A Critique of Skinner's Views on the Explanatory Inadequacy of Cognitive Theories

Author(s): Michael G. Wessells

Source: Behaviorism, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Fall, 1981), pp. 153-170
Published by: Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27758983 .
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A CRITIQUE OF SKINNER'S VIEWS ON THE

EXPLANATORY INADEQUACY OF COGNITIVE
THEORIES
Michael

G. Wessells1
Vassar College

Over several decades, B. F. Skinner (1953, 1957, 1964, 1968, 1969, 1974,

theo
theories, including the cognitive
1977a) has sharply criticized mentalistic
one
as
as
When
influential
ries that now pervade experimental
Skin
psychology.
ner condemns
to
theories, it is all too easy for radical behaviorists
cognitive
a
is
fair
This
without
unfortunate
and
research
hearing.
reject cognitive
theory
are complementary
and cognitive analyses
behavioral
1973;
(Catania,
As
discussed
below,
cognitive analyses can specify the biological
1977).
Segal,
bases of behavior
and the private events that influence behavior. Behavioristic
can identify the environmental
on
antecedents
of
the
other
hand,
analyses,
can
be
the
entire
that
behavioral
events.
It
is
and
story
unlikely
public
private
because

to do, or
told fully either from the inside, as many cognitivists have attempted
as many
to do. Joint inquiry
have attempted
behaviorists
from the outside,
and cognitivists could lead to a more complete understand
among behaviorists
and the private determinants
of behavior. This
environmental
the
both
of
ing
and
in
of
written
the
is
among behaviorists
fostering cooperation
paper
spirit
cognitivists.
Skinner's

criticisms of cognitive psychology may be divided into two propo

in separate papers. First, cognitive theories lack
be examined
sitions which
power. Second,
cognitive theories obstruct the search for the causes
explanatory
the first proposition
of behavior. The aim of this paper is to critically evaluate
limitations on the ex
and to argue that Skinner has not identified principled
power of cognitive
theory. It is important to note what is at stake
planatory
were logically flawed, cognitive theories and
here. If all cognitive explanations
will

they guide would be unworthy of the serious attention of radical

and cognitive analyses would be
and
attempts to bridge behavioral
behaviorists,
some of the weaknesses
of Skinner's pro
ill-advised. This paper also examines
is
influenced
that
behavior
for
by biologi
behavior, particularly
gram
explaining
to which
the radical behaviorist outlook,
cal factors. The aim is not to disparage
the author is highly sympathetic, but to disarm ineffective criticisms that detract
it
is to advance,
from the radical behaviorist
position. After all, if behaviorism
the research

must be criticized by behaviorists (Sidman, 1976).

three main
plan of this paper is to evaluate separately each of Skinner's
These
of
the
proposals
cognitive explanations.
inadequacy
regarding
proposals
in
are incomplete
as follows. First, cognitive explanations
may be summarized
The

re
and an anonymous
Jan Krueger,
Steve Sadowsky,
J. D. Keehn,
am grateful to John Donahoe,
for reprints should be sent
on an earlier version of this paper. Requests
for their helpful comments
12601.
New York
of Psychology, Vassar College, Poughkeepsie,
to Michael G. Wessells, Department
H

viewer

153

Michael

G. Wessells

that they fail to specify the environmental

antecedents
of inner events. Second,
are fictional because
are
circular
and because
the
cognitive explanations
they
are not causes of behavior but are either mediational
or
inner processes
putative
are unnecessary
since they add
Third,
cognitive
explanations
epiphenomenal.
the envi
to an exhaustive
analysis of the functional relations between
nothing
ronment and behavior.
are difficult to evaluate for several reasons. For one thing,
These proposals
even ambivalent
is
Skinner's
(Dennett,
dynamic,
position
1978), and he some

times modifies
the strength of or the grounds
statement (cf. Scriven, 1956). Further, Skinner's
of his critique requires an
ly, so an evaluation
this paper concerns his criticisms of
Although

on which

a particular
he makes
intertwine extensive
objections
analysis of his overall approach.
experimental
cognitive psychol
itwill be necessary
in some
processing,

theories of information
ogy, particularly
instances to examine his broader, and, in general, older views on mentalism
and
on cognitive theories from the nonexperimental
areas of psychology. The analy
sis of Skinner's
older views may seem unfair because
theories have
cognitive
.changed rapidly in recent years. But the older ideas discussed below have occur
red repeatedly
and have appeared
in works
after the
that Skinner published

the rise of theories of information processing. Although

mid-1960s,
following
in order to show the timeli
contemporary
cognitive theories will be discussed
ness of the issues, most of the statements regarding the nature of cognitive analy
ses could have been made in reference to prominent theories from the 1960s and
the early 1970s. Moreover, many of the theories discussed
in this paper and in its

sequel had appeared well before 1977, the year inwhich Skinner published his

most

recent critique
ner's main proposals
are now examined.

of cognitive
regarding

these points inmind, Skin

psychology. Keeing
the explanatory
of cognitive theory
inadequacy

INCOMPLETENESS
The proposal
that cognitive theories are incomplete
is illustrated in the fol
lowing passages concerning mental way stations, thirst, and feelings, respectively.
. . .We may
... An
quences.

for unfinished causal se

object, first, to the predilection
action is not explained
by attributing it to expectations
the expectations
have
in turn been accounted
for. . . . (Skinner,

until

1969, p. 240)
...

In each case we have a causal chain consisting of three links: (1)

an operation
on the organism
from without ? for example,
performed
water deprivation;
for example, physiological
or
(2) an inner condition
for example, drinking. . . .
psychic thirst; and (3) a kind of behavior
The most
is to follow the causal sequence
objectionable
practice
back only as far as the hypothetical
second link. . . .
... We cannot account
for the behavior of any system while staying
inside it; eventually we must turn to forces operating upon the
wholly
organism from without.
(Skinner, 1953, pp. 34-35)

154

A Critique Of Skinner's Views Of The Explanatory Inadequacy Of

Theories

Cognitive

Since many of the events which must be taken into account

in ex
are
behavior
associated
with
can
states
that
be
plaining
bodily
felt, what
is felt may serve as a clue to the contingencies.
But the feelings are not
the contingencies

and

cannot

P. 4)

replace

them as causes.

