1

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 78059 August 31, 1987

xxx xxx xxx

That I am the OIC Governor of Rizal having been appointed as such on March 20, 1986;
That as being OIC Governor of the Province of Rizal and in the performance of my duties thereof, I among
others, have signed as I did sign the unnumbered memorandum ordering the replacement of all the barangay
officials of all the barangay(s) in the Municipality of Taytay, Rizal;

ALFREDO M. DE LEON, ANGEL S. SALAMAT, MARIO C. STA. ANA, JOSE C. TOLENTINO, ROGELIO J.
DE LA ROSA and JOSE M. RESURRECCION, petitioners,
vs.
HON. BENJAMIN B. ESGUERRA, in his capacity as OIC Governor of the Province of Rizal, HON.
ROMEO C. DE LEON, in his capacity as OIC Mayor of the Municipality of Taytay, Rizal, FLORENTINO
G. MAGNO, REMIGIO M. TIGAS, RICARDO Z. LACANIENTA, TEODORO V. MEDINA, ROSENDO S. PAZ,
and TERESITA L. TOLENTINO, respondents.

That the above cited memorandum dated December 1, 1986 was signed by me personally on February
8,1987;

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Before us now, petitioners pray that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be declared null and void
and that respondents be prohibited from taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay
Councilmen, respectively. Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982
(BP Blg. 222), their terms of office "shall be six (6) years which shall commence on June 7, 1982 and shall
continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified," or up to June 7, 1988. It is also
their position that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the
authority to replace them and to designate their successors.

An original action for Prohibition instituted by petitioners seeking to enjoin respondents from replacing them
from their respective positions as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores,
Municipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal.
As required by the Court, respondents submitted their Comment on the Petition, and petitioner's their Reply to
respondents' Comment.
In the Barangay elections held on May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain
and the other petitioners Angel S. Salamat, Mario C. Sta. Ana, Jose C. Tolentino, Rogelio J. de la Rosa and
Jose M. Resurreccion, as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal under Batas Pambansa
Blg. 222, otherwise known as the Barangay Election Act of 1982.
On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M, de Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986
but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent
Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The designation made by the
OIC Governor was "by authority of the Minister of Local Government."
Also on February 8, 1987, respondent OIC Governor signed a Memorandum, antedated December 1, 1986
designating respondents Remigio M. Tigas, Ricardo Z. Lacanienta Teodoro V. Medina, Roberto S. Paz and
Teresita L. Tolentino as members of the Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality.
That the Memoranda had been antedated is evidenced by the Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, the
pertinent portions of which read:

That said memorandum was further deciminated (sic) to all concerned the following day, February 9. 1987.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NONE.Pasig, Metro Manila, March 23, 1987.

On the other hand, respondents rely on Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution, promulgated on
March 25, 1986, which provided:
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in
office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and
qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from February
25,1986.
By reason of the foregoing provision, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive
officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of the aforequoted provision and not
because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing
the term of office of Barangay officials to six (6) years must be deemed to have been repealed for being
inconsistent with the aforequoted provision of the Provisional Constitution.
Examining the said provision, there should be no question that petitioners, as elective officials under the 1973
Constitution, may continue in office but should vacate their positions upon the occurrence of any of the events
mentioned. 1

2
Since the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution, there has been no proclamation or executive order
terminating the term of elective Barangay officials. Thus, the issue for resolution is whether or not the
designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the one-year period which ended
on February 25, 1987.

Rizal, are both declared to be of no legal force and effect; and (2) the Writ of Prohibition is granted enjoining
respondents perpetually from proceeding with the ouster/take-over of petitioners' positions subject of this
Petition. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.

Considering the candid Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, we hold that February 8, 1977, should be
considered as the effective date of replacement and not December 1,1986 to which it was ante dated, in
keeping with the dictates of justice.

Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

But while February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one-year deadline, the aforequoted provision in the
Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution reading.
SECTION 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore, the Provisional
Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC
Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III, thereof to designate respondents to the elective
positions occupied by petitioners.
Petitioners must now be held to have acquired security of tenure specially considering that the Barangay
Election Act of 1982 declares it "a policy of the State to guarantee and promote the autonomy of the
barangays to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities. 2 Similarly, the 1987 Constitution
ensures the autonomy of local governments and of political subdivisions of which the barangays form a
part, 3 and limits the President's power to "general supervision" over local governments. 4 Relevantly, Section
8, Article X of the same 1987 Constitution further provides in part:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years ...
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law, therefore, the term of office of six (6)
years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 5 should still govern.
Contrary to the stand of respondents, we find nothing inconsistent between the term of six (6) years for
elective Barangay officials and the 1987 Constitution, and the same should, therefore, be considered as still
operative, pursuant to Section 3, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, reading:
Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations letters of instructions, and other executive
issuances not inconsistent, with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked.
WHEREFORE, (1) The Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Governor on February 8, 1987 designating
respondents as the Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen, respectively, of Barangay Dolores, Taytay,

3
a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the GSIS/MHC the Management Contract,
International Marketing/Reservation System Contract or other type of contract specified by the Highest Bidder
in its strategic plan for the Manila Hotel x x x x
b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with GSIS x x x x
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 122156. February 3, 1997]
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA
HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT
CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.

K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner after the following conditions are
met:
a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later than October 23, 1995 (reset to November
3, 1995); and

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP (Committee on Privatization)/ OGCC (Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel) are obtained.[3]

The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos,[1] is invoked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation
(MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision is not selfexecuting but requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the 51%
shares form part of the national economy and patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the Constitution.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the
necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price
of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad. [4] In a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner
sent a managers check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos (P33,000,000.00) as Bid
Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad x x x x[5] which respondent GSIS
refused to accept.

The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986,
decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent
MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual strategic partner, is to provide management expertise and/or an
international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and
performance of the Manila Hotel.[2] In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the
MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as
its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, orP2.42 more than the bid of
petitioner.

On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the
matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated
with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the
Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale
to the Malaysian firm.
On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En Banc after it was referred to it by the
First Division. The case was then set for oral arguments with former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and
Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as amici curiae.

Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent GSIS state I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC 1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by October 23, 1995 (reset to
November 3, 1995) or the Highest Bidder will lose the right to purchase the Block of Shares and GSIS will
instead offer the Block of Shares to the other Qualified Bidders:

4
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the
Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument
which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of
Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release
the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national
patrimony.[6]Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the
business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation,
the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the
national economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered
by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies. [7]
It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its business also
unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of
the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be
awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted
bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share. [8]
Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is
merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing
legislation(s) x x x x Thus, for the said provision to operate, there must be existing laws to lay down conditions
under which business may be done.[9]
Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national
patrimony which only refers to lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine wealth in
its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII,
1987 Constitution. According to respondents, while petitioner speaks of the guests who have slept in the hotel
and the events that have transpired therein which make the hotel historic, these alone do not make the hotel
fall under the patrimony of the nation. What is more, the mandate of the Constitution is addressed to the
State, not to respondent GSIS which possesses a personality of its own separate and distinct from the
Philippines as a State.
Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the constitutional provision invoked
is still inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the
hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands. Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC cannot be
considered part of the national patrimony.Moreover, if the disposition of the shares of the MHC is really
contrary to the Constitution, petitioner should have questioned it right from the beginning and not after it had
lost in the bidding.
Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1., of the bidding rules which provides that if for any
reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified
Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest
bid in terms of price per share, is misplaced. Respondents postulate that the privilege of submitting a
matching bid has not yet arisen since it only takes place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be

awarded the Block of Shares. Thus the submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature since Renong
Berhad could still very well be awarded the block of shares and the condition giving rise to the exercise of the
privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken place.
Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion should fail since respondent GSIS did
not exercise its discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse its discretion it was not so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus should fail as petitioner has no clear legal right to what it demands
and respondents do not have an imperative duty to perform the act required of them by petitioner.
We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a
nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It
has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. [10] It prescribes the permanent
framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their respective powers and
duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The fundamental conception
in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which
all private rights must be determined and all public authority administered. [11] Under the doctrine of
constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether
promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private
purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental,
paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions command
the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of
government providing for the different departments of the governmental machinery and securing certain
fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. [12] A provision which lays down a general principle, such as
those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete
in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies
sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.Thus a
constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed
are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its
terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. [13]
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different
principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the
people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has
evolved into one more like that of a legislative body.Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act
is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution
are self-executing.If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing,
the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.
[14]
This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that x x x x in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing x
x x x Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-

5
executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be
effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them
entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. [15]
Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is clearly not self-executing, as
they quote from discussions on the floor of the 1986 Constitutional Commission MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am asking this question as the Chairman of the Committee on
Style. If the wording of PREFERENCE is given to QUALIFIED FILIPINOS, can it be understood as a
preference to qualified Filipinos vis-a-vis Filipinos who are not qualified. So, why do we not make it
clear? To qualified Filipinos as against aliens?
THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word
QUALIFIED?
MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS as against whom? As against
aliens or over aliens ?
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is understood. We use the word QUALIFIED because
the existing laws or prospective laws will always lay down conditions under which business may be
done. For example, qualifications on capital, qualifications on the setting up of other financial
structures, et cetera (underscoring supplied by respondents).
MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes.[16]
Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is
non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from
enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with
the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of
constitutional provisions.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of
powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be
used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the
determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that
legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional
provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a
constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an
indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the
constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in
harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available.

[17]

Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not,
by itself, fully enforceable.
Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from
the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-executing. [18] The
argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact
measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first
paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments
within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second
paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in order to give
preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in
another.[19]
Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain constitutional provisions are merely statements of
principles and policies, which are basically not self-executing and only placed in the Constitution as moral
incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights - are simply not in point. Basco v. Philippine
Amusements and Gaming Corporation[20] speaks of constitutional provisions on personal dignity,[21] the sanctity
of family life,[22] the vital role of the youth in nation-building, [23] the promotion of social justice, [24] and the values
of education.[25]Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance[26] refers to constitutional provisions on social justice and
human rights[27] and on education.[28] Lastly, Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato[29] cites provisions on the promotion of
general welfare,[30] the sanctity of family life, [31] the vital role of the youth in nation-building [32] and the promotion
of total human liberation and development. [33] A reading of these provisions indeed clearly shows that they are
not judicially enforceable constitutional rights but merely guidelines for legislation. The very terms of the
provisions manifest that they are only principles upon which legislations must be based. Res ipsa loquitur.
On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per
se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it
means just that - qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in
certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the
absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce
such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which
all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission[34] explains The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers not only to our rich natural
resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race. It also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and
letters. Therefore, we should develop not only our lands, forests, mines and other natural resources but also
the mental ability or faculty of our people.

6
We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage.[35] When the Constitution
speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution
could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark - a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an
American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino. Formerly a concourse
for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine
history. It was called the Cultural Center of the 1930s. It was the site of the festivities during the inauguration
of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest House of the Philippine Government it plays
host to dignitaries and official visitors who are accorded the traditional Philippine hospitality.[36]
The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a City.
[37]
During World War II the hotel was converted by the Japanese Military Administration into a military
headquarters. When the American forces returned to recapture Manila the hotel was selected by the
Japanese together with Intramuros as the two (2) places for their final stand. Thereafter, in the 1950s and
1960s, the hotel became the center of political activities, playing host to almost every political convention. In
1970 the hotel reopened after a renovation and reaped numerous international recognitions, an
acknowledgment of the Filipino talent and ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel was the site of a failed coup
d etat where an aspirant for vice-president was proclaimed President of the Philippine Republic.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and
frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with
our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our
national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the
constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns
the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be
disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain
respondents claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only 51%
of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building
stands.[38]

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, apparently the proponent is agreeable, but we have to raise a
question. Suppose it is a corporation that is 80-percent Filipino, do we not give it preference?
MR. DAVIDE. The Nolledo amendment would refer to an individual Filipino. What about a corporation
wholly owned by Filipino citizens?
MR. MONSOD. At least 60 percent, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. Is that the intention?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, because, in fact, we would be limiting it if we say that the preference should only
be 100-percent Filipino.
MR. DAVIDE. I want to get that meaning clear because QUALIFIED FILIPINOS may refer only to
individuals and not to juridical personalities or entities.
MR. MONSOD. We agree, Madam President.[39]
xxxx
MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote, may I request that the amendment be read again.
MR. NOLLEDO. The amendment will read: IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND
CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE
PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. And the word Filipinos here, as intended by the proponents,
will include not only individual Filipinos but also Filipino-controlled entities or entities fully-controlled by
Filipinos.[40]
The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus -

The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used in our Constitution also includes
corporations at least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos. This is very clear from the proceedings of the 1986
Constitutional Commission THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. I would like to introduce an amendment to the Nolledo amendment. And the amendment
would consist in substituting the words QUALIFIED FILIPINOS with the following: CITIZENS OF THE
PHILIPPINES OR CORPORATIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS WHOSE CAPITAL OR CONTROLLING
STOCK IS WHOLLY OWNED BY SUCH CITIZENS.
xxxx

MR. FOZ. Madam President, I would like to request Commissioner Nolledo to please restate his
amendment so that I can ask a question.
MR. NOLLEDO. IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS.
MR. FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a foreign enterprise is qualified and a Filipino enterprise
is also qualified, will the Filipino enterprise still be given a preference?
MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.

7
MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than the Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino
still be preferred?
MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is yes.
MR. FOZ. Thank you.[41]
Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision Commissioner Nolledo continues
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President. Instead of MUST, it will be SHALL - THE STATE SHALL GIVE
PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. This embodies the so-called Filipino First policy.That means
that Filipinos should be given preference in the grant of concessions, privileges and rights covering the
national patrimony.[42]
The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the subject provision was
still further clarified by Commissioner Nolledo[43] Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the Pro-Filipino bias in all economic concerns. It is better
known as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy x x x x This provision was never found in previous Constitutions x x x x
The term qualified Filipinos simply means that preference shall be given to those citizens who can make a
viable contribution to the common good, because of credible competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT
mandate the pampering and preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or
inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would be counterproductive and inimical to the common
good.
In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be made between a
qualified foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the latter shall be chosen over the former.
Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered by respondent GSIS and selected
as one of the qualified bidders. It was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in accordance with its own guidelines
so that the sole inference here is that petitioner has been found to be possessed of proven management
expertise in the hotel industry, or it has significant equity ownership in another hotel company, or it has an
overall management and marketing proficiency to successfully operate the Manila Hotel. [44]
The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution by arguing that the subject provision is not
self-executory and requires implementing legislation is quite disturbing.The attempt to violate a clear
constitutional provision - by the government itself - is only too distressing. To adopt such a line of reasoning is
to renounce the duty to ensure faithfulness to the Constitution. For, even some of the provisions of the
Constitution which evidently need implementing legislation have juridical life of their own and can be the
source of a judicial remedy. We cannot simply afford the government a defense that arises out of the failure to
enact further enabling, implementing or guiding legislation. In fine, the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas,
S.J., on constitutional government is apt -

The executive department has a constitutional duty to implement laws, including the Constitution, even before
Congress acts - provided that there are discoverable legal standards for executive action. When the executive
acts, it must be guided by its own understanding of the constitutional command and of applicable laws. The
responsibility for reading and understanding the Constitution and the laws is not the sole prerogative of
Congress. If it were, the executive would have to ask Congress, or perhaps the Court, for an interpretation
every time the executive is confronted by a constitutional command. That is not how constitutional
government operates.[45]
Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS
which by itself possesses a separate and distinct personality. This argument again is at best specious. It is
undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior approval of the State
acting through respondent Committee on Privatization. As correctly pointed out by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas,
S.J., this fact alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a state action. In
constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are considered state
action covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a public function; (2) when the
government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible for his
action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of
respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the second and third categories
of state action. Without doubt therefore the transaction, although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a
transaction of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional command. [46]
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the government as
elements of the State. After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of power - legislative, executive
and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the
three (3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is
addressed among others to the Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality
deriving its authority from the State.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The
bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has
negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First
Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest
bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents
are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest
bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987
Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties.
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as it should be,
impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being
violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law that all laws and contracts must conform
with the fundamental law of the land.Those which violate the Constitution lose their reason for being.
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded
the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided

8
that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share. [47] Certainly, the
constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares immediately to the foreign
bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of
a strongerreason than the constitutional injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of
rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of
a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign
entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if
we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this
may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to
be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors. But the
Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These are given
factors which investors must consider when venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person
therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed
to know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum.
The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the sale to Renong Berhad
since petitioner was well aware from the beginning that a foreigner could participate in the bidding is
meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited to the bidding. But foreigners may be
awarded the sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match the highest bid tendered
by the foreign entity. In the case before us, while petitioner was already preferred at the inception of the
bidding because of the constitutional mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid offered by Renong
Berhad. Thus it did not have the right or personality then to compel respondent GSIS to accept its earlier
bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the bid of the foreign firm and the apparent disregard by respondent
GSIS of petitioners matching bid did the latter have a cause of action.
Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard unless perhaps the award has been
finally made. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match
the bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any other ordinary market player, and
bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgment, regardless of the consequences to the Filipino people. The
miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus we would rather remedy the indiscretion while there
is still an opportunity to do so than let the government develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays
down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules,
respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to
execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding
guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the
corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid
of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in the 1987 Constitution not
merely to be used as a guideline for future legislation but primarily to be enforced; so must it be enforced. This
Court as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution will never shun, under any reasonable circumstance, the
duty of upholding the majesty of the Constitution which it is tasked to defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is
not the intention of this Court to impede and diminish, much less undermine, the influx of foreign
investments. Far from it, the Court encourages and welcomes more business opportunities but avowedly
sanctions the preference for Filipinos whenever such preference is ordained by the Constitution. The position
of the Court on this matter could have not been more appropriately articulated by Chief Justice Narvasa As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its function to substitute its judgment for that of the
legislature or the executive about the wisdom and feasibility of legislation economic in nature, the Supreme
Court has not been spared criticism for decisions perceived as obstacles to economic progress and
development x x x x in connection with a temporary injunction issued by the Courts First Division against the
sale of the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and its partner, certain statements were published in a major
daily to the effect that that injunction again demonstrates that the Philippine legal system can be a major
obstacle to doing business here.
Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no business of the Court to intervene in contracts of
the kind referred to or set itself up as the judge of whether they are viable or attainable, it is its bounden duty
to make sure that they do not violate the Constitution or the laws, or are not adopted or implemented with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It will never shirk that duty, no matter
how buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed criticism.[48]
Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability and preventing further losses,
regardless of the character of the asset, should not take precedence over non-material values. A commercial,
nay even a budgetary, objective should not be pursued at the expense of national pride and dignity. For the
Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-material values. Indeed, the Court will always defer to the
Constitution in the proper governance of a free society; after all, there is nothing so sacrosanct in any
economic policy as to draw itself beyond judicial review when the Constitution is involved. [49]
Nationalism is inherent in the very concept of the Philippines being a democratic and republican state, with
sovereignty residing in the Filipino people and from whom all government authority emanates. In nationalism,
the happiness and welfare of the people must be the goal. The nation-state can have no higher purpose. Any
interpretation of any constitutional provision must adhere to such basic concept. Protection of foreign
investments, while laudible, is merely a policy. It cannot override the demands of nationalism.[50]
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the highest
bidder solely for the sake of privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary piece of property in a
commercial district. We are talking about a historic relic that has hosted many of the most important events in
the short history of the Philippines as a nation. We are talking about a hotel where heads of states would
prefer to be housed as a strong manifestation of their desire to cloak the dignity of the highest state function to
their official visits to the Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role
as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture. In this sense, it has become truly

9
a reflection of the Filipino soul - a place with a history of grandeur; a most historical setting that has played a
part in the shaping of a country.[51]
This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts of respondents to sell the historical
landmark - this Grand Old Dame of hotels in Asia - to a total stranger. For, indeed, the conveyance of this epic
exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien hands cannot be less than mephistophelian for it is, in whatever
manner viewed, a veritable alienation of a nations soul for some pieces of foreign silver. And so we ask: What
advantage, which cannot be equally drawn from a qualified Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos if Manila
Hotel - and all that it stands for - is sold to a non-Filipino? How much of national pride will vanish if the nations
cultural heritage is entrusted to a foreign entity? On the other hand, how much dignity will be preserved and
realized if the national patrimony is safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous and well-meaning
Filipino? This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policyprovision of the Philippine
Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the
elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL
CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE
COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL
CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per
share and thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to issue the
necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Kapunan, Francisco, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ, concur.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), and Melo, J., joins J. Puno in his dissent.

10
to extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary nor legally permissible. Both its resolution
and protection of the public interest lie in adherence to, not departure from, the Constitution.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 160261

November 10, 2003

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,

NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS
OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE
SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE
GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how passionate and seemingly
irreconcilable it may appear to be, over the determination by the independent branches of government of the
nature, scope and extent of their respective constitutional powers where the Constitution itself provides for the
means and bases for its resolution.
Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at times turbulent, dynamics of the
relationship among these co-equal branches. This Court is confronted with one such today involving the
legislature and the judiciary which has drawn legal luminaries to chart antipodal courses and not a few of our
countrymen to vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.
There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present controversy subject of the
instant petitions whether the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution, and
whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps even more
truth to the view that it was brought upon by a political crisis of conscience.

In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential
truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of
government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the
governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by the
Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without destroying
their indispensable co-equality.
Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government, intended as they are to insure
that governmental power is wielded only for the good of the people, mandate a relationship of
interdependence and coordination among these branches where the delicate functions of enacting,
interpreting and enforcing laws are harmonized to achieve a unity of governance, guided only by what is in the
greater interest and well-being of the people. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.
Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XI
Accountability of Public Officers
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to
the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives.
SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or
betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by
law, but not by impeachment.
SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by
any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of
Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter.
The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House
within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall
be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address all the issues which
this controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort

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(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable
resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of
each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members
of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith
proceed.

upon a resolution of endorsement by any

Member thereof or by a verified complaint or
resolution of impeachment filed by at least
one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the
House.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period
of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that
purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the
concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

In cases where a verified complaint or a

resolution of impeachment is filed or
endorsed, as the case may be, by at least
one-third (1/3) of the Members of the
House, impeachment proceedings are
deemed initiated at the time of the filing
of such verified complaint or resolution
of impeachment with the Secretary
General.

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to
hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and
subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this
section. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th Congress of the House of
Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House
Impeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules 1 approved
by the 11th Congress. The relevant distinctions between these two Congresses' House Impeachment Rules
are shown in the following tabulation:

RULE V
11TH CONGRESS RULES

12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES

BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT

RULE II

RULE V

INITIATING IMPEACHMENT

BAR AGAINST INITIATION OF

IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS
AGAINST THE SAME OFFICIAL

Section 2. Mode of Initiating

Impeachment. Impeachment shall be
initiated only by a verified complaint for
impeachment filed by any Member of the
House of Representatives or by any citizen

Section 16. Impeachment Proceedings

Deemed Initiated. In cases where a
Member of the House files a verified

complaint of impeachment or a citizen files

a verified complaint that is endorsed by a
Member of the House through a resolution
of endorsement against an impeachable
officer, impeachment proceedings against
such official are deemed initiated on the
day the Committee on Justice finds that the
verified complaint and/or resolution against
such official, as the case may be, is
sufficient in substance, or on the date the
House votes to overturn or affirm the
finding of the said Committee that the
verified complaint and/or resolution, as the
case may be, is not sufficient in substance.

Section 14. Scope of Bar. No

impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once
within the period of one (1) year.

Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of

Impeachment Proceedings. Within a
period of one (1) year from the date
impeachment proceedings are deemed
initiated as provided in Section 16 hereof,
no impeachment proceedings, as such,
can be initiated against the same official.
(Italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, 2 sponsored by Representative Felix
William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."3

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On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint 4 (first impeachment
complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices 5 of this Court for "culpable
violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." 6 The complaint was endorsed
by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, 7 and was referred to
the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003 8 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution which reads:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be
included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three
session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit
its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution.
The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt
thereof.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was
"sufficient in form,"9 but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in
substance.10 To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in
accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a
day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint 11 was filed
with the Secretary General of the House12 by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac)
and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This
second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by
at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives. 13
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend
that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5
of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official
more than once within a period of one year."
In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has a duty as a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use all available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment,
that the issues raised in his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of transcendental
importance, and that he "himself was a victim of the capricious and arbitrary changes in the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the 12th Congress,"14 posits that his right to bring an
impeachment complaint against then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been violated due to the capricious
and arbitrary changes in the House Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on November 28, 2001 by the
House of Representatives and prays that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and
9 thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of mandamus directing respondents House
of Representatives et. al. to comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the Constitution, to return the
second impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the records of the House of Representatives, and to
promulgate rules which are consistent with the Constitution; and (3) this Court permanently enjoin respondent
House of Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, alleging that the
issues of the case are of transcendental importance, pray, in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition, the
issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from filing any Articles of
Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the Senate; and for the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting
respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of Impeachment
against the Chief Justice or, in the event that the Senate has accepted the same, from proceeding with the
impeachment trial.
In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers
and members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that their petition for Prohibition involves public
interest as it involves the use of public funds necessary to conduct the impeachment trial on the second
impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining Congress from conducting
further proceedings on said second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court has recognized that he has locus
standi to bring petitions of this nature in the cases of Chavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal
Bay Development Corporation,16 prays in his petition for Injunction that the second impeachment complaint be
declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers and members of the legal
profession, pray in their petition for Prohibition for an order prohibiting respondent House of Representatives
from drafting, adopting, approving and transmitting to the Senate the second impeachment complaint, and
respondents De Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.
In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and Deputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez,
alleging that, as members of the House of Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring that only
constitutional impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that the
second impeachment complaint and any act proceeding therefrom be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they have a right to be protected
against all forms of senseless spending of taxpayers' money and that they have an obligation to protect the
Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, and the integrity of the Judiciary, allege in their petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition that it is instituted as "a class suit" and pray that (1) the House Resolution endorsing the second
impeachment complaint as well as all issuances emanating therefrom be declared null and void; and (2) this
Court enjoin the Senate and the Senate President from taking cognizance of, hearing, trying and deciding the
second impeachment complaint, and issue a writ of prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and
agents to desist from conducting any proceedings or to act on the impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members are citizens and taxpayers, and its
co-petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a member of the Philippine Bar, both allege in their
petition, which does not state what its nature is, that the filing of the second impeachment complaint involves
paramount public interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules and the second
impeachment complaint/Articles of Impeachment be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a member of the Philippine Bar
Association and of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a

12

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taxpayer, pray in their petition for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction to
enjoin the House of Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it is mandated by the Code of
Professional Responsibility to uphold the Constitution, prays in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that
Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the House Impeachment Rules be
declared unconstitutional and that the House of Representatives be permanently enjoined from proceeding
with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
that the House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et. al., in their petition for Prohibition
and Injunction which they claim is a class suit filed in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran17 which
was filed in behalf of succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a writ prohibiting
respondents House of Representatives and the Senate from conducting further proceedings on the second
impeachment complaint and that this Court declare as unconstitutional the second impeachment complaint
and the acts of respondent House of Representatives in interfering with the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino, alleging that the issues in his
petition for Prohibition are of national and transcendental significance and that as an official of the Philippine
Judicial Academy, he has a direct and substantial interest in the unhampered operation of the Supreme Court
and its officials in discharging their duties in accordance with the Constitution, prays for the issuance of a writ
prohibiting the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate and the
Senate from receiving the same or giving the impeachment complaint due course.
In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his petition for Prohibition that
respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at the time they filed the second impeachment complaint, were
"absolutely without any legal power to do so, as they acted without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of
Impeachment assail the alleged abuse of powers of the Chief Justice to disburse the (JDF)."
In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L. Hofilea, alleging that as professors
of law they have an abiding interest in the subject matter of their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as it
pertains to a constitutional issue "which they are trying to inculcate in the minds of their students," pray that
the House of Representatives be enjoined from endorsing and the Senate from trying the Articles of
Impeachment and that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging his locus standi, but alleging that
the second impeachment complaint is founded on the issue of whether or not the Judicial Development Fund
(JDF) was spent in accordance with law and that the House of Representatives does not have exclusive
jurisdiction in the examination and audit thereof, prays in his petition "To Declare Complaint Null and Void for
Lack of Cause of Action and Jurisdiction" that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the issues raised in the filing of the
second impeachment complaint involve matters of transcendental importance, prays in its petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint and all proceedings arising therefrom be

declared null and void; (2) respondent House of Representatives be prohibited from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment to the Senate; and (3) respondent Senate be prohibited from accepting the Articles of
Impeachment and from conducting any proceedings thereon.
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, pray in their petition
for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint as well as the resolution of endorsement
and impeachment by the respondent House of Representatives be declared null and void and (2) respondents
Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon be prohibited from accepting any Articles of Impeachment
against the Chief Justice or, in the event that they have accepted the same, that they be prohibited from
proceeding with the impeachment trial.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263, the first three of the eighteen which
were filed before this Court,18 prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or preliminary
injunction to prevent the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment arising from
the second impeachment complaint to the Senate. Petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261 likewise
prayed for the declaration of the November 28, 2001 House Impeachment Rules as null and void for being
unconstitutional.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295, which were filed on October 28,
2003, sought similar relief. In addition, petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that House
Resolution No. 260 (calling for a legislative inquiry into the administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF)
infringes on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and is a direct violation of the constitutional
principle of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, a motion was put forth that
the second impeachment complaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, but it was not carried because the
House of Representatives adjourned for lack of quorum,19 and as reflected above, to date, the Articles of
Impeachment have yet to be forwarded to the Senate.
Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
which were filed on or before October 28, 2003, Justices Puno and Vitug offered to recuse themselves, but
the Court rejected their offer. Justice Panganiban inhibited himself, but the Court directed him to participate.
Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its Resolution of October 28, 2003, resolved
to (a) consolidate the petitions; (b) require respondent House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as
the Solicitor General, to comment on the petitions not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set the
petitions for oral arguments on November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and (d) appointed distinguished legal
experts as amici curiae.20 In addition, this Court called on petitioners and respondents to maintain the status
quo, enjoining all the parties and others acting for and in their behalf to refrain from committing acts that would
render the petitions moot.
Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia,
Jr. and/or its co-respondents, by way of special appearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting that this
Court has no jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives, which is an
independent and co-equal branch of government under the Constitution, from the performance of its
constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr.,
in his own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela)21 and Comment, praying that "the

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consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the
impeachment proceedings and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the
impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases, including the one where the Chief Justice is the
respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution." 22
Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court resolved to (a) consolidate them with
the earlier consolidated petitions; (b) require respondents to file their comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of
November 3, 2003; and (c) include them for oral arguments on November 5, 2003.
On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President Franklin M. Drilon, filed a
Manifestation stating that insofar as it is concerned, the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in
law or in fact, adding that as of the time of the filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before
it since (1) its constitutional duty to constitute itself as an impeachment court commences only upon its receipt
of the Articles of Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the principal issues raised by the petitions pertain
exclusively to the proceedings in the House of Representatives.
On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261,
160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, and 160295, questioning the status quo Resolution issued by this Court on
October 28, 2003 on the ground that it would unnecessarily put Congress and this Court in a "constitutional
deadlock" and praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as the matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial
determination.
On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra filed in G.R. No. 160262 a
"Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit the Herein Incorporated Petition in Intervention."
On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a
Motion for Intervention in G.R. No. 160261. On November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the
Philippines, Inc. also filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262,
160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310.
The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's Comment and Attorneys Macalintal
and Quadra's Petition in Intervention were admitted.
On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and the arguments of petitioners,
intervenors Senator Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on the principal
issues outlined in an Advisory issued by this Court on November 3, 2003, to wit:
Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked; who can invoke it; on what issues
and at what time; and whether it should be exercised by this Court at this time.
In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:
a) locus standi of petitioners;
b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);
c) political question/justiciability;

d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of impeachment;

e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of impeachment;
f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution;
and
g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)
In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising from the instant petitions as well
as the myriad arguments and opinions presented for and against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this Court
has sifted and determined them to be as follows: (1) the threshold and novel issue of whether or not the power
of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or not the essential
pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3) the substantive
issues yet remaining. These matters shall now be discussed in seriatim.
Judicial Review
As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of judicial review to determine the
validity of the second impeachment complaint.
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article
VIII of our present 1987 Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the government. (Emphasis supplied)
Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the
definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral Commission23 after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose
provisions, unlike the present Constitution, did not contain the present provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par.
2 on what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed:
x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be
forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between
the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it
was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the
expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to operate
and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject to specific
limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain
language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these
restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not

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provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional
channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of
sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and
restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United
States where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this
moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been set at
rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating
power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.

