It is because Thomas and I agree with the tenants of impartial peacekeeping, we negate the
resolution Resolved: United Nations peacekeepers should have the power to engage in offensive
operations.
We observe that the negative doesnt need to defend the status quo and for the affirmative to
deviate from the status quo, they must prove the willingness of the UN to support their advocacy.
Contention 1: Offensive force requires peacekeepers to become biased occupiers instead of
impartial protectors
When UN peacekeepers have to decide who is right and who is wrong, they are often mistaken.
The Foreign Intervention Brigade (FIB), a UN force, has gotten the situation totally wrong.
The News Record1 writes about how the FIB fails to be impartial by fighting with the
government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. They are being manipulated to fight
against the rebel group M23.
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Phil Moore2 explains how M23 is actually preferred by the locals over their government. He says
that locals cheer and applaud the M23 fighters, with some locals saying that the national
government in Kinshasa is responsible for creating the conflict. In fact, M23 only mutinied after
the Army failed to uphold their end of a peace deal. This shows how the UN force is on the
wrong side of the issue
2Phil Moore2012
http://www.modernghana.com/news/431610/1/dr-congo-rebels-capture-goma-accused-ofatrocities.html
Locals however cheered and applauded two vehicles full of rebels as they drove around the city
centre after fighters of the M23 movement marched into the city facing little resistance.
In Gisenyi, people seemed relieved at the rebel takeover.
"They welcomed them with cheers because the government soldiers had fled," leaving a
security vacuum, said a man who had fled Goma and who gave his name only as Alain.
Rwandan Jean-Bosco said: "We can only be happy, because it is over.... It was the
(Kinshasa) authorities who stirred up the hatred" of Congolese Tutsis, sometimes branded
as "foreigners" in the DR Congo.
The M23, formed by former members of an ethnic Tutsi rebel group, mutinied in April after the failure of a 2009
peace deal that integrated them into the regular army.
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And while they fight M23, they have been supporting a different rebel group, the FDLR
The News Record3 explains how Rwanda has evidence that the UN force was cooperating with
the FDLR, one of the groups the UN force was sent to neutralize. This included senior
commanders integrating FDLR groups into Congolese army units. Powell4 writes that after the
defeat of M23, FDLR had a 6 month grace period to disarm, instead, the group has continued
their human rights abuses and recruiting. And this is a big problem, because the FDLR has a long
history of atrocities and war crimes.
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The European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights5 explains how the FDLR is primarily
made up of soldiers fleeing prosecution for their roles in the Rwandan Genocide. They have been
responsible for large numbers of rape, forcible recruitment of child soldiers, and sexual violence.
Several among their leadership have been prosecuted for these crimes against humanity, but the
crimes continue to this day. Now4, the FDLR has had 6 months to recruit and gain strength, with
the UN saying confrontation is now inevitable.
The only modern instance of offensive force by UN Peacekeepers has been a dismal failure, with
the FIB fighting against the locally favored faction while working with seasoned war criminals.
http://www.ecchr.de/kongo-war-crimes-trial.html
For several years now, the FDLR has been carrying out attacks on the Congolese civilian population in eastern Congo. The FDLR is principally
made up of Hutu refugees who fled to eastern Congo from Rwanda in 1994 and over the
years that followed. From there, the FDLR have since been fighting the Rwandan Government led
by Paul Kagame. Attempts by the UN and the DRC to disarm the FDLR have continually been met
with reprisals against the Congolese civilian population. Huge numbers of women have
been subjected to rape, among other things. In spring 2009 the FDLR once again intensified its attacks on the civilian population
in eastern Congo.
. He also faces
accusations of war crimes, particularly the killing, cruel or inhumane treatment, sexual
coercion or rape of a person protected under international humanitarian law, as well as
forcibly recruiting child soldiers and perpetrating war crimes against property. The FDLR
are alleged to have utilized sexualized violence against the Congolese civilian population as part of
their battle strategy, and to have in numerous cases plundered, killed and inflicted grievous
bodily injuries. In many cases women are said to have been brutally abused, injuries which
in some cases were fatal. Murwanashyaka is not accused of committing these acts himself, but of failing to take action to prevent his subordinates
Murwanashyaka is accused of being responsible for crimes against humanity, particularly killing and sexual coercion or rape
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6 Festus Aboagye
2012
http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/ASFPolBrief.pdf
African countries therefore took note of the findings by the UNs Panel on UN Peace
Operations that the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda
had not been planned, deployed or
instructed in a way that would have enabled it to stop the genocide
(UNAMIR)
and that UNAMIR was also the victim of a lack of political will in the Security
UN missions continue to show disparities between the higher intent expressed in UNSC
mandates and the political security realities and missions resources on the ground. In Sudan in
2011, these disparities resulted in the failure of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to fulfill its
mandate in protecting civilians. In early 2012, the same gaps contributed to the lack of firm
action by the UN Mission in South Sudan
during the tragic cycle of conflicts
Operationally, some
(UNMISS)
for instance, and the north south conflagration over Heglig in mid April 2012.