(Skinner,

1977a,

to cognitive
These
criticisms apply potentially
theories that involve hypo
thetical rules, attentional processes,
images, encoding strategies, and so on. From
are
Skinner's
these
theories
since they are "second-link"
position,
incomplete
theories that do not specify
constructs and processes.

the environmental

antecedents

of the postulated

In order to evaluate
this criticism, the nature of cognitive explanations
must
are
be understood.
ori
speaking, cognitive explanations
Generally
biologically
and
the
bear
unmistakable
ented, nonphysiological
mechanistic;
they
imprint of
rationalism.
... An
mechanistic
Let us

account
must
to universal
ultimately
appeal
.
.
.
p.
3)
(Pylyshyn,
principles.
1973,
as the system of prin
"universal
define
(UG)
grammar"
are
or
that
and
rules
elements
conditions
ples,
properties of all human
?
not
but
accident
of course, I mean
merely by
languages
by necessity
can
as expressing
not
UG
be
taken
biological,
logical necessity. Thus,
"the essence of human
will
be
UG
invariant
among humans.
language."

UG

will

explanatory

specify what

learning must

language

achieve,

if it takes place

successfully.Thus UG will be a significantcomponent of LT (H,L) [that

in the domain of language]. What

is
is, the learning theory for humans
of
have
the
must
the
structure
UG,
attained,
properties
learned,
cognitive
as well, accidental
Each
though it will have other properties
properties.
to UG;
human
language will conform
languages will differ in other,
a language violating UG,
we
were
to
construct
If
accidental
properties.

we would find that it could not be learnedby LT (H,L). That is, itwould
not be learnable under normal
. . . (Chomsky,
1975, p. 29)

conditions

of access

and exposure

to data.

are biologically
in that they specify the univer
oriented
Cognitive
explanations
the
that enable
that describe
sal principles
biological
abstractly
properties
are
as
in
that
the
universal
to
learn
do.
They
nonphysiological
they
organisms
are
a
are
on
a
to
not
level
and
tied
stated
particular physi
conceptual
principles
This conceptual
cal medium.
approach neither denies the merits of physiological
dualism
1968, 1981 ;Kosslyn,
(Chomsky,
1976; Fodor,
analyses nor embraces
assumes
the
functional
that
the
1980). Rather,
properties of a system
approach
can be specified conceptually
the
1968). For example,
(Deutsch,
1960; Fodor,
can
a
in
terms
thereon
be
and
the
constraints
of
computer
specified
processing
events. Similarly, the
reference to electrical and magnetic
of programs, without
refer
without
of a person might be specified conceptually
cognitive processing
events. Most cognitive theories are mechanistic,
ence to neurophysiological
and,
that human cognition is a species of in
in keeping with the working assumption
theories are stated in the form of
formation processing
(Simon,
1978),2 many
need not be embodied
the mechanisms
the current popularity of the computer methaphor,
has adopted
for
Neisser
or
in
(1976),
example,
terminology.
information-processing
programs

2Despite
computer
cognitive

position

that departs

from present

conceptions

of information

155

processing.

in
a

Michael

G. Wessells

computer programs
To be sure, a cognitive theory does not explain the occurrence of a particular
antecedents
of the response. Yet an
response by specifying the environmental
the
account
effects of the environ
does
accommodate
explanatory
cognitive
the
to particular
ment.
In a complete
effects
of
exposure
cognitive account,
from a set of universal principles
that specify the
stimuli would
be deducible

to influence behavior. Using the

internal mechanisms
that allow the environment
a cognitive explanation
would
familiar computer metaphor,
specify the princi
the
of
human
the
hardware
information
system. In
ples governing
processing
can
the
the
constrain
kinds
these
of
use, the
programs
turn,
system
principles
the system can perform and the mechanisms
kinds of functions
the
whereby
such an account must accommodate
environment
influences the system. Because
and behavior,
the functional
environment
it is not incomplete
relations between
in the sense Skinner contends.
if
this
is incomplete,
of
Indeed,
type
explanation

then behavioristic
accounts must also be incomplete, for the functional relations
are a subset of the data that a cognitive explanation
determined
behaviorists
by
must eventually
Because
Skinner has not demonstrated
that cog
accommodate.
are logically incapable
nitive explanations
of accounting
for the effects of the
environment, his criticism is uncompelling.
is incomplete because
One might argue that a cognitive explanation
it does
not indicate which aspects of the phylogenetic
environment determined
the uni
versal processing mechanisms
of the organism and, indirectly, the effects of the
environment.
But
this criticism applies to all analyses of behavior,
ontogenetic
Skinner's
included. As will be argued in detail later, itmay be neither necessary
nor practical
to demand
that a theory identify the phylogenetic
antecedents
of
behavior.
The conclusion
that cognitive explanations
does not imply that current cognitive
theories

are not necessarily

incomplete
are explanatorily
In
adequate.
are
theories
not
fact, contemporary
cognitive
(for dis
descriptive,
explanatory
cussions
of descriptive
and explanatory
cognitive
theories, see Honig,
1978;
theories have not identified universal properties
or
1973). Extant
Pylyshyn,
mechanisms
that underlie and constrain learning. Rather, current theories postu
late constucts and processes ? for example,
the depth and the elaborateness
of
and
reconstructive
retrieval processes
(Craik
processing
Tulving,
1975),
(Spiro,
that serve to order observations,
to
1980), and schemata
(Thorndyke,
1977)
mechanisms
behavior
and
to
identify possible
underlying
generate predictions.
These
as both cognitivists and behaviorists
theories are incomplete,
descriptive
would
agree. Yet these theories constitute a transitional step along the arduous

in this manner,
Viewed
these theories are invulnerable
path toward explanation.
to the criticism of incompleteness.
become
vulnerable
They
only if they are
as
inherent
in
the
mistakenly
regarded
explanatory.
Nothing
cognitive approach
necessitates
such an error. Of course, this rejection of Skinner's
incompleteness
criticism does not entail the acceptance
of the strategies that many cognitivists
use in constructing
an explanatory
theory. These
strategies and the problems
associated with them will be discussed
in the second paper.
If cognitive theories are not inherently
incomplete, why do they appear to
be incomplete
from the radical behaviorist
outlook?
Primary among the many
reasons are the following. First, many of the cognitive accounts pro
possible
are incurably vague and in
posed by laypeople
(and by misguided
psychologists)