In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in the 1935 Constitution, the power
of judicial review was exercised by our courts to invalidate constitutionally infirm acts. 29 And as pointed out by
noted political law professor and former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, 30 the executive and
legislative branches of our government in fact effectively acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article
7 of the Civil Code, to wit:

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and
extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as
the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not
assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth
all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review
under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies
to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional
question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and
barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this
manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than
that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the
legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of
actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government. 24(Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)

When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and
the latter shall govern.

As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the
different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is
inherent in all courts25 as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." 26
Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not explicitly conferred upon the courts
by its Constitution, such power has "been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one
and a half centuries." To be sure, it was in the 1803 leading case of Marbury v. Madison27 that the power of
judicial review was first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to wit:
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the
constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall
be made in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the
principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution
is void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument. 28(Italics in the
original; emphasis supplied)

Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be
excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary
to the laws or the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is indeed an integral component of the
delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers,
forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for
the benefit of the people for which it serves.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from
the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be
absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate
system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of
the government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively
checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare
executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.32 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "x x x judicial review is
essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers
among the three great departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries
of authority and control between them."33 To him, "[j]udicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of
participation or instrument of intervention of the judiciary in that balancing operation." 34
To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by "any branch or
instrumentalities of government," the afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for
the first time into its history, into block letter law the so-called "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this Court,
the nature of and rationale for which are mirrored in the following excerpt from the sponsorship speech of its
proponent, former Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:
xxx
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:

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The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial law. As a
matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime
was marred considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases against the government,
which then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political questions
and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus,
that is, the authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, and other matters related to the
operation and effect of martial law failed because the government set up the defense of political question. And
the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on
the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely
request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations
thereof during the martial law regime. x x x
xxx
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the
government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction
or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass
judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade
the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political
question.35 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

are couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given theirordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to
them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to
obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as much as possible should
be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision
to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate
that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where the need for
construction is reduced to a minimum.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in
accordance with the intent of its framers. And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary38 in this wise:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under
consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object
sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A
doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances
under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the
framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be
accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason
and calculated to effect that purpose. 39 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40 where, speaking through Madame Justice
Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared:
x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional
construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be
given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the
realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be
safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation
offered by the framers.41 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v.
De Leon,42 this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:

To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to the
Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional construction.

x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a provision of our
Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect
others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision should
function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all
other provisions of that great document.43 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
Administration,36 this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:

Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court affirmed that:

We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course stop
there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is

to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a
particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great

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purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and
interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to
be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand
together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which
will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.45(Emphasis
supplied)
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available. In still the
same case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court expounded:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional
convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be
had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the
Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing
the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as
to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at
the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution
from what appears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was
understood by the people adopting it than in the framers's understanding thereof. 46 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and jurisprudential application of the
power of judicial review that respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise
the novel argument that the Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial
review.
Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that impeachment is a political
action which cannot assume a judicial character. Hence, any question, issue or incident arising at any stage of
the impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review.47
For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole power to try" impeachment
cases48 (1) entirely excludes the application of judicial review over it; and (2) necessarily includes the Senate's
power to determine constitutional questions relative to impeachment proceedings. 49
In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment proceedings are outside the scope of
judicial review, respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily on
American authorities, principally the majority opinion in the case of Nixon v. United States.50 Thus, they
contend that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings is inappropriate since it runs
counter to the framers' decision to allocate to different fora the powers to try impeachments and to try crimes;
it disturbs the system of checks and balances, under which impeachment is the only legislative check on the
judiciary; and it would create a lack of finality and difficulty in fashioning relief. 51 Respondents likewise point to
deliberations on the US Constitution to show the intent to isolate judicial power of review in cases of
impeachment.

Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the American Constitution and
American authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition that the Senate's "sole power to try and
decide impeachment cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment to the legislature, to the total
exclusion of the power of judicial review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment process.
Nor can it reasonably support the interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the inherently
judicial power to determine constitutional questions incident to impeachment proceedings.
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious application
for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as
Philippine constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC,52 "[i]n resolving
constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly
applicable because they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and needs." 53 Indeed, although
the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths of development have
long since diverged. In the colorful words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord."
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S.
Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court
and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly
provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded
definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch
or instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect
to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution
bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, 54 our Constitution,
though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, 55 provides
for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI
thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the
impeachment of one and the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality and may also
lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial
statesmanship on the principle that "whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of the people
expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness and pride." 56
But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the
Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole
discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v.
Carr,57"judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through
the power of judicial review.
The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon,59 cited by respondents in support of the
argument that the impeachment power is beyond the scope of judicial review, are not in point. These cases
concern the denial of petitions for writs of mandamus to compel the legislature to perform non-ministerial acts,
and do not concern the exercise of the power of judicial review.

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There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over
congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,60 this Court ruled that it is well within the power and
jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution
or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Tanada v. Angara,61 in
seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that
the petition raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to
settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this Court declared null and void a resolution of the House of
Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a congressman as a member of
the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v.
Mitra,63 it held that the resolution of whether the House representation in the Commission on Appointments
was based on proportional representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the
Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson,64 it held that the act of the House of
Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject to judicial review.
In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held that although under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively
in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of
Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission,66 it ruled that confirmation by the National Assembly of the
election of any member, irrespective of whether his election is contested, is not essential before such
member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be
interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." 67 Both are integral
components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of
government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
Essential Requisites for Judicial Review
As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of judicial review, like almost all powers
conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy
calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge;
he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after
full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the
very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions
and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does
not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the
presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to
abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies
must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive
and legislative departments of the government.68 (Italics in the original)
Standing

Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. 69
Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that petitioners do not have standing
since only the Chief Justice has sustained and will sustain direct personal injury. Amicus curiae former Justice
Minister and Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza similarly contends.
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing since this Court had, in the
past, accorded standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving paramount
public interest70 and transcendental importance,71 and that procedural matters are subordinate to the need to
determine whether or not the other branches of the government have kept themselves within the limits of the
Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them. 72 Amicus curiae Dean
Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is of the same opinion, citing transcendental importance and the
well-entrenched rule exception that, when the real party in interest is unable to vindicate his rights by seeking
the same remedies, as in the case of the Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot himself invoke the
jurisdiction of this Court, the courts will grant petitioners standing.
There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule on standing, for the
former is a concept of civil procedure73 while the latter has constitutional underpinnings.74 In view of the
arguments set forth regarding standing, it behooves the Court to reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v.
Morato75 to clarify what is meant by locus standi and to distinguish it from real party-in-interest.
The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest has been noted by authorities thus: "It is
important to note . . . that standing because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very
different from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to
sue. Although all three requirements are directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an
action, standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as broader policy concerns
relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas.
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not by parties
who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by concerned
citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Hence the question in standing is whether
such parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions."
xxx
On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether he is "the party who would be
benefited or injured by the judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of the suit.'" 76 (Citations omitted)
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the
House of Representatives, none of the petitioners before us asserts a violation of the personal rights of the

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Chief Justice. On the contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of their own rights as taxpayers;
members of Congress; citizens, individually or in a class suit; and members of the bar and of the legal
profession which were supposedly violated by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of
Representatives.
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when specific requirements
have been met have been given standing by this Court.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct
and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he
sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not
merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or
is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected
to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. 77 In fine, when the proceeding
involves the assertion of a public right,78 the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal
interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed,
or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds
through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.79 Before he can invoke the power of judicial
review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure
of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the
questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members
of the public.80
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be
entertained.81 This Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any
impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice
will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he claims infringes
his prerogatives as a legislator.82 Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain
inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office. 83
While an association has legal personality to represent its members, 84 especially when it is composed of
substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital interests, 85 the mere invocation by the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and
nothing more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with standing. Its interest is too general.
It is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. However, a reading of the petitions shows that it has
advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty
and weight as precedents.86 It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the
issues presented by it.

court.89Where it clearly appears that not all interests can be sufficiently represented as shown by the divergent
issues raised in the numerous petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail. Since
petitionersadditionally allege standing as citizens and taxpayers, however, their petition will stand.
The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole ground of transcendental importance,
while Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397, is mum on his standing.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following instructive determinants
formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the
funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or
statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of
any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised. 90 Applying these
determinants, this Court is satisfied that the issues raised herein are indeed of transcendental importance.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the
petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues raised are
of paramount importance to the public.91 Such liberality does not, however, mean that the requirement that a
party should have an interest in the matter is totally eliminated. A party must, at the very least, still plead the
existence of such interest, it not being one of which courts can take judicial notice. In petitioner Vallejos' case,
he failed to allege any interest in the case. He does not thus have standing.
With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of Court requires an intervenor to
possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest
against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in
the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. While intervention is not a matter of right, it may be permitted
by the courts when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing
intervention.92
In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra's case, they seek to join petitioners
Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262. Since, save for one additional issue, they raise the same issues and
the same standing, and no objection on the part of petitioners Candelaria, et. al. has been interposed, this
Court as earlier stated, granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et. al. sought to join petitioner
Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking their right as citizens to intervene, alleging that "they will suffer if this
insidious scheme of the minority members of the House of Representatives is successful," this Court found
the requisites for intervention had been complied with.
Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292,
160295, and 160310 were of transcendental importance, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the
Philippines, Inc. filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" to raise the additional issue of
whether or not the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice is valid and based on any of the
grounds prescribed by the Constitution.

In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons intervening must be
sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned 87 to enable the court to deal properly with all
interests involved in the suit,88 for a judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is,
under the res judicata principle, binding on all members of the class whether or not they were before the

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Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al. and World
War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation the
respective motions to intervene were hereby granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the limited purpose of making of record
and arguing a point of view that differs with Senate President Drilon's. He alleges that submitting to this
Court's jurisdiction as the Senate President does will undermine the independence of the Senate which will sit
as an impeachment court once the Articles of Impeachment are transmitted to it from the House of
Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a legal interest in the matter in litigation, he being a
member of Congress against which the herein petitions are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate all
substantial issues relating to the matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene was granted and he was, as earlier
stated, allowed to argue.
Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be denied for, while he asserts an interest
as a taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao
v. Comelec,93 to wit:
x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their
Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation of specific
constitutional protection against abuses of legislative power," or that there is a misapplication of such funds by
respondent COMELEC, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do
petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law.94 (Citations omitted)
In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the act of petitioners will result in
illegal disbursement of public funds or in public money being deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally,
his mere interest as a member of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him with standing.
Ripeness and Prematurity
In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a case to be considered ripe
for adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either
branch before a court may come into the picture."96 Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what was
done, if and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the second impeachment
complaint against the Chief Justice in accordance with the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th
Congress, the constitutionality of which is questioned. The questioned acts having been carried out, i.e., the
second impeachment complaint had been filed with the House of Representatives and the 2001 Rules have
already been already promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged unconstitutional act should
be accomplished and performed before suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been complied with.
Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant petitions are premature. Amicus
curiaeformer Senate President Jovito R. Salonga opines that there may be no urgent need for this Court to
render a decision at this time, it being the final arbiter on questions of constitutionality anyway. He thus
recommends that all remedies in the House and Senate should first be exhausted.

Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law who suggests to this Court to
take judicial notice of on-going attempts to encourage signatories to the second impeachment complaint to
withdraw their signatures and opines that the House Impeachment Rules provide for an opportunity for
members to raise constitutional questions themselves when the Articles of Impeachment are presented on a
motion to transmit to the same to the Senate. The dean maintains that even assuming that the Articles are
transmitted to the Senate, the Chief Justice can raise the issue of their constitutional infirmity by way of a
motion to dismiss.
The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the Representatives of their signatures would
not, by itself, cure the House Impeachment Rules of their constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a
withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the questioned second impeachment complaint since it would only place it
under the ambit of Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI of the Constitution97 and, therefore, petitioners would
continue to suffer their injuries.
Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or both Houses of Congress before
coming to this Court is shown by the fact that, as previously discussed, neither the House of Representatives
nor the Senate is clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness on the issue of constitutionality, whether
concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as said power is exclusively vested in the judiciary by the
earlier quoted Section I, Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought from a body which is bereft
of power to grant it.
Justiciability
In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion defined the term "political
question," viz:
[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.99 (Italics in the original)
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any rhyme or reason, this Court
vacillated on its stance of taking cognizance of cases which involved political questions. In some cases, this
Court hid behind the cover of the political question doctrine and refused to exercise its power of judicial
review.100 In other cases, however, despite the seeming political nature of the therein issues involved, this
Court assumed jurisdiction whenever it found constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred
upon political bodies.101 Even in the landmark 1988 case of Javellana v. Executive Secretary102 which raised
the issue of whether the 1973 Constitution was ratified, hence, in force, this Court shunted the political
question doctrine and took cognizance thereof. Ratification by the people of a Constitution is a political
question, it being a question decided by the people in their sovereign capacity.
The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine to refuse to take jurisdiction over
certain cases during the Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a
Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify this Court's power of judicial review and its application on issues
involving political questions, viz:

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MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the usual comment that the judiciary
is the weakest among the three major branches of the service. Since the legislature holds the purse and the
executive the sword, the judiciary has nothing with which to enforce its decisions or commands except the
power of reason and appeal to conscience which, after all, reflects the will of God, and is the most powerful of
all other powers without exception. x x x And so, with the body's indulgence, I will proceed to read the
provisions drafted by the Committee on the Judiciary.
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial law. As a
matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime
was marred considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases against the government,
which then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political questions
and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas
corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, and other matters
related to the operation and effect of martial law failed because the government set up the defense of
political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon
it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved.
It did not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged
further violations thereof during the martial law regime. I am sure the members of the Bar are familiar
with this situation. But for the benefit of the Members of the Commission who are not lawyers, allow me to
explain. I will start with a decision of the Supreme Court in 1973 on the case of Javellana vs. the Secretary of
Justice, if I am not mistaken. Martial law was announced on September 22, although the proclamation was
dated September 21. The obvious reason for the delay in its publication was that the administration had
apprehended and detained prominent newsmen on September 21. So that when martial law was announced
on September 22, the media hardly published anything about it. In fact, the media could not publish any story
not only because our main writers were already incarcerated, but also because those who succeeded them in
their jobs were under mortal threat of being the object of wrath of the ruling party. The 1971 Constitutional
Convention had begun on June 1, 1971 and by September 21 or 22 had not finished the Constitution; it had
barely agreed in the fundamentals of the Constitution. I forgot to say that upon the proclamation of martial law,
some delegates to that 1971 Constitutional Convention, dozens of them, were picked up. One of them was
our very own colleague, Commissioner Calderon. So, the unfinished draft of the Constitution was taken over
by representatives of Malacaang. In 17 days, they finished what the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention had been unable to accomplish for about 14 months. The draft of the 1973 Constitution was

presented to the President around December 1, 1972, whereupon the President issued a decree calling a
plebiscite which suspended the operation of some provisions in the martial law decree which prohibited
discussions, much less public discussions of certain matters of public concern. The purpose was presumably
to allow a free discussion on the draft of the Constitution on which a plebiscite was to be held sometime in
January 1973. If I may use a word famous by our colleague, Commissioner Ople, during the interregnum,
however, the draft of the Constitution was analyzed and criticized with such a telling effect that Malacaang
felt the danger of its approval. So, the President suspended indefinitely the holding of the plebiscite and
announced that he would consult the people in a referendum to be held from January 10 to January 15. But
the questions to be submitted in the referendum were not announced until the eve of its scheduled beginning,
under the supposed supervision not of the Commission on Elections, but of what was then designated as
"citizens assemblies or barangays." Thus the barangays came into existence. The questions to be
propounded were released with proposed answers thereto, suggesting that it was unnecessary to hold a
plebiscite because the answers given in the referendum should be regarded as the votes cast in the
plebiscite. Thereupon, a motion was filed with the Supreme Court praying that the holding of the referendum
be suspended. When the motion was being heard before the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice delivered
to the Court a proclamation of the President declaring that the new Constitution was already in force because
the overwhelming majority of the votes cast in the referendum favored the Constitution. Immediately after the
departure of the Minister of Justice, I proceeded to the session room where the case was being heard. I then
informed the Court and the parties the presidential proclamation declaring that the 1973 Constitution had been
ratified by the people and is now in force.
A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential proclamation null and void. The main defense
put up by the government was that the issue was a political question and that the court had no jurisdiction to
entertain the case.
xxx
The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to January 15, the vast majority ratified the
draft of the Constitution. Note that all members of the Supreme Court were residents of Manila, but none of
them had been notified of any referendum in their respective places of residence, much less did they
participate in the alleged referendum. None of them saw any referendum proceeding.
In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a majority of the members of the Court felt that
there had been no referendum.
Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a big difference between a referendum
and a plebiscite. But another group of justices upheld the defense that the issue was a political
question. Whereupon, they dismissed the case. This is not the only major case in which the plea of
"political question" was set up. There have been a number of other cases in the past.
x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because the issue was clearly justiciable.
xxx
x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its functions, it faced the following questions:
What is judicial power? What is a political question?

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The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle actual controversies involving
conflicts of rights which are demandable and enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed by law but
cannot be enforced by a judiciary party. In a decided case, a husband complained that his wife was unwilling
to perform her duties as a wife. The Court said: "We can tell your wife what her duties as such are and that
she is bound to comply with them, but we cannot force her physically to discharge her main marital duty to her
husband. There are some rights guaranteed by law, but they are so personal that to enforce them by actual
compulsion would be highly derogatory to human dignity."
This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable or enforceable . . .
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical questions. In a presidential system
of government, the Supreme Court has, also another important function. The powers of government
are generally considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary.
Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the others. Because of that supremacy
power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the
government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction
or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass
judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter
evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political
question.
I have made these extended remarks to the end that the Commissioners may have an initial food for thought
on the subject of the judiciary.103 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice Concepcion further clarified the
concept of judicial power, thus:
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but judicial power is not vested in the
Supreme Court alone but also in other lower courts as may be created by law.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?
MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to identify political questions with
jurisdictional questions. But there is a difference.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary cases but where there is a
question as to whether the government had authority or had abused its authority to the extent of

lacking jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction, that is not a political question. Therefore, the court has
the duty to decide.
xxx
FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided by the Supreme Court according to the
new numerical need for votes.
On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with the political question doctrine?
MR. CONCEPCION. No.
FR. BERNAS. It is not.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of discretion, amounting to a lack of
jurisdiction. . .
FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not intended to do away with the political
question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.
When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define what is judicial power. But the
Gentleman will notice it says, "judicial power includes" and the reason being that the definition that
we might make may not cover all possible areas.
FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems arising from the political question
doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that truly political questions are beyond the
pale of judicial power.104 (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial
power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this
creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that
Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is
gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which
"are not truly political questions."
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of
powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can
review questions which are not truly political in nature.
As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP College of Law, this Court has in fact
in a number of cases taken jurisdiction over questions which are not truly political following the effectivity of
the present Constitution.
In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene Cortes, held:

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The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial
inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political
departments to decide.106 x x x

conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits. This Court shall thus now apply this
standard to the present controversy.

In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,107 through Justice Teodoro Padilla, this Court declared:

These petitions raise five substantial issues:

The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform under the Constitution.
Moreover, as held in a recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to
judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has
been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution,
although said provision by no means does away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate
cases."108 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses
under the Constitution.

And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is
that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not
be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper
cases, even the political question.110 x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable political questions and non-justiciable
political questions, however. Identification of these two species of political questions may be problematic.
There has been no clear standard. The American case of Baker v. Carr111 attempts to provide some:
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an
unusual need for questioning adherence to a political decision already made; or thepotentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.112 (Underscoring
supplied)
Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. These standards are not separate and distinct
concepts but are interrelated to each in that the presence of one strengthens the conclusion that the others
are also present.
The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American concept of judicial review is radically
different from our current concept, for Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides our courts with far less
discretion in determining whether they should pass upon a constitutional issue.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question lies in
the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions

II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI of the
Constitution.
III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial Development Fund is
an unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which this Court has no
jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this Court to make a determination of
what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the
Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission.113
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these,
namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the
records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the framers could find no better way to
approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by alluding to both positive
and negative examples of both, without arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard
therefor.114 Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond
the scope of its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII.
Lis Mota
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act
should be avoided whenever possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission on Elections,115 this Court
held:
x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law
to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised,if the
record also presents some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will
be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case arises in which a
decision upon such question will be unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

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The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,117 where this Court invalidated
Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No. 6657 for being confiscatory and violative of due process, to wit:
It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is
shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus,
there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial
determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the
resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself.118 [Emphasis
supplied]
Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the
very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the invalidity of the second impeachment
complaint, collectively raise several constitutional issues upon which the outcome of this controversy could
possibly be made to rest. In determining whether one, some or all of the remaining substantial issues should
be passed upon, this Court is guided by the related cannon of adjudication that "the court should not form a
rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is applied."119
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among other reasons, the second
impeachment complaint is invalid since it directly resulted from a Resolution 120 calling for a legislative inquiry
into the JDF, which Resolution and legislative inquiry petitioners claim to likewise be unconstitutional for being:
(a) a violation of the rules and jurisprudence on investigations in aid of legislation; (b) an open breach of the
doctrine of separation of powers; (c) a violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the
judiciary; and (d) an assault on the independence of the judiciary.121
Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims, it is the studied opinion of this Court that
the issue of the constitutionality of the said Resolution and resulting legislative inquiry is too far removed from
the issue of the validity of the second impeachment complaint. Moreover, the resolution of said issue would, in
the Court's opinion, require it to form a rule of constitutional law touching on the separate and distinct matter
of legislative inquiries in general, which would thus be broader than is required by the facts of these
consolidated cases. This opinion is further strengthened by the fact that said petitioners have raised other
grounds in support of their petition which would not be adversely affected by the Court's ruling.
En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative inquiries has already been
enunciated by this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Commttee,122 viz:
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore absolute or
unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided

therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It
follows then that the right rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to
due process and the right not be compelled to testify against one's self. 123
In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra, while joining the original
petition of petitioners Candelaria, et. al., introduce the new argument that since the second impeachment
complaint was verified and filed only by Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella,
the same does not fall under the provisions of Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the
Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall
forthwith proceed.
They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives signed a Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy the requisites for the application of the afore-mentioned
section in that the "verified complaint or resolution of impeachment" was not filed "by at least one-third of all
the Members of the House." With the exception of Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella, the signatories
to said Resolution are alleged to have verified the same merely as a "Resolution of Endorsement." Intervenors
point to the "Verification" of the Resolution of Endorsement which states that:
"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of the abovementioned Complaint of
Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix William B. Fuentebella x x x"124
Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution requires in order for said second
impeachment complaint to automatically become the Articles of Impeachment and for trial in the Senate to
begin "forthwith," is that the verified complaint be "filed," not merely endorsed, by at least one-third of the
Members of the House of Representatives. Not having complied with this requirement, they concede that the
second impeachment complaint should have been calendared and referred to the House Committee on
Justice under Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution, viz:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be
included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three
session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit
its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution.
The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt
thereof.
Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined that for Section 3 (4), Article XI of
the Constitution to apply, there should be 76 or more representatives who signed and verified the second
impeachment complaint as complainants, signed and verified the signatories to a resolution of impeachment.
Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least
one-third of the members of the House of Representatives as endorsers is not the resolution of impeachment
contemplated by the Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being necessary only from at least one
Member whenever a citizen files a verified impeachment complaint.

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While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra, does indeed limit the scope of the
constitutional issues to the provisions on impeachment, more compelling considerations militate against its
adoption as the lis mota or crux of the present controversy. Chief among this is the fact that only Attorneys
Macalintal and Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No. 160262, have raised this issue as a ground for invalidating the
second impeachment complaint. Thus, to adopt this additional ground as the basis for deciding the instant
consolidated petitions would not only render for naught the efforts of the original petitioners in G.R. No.
160262, but the efforts presented by the other petitioners as well.
Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for the determination of the instant
cases is made easier by the fact that said intervenors Macalintal and Quadra have joined in the petition of
Candelaria, et. al., adopting the latter's arguments and issues as their own. Consequently, they are not unduly
prejudiced by this Court's decision.
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as they are, constitute the very lis
mota of the instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules
adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section
3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.

person, interest or power and to be equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations lurking
in [his] office."130
The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had already been settled in the case
ofAbbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal.131 In that case, the petitioners filed with the respondent Senate Electoral
Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and
resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them were interested parties to said case as
respondents therein. This would have reduced the Tribunal's membership to only its three Justices-Members
whose disqualification was not sought, leaving them to decide the matter. This Court held:
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by
any of his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same objections to the substitute's competence,
the proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to
abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the
participation of its entire membership of Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration that the Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty
which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is in the highest public interest as
evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law.

Judicial Restraint
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the Senate, sitting as an
impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Again, this Court
reiterates that the power of judicial review includes the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment
proceedings.
On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that "[t]here is a moral compulsion for the
Court to not assume jurisdiction over the impeachment because all the Members thereof are subject to
impeachment."125 But this argument is very much like saying the Legislature has a moral compulsion not to
pass laws with penalty clauses because Members of the House of Representatives are subject to them.
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this Court. Adjudication may not
be declined, because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no
other tribunal to which the controversy may be referred."126 Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from its
duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than being clothed with authority thus, this
Court is duty-bound to take cognizance of the instant petitions. 127 In the august words of amicus curiae Father
Bernas, "jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it, even
if it is vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty."
Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of government cannot inhibit itself
and must rule upon the challenge because no other office has the authority to do so. 128 On the occasion that
this Court had been an interested party to the controversy before it, it has acted upon the matter "not with
officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and
fairness."129 After all, "by [his] appointment to the office, the public has laid on [a member of the judiciary] their
confidence that [he] is mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied contentions. For this
reason, they expect [him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to displease any

It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the Constitution could not have
been unaware of the possibility of an election contest that would involve all Senatorselect, six of whom
would inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of
the 1992 elections when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the
Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations or for the substitution of
Senators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such situations must
simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the
Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and collectively.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or
disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal
may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels
that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What we
are merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function
as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the
three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held that:
Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of them, is nothing short ofpro
tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a
judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. And if that judge is the one designated by the Constitution to
exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court, the deprivation of his or their
judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of the court itself. It affects the very heart of
judicial independence. The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Court
no alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire
membership of Justices.133 (Italics in the original)

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Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it exercises its power of judicial
review.
In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the "seven pillars" of limitations of the
power of judicial review, enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA135 as
follows:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding,
declining because to decide such questions 'is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the
determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that, by
means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the
constitutionality of the legislative act.'
2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.' . . .
'It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a
decision of the case.'
3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to
which it is to be applied.'
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is
also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found most varied
application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question,
the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter. Appeals from
the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a question under the Federal Constitution are frequently
dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on an independent state ground.
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is
injured by its operation. Among the many applications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of the
right of challenge to one who lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official
interested only in the performance of his official duty will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the
Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to have the Nineteenth Amendment
declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not
entertained although made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself
of its benefits.
7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of
constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of
the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided (citations omitted).
The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander v. TVA from different
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following categories:

1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case

2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts of the case
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the statute
5. that the parties are not in estoppel
6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.
As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the exercise of judicial review:
1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power
2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.136
Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial restraint the possibility that
"judicial review of impeachments might also lead to embarrassing conflicts between the Congress and the
[J]udiciary." They stress the need to avoid the appearance of impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial
hearings, and the scenario that it would be confusing and humiliating and risk serious political instability at
home and abroad if the judiciary countermanded the vote of Congress to remove an impeachable
official.137 Intervenor Soriano echoes this argument by alleging that failure of this Court to enforce its
Resolution against Congress would result in the diminution of its judicial authority and erode public confidence
and faith in the judiciary.
Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated by the Solicitor General, the
possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court to refrain from upholding the
Constitution in all impeachment cases. Justices cannot abandon their constitutional duties just because their
action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act.
x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive act is not regarded as settled until the
Supreme Court has passed upon the constitutionality of the act involved, the judgment has not only juridical
effects but also political consequences. Those political consequences may follow even where the Court fails to
grant the petitioner's prayer to nullify an act for lack of the necessary number of votes. Frequently, failure to
act explicitly, one way or the other, itself constitutes a decision for the respondent and validation, or at least
quasi-validation, follows." 138
Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this Court was split and "in the end there were not enough
votes either to grant the petitions, or to sustain respondent's claims," 140 the pre-existing constitutional order
was disrupted which paved the way for the establishment of the martial law regime.
Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the coordinate branches of the
government would behave in a lawless manner and not do their duty under the law to uphold the Constitution
and obey the laws of the land. Yet there is no reason to believe that any of the branches of government will

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behave in a precipitate manner and risk social upheaval, violence, chaos and anarchy by encouraging
disrespect for the fundamental law of the land.
Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by the doctrine in People v.
Veneracion, to wit:141
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If [public officers], under the guise of
religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are
required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws,
not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its authority. Under this
system, [public officers] are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it without fear or
favor," resist encroachments by governments, political parties, or even the interference of their own personal
beliefs.142
Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure
for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule
V of the House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present Constitution,
contending that the term "initiate" does not mean "to file;" that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the House of
Representatives, as a collective body, which has the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment; that
initiate could not possibly mean "to file" because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of the Constitution
provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member
of the House of Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any member; or
(3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House. Respondent House of Representatives concludes that the
one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not have
been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had
not been initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it.
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate." Resort to statutory
construction is, therefore, in order.
That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution, Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who
eventually became an Associate Justice of this Court, agreed on the meaning of "initiate" as "to file," as
proffered and explained by Constitutional Commissioner Maambong during the Constitutional Commission
proceedings, which he (Commissioner Regalado) as amicus curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the
instant petitions held on November 5, 2003 at which he added that the act of "initiating" included the act of
taking initial action on the complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word "initiate" as it twice appears in
Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.
"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set
going. As Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it means "to
perform or facilitate the first action," which jibes with Justice Regalado's position, and that of Father Bernas,
who elucidated during the oral arguments of the instant petitions on November 5, 2003 in this wise:

Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a comlexus of acts consisting of a beginning,
a middle and an end. The end is the transmittal of the articles of impeachment to the Senate. The middle
consists of those deliberative moments leading to the formulation of the articles of impeachment. The
beginning or the initiation is the filing of the complaint and its referral to the Committee on Justice.
Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by Representatives Cojuangco and Fuentebella
says that impeachment is "deemed initiated" when the Justice Committee votes in favor of impeachment or
when the House reverses a contrary vote of the Committee. Note that the Rule does not say "impeachment
proceedings" are initiated but rather are "deemed initiated." The language is recognition that initiation
happened earlier, but by legal fiction there is an attempt to postpone it to a time after actual initiation.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into the intent of the law.
Fortunately, the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution can be pried from its records:
MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the procedure and the substantive provisions on
impeachment, I understand there have been many proposals and, I think, these would need some time for
Committee action.
However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the Committee a resolution on impeachment
proceedings, copies of which have been furnished the Members of this body. This is borne out of my
experience as a member of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government which took
charge of the last impeachment resolution filed before the First Batasang Pambansa. For the information of
the Committee, the resolution covers several steps in the impeachment proceedings starting with
initiation, action of the Speaker committee action, calendaring of report, voting on the report,
transmittal referral to the Senate, trial and judgment by the Senate.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the approval of the
amendment submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking that we do not
really initiate the filing of the Articles of Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out
earlier, was that the initiation starts with the filing of the complaint. And what is actually done on the
floor is that the committee resolution containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one approved by
the body.
As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it appears that the initiation
starts on the floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of the impeachment proceedings of
President Richard Nixon wherein the Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the
resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was the body who approved the resolution. It is
not the body which initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the resolution. So, on that score,
probably the Committee on Style could help in rearranging these words because we have to be very technical
about this. I have been bringing with me The Rules of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress.
The Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted
my proposal, but the Committee has already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.

