FOUCAULT
AESTHETICS,
METHOD,
AND
EPISTEMOLOGY
Edited by
JAMES D. FAUBION
Translated by
ROBERT HURLEY AND OTHERS
ESSENTIAL
WORKS
OF
FOUCAULT
1954-1984
VOLUME
TWO
ALLEN LANE
THE PENGUIN PRESS
PHILOSOPHY AND
PSYCHOLOGY*
What is psychology?
Let me say that I don't think we should try to define psychology as a science but perhaps as a cultural form. It fits into a whole
series of phenomena with which Western culture has been familiar
for a long time, and in which there emerged such things as confession, casuistry, dialogues, discourses, and argumentations that could
be articulated in certain milieus of the Middle Ages, love courtships or
whatnot in the mannered circles of the seventeenth century.
A.B. Are there internal or external relations between psychology
as a cultural form and philosophy as a cultural form? And is philosophy a cultural form?
M.F. You're asking two questions:
1. Is philosophy a cultural form? I have to say that I'm not much of
a philosopher, so I'm not really in a position to know. I think that's the
great problem being debated now; perhaps philosophy is in fact the
most general cultural form in which we might be able to reflect on the
reality of the West.
2. Now, what are the relations between psychology as a cultural
form and philosophy? Well, I believe that we are looking at a point of
conflict that for five hundred years has set philosophers and psychologists against one another, a problem that is given a new pertinence by all the questions that revolve around educational reform.
A.B.
M.F.
in at the same time a lot of problems that no longer involved either the
individual, exactly, or the soul opposed to the body; but that one
brought back inside the strictly psychological problematic what had
previously been excluded from it, either on the grounds that it was
physiology, reintroducing the problem of the body, or sociology, reintroducing the problem of the individual with his milieu, the group to
which he belongs, the society in which he is caught, the culture in
which he and his ancestors have always thought. With the result that
the simple discovery of the unconscious is not an addition of domains:
it is not an extension of psychology, it is actually the appropriation, by
psychology, of most of the domains that the human sciences
covered- so that one can say that, starting with Freud, all the human
sciences became, in one way or another, sciences of the psyche. And
the old realism a Ia Emile Durkbeim- conceiving of society as a substance in opposition to the individual who is also a kind of substance
incorporated into society-appears to me to be unthinkable now. In
the same way, the old distinction of the soul and the body, which was
still valid even for the psychophysiology of the nineteenth century,
that old opposition no longer exists, now that we know that our body
forms part of our psyche, or forms part of that experience, conscious
and unconscious at once, which psychology addresses-so that all
there is now, basically, is psychology.
A.B. This restructuring, which culminates in a sort of psychological totalitarianism, is carried out around the theme of the discovery of
the unconscious, to repeat your expression. Now, the word discovery
is usually linked to a scientific context. How do you understand the
discovery of the unconscious, then? Wbat type of discovery is involved?
M.F. Well, the unconscious was literally discovered by Freud as a
thing; he perceived it as a certain number of mechanisms that existed
at the same time in man in general and in a given particular man.
Did Freud thereby commit psychology to a radical concretification
[chosification], against which the entire subsequent history of modem
psychology never ceased to react, up to Maurice Merleau-Ponty; up to
contemporary thinkers? Possibly so; but it may be precisely in that
absolute horizon of things that psychology was made possible, if only
as criticism.
Then again, for Freud the unconscious has a languagelike structure; but one should bear in mind that Freud is an exegete and not a
255
is, therefore, a science of the individual, not only by virtue ofits object
but ultimately by virtue of its method. Or is there a general hermeneutic?
M.F. One needs to distinguish, in this instance and elsewhere, between the general and the absolute; there is no absolute hermeneutic,
in the sense that one can never be sure that one has obtained the final
text, that what one has obtained doesn't mean something else behind
what it means. And one can never be sure, on the other hand, of doing
an absolute linguistics. So, whatever the approach, one is never sure
of reaching either the absolutely general form or the absolutely primary text.
That being said, I still think that there are relatively large generalized structures, and that, for example, there may be among several
individuals a certain number of identical processes [procedes] that
may be encountered in all of them alike; and there is no reason why
structures you have discovered for one would not apply to the other.
A.B. Will psychology be, in the last instance, the science of these
structures or knowledge of the individual text?
M.F. Psychology will be the knowledge of structures; and the
eventual therapeutics, which cannot fail to be tied to psychology, will
be knowledge of the individual text-that is, I don't think psychology
can ever dissociate itself from a certain normative program. Psychology may well be, like philosophy itself, a medicine and a therapeutics-actually, there is no doubt that it's a medicine and a
therapeutics. And the fact that in its most positive forms psychology
happens to be separated into two subsciences, which would be psychology and pedagogy for example, or psychopathology and psychiatry, separated into two moments as isolated as these, is really nothing
but the sign that they must be brought together. Every psychology is a
pedagogy, all decipherment is a therapeutics: you cannot know without transforming [sans tran,iformerj.
A.B. Several times you have seemed to say that psychology is not
satisfied with establishing relations, structures, no matter how rigorous and complex, between given elements, but that it always involves
interpretations-and that the other sciences, on the contrary, when
they encountered data to be interpreted, were no longer adequate to
the task. And you seem to be saying that psychology had to appear on
the scene. If that is the case, does the word "psychology" seem to you
259
1 Rene Descartes, Traite de l'homme (Paris: Clerselier, 1664), in Oeuvres et lettres, ed. A. Bridoux
(Paris: Gallimard, 1955), pp. 8o5-73 [lreatise qf Man, trans. Thomas Steele Hall (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972)].
2
David Hume, A Treatise Q[ Human Nature, Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental
Method qf Reasoning into Moral Subjects (London: J. Noon, 1739-1740), 5 vols., trans. by A.
Leroy as Traite de lii nature humaine: essai pour introduire la mk.thode experimentale dans le.s