156

A Critique Of Skinner's Viewe Of The Explanatory Inadequacy Of

Cognitive

Theories

Because
scientific cognitive
theories are sometimes grouped with in
complete.
into
ill-conceived
theories
the
formal,
category of mentalistic
theories, the scien
tific theories probably
suffer unfairly from guilt by association
(Scriven,
1956).
theories ignore the profound
effects of reinforcement. Most
Second,
cognitive
of the historically
based
reaction
consequence
likely, this is an unfortunate
was
the
behavioristic
orientation
that
fueled
against
po
by Chomsky's
(1959)
lemics. Third, many extant cognitive accounts are descriptive rather than explan

atory and do not concern the effects of the environment.3

Fourth,
cognitivists
seek an explanation
that is centered around universal, biologically
determined
and processing
mechanisms.
As cognitivists
principles
investigate organismic
structures and mechanisms
rather than the effects of the environment,
their ef
forts will appear to be intrinsically incomplete. Collectively,
these factors have
seem to be explanatory
fictions rather than
probably made
cognitive accounts
legitimate

scientific

theories.

EXPLANATORY

FICTIONALITY

principal criticism, that cognitive theories are explanatory

is based on three related
the appearance
of explanations,
are
is
assertions.4
First, cognitive explanations
logically circular. This concern
ideational explanations.
apparent in the following passages concerning
Skinner's
second
fictions having only

The fictional nature of this form of inner cause is shown by the ease
is discovered
the mental process
with which
to have just the properties
a professor turns up in the
to account
needed
for the behavior. When
or gives the wrong
his mind
wrong classroom
lecture, it is because
is,
... In all this it is obvious
at least for the moment,
absent.
that the mind
and the ideas, together with their special characteristics are being invented
. . . .(Skinner, 1953, p. 30)
on.the
spot to provide spurious explanations
. . .The difficulty is that the ideas for which sounds are said to stand
. . .
as signs cannot be independently
observed.
to be
We evidently
the ideas at will from the behavior
construct
...
no
the
real
is
There
It
function
of
course,
is,
explanation.
explained.
fiction to allay curiosity and to bring inquiry to an
of an explanatory

end. (Skinner, 1957, p. 6)

concern here is that inner causes are sometimes

inferred from the very
are
the
to
and
ends
intended
resulting circular account
explain,
they
it
is
the
external
of
obscurity
controlling vari
Presumably,
inquiry prematurely.
ables that invites fictional cognitive accounts.

Skinner's
behaviors

ple,

For exam
cognitive theories do concern the effects of the environment.
influences
model
of concepts holds that the stucture of the environment
the
1977, 1978). Similarly, some accounts of language development
emphasize
stimuli to which children are exposed
1977). One might argue that
(Newport,

3Note that some descriptive

the prototype-transformation

(Rosch,
acquisition
of the linguistic
the effects
cognitivists analyze

concept

importance

of the environment
inappropriately,
of reinforcement.
But this argument is uncompelling,
contingencies
effects that cognitivists study are best analyzed
the environmental
ment.
4The
This

issue

thorough

failing to identify and to manipulate

that
for it has not been demonstrated
of reinforce
in terms of contingencies

status of theoretical
fictionality may bear on the ontological
charge of explanatory
has
on it will not be discussed
here since Scriven
and Skinner's
(1956)
position
analysis.

157

constructs.
provided

Michael

G. Wessells

the invention of men

By its very nature op?rant behavior encourages
said to initiate action.
In a reflex, conditioned
tal or cognitive processes
or unconditioned,
there is conspicuous
prior cause. Something
triggers
that has been positively
the response.
But behavior
reinforced occurs
are never compelling.
The
upon occasions
which,
though predisposing,
seems to start up suddenly, without
advance notice, as if spon
behavior
the invention of such cognitive entities as in
taneously generated. Hence
or will. . . .Because
circumstances
which
tention, purpose,
controlling
are
the
reinforcement
mental
lie in the organism's
of
obscure,
history
. . . (Skinner, 1977a, p. 4)
surrogate gets it chance.
Skinner's
of behavior.

second

point

is that

inner states

and events

are not

true courses

Inner entities or events do not "cause"

behavior, nor does behavior
... In an acceptable
are
mediators.
them.
best
?t
explan
they
"express"
causes
must be found outside
behavior
the
of
the
ultimate
scheme
atory
organism.

(Skinner,

1972, p. 325)

than this passage

indicates. Skin
is more complicated
In fact, Skinner's position
rela
into "functional
ner (1953, p. 23) translates "cause-and-effect
connection"
a "change
and an
in an independent
variable"
becomes
tion," where a "cause"
a "change
that private
variable." He maintains
in a dependent
"effect" becomes
as
the bodily
when
for
events can enter functional
occurs,
relations,
example,
the verbal response "That hurts!"
controls
condition we call "pain"
(Skinner,

1974, pp. 32ff.).