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xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of Section 3 (3). My
reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is only in keeping with the exact formulation of the
Rules of the House of Representatives of the United States regarding impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of this provision, that on page 2, Section 3
(3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete the words which read: "to initiate impeachment proceedings" and the
comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word "resolution" the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then
capitalize the letter "i" in "impeachment" and replace the word "by" with OF, so that the whole section will now
read: "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a
resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the Committee or to override its contrary resolution. The
vote of each Member shall be recorded."
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of Representatives of the
United States is concerned, really starts from the filing of the verified complaint and every resolution to
impeach always carries with it the Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words "Articles of
Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in the case of the direct filing of a verified compliant of one-third of all
the Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam President, that my amendment will not vary the
substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform procedure of the House of Representatives of the
United States Congress. Thank you, Madam President.143 (Italics in the original; emphasis and udnerscoring
supplied)
This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and accepted by the Committee on the
Accountability of Public Officers.144
It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the complaint. In his amicus
curiaebrief, Commissioner Maambong explained that "the obvious reason in deleting the phrase "to initiate
impeachment proceedings" as contained in the text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and
make it understood once and for all that the initiation of impeachment proceedings starts with the
filing of the complaint, and the vote of one-third of the House in a resolution of impeachment does not
initiate the impeachment proceedings which was already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint
under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the Constitution."145
Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is Father Bernas, who was also
a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the word "initiate" as used in Article XI, Section 3(5)
means to file, both adding, however, that the filing must be accompanied by an action to set the complaint
moving.
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the word "initiate," appearing in the
constitutional provision on impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment.
xxx

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of
one year, (Emphasis supplied)
refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding."
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to initiate." The object in the first
sentence is "impeachment case." The object in the second sentence is "impeachment proceeding." Following
the principle of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be distinguished from the term
"proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be decided by the Senate. Abovequoted first provision provides that the House, by a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to
the Senate. It is in that sense that the House has "exclusive power" to initiate all cases of impeachment. No
other body can do it. However, before a decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a "proceeding" must
be followed to arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated." To initiate, which comes from the Latin
word initium, means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a beginning, a
middle, and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the House and consists of several steps: (1) there
is the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the House of Representatives or by a private citizen
endorsed by a Member of the House of the Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this complaint by
the proper Committee which may either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the
Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the House for further
processing; and (4) there is the processing of the same complaint by the House of Representatives which
either affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third
of all the members. If at least one third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are
prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is
at this point that an impeachable public official is successfully impeached. That is, he or she is successfully
charged with an impeachment "case" before the Senate as impeachment court.
Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when the complaint is
transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of
another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment proceeding" initiated when the House
deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has already
been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning.
Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee
on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal
reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary toinitiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground
that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint
does.146 Thus the line was deleted and is not found in the present Constitution.
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against
the same official more than once within a period of one year," it means that no second verified complaint may
be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. By his explanation, this interpretation is
founded on the common understanding of the meaning of "to initiate" which means to begin. He reminds that
the Constitution is ratified by the people, both ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand it; and that
ordinary people read ordinary meaning into ordinary words and not abstruse meaning, they ratify words as
they understand it and not as sophisticated lawyers confuse it.

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To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment proceedings
because Section 3 (1) says "The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases
of impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the principle of reddendo singula
singulisby equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment proceeding."

contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out.
Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules, viz:

From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former Constitutional
Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint
coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint.

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by
any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of
Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter.
The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House
within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall
be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the
impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the
members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3
(5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment
complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment proceedings
are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint
and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the
Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the
filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or
a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These rules clearly contravene
Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the term "initiate" a meaning different meaning from filing and
referral.
In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court could not use contemporaneous
construction as an aid in the interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of Article XI, citing Vera v. Avelino147 wherein this Court
stated that "their personal opinions (referring to Justices who were delegates to the Constitution Convention)
on the matter at issue expressed during this Court's our deliberations stand on a different footing from the
properly recorded utterances of debates and proceedings." Further citing said case, he states that this Court
likened the former members of the Constitutional Convention to actors who are so absorbed in their emotional
roles that intelligent spectators may know more about the real meaning because of the latter's balanced
perspectives and disinterestedness.148
Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present petitions. There are at present only two
members of this Court who participated in the 1986 Constitutional Commission Chief Justice Davide and
Justice Adolf Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has not taken part in these proceedings for obvious reasons.
Moreover, this Court has not simply relied on the personal opinions now given by members of the
Constitutional Commission, but has examined the records of the deliberations and proceedings thereof.
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is clear and
unequivocal that it and only it has the power to make and interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its
argument is premised on the assumption that Congress has absolute power to promulgate its rules. This
assumption, however, is misplaced.
Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is
limited by the phrase "to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Hence, these rules cannot

Section 3. (1) x x x

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to either affirm a favorable
resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of
each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members
of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith
proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of
one year.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as alleged
Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter or
amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.
In Osmea v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within the province of either House of Congress to interpret
its rules and that it was the best judge of what constituted "disorderly behavior" of its members. However,
in Paceta v. Secretary of the Commission on Appointments,150 Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando,
speaking for this Court and quoting Justice Brandeis in United States v. Smith,151 declared that where the
construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than members of the Legislature, the question
becomes judicial in nature. InArroyo v. De Venecia,152 quoting United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,153 Justice
Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held that while the Constitution empowers each house to determine
its rules of proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights,
and further that there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established
by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. It is only within these limitations that all matters of
method are open to the determination of the Legislature. In the same case of Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice
Reynato S. Puno, in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, was even more emphatic as he stressed that in
the Philippine setting there is even more reason for courts to inquire into the validity of the Rules of
Congress, viz:
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I
agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over he case
at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment
against the interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.

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Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as a window to view the issues before the
Court. It is in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined the boundaries of the power of the judiciary to
review congressional rules. It held:

under martial law where abusive exercises of state power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the
misuse of the political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion,
the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis--vis the Executive and the
Legislative departments of government.155

"x x x
xxx
"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may determine the rules of its proceedings."
It appears that in pursuance of this authority the House had, prior to that day, passed this as one of its rules:
Rule XV
3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the names of members sufficient to
make a quorum in the hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and recorded in the
journal, and reported to the Speaker with the names of the members voting, and be counted and announced
in determining the presence of a quorum to do business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question, therefore, is as to the validity of
this rule, and not what methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for determining the presence of
a quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or clerk may of their own volition place upon the journal. Neither do
the advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any matters for judicial
consideration. With the courts the question is only one of power. The Constitution empowers each house
to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate
fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of
proceedings established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these
limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the
rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the
validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make
rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised
by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or
tribunal."
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of congressional rules, i.e,
whether they are constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was found to satisfy the test: (1)
that it did not ignore any constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its method
had a reasonable relationship with the result sought to be attained. By examining Rule XV, the Court did not
allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of separation of powers. 154
xxx
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to categorically reject the
political question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For section 1, Article
VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower courts "x x x to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the government." This power is new and was not granted to our courts
in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state
constitution. The CONCOM granted this enormous power to our courts in view of our experience

The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not a mere power which it can
decline to exercise. Precisely to deter this disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a duty of this
Court to strike down any act of a branch or instrumentality of government or any of its officials done
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the
Constitution has elongated the checking powers of this Court against the other branches of government
despite their more democratic character, the President and the legislators being elected by the people. 156
xxx
The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the courts of justice. . . to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government' constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional
Commission to upgrade the powers of this court vis--vis the other branches of government. This provision
was dictated by our experience under martial law which taught us that a stronger and more independent
judiciary is needed to abort abuses in government. x x x
xxx
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of government committed with grave
abuse of discretion, the new Constitution transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This
transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as nation, is not merely evolutionary but
revolutionary.Under the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional violations by
initially determining what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress this Court
is mandated to approach constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not do but what
it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by not resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new constitutional provision as
the case at bar once more calls us to define the parameters of our power to review violations of the rules of
the House. We will not be true to our trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if we refuse
to exercise this new power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding timidity to
unsheathe the judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened other branches of government to
denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga
that this novel provision stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation
should not be depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case at
bar, the lessons of our own history should provide us the light and not the experience of foreigners. 157 (Italics
in the original emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant petitions. Here, the third parties
alleging the violation of private rights and the Constitution are involved.

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Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v. US158 as basis for arguing that this Court
may not decide on the constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules. As already
observed, the U.S. Federal Constitution simply provides that "the House of Representatives shall have the
sole power of impeachment." It adds nothing more. It gives no clue whatsoever as to how this "sole power" is
to be exercised. No limitation whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme Court concluded that there was a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of a constitutional power to the House of Representatives.
This reasoning does not hold with regard to impeachment power of the Philippine House of Representatives
since our Constitution, as earlier enumerated, furnishes several provisions articulating how that "exclusive
power" is to be exercised.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules which state that
impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice
that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or
overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient
in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives
of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House thus
clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term "initiate" a meaning different from "filing."
Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral
to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not
be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred
to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October
23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the
same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
Conclusion
If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a phenomenon that takes the center
stage of our individual and collective consciousness as a people with our characteristic flair for human drama,
conflict or tragedy. Of course this is not to demean the seriousness of the controversy over the Davide
impeachment. For many of us, the past two weeks have proven to be an exasperating, mentally and
emotionally exhausting experience. Both sides have fought bitterly a dialectical struggle to articulate what they
respectively believe to be the correct position or view on the issues involved. Passions had ran high as
demonstrators, whether for or against the impeachment of the Chief Justice, took to the streets armed with
their familiar slogans and chants to air their voice on the matter. Various sectors of society - from the
business, retired military, to the academe and denominations of faith offered suggestions for a return to a
state of normalcy in the official relations of the governmental branches affected to obviate any perceived
resulting instability upon areas of national life.

Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of Impeachment had been constituted, this Court
was specifically asked, told, urged and argued to take no action of any kind and form with respect to the
prosecution by the House of Representatives of the impeachment complaint against the subject respondent
public official. When the present petitions were knocking so to speak at the doorsteps of this Court, the same
clamor for non-interference was made through what are now the arguments of "lack of jurisdiction," "nonjusticiability," and "judicial self-restraint" aimed at halting the Court from any move that may have a bearing on
the impeachment proceedings.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of the constitutionality of
initiating the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is concerned. To reiterate what has been
already explained, the Court found the existence in full of all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its
constitutionally vested power and duty of judicial review over an issue whose resolution precisely called for
the construction or interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an
issue of a genuine constitutional material which only this Court can properly and competently address and
adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation of powers under our system of government. Face-toface thus with a matter or problem that squarely falls under the Court's jurisdiction, no other course of action
can be had but for it to pass upon that problem head on.
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the process of impeachment has
effectively set up a regime of judicial supremacy, is patently without basis in fact and in law.
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue
of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally
imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor
indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business
of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government. Rather, the
raison d'etre of the judiciary is to complement the discharge by the executive and legislative of their own
powers to bring about ultimately the beneficent effects of having founded and ordered our society upon the
rule of law.
It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of constitutionality of the impeachment proceedings
against the Chief Justice, the members of this Court have actually closed ranks to protect a brethren. That the
members' interests in ruling on said issue is as much at stake as is that of the Chief Justice. Nothing could be
farther from the truth.
The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has long held and been entrusted with
the judicial power to resolve conflicting legal rights regardless of the personalities involved in the suits or
actions. This Court has dispensed justice over the course of time, unaffected by whomsoever stood to benefit
or suffer therefrom, unfraid by whatever imputations or speculations could be made to it, so long as it
rendered judgment according to the law and the facts. Why can it not now be trusted to wield judicial power in
these petitions just because it is the highest ranking magistrate who is involved when it is an incontrovertible
fact that the fundamental issue is not him but the validity of a government branch's official act as tested by the
limits set by the Constitution? Of course, there are rules on the inhibition of any member of the judiciary from
taking part in a case in specified instances. But to disqualify this entire institution now from the suit at bar is to
regard the Supreme Court as likely incapable of impartiality when one of its members is a party to a case,
which is simply a non sequitur.

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No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system which recognizes
equality of all men before the law as essential to the law's moral authority and that of its agents to secure
respect for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch or instrumentality
that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal equality other than the Supreme Court which has
discerned its real meaning and ramifications through its application to numerous cases especially of the highprofile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is any other
member of this Court. But just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law
than anybody else. The law is solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective of his station in life.
The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put to test once again by this
impeachment case against Chief Justice Hilario Davide. Accordingly, this Court has resorted to no other than
the Constitution in search for a solution to what many feared would ripen to a crisis in government. But though
it is indeed immensely a blessing for this Court to have found answers in our bedrock of legal principles, it is
equally important that it went through this crucible of a democratic process, if only to discover that it can
resolve differences without the use of force and aggression upon each other.
WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which
were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently,
the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary
General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of
Article XI of the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo and Tinga, JJ., see separate opinion.
Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Vitug, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., see separate concurring opinion.
Quisumbing, J., concurring separate opinion received.
Carpio, J., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., concur in the majority opinion and in the separate opinion of J. Vitug.
Corona, J., will write a separate concurring opinion.
Azcuna, J., concur in the separate opinion.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28196

November 9, 1967

RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DIRECTOR OF PRINTING and AUDITOR GENERAL, respondents.
G.R. No. L-28224

November 9, 1967

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:

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G. R. No. L-28196 is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary injunction.
Petitioner therein prays for judgment:
1) Restraining: (a) the Commission on Elections from enforcing Republic Act No. 4913, or from performing any
act that will result in the holding of the plebiscite for the ratification of the constitutional amendments proposed
in Joint Resolutions Nos. 1 and 3 of the two Houses of Congress of the Philippines, approved on March 16,
1967; (b) the Director of Printing from printing ballots, pursuant to said Act and Resolutions; and (c) the
Auditor General from passing in audit any disbursement from the appropriation of funds made in said Republic
Act No. 4913; and
2) declaring said Act unconstitutional and void.
The main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed
the following resolutions:
1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution of the
Philippines, be amended so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum
of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned among the several
provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, although each
province shall have, at least, one (1) member;
2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the convention to be
composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be "elected in the general
elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and
3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same Constitution, be amended so as to
authorize Senators and members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the
aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17, 1967, became
Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned
Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections which shall be held
on November 14, 1967.
The petition in L-28196 was filed on October 21, 1967. At the hearing thereof, on October 28, 1967, the
Solicitor General appeared on behalf of respondents. Moreover, Atty. Juan T. David and counsel for the
Philippine Constitution Association hereinafter referred to as the PHILCONSA were allowed to argue
as amici curiae. Said counsel for the PHILCONSA, Dr. Salvador Araneta, likewise prayed that the decision in
this case be deferred until after a substantially identical case brought by said organization before the
Commission on Elections,1 which was expected to decide it any time, and whose decision would, in all
probability, be appealed to this Court had been submitted thereto for final determination, for a joint decision
on the identical issues raised in both cases. In fact, on October 31, 1967, the PHILCONSA filed with this Court

the petition in G. R. No. L-28224, for review bycertiorari of the resolution of the Commission on
Elections2 dismissing the petition therein. The two (2) cases were deemed submitted for decision on
November 8, 1967, upon the filing of the answer of respondent, the memorandum of the petitioner and the
reply memorandum of respondent in L-28224.
Ramon A. Gonzales, the petitioner in L-28196, is admittedly a Filipino citizen, a taxpayer, and a voter. He
claims to have instituted case L-28196 as a class unit, for and in behalf of all citizens, taxpayers, and voters
similarly situated. Although respondents and the Solicitor General have filed an answer denying the truth of
this allegation, upon the ground that they have no knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth
thereof, such denial would appear to be a perfunctory one. In fact, at the hearing of case L-28196, the
Solicitor General expressed himself in favor of a judicial determination of the merits of the issued raised in
said case.
The PHILCONSA, petitioner in L-28224, is admittedly a corporation duly organized and existing under the
laws of the Philippines, and a civic, non-profit and non-partisan organization the objective of which is to uphold
the rule of law in the Philippines and to defend its Constitution against erosions or onslaughts from whatever
source. Despite his aforementioned statement in L-28196, in his answer in L-28224 the Solicitor General
maintains that this Court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of L-28224, upon the ground that the
same is "merely political" as held in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito.3 Senator Arturo M. Tolentino, who appeared
before the Commission on Elections and filed an opposition to the PHILCONSA petition therein, was allowed
to appear before this Court and objected to said petition upon the ground: a) that the Court has no jurisdiction
either to grant the relief sought in the petition, or to pass upon the legality of the composition of the House of
Representatives; b) that the petition, if granted, would, in effect, render in operational the legislative
department; and c) that "the failure of Congress to enact a valid reapportionment law . . . does not have the
legal effect of rendering illegal the House of Representatives elected thereafter, nor of rendering its acts null
and void."
JURISDICTION
As early as Angara vs. Electoral Commission,4 this Court speaking through one of the leading members of
the Constitutional Convention and a respected professor of Constitutional Law, Dr. Jose P. Laurel declared
that "the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper
allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof." It
is true that in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito,5 this Court characterizing the issue submitted thereto as a political one,
declined to pass upon the question whether or not a given number of votes cast in Congress in favor of a
proposed amendment to the Constitution which was being submitted to the people for ratification
satisfied the three-fourths vote requirement of the fundamental law. The force of this precedent has been
weakened, however, by Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate,6 Avelino vs. Cuenco,7 Taada vs.
Cuenco,8 and Macias vs. Commission on Elections.9 In the first, we held that the officers and employees of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal are under its supervision and control, not of that of the Senate President, as claimed
by the latter; in the second, this Court proceeded to determine the number of Senators necessary for
a quorum in the Senate; in the third, we nullified the election, by Senators belonging to the party having the
largest number of votes in said chamber, purporting to act on behalf of the party having the second largest
number of votes therein, of two (2) Senators belonging to the first party, as members, for the second party, of
the, Senate Electoral Tribunal; and in the fourth, we declared unconstitutional an act of Congress purporting to

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apportion the representative districts for the House of Representatives, upon the ground that the
apportionment had not been made as may be possible according to the number of inhabitants of each
province. Thus we rejected the theory, advanced in these four (4) cases, that the issues therein raised were
political questions the determination of which is beyond judicial review.
Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not included in the general
grant of legislative powers to Congress.10 It is part of the inherent powers of the people as the repository of
sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours11 to make, and, hence, to amend their own Fundamental
Law. Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such
power.12Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives act, notas members of Congress, but as component elements of a constituent assembly.
When acting as such, the members of Congress derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people,
when performing the same function,13 for their authority does not emanate from the Constitution they
are the very source of all powers of government, including the Constitution itself .
Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the members of
Congress derive their authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do not have the
final say on whether or not their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits. Otherwise, they could brush
aside and set the same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a government of laws, not of men,
and to the rigid nature of our Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed by the fact that, the Constitution expressly
confers upon the Supreme Court,14 the power to declare a treaty unconstitutional,15 despite the eminently
political character of treaty-making power.

In the cases at bar, it is conceded that the R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 have been approved by a vote of threefourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately. This,
notwithstanding, it is urged that said resolutions are null and void because:
1. The Members of Congress, which approved the proposed amendments, as well as the resolution calling a
convention to propose amendments, are, at best, de facto Congressmen;
2. Congress may adopt either one of two alternatives propose amendments or call a convention therefore
but may not avail of both that is to say, propose amendment and call a convention at the same time;
3. The election, in which proposals for amendment to the Constitution shall be submitted for ratification, must
be aspecial election, not a general election, in which officers of the national and local governments such as
the elections scheduled to be held on November 14, 1967 will be chosen; and
4. The spirit of the Constitution demands that the election, in which proposals for amendment shall be
submitted to the people for ratification, must be held under such conditions which, allegedly, do not exist
as to give the people a reasonable opportunity to have a fair grasp of the nature and implications of said
amendments.
Legality of Congress and Legal Status of the Congressmen
The first objection is based upon Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution, which provides:

In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress acting as a constituent assembly violates the
Constitution essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review, and, to the extent that
this view may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito,16 the latter should be deemed
modified accordingly. The Members of the Court are unanimous on this point.
THE MERITS
Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, as amended, reads:
The Congress in joint session assembled by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of
the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a
convention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a
majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification.
Pursuant to this provision, amendments to the Constitution may be proposed, either by Congress, or by a
convention called by Congress for that purpose. In either case, the vote of "three-fourths of all the members of
the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately" is necessary. And, "such amendments
shall be valid as part of" the "Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at
which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification."

The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than one hundred and twenty Members who
shall be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their
respective inhabitants, but each province shall have at least one Member. The Congress shall by law make an
apportionment within three years after the return of every enumeration, and not otherwise. Until such
apportionment shall have been made, the House of Representatives shall have the same number of Members
as that fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the qualified electors from the present
Assembly districts. Each representative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous and compact
territory.
It is urged that the last enumeration or census took place in 1960; that, no apportionment having been made
within three (3) years thereafter, the Congress of the Philippines and/or the election of its Members became
illegal; that Congress and its Members, likewise, became a de facto Congress and/or de facto congressmen,
respectively; and that, consequently, the disputed Resolutions, proposing amendments to the Constitution, as
well as Republic Act No. 4913, are null and void.
It is not true, however, that Congress has not made an apportionment within three years after the enumeration
or census made in 1960. It did actually pass a bill, which became Republic Act No. 3040, 17 purporting to make
said apportionment. This Act was, however, declared unconstitutional, upon the ground that the apportionment
therein undertaken had not been made according to the number of inhabitants of the different provinces of the
Philippines.18

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Moreover, we are unable to agree with the theory that, in view of the failure of Congress to make a valid
apportionment within the period stated in the Constitution, Congress became an "unconstitutional Congress"
and that, in consequence thereof, the Members of its House of Representatives are de facto officers. The
major premise of this process of reasoning is that the constitutional provision on "apportionment within three
years after the return of every enumeration, and not otherwise," is mandatory. The fact that Congress is under
legal obligation to make said apportionment does not justify, however, the conclusion that failure to comply
with such obligation rendered Congress illegal or unconstitutional, or that its Members have become de
facto officers.
It is conceded that, since the adoption of the Constitution in 1935, Congress has not made a valid
apportionment as required in said fundamental law. The effect of this omission has been envisioned in the
Constitution, pursuant to which:
. . . Until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of Representatives shall have the same
number of Members as that fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the qualified
electors from the present Assembly districts. . . . .

jure bodies, and that the Members thereof were de jure officers. Pursuant to the theory of petitioners herein,
upon expiration of said period of three years, or late in 1963, Congress became illegal and its Members, or at
least, those of the House of Representatives, became illegal holder of their respective offices, and were de
facto officers.
Petitioners do not allege that the expiration of said three-year period without a reapportionment, had the effect
of abrogating or repealing the legal provision creating Congress, or, at least, the House of Representatives,
and are not aware of any rule or principle of law that would warrant such conclusion. Neither do they allege
that the term of office of the members of said House automatically expired or that they ipso facto forfeited their
seats in Congress, upon the lapse of said period for reapportionment. In fact, neither our political law, nor our
law on public officers, in particular, supports the view that failure to discharge a mandatory duty, whatever it
may be, would automatically result in the forfeiture of an office, in the absence of a statute to this effect.

The provision does not support the view that, upon the expiration of the period to make the apportionment, a
Congress which fails to make it is dissolved or becomes illegal. On the contrary, it implies necessarily that
Congress shall continue to function with the representative districts existing at the time of the expiration of
said period.

Similarly, it would seem obvious that the provision of our Election Law relative to the election of Members of
Congress in 1965 were not repealed in consequence of the failure of said body to make an apportionment
within three (3) years after the census of 1960. Inasmuch as the general elections in 1965 were presumably
held in conformity with said Election Law, and the legal provisions creating Congress with a House of
Representatives composed of members elected by qualified voters of representative districts as they existed
at the time of said elections remained in force, we can not see how said Members of the House of
Representatives can be regarded as de facto officers owing to the failure of their predecessors in office to
make a reapportionment within the period aforementioned.

It is argued that the above-quoted provision refers only to the elections held in 1935. This theory assumes that
an apportionment had to be made necessarily before the first elections to be held after the inauguration of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, or in 1938.19 The assumption, is, however, unwarranted, for there had been
no enumeration in 1935, and nobody could foretell when it would be made. Those who drafted and adopted
the Constitution in 1935 could be certain, therefore, that the three-year period, after the earliest possible
enumeration, would expire after the elections in 1938.

Upon the other hand, the Constitution authorizes the impeachment of the President, the Vice-President, the
Justices of the Supreme Court and the Auditor General for, inter alia, culpable violation of the
Constitution,20 the enforcement of which is, not only their mandatory duty, but also, their main function. This
provision indicates that, despite the violation of such mandatory duty, the title to their respective offices
remains unimpaired, until dismissal or ouster pursuant to a judgment of conviction rendered in accordance
with Article IX of the Constitution. In short, the loss of office or the extinction of title thereto is not automatic.

What is more, considering that several provisions of the Constitution, particularly those on the legislative
department, were amended in 1940, by establishing a bicameral Congress, those who drafted and adopted
said amendment, incorporating therein the provision of the original Constitution regarding the apportionment
of the districts for representatives, must have known that the three-year period therefor would expire after the
elections scheduled to be held and actually held in 1941.

Even if we assumed, however, that the present Members of Congress are merely de facto officers, it would
not follow that the contested resolutions and Republic Act No. 4913 are null and void. In fact, the main
reasons for the existence of the de facto doctrine is that public interest demands that acts of persons holding,
under color of title, an office created by a valid statute be, likewise, deemed valid insofar as the public as
distinguished from the officer in question is concerned.21 Indeed, otherwise, those dealing with officers and
employees of the Government would be entitled to demand from them satisfactory proof of their title to the
positions they hold,before dealing with them, or before recognizing their authority or obeying their commands,
even if they should act within the limits of the authority vested in their respective offices, positions or
employments.22 One can imagine this great inconvenience, hardships and evils that would result in the
absence of the de facto doctrine.

Thus, the events contemporaneous with the framing and ratification of the original Constitution in 1935 and of
the amendment thereof in 1940 strongly indicate that the provision concerning said apportionment and the
effect of the failure to make it were expected to be applied to conditions obtaining after the elections in 1935
and 1938, and even after subsequent elections.
Then again, since the report of the Director of the Census on the last enumeration was submitted to the
President on November 30, 1960, it follows that the three-year period to make the apportionment did not
expire until 1963, or after the Presidential elections in 1961. There can be no question, therefore, that the
Senate and the House of Representatives organized or constituted on December 30, 1961, were de

As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally.23 It may not be contested
except directly, by quo warranto proceedings. Neither may the validity of his acts be questioned upon the
ground that he is merely a de facto officer.24 And the reasons are obvious: (1) it would be an indirect inquiry

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into the title to the office; and (2) the acts of a de facto officer, if within the competence of his office, are valid,
insofar as the public is concerned.
It is argued that the foregoing rules do not apply to the cases at bar because the acts therein involved have
not been completed and petitioners herein are not third parties. This pretense is untenable. It is inconsistent
withTayko vs. Capistrano.25 In that case, one of the parties to a suit being heard before Judge Capistrano
objected to his continuing to hear the case, for the reason that, meanwhile, he had reached the age of
retirement. This Court held that the objection could not be entertained, because the Judge was at least, a de
facto Judge, whose title can not be assailed collaterally. It should be noted that Tayko was not a third party
insofar as the Judge was concerned. Tayko was one of the parties in the aforementioned suit. Moreover,
Judge Capistrano had not, as yet, finished hearing the case, much less rendered decision therein. No rights
had vested in favor of the parties, in consequence of the acts of said Judge. Yet, Tayko's objection was
overruled. Needless to say, insofar as Congress is concerned, its acts, as regards the Resolutions herein
contested and Republic Act No. 4913, are complete. Congress has nothing else to do in connection therewith.
The Court is, also, unanimous in holding that the objection under consideration is untenable.
Available Alternatives to Congress
Atty. Juan T. David, as amicus curiae, maintains that Congress may either propose amendments to the
Constitution or call a convention for that purpose, but it can not do both, at the same time. This theory is
based upon the fact that the two (2) alternatives are connected in the Constitution by the disjunctive "or." Such
basis is, however, a weak one, in the absence of other circumstances and none has brought to our
attention supporting the conclusion drawn by the amicus curiae. In fact, the term "or" has, oftentimes, been
held to mean "and," or vice-versa, when the spirit or context of the law warrants it. 26
It is, also, noteworthy that R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 propose amendments to the constitutional provision on
Congress, to be submitted to the people for ratification on November 14, 1967, whereas R. B. H. No. 2 calls
for a convention in 1971, to consider proposals for amendment to the Constitution, in general. In other words,
the subject-matter of R. B. H. No. 2 is different from that of R B. H. Nos. 1 and 3. Moreover, the amendments
proposed under R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3, will be submitted for ratification several years before those that may be
proposed by the constitutional convention called in R. B. H. No. 2. Again, although the three (3) resolutions
were passed on the same date, they were taken up and put to a vote separately, or one after the other. In
other words, they were notpassed at the same time.
In any event, we do not find, either in the Constitution, or in the history thereof anything that would negate the
authority of different Congresses to approve the contested Resolutions, or of the same Congress to pass the
same in, different sessions or different days of the same congressional session. And, neither has any
plausible reason been advanced to justify the denial of authority to adopt said resolutions on the same day.
Counsel ask: Since Congress has decided to call a constitutional convention to propose amendments, why
not let the whole thing be submitted to said convention, instead of, likewise, proposing some specific
amendments, to be submitted for ratification before said convention is held? The force of this argument must
be conceded. but the same impugns the wisdom of the action taken by Congress, not its authority to take it.

