
security, humanitarian, development and human rights dimensions.
The ASFs success will be a fulfillment of the AUs mandate to maintain peace and security, and
prevent future conflicts on the continent. It will also serve as part of an African solution to some
of Africas most serious challenges and crises

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Consent of the parties

UN peacekeeping operations are deployed with the consent of the main parties to the
conflict. This requires a commitment by the parties to a political process. Their acceptance of a peacekeeping operation
provides the UN with the necessary freedom of action, both political and physical, to carry out its mandated tasks. / In the
absence of such consent, a peacekeeping operation risks becoming a party to the conflict; and being drawn towards enforcement
action, and away from its fundamental role of keeping the peace. / The fact that the main parties have given their consent to the
deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation does not necessarily imply or guarantee that there will also be consent at
the local level, particularly if the main parties are internally divided or have weak command and control systems. Universality of
consent becomes even less probable in volatile settings, characterized by the presence of armed groups not under the control of
any of the parties, or by the presence of other spoilers.

Impartiality
Impartiality is crucial to maintaining the consent and cooperation of the main parties, but should
not be confused with neutrality or inactivity. United Nations peacekeepers should be impartial in their dealings
with the parties to the conflict, but not neutral in the execution of their mandate. / Just as a good referee is impartial, but will
penalize infractions, so a peacekeeping operation should not condone actions by the parties that violate the undertakings of the
peace process or the international norms and principles that a United Nations peacekeeping operation upholds . / Notwithstanding

a peacekeeping operation must scrupulously avoid

activities that might compromise its image of impartiality. A mission should not shy away from a rigorous
application of the principle of impartiality for fear of misinterpretation or retaliation. Failure to do so may undermine
the peacekeeping operations credibility and legitimacy, and may lead to a withdrawal of consent
for its presence by one or more of the parties.
the need to establish and maintain good relations with the parties ,

Non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate

UN peacekeeping operations are not an enforcement tool. However, they may use force at
the tactical level, with the authorization of the Security Council, if acting in self-defence
and defence of the mandate. / In certain volatile situations, the Security Council has given UN peacekeeping
operations robust mandates authorizing them to use all necessary means to deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political
process, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack, and/or assist the national authorities in maintaining law and
order. / Although on the ground they may sometimes appear similar, robust

peacekeeping should not be

confused with peace enforcement, as envisaged under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

Robust peacekeeping involves the use of force at the tactical level with the authorization of the Security Council and
consent of the host nation and/or the main parties to the conflict.

By contrast, peace enforcement does not require the consent of the main parties and
may involve the use of military force at the strategic or international level, which is
normally prohibited for Member States under Article 2(4) of the Charter, unless
authorized by the Security Council.
A UN peacekeeping operation should only use force as a measure of last resort. It should always be calibrated in a precise,
proportional and appropriate manner, within the principle of the minimum force necessary to achieve the desired effect, while
sustaining consent for the mission and its mandate. The use of force by a UN peacekeeping operation always has political
implications and can often give rise to unforeseen circumstances. / Judgments

concerning its use need to be

made at the appropriate level within a mission, based on a combination of factors including mission
capability; public perceptions; humanitarian impact; force protection; safety and security

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of personnel; and, most importantly, the effect that such action will have on national and
local consent for the mission.

Proof UN troops are scared

Bellamy10 writes that UN peacekeepers are already unwilling to put their lives at risk. One result
of this is that, despite more robust mandates, UN peacekeepers are typically not engaged in
proactive action to protect civilians or diminish the capacity of armed groups to target them. This
means that despite authorization to use force, peacekeeping forces are unwilling to actually risk
their lives. Jacobson11 explains that it is hard to expect foreigners to risk their lives to protect
people they dont know or have any commitment to.

10 Alex Bellamy for Global Observatory of the IPI29 May 2014.

This leaves us with the need to explain why there is no simple connection between developments in UN peacekeeping and
fatalities caused by malicious action. Among the reasons are no doubt significant improvements in operating practices,
information gathering and communications, and peacekeeper capabilities. But another explanation may lie in the way mission
leaders translate robust protection mandates into practice. A recent Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) report found that

UN peacekeepers typically refrained from using force to protect civilians despite having mandates
to do so, preferring instead to limit the use of force to self-defense. Moreover, it found that they were
often not present in the most dangerous situations. One result of this is that, despite their mandates,
UN peacekeepers are typically not engaged in proactive action to protect civilians or diminish the
capacity of armed groups to target them. Hence, they are not necessarily putting themselves in greater danger than
they otherwise would. This is perhaps borne out by the fact that many of the casualties described earlier
were sustained in the course of regular peacekeeping dutiesmediating disputes, escorting convoys,
protecting UN bases from attackrather than in new types of action relating to enhanced
protection mandates

11 http://www.idppcenter.com/UN_Peacekeeping_Failures.pdfThomas W. Jacobson
Obviously, it is difficult to justify U.N. peacekeeping as successful, wise, or in the safety and best interests of the people they are
purportedly assigned to protect. By noble character and nature, a father will risk his life to protect his family,

and a man to protect his community or nation. But it goes against human nature to expect
foreigners to risk their lives to protect people they dont know and to whom they have no
relational connection or commitment. U.N. peacekeeping creates the illusion of safety and doing something good,
but is inherently flawed.

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Funding Stuff
Aboagye
To ameliorate the burden of the ASF as a substitute for UN missions, the AU PSC ought to coordinate closely
with the UNSC and seek to leverage it to meet three objective criteria, namely: UNSC acceptance to deploy in conflict situations in Africa that pose a
threat to international security; deployment of capable forces with appropriate mandates; and, in
Situations where the UNSC declines to undertake these responsibilities, to provide full
logistical and funding support to AU-mandated operations, on a reimbursement basis.