1957, pp. 130ff., 313-318;
1953, pp. 262, 273;
1945, passim;
On this view, a private event that controls a response counts as a cause of behav
Skinner (1957, p. 10) accepts functional relations as
ior (Zuriff, 1979). Because
status to private events. Yet he has
he
seemingly grants explanatory
explanatory,
variables that cause and explain behav
that it is environmental
stated repeatedly

ior (Skinner, 1953, p. 31 ; 1972, p. 325; 1974, p. 176).

are reconciled
These
by Skinner's
(1945,
conflicting
positions
apparently
1957, 1965) view that private events control behavior by virtue of the external
The private
of reinforcement
arranged by the verbal community.
contingencies
sense that they belong to the intermediate
events are causal only in the weak
Their functional
condition-behavior.
link of the causal chain environment-inner
causes
the
are
"ultimate
the
locus
the
of
determined
environment,
by
properties
is best summarized by saying that private
of behavior."
Thus, Skinner's position
not true causes of behavior. For Skinner, no theory con
events are mediators,
even
a noncircular
theory, can explain behavior. Obviously,
cerning inner events,
view discussed
the cognitive
contrasts
this view of explanation
starkly with
above.

third point is that many private events do not control behavior

Skinner's
and are epiphenomenal.
. . .Covert responses are not the causes of overt, both are the prod
. . . (Skinner,
ucts of common variables
1969, p. 258).
.
. . What
is not some nonphysical
observed
is felt or introspectively
own
or
life
but the observer's
mental
of consciousness,
world
mind,
as I shall show later, that introspection
is a
body. This does not mean,
kind of physiological
(and this is the heart of
research, nor does it mean
are the
are felt or introspectively
observed
that what
the argument)
of its current
causes of behavior. An organism behaves as it does because
. . What
.
are
structure, but most of this is out of reach of introspection.
of those histories.
observed are certain collateral products
introspectively

158

A Critique Of Skinner's View Of The Explanatory Inadequacy Of

Cognitive

Theories

(Skinner, 1974, p. 17; italics added)

those upon which we
Here Skinner asserts that some private events, particularly
can introspect, are collateral products of conditioning
histories and do not con
a set of objects, one might construct
in memorizing
trol behavior. For example,
an image of the objects
and consciously
inspect the image. The
introspected
recall
one's
of the objects.
to
influence
From Skinner's
appear
image might
the introspected
image is a product of a history of rein
however,
perspective,
forcement
of op?rant
(Skinner,
1953, pp. 270-275;
1974,
seeing responses
events are not causal, for the physiological
pp. 82-86).
Further, the introspected
of behavior by contin
involved in the shaping and the maintenance
processes
are
the
of
reinforcement
of
scope
introspection
1974,
beyond
(Skinner,
gencies

pp. 216ff.; 1977a, pp. 9-10).

the non
views concerning
the sake of clarity, Skinner's
For
circularity,
causal status of private events, and epiphenomenalism
will be examined
sepa
rately.

Circularity
The proposal
that cognitive theories are logically circular is cogent inmany
the circularity of influential
have
instances.
recognized
Indeed,
cognitivists
of
theories such as the levels-of-processing
memory
1978;
(Baddeley,
analysis
at
of
The
1975).
circularity has hampered
problem
1978; Postman,
Eysenck,
and
the
short-term
and
to
the
of
define
units
memory
(Glanzer
capacity
tempts
short-term mem
1974), to distinguish empirically between
1974; Simon,
Razel,
(Waugh
ory and long-term memory
structure upon
fects of semantic

and Norman,
the retrieval

the ef
1965), and to determine
from semantic
of information

memory (Smith, 1978), among others. In pointing out thisproblem, Skinner has
performed an important service.
But logical circularity is no more a necessary problem of cognitive theories
such as feature detectors
constructs
than of b?havioral
theories. For example,

(see Eimas and Miller, 1978) and prototypes (see Posner, 1969; Rosch, 1977)

of the data they were intended to explain. As

independently
the
independent
ability to define inner processes
inquiry advances,
physiological
will
to
be
the
behavior
of
undoubtedly
improve. Further, cognitiv
explained
ly
to logically
constructs
of circularity by anchoring
ists can avoid the problem

have

been

defined

1956).
(Garner, Hake and Eriksen,
operations
independent
the point that logically circular theories
criticism also overlooks
Skinner's
in the initial stages of research
can contribute
to scientific inquiry, particularly
and to make test
to
organize observations
they help
1976). Specifically,
(Audi,
and
that guide research. Indeed, the concepts of reinforcement
able predictions
and guided useful research before attempts were made
the op?rant organized

(for example, Meehl, 1950; Schick, 1971) to define the concepts independently

similar lines,
to explain. Along
intended
of the phenomena
they had been
the
that many,
treatise on verbal behavior, an insightful interpretation
Skinner's
ac
circular
useful
will
believe
many
author
research, proposed
included,
guide
statements
the following
counts. Consider
autoclitics,
descriptive
concerning
verbal responses that are controlled by other covert or overt verbal responses and
the reaction of the listener.
that modify
The speaker may acquire verbal behavior descriptive of his own be
. . .The behavior
the speaker may
so described may be verbal:
havior.

159

Michael

G. Wessells

himself talking. He may describe the responses he has made,

or will make.
or /
For example, he may say / said "Heads"
is making,
"
. . .The events available to him
now say "Heads"
or / will say "Heads.
as stimuli consist of the products of his own behavior as speaker. He may
hear himself or react to private stimuli associated with vocal behavior,
possibly of a covert or even incipient form. . . . Such stimulation may
talk about

also

assume

control

pp. 313-314)

of the verbal op?rant

called

the tact. (Skinner,

1957,

Here the private stimuli, particularly

those associated with the covert responses,
are inferred directly from the responses
to be accounted
for. This type of ac
occurs
Verbal
Behavior. The
count, indisputably
circular,
frequently throughout
not
is
that
Skinner's
of
is
verbal
behavior
circular (it is
point
analysis
hopelessly
se
an
that
rob
not
but
does
account
of
its
value.
not)
circularity per
as it is in
is a grave problem when it is inherent in an account,
Circularity
accounts proposed by laypeople, and when it brings inquiry to
indicated above, cognitive theories are not inherently circular.
Equally
important, circular cognitive theories have not ended inquiry but have
stimulated
research aimed at defining independently
constructs such as the level
of processing
Craik
and
and Eysenck,
(for example,
Tulving,
1975; Eysenck

many mentalistic
an end. But as

1979).

These

Noncausal

considerations

Status

weaken

Skinner's

criticism

substantially.

of Inner Events

Skinner's
second argumeht,
are not causes of behavior
that inner processes
that the ultimate causes of behavior are in the environment,
leads to a logi
cal regress (Audi, 1976). For example,
the effects of the ontogenetic
environment
at a particular moment
on
in
the
effects
of
to
depend
part
previous exposures
as witnessed
the environment,
in the phenomena
of blocking and selective atten
tion (Mackintosh,
environ
1974). How,
then, can the effects of the ontogenetic
ment that occur at one particular moment be singled out as causal?
Skinner's
resolution
of this problem
is characteristically
attempted
prag
and

matic.