One seeming purpose thereof to permit Members of Congress to run for election as delegates to the
constitutional convention and participate in the proceedings therein, without forfeiting their seats in Congress.
Whether or not this should be done is a political question, not subject to review by the courts of justice.
On this question there is no disagreement among the members of the Court.
May Constitutional Amendments Be Submitted for Ratification in a General Election?
Article XV of the Constitution provides:
. . . The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and
of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a
contention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a
majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification.
There is in this provision nothing to indicate that the "election" therein referred to is a "special," not a general,
election. The circumstance that three previous amendments to the Constitution had been submitted to the
people for ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the
circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification
in general elections.
It would be better, from the viewpoint of a thorough discussion of the proposed amendments, that the same be
submitted to the people's approval independently of the election of public officials. And there is no denying the
fact that an adequate appraisal of the merits and demerits proposed amendments is likely to be
overshadowed by the great attention usually commanded by the choice of personalities involved in general
elections, particularly when provincial and municipal officials are to be chosen. But, then, these considerations
are addressed to the wisdom of holding a plebiscite simultaneously with the election of public officer. They do
not deny the authority of Congress to choose either alternative, as implied in the term "election" used, without
qualification, in the abovequoted provision of the Constitution. Such authority becomes even more patent
when we consider: (1) that the term "election," normally refers to the choice or selection of candidates to
public office by popular vote; and (2) that the word used in Article V of the Constitution, concerning the grant
of suffrage to women is, not "election," but "plebiscite."
Petitioners maintain that the term "election," as used in Section 1 of Art. XV of the Constitution, should be
construed as meaning a special election. Some members of the Court even feel that said term ("election")
refers to a "plebiscite," without any "election," general or special, of public officers. They opine that
constitutional amendments are, in general, if not always, of such important, if not transcendental and vital
nature as to demand that the attention of the people be focused exclusively on the subject-matter thereof, so
that their votes thereon may reflect no more than their intelligent, impartial and considered view on the merits
of the proposed amendments, unimpaired, or, at least, undiluted by extraneous, if not insidious factors, let
alone the partisan political considerations that are likely to affect the selection of elective officials.

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This, certainly, is a situation to be hoped for. It is a goal the attainment of which should be promoted. The ideal
conditions are, however, one thing. The question whether the Constitution forbids the submission of proposals
for amendment to the people except under such conditions, is another thing. Much as the writer and those
who concur in this opinion admire the contrary view, they find themselves unable to subscribe thereto without,
in effect, reading into the Constitution what they believe is not written thereon and can not fairly be deduced
from the letter thereof, since the spirit of the law should not be a matter of sheer speculation.
The majority view although the votes in favor thereof are insufficient to declare Republic Act No. 4913
unconstitutional as ably set forth in the opinion penned by Mr. Justice Sanchez, is, however, otherwise.
Would the Submission now of the Contested Amendments to the People Violate the Spirit of the Constitution?
It should be noted that the contested Resolutions were approved on March 16, 1967, so that, by November
14, 1967, our citizenry shall have had practically eight (8) months to be informed on the amendments in
question. Then again, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 4913 provides:
(1) that "the amendments shall be published in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette, at least twenty
days prior to the election;"
(2) that "a printed copy of the proposed amendments shall be posted in a conspicuous place in every
municipality, city and provincial office building and in every polling place not later than October 14, 1967," and
that said copy "shall remain posted therein until after the election;"
(3) that "at least five copies of said amendment shall be kept in each polling place, to be made available for
examination by the qualified electors during election day;"
(4) that "when practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as may be determined by the Commission
on Elections, shall be kept in each polling place;"
(5) that "the Commission on Elections shall make available copies of said amendments in English, Spanish
and, whenever practicable, in the principal native languages, for free distributing:" and
(6) that the contested Resolutions "shall be printed in full" on the back of the ballots which shall be used on
November 14, 1967.

These were substantially the same means availed of to inform the people of the subject submitted to them for
ratification, from the original Constitution down to the Parity Amendment. Thus, referring to the original
Constitution, Section 1 of Act No. 4200, provides:
Said Constitution, with the Ordinance appended thereto, shall be published in the Official Gazette, in English
and in Spanish, for three consecutive issues at least fifteen days prior to said election, and a printed copy of
said Constitution, with the Ordinance appended thereto, shall be posted in a conspicuous place in each
municipal and provincial government office building and in each polling place not later than the twenty-second
day of April, nineteen hundred and thirty-five, and shall remain posted therein continually until after the
termination of the election. At least ten copies of the Constitution with the Ordinance appended thereto, in
English and in Spanish, shall be kept at each polling place available for examination by the qualified electors
during election day. Whenever practicable, copies in the principal local dialects as may be determined by the
Secretary of the Interior shall also be kept in each polling place.
The provision concerning woman's suffrage is Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 34, reading:
Said Article V of the Constitution shall be published in the Official Gazette, in English and in Spanish, for three
consecutive issues at least fifteen days prior to said election, and the said Article V shall be posted in a
conspicuous place in each municipal and provincial office building and in each polling place not later than the
twenty-second day of April, nineteen and thirty-seven, and shall remain posted therein continually until after
the termination of the plebiscite. At least ten copies of said Article V of the Constitution, in English and in
Spanish, shall be kept at each polling place available for examination by the qualified electors during the
plebiscite. Whenever practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as may be determined by the
Secretary of the Interior, shall also be kept in each polling place.
Similarly, Section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 517, referring to the 1940 amendments, is of the following tenor:
The said amendments shall be published in English and Spanish in three consecutive issues of the Official
Gazette at least twenty days prior to the election. A printed copy thereof shall be posted in a conspicuous
place in every municipal, city, and provincial government office building and in every polling place not later
than May eighteen, nineteen hundred and forty, and shall remain posted therein until after the election. At
least ten copies of said amendments shall be kept in each polling place to be made available for examination
by the qualified electors during election day. When practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as
may be determined by the Secretary of the Interior, shall also be kept therein.
As regards the Parity Amendment, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 73 is to the effect that:

We are not prepared to say that the foregoing measures are palpably inadequate to comply with the
constitutional requirement that proposals for amendment be "submitted to the people for their ratification," and
that said measures are manifestly insufficient, from a constitutional viewpoint, to inform the people of the
amendment sought to be made.

The said amendment shall be published in English and Spanish in three consecutive issues of the Official
Gazette at least twenty days prior to the election. A printed copy thereof shall be posted in a conspicuous
place in every municipal, city, and provincial government office building and in every polling place not later
than February eleven, nineteen hundred and forty-seven, and shall remain posted therein until after the
election. At least, ten copies of the said amendment shall be kept in each polling place to be made available
for examination by the qualified electors during election day. When practicable, copies in the principal native
languages, as may be determined by the Commission on Elections, shall also be kept in each polling place.

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The main difference between the present situation and that obtaining in connection with the former proposals
does not arise from the law enacted therefor. The difference springs from the circumstance that the major
political parties had taken sides on previous amendments to the Constitution except, perhaps, the woman's
suffrage and, consequently, debated thereon at some length before the plebiscite took place. Upon the
other hand, said political parties have not seemingly made an issue on the amendments now being contested
and have, accordingly, refrained from discussing the same in the current political campaign. Such debates or
polemics as may have taken place on a rather limited scale on the latest proposals for amendment,
have been due principally to the initiative of a few civic organizations and some militant members of our
citizenry who have voiced their opinion thereon. A legislation cannot, however, be nullified by reason of the
failure of certain sectors of the community to discuss it sufficiently. Its constitutionality or unconstitutionality
depends upon no other factors than those existing at the time of the enactment thereof, unaffected by the acts
or omissions of law enforcing agencies, particularly those that take place subsequently to the passage or
approval of the law.
Referring particularly to the contested proposals for amendment, the sufficiency or insufficiency, from a
constitutional angle, of the submission thereof for ratification to the people on November 14, 1967, depends
in the view of those who concur in this opinion, and who, insofar as this phase of the case, constitute the
minority upon whether the provisions of Republic Act No. 4913 are such as to fairly apprise the people of
the gist, the main idea or the substance of said proposals, which is under R. B. H. No. 1 the increase of
the maximum number of seats in the House of Representatives, from 120 to 180, and under R. B. H. No. 3
the authority given to the members of Congress to run for delegates to the Constitutional Convention and, if
elected thereto, to discharge the duties of such delegates, without forfeiting their seats in Congress. We
who constitute the minority believe that Republic Act No. 4913 satisfies such requirement and that said Act
is, accordingly, constitutional.

The system of checks and balances underlying the judicial power to strike down acts of the Executive or of
Congress transcending the confines set forth in the fundamental laws is not in derogation of the principle of
separation of powers, pursuant to which each department is supreme within its own sphere. The
determination of the conditions under which the proposed amendments shall be submitted to the people is
concededly a matter which falls within the legislative sphere. We do not believe it has been satisfactorily
shown that Congress has exceeded the limits thereof in enacting Republic Act No. 4913. Presumably, it could
have done something better to enlighten the people on the subject-matter thereof. But, then, no law is perfect.
No product of human endeavor is beyond improvement. Otherwise, no legislation would be constitutional and
valid. Six (6) Members of this Court believe, however, said Act and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 violate the spirit of
the Constitution.
Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring Republic Act 4913 and R. B. H. Nos. 1
and 3 unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions in these two (2) cases must be, as they are hereby, dismiss
and the writs therein prayed for denied, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Makalintal and Bengzon, J.P., JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., concurs fully with the above opinion, adding a few words on the question of jurisdiction.

A considerable portion of the people may not know how over 160 of the proposed maximum of representative
districts are actually apportioned by R. B. H. No. 1 among the provinces in the Philippines. It is not
improbable, however, that they are not interested in the details of the apportionment, or that a careful reading
thereof may tend in their simple minds, to impair a clear vision thereof. Upon the other hand, those who are
more sophisticated, may enlighten themselves sufficiently by reading the copies of the proposed amendments
posted in public places, the copies kept in the polling places and the text of contested resolutions, as printed
in full on the back of the ballots they will use.
It is, likewise, conceivable that as many people, if not more, may fail to realize or envisage the effect of R. B.
H. No. 3 upon the work of the Constitutional Convention or upon the future of our Republic. But, then, nobody
can foretell such effect with certainty. From our viewpoint, the provisions of Article XV of the Constitution are
satisfied so long as the electorate knows that R. B. H. No. 3 permits Congressmen to retain their seats as
legislators, even if they should run for and assume the functions of delegates to the Convention.
We are impressed by the factors considered by our distinguished and esteemed brethren, who opine
otherwise, but, we feel that such factors affect the wisdom of Republic Act No. 4913 and that of R. B. H. Nos.
1 and 3, not theauthority of Congress to approve the same.

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shall have the same qualifications as those of Congressmen, to be elected on the second Tuesday of
November, 1970 in accordance with the Revised Election Code.
After the adoption of said Res. No. 2 in 1967 but before the November elections of that year, Congress, acting
as a legislative body, enacted Republic Act No. 4914 implementing the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 and
practically restating in toto the provisions of said Resolution No. 2.
On June 17, 1969, Congress, also acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution No. 4 amending the
aforesaid Resolution No. 2 of March 16, 1967 by providing that the convention "shall be composed of 320
delegates apportioned among the existing representative districts according to the number of their respective
inhabitants: Provided, that a representative district shall be entitled to at least two delegates, who shall have
the same qualifications as those required of members of the House of Representatives," 1 "and that any other
details relating to the specific apportionment of delegates, election of delegates to, and the holding of, the
Constitutional Convention shall be embodied in an implementing legislation: Provided, that it shall not be
inconsistent with the provisions of this Resolution." 2

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-32432 September 11, 1970

On August 24, 1970, Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted Republic Act No. 6132, implementing
Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4, and expressly repealing R.A. No.
4914. 3

MANUEL B. IMBONG, petitioner,

vs.
JAIME FERRER, as Chairman of the Comelec, LINO M. PATAJO and CESAR MILAFLOR, as members
thereof, respondents.

Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales assails the validity of the entire law as well as the particular provisions embodied
in Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a). Petitioner Manuel B. Imbong impugns the constitutionality of only par. I
of Sec. 8(a) of said R.A. No. 6132 practically on the same grounds advanced by petitioner Gonzales.

G.R. No. L-32443 September 11, 1970

IN THE MATTER OF A PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT REGARDING THE VALIDITY OF R.A.
No. 6132, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION ACT OF 1970. RAUL M.
GONZALES,petitioner,
vs.
COMELEC, respondent.
MAKASIAR, J.:
These two separate but related petitions for declaratory relief were filed pursuant to Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 6132
by petitioners Manuel B. Imbong and Raul M. Gonzales, both members of the Bar, taxpayers and interested in
running as candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention. Both impugn the constitutionality of R.A.
No. 6132, claiming during the oral argument that it prejudices their rights as such candidates. After the
Solicitor General had filed answers in behalf the respondents, hearings were held at which the petitioners and
the amici curiae, namely Senator Lorenzo Taada, Senator Arturo Tolentino, Senator Jovito Salonga, and
Senator Emmanuel Pelaez argued orally.
It will be recalled that on March 16, 1967, Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of
the Constitution, passed Resolution No. 2 which among others called for a Constitutional Convention to
propose constitutional amendments to be composed of two delegates from each representative district who

I.

The validity of Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 6132, which considers, all public officers and employees, whether elective or
appointive, including members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as well as officers and employees of
corporations or enterprises of the government, as resigned from the date of the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, was recently sustained by this Court, on the grounds, inter alia, that the same is merely an
application of and in consonance with the prohibition in Sec. 2 of Art. XII of the Constitution and that it does
not constitute a denial of due process or of the equal protection of the law. Likewise, the constitutionality of
paragraph 2 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 was upheld. 4
II. Without first considering the validity of its specific provisions, we sustain the constitutionality of the
enactment of R.A. No. 6132 by Congress acting as a legislative body in the exercise of its broad law-making
authority, and not as a Constituent Assembly, because
1. Congress, when acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution, has full and
plenary authority to propose Constitutional amendments or to call a convention for the purpose, by a threefourths vote of each House in joint session assembled but voting separately. Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 calling
for a constitutional convention were passed by the required three-fourths vote.
2. The grant to Congress as a Constituent Assembly of such plenary authority to call a constitutional
convention includes, by virtue of the doctrine of necessary implication, all other powers essential to the
effective exercise of the principal power granted, such as the power to fix the qualifications, number,
apportionment, and compensation of the delegates as well as appropriation of funds to meet the expenses for

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the election of delegates and for the operation of the Constitutional Convention itself, as well as all other
implementing details indispensable to a fruitful convention. Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 already embody the
above-mentioned details, except the appropriation of funds.
3. While the authority to call a constitutional convention is vested by the present Constitution solely and
exclusively in Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly, the power to enact the implementing details, which
are now contained in Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 as well as in R.A. No. 6132, does not exclusively pertain to
Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly. Such implementing details are matters within the competence of
Congress in the exercise of its comprehensive legislative power, which power encompasses all matters not
expressly or by necessary implication withdrawn or removed by the Constitution from the ambit of legislative
action. And as lone as such statutory details do not clash with any specific provision of the constitution, they
are valid.
4. Consequently, when Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, omits to provide for such implementing
details after calling a constitutional convention, Congress, acting as a legislative body, can enact the
necessary implementing legislation to fill in the gaps, which authority is expressly recognized in Sec. 8 of Res
No. 2 as amended by Res. No. 4.
5. The fact that a bill providing for such implementing details may be vetoed by the President is no argument
against conceding such power in Congress as a legislative body nor present any difficulty; for it is not
irremediable as Congress can override the Presidential veto or Congress can reconvene as a Constituent
Assembly and adopt a resolution prescribing the required implementing details.

The Director of the Bureau of Census and Statistics himself, in a letter to Senator Pelaez dated July 30, 1970,
stated that "on the basis of the preliminary count of the population, we have computed the distribution of
delegates to the Constitutional Convention based on Senate Bill 77 (p. 2 lines 5 to 32 and p. 3 line 12) which
is a fair and an equitable method of distributing the delegates pursuant to the provisions of the joint Resolution
of both Houses No. 2, as amended. Upon your request at the session of the Senate-House Conference
Committee meeting last night, we are submitting herewith the results of the computation on the basis of the
above-stated method."
Even if such latest census were a preliminary census, the same could still be a valid basis for such
apportionment.6 The fact that the lone and small congressional district of Batanes, may be over-represented,
because it is allotted two delegates by R.A. No. 6132 despite the fact that it has a population very much less
than several other congressional districts, each of which is also allotted only two delegates, and therefore
under-represented, vis-a-vis Batanes alone, does not vitiate the apportionment as not effecting proportional
representation. Absolute proportional apportionment is not required and is not possible when based on the
number of inhabitants, for the population census cannot be accurate nor complete, dependent as it is on the
diligence of the census takers, aggravated by the constant movement of population, as well as daily death
and birth. It is enough that the basis employed is reasonable and the resulting apportionment is substantially
proportional. Resolution No. 4 fixed a minimum of two delegates for a congressional district.

III. Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales asserts that Sec. 2 on the apportionment of delegates is not in accordance
with proportional representation and therefore violates the Constitution and the intent of the law itself, without
pinpointing any specific provision of the Constitution with which it collides.

While there may be other formulas for a reasonable apportionment considering the evidence submitted to
Congress by the Bureau of Census and Statistics, we are not prepared to rule that the computation formula
adopted by, Congress for proportional representation as, directed in Res. No. 4 is unreasonable and that the
apportionment provided in R.A. No. 6132 does not constitute a substantially proportional representation.

Unlike in the apportionment of representative districts, the Constitution does not expressly or impliedly require
such apportionment of delegates to the convention on the basis of population in each congressional district.
Congress, sitting as a Constituent Assembly, may constitutionally allocate one delegate for, each
congressional district or for each province, for reasons of economy and to avoid having an unwieldy
convention. If the framers of the present Constitution wanted the apportionment of delegates to the convention
to be based on the number of inhabitants in each representative district, they would have done so in so many
words as they did in relation to the apportionment of the representative districts. 5

In the Macias case, relied on by petitioner Gonzales, the apportionment law, which was nullified as
unconstitutional, granted more representatives to a province with less population than the provinces with more
inhabitants. Such is not the case here, where under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 6132 Batanes is allotted only two
delegates, which number is equal to the number of delegates accorded other provinces with more population.
The present petitions therefore do not present facts which fit the mould of the doctrine in the case of Macias
et al. vs. Comelec, supra.

The apportionment provided for in Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 6132 cannot possibly conflict with its own intent
expressed therein; for it merely obeyed and implemented the intent of Congress acting as a Constituent
Assembly expressed in Sec. 1 of Res. No. 4, which provides that the 320 delegates should be apportioned
among the existing representative districts according to the number of their respective inhabitants, but fixing a
minimum of at least two delegates for a representative district. The presumption is that the factual predicate,
the latest available official population census, for such apportionment was presented to Congress, which,
accordingly employed a formula for the necessary computation to effect the desired proportional
representation.
The records of the proceedings on Senate Bill No. 77 sponsored by Senator Pelaez which is now R.A. No.
6132, submitted to this Tribunal by the amici curiae, show that it based its apportionment of the delegates on
the 1970 official preliminary population census taken by the Bureau of Census and Statistics from May 6 to
June 30, 1976; and that Congress adopted the formula to effect a reasonable apportionment of delegates.

The impossibility of absolute proportional representation is recognized by the Constitution itself when it directs
that the apportionment of congressional districts among the various provinces shall be "as nearly as may be
according to their respective inhabitants, but each province shall have at least one member" (Sec. 5, Art. VI,
Phil. Const., emphasis supplied). The employment of the phrase "as nearly as may be according to their
respective inhabitants" emphasizes the fact that the human mind can only approximate a reasonable
apportionment but cannot effect an absolutely proportional representation with mathematical precision or
exactitude.
IV. Sec. 5 of R.A. 6132 is attacked on the ground that it is an undue deprivation of liberty without due process
of law and denies the equal protection of the laws. Said Sec. 5 disqualifies any elected delegate from running
"for any public office in any election" or from assuming "any appointive office or position in any branch of the
government government until after the final adjournment of the Constitutional Convention."

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That the citizen does not have any inherent nor natural right to a public office, is axiomatic under our
constitutional system. The State through its Constitution or legislative body, can create an office and define
the qualifications and disqualifications therefor as well as impose inhibitions on a public officer. Consequently,
only those with qualifications and who do not fall under any constitutional or statutory inhibition can be validly
elected or appointed to a public office. The obvious reason for the questioned inhibition, is to immunize the
delegates from the perverting influence of self-interest, party interest or vested interest and to insure that he
dedicates all his time to performing solely in the interest of the nation his high and well nigh sacred function of
formulating the supreme law of the land, which may endure for generations and which cannot easily be
changed like an ordinary statute. With the disqualification embodied in Sec. 5, the delegate will not utilize his
position as a bargaining leverage for concessions in the form of an elective or appointive office as long as the
convention has not finally adjourned. The appointing authority may, by his appointing power, entice votes for
his own proposals. Not love for self, but love for country must always motivate his actuations as delegate;
otherwise the several provisions of the new Constitution may only satisfy individual or special interests,
subversive of the welfare of the general citizenry. It should be stressed that the disqualification is not
permanent but only temporary only to continue until the final adjournment of the convention which may not
extend beyond one year. The convention that framed the present Constitution finished its task in
approximately seven months from July 30, 1934 to February 8, 1935.
As admitted by petitioner Gonzales, this inhibition finds analogy in the constitutional provision prohibiting a
member of Congress, during the time for which he was elected, from being appointed to any civil office which
may have been created or the emolument whereof shall have been increased while he was a member of the
Congress. (Sec. 16, Art. VI, Phil. Constitution.)
As observed by the Solicitor General in his Answer, the overriding objective of the challenged disqualification,
temporary in nature, is to compel the elected delegates to serve in full their term as such and to devote all
their time to the convention, pursuant to their representation and commitment to the people; otherwise, his
seat in the convention will be vacant and his constituents will be deprived of a voice in the convention. The
inhibition is likewise "designed to prevent popular political figures from controlling elections or positions. Also it
is a brake on the appointing power, to curtail the latter's desire to 'raid' the convention of "talents" or attempt to
control the convention." (p. 10, Answer in L-32443.)
Thus the challenged disqualification prescribed in Sec. 5 of R.A. No. 6132 is a valid limitation on the right to
public office pursuant to state police power as it is reasonable and not arbitrary.
The discrimination under Sec. 5 against delegates to the Constitutional Convention is likewise constitutional;
for it is based on a substantial distinction which makes for real differences, is germane to the purposes of the
law, and applies to all members of the same class. 7 The function of a delegate is more far-reaching and its
effect more enduring than that of any ordinary legislator or any other public officer. A delegate shapes the
fundamental law of the land which delineates the essential nature of the government, its basic organization
and powers, defines the liberties of the people, and controls all other laws. Unlike ordinary statutes,
constitutional amendments cannot be changed in one or two years. No other public officer possesses such a
power, not even the members of Congress unless they themselves, propose constitutional amendments when
acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution. The classification, therefore, is
neither whimsical nor repugnant to the sense of justice of the community.

As heretofore intimated, the inhibition is relevant to the object of the law, which is to insure that the proposed
amendments are meaningful to the masses of our people and not designed for the enhancement of
selfishness, greed, corruption, or injustice.
Lastly, the disqualification applies to all the delegates to the convention who will be elected on the second
Tuesday of November, 1970.
V. Paragraph 1, Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is impugned by both petitioners as violative of the constitutional
guarantees of due process, equal protection of the laws, freedom of expressions, freedom of assembly and
freedom of association.
This Court ruled last year that the guarantees of due process, equal protection of the laws, peaceful assembly,
free expression, and the right of association are neither absolute nor illimitable rights; they are always subject
to the pervasive and dormant police power of the State and may be lawfully abridged to serve appropriate and
important public interests. 8
In said Gonzalez vs. Comelec case the Court applied the clear and present danger test to determine whether
a statute which trenches upon the aforesaid Constitutional guarantees, is a legitimate exercise of police
power. 9
Paragraph 1 of Sec. 8(a), R.A. No. 6132 prohibits:
1. any candidate for delegate to the convention
(a) from representing, or (b) allowing himself to be represented as being a candidate of any political party or
any other organization; and
2. any political party, political group, political committee, civic, religious, professional or other organizations or
organized group of whatever nature from
(a) intervening in the nomination of any such candidate or in the filing of his certificate, or (b) from giving aid or
support directly or indirectly, material or otherwise, favorable to or against his campaign for election.
The ban against all political parties or organized groups of whatever nature contained in par. 1 of Sec. 8(a), is
confined to party or organization support or assistance, whether material, moral, emotional or otherwise. The
very Sec. 8(a) in its provisos permits the candidate to utilize in his campaign the help of the members of his
family within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, and a campaign staff composed of not more
than one for every ten precincts in his district. It allows the full exercise of his freedom of expression and his
right to peaceful assembly, because he cannot be denied any permit to hold a public meeting on the pretext
that the provision of said section may or will be violated. The right of a member of any political party or
association to support him or oppose his opponent is preserved as long as such member acts individually. The
very party or organization to which he may belong or which may be in sympathy with his cause or program of

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reforms, is guaranteed the right to disseminate information about, or to arouse public interest in, or to
advocate for constitutional reforms, programs, policies or constitutional proposals for amendments.
It is therefore patent that the restriction contained in Sec. 8(a) is so narrow that the basic constitutional rights
themselves remain substantially intact and inviolate. And it is therefore a valid infringement of the aforesaid
constitutional guarantees invoked by petitioners.
In the aforesaid case of Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, this Court unanimously sustained the validity of the
limitation on the period for nomination of candidates in Sec. 50-A of R.A. No. 4880, thus:
The prohibition of too early nomination of candidates presents a question that is not too formidable in
character. According to the act: "It shall be unlawful for any political party, political committee, or political group
to nominate candidates for any elective public office voted for at large earlier than one hundred and fifty days
immediately preceding an election, and for any other elective public office earlier than ninety days immediately
preceding an election.
The right of association is affected. Political parties have less freedom as to the time during which they may
nominate candidates; the curtailment is not such, however, as to render meaningless such a basic right. Their
scope of legitimate activities, save this one, is not unduly narrowed. Neither is there infringement of their
freedom to assemble. They can do so, but not for such a purpose. We sustain its validity. We do so
unanimously. 10
In said Gonzales vs. Comelec case, this Court likewise held that the period for the conduct of an election
campaign or partisan political activity may be limited without offending the aforementioned constitutional
guarantees as the same is designed also to prevent a "clear and present danger of a substantive evil, the
debasement of the electoral process." 11
Even if the partisan activity consists of (a) forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other
group of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or
against a party or candidate; (b) holding political conventions, caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies,
parades or other similar assemblies for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against any candidate or party; and (c) giving, soliciting, or receiving contributions for
election campaign either directly or indirectly, (Sec. 50-B, pars. (a), (b), and (c), R.A. 4880), the abridgment
was still affirmed as constitutional by six members of this Court, which could not "ignore ... the legislative
declaration that its enactment was in response to a serious substantive evil affecting the electoral process, not
merely in danger of happening, but actually in existence, and likely to continue unless curbed or remedied. To
assert otherwise would be to close one's eyes to the reality of the situation." 12;

The debasement of the electoral process as a substantive evil exists today and is one of the major compelling
interests that moved Congress into prescribing the total ban contained in par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132,
to justify such ban. In the said Gonzales vs. Comelec case, this Court gave "due recognition to the legislative
concern to cleanse, and if possible, render spotless, the electoral process," 14 impressed as it was by the
explanation made by the author of R.A. No. 4880, Sen. Lorenzo Taada, who appeared as amicus curiae,
"that such provisions were deemed by the legislative body to be part and parcel of the necessary and
appropriate response not merely to a clear and present danger but to the actual existence of a grave and
substantive evil of excessive partisanship, dishonesty and corruption as well as violence that of late has
marred election campaigns and partisan political activities in this country. He did invite our attention likewise to
the well-settled doctrine that in the choice of remedies for an admitted malady requiring governmental action,
on the legislature primarily rests the responsibility. Nor should the cure prescribed by it, unless clearly
repugnant to fundamental rights, be ignored or disregarded." 15
But aside from the clear and imminent danger of the debasement of the electoral process, as conceded by
Senator Pelaez, the basic motivation, according to Senate Majority Floor Leader Senator Arturo Tolentino, the
sponsor of the Puyat-Tolentino amendment embodied in par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132, is to assure the
candidates equal protection of the laws by according them equality of chances. 16 The primary purpose of the
prohibition then is also to avert the clear and present danger of another substantive evil, the denial of the
equal protection of the laws. The candidates must depend on their individual merits and not on the support of
political parties or organizations. Senator Tolentino and Senator Salonga emphasized that under this
provision, the poor candidate has an even chance as against the rich candidate. We are not prepared to
disagree with them, because such a conclusion, predicated as it is on empirical logic, finds support in our
recent political history and experience. Both Senators stressed that the independent candidate who wins in
the election against a candidate of the major political parties, is a rare phenomenon in this country and the
victory of an independent candidate mainly rests on his ability to match the resources, financial and otherwise,
of the political parties or organizations supporting his opponent. This position is further strengthened by the
principle that the guarantee of social justice under Sec. V, Art. II of the Constitution, includes the guarantee of
equal opportunity, equality of political rights, and equality before the law enunciated by Mr. Justice Tuazon in
the case Guido vs. Rural Progress Administration. 17
While it may be true that a party's support of a candidate is not wrong per se it is equally true that Congress in
the exercise of its broad law-making authority can declare certain acts as mala prohibita when justified by the
exigencies of the times. One such act is the party or organization support proscribed in Sec. 8(a),which ban is
a valid limitation on the freedom of association as well as expression, for the reasons aforestated.
Senator Tolentino emphasized that "equality of chances may be better attained by banning all organization
support." 18
The questioned par. 1 of Sec. 8 (a) likewise can easily pass the balancing-of-interest test.

Likewise, because four members dissented, this Court in said case of Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, failed to
muster the required eight votes to declare as unconstitutional the limitation on the period for (a) making
speeches, announcements or commentaries or holding interviews for or against the election of any party or
candidate for public office; (b) publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials; and (e) directly or
indirectly soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against any candidate or
party specified in Sec. 50-B, pars. (c), (d) & (e) of R.A. 4880. 13

19

In the apt words of the Solicitor General:

It is to be noted that right now the nation is on the threshold of rewriting its Constitution in a hopeful endeavor
to find a solution to the grave economic, social and political problems besetting the country. Instead of directly

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proposing the amendments Congress has chosen to call a Constitutional Convention which shall have the
task of fashioning a document that shall embody the aspirations and ideals of the people. Because what is to
be amended is the fundamental law of the land, it is indispensable that the Constitutional Convention be
composed of delegates truly representative of the people's will. Public welfare demands that the delegates
should speak for the entire nation, and their voices be not those of a particular segment of the citizenry, or of a
particular class or group of people, be they religious, political, civic or professional in character. Senator
Pelaez, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Codes and Constitutional Amendments, eloquently stated that
"the function of a constitution is not to represent anyone in interest or set of interests, not to favor one group at
the expense or disadvantage of the candidates but to encompass all the interests that exist within our
society and to blend them into one harmonious and balanced whole. For the constitutional system means, not
the predominance of interests, but the harmonious balancing thereof."
So that the purpose for calling the Constitutional Convention will not be deflated or frustrated, it is necessary
that the delegatee thereto be independent, beholden to no one but to God, country and conscience.
xxx xxx xxx
The evil therefore, which the law seeks to prevent lies in the election of delegates who, because they have
been chosen with the aid and resources of organizations, cannot be expected to be sufficiently representative
of the people. Such delegates could very well be the spokesmen of narrow political, religious or economic
interest and not of the great majority of the people. 20
We likewise concur with the Solicitor General that the equal protection of the laws is not unduly subverted in
par. I of Sec. 8(a); because it does not create any hostile discrimination against any party or group nor does it
confer undue favor or privilege on an individual as heretofore stated. The discrimination applies to all
organizations, whether political parties or social, civic, religious, or professional associations. The ban is
germane to the objectives of the law, which are to avert the debasement of the electoral process, and to attain
real equality of chances among individual candidates and thereby make real the guarantee of equal protection
of the laws.