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7 Festus Aboagye
2012
http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/ASFPolBrief.pdf
Had the efforts of the AU gained sufficient critical mass by 2005, the ASF would have become
operational in 2010.
, the ASF would have been the instrument of choice for
hunt for Joseph Kony, the leader of the Lords Resistance Army
, the mandate
of the AU Mission in Somali (AMISOM, 2007) would also have been transferred to the ASF in
2007. The projected deployment of an AU force to the eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC) to deal with the pervasive civilian insecurity would also have been a job for the
ASF.
Had that been the case
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8 On the other hand, it should have dawned on the AU that in practical terms, the ASF should possess such backstopping capabilities
Oscar Nkala2014
http://defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=35999:east-african-nations-pledge-5-000-troops-for-regional-stand-by-force&catid=56:diplomacy-a-peace&Itemid=111
Ten East African nations have pledged to contribute three motorized battalions, one mechanised battalion, one light
infantry battalion and three squadrons/companies
towards the setting up of the Eastern Africa Standby Force
(EASF) which is set to become operational by December
Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) spokesman General Joseph Nzabamwita told the Rwandan daily New Times that member countries have already pledged significant troop
and material contributions to make the force a reality.
The regional defence, intelligence and security services chiefs from Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda who met in Kigali also agreed that each country
would contribute four special police units of between 140 and 170 officers each to support the civilian peacekeeping
component during active deployments. Other combat support services pledged include two hospitals, combat engineers
and special forces.
"From the pledges made, we got all the troops and the police officers we needed to put at the disposal of the force to
enable it to do rapid deployments, at any time,"
of 850 men each
Nzambamwita said.
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Contemporary PSOs are mandated to assist countries with the implementation of a ceasefire
and/or Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), aimed at managing the transition from a state of
conflict to a future state of sustainable peace. The ASF is expected to be Africas peacekeeping
capacity, and will undertake peace operations with complex mandates that cover the political,
security, humanitarian, development and human rights dimensions.
The ASFs success will be a fulfillment of the AUs mandate to maintain peace and security, and
prevent future conflicts on the continent. It will also serve as part of an African solution to some
of Africas most serious challenges and crises
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Impartiality
Impartiality is crucial to maintaining the consent and cooperation of the main parties, but should
not be confused with neutrality or inactivity. United Nations peacekeepers should be impartial in their dealings
with the parties to the conflict, but not neutral in the execution of their mandate. / Just as a good referee is impartial, but will
penalize infractions, so a peacekeeping operation should not condone actions by the parties that violate the undertakings of the
peace process or the international norms and principles that a United Nations peacekeeping operation upholds . / Notwithstanding
confused with peace enforcement, as envisaged under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.
Robust peacekeeping involves the use of force at the tactical level with the authorization of the Security Council and
consent of the host nation and/or the main parties to the conflict.
By contrast, peace enforcement does not require the consent of the main parties and
may involve the use of military force at the strategic or international level, which is
normally prohibited for Member States under Article 2(4) of the Charter, unless
authorized by the Security Council.
A UN peacekeeping operation should only use force as a measure of last resort. It should always be calibrated in a precise,
proportional and appropriate manner, within the principle of the minimum force necessary to achieve the desired effect, while
sustaining consent for the mission and its mandate. The use of force by a UN peacekeeping operation always has political
implications and can often give rise to unforeseen circumstances. / Judgments
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of personnel; and, most importantly, the effect that such action will have on national and
local consent for the mission.
UN peacekeepers typically refrained from using force to protect civilians despite having mandates
to do so, preferring instead to limit the use of force to self-defense. Moreover, it found that they were
often not present in the most dangerous situations. One result of this is that, despite their mandates,
UN peacekeepers are typically not engaged in proactive action to protect civilians or diminish the
capacity of armed groups to target them. Hence, they are not necessarily putting themselves in greater danger than
they otherwise would. This is perhaps borne out by the fact that many of the casualties described earlier
were sustained in the course of regular peacekeeping dutiesmediating disputes, escorting convoys,
protecting UN bases from attackrather than in new types of action relating to enhanced
protection mandates
11 http://www.idppcenter.com/UN_Peacekeeping_Failures.pdfThomas W. Jacobson
Obviously, it is difficult to justify U.N. peacekeeping as successful, wise, or in the safety and best interests of the people they are
purportedly assigned to protect. By noble character and nature, a father will risk his life to protect his family,
and a man to protect his community or nation. But it goes against human nature to expect
foreigners to risk their lives to protect people they dont know and to whom they have no
relational connection or commitment. U.N. peacekeeping creates the illusion of safety and doing something good,
but is inherently flawed.
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Funding Stuff
Aboagye
To ameliorate the burden of the ASF as a substitute for UN missions, the AU PSC ought to coordinate closely
with the UNSC and seek to leverage it to meet three objective criteria, namely: UNSC acceptance to deploy in conflict situations in Africa that pose a
threat to international security; deployment of capable forces with appropriate mandates; and, in
Situations where the UNSC declines to undertake these responsibilities, to provide full
logistical and funding support to AU-mandated operations, on a reimbursement basis.