...

It is true that we could trace human behavior not only to the

it but also to the causes of
physical conditions which shape and maintain
those conditions
and the causes of those causes, almost ad infinitum, but
there is no point
in going back beyond
the point at which effective
action can be taken. That point is not to be found in the
psyche, and the
force of mental
explanatory
the environment
has come

1974, p. 210; italicsadded)

life has steadily declined

as the promise of
to be more
clearly understood.
(Skinner,

. . . the real causes

ifwe want to do
lay in the environment, because
it is to the environment we must
turn. . . .
anything about genocide,

(Skinner and Blanshard, 1967, p. 331)

On this view, explanation

and the ability to control behavior are intimately re
lated. Skinner regards the environment
as the cause of behavior because
it is the
environment
that is directly accessible
and that can be used to predict and con
trol behavior. For Skinner, explanation
is the handmaiden
of pragmatism.
This approach
is troublesome
because
the ability to control behavior
is
neither necessary nor sufficient for the achievement
of an explanatory
account.

160

A Critique Of Skinner's View Of The Explanatory Inadequacy Of

Cognitive

Theories

theories in astronomy have explanatory

power even though they have not
Many
our
events
enhanced
(Martin, 1978). Further, environ
ability to control cosmic
events that are useful in predicting and controlling behavior may not be
mental
in any intelligible sense. For example, medical
causal or explanatory
physicians
often prescribe
alleviates
the patients'
pills, the ingestion of which
placebo
In these cases, the ingestion of the placebo
clearly controls behavior.
symptoms.
But it seems odd to argue that the ingestion of the pill therefore caused or ex
the patients' behavior. For the ingestion of the placebo may have been a
plained
of behavior. Behav
for the modification
sufficient but not a necessary condition
can
in
absence
the
and vice versa.
be
achieved
of
ioral control, then,
explanation
a
status simply
cannot
be
ascribed
factors
Environmental
privileged explanatory
because

they are accessible

and useful

in controlling

behavior.

Another problem is that pragmatism is a fickle criterionby which to judge

the teaching of
Contemporary
cognitive theories have already advanced
measurement
the
of
1977) and
1977),
intelligence (Sternberg,
reasoning (Collins,
skills
the improvement
memorial
of
(Atkinson,
1977). Conceiv
1975; Morris,
for
methods
identify
controlling behav
ably, cognitive theories might eventually
were to occur,
behavioral
If
that
that
theories.
those
ior
surpass
by
generated
conclude
that
Skinner's
would
one, following
cognitive theories pro
approach,
theories.

vide better explanations

theories provide?
than behavioral
to ele
indicates that it is unjustifiable
The absurdity of such a conclusion
concerns
to
as
the
status
and methodological
Skinner has done, pragmatic
vate,
one's
An explanatory
of explanatory
theory may advance
ability
prerequisites.
is not the
to control a phenomenon,
but the ability to control the phenomenon
sine qua non of the explanatory
power of the theory. The explanatory
adequacy

of a theory should be decided by the extent to which the theory agrees with

exhibits generality and internal consistency, makes novel,

existing observations,
non trivial predictions,
and so
converges with other theories, achieves parsimony,
is relevant to the task of explaining behavior only
on. The control of behavior
of the theory are assessed through attempts to control
insofar as the predictions
one aims to make need not be dictated by
behavior. But the kinds of predictions
the pragmatic desire to change behavior for the better.
the attempt to use the ability to control behavior as the criterion
Ironically,
environmentalist
works
is explanatory
against Skinner's
a
of Skinner's
to
strict
instances. According
interpretation
are
inner structures and are products
genes lack causal status since they
position,
environment
of the phylogenetic
1974,
(Skinner,
1953, p. 26; 1969, p. 87;
is largely inaccessible
environment
But the phylogenetic
and, apart
pp. 33-45).
of selective breeding, it cannot be used to con
from the time-consuming method
and acces
In contrast, genetic structure is relatively discoverable
trol behavior.
what
deciding
in some
approach
for

genetic structure
by manipulating
sible, and the ability to control characteristics
is advancing rapidly. Using the criterion of control, genes seem to have a stronger
environment has. On Skinner's own
claim to causal status than the phylogenetic
not the
is
the
it
that
the
environment,
argument
phylogenetic
then,
grounds,
the bio
to
causes
With
must
be
that
behavior
discovering
regard
rejected.
genes,
causes
the
of
of
the
determinants
environmentalizing
strategy
behavior,
logical
not
of behavior
pay.
1978) may
(Schnaitter,
One might object that Skinner would probably be willing to attribute causal

161

Michael
status

to genes

so long as particular

G. Wessells
genetic

antecedents

of behavior

had become

isolable and manipulable via physiological procedures (see Skinner, 1972, p. 422;

are dictating what

considerations
1974, p. 215). But here again, methodological
the positions of the horse and the cart have been re
counts as an explanation;
became
versed. Also note that in the history of biology, genetic explanations
on a physio
useful well before genes had been defined and made manipulable
1965). One may agree with Skinner that ex
1966; Dunn,
logical level (Carlson,
refer to physical events. But it does not
in
must,
concepts
principle,
planatory
lacks explanatory
follow that a concept
power unless its physical referents have
in the biological
and the physical
been identified. Like
sciences,
investigators
concepts even when the physical referents of
may use explanatory
psychologists
the concepts are unknown.