The civic associations other than political parties cannot with reason insist that they should be exempted from
the ban; because then by such exemption they would be free to utilize the facilities of the campaign
machineries which they are denying to the political parties. Whenever all organization engages in a political
activity, as in this campaign for election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention, to that extent it partakes
of the nature of a political organization. This, despite the fact that the Constitution and by laws of such civic,
religious, or professional associations usually prohibit the association from engaging in partisan political
activity or supporting any candidate for an elective office. Hence, they must likewise respect the ban.
The freedom of association also implies the liberty not to associate or join with others or join any existing
organization. A person may run independently on his own merits without need of catering to a political party or
any other association for support. And he, as much as the candidate whose candidacy does not evoke
sympathy from any political party or organized group, must be afforded equal chances. As emphasized by
Senators Tolentino and Salonga, this ban is to assure equal chances to a candidate with talent and imbued
with patriotism as well as nobility of purpose, so that the country can utilize their services if elected.
Impressed as We are by the eloquent and masterly exposition of Senator Taada for the invalidation of par. 1
of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132, demonstrating once again his deep concern for the preservation of our civil
liberties enshrined in the Bill of Rights, We are not persuaded to entertain the belief that the challenged ban
transcends the limits of constitutional invasion of such cherished immunities.
WHEREFORE, the prayers in both petitions are hereby denied and R.A. No. 6132 including Secs. 2, 4, 5, and
8(a), paragraph 1, thereof, cannot be declared unconstitutional. Without costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon and Castro, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, J., concurs in the result.
Teehankee, J., is on leave.

The political parties and the other organized groups have built-in advantages because of their machinery and
other facilities, which, the individual candidate who is without any organization support, does not have. The
fact that the other civic of religious organizations cannot have a campaign machinery as efficient as that of a
political party, does not vary the situation; because it still has that much built-in advantage as against the
individual candidate without similar support. Moreover, these civic religious and professional organization may
band together to support common candidates, who advocates the reforms that these organizations champion
and believe are imperative. This is admitted by petitioner Gonzales thru the letter of Senator Ganzon dated
August 17, 1970 attached to his petition as Annex "D", wherein the Senator stated that his own "Timawa"
group had agreed with the Liberal Party in Iloilo to support petitioner Gonzales and two others as their
candidates for the convention, which organized support is nullified by the questioned ban, Senator Ganzon
stressed that "without the group moving and working in joint collective effort" they cannot "exercise effective
control and supervision over our
leaders the Women's League, the area commanders, etc."; but with their joining with the LP's they "could
have presented a solid front with very bright chances of capturing all seats."

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RAMON A. GONZALES, MANUEL B. IMBONG, JO AUREA MARCOS-IMBONG, RAY ALLAN T. DRILON,
NELSON B. MALANA and GIL M. TABIOS, petitioners,
vs.
THE NATIONAL TREASURER and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa
Resolutions1 proposing constitutional amendments, goes further than merely assailing their alleged
constitutional infirmity. Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine
Bar and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are
suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution
is not the fundamental law, the Javellana 2 ruling to the contrary notwithstanding. To put it at its mildest, such
an approach has the arresting charm of novelty but nothing else. It is in fact self defeating, for if such were
indeed the case, petitioners have come to the wrong forum. We sit as a Court duty-bound to uphold and apply
that Constitution. To contend otherwise as was done here would be, quite clearly, an exercise in futility. Nor
are the arguments of petitioners cast in the traditional form of constitutional litigation any more persuasive. For
reasons to be set forth, we dismiss the petitions.
The suits for prohibition were filed respectively on March 6 3 and March 12, 1981. 4 On March 10 and 13
respectively, respondents were required to answer each within ten days from notice. 5 There was a comment
on the part of the respondents. Thereafter, both cases were set for hearing and were duly argued on March 26
by petitioners and Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza for respondents. With the submission of pertinent
data in amplification of the oral argument, the cases were deemed submitted for decision.
It is the ruling of the Court, as set forth at the outset, that the petitions must be dismissed.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-56350 April 2, 1981
SAMUEL C. OCCENA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE NATIONAL TREASURER, THE
DIRECTOR OF PRINTING, respondents.

1. It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In the dispositive
portion of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, 6 dismissing petitions for prohibition and mandamus to
declare invalid its ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six 7 to four. 8 It then concluded: "This
being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in
force and effect." 9 Such a statement served a useful purpose. It could even be said that there was a need for
it. It served to clear the atmosphere. It made manifest that, as of January 17, 1973, the present Constitution
came into force and effect. With such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the
cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a
factor for instability was removed. Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973
Constitution is the fundamental law. It is as simple as that. What cannot be too strongly stressed is that the
function of judicial review has both a positive and a negative aspect. As was so convincingly demonstrated by
Professors Black 10 and Murphy, 11 the Supreme Court can check as well as legitimate. In declaring what the
law is, it may not only nullify the acts of coordinate branches but may also sustain their validity. In the latter
case, there is an affirmation that what was done cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere
dismissal of a suit of this character suffices. That is the meaning of the concluding statement in Javellana.
Since then, this Court has invariably applied the present Constitution. The latest case in point is People v.

G.R. No. L-56404 April 2, 1981

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Sola, 12 promulgated barely two weeks ago. During the first year alone of the effectivity of the present
Constitution, at least ten cases may be cited. 13
2. We come to the crucial issue, the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments and
how it may be exercised. More specifically as to the latter, the extent of the changes that may be introduced,
the number of votes necessary for the validity of a proposal, and the standard required for a proper
submission. As was stated earlier, petitioners were unable to demonstrate that the challenged resolutions are
tainted by unconstitutionality.
(1) The existence of the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa is indubitable. The applicable provision in
the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit. Insofar as pertinent it reads thus: "The Interim Batasang Pambansa
shall have the same powers and its Members shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges,
and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the Members
thereof."14 One of such powers is precisely that of proposing amendments. The 1973 Constitution in its
Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon
special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with the
Article on Amendments. 15 When, therefore, theInterim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the President
and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body it acted by virtue Of such impotence Its
authority to do so is clearly beyond doubt. It could and did propose the amendments embodied in the
resolutions now being assailed. It may be observed parenthetically that as far as petitioner Occena is
Concerned, the question of the authority of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments is not
new. In Occena v. Commission on Elections, 16 filed by the same petitioner, decided on January 28, 1980,
such a question was involved although not directly passed upon. To quote from the opinion of the Court
penned by Justice Antonio in that case: "Considering that the proposed amendment of Section 7 of Article X of
the Constitution extending the retirement of members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts from
sixty-five (65) to seventy (70) years is but a restoration of the age of retirement provided in the 1935
Constitution and has been intensively and extensively discussed at the Interim Batasang Pambansa, as well
as through the mass media, it cannot, therefore, be said that our people are unaware of the advantages and
disadvantages of the proposed amendment." 17
(2) Petitioners would urge upon us the proposition that the amendments proposed are so extensive in
character that they go far beyond the limits of the authority conferred on the Interim Batasang Pambansa as
Successor of the Interim National Assembly. For them, what was done was to revise and not to amend. It
suffices to quote from the opinion of Justice Makasiar, speaking for the Court, in Del Rosario v. Commission
on Elections 18 to dispose of this contention. Thus: "3. And whether the Constitutional Convention will only
propose amendments to the Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely
new Constitution based on an Ideology foreign to the democratic system, is of no moment; because the same
will be submitted to the people for ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no debate
about the validity of the new Constitution. 4. The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and
replaced with a new one ... is no argument against the validity of the law because 'amendment' includes the
'revision' or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely amended
in part or revised or totally changed would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the
sovereign people." 19 There is here the adoption of the principle so well-known in American decisions as well
as legal texts that a constituent body can propose anything but conclude nothing. 20 We are not disposed to
deviate from such a principle not only sound in theory but also advantageous in practice.

(3) That leaves only the questions of the vote necessary to propose amendments as well as the standard for
proper submission. Again, petitioners have not made out a case that calls for a judgment in their favor. The
language of the Constitution supplies the answer to the above questions. The Interim Batasang Pambansa,
sitting as a constituent body, can propose amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It
would be an indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative
body applies as well when it has been convened as the agency through which amendments could be
proposed. That is not a requirement as far as a constitutional convention is concerned. It is not a requirement
either when, as in this case, the Interim Batasang Pambansa exercises its constituent power to propose
amendments. Moreover, even on the assumption that the requirement of three- fourth votes applies, such
extraordinary majority was obtained. It is not disputed that Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment
allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land
for residential purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency,
the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and
Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1
abstention. Where then is the alleged infirmity? As to the requisite standard for a proper submission, the
question may be viewed not only from the standpoint of the period that must elapse before the holding of the
plebiscite but also from the standpoint of such amendments having been called to the attention of the people
so that it could not plausibly be maintained that they were properly informed as to the proposed changes. As
to the period, the Constitution indicates the way the matter should be resolved. There is no ambiguity to the
applicable provision: "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the approval of
such amendment or revision." 21 The three resolutions were approved by the InterimBatasang Pambansa
sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of
the plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day period provided by the Constitution. Thus any
argument to the contrary is unavailing. As for the people being adequately informed, it cannot be denied that
this time, as in the cited 1980 Occena opinion of Justice Antonio, where the amendment restored to seventy
the retirement age of members of the judiciary, the proposed amendments have "been intensively and
extensively discussed at the Interim Batasang Pambansa, as well as through the mass media, [ so that ] it
cannot, therefore, be said that our people are unaware of the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed
amendment [ s ]." 22
WHEREFORE, the petitions are dismissed for lack of merit. No costs.
Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.,
concur.
Abad Santos, J., is on leave.

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G.R. No. L-34150 October 16, 1971
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, THE AUDITOR, and THE DISBURSING
OFFICER OF THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, respondents, RAUL S. MANGLAPUS, JESUS
G. BARRERA, PABLO S. TRILLANA III, VICTOR DE LA SERNA, MARCELO B. FERNAN, JOSE Y. FERIA,
LEONARDO SIGUION REYNA, VICTOR F. ORTEGA, and JUAN V. BORRA, Intervenors.
BARREDO, J.:
Petition for prohibition principally to restrain the respondent Commission on Elections "from undertaking to
hold a plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at which the proposed constitutional amendment "reducing the voting
age" in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines to eighteen years "shall be, submitted" for
ratification by the people pursuant to Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971, and
the subsequent implementing resolutions, by declaring said resolutions to be without the force and effect of
law in so far as they direct the holding of such plebiscite and by also declaring the acts of the respondent
Commission (COMELEC) performed and to be done by it in obedience to the aforesaid Convention
resolutions to be null and void, for being violative of the Constitution of the Philippines.
As a preliminary step, since the petition named as respondent only the COMELEC, the Count required that
copies thereof be served on the Solicitor General and the Constitutional Convention, through its President, for
such action as they may deem proper to take. In due time, respondent COMELEC filed its answer joining
issues with petitioner. To further put things in proper order, and considering that the fiscal officers of the
Convention are indispensable parties in a proceeding of this nature, since the acts sought to be enjoined
involve the expenditure of funds appropriated by law for the Convention, the Court also ordered that the
Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and Auditor of the Convention be made respondents. After the petition
was so amended, the first appeared thru Senator Emmanuel Pelaez and the last two thru Delegate Ramon
Gonzales. All said respondents, thru counsel, resist petitioner's action.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

For reasons of orderliness and to avoid unnecessary duplication of arguments and even possible confusion,
and considering that with the principal parties being duly represented by able counsel, their interests would be
adequately protected already, the Court had to limit the number of intervenors from the ranks of the delegates
to the Convention who, more or less, have legal interest in the success of the respondents, and so, only
Delegates Raul S. Manglapus, Jesus G. Barrera, Pablo S. Trillana III, Victor de la Serna, Marcelo B. Fernan,
Jose Y. Feria, Leonardo Siguion Reyna, Victor Ortega and Juan B. Borra, all distinguished lawyers in their
own right, have been allowed to intervene jointly. The Court feels that with such an array of brilliant and
dedicated counsel, all interests involved should be duly and amply represented and protected. At any rate,
notwithstanding that their corresponding motions for leave to intervene or to appear as amicus curiae 1 have
been denied, the pleadings filed by the other delegates and some private parties, the latter in representation
of their minor children allegedly to be affected by the result of this case with the records and the Court
acknowledges that they have not been without value as materials in the extensive study that has been
undertaken in this case.

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The background facts are beyond dispute. The Constitutional Convention of 1971 came into being by virtue of
two resolutions of the Congress of the Philippines approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly
convened for the purpose of calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution namely,
Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint sessions of Congress held on March 16, 1967 and June 17, 1969 respectively.
The delegates to the said Convention were all elected under and by virtue of said resolutions and the
implementing legislation thereof, Republic Act 6132. The pertinent portions of Resolution No 2 read as follows:

Section 3. This partial amendment, which refers only to the age qualification for the exercise of suffrage shall
be without prejudice to other amendments that will be proposed in the future by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention on other portions of the amended Section or on other portions of the entire Constitution.
Section 4. The Convention hereby authorizes the use of the sum of P75,000.00 from its savings or from its
unexpended funds for the expense of the advanced plebiscite; provided, however that should there be no
savings or unexpended sums, the Delegates waive P250.00 each or the equivalent of 2-1/2 days per diem.

SECTION 1. There is hereby called a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the
Philippines, to be composed of two elective Delegates from each representative district who shall have the
same qualifications as those required of Members of the House of Representatives.

By a letter dated September 28, 1971, President Diosdado Macapagal, called upon respondent Comelec "to
help the Convention implement (the above) resolution." The said letter reads:

xxx xxx xxx

September 28, 1971

SECTION 7. The amendments proposed by the Convention shall be valid and considered part of the
Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast in an election at which they are submitted to the
people for their ratification pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution.

The Commission on Elections Manila. Thru the Chairman

Resolution No. 4 merely modified the number of delegates to represent the different cities and provinces fixed
originally in Resolution No 2.
After the election of the delegates held on November 10, 1970, the Convention held its inaugural session on
June 1, 1971. Its preliminary labors of election of officers, organization of committees and other preparatory
works over, as its first formal proposal to amend the Constitution, its session which began on September 27,
1971, or more accurately, at about 3:30 in the morning of September 28, 1971, the Convention approved
Organic Resolution No. 1 reading thus: .
CC ORGANIC RESOLUTION NO. 1
A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION ONE OF ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
PHILIPPINES SO AS TO LOWER THE VOTING AGE TO 18

Gentlemen: Last night the Constitutional Convention passed Resolution No. 1 quoted as follows:
xxx xxx xxx ((see above)
Pursuant to the provision of Section 14, Republic Act No. 6132 otherwise known as the Constitutional
Convention Act of 1971, may we call upon you to help the Convention implement this resolution:
Sincerely,
(Sgd.) DIOSDADO P. MACAPAGAL
DIOSDADO P. MACAPAGAL
President
On September 30, 1971, COMELEC "RESOLVED to inform the Constitutional Convention that it will hold the
plebiscite on condition that:

BE IT RESOLVED as it is hereby resolved by the 1971 Constitutional Convention:

Section 1. Section One of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines is amended to as follows:
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by (male) citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law,
who are (twenty-one) EIGHTEEN years or over and are able to read and write, and who shall have resided in
the Philippines for one year and in the municipality wherein they propose to vote for at least six months
preceding the election.
Section 2. This amendment shall be valid as part of the Constitution of the Philippines when approved by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to coincide with the local elections in November 1971.

(a) The Constitutional Convention will undertake the printing of separate official ballots, election returns and
tally sheets for the use of said plebiscite at its expense;
(b) The Constitutional Convention will adopt its own security measures for the printing and shipment of said
ballots and election forms; and
(c) Said official ballots and election forms will be delivered to the Commission in time so that they could be
distributed at the same time that the Commission will distribute its official and sample ballots to be used in the
elections on November 8, 1971.
What happened afterwards may best be stated by quoting from intervenors' Governors' statement of the
genesis of the above proposal:

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The President of the Convention also issued an order forming an Ad Hoc Committee to implement the
Resolution.
This Committee issued implementing guidelines which were approved by the President who then transmitted
them to the Commission on Elections.
The Committee on Plebiscite and Ratification filed a report on the progress of the implementation of the
plebiscite in the afternoon of October 7,1971, enclosing copies of the order, resolution and letters of
transmittal above referred to (Copy of the report is hereto attached as Annex 8-Memorandum).
RECESS RESOLUTION
In its plenary session in the evening of October 7, 1971, the Convention approved a resolution authored by
Delegate Antonio Olmedo of Davao Oriental, calling for a recess of the Convention from November 1, 1971 to
November 9, 1971 to permit the delegates to campaign for the ratification of Organic Resolution No. 1.
(Copies of the resolution and the transcript of debate thereon are hereto attached as Annexes 9 and 9-A
Memorandum, respectively).
RESOLUTION CONFIRMING IMPLEMENTATION
On October 12, 1971, the Convention passed Resolution No. 24 submitted by Delegate Jose Ozamiz
confirming the authority of the President of the Convention to implement Organic Resolution No. 1, including
the creation of the Ad Hoc Committee ratifying all acts performed in connection with said implementation.

courts. In this connection, it is to be noted that none of the respondent has joined intervenors in this posture.
In fact, respondents Chief Accountant and Auditor of the convention expressly concede the jurisdiction of this
Court in their answer acknowledging that the issue herein is a justifiable one.
Strangely, intervenors cite in support of this contention portions of the decision of this Court in the case of
Gonzales v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 774, wherein the members of the Court, despite their being divided in their
opinions as to the other matters therein involved, were precisely unanimous in upholding its jurisdiction.
Obviously, distinguished counsel have either failed to grasp the full impact of the portions of Our decision they
have quoted or would misapply them by taking them out of context.
There should be no more doubt as to the position of this Court regarding its jurisdiction vis-a-vis the
constitutionality of the acts of the Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, and, for that matter, those of a
constitutional convention called for the purpose of proposing amendments to the Constitution, which
concededly is at par with the former. A simple reading of Our ruling in that very case of Gonzales relied upon
by intervenors should dispel any lingering misgivings as regards that point. Succinctly but comprehensively,
Chief Justice Concepcion held for the Court thus: .
As early as Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil. 139, 157), this Court speaking through one of the
leading members of the Constitutional Convention and a respected professor of Constitutional Law, Dr. Jose
P. Laurel declared that "the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to
determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or
constituent units thereof."

Upon these facts, the main thrust of the petition is that Organic Resolution No. 1 and the other implementing
resolutions thereof subsequently approved by the Convention have no force and effect as laws in so far as
they provide for the holding of a plebiscite co-incident with the elections of eight senators and all city,
provincial and municipal officials to be held on November 8, 1971, hence all of Comelec's acts in obedience
thereof and tending to carry out the holding of the plebiscite directed by said resolutions are null and void, on
the ground that the calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a power lodged exclusively
in Congress, as a legislative body, and may not be exercised by the Convention, and that, under Section 1,
Article XV of the Constitution, the proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to the people for
ratification separately from each and all of the other amendments to be drafted and proposed by the
Convention. On the other hand, respondents and intervenors posit that the power to provide for, fix the date
and lay down the details of the plebiscite for the ratification of any amendment the Convention may deem
proper to propose is within the authority of the Convention as a necessary consequence and part of its power
to propose amendments and that this power includes that of submitting such amendments either individually
or jointly at such time and manner as the Convention may direct in discretion. The Court's delicate task now is
to decide which of these two poses is really in accord with the letter and spirit of the Constitution.

It is true that in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito (supra), this Court characterizing the issue submitted thereto as a
political one declined to pass upon the question whether or not a given number of votes cast in Congress in
favor of a proposed amendment to the Constitution which was being submitted to the people for ratification
satisfied the three-fourths vote requirement of the fundamental law. The force of this precedent has been
weakened, however, by Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate (81 Phil. 818), Avelino v. Cuenco, (L-2851,
March 4 & 14, 1949), Taada v. Cuenco, (L-10520, Feb. 28, 1957) and Macias v. Commission on Elections,
(L-18684, Sept. 14, 1961). In the first we held that the officers and employees of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
are under its supervision and control, not of that of the Senate President, as claimed by the latter; in the
second, this Court proceeded to determine the number of Senators necessary for quorum in the Senate; in
the third, we nullified the election, by Senators belonging to the party having the largest number of votes in
said chamber, purporting to act, on behalf of the party having the second largest number of votes therein of
two (2) Senators belonging to the first party, as members, for the second party, of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal; and in the fourth, we declared unconstitutional an act of Congress purporting to apportion the
representatives districts for the House of Representatives, upon the ground that the apportionment had not
been made as may be possible according to the number of inhabitants of each province. Thus we rejected the
theory, advanced in these four (4) cases that the issues therein raised were political questions the
determination of which is beyond judicial review.

As a preliminary and prejudicial matter, the intervenors raise the question of jurisdiction. They contend that the
issue before Us is a political question and that the Convention being legislative body of the highest order is
sovereign, and as such, its acts impugned by petitioner are beyond the control of the Congress and the

Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not included in the general
grant of legislative powers to Congress (Section 1, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines). It is part of the
inherent powers of the people as the repository sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours (Section 1,

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Art. 11, Constitution of the Philippines) to make, and, hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law.
Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such
power. (Section 1, Art. XV, Constitution of the Philippines) Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that
Senators and members of the House of Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as component
elements of aconstituent assembly. When acting as such, the members of Congress derive their authority
from the Constitution, unlike the people, when performing the same function, (Of amending the Constitution)
for their authority does not emanate from the Constitution they are the very source of all powers of
government including the Constitution itself.
Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the members of
Congress derive their authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do not have the
final say on whether or not their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits. Otherwise, they could brush
aside and set the same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a government of laws, not of men,
and to the rigid nature of our Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed by the fact that the Constitution expressly
confers upon the Supreme Court, (And, inferentially, to lower courts.) the power to declare a treaty
unconstitutional. (Sec. 2(1), Art. VIII of the Constitution), despite the eminently political character of treatymaking power.
In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress acting as a constituent assembly violates the
Constitution is essentially justiciable not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review, and, to the extent that
this view may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, (supra) the latter should be
deemed modified accordingly. The Members of the Court are unanimous on this point.
No one can rightly claim that within the domain of its legitimate authority, the Convention is not supreme.
Nowhere in his petition and in his oral argument and memoranda does petitioner point otherwise. Actually,
what respondents and intervenors are seemingly reluctant to admit is that the Constitutional Convention of
1971, as any other convention of the same nature, owes its existence and derives all its authority and power
from the existing Constitution of the Philippines. This Convention has not been called by the people directly as
in the case of a revolutionary convention which drafts the first Constitution of an entirely new government born
of either a war of liberation from a mother country or of a revolution against an existing government or of a
bloodless seizure of power a la coup d'etat. As to such kind of conventions, it is absolutely true that the
convention is completely without restrain and omnipotent all wise, and it is as to such conventions that the
remarks of Delegate Manuel Roxas of the Constitutional Convention of 1934 quoted by Senator Pelaez refer.
No amount of rationalization can belie the fact that the current convention came into being only because it
was called by a resolution of a joint session of Congress acting as a constituent assembly by authority of
Section 1, Article XV of the present Constitution which provides:
ARTICLE XV AMENDMENTS
SECTION 1. The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution
or call a convention for the purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when
approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people
for their ratification.

True it is that once convened, this Convention became endowed with extra ordinary powers generally beyond
the control of any department of the existing government, but the compass of such powers can be coextensive only with the purpose for which the convention was called and as it may propose cannot have any
effect as part of the Constitution until the same are duly ratified by the people, it necessarily follows that the
acts of convention, its officers and members are not immune from attack on constitutional grounds. The
present Constitution is in full force and effect in its entirety and in everyone of its parts the existence of the
Convention notwithstanding, and operates even within the walls of that assembly. While it is indubitable that in
its internal operation and the performance of its task to propose amendments to the Constitution it is not
subject to any degree of restraint or control by any other authority than itself, it is equally beyond cavil that
neither the Convention nor any of its officers or members can rightfully deprive any person of life, liberty or
property without due process of law, deny to anyone in this country the equal protection of the laws or the
freedom of speech and of the press in disregard of the Bill of Rights of the existing Constitution. Nor, for that
matter, can such Convention validly pass any resolution providing for the taking of private property without just
compensation or for the imposition or exacting of any tax, impost or assessment, or declare war or call the
Congress to a special session, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, pardon a convict or render
judgment in a controversy between private individuals or between such individuals and the state, in violation
of the distribution of powers in the Constitution.
It being manifest that there are powers which the Convention may not and cannot validly assert, much less
exercise, in the light of the existing Constitution, the simple question arises, should an act of the Convention
be assailed by a citizen as being among those not granted to or inherent in it, according to the existing
Constitution, who can decide whether such a contention is correct or not? It is of the very essence of the rule
of law that somehow somewhere the Power and duty to resolve such a grave constitutional question must be
lodged on some authority, or we would have to confess that the integrated system of government established
by our founding fathers contains a wide vacuum no intelligent man could ignore, which is naturally unworthy of
their learning, experience and craftsmanship in constitution-making.
We need not go far in search for the answer to the query We have posed. The very decision of Chief Justice
Concepcion in Gonzales, so much invoked by intervenors, reiterates and reinforces the irrefutable logic and
wealth of principle in the opinion written for a unanimous Court by Justice Laurel in Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil., 134, reading:
... (I)n the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the
executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and interlacing of
functions and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say where the
one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmark
of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial
department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of
powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it
was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the
expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to operate
and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of check and balances and subject to specific limitations
and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the

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restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are
transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct
the course of government along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere
verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment and the principles of good government mere political
apothegms. Certainly the limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be
in any living Constitution. In the United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their
constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and
development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and half
centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of
Article VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers or government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and
extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the
rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but
only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims
of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial
supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of
judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by
the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt
at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to strike conclusions unrelated to
actualities. Narrowed as its functions is in this manner the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom,
justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to
legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also
because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and
justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments
of the government.
But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, it ought not the
less to be remembered that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself is not "the chief palladium of
constitutional liberty ... the people who are authors of this blessing must also be its guardians ... their eyes
must be ever ready to mark, their voices to pronounce ... aggression on the authority of their Constitution." In
the last and ultimate analysis then, must the success of our government in the unfolding years to come be
tested in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts than in consultation rooms and court chambers.
In the case at bar, the National Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed the
election of the herein petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission has by
resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly; notwithstanding the previous
confirmations made by the National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner, the resolution of
the National Assembly has the effect of cutting off the power of the Electoral Commission to entertain protests
against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, submitted after
December 3, 1935 then the resolution of the Electoral Commission of December 9, 1935, is mere surplusage
and had no effect. But, if, as contended by the respondents, the Electoral Commission has the sole power of

regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the National Assembly, then the resolution of December 9, 1935,
by which the Electoral Commission fixed said date as the last day for filing protests against the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, should be upheld.
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature
between the National Assembly on the one hand and the Electoral Commission on the other. From the very
nature of the republican government established in our country in the light of American experience and of our
own, upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the
Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries. The Electoral Commission as we shall have occasion to
refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose, namely, to determine all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. Although the
Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it
does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is
not subject to constitutional restriction. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the
government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between
departmental powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in
justiciable and appropriate cases. Discarding the English type and other European types of constitutional
government, the framers of our Constitution adopted the American type where the written constitution is
interpreted and given effect by the judicial department. In some countries which have declined to follow the
American example, provisions have been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts from exercising
the power to interpret the fundamental law. This is taken as a recognition of what otherwise would be the rule
that in the absence of direct prohibition, courts are bound to assume what is logically their function. For
instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921 expressly provides that courts shall have no power to examine
the validity of statutes (art. 81, Chap. IV). The former Austrian Constitution contained a similar declaration. In
countries whose constitution are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this power. This is true in Norway,
Greece, Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to
Constitutional Charter of the Czechoslavak, Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts. 121-123, Title IX,
Constitution of the Republic of 1931) especial constitutional courts are established to pass upon the validity of
ordinary laws. In our case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional
arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. Were we to
decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who will determine the conflict? And if the conflict were left
undecided and undetermined, would not a void be thus created in our constitutional system which may in the
long run prove destructive of the entire framework? To ask these questions is to answer them. Natura vacuum
abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason, and authority, we
are clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the
Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the
character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." .
As the Chief Justice has made it clear in Gonzales, like Justice Laurel did in Angara, these postulates just
quoted do not apply only to conflicts of authority between the three existing regular departments of the
government but to all such conflicts between and among these departments, or, between any of them, on the
one hand, and any other constitutionally created independent body, like the electoral tribunals in Congress,
the Comelec and the Constituent assemblies constituted by the House of Congress, on the other. We see no
reason of logic or principle whatsoever, and none has been convincingly shown to Us by any of the

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respondents and intervenors, why the same ruling should not apply to the present Convention, even if it is an
assembly of delegate elected directly by the people, since at best, as already demonstrated, it has been
convened by authority of and under the terms of the present Constitution..
Accordingly, We are left with no alternative but to uphold the jurisdiction of the Court over the present case. It
goes without saying that We do this not because the Court is superior to the Convention or that the
Convention is subject to the control of the Court, but simply because both the Convention and the Court are
subject to the Constitution and the rule of law, and "upon principle, reason and authority," per Justice Laurel,
supra, it is within the power as it is the solemn duty of the Court, under the existing Constitution to resolve the
issues in which petitioner, respondents and intervenors have joined in this case.
II. The issue of jurisdiction thus resolved, We come to the crux of the petition. Is it within the powers of the
Constitutional Convention of 1971 to order, on its own fiat, the holding of a plebiscite for the ratification of the
proposed amendment reducing to eighteen years the age for the exercise of suffrage under Section 1 of
Article V of the Constitution proposed in the Convention's Organic Resolution No. 1 in the manner and form
provided for in said resolution and the subsequent implementing acts and resolution of the Convention?
At the threshold, the environmental circumstances of this case demand the most accurate and unequivocal
statement of the real issue which the Court is called upon to resolve. Petitioner has very clearly stated that he
is not against the constitutional extension of the right of suffrage to the eighteen-year-olds, as a matter of fact,
he has advocated or sponsored in Congress such a proposal, and that, in truth, the herein petition is not
intended by him to prevent that the proposed amendment here involved be submitted to the people for
ratification, his only purpose in filing the petition being to comply with his sworn duty to prevent, Whenever he
can, any violation of the Constitution of the Philippines even if it is committed in the course of or in connection
with the most laudable undertaking. Indeed, as the Court sees it, the specific question raised in this case is
limited solely and only to the point of whether or not it is within the power of the Convention to call for a
plebiscite for the ratification by the people of the constitutional amendment proposed in the abovequoted
Organic Resolution No. 1, in the manner and form provided in said resolution as well as in the subject
question implementing actions and resolution of the Convention and its officers, at this juncture of its
proceedings, when as it is a matter of common knowledge and judicial notice, it is not set to adjourn sine die,
and is, in fact, still in the preliminary stages of considering other reforms or amendments affecting other parts
of the existing Constitution; and, indeed, Organic Resolution No. 1 itself expressly provides, that the
amendment therein proposed "shall be without prejudice to other amendments that will be proposed in the
future by the 1971 Constitutional Convention on other portions of the amended section or on other portions of
the entire Constitution." In other words, nothing that the Court may say or do, in this case should be
understood as reflecting, in any degree or means the individual or collective stand of the members of the
Court on the fundamental issue of whether or not the eighteen-year-olds should be allowed to vote, simply
because that issue is not before Us now. There should be no doubt in the mind of anyone that, once the Court
finds it constitutionally permissible, it will not hesitate to do its part so that the said proposed amendment may
be presented to the people for their approval or rejection.
Withal, the Court rests securely in the conviction that the fire and enthusiasm of the youth have not blinded
them to the absolute necessity, under the fundamental principles of democracy to which the Filipino people is
committed, of adhering always to the rule of law. Surely, their idealism, sincerity and purity of purpose cannot
permit any other line of conduct or approach in respect of the problem before Us. The Constitutional