here why many cognitivists do not view physiological

It is worth mentioning
As pointed out earlier, cognitivists hold that the
analysis as their chief method.5
can be specified on a conceptual
functional properties of information processors
level. Many of the most complex aspects of the operation of a system can be an
level (Fodor,
1981). More
alyzed most naturally at a molar, nonphysiological
need not await the de
over, attempts to explain and to control inner processes
that could be used to
of a highly advanced
physiological
technology
velopment
This approach
has a pragmatic
identify the physical bases of inner processes.
(func
ring to it, and it is consistent with Skinner's (1938) view that explanatory
even though the physiological
bases of these
tional) relations can be discerned
relations are unknown.
causes behav
In conclusion,
Skinner'.s argument that only the environment

it entails the enslavement

ior fails because
of explanation
and
to pragmatic
concerns. A more reasonable
is
for radical behaviorists
methodological
position
that both environmental
and inner events are causes of behavior (see Schnaitter,
accounts may seem to depart from this view since they explain
1978). Cognitive
in terms of universal inner processes. Recall, however,
behavior
that a cognitive
must accommodate
the functional
relations between
the environ
explanation
ment and behavior
that are formed in the lifetime of the organism. In this sense,
do not ignore environmental
cognitive explanations
do not attribute
causal status to all
explanations
is thus kept open.
leading to epiphenomenalism

causes. Further,
inner events, and

cognitive
the door

Epiphenomenalism

Skinner (1974, p. 17; 1977a, pp. 9-10) has stated thatwhat we introspect

upon are collateral products, not causes of behavior, and that the physiological
that mediate
the control of behavior by the environment
are beyond
processes
the reach of introspection. He also asserts that cognitive psychologists
say they
know cognitive processes
through introspection.
have two answers
Cognitive psychologists
tal apparatus
or construct. One
is a metaphor
are known
through introspection. Do not all
they think? . . .No one doubts that behavior
the question
is how well they can be known
are searching
^Of course, many cognitive psychologists
See Posner (1978)
and Thatcher and John (1977).

162

to the charge that the men

is that cognitive processes
thinking persons know that
involves internal processes;
. . .
through introspection.

for the pysiological

bases of cognitive processes.

A Critique Of Skinner's View Of The Explanatory Inadequacy Of

Theories

Cognitive

(Skinner, 1977a, pp. 9-10)

of contemporary
reveals a serious misunderstanding
passage
cognitive
now
believe
that
Most
many
inner, causal processes
psychology.
cognitivists
cannot be introspected upon.
this view in 1967 in his
Indeed, Neisser expressed
This

discussion

of visual

images:

. . .My own view, as the reader has already discovered,

is that both
anew
on
are
and
constructed
every occasion
memory
percepts
images
.
. . When
an image is constructed,
the opera
when they are experienced.
use
which
the information,
otherwise
is carried silently,
tions of synthesis
in ways which
(by definition) we can hardly "visualize."
unconsciously,

(Neisser, 1967, p. 170)

Similarly, Kosslyn
his research, writes

(1978),

who

has

used

introspective

evidence

extensively

in

To some, the study of imagery seems simple. All one needs to do is

to saying that in order to study visual
to introspect. This is equivalent
one
to
needs
do
is
look. Clearly, much processing goes on
all
perception,
of an object, either when we are perceiving
conscious
before we become
entails uncover
of either phenomenon
it or imaging it. An understanding
and
the rele
mechanisms
for
the
processing
responsible
representing
ing
. . . (Kosslyn,
vant information.
1978, p. 217)
accounts
Past generations of cognitive psychologists may have based explanatory
But
most
contemporary
cognitivists
knowledge.
introspective
primarily upon
reveal the universal processing mech
cannot possibly
believe that introspection
account.
anisms that would
constitute an explanatory
is known
believe
what
that
through introspection
Further, many cognitivists
and
inner
is
of
and
is epiphenomenal
(Anderson
unrevealing
pausai processes

Bower, .1973; Anderson,

Simon,

1972).

Consider,

written by Pylyshyn.

1976, 1978; Kieras, 1978; Pylyshyn, 1973, 1978;

these passages

for example,

from an influential

paper

. . . Just because we know that we use certain mnemonic

strategies,
certain ob
or that we say certain things to ourselves, or that we "see"
eye" or "hear" ourselves rehearsing a series of num
jects in our "mind's
assume that the contents of such subjective knowl
we
cannot
etc.,
bers,
proce
edge can be identified with the kind of information-processing
dures which will go into an explanatory
1973, p. 3)
theory. (Pylyshyn,
. . .The
in thinking is
role of experienced
images (i.e., appearances)
that the con
the assumption
clear since even if we make
by no means
useful psychological
reveal theoretically
tents of our experiences
proc
car
esses, it still remains true that very little (if any) of the thinking is
ried by such processes.

(Pylyshyn,

1973, p. 6)

that
in experimental
simply do not believe
psychology
cognitivists
the
most
For
are
known
part,
they
through
introspection.
processes
cognitive
and they agree with Skinner
use introspective
reports as data to be explained,
reports may be useful even though they do not
(1974, p. 16) that introspective
reveal the causes of behavior (Kosslyn and Pomerantz,
1977). Thus, the prevalent
on introspective
agrees remarkably well with
knowledge
position
cognitivistic
Overall,

163

Michael

G. Wessells

and cognitivists are quick to

their convergences.
the
may be valid, Skinner maintains
chief supporting argument is that the
not allow us to introspect upon the
that
on behavior
the
effects
of the environment
events
mediate
physiological
one
is
But
it
conceivable
that
could intro
p.
p.
216;
10).
1977a,
1974,
(Skinner,
events. As
upon
spect upon causal factors without
introspecting
physiological
that at a particular time, there occurs in the brain of person P
sume, for example,
a set of neural events N and that P introspectively observes a visual image (I) of
a set of objects. Also assume that P recalls the names of the objects if and only if
N and I are occurring. Presumably,
Skinner's position would be that the neural
so the image is
events (N) cause both the image and the recall of the objects,
causes
not
reveal
the
does
of
the
recall
of the objects.
and
(N)
epiphenomenal
is that the image consists of the set of neural
Another
however,
possibility,
events N in much
the same way that an overt response such as the lifting of an
arm consists of a set of neural and muscular
events. On this view, I can be con
even though I reveals nothing
strued as the cause of the recall of the objects
as an endorsement
not
about N. This hypothetical
is
intended
of the
example
that of Skinner.

It is unfortunate

that behaviorists

point out their differences and to overlook

the epiphenomenalist
position
Although
on
contestable
position
grounds. Skinner's
of our nervous system does
construction

the point is that physicalism

central-state
does not re
identity thesis. Rather,
is necessarily
the view that introspective knowledge
limited because of the
events on a molecular
level.
inability to introspect upon physiological
are
an
events
Whether
is
issue that
introspected
epiphenomenal
empirical
cannot be decided by argument or by apodictic decree.6 Even if future research

quire

the epiphenomenalist
supported
by be undermined.

position,

the cognitive

outlook

would

not there

NONNECESSITY
Skinner's

third criticism

of cognitive

explanations

is that they are unneces

sary.

. . .The

can be ac
behavior generated by a given set of contingencies
counted
for without
to hypothetical
inner states or processes.
appealing
If a conspicuous
stimulus does not have an effect, it is not because
the
to it or because
some central gatekeeper has
organism has not attended
screened it out, but because
the stimulus plays no important role in the

The other cognitive processes

invoked
prevailing contingencies.
an input-output
formula can be disposed
of in the same way.

1969, p. 8)

to salvage
(Skinner,

. . .There

is a familiar experiment on color generalization

in which a
pigeon pecks at a disk of, say, green light, the behavior being reinforced
on a variable interval schedule. When a stable rate of
responding develops,
extreme versions of the epiphenomenalist
in research con
position are being challenged
to one seminal model
imagery (Kosslyn and Pomerantz,
1977; Shepard,
1978). According
(Kosslyn,
from abstract conceptual
that is in a propositional,
1980), images are constructed
knowledge
nonintrospect
ible format. But an image, once constructed,
can be used in further processing. For example,
the image can
be scanned or rotated, and global parts of the image can be compared. On this view, an
con
introspectable,
structed product of nonconscious
to say, the
Needless
processing may be functional, not epiphenomenal.
6Currently,

cerning

evaluation

of this view requires much more

research.

164

A Critique Of Skinner's View Of The Explanatory Inadequacy Of

Cognitive

Theories

are given, and the color of the disk is changed.

further reinforcements
to
another
color at a rate which depends upon how
pigeon responds
it differs from the original; rather similar colors evoke fairly high
much
rates, very different colors low rates. A cognitive psychologist might ex
in this way: The pigeon takes in a new color (as "in
plain the matter
retrieves
the
put"),
original color from memory, where it has been stored
in some processed
form, puts the two colored images side by side so that
no

The

the differences,
and after evaluating
be easily compared,
they may
rate.
But
is
at
what
the
advantage
gained by moving
responds
appropriate
to different colors on a disk to an inner
that responds
from a pigeon

pigeon that responds to colored images in itsmind? The simple fact is

different colors con
of a known history of reinforcement,
that because
trol different rates.
. . .The whole field of the processing of information can be reformu
in the control exerted by stimuli. (Skinner,
lated as changes
1977a, p. 7;

italics added)

is gained by postulating
Skinner asserts that nothing
cognitive states and
can
of
be
and a
Behavior
processes.
explained
by contingencies
reinforcement,
ex
is
it
not
suffer
the
because
does
of
account
behavioristic
preferred
problems
and
incompleteness
fictionality.
planatory
are vulnerable
to this criticism. For example,
if one
Some cognitive accounts

Here

a particular
stimulus controlled
that a particular
observed
response, one might
an association
a
the
had
account
that
formed
by saying
give
organism
descriptive
As
the
the
Skinner
this
between
stimulus and
response.
analysis is cir
proposed,
an
in
it
adds
little
to
account
terms
and
of stimulus con
cular and incomplete,
trol.

to many other descriptive

and explanatory
cognitive
theories,
applied
this criticism is tenuous. The criticism assumes that behavioral
theories
however,
can do all that cognitive
is unproven.
theories can, but this assumption
For
some cognitive
theories of comprehension
and van Dijk,
(Kintsch
example,
As

1978; Rumelhart, 1977) hold that comprehending a paragraph entails the tacit

of a propositional
representation
accurate predictions
have made
and Keenan,
(Kintsch
1973)
comprehension
construction
tive theories

of the paragraph. These descrip

the speed of
about, for example,
in which
and about the manner

people recall and summarize prose passages (Miller and Kintsch, 1980). No one

can make
the many predic
accounts
that behavioristic
has ever demonstrated
the
that cognitive theories are now making. Despite
tions about comprehension
the claim that the field of
of Skinner's
analysis of verbal behavior,
potential
can be
less the entire field of information processing,
much
comprehension,
an
note.
is
in terms of stimulus control
reformulated
extravagant
promissory
adult readers have exceedingly
This note will be difficult to cash because
long
these histories
to verbal stimuli. Whether
and intricate histories of responding

can ever be specified in the degree of detail required for making precise predic
It remains to be
in everyday
tions about comprehension
settings is unknown.
advocated
reformulation
that the behavioral
shown
by Skinner can be made
without
significant loss.
fill in some of the gaps that now exist in
Further,
cognitive accounts may

165

Michael
strictly behavioral

analyses.

One

G. Wessells

of these gaps

concerns

biological

influences

on

learning (Seligman, 1970; Shettleworth, 1972; Staddon and Simmelhag, 1971).