Convention of 1971 itself was born, in a great measure, because of the pressure brought to bear upon the
Congress of the Philippines by various elements of the people, the youth in particular, in their incessant
search for a peaceful and orderly means of bringing about meaningful changes in the structure and bases of
the existing social and governmental institutions, including the provisions of the fundamental law related to the
well-being and economic security of the underprivileged classes of our people as well as those concerning the
preservation and protection of our natural resources and the national patrimony, as an alternative to violent
and chaotic ways of achieving such lofty ideals. In brief, leaving aside the excesses of enthusiasm which at
times have justifiably or unjustifiably marred the demonstrations in the streets, plazas and campuses, the
youth of the Philippines, in general, like the rest of the people, do not want confusion and disorder, anarchy
and violence; what they really want are law and order, peace and orderliness, even in the pursuit of what they
strongly and urgently feel must be done to change the present order of things in this Republic of ours. It would
be tragic and contrary to the plain compulsion of these perspectives, if the Court were to allow itself in
deciding this case to be carried astray by considerations other than the imperatives of the rule of law and of
the applicable provisions of the Constitution. Needless to say, in a larger measure than when it binds other
departments of the government or any other official or entity, the Constitution imposes upon the Court the
sacred duty to give meaning and vigor to the Constitution, by interpreting and construing its provisions in
appropriate cases with the proper parties, and by striking down any act violative thereof. Here, as in all other
cases, We are resolved to discharge that duty.
During these twice when most anyone feels very strongly the urgent need for constitutional reforms, to the
point of being convinced that meaningful change is the only alternative to a violent revolution, this Court would
be the last to put any obstruction or impediment to the work of the Constitutional Convention. If there are
respectable sectors opining that it has not been called to supplant the existing Constitution in its entirety, since
its enabling provision, Article XV, from which the Convention itself draws life expressly speaks only of
amendments which shall form part of it, which opinion is not without persuasive force both in principle and in
logic, the seemingly prevailing view is that only the collective judgment of its members as to what is warranted
by the present condition of things, as they see it, can limit the extent of the constitutional innovations the
Convention may propose, hence the complete substitution of the existing constitution is not beyond the ambit
of the Convention's authority. Desirable as it may be to resolve, this grave divergence of views, the Court does
not consider this case to be properly the one in which it should discharge its constitutional duty in such
premises. The issues raised by petitioner, even those among them in which respondents and intervenors have
joined in an apparent wish to have them squarely passed upon by the Court do not necessarily impose upon
Us the imperative obligation to express Our views thereon. The Court considers it to be of the utmost
importance that the Convention should be untrammelled and unrestrained in the performance of its
constitutionally as signed mission in the manner and form it may conceive best, and so the Court may step in
to clear up doubts as to the boundaries set down by the Constitution only when and to the specific extent only
that it would be necessary to do so to avoid a constitutional crisis or a clearly demonstrable violation of the
existing Charter. Withal, it is a very familiar principle of constitutional law that constitutional questions are to be
resolved by the Supreme Court only when there is no alternative but to do it, and this rule is founded precisely
on the principle of respect that the Court must accord to the acts of the other coordinate departments of the
government, and certainly, the Constitutional Convention stands almost in a unique footing in that regard.
In our discussion of the issue of jurisdiction, We have already made it clear that the Convention came into
being by a call of a joint session of Congress pursuant to Section I of Article XV of the Constitution, already
quoted earlier in this opinion. We reiterate also that as to matters not related to its internal operation and the

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performance of its assigned mission to propose amendments to the Constitution, the Convention and its
officers and members are all subject to all the provisions of the existing Constitution. Now We hold that even
as to its latter task of proposing amendments to the Constitution, it is subject to the provisions of Section I of
Article XV. This must be so, because it is plain to Us that the framers of the Constitution took care that the
process of amending the same should not be undertaken with the same ease and facility in changing an
ordinary legislation. Constitution making is the most valued power, second to none, of the people in a
constitutional democracy such as the one our founding fathers have chosen for this nation, and which we of
the succeeding generations generally cherish. And because the Constitution affects the lives, fortunes, future
and every other conceivable aspect of the lives of all the people within the country and those subject to its
sovereignty, every degree of care is taken in preparing and drafting it. A constitution worthy of the people for
which it is intended must not be prepared in haste without adequate deliberation and study. It is obvious that
correspondingly, any amendment of the Constitution is of no less importance than the whole Constitution
itself, and perforce must be conceived and prepared with as much care and deliberation. From the very nature
of things, the drafters of an original constitution, as already observed earlier, operate without any limitations,
restraints or inhibitions save those that they may impose upon themselves. This is not necessarily true of
subsequent conventions called to amend the original constitution. Generally, the framers of the latter see to it
that their handiwork is not lightly treated and as easily mutilated or changed, not only for reasons purely
personal but more importantly, because written constitutions are supposed to be designed so as to last for
some time, if not for ages, or for, at least, as long as they can be adopted to the needs and exigencies of the
people, hence, they must be insulated against precipitate and hasty actions motivated by more or less
passing political moods or fancies. Thus, as a rule, the original constitutions carry with them limitations and
conditions, more or less stringent, made so by the people themselves, in regard to the process of their
amendment. And when such limitations or conditions are so incorporated in the original constitution, it does
not lie in the delegates of any subsequent convention to claim that they may ignore and disregard such
conditions because they are as powerful and omnipotent as their original counterparts.
Nothing of what is here said is to be understood as curtailing in any degree the number and nature and the
scope and extent of the amendments the Convention may deem proper to propose. Nor does the Court
propose to pass on the issue extensively and brilliantly discussed by the parties as to whether or not the
power or duty to call a plebiscite for the ratification of the amendments to be proposed by the Convention is
exclusively legislative and as such may be exercised only by the Congress or whether the said power can be
exercised concurrently by the Convention with the Congress. In the view the Court takes of present case, it
does not perceive absolute necessity to resolve that question, grave and important as it may be. Truth to tell,
the lack of unanimity or even of a consensus among the members of the Court in respect to this issue creates
the need for more study and deliberation, and as time is of the essence in this case, for obvious reasons,
November 8, 1971, the date set by the Convention for the plebiscite it is calling, being nigh, We will refrain
from making any pronouncement or expressing Our views on this question until a more appropriate case
comes to Us. After all, the basis of this decision is as important and decisive as any can be.
The ultimate question, therefore boils down to this: Is there any limitation or condition in Section 1 of Article
XV of the Constitution which is violated by the act of the Convention of calling for a plebiscite on the sole
amendment contained in Organic Resolution No. 1? The Court holds that there is, and it is the condition and
limitation that all the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be submitted to the people in
a single "election" or plebiscite. It being indisputable that the amendment now proposed to be submitted to a
plebiscite is only the first amendment the Convention propose We hold that the plebiscite being called for the

purpose of submitting the same for ratification of the people on November 8, 1971 is not authorized by
Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, hence all acts of the Convention and the respondent Comelec in
that direction are null and void.
We have arrived at this conclusion for the following reasons:
1. The language of the constitutional provision aforequoted is sufficiently clear. lt says distinctly that either
Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention called for the purpose "may propose amendments
to this Constitution," thus placing no limit as to the number of amendments that Congress or the Convention
may propose. The same provision also as definitely provides that "such amendments shall be valid as part of
this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are
submitted to the people for their ratification," thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many "elections" or
plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or amendments proposed by the same constituent assembly
of Congress or convention, and the provision unequivocably says "an election" which means only one.
(2) Very little reflection is needed for anyone to realize the wisdom and appropriateness of this provision. As
already stated, amending the Constitution is as serious and important an undertaking as constitution making
itself. Indeed, any amendment of the Constitution is as important as the whole of it if only because the
Constitution has to be an integrated and harmonious instrument, if it is to be viable as the framework of the
government it establishes, on the one hand, and adequately formidable and reliable as the succinct but
comprehensive articulation of the rights, liberties, ideology, social ideals, and national and nationalistic policies
and aspirations of the people, on the other. lt is inconceivable how a constitution worthy of any country or
people can have any part which is out of tune with its other parts..
A constitution is the work of the people thru its drafters assembled by them for the purpose. Once the original
constitution is approved, the part that the people play in its amendment becomes harder, for when a whole
constitution is submitted to them, more or less they can assumed its harmony as an integrated whole, and
they can either accept or reject it in its entirety. At the very least, they can examine it before casting their vote
and determine for themselves from a study of the whole document the merits and demerits of all or any of its
parts and of the document as a whole. And so also, when an amendment is submitted to them that is to form
part of the existing constitution, in like fashion they can study with deliberation the proposed amendment in
relation to the whole existing constitution and or any of its parts and thereby arrive at an intelligent judgment
as to its acceptability.
This cannot happen in the case of the amendment in question. Prescinding already from the fact that under
Section 3 of the questioned resolution, it is evident that no fixed frame of reference is provided the voter, as to
what finally will be concomitant qualifications that will be required by the final draft of the constitution to be
formulated by the Convention of a voter to be able to enjoy the right of suffrage, there are other considerations
which make it impossible to vote intelligently on the proposed amendment, although it may already be
observed that under Section 3, if a voter would favor the reduction of the voting age to eighteen under
conditions he feels are needed under the circumstances, and he does not see those conditions in the ballot
nor is there any possible indication whether they will ever be or not, because Congress has reserved those for
future action, what kind of judgment can he render on the proposal?

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But the situation actually before Us is even worse. No one knows what changes in the fundamental principles
of the constitution the Convention will be minded to approve. To be more specific, we do not have any means
of foreseeing whether the right to vote would be of any significant value at all. Who can say whether or not
later on the Convention may decide to provide for varying types of voters for each level of the political units it
may divide the country into. The root of the difficulty in other words, lies in that the Convention is precisely on
the verge of introducing substantial changes, if not radical ones, in almost every part and aspect of the
existing social and political order enshrined in the present Constitution. How can a voter in the proposed
plebiscite intelligently determine the effect of the reduction of the voting age upon the different institutions
which the Convention may establish and of which presently he is not given any idea?

Concepcion, C.J., Teehankee, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

We are certain no one can deny that in order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment to the
Constitution may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an
intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se as well as its relation to the other parts of the
Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole. In the context of the present state of things, where
the Convention has hardly started considering the merits of hundreds, if not thousands, of proposals to amend
the existing Constitution, to present to the people any single proposal or a few of them cannot comply with this
requirement. We are of the opinion that the present Constitution does not contemplate in Section 1 of Article
XV a plebiscite or "election" wherein the people are in the dark as to frame of reference they can base their
judgment on. We reject the rationalization that the present Constitution is a possible frame of reference, for
the simple reason that intervenors themselves are stating that the sole purpose of the proposed amendment
is to enable the eighteen year olds to take part in the election for the ratification of the Constitution to be
drafted by the Convention. In brief, under the proposed plebiscite, there can be, in the language of Justice
Sanchez, speaking for the six members of the Court in Gonzales, supra, "no proper submission".
III. The Court has no desire at all to hamper and hamstring the noble work of the Constitutional Convention.
Much less does the Court want to pass judgment on the merits of the proposal to allow these eighteen years
old to vote. But like the Convention, the Court has its own duties to the people under the Constitution which is
to decide in appropriate cases with appropriate parties Whether or not the mandates of the fundamental law
are being complied with. In the best light God has given Us, we are of the conviction that in providing for the
questioned plebiscite before it has finished, and separately from, the whole draft of the constitution it has been
called to formulate, the Convention's Organic Resolution No. 1 and all subsequent acts of the Convention
implementing the same violate the condition in Section 1, Article XV that there should only be one "election" or
plebiscite for the ratification of all the amendments the Convention may propose. We are not denying any right
of the people to vote on the proposed amendment; We are only holding that under Section 1, Article XV of the
Constitution, the same should be submitted to them not separately from but together with all the other
amendments to be proposed by this present Convention.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition herein is granted. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the
Constitutional Convention of 1971 and the implementing acts and resolutions of the Convention, insofar as
they provide for the holding of a plebiscite on November 8, 1971, as well as the resolution of the respondent
Comelec complying therewith (RR Resolution No. 695) are hereby declared null and void. The respondents
Comelec, Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and Auditor of the Constitutional Convention are hereby
enjoined from taking any action in compliance with the said organic resolution. In view of the peculiar
circumstances of this case, the Court declares this decision immediately executory. No costs.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976
PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.
MARTIN, J,:

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The capital question raised in these prohibition suits with preliminary injunction relates to the power of the
incumbent President of the Philippines to propose amendments to the present Constitution in the absence of
the interim National Assembly which has not been convened.
On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991 calling for a
national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other
things, the issues of martial law, the I . assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period
of its existence, the length of the period for tile exercise by the President of his present powers.1
Twenty days after or on September 22, 1976, the President issued another related decree, Presidential
Decree No. 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree No. 991, by declaring the provisions of
presidential Decree No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens
Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976. Quite relevantly,
Presidential Decree No. 1031 repealed Section 4, of Presidential Decree No. 991, the full text of which
(Section 4) is quoted in the footnote below. 2

3. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall, within 30 days from the election and selection of the
members, convene the interim Batasang Pambansa and preside over its sessions until the Speaker shall
have been elected. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall be the Prime Minister and he shall
continue to exercise all his powers even after the interim Batasang Pambansa is organized and ready to
discharge its functions and likewise he shall continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives under the
nineteen hundred and thirty five. Constitution and the powers vested in the President and the Prime Minister
under this Constitution.
4. The President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet shall exercise all the powers and functions, and discharge
the responsibilities of the regular President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet, and shall be subject only to such
disqualifications as the President (Prime Minister) may prescribe. The President (Prime Minister) if he so
desires may appoint a Deputy Prime Minister or as many Deputy Prime Ministers as he may deem necessary.
5. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law shall have been
lifted.

On the same date of September 22, 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree No. 1033, stating the
questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites
in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the National Assembly
evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for
a legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.

6. Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave emergency or a threat or
imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is
unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he may,
in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders or letters of instructions, which shall form
part of the law of the land.

The questions ask, to wit:

7. The barangays and sanggunians shall continue as presently constituted but their functions, powers, and
composition may be altered by law.

(1) Do you want martial law to be continued?

(2) Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you approve the following amendments to the
Constitution? For the purpose of the second question, the referendum shall have the effect of a plebiscite
within the contemplation of Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution.
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS:
1. There shall be, in lieu of the interim National Assembly, an interim Batasang Pambansa. Members of the
interim Batasang Pambansa which shall not be more than 120, unless otherwise provided by law, shall
include the incumbent President of the Philippines, representatives elected from the different regions of the
nation, those who shall not be less than eighteen years of age elected by their respective sectors, and those
chosen by the incumbent President from the members of the Cabinet. Regional representatives shall be
apportioned among the regions in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis
of a uniform and progressive ratio while the sectors shall be determined by law. The number of
representatives from each region or sector and the, manner of their election shall be prescribed and regulated
by law.
2. The interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its members shall have the same
functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the
regular National Assembly and the members thereof. However, it shall not exercise the power provided in
Article VIII, Section 14(l) of the Constitution.

Referenda conducted thru the barangays and under the Supervision of the Commission on Elections may be
called at any time the government deems it necessary to ascertain the will of the people regarding any
important matter whether of national or local interest.
8. All provisions of this Constitution not inconsistent with any of these amendments shall continue in full force
and effect.
9. These amendments shall take effect after the incumbent President shall have proclaimed that they have
been ratified by I majority of the votes cast in the referendum-plebiscite."
The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976
National Referendum-Plebiscite.
On September 27, 1976, PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, father and son, commenced L44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding
and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential
Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential
Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct
the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.

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Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President
to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the
Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis.
On October 5, 1976, the Solicitor General filed the comment for respondent Commission on Elections, The
Solicitor General principally maintains that petitioners have no standing to sue; the issue raised is political in
nature, beyond judicial cognizance of this Court; at this state of the transition period, only the incumbent
President has the authority to exercise constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a step towards
normalization.
On September 30, 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, docketed as L-44684, was
instituted by VICENTE M. GUZMAN, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting that the
power to propose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly
conferred on the interim National Assembly under Section 16, Article XVII of the Constitution.3
Still another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on October 5, 1976 by RAUL M.
GONZALES, his son RAUL, JR., and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, docketed as L- 44714, to restrain the
implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16.
These last petitioners argue that even granting him legislative powers under Martial Law, the incumbent
President cannot act as a constituent assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution; a referendumplebiscite is untenable under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973; the submission of the proposed
amendments in such a short period of time for deliberation renders the plebiscite a nullity; to lift Martial Law,
the President need not consult the people via referendum; and allowing 15-.year olds to vote would amount to
an amendment of the Constitution, which confines the right of suffrage to those citizens of the Philippines 18
years of age and above.
We find the petitions in the three entitled cases to be devoid of merit.
I. Justiciability of question raised.
1. As a preliminary resolution, We rule that the petitioners in L-44640 (Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V.
Sanidad) possess locus standi to challenge the constitutional premise of Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031,
and 1033. It is now an ancient rule that the valid source of a stature Presidential Decrees are of such naturemay be contested by one who will sustain a direct injuries as a in result of its enforcement. At the instance of
taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds may be enjoined, upon the theory that the
expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act
constitutes a misapplication of such funds. 4 The breadth of Presidential Decree No. 991 carries all
appropriation of Five Million Pesos for the effective implementation of its purposes. 5 Presidential Decree No.
1031 appropriates the sum of Eight Million Pesos to carry out its provisions. 6 The interest of the aforenamed
petitioners as taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of these amounts of public money sufficiently clothes them
with that personality to litigate the validity of the Decrees appropriating said funds. Moreover, as regards
taxpayer's suits, this Court enjoys that open discretion to entertain the same or not. 7 For the present case,
We deem it sound to exercise that discretion affirmatively so that the authority upon which the disputed
Decrees are predicated may be inquired into.

2. The Solicitor General would consider the question at bar as a pure political one, lying outside the domain of
judicial review. We disagree. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification, raises a judicial
question. 8 This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the of normally
exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to
propose amendments o the constitution resides in the interim National Assembly in the period of transition
(See. 15, Transitory provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active session, the
power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1,
pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the
National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly the incumbent President undertook the
proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the
people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity regularity of the procedure for
amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable
issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the
force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a
justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2), Article X of the new
Constitution provides: "All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law may
shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be
declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members. ..." The Supreme Court has the
last word in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself The amending,
like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so that
the Supreme Court is vested with that authorities to determine whether that power has been discharged within
its limits.
Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, of the legality of a particular act. Where the vortex
of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable or
non-political. What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in
proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such act or to assume
the power of a constituent assembly. Whether the amending process confers on the President that power to
propose amendments is therefore a downright justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, the
actuation of the President would merely be a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution provides how it may be
amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or
the authority assumed was valid or not. 10
We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his theory of non-justiciability, that the
question of the President's authority to propose amendments and the regularity of the procedure adopted for
submission of the proposal to the people ultimately lie in the judgment of the A clear Descartes fallacy
of vicious circle. Is it not that the people themselves, by their sovereign act, provided for the authority and
procedure for the amending process when they ratified the present Constitution in 1973? Whether, therefore,
the constitutional provision has been followed or not is the proper subject of inquiry, not by the people
themselves of course who exercise no power of judicial but by the Supreme Court in whom the people
themselves vested that power, a power which includes the competence to determine whether the
constitutional norms for amendments have been observed or not. And, this inquiry must be done a prior not a
posterior i.e., before the submission to and ratification by the people.
Indeed, the precedents evolved by the Court or, prior constitutional cases underline the preference of the
Court's majority to treat such issue of Presidential role in the amending process as one of non-political
impression. In the Plebiscite Cases, 11 the contention of the Solicitor General that the issue on the legality of
Presidential Decree No. 73 "submitting to the Pilipino people (on January 15, 1973) for ratification or rejection

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the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention and
appropriating fund s therefore "is a political one, was rejected and the Court unanimously considered the issue
as justiciable in nature. Subsequently in the Ratification Cases 12involving the issue of whether or not the
validity of Presidential Proclamation No. 1102. announcing the Ratification by the Filipino people of the
constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention," partakes of the nature of a political question,
the affirmative stand of' the Solicitor General was dismissed, the Court ruled that the question raised is
justiciable. Chief Justice Concepcion, expressing the majority view, said, Thus, in the aforementioned
plebiscite cases, We rejected the theory of the respondents therein that the question whether Presidential
Decree No. 73 calling a plebiscite to be held on January 15, 1973, for the ratification or rejection of the
proposed new Constitution, was valid or not, was not a proper subject of judicial inquiry because, they
claimed, it partook of a political nature, and We unanimously declared that the issue was a justiciable one.
With Identical unanimity. We overruled the respondent's contention in the 1971 habeas corpus cases,
questioning Our authority to determine the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases of the Presidential
proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on August 21, 1971, despite the opposite
view taken by this Court in Barcelon vs. Baker and Montenegro vs. Castaneda, insofar as it adhered to the
former case, which view We, accordingly, abandoned and refused to apply. For the same reason, We did not
apply and expressly modified, in Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections, the political-question theory adopted
in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito." 13 The return to Barcelon vs. Baker and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, urged by the
Solicitor General, was decisively refused by the Court. Chief Justice Concepcion continued: "The reasons
adduced in support thereof are, however, substantially the same as those given in support on the political
question theory advanced in said habeas corpus and plebiscite cases, which were carefully considered by this
Court and found by it to be legally unsound and constitutionally untenable. As a consequence. Our decisions
in the aforementioned habeas corpus cases partakes of the nature and effect of a stare decisis which gained
added weight by its virtual reiteration."

(1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional
Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly. However the calling of
a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an election voted upon by a majority vote of
all the members of the National Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority
vote of all the Members of the National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister,.

II. The amending process as laid out in the new Constitution.

3. In sensu strictiore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment to a
Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. lt is not legislating when engaged in the
amending process.16 Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter
itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular
National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the National Assembly). While ordinarily it
is the business of the legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional conferment
amending of the Constitution is not legislative in character. In political science a distinction is made between
constitutional content of an organic character and that of a legislative character'. The distinction, however, is
one of policy, not of law. 17Such being the case, approval of the President of any proposed amendment is a
misnomer 18 The prerogative of the President to approve or disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of
legislation. The President has nothing to do with proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution. 19

1. Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains:

SECTION 1. (1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the National
Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National
Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote
of all its Members, submit the question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an election.
SECTION 2. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such
amendment or revision.
In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the Transitory Provisions is
conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads:
SECTION 15. The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a
majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect
when ratified in accordance with Article Sixteen hereof.
There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of normalcy
and period of transition. In times of normally, the amending process may be initiated by the proposals of the

2. This Court in Aquino v. COMELEC," had already settled that the incumbent President is vested with that
prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly. Speaking for the
majority opinion in that case, Justice Makasiar said: "The Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the
President the determination of the time when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly,
consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the country." Concurring, Justice Fernandez,
himself a member of that Constitutional Convention, revealed: "(W)hen the Delegates to the Constitutional
Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the fact that under the same, the
incumbent President was given the discretion as to when he could convene the interim National Assembly; it
was so stated plainly by the sponsor, Delegate Yaneza; as a matter of fact, the proposal that it be convened
'immediately', made by Delegate Pimentel (V) was rejected. The President's decision to defer the convening
of the interim National Assembly soon found support from the people themselves. In the plebiscite of January
10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973 Constitution was submitted, the people voted against the
convening of the interim National Assembly. In the referendum of July 24, 1973, the Citizens Assemblies
("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will to withhold the convening of the interim National Assembly. Again,
in the referendum of February 27, 1975, the proposed question of whether the interim National Assembly shall
be initially convened was eliminated, because some of the members of Congress and delegates of the
Constitutional Convention, who were deemed automatically members of the I interim National Assembly, were
against its inclusion since in that referendum of January, 1973, the people had already resolved against it.

III. Concentration of Powers in the President during crisis government.

1. In general, the governmental powers in crisis government the Philippines is a crisis government today are
more or less concentrated in the President. 20 According to Rossiter, "(t)he concentration of government power
in a democracy faced by an emergency is a corrective to the crisis inefficiencies inherent in the doctrine of the
separation of powers. In most free states it has generally been regarded as imperative that the total power of
the government be parceled out among three mutually independent branches executive, legislature, and
judiciary. It is believed to be destructive of constitutionalism if any one branch should exercise any two or
more types of power, and certainly a total disregard of the separation of powers is, as Madison wrote in the
Federalist, No. 47, 'the very definition of tyranny.' In normal times the separation of powers forms a distinct
obstruction to arbitrary governmental action. By this same token, in abnormal times it may form an

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insurmountable barrier to a decisive emergency action in behalf of the state and its independent existence.
There are moments in the life of any government when all powers must work together in unanimity of purpose
and action, even if this means the temporary union of executive, legislative, and judicial power in the hands of
one man. The more complete the separation of powers in a constitutional system, the more difficult and yet
the more necessary will be their fusion in time of crisis. This is evident in a comparison of the crisis
potentialities of the cabinet and presidential systems of government. In the former the all-important harmony
of legislature and executive is taken for granted; in the latter it is neither guaranteed nor to be to confidently
expected. As a result, cabinet is more easily established and more trustworthy than presidential dictatorship.
The power of the state in crisis must not only be concentrated and expanded; it must also be freed from the
normal system of constitutional and legal limitations. 21 John Locke, on the other hand, claims for the
executive in its own right a broad discretion capable even of setting aside the ordinary laws in the meeting of
special exigencies for which the legislative power had not provided. 22 The rationale behind such broad
emergency powers of the Executive is the release of the government from "the paralysis of constitutional
restrains" so that the crisis may be ended and normal times restored.
2. The presidential exercise of legislative powers in time of martial law is now a conceded valid at. That sun
clear authority of the President is saddled on Section 3 (pars. 1 and 2) of the Transitory Provisions, thus: 23
The incumbent President of the Philippines shall initially convene the interim National Assembly and shall
preside over its sessions until the interim Speaker shall have been elected. He shall continue to exercise his
powers and prerogatives under the nineteen hundred and thirty-five Constitution and the powers vested in the
President and the Prime Minister under this Constitution until the calls upon the interim National Assembly to
elect the interim President and the interim Prime Minister, who shall then exercise their respective powers
vested by this Constitution.
All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent
President shall be part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, binding, and effective even after lifting of
martial law or the ratification of this Constitution, unless modified, revoked, or superseded by subsequent
proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the incumbent President, or unless expressly and
explicitly modified or repealed by the regular National Assembly.
"It is unthinkable," said Justice Fernandez, a 1971 Constitutional Convention delegate, "that the Constitutional
Convention, while giving to the President the discretion when to call the interim National Assembly to session,
and knowing that it may not be convened soon, would create a vacuum in the exercise of legislative powers.
Otherwise, with no one to exercise the lawmaking powers, there would be paralyzation of the entire
governmental machinery." 24 Paraphrasing Rossiter, this is an extremely important factor in any constitutional
dictatorship which extends over a period of time. The separation of executive and legislature ordained in the
Constitution presents a distinct obstruction to efficient crisis government. The steady increase in executive
power is not too much a cause for as the steady increase in the magnitude and complexity of the problems
the President has been called upon by the Filipino people to solve in their behalf, which involve rebellion,
subversion, secession, recession, inflation, and economic crisis-a crisis greater than war. In short, while
conventional constitutional law just confines the President's power as Commander-in-Chief to the direction of
the operation of the national forces, yet the facts of our political, social, and economic disturbances had
convincingly shown that in meeting the same, indefinite power should be attributed to tile President to take
emergency measures 25
IV. Authority of the incumbent President t to propose amendments to the Constitution.

1. As earlier pointed out, the power to legislate is constitutionally consigned to the interim National Assembly
during the transition period. However, the initial convening of that Assembly is a matter fully addressed to the
judgment of the incumbent President. And, in the exercise of that judgment, the President opted to defer
convening of that body in utter recognition of the people's preference. Likewise, in the period of transition, the
power to propose amendments to the Constitution lies in the interim National Assembly upon special call by
the President (See. 15 of the Transitory Provisions). Again, harking to the dictates of the sovereign will, the
President decided not to call the interim National Assembly. Would it then be within the bounds of the
Constitution and of law for the President to assume that constituent power of the interim Assembly vis-a-vis
his assumption of that body's legislative functions? The answer is yes. If the President has been legitimately
discharging the legislative functions of the interim Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly
discharge the function of that Assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct,
although peculiar, to its gross legislative power. This, of course, is not to say that the President has converted
his office into a constituent assembly of that nature normally constituted by the legislature. Rather, with the
interim National Assembly not convened and only the Presidency and the Supreme Court in operation, the
urges of absolute necessity render it imperative upon the President to act as agent for and in behalf of the
people to propose amendments to the Constitution. Parenthetically, by its very constitution, the Supreme
Court possesses no capacity to propose amendments without constitutional infractions. For the President to
shy away from that actuality and decline to undertake the amending process would leave the governmental
machineries at a stalemate or create in the powers of the State a destructive vacuum, thereby impeding the
objective of a crisis government "to end the crisis and restore normal times." In these parlous times, that
Presidential initiative to reduce into concrete forms the constant voices of the people reigns supreme. After all,
constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions, like the President now, are mere agents of the
people .26
2. The President's action is not a unilateral move. As early as the referendums of January 1973 and February
1975, the people had already rejected the calling of the interim National Assembly. The Lupong
Tagapagpaganap of the Katipunan ng mga Sanggunian, the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay, and
the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay, representing 42,000 barangays, about the same number of
Kabataang Barangay organizations, Sanggunians in 1,458 municipalities, 72 provinces, 3 sub-provinces, and
60 cities had informed the President that the prevailing sentiment of the people is for the abolition of the
interim National Assembly. Other issues concerned the lifting of martial law and amendments to the
Constitution .27 The national organizations of Sangguniang Bayan presently proposed to settle the issues of
martial law, the interim Assembly, its replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the
exercise by the President of its present powers in a referendum to be held on October 16 . 28 The Batasang
Bayan (legislative council) created under Presidential Decree 995 of September 10, 1976, composed of 19
cabinet members, 9 officials with cabinet rank, 91 members of the Lupong Tagapagpaganap (executive
committee) of the Katipunan ng mga Sangguniang Bayan voted in session to submit directly to the people in a
plebiscite on October 16, the previously quoted proposed amendments to the Constitution, including the issue
of martial law .29 Similarly, the "barangays" and the "sanggunians" endorsed to the President the submission
of the proposed amendments to the people on October 16. All the foregoing led the President to initiate the
proposal of amendments to the Constitution and the subsequent issuance of Presidential Decree No, 1033 on
September 22, 1976 submitting the questions (proposed amendments) to the people in the National
Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16.
V. The People is Sovereign
1. Unlike in a federal state, the location of sovereignty in a unitary state is easily seen. In the Philippines, a
republican and unitary state, sovereignty "resides in the people and all government authority emanates from

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them.30 In its fourth meaning, Savigny would treat people as "that particular organized assembly of
individuals in which, according to the Constitution, the highest power exists." 31 This is the concept of popular
sovereignty. It means that the constitutional legislator, namely the people, is sovereign 32 In consequence, the
people may thus write into the Constitution their convictions on any subject they choose in the absence of
express constitutional prohibition. 33 This is because, as Holmes said, the Constitution "is an experiment, as all
life is all experiment." 34 "The necessities of orderly government," wrote Rottschaefer, "do not require that one
generation should be permitted to permanently fetter all future generations." A constitution is based, therefore,
upon a self-limiting decision of the people when they adopt it. 35
2. The October 16 referendum-plebiscite is a resounding call to the people to exercise their sovereign power
as constitutional legislator. The proposed amendments, as earlier discussed, proceed not from the thinking of
a single man. Rather, they are the collated thoughts of the sovereign will reduced only into enabling forms by
the authority who can presently exercise the powers of the government. In equal vein, the submission of those
proposed amendments and the question of martial law in a referendum-plebiscite expresses but the option of
the people themselves implemented only by the authority of the President. Indeed, it may well be said that the
amending process is a sovereign act, although the authority to initiate the same and the procedure to be
followed reside somehow in a particular body.
VI Referendum-Plebiscite not rendered nugatory by the participation of the 15-year olds.
1. October 16 is in parts a referendum and a plebiscite. The question - (1) Do you want martial law to be
continued? - is a referendum question, wherein the 15-year olds may participate. This was prompted by the
desire of the Government to reach the larger mas of the people so that their true pulse may be felt to guide
the President in pursuing his program for a New Order. For the succeeding question on the proposed
amendments, only those of voting age of 18 years may participate. This is the plebiscite aspect, as
contemplated in Section 2, Article XVI of the new Constitution. 36 On this second question, it would only be the
votes of those 18 years old and above which will have valid bearing on the results. The fact that the voting
populace are simultaneously asked to answer the referendum question and the plebiscite question does not
infirm the referendum-plebiscite. There is nothing objectionable in consulting the people on a given issue,
which is of current one and submitting to them for ratification of proposed constitutional amendments. The fear
of commingled votes (15-year olds and 18-year olds above) is readily dispelled by the provision of two ballot
boxes for every barangay center, one containing the ballots of voters fifteen years of age and under eighteen,
and another containing the ballots of voters eighteen years of age and above. 37 The ballots in the ballot box
for voters fifteen years of age and under eighteen shall be counted ahead of the ballots of voters eighteen
years and above contained in another ballot box. And, the results of the referendum-plebiscite shall be
separately prepared for the age groupings, i.e., ballots contained in each of the two boxes. 38
2. It is apt to distinguish here between a "referendum" and a "plebiscite." A "referendum" is merely consultative
in character. It is simply a means of assessing public reaction to the given issues submitted to the people foe
their consideration, the calling of which is derived from or within the totality of the executive power of the
President. 39It is participated in by all citizens from the age of fifteen, regardless of whether or not they are
illiterates, feeble-minded, or ex- convicts . 40 A "plebiscite," on the other hand, involves the constituent act of
those "citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are eighteen years of age or over, and
who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote
for at least six months preceding the election Literacy, property or any other substantive requirement is not
imposed. It is generally associated with the amending process of the Constitution, more particularly, the
ratification aspect.