Skinner (1966, 1969, 1974, 1975, 1977b) often accounts for biological influ

ences by attributing a particular instance of stimulus control to the effects of the

tend to
environment.
But these attributions,
though provocative,
phylogenetic
accounts.
he
not
Nowhere
does
be piecemeal
provide an or
systematic
listings,
the
for
account
of
that,
shaped
contingencies
example,
phylogenetic
ganized
is modified
in ways
such that their behavior
by some contingencies
organisms
of reinforcement
but not by others. Equally
important, it is unlikely that he will
an
one
the
ismostly
account.
environment
For
such
thing,
phylogenetic
provide

so it is extremely difficult to identify the environmental

factors that
inaccessible,
the
envi
because
environments.
And
in
ancestral
behavior
ontogenetic
shaped
in controlling
has
value
Skinner
ronment
is of greatest practical
behavior,
determinants of behavior.
focused his research almost entirely on the ontogenetic
In the absence of systematic investigations of and accounts of the effects of bio
logical factors on learning, theories of stimulus control are incomplete.
In accounting
for the effects of biological
factors, cognitive theories may be

include formalized
previously,
cognitive explanations
quite useful. As discussed
based prop
the
statements or representations
universal, biologically
concerning
the
that they accommodate
erties of the organism. These
statements, provided
occur
factors that
and ontogenetic
interactions between biological
during devel
could be used to predict the constraints on the stimuli that will control
opment,
the behavior
of organisms. Of course, one could argue that cognitive explana
even
for the effects of bio
for accounting
if attainable,
are not necessary
tions,

logical factors. Skinner (1953, p. 54; 1969, p. 173) believes that physiological

fill in the gaps in our understanding

of the effects of the
eventually
But this argument cuts both ways. If cognitive theo
environment.
phylogenetic
for via behavioral
that can also be accounted
ries can account
for observations
and physiological
then the latter two could be viewed as unnecessary.
analyses,
In reality, our present knowledge
is too limited to allow definite statements
about the necessity or the nonnecessity
of particular approaches.
The deeper problem
that is
criticism is that an account
facing Skinner's
or invalid. For example, even
is not therefore unimportant
logically unnecessary
if the laws of chemistry were reducible
to the laws of physics, itwould not fol
analyses

will

low that the laws of chemistry lack explanatory

power and
a physiologist
accounts
could argue that behavioristic
Moreover,
because
functional
relations
the environment
between
and
on a physiological
level. Yet
this does not imply
explained
are unimportant
accounts
or invalid. The laws of behavior are

practical utility.
are unnecessary
can be
behavior
that behavioristic
laws regardless

of

the availability of knowledge about underlyingphysiological processes (Skinner,

And
the behavioral
laws have obvious
value (see
1938, pp. 418ff.).
practical
Catania
and Brigham,
1978).
Similarly,
cognitive analyses may be important
even if they are logically unnecessary.
For one thing, they may provide system
atic accounts
of the effects of biological
factors on behavior. Further, they are
in analyzing
that has arisen through a complex
and un
behavior
advantageous
known history. This point will receive additional
attention
in the sequel to this
paper.

In conclusion,
invented whenever

are not added theoretical baggage

that is
cognitive accounts
the environmental
antecedents
of behavior are inconspicuous.

166

A Critique Of Skinner's View Of The Explanatory Inadequacy Of

Cognitive

Even

Theories

if an individual's

relations were known

history of environmental-behavioral
would
view
the
task as incomplete.
completely,
cognitivists
explanatory
They
would ask what were the biological
that
to
properties
permitted the environment
have the observed
effects on behavior.
In light of Skinner's primary goal of con
it is understandable
that he sees no reason to look beyond the
trolling behavior,
environmental
determinants
of behavior.
But in light of cognitivists'
goal of
the
behavior
and
environmental
influences thereon, it is understand
explaining
able that they look beyond the environmental
determinants
of behavior. Wheth
er cognitivists will achieve an explanatory
theory cannot now be determined,
as unnecessary
and it is too early to depict cognitive accounts
diversions
from
the path

toward

explanation.

CONCLUSION
criticism concerning
Skinner's
and fictionality
explanatory
incompleteness
some
to
theories are
apply
descriptive
cognitive theories. Yet many descriptive
to Skinner's proposals
invulnerable
and
regarding circularity, epiphenomenalism
the noncausal
status of inner events. Further, explanatory
theories
cognitive
elude the incompleteness
and the fictionality
criticisms entirely. The criticism

to cognitive explanations,
may
regarding nonnecessity
apply
though this has
never been demonstrated,
but this criticism overlooks-the
potential usefulness of
limita
cognitive accounts. Thus none of Skinner's objections
identify principled
tions on cognitive explanations.
This conclusion
does not imply approbation
of

criticisms con
cognitive
theories, nor does it negate Skinner's poignant
the topic of the second paper. This
cerning the perils of cognitive theorizing,
conclusion
does
that it is premature
to depict cognitive
ac
imply, however,
counts as inherently flawed and unworthy of the serious, dispassionate
attention
of radical behaviorists.
The paper
is intended
to be propadeutic
to cooperative
research and con
extant

structive

radical behaviorists
and
among
an exposition
of the differences

the
cognitivists. Achieving
between
the behavioral
and
One
of the chief points made
above
is that the two
cognitive
approaches.
aims and their conceptions
approaches
diverge sharply in their metatheoretical
are to predict and con
about explanation.
The chief aims of radical behaviorism
latter aims

dialogue

requires

trol behavior.
Skinner maintains
that the greatest degree of behavioral
control
so he looks to the
is accomplished
environmental
by manipulating
variables,
environment
for an explanation
of behavior.
In this approach,
and
pragmatism
are thoroughly
In contrast, the principal
interwoven.
conception
explanatory
is to explain behavior by specifying on a concep
aim of cognitive psychology
the en
tual level the universal,
internal structures and processes
through which

exerts its effects.

Some unfortunate misunderstandings
have probably
arisen from the failure
to discern and to analyze
in goals and in conceptions
these differences
about
From
the behaviorist
appear fic
explanation.
outlook,
cognitive explanations
tional in that they do not refer ultimately
to the environment. From the cogni
tive outlook,
behavioral
and misguided
because
appear incomplete
explanations
the effects of the environment.
In order to
they describe but fail to explain
achieve extensive cooperation
between behaviorists
and cognitivists, these differ

vironment

167

G. Wessells

Michael

in conceptions
of explanation will have to be reconciled.
the present research of
in the absence
of a reconciliation,
however,
behaviorists
and cognitivists may be viewed as complementary
1973;
(Catania,
In
research
may
private
specify important
1977).
cognitive
particular,
Segal,
re
that influence behavior,
and behavioristic
events and biological
properties
of private events and of the
determinants
search may specify the environmental
In view of the substantial
relations between
private events and overt behavior.
seems worthwhile
it
to try
collaborative
from
that
follow
research,
gains
might
chasm that now exists.
to bridge the explanatory
enees

Even

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