VII
1. There appeals to be no valid basis for the claim that the regime of martial law stultifies in main the freedom
to dissent. That speaks of a bygone fear. The martial law regime which, in the observation of Justice
Fernando, 41 is impressed with a mild character recorded no State imposition for a muffled voice. To be sure,
there are restraints of the individual liberty, but on certain grounds no total suppression of that liberty is aimed
at. The for the referendum-plebiscite on October 16 recognizes all the embracing freedoms of expression and
assembly The President himself had announced that he would not countenance any suppression of dissenting
views on the issues, as he is not interested in winning a "yes" or "no" vote, but on the genuine sentiment of
the people on the issues at hand. 42 Thus, the dissenters soon found their way to the public forums, voicing
out loud and clear their adverse views on the proposed amendments and even (in the valid ratification of the
1973 Constitution, which is already a settled matter. 43 Even government employees have been held by the
Civil Service Commission free to participate in public discussion and even campaign for their stand on the
referendum-plebiscite issues. 44
VIII. Time for deliberation is not short.
1. The period from September 21 to October 16 or a period of 3 weeks is not too short for free debates or
discussions on the referendum-plebiscite issues. The questions are not new. They are the issues of the day.
The people have been living with them since the proclamation of martial law four years ago. The referendums
of 1973 and 1975 carried the same issue of martial law. That notwithstanding, the contested brief period for
discussion is not without counterparts in previous plebiscites for constitutional amendments. Justice Makasiar,
in the Referendum Case, recalls: "Under the old Society, 15 days were allotted for the publication in three
consecutive issues of the Official Gazette of the women's suffrage amendment to the Constitution before the
scheduled plebiscite on April 30, 1937 (Com. Act No. 34). The constitutional amendment to append as
ordinance the complicated Tydings-Kocialskowski was published in only three consecutive issues of the
Official Gazette for 10 days prior to the scheduled plebiscite (Com. Act 492). For the 1940 Constitutional
amendments providing for the bicameral Congress, the reelection of the President and Vice President, and
the creation of the Commission on Elections, 20 days of publication in three consecutive issues of the Official
Gazette was fixed (Com Act No. 517). And the Parity Amendment, an involved constitutional amendment
affecting the economy as well as the independence of the Republic was publicized in three consecutive issues
of the Official Gazette for 20 days prior to the plebiscite (Rep. Act No. 73)." 45
2. It is worthy to note that Article XVI of the Constitution makes no provision as to the specific date when the
plebiscite shall be held, but simply states that it "shall be held not later than three months after the approval of
such amendment or revision." In Coleman v. Miller, 46 the United States Supreme court held that this matter of
submission involves "an appraisal of a great variety of relevant conditions, political, social and economic,"
which "are essentially political and not justiciable." The constituent body or in the instant cases, the President,
may fix the time within which the people may act. This is because proposal and ratification are not treated as
unrelated acts, but as succeeding steps in a single endeavor, the natural inference being that they are not to
be widely separated in time; second, it is only when there is deemed to be a necessity therefor that
amendments are to be proposed, the reasonable implication being that when proposed, they are to be
considered and disposed of presently, and third, ratification is but the expression of the approbation of the
people, hence, it must be done contemporaneously. 47 In the words of Jameson, "(a)n alteration of the
Constitution proposed today has relation to the sentiment and the felt needs of today, and that, if not ratified
early while that sentiment may fairly be supposed to exist. it ought to be regarded as waived, and not again to
be voted upon, unless a second time proposed by proper body

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IN RESUME

SO ORDERED.

The three issues are

Aquino, J, in the result.

1. Is the question of the constitutionality of Presidential Decrees Nos. 991, 1031 and 1033 political or
justiciable?
2. During the present stage of the transition period, and under, the environmental circumstances now
obtaining, does the President possess power to propose amendments to the Constitution as well as set up the
required machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his proposals by the people?
3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed therefor a
sufficient and proper submission?
Upon the first issue, Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro and Associate Justices Enrique M. Fernando, Claudio
Teehankee, Antonio P. Barredo, Cecilia Munoz Palma, Hermogenes Concepcion Jr. and Ruperto G. Martin
are of the view that the question posed is justiciable, while Associate Justices Felix V. Makasiar, Felix Q.
Antonio and Ramon C. Aquino hold the view that the question is political.
Upon the second issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino,
Concepcion Jr. and Martin voted in the affirmative, while Associate Justices Teehankee and Munoz Palma
voted in the negative. Associate Justice Fernando, conformably to his concurring and dissenting opinion in
Aquino vs. Enrile (59 SCRA 183), specifically dissents from the proposition that there is concentration of
powers in the Executive during periods of crisis, thus raising serious doubts as to the power of the President
to propose amendments.
Upon the third issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion Jr.
and Martin are of the view that there is a sufficient and proper submission of the proposed amendments for
ratification by the people. Associate Justices Barredo and Makasiar expressed the hope, however that the
period of time may be extended. Associate Justices Fernando, Makasiar and Antonio are of the view that the
question is political and therefore beyond the competence and cognizance of this Court, Associate Justice
Fernando adheres to his concurrence in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales vs. COMELEC
(21 SCRA 774).Associate Justices Teehankee and MUNOZ Palma hold that prescinding from the President's
lack of authority to exercise the constituent power to propose the amendments, etc., as above stated, there is
no fair and proper submission with sufficient information and time to assure intelligent consent or rejection
under the standards set by this Court in the controlling cases of Gonzales, supra, and Tolentino vs.
COMELEC (41 SCRA 702).
Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin
voted to dismiss the three petitions at bar. For reasons as expressed in his separate opinion, Associate
Justice Fernando concurs in the result. Associate Justices Teehankee and Munoz Palma voted to grant the
petitions.
ACCORDINGLY, the vote being 8 to 2 to dismiss, the said petitions are hereby dismissed. This decision is
immediately executory.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in their
capacities as founding members of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA), respondents.
SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK), MOVEMENT
OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), INTEGRATED
BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitionersintervenors.

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DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system
of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Undoubtedly, this demands special
attention, as this system of initiative was unknown to the people of this country, except perhaps to a few
scholars, before the drafting of the 1987 Constitution. The 1986 Constitutional Commission itself, through the
original proponent 1 and the main sponsor 2 of the proposed Article on Amendments or Revision of the
Constitution, characterized this system as "innovative". 3 Indeed it is, for both under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, only two methods of proposing amendments to, or revision of, the Constitution were
recognized, viz., (1) by Congress upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members and (2) by a constitutional
convention. 4 For this and the other reasons hereafter discussed, we resolved to give due course to this
petition.
On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent Commission on
Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials,
by People's Initiative" (hereafter, Delfin Petition) 5 wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order

DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII, AND
SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is signed by
at least twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters in the country it will be formally filed with the
COMELEC.
Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith given the number UND 96-037 (INITIATIVE), the
COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an Order 11 (a) directing Delfin "to cause the publication of the
petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution (including the proposal,
proposed constitutional amendment, and the signature form), and the notice of hearing in three (3) daily
newspapers of general circulation at his own expense" not later than 9 December 1996; and (b) setting the
case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at 10:00 a.m.

2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached "Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation;

At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996, the following appeared: Delfin and Atty. Pete Q.
Quadra; representatives of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA); intervenoroppositor Senator Raul S. Roco, together with his two other lawyers, and representatives of, or counsel for,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest
Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN). 12 Senator Roco, on that same day, filed a Motion
to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the
COMELEC.

3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and
volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose.

After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda
and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. 13

Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, 6 a group of
citizens desirous to avail of the system intended to institutionalize people power; that he and the members of
the Movement and other volunteers intend to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution granted under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the exercise of that power shall be
conducted in proceedings under the control and supervision of the COMELEC; that, as required in COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300, signature stations shall be established all over the country, with the assistance of
municipal election registrars, who shall verify the signatures affixed by individual signatories; that before the
Movement and other volunteers can gather signatures, it is necessary that the time and dates to be
designated for the purpose be first fixed in an order to be issued by the COMELEC; and that to adequately
inform the people of the electoral process involved, it is likewise necessary that the said order, as well as the
Petition on which the signatures shall be affixed, be published in newspapers of general and local circulation,
under the control and supervision of the COMELEC.

On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and
Maria Isabel Ongpin filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the following arguments:

1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;

The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended are Sections 4 and 7 of Article
VI, 7Section 4 of Article VII, 8 and Section 8 of Article X 9 of the Constitution. Attached to the petition is a copy of
a "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution" 10 embodying the proposed amendments which consist in the
deletion from the aforecited sections of the provisions concerning term limits, and with the following
proposition:

(1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by
law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; in fact, Senate Bill No. 1290 entitled An Act
Prescribing and Regulating Constitution Amendments by People's Initiative, which petitioner Senator Santiago
filed on 24 November 1995, is still pending before the Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments.
(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the Constitution,
on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution,
unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This
deliberate omission indicates that the matter of people's initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some
future law. Former Senator Arturo Tolentino stressed this deficiency in the law in his privilege speech delivered
before the Senate in 1994: "There is not a single word in that law which can be considered as implementing
[the provision on constitutional initiative]. Such implementing provisions have been obviously left to a separate
law.

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(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print media. This indicates
that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments because the latter take effect only upon
ratification and not after publication.
(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 to govern "the conduct of initiative on the
Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws, is ultra vires insofar asinitiative on
amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and
regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only Congress is authorized by
the Constitution to pass the implementing law.
(5) The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or
lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside the power of the people's initiative.
(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people's initiative; neither the COMELEC nor any
other government department, agency, or office has realigned funds for the purpose.
To justify their recourse to us via the special civil action for prohibition, the petitioners allege that in the event
the COMELEC grants the Delfin Petition, the people's initiative spearheaded by PIRMA would entail expenses
to the national treasury for general re-registration of voters amounting to at least P180 million, not to mention
the millions of additional pesos in expenses which would be incurred in the conduct of the initiative itself.
Hence, the transcendental importance to the public and the nation of the issues raised demands that this
petition for prohibition be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside technicalities of procedure and calling
for the admission of a taxpayer's and legislator's suit. 14 Besides, there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the respondents to comment on the petition within a nonextendible period of ten days from notice; and (b) issued a temporary restraining order, effective immediately
and continuing until further orders, enjoining public respondent COMELEC from proceeding with the Delfin
Petition, and private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa from conducting a signature drive for people's
initiative to amend the Constitution.
On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through Atty Quadra, filed their Comment
argue therein that:

15

on the petition. They

COST OF THE DAILY PER DIEM OF THE SUPERVISING SCHOOL TEACHERS IN THE SIGNATURE
GATHERING TO BE DEPOSITED and TO BE PAID BY DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS IS P2,571,200.00;
3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE COMELEC IS ONLY ON THE SIGNATURE GATHERING WHICH
BY LAW COMELEC IS DUTY BOUND "TO SUPERVISE CLOSELY" PURSUANT TO ITS "INITIATORY
JURISDICTION" UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN ITS RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996
DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS.COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO.
125416;
4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON AUGUST 4, 1989 IS THE ENABLING LAW IMPLEMENTING THE
POWER OF PEOPLE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION. SENATOR
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO. 1290 IS A DUPLICATION OF WHAT ARE ALREADY
PROVIDED FOR IN REP. ACT NO. 6735;
5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 PROMULGATED ON JANUARY 16, 1991 PURSUANT TO REP. ACT
6735 WAS UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN
THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416
WHERE THE HONORABLE COURT SAID: "THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS CAN DO NO LESS BY
SEASONABLY AND JUDICIOUSLY PROMULGATING GUIDELINES AND RULES FOR BOTH NATIONAL
AND LOCAL USE, IN IMPLEMENTING OF THESE LAWS."
6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO. 1290 CONTAINS A PROVISION
DELEGATING TO THE COMELEC THE POWER TO "PROMULGATE SUCH RULES AND REGULATIONS
AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES OF THIS ACT." (SEC. 12, S.B. NO. 1290,
ENCLOSED AS ANNEX E, PETITION);
7. THE LIFTING OF THE LIMITATION ON THE TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS PROVIDED
UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IS NOT A "REVISION" OF THE CONSTITUTION. IT IS ONLY AN
AMENDMENT. "AMENDMENT ENVISAGES AN ALTERATION OF ONE OR A FEW SPECIFIC PROVISIONS
OF THE CONSTITUTION. REVISION CONTEMPLATES A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT
TO DETERMINE HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT IT SHOULD BE ALTERED." (PP. 412-413, 2ND. ED. 1992,
1097 PHIL. CONSTITUTION, BY JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.).

1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT "IT WOULD ENTAIL EXPENSES TO THE NATIONAL TREASURY FOR GENERAL
REGISTRATION OF VOTERS AMOUNTING TO AT LEAST PESOS: ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY MILLION
(P180,000,000.00)" IF THE "COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION FILED BY RESPONDENT DELFIN
BEFORE THE COMELEC.

Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin filed in his own behalf a Comment 16 which starts off with
an assertion that the instant petition is a "knee-jerk reaction to a draft 'Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution'. . . which is not formally filed yet." What he filed on 6 December 1996 was an "Initiatory Pleading"
or "Initiatory Petition," which was legally necessary to start the signature campaign to amend the Constitution
or to put the movement to gather signatures under COMELEC power and function. On the substantive
allegations of the petitioners, Delfin maintains as follows:

2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE SPENT BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IF THE COMELEC
GRANTS THE PETITION OF RESPONDENT DELFIN. ALL EXPENSES IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING
ARE ALL FOR THE ACCOUNT OF RESPONDENT DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS PER THEIR
PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES AND EXPENDITURES SUBMITTED TO THE COMELEC. THE ESTIMATED

(1) Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a law, R.A. No. 6735, which governs the conduct
of initiative to amend the Constitution. The absence therein of a subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, since
subtitles are not requirements for the validity or sufficiency of laws.

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(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides that the proposition in an initiative to amend the
Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as of the day of
the plebiscite.
(3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra vires is contradicted by (a) Section 2, Article IX-C of
the Constitution, which grants the COMELEC the power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall; and (b) Section 20 of R.A.
6735, which empowers the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the purposes of the Act.
(4) The proposed initiative does not involve a revision of, but mere amendment to, the Constitution because it
seeks to alter only a few specific provisions of the Constitution, or more specifically, only those which lay term
limits. It does not seek to reexamine or overhaul the entire document.
As to the public expenditures for registration of voters, Delfin considers petitioners' estimate of P180 million as
unreliable, for only the COMELEC can give the exact figure. Besides, if there will be a plebiscite it will be
simultaneous with the 1997 Barangay Elections. In any event, fund requirements for initiative will be a priority
government expense because it will be for the exercise of the sovereign power of the people.
In the Comment 17 for the public respondent COMELEC, filed also on 2 January 1997, the Office of the
Solicitor General contends that:
(1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia, people's initiative to amend the Constitution. Its Section 2 on
Statement of Policy explicitly affirms, recognizes, and guarantees that power; and its Section 3, which
enumerates the three systems of initiative, includes initiative on the Constitution and defines the same as the
power to propose amendments to the Constitution. Likewise, its Section 5 repeatedly mentions initiative on
the Constitution.
(2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the Constitution is not necessary in R.A. No. 6735 because, being
national in scope, that system of initiative is deemed included in the subtitle on National Initiative and
Referendum; and Senator Tolentino simply overlooked pertinent provisions of the law when he claimed that
nothing therein was provided for initiative on the Constitution.
(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent nor a material proof that R.A. No. 6735 does not deal
with initiative on the Constitution.
(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials constitutes a mere amendment to the Constitution, not a
revision thereof.
(5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly issued under Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 and under the
Omnibus Election Code. The rule-making power of the COMELEC to implement the provisions of R.A. No.
6735 was in fact upheld by this Court in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC.

On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro tunc the temporary restraining order; (b) noted the
aforementioned Comments and the Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order filed by private respondents
through Atty. Quadra, as well as the latter's Manifestation stating that he is the counsel for private respondents
Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa only and the Comment he filed was for the Pedrosas; and (c) granted the
Motion for Intervention filed on 6 January 1997 by Senator Raul Roco and allowed him to file his Petition in
Intervention not later than 20 January 1997; and (d) set the case for hearing on 23 January 1997 at 9:30 a.m.
On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK) and the Movement of Attorneys for
Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), filed a Motion for Intervention. Attached to the motion
was their Petition in Intervention, which was later replaced by an Amended Petition in Intervention wherein
they contend that:
(1) The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision of, the Constitution because, in
the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., 18 it would involve a change from a political philosophy that rejects
unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure; and although the change might appear to be an isolated
one, it can affect other provisions, such as, on synchronization of elections and on the State policy of
guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibiting political
dynasties. 19 Arevision cannot be done by initiative which, by express provision of Section 2 of Article XVII of
the Constitution, is limited to amendments.
(2) The prohibition against reelection of the President and the limits provided for all other national and local
elective officials are based on the philosophy of governance, "to open up the political arena to as many as
there are Filipinos qualified to handle the demands of leadership, to break the concentration of political and
economic powers in the hands of a few, and to promote effective proper empowerment for participation in
policy and decision-making for the common good"; hence, to remove the term limits is to negate and nullify
the noble vision of the 1987 Constitution.
(3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to the purpose of initiative, particularly in a conflict-of-interest
situation. Initiative is intended as a fallback position that may be availed of by the people only if they are
dissatisfied with the performance of their elective officials, but not as a premium for good performance. 20
(4) R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself to be called the enabling law that implements the
people's initiative on amendments to the Constitution. It fails to state (a) the proper parties who may file the
petition, (b) the appropriate agency before whom the petition is to be filed, (c) the contents of the petition, (d)
the publication of the same, (e) the ways and means of gathering the signatures of the voters nationwide and
3% per legislative district, (f) the proper parties who may oppose or question the veracity of the signatures, (g)
the role of the COMELEC in the verification of the signatures and the sufficiency of the petition, (h) the appeal
from any decision of the COMELEC, (I) the holding of a plebiscite, and (g) the appropriation of funds for such
people's initiative. Accordingly, there being no enabling law, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to hear Delfin's
petition.
(5) The deficiency of R.A. No. 6735 cannot be rectified or remedied by COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, since
the COMELEC is without authority to legislate the procedure for a people's initiativeunder Section 2 of Article
XVII of the Constitution. That function exclusively pertains to Congress. Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 does not

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constitute a legal basis for the Resolution, as the former does not set a sufficient standard for a valid
delegation of power.

At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the parties argued on the following pivotal issues, which the
Court formulated in light of the allegations and arguments raised in the pleadings so far filed:

On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his Petition in

Intervention. 21 He avers that R.A. No. 6735 is the enabling law that implements the people's right to initiate
constitutional amendments. This law is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505; he coauthored the House Bill and even delivered a sponsorship speech thereon. He likewise submits that the
COMELEC was empowered under Section 20 of that law to promulgate COMELEC Resolution No. 2300.
Nevertheless, he contends that the respondent Commission is without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
Delfin Petition and to order its publication because the said petition is not the initiatory pleading contemplated
under the Constitution, Republic Act No. 6735, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. What vests jurisdiction
upon the COMELEC in an initiative on the Constitution is the filing of a petition for initiative which is signedby
the required number of registered voters. He also submits that the proponents of a constitutional amendment
cannot avail of the authority and resources of the COMELEC to assist them is securing the required number
of signatures, as the COMELEC's role in an initiative on the Constitution is limited to the determination of the
sufficiency of the initiative petition and the call and supervision of a plebiscite, if warranted.

1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and
Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the Constitution;
and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.

On 20 January 1997, LABAN filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene.

The following day, the IBP filed a Motion for Intervention to which it attached a Petition in Intervention raising
the following arguments:
(1) Congress has failed to enact an enabling law mandated under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution.
(2) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot substitute for the required implementing law on the initiative to
amend the Constitution.
(3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal defect in that it does not have the required number of
signatures.
(4) The petition seeks, in effect a revision of the Constitution, which can be proposed only by Congress or a
constitutional convention. 22
On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a Resolution (a) granting the Motions for Intervention filed by the DIK
and MABINI and by the IBP, as well as the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by LABAN; (b) admitting the
Amended Petition in Intervention of DIK and MABINI, and the Petitions in Intervention of Senator Roco and of
the IBP; (c) requiring the respondents to file within a nonextendible period of five days their Consolidated
Comments on the aforesaid Petitions in Intervention; and (d) requiring LABAN to file its Petition in Intervention
within a nonextendible period of three days from notice, and the respondents to comment thereon within a
nonextendible period of five days from receipt of the said Petition in Intervention.

2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations Governing the
Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on National and Local Laws) regarding
the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of
specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.
3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials, as proposed in the draft "Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution," would constitute a revision of, or an amendment to, the Constitution.
4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition solely intended to obtain
an order (a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering; (b) instructing municipal election officers to
assist Delfin's movement and volunteers in establishing signature stations; and (c) directing or causing the
publication of, inter alia, the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution.
5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a pending case
before the COMELEC.
After hearing them on the issues, we required the parties to submit simultaneously their respective
memoranda within twenty days and requested intervenor Senator Roco to submit copies of the deliberations
on House Bill No. 21505.
On 27 January 1997, LABAN filed its Petition in Intervention wherein it adopts the allegations and arguments
in the main Petition. It further submits that the COMELEC should have dismissed the Delfin Petition for failure
to state a sufficient cause of action and that the Commission's failure or refusal to do so constituted grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
On 28 January 1997, Senator Roco submitted copies of portions of both the Journal and the Record of the
House of Representatives relating to the deliberations of House Bill No. 21505, as well as the transcripts of
stenographic notes on the proceedings of the Bicameral Conference Committee, Committee on Suffrage and
Electoral Reforms, of 6 June 1989 on House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17.
Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa filed their Consolidated Comments on the Petitions in
Intervention of Senator Roco, DIK and MABINI, and IBP. 23 The parties thereafter filed, in due time, their
separate memoranda. 24
As we stated in the beginning, we resolved to give due course to this special civil action.

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For a more logical discussion of the formulated issues, we shall first take up the fifth issue which appears to
pose a prejudicial procedural question.
I
THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE PENDENCY IN THE COMELEC OF THE DELFIN
PETITION.
Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties paid no serious attention to the fifth issue, i.e.,
whether it is proper for this Court to take cognizance of this special civil action when there is a pending case
before the COMELEC. The petitioners provide an affirmative answer. Thus:
28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition filed by private respondent Delfin. This
being so, it becomes imperative to stop the Comelec from proceeding any further, and under the Rules of
Court, Rule 65, Section 2, a petition for prohibition is the proper remedy.
29. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and
directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with
which it is not legally vested. (People v. Vera, supra., p. 84). In this case the writ is an urgent necessity, in view
of the highly divisive and adverse environmental consequences on the body politic of the questioned Comelec
order. The consequent climate of legal confusion and political instability begs for judicial statesmanship.

It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the Delfin
Petition because the said petition is not supported by the required minimum number of signatures of
registered voters. LABAN also asserts that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss
the Delfin Petition, which does not contain the required number of signatures. In light of these claims, the
instant case may likewise be treated as a special civil action for certiorari under Section I of Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.
In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor Roco in his Memorandum, this Court may brush aside
technicalities of procedure in
cases of transcendental importance. As we stated in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr. 28
A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion,
set aside in view of the importance of issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers Cases, this Court
brushed aside this technicality because the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands
that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.
II
R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY, INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:

30. In the final analysis, when the system of constitutional law is threatened by the political ambitions of man,
only the Supreme Court
can save a nation in peril and uphold the paramount majesty of the Constitution. 25
It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the
ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain the petition. 26 The COMELEC made no
ruling thereon evidently because after having heard the arguments of Delfin and the oppositors at the hearing
on 12 December 1996, it required them to submit within five days their memoranda or
oppositions/memoranda. 27 Earlier, or specifically on 6 December 1996, it practically gave due course to the
Delfin Petition by ordering Delfin to cause the publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for
Initiative, the signature form, and the notice of hearing; and by setting the case for hearing. The COMELEC's
failure to act on Roco's motion to dismiss and its insistence to hold on to the petition rendered ripe and viable
the instant petition under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition. Where the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person,
whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant to desist from further
proceedings in the action or matter specified therein.

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment
under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener
than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
This provision is not self-executory. In his book,
Commission, stated:

29

Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional

Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the
Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the last analysis it still is
dependent on congressional action.
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system
of initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until Congress provides for its
implementation. Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people
cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.

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This system of initiative was originally included in Section 1 of the draft Article on Amendment or Revision
proposed by the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
in its Committee Report No. 7 (Proposed Resolution No. 332). 30 That section reads as follows:
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed:
(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
(b) by a constitutional convention; or
(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in Article___ Section ___of the
Constitution. 31
After several interpellations, but before the period of amendments, the Committee submitted a new
formulation of the concept of initiative which it denominated as Section 2; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President. May we respectfully call attention of the Members of the
Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete
Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision governing the matter of initiative. This is now
covered by Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I quote
Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to this
Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7.

32

The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details for carrying out Section 2 are left to the legislature.
Thus:
FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just two simple, clarificatory questions.
First, on Section 1 on the matter of initiative upon petition of at least 10 percent, there are no details in the
provision on how to carry this out. Do we understand, therefore, that we are leaving this matter to the
legislature?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
FR. BERNAS. And do we also understand, therefore, that for as long as the legislature does not pass the
necessary implementing law on this, this will not operate?
MR. SUAREZ. That matter was also taken up during the committee hearing, especially with respect to the
budget appropriations which would have to be legislated so that the plebiscite could be called. We deemed it
best that this matter be left to the legislature. The Gentleman is right. In any event, as envisioned, no
amendment through the power of initiative can be called until after five years from the date of the ratification of
this Constitution. Therefore, the first amendment that could be proposed through the exercise of this initiative
power would be after five years. It is reasonably expected that within that five-year period, the National
Assembly can come up with the appropriate rules governing the exercise of this power.

FR. BERNAS. Since the matter is left to the legislature the details on how this is to be carried out is it
possible that, in effect, what will be presented to the people for ratification is the work of the legislature rather
than of the people? Does this provision exclude that possibility?
MR. SUAREZ. No, it does not exclude that possibility because even the legislature itself as a body could
propose that amendment, maybe individually or collectively, if it fails to muster the three-fourths vote in order
to constitute itself as a constituent assembly and submit that proposal to the people for ratification through the
process of an initiative.
xxx xxx xxx
MS. AQUINO. Do I understand from the sponsor that the intention in the proposal is to vest constituent power
in the people to amend the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is absolutely correct, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. I fully concur with the underlying precept of the proposal in terms of institutionalizing popular
participation in the drafting of the Constitution or in the amendment thereof, but I would have a lot of difficulties
in terms of accepting the draft of Section 2, as written. Would the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy
of legal mandate, constituent power has primacy over all other legal mandates?
MR. SUAREZ. The Commissioner is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. And would the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy of legal values, the Constitution is
source of all legal mandates and that therefore we require a great deal of circumspection in the drafting and in
the amendments of the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That proposition is nondebatable.
MS. AQUINO. Such that in order to underscore the primacy of constituent power we have a separate article in
the constitution that would specifically cover the process and the modes of amending the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. Therefore, is the sponsor inclined, as the provisions are drafted now, to again concede to the
legislature the process or the requirement of determining the mechanics of amending the Constitution by
people's initiative?
MR. SUAREZ. The matter of implementing this could very well be placed in the hands of the National
Assembly, not unless we can incorporate into this provision the mechanics that would adequately cover all the
conceivable situations. 33
It was made clear during the interpellations that the aforementioned Section 2 is limited to proposals to
AMEND not to REVISE the Constitution; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. . . . This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative, which came about
because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the traditional modes of
amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee members felt that this system of initiative
should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of
the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. 34
xxx xxx xxx

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MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a separate
section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of
realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate
section as if it were a self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of initiative is
limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision which contemplates a total overhaul
of the Constitution. That was the sense that was conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and (b)
in Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas theprocess of initiation to amend, which is given to
the public, would only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee. 35

MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioner's amendment does not prevent the legislature from asking another
body to set the proposition in proper form.
MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In other words, the implementation of this particular right would
be subject to legislation, provided the legislature cannot determine anymore the percentage of the
requirement.
MR. ROMULO. But the procedures, including the determination of the proper form for submission to the
people, may be subject to legislation.
MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the substantive right to initiate. In other words, none of the
procedures to be proposed by the legislative body must diminish or impair the right conceded here.
MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the Constitution can the procedures which I have discussed be legislated?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes. 37

Amendments to the proposed Section 2 were thereafter introduced by then Commissioner Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., which the Committee accepted. Thus:

Commissioner Davide also reaffirmed that his modified amendment strictly confines initiative to
AMENDMENTS to NOT REVISION of the Constitution. Thus:

MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. I propose to substitute the entire Section 2 with the following:
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I have modified the proposed amendment after taking into account the
modifications submitted by the sponsor himself and the honorable Commissioners Guingona, Monsod, Rama,
Ople, de los Reyes and Romulo. The modified amendment in substitution of the proposed Section 2 will now
read as follows: "SECTION 2. AMENDMENTS TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY
PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE
PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER Of REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS
THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS
FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE
YEARS THEREAFTER.

MR. DAVIDE. With pleasure, Madam President.

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE
OF THIS RIGHT.

MR. DAVIDE. A distinction has to be made that under this proposal, what is involved is an amendment to the
Constitution. To amend a Constitution would ordinarily require a proposal by the National Assembly by a vote
of three-fourths; and to call a constitutional convention would require a higher number. Moreover, just to
submit the issue of calling a constitutional convention, a majority of the National Assembly is required, the
import being that the process of amendment must be made more rigorous and difficult than probably initiating
an ordinary legislation or putting an end to a law proposed by the National Assembly by way of a referendum.
I cannot agree to reducing the requirement approved by the Committee on the Legislative because it would
require another voting by the Committee, and the voting as precisely based on a requirement of 10 percent.
Perhaps, I might present such a proposal, by way of an amendment, when the Commission shall take up the
Article on the Legislative or on the National Assembly on plenary sessions. 39

MR. SUAREZ. Madam President, considering that the proposed amendment is reflective of the sense
contained in Section 2 of our completed Committee Report No. 7, we accept the proposed amendment.

36

The interpellations which ensued on the proposed modified amendment to Section 2 clearly showed that it
was a legislative act which must implement the exercise of the right. Thus:
MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, is it possible for the legislature to set forth certain
procedures to carry out the initiative. . .?
MR. DAVIDE. It can.
xxx xxx xxx

MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line 1 refers to
"amendment." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made the
distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by Section 1. So
insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision." 38
Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the process of proposing amendments through initiative must
be more rigorous and difficult than the initiative on legislation. Thus:

The Davide modified amendments to Section 2 were subjected to amendments, and the final version, which
the Commission approved by a vote of 31 in favor and 3 against, reads as follows:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. Section 2, as amended, reads as follows: "AMENDMENT TO
THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH
INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF
REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT

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LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS
SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS
CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.

units. The Bicameral Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 into a
draft bill, which was subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate 50and by the House of
Representatives. 51 This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE

FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT. 40

But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to "provide for the implementation
of the exercise of the right?"

The entire proposed Article on Amendments or Revisions was approved on second reading on 9 July
1986.41 Thereafter, upon his motion for reconsideration, Commissioner Gascon was allowed to introduce an
amendment to Section 2 which, nevertheless, was withdrawn. In view thereof, the Article was again approved
on Second and Third Readings on 1 August 1986. 42

A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.

However, the Committee on Style recommended that the approved Section 2 be amended by changing
"percent" to "per centum" and "thereof" to "therein" and deleting the phrase "by law" in the second paragraph
so that said paragraph reads: The Congress 43 shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this
right. 44 This amendment was approved and is the text of the present second paragraph of Section 2.

Sec. 2. Statement and Policy. The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to
directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions
passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed,
recognized and guaranteed. (Emphasis supplied).

The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of
Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory.

The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane nor
relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and local laws,
ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out
earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the
power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system
of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."

Has Congress "provided" for the implementation of the exercise of this right? Those who answer the question
in the affirmative, like the private respondents and intervenor Senator Roco, point to us R.A. No. 6735.
There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement the exercise of the right than through the
passage of a statute or legislative act. This is the essence or rationale of the last minute amendment by the
Constitutional Commission to substitute the last paragraph of Section 2 of Article XVII then reading:

First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The said section reads:

The foregoing conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that this section was lifted from Section 1 of Senate
Bill No. 17, which solely referred to a statement of policy on local initiative and referendum and appropriately
used the phrases "propose and enact," "approve or reject" and "in whole or in part." 52

The Congress 45 shall by law provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
With The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
This substitute amendment was an investiture on Congress of a power to provide for the rules implementing
the exercise of the right. The "rules" means "the details on how [the right] is to be carried out." 46
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose amendments
to the Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17. The former was
prepared by the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of the House of Representatives on the basis
of two House Bills referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497, 47 which dealt with the initiative and referendum
mentioned
in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b) House Bill No. 988, 48 which dealt with the subject
matter of House Bill No. 497, as well as with initiative and referendum under Section 3 of Article X (Local
Government) and initiative provided for in Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. Senate Bill No.
17 49 solely dealt with initiative and referendum concerning ordinances or resolutions of local government

Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative on amendments to the
Constitution and mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and that Section 5 (Requirements)
restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters who must submit the
proposal. But unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents of a
petition forinitiative on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among other things, statement of
the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be. It
does not include, as among the contents of the petition, the provisions of the Constitution sought to be
amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution. Said paragraph (c) reads in full as follows:
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as
the case may be;
c.2 the proposition;
c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;

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c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided therein;
c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly
written or printed at the top of every page of the petition. (Emphasis supplied).
The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed" only
strengthens the conclusion that Section 2, quoted earlier, excludes initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local
Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This
conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum
on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of
the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that
in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.
We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is subsumed under the
subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in scope. Our reading of Subtitle II
(National Initiative and Referendum) and Subtitle III (Local Initiative and Referendum) leaves no room for
doubt that the classification is not based on the scope of the initiative involved, but on
its nature and character. It is "national initiative," if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a national
law, or a law which only Congress can pass. It is "local initiative" if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted
is a law, ordinance, or resolution which only the legislative bodies of the governments of the autonomous
regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass. This classification of initiative
into national and local is actually based on Section 3 of the Act, which we quote for emphasis and clearer
understanding:

A further examination of the Act even reveals that the subtitling is not accurate. Provisions not germane to the
subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum are placed therein, like (1) paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 9,
which reads:
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an election called for the
purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after certification and proclamation of the Commission.
(Emphasis supplied).
(2) that portion of Section 11 (Indirect Initiative) referring to indirect initiative with the legislative bodies of local
governments; thus:
Sec. 11. Indirect Initiative. Any duly accredited people's organization, as defined by law, may file a petition
for indirect initiative with the House of Representatives, and other legislative bodies. . . .
and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to decisions of the COMELEC on the findings of sufficiency or
insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum, which could be petitions for both national and local
initiative and referendum.
Upon the other hand, Section 18 on "Authority of Courts" under subtitle III on Local Initiative and Referendum
is misplaced, 54 since the provision therein applies to both national and local initiative and referendum. It
reads:
Sec. 18. Authority of Courts. Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from declaring
null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violation of the Constitution or want of capacity
of the local legislative body to enact the said measure.

Sec. 3. Definition of terms

xxx xxx xxx
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution;
a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and
a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city,
municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance. (Emphasis supplied).
Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there should have been a subtitle on initiative on
amendments to the Constitution. 53

Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for the details in the
implementation of initiative and referendum on national and local legislation thereby giving them special
attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
Anent the initiative on national legislation, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the petition and the contents of the petition;
(b) The conduct and date of the initiative;
(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and the required number of votes for its approval;
(d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of the proposition;
(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation
in the Philippines; and
(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the proposition.

55

As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the following:

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(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of signatures of registered voters for the petition;
(b) The submission of the petition to the local legislative body concerned;
(c) The effect of the legislative body's failure to favorably act thereon, and the invocation of the power of
initiative as a consequence thereof;
(d) The formulation of the proposition;
(e) The period within which to gather the signatures;
(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be signed;
(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through its official in the local government unit concerned
as to whether the required number of signatures have been obtained;
(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the submission of the proposition to the registered voters for
their approval, which must be within the period specified therein;
(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;
(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;
(k) The limitations on local initiative; and
(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies. 56

is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the
delegate; and (b) fixes a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable to
which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. 61 A sufficient standard is one which
defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it.
It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. 62

Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of its twentythree sections, merely (a) mentions, the word "Constitution" in Section 2; (b) defines "initiative on the
Constitution" and includes it in the enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section 3; (c) speaks of
"plebiscite" as the process by which the proposition in an initiative on the Constitution may be approved or
rejected by the people; (d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the number of voters who should
sign the petition; and (e) provides for the date of effectivity of the approved proposition.

It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the
exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of
initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC's power under Section
2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those
promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where
subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the "completeness" and the "sufficient standard"
tests.

There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important or the paramount system of initiative.
RA. No. 6735 thus delivered a humiliating blow to the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution
by merely paying it a reluctant lip service. 57
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in
essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its
lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by "empowering" the COMELEC "to
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act. 58
The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas
delegata non delegari potest. 59 The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:

Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed
to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then
invalid.
III
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT PRESCRIBES RULES AND REGULATIONS ON THE
CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.

IV
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION.
Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a full compliance with the power of Congress to
implement the right to initiate constitutional amendments, or that it has validly vested upon the COMELEC the
power of subordinate legislation and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.

(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies. 60

Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for initiative on
the Constitution must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters of which every
legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein. The Delfin Petition does not
contain signatures of the required number of voters. Delfin himself admits that he has not yet gathered
signatures and that the purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain assistance in his drive to gather
signatures. Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly initiated.

Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate rules
and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5 above. However, in every case of
permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a)

The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is
theinitiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only
participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of

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the petition; 63(2) to issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total number of
registered voters in each legislative district; 64 (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in the establishment
of signature stations; 65 and (4) to verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on the basis of the
registry list of voters, voters' affidavits, and voters' identification cards used in the immediately preceding
election. 66
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300,
it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The respondent Commission must have
known that the petition does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number.
Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more
than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the
hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda or
oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and
merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.

The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent as against the
Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED as against private respondents.
Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan, Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.

The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of whether the proposal to lift the term limits of
elective national and local officials is an amendment to, and not a revision of, the Constitution is rendered
unnecessary, if not academic.
CONCLUSION
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or
taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall
have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution should no longer be
kept in the cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and strength. Congress should not tarry any longer
in complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of the right of the people under
that system.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules and
regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).

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Antecedent Facts
On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado
("Lambino Group"), with other groups1 and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative
petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the
COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c) 2 and Section
73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735").
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least
twelveper centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per
centum(3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had
verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI
(Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department)5 and by adding Article XVIII
entitled "Transitory Provisions."6 These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system
to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group prayed that after due publication of
their petition, the COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification:

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 174153

October 25, 2006

RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED

VOTERS,Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
These are consolidated petitions on the Resolution dated 31 August 2006 of the Commission on Elections
("COMELEC") denying due course to an initiative petition to amend the 1987 Constitution.

DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION,
CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A
UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY
PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating
modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative. 7
The Ruling of the COMELEC
On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition
for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution. The COMELEC invoked
this Court's ruling in Santiago v. Commission on Elections8 declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the
initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.9
In G.R. No. 174153, the Lambino Group prays for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and mandamus to set
aside the COMELEC Resolution of 31 August 2006 and to compel the COMELEC to give due course to their
initiative petition. The Lambino Group contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying due course to their petition since Santiago is not a binding precedent. Alternatively, the Lambino
Group claims that Santiago binds only the parties to that case, and their petition deserves cognizance as an
expression of the "will of the sovereign people."
In G.R. No. 174299, petitioners ("Binay Group") pray that the Court require respondent COMELEC
Commissioners to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt for the COMELEC's verification of
signatures and for "entertaining" the Lambino Group's petition despite the permanent injunction in Santiago.
The Court treated the Binay Group's petition as an opposition-in-intervention.

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In his Comment to the Lambino Group's petition, the Solicitor General joined causes with the petitioners,
urging the Court to grant the petition despite the Santiago ruling. The Solicitor General proposed that the
Court treat RA 6735 and its implementing rules "as temporary devises to implement the system of initiative."
Various groups and individuals sought intervention, filing pleadings supporting or opposing the Lambino
Group's petition. The supporting intervenors10 uniformly hold the view that the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in relying on Santiago. On the other hand, the opposing intervenors11 hold the contrary
view and maintain that Santiago is a binding precedent. The opposing intervenors also challenged (1) the
Lambino Group's standing to file the petition; (2) the validity of the signature gathering and verification
process; (3) the Lambino Group's compliance with the minimum requirement for the percentage of voters
supporting an initiative petition under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution; 12 (4) the nature of the
proposed changes as revisions and not mere amendments as provided under Section 2, Article XVII of the
1987 Constitution; and (5) the Lambino Group's compliance with the requirement in Section 10(a) of RA 6735
limiting initiative petitions to only one subject.
The Court heard the parties and intervenors in oral arguments on 26 September 2006. After receiving the
parties' memoranda, the Court considered the case submitted for resolution.
The Issues
The petitions raise the following issues:
1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions" to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the
Constitution; and
3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino
Group's petition.

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a people's
initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly explain the meaning of an amendment "directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition," thus:
MR. RODRIGO: Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some voters want to propose a constitutional
amendment. Is the draft of the proposed constitutional amendment ready to be shown to the people
when they are asked to sign?
MR. SUAREZ: That can be reasonably assumed, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is ready and shown to them before they sign.
Now, who prepares the draft?
MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: No, because before they sign there is already a draft shown to them and they are asked
whether or not they want to propose this constitutional amendment.
MR. SUAREZ: As it is envisioned, any Filipino can prepare that proposal and pass it around for
signature.13 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed constitutional amendment"
should be "ready and shown" to the people "before" they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that
"before they sign there is already a draft shown to them." The framers also "envisioned" that the people
should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must "prepare that proposal and pass it
around for signature."
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" is
that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be
present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign
on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.

The Ruling of the Court

There is no merit to the petition.
The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution for conducting
a people's initiative. Thus, there is even no need to revisit Santiago, as the present petition warrants
dismissal based alone on the Lambino Group's glaring failure to comply with the basic requirements of the
Constitution. For following the Court's ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the
Commision on Elections.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct
Proposal by the People

These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the
people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is
"directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" only if the people sign on a
petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If
so attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the
several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before
signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that every one of the millions
of signatories had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing.

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The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed14 the concept of people's initiative from the United States
where various State constitutions incorporate an initiative clause. In almost all States 15 which allow initiative
petitions,the unbending requirement is that the people must first see the full text of the proposed
amendments before they sign to signify their assent, and that the people must sign on an initiative
petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.16
The rationale for this requirement has been repeatedly explained in several decisions of various courts. Thus,
inCapezzuto v. State Ballot Commission, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, affirmed by the First
Circuit Court of Appeals, declared:
[A] signature requirement would be meaningless if the person supplying the signature has not first
seen what it is that he or she is signing. Further, and more importantly, loose interpretation of the
subscription requirement can pose a significant potential for fraud. A person permitted to describe orally the
contents of an initiative petition to a potential signer, without the signer having actually examined the petition,
could easily mislead the signer by, for example, omitting, downplaying, or even flatly misrepresenting, portions
of the petition that might not be to the signer's liking. This danger seems particularly acute when, in this
case, the person giving the description is the drafter of the petition, who obviously has a vested
interest in seeing that it gets the requisite signatures to qualify for the ballot.17 (Boldfacing and
underscoring supplied)
Likewise, in Kerr v. Bradbury,18 the Court of Appeals of Oregon explained:
The purposes of "full text" provisions that apply to amendments by initiative commonly are described in similar
terms. x x x (The purpose of the full text requirement is to provide sufficient information so that
registered voters can intelligently evaluate whether to sign the initiative petition."); x x x (publication of
full text of amended constitutional provision required because it is "essential for the elector to have x x x the
section which is proposed to be added to or subtracted from. If he is to vote intelligently, he must have this
knowledge. Otherwise in many instances he would be required to vote in the dark.") (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, "an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect of that which is
proposed" and failure to do so is "deceptive and misleading" which renders the initiative void.19

Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the
signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements
in gathering the signatures - that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of
the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the people
signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a signature
sheet20 after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum on 11 October
2006. The signature sheet with this Court during the oral arguments was the signature sheet attached 21 to the
opposition in intervention filed on 7 September 2006 by intervenor Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra.
The signature sheet attached to Atty. Quadra's opposition and the signature sheet attached to the Lambino
Group's Memorandum are the same. We reproduce below the signature sheet in full:

Province:

City/Municipality:

No. of
Verified

Legislative District:

Barangay:

Signatures:

PROPOSITION: "DO YOU APPROVE OF THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERALPRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO
ACHIEVE GREATER EFFICIENCY, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT; AND PROVIDING AN
ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO
ANOTHER?"

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the full text of
the proposed amendments. However, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that the
framers intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on people's initiative. In particular, the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the framers intended that the people
must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must
sign on a petition containing such full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735, the Initiative
and Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes as valid, requires that the people must sign the
"petition x x x as signatories."
The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The proponents secure the signatures
in their private capacity and not as public officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties who can
impartially explain the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the people. The
proponents present favorably their proposal to the people and do not present the arguments against their
proposal. The proponents, or their supporters, often pay those who gather the signatures.

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Precinct
Number

Name
Last Name,
First Name,
M.I.

Address

Birthdate
MM/DD/YY

Signature

Verification

I hereby APPROVE the proposed amendment to the 1987

Constitution. My signature herein which shall form part of
the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution signifies
my support for the filing thereof.
There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text
of the Lambino Group's proposed changes in the
signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state
that the text of the proposed changes is attached to it.
Petitioner Atty. Raul Lambino admitted this during the oral
arguments before this Court on 26 September 2006.
The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the
people approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to
the Unicameral-Parliamentary system of government. The
signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of
the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the
signature sheet. Clearly, the signature sheet is not the
"petition" that the framers of the Constitution envisioned
when they formulated the initiative clause in Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution.

10

Petitioner Atty. Lambino, however, explained that during the

signature-gathering from February to August 2006, the
Lambino Group circulated, together with the signature
sheets, printed copies of the Lambino Group's draft petition
which they later filed on 25 August 2006 with the
COMELEC. When asked if his group also circulated the
draft of their amended petition filed on 30 August 2006 with
the COMELEC, Atty. Lambino initially replied that they
circulated both. However, Atty. Lambino changed his answer
and stated that what his group circulated was the draft of the
30 August 2006 amended petition, not the draft of the 25
August 2006 petition.
The Lambino Group would have this Court believe that they
prepared the draft of the 30 August 2006 amended
petition almost seven months earlier in February
2006 when they started gathering signatures. Petitioner
Erico B. Aumentado's "Verification/Certification" of the 25
August 2006 petition, as well as of the 30 August 2006
amended petition, filed with the COMELEC, states as
follows:
I have caused the preparation of the foregoing [Amended]
Petition in my personal capacity as a registered voter, for

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and on behalf of the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines, as shown by ULAP Resolution No.
2006-02 hereto attached, and as representative of the mass of signatories hereto. (Emphasis supplied)
The Lambino Group failed to attach a copy of ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 to the present petition. However,
the "Official Website of the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines"22 has posted the full text of Resolution
No. 2006-02, which provides:
RESOLUTION NO. 2006-02
RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THE PROPOSALS OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION ON
CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS, there is a need for the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP) to adopt a common
stand on the approach to support the proposals of the People's Consultative Commission on Charter Change;
WHEREAS, ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms as embodied in the ULAP Joint Declaration for Constitutional
Reforms signed by the members of the ULAP and the majority coalition of the House of Representatives in
Manila Hotel sometime in October 2005;

ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not authorize petitioner Aumentado to prepare the 25 August 2006
petition, or the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02
"support(s) the porposals (sic) of the Consulatative (sic) Commission on Charter Change through
people's initiative and referendum as a mode of amending the 1987 Constitution." The proposals of the
Consultative Commission24 arevastly different from the proposed changes of the Lambino Group in the 25
August 2006 petition or 30 August 2006 amended petition filed with the COMELEC.
For example, the proposed revisions of the Consultative Commission affect all provisions of the existing
Constitution, from the Preamble to the Transitory Provisions. The proposed revisions have profound
impact on the Judiciary and the National Patrimony provisions of the existing Constitution, provisions that the
Lambino Group's proposed changes do not touch. The Lambino Group's proposed changes purport to affect
only Articles VI and VII of the existing Constitution, including the introduction of new Transitory Provisions.
The ULAP adopted Resolution No. 2006-02 on 14 January 2006 or more than six months before the filing of
the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006 amended petition with the COMELEC. However, ULAP
Resolution No. 2006-02 does not establish that ULAP or the Lambino Group caused the circulation of the draft
petition, together with the signature sheets, six months before the filing with the COMELEC. On the
contrary, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 casts grave doubt on the Lambino Group's claim that they
circulated the draft petition together with the signature sheets. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not
refer at all to the draft petition or to the Lambino Group's proposed changes.
In their Manifestation explaining their amended petition before the COMELEC, the Lambino Group declared:

WHEREAS, the People's Consultative Commission on Charter Change created by Her Excellency to
recommend amendments to the 1987 Constitution has submitted its final report sometime in December 2005;
WHEREAS, the ULAP is mindful of the current political developments in Congress which militates against the
use of the expeditious form of amending the 1987 Constitution;
WHEREAS, subject to the ratification of its institutional members and the failure of Congress to amend the
Constitution as a constituent assembly, ULAP has unanimously agreed to pursue the constitutional reform
agenda through People's Initiative and Referendum without prejudice to other pragmatic means to pursue the
same;

After the Petition was filed, Petitioners belatedly realized that the proposed amendments alleged in the
Petition, more specifically, paragraph 3 of Section 4 and paragraph 2 of Section 5 of the Transitory Provisions
were inaccurately stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not allege that they were amending the petition because the amended petition was
what they had shown to the people during the February to August 2006 signature-gathering. Instead, the
Lambino Group alleged that the petition of 25 August 2006 "inaccurately stated and failed to correctly reflect
their proposed amendments."

WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, THAT ALL THE MEMBER-LEAGUES OF

THE UNION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ULAP) SUPPORT THE PORPOSALS (SIC)
OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULATATIVE (SIC) COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH
PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION;

The Lambino Group never alleged in the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006 amended petition
with the COMELEC that they circulated printed copies of the draft petition together with the signature sheets.
Likewise, the Lambino Group did not allege in their present petition before this Court that they circulated
printed copies of the draft petition together with the signature sheets. The signature sheets do not also contain
any indication that the draft petition is attached to, or circulated with, the signature sheets.

DONE, during the ULAP National Executive Board special meeting held on 14 January 2006 at the Century
Park Hotel, Manila.23 (Underscoring supplied)

It is only in their Consolidated Reply to the Opposition-in-Interventions that the Lambino Group first claimed
that they circulated the "petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC," thus:
[T]here is persuasive authority to the effect that "(w)here there is not (sic) fraud, a signer who did not read
the measure attached to a referendum petition cannot question his signature on the ground that he
did not understand the nature of the act." [82 C.J.S. S128h. Mo. State v. Sullivan, 224, S.W. 327, 283 Mo.
546.] Thus, the registered voters who signed the signature sheets circulated together with the petition

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for initiative filed with the COMELEC below, are presumed to have understood the proposition contained in
the petition. (Emphasis supplied)

100,000 signature sheets with the attached petition, the maximum number of people who saw the petition
before they signed the signature sheets would not exceed 1,000,000.

The Lambino Group's statement that they circulated to the people "the petition for initiative filed with the
COMELEC" appears an afterthought, made after the intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Cebu City
Chapter and Cebu Province Chapters) and Atty. Quadra had pointed out that the signature sheets did not
contain the text of the proposed changes. In their Consolidated Reply, the Lambino Group alleged that they
circulated "the petition for initiative" but failed to mention the amended petition. This contradicts what Atty.
Lambino finally stated during the oral arguments that what they circulated was the draft of the amended
petition of 30 August 2006.

With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would be physically impossible for all or a great majority of
the 6.3 million signatories to have seen the petition before they signed the signature sheets. The inescapable
conclusion is that the Lambino Group failed to show to the 6.3 million signatories the full text of the
proposed changes. If ever, not more than one million signatories saw the petition before they signed the
signature sheets.

The Lambino Group cites as authority Corpus Juris Secundum, stating that "a signer who did not read the
measure attached to a referendum petition cannot question his signature on the ground that he did not
understand the nature of the act." The Lambino Group quotes an authority that cites a proposed
changeattached to the petition signed by the people. Even the authority the Lambino Group quotes
requires that the proposed change must be attached to the petition. The same authority the Lambino Group
quotes requires the people to sign on the petition itself.
Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence that the proposed amendment must be incorporated with, or
attached to, the initiative petition signed by the people. In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed
changes were not incorporated with, or attached to, the signature sheets. The Lambino Group's citation
of Corpus Juris Secundum pulls the rug from under their feet.
It is extremely doubtful that the Lambino Group prepared, printed, circulated, from February to August 2006
during the signature-gathering period, the draft of the petition or amended petition they filed later with the
COMELEC. The Lambino Group are less than candid with this Court in their belated claim that they printed
and circulated, together with the signature sheets, the petition or amended petition. Nevertheless,
even assumingthe Lambino Group circulated the amended petition during the signature-gathering
period, the Lambino Group admitted circulating only very limited copies of the petition.
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino expressly admitted that they printed only 100,000 copies of
the draft petition they filed more than six months later with the COMELEC. Atty. Lambino added that he
also asked other supporters to print additional copies of the draft petition but he could not state with certainty
how many additional copies the other supporters printed. Atty. Lambino could only assure this Court of
the printing of 100,000 copies because he himself caused the printing of these 100,000 copies.
Likewise, in the Lambino Group's Memorandum filed on 11 October 2006, the Lambino Group expressly
admits that "petitioner Lambino initiated the printing and reproduction of 100,000 copies of the
petition for initiative x x x."25 This admission binds the Lambino Group and establishes beyond any
doubt that the Lambino Group failed to show the full text of the proposed changes to the great
majority of the people who signed the signature sheets.
Thus, of the 6.3 million signatories, only 100,000 signatories could have received with certainty one copy each
of the petition, assuming a 100 percent distribution with no wastage. If Atty. Lambino and company attached
one copy of the petition to each signature sheet, only 100,000 signature sheets could have circulated with the
petition. Each signature sheet contains space for ten signatures. Assuming ten people signed each of these

In any event, the Lambino Group's signature sheets do not contain the full text of the proposed changes,
either on the face of the signature sheets, or as attachment with an indication in the signature sheet of such
attachment.Petitioner Atty. Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments, and this admission binds
the Lambino Group. This fact is also obvious from a mere reading of the signature sheet. This
omission is fatal. The failure to so include the text of the proposed changes in the signature sheets renders
the initiative void for non-compliance with the constitutional requirement that the amendment must be
"directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition." The signature sheet is not the
"petition" envisioned in the initiative clause of the Constitution.
For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets did not see the full text
of the proposed changes before signing. They could not have known the nature and effect of the proposed
changes, among which are:
1. The term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted and thus members of Parliament can be reelected indefinitely;26
2. The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely until its members, who are almost all the
present members of Congress, decide to call for new parliamentary elections. Thus, the members of the
interim Parliament will determine the expiration of their own term of office; 27
3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed changes, the interim Parliament shall convene to
propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.28
These three specific amendments are not stated or even indicated in the Lambino Group's signature sheets.
The people who signed the signature sheets had no idea that they were proposing these amendments. These
three proposed changes are highly controversial. The people could not have inferred or divined these
proposed changes merely from a reading or rereading of the contents of the signature sheets.
During the oral arguments, petitioner Atty. Lambino stated that he and his group assured the people during
the signature-gathering that the elections for the regular Parliament would be held during the 2007
local elections if the proposed changes were ratified before the 2007 local elections. However, the text of the
proposed changes belies this.
The proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, as found in the amended petition, states:

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Section 5(2). The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament, which shall
be synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of all local government officials. x x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 5(2) does not state that the elections for the regular Parliament will be held simultaneously with the
2007 local elections. This section merely requires that the elections for the regular Parliament shall be held
simultaneously with the local elections without specifying the year.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, who claims to be the principal drafter of the proposed changes, could have easily
written the word "next" before the phrase "election of all local government officials." This would have insured
that the elections for the regular Parliament would be held in the next local elections following the ratification
of the proposed changes. However, the absence of the word "next" allows the interim Parliament to schedule
the elections for the regular Parliament simultaneously with any future local elections.
Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will decide the expiration of their own term of office. This allows
incumbent members of the House of Representatives to hold office beyond their current three-year term of
office, and possibly even beyond the five-year term of office of regular members of the Parliament. Certainly,
this is contrary to the representations of Atty. Lambino and his group to the 6.3 million people who
signed the signature sheets. Atty. Lambino and his group deceived the 6.3 million signatories, and
even the entire nation.
This lucidly shows the absolute need for the people to sign an initiative petition that contains the full text of
the proposed amendments to avoid fraud or misrepresentation. In the present initiative, the 6.3 million
signatories had to rely on the verbal representations of Atty. Lambino and his group because the signature
sheets did not contain the full text of the proposed changes. The result is a grand deception on the 6.3
million signatories who were led to believe that the proposed changes would require the holding in 2007 of
elections for the regular Parliament simultaneously with the local elections.
The Lambino Group's initiative springs another surprise on the people who signed the signature sheets. The
proposed changes mandate the interim Parliament to make further amendments or revisions to the
Constitution. The proposed Section 4(4), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, provides:
Section 4(4). Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim Parliament shall
convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the principles of
local autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy. (Emphasis supplied)
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino stated that this provision is a "surplusage" and the Court and the
people should simply ignore it. Far from being a surplusage, this provision invalidates the Lambino Group's
initiative.
Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the
Unicameral-Parliamentary system. American jurisprudence on initiatives outlaws this as logrolling - when the
initiative petition incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the same petition. This puts the people in a
dilemma since they can answer only either yes or no to the entire proposition, forcing them to sign a petition
that effectively contains two propositions, one of which they may find unacceptable.

Under American jurisprudence, the effect of logrolling is to nullify the entire proposition and not only the
unrelated subject matter. Thus, in Fine v. Firestone,29 the Supreme Court of Florida declared:
Combining multiple propositions into one proposal constitutes "logrolling," which, if our judicial
responsibility is to mean anything, we cannot permit. The very broadness of the proposed amendment
amounts to logrolling because the electorate cannot know what it is voting on - the amendment's proponents'
simplistic explanation reveals only the tip of the iceberg. x x x x The ballot must give the electorate fair notice
of the proposed amendment being voted on. x x x x The ballot language in the instant case fails to do that.
The very broadness of the proposal makes it impossible to state what it will affect and effect and violates the
requirement that proposed amendments embrace only one subject. (Emphasis supplied)
Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people. In Yute Air Alaska v. McAlpine,30 the Supreme Court of
Alaska warned against "inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in logrolling:
Whenever a bill becomes law through the initiative process, all of the problems that the single-subject rule
was enacted to prevent are exacerbated. There is a greater danger of logrolling, or the deliberate
intermingling of issues to increase the likelihood of an initiative's passage, and there is a greater opportunity
for "inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in the enactment-by-initiative process. The drafters of an initiative
operate independently of any structured or supervised process. They often emphasize particular provisions of
their proposition, while remaining silent on other (more complex or less appealing) provisions, when
communicating to the public. x x x Indeed, initiative promoters typically use simplistic advertising to
present their initiative to potential petition-signers and eventual voters. Many voters will never read the
full text of the initiative before the election. More importantly, there is no process for amending or splitting the
several provisions in an initiative proposal. These difficulties clearly distinguish the initiative from the
legislative process. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the present initiative appears merely a preliminary step for further amendments or revisions to be
undertaken by the interim Parliament as a constituent assembly. The people who signed the signature sheets
could not have known that their signatures would be used to propose an amendment mandating the interim
Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.
Apparently, the Lambino Group inserted the proposed Section 4(4) to compel the interim Parliament to
amend or revise again the Constitution within 45 days from ratification of the proposed changes, or before
the May 2007 elections. In the absence of the proposed Section 4(4), the interim Parliament has the
discretion whether to amend or revise again the Constitution. With the proposed Section 4(4), the initiative
proponents want the interim Parliament mandated to immediately amend or revise again the Constitution.
However, the signature sheets do not explain the reason for this rush in amending or revising again so soon
the Constitution. The signature sheets do not also explain what specific amendments or revisions the initiative
proponents want the interim Parliament to make, and why there is a need for such further amendments or
revisions. The people are again left in the dark to fathom the nature and effect of the proposed
changes. Certainly, such an initiative is not "directly proposed by the people" because the people do not even
know the nature and effect of the proposed changes.
There is another intriguing provision inserted in the Lambino Group's amended petition of 30 August 2006.
The proposed Section 4(3) of the Transitory Provisions states:

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Section 4(3). Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be members of Parliament until noon of the
thirtieth day of June 2010.
After 30 June 2010, not one of the present Senators will remain as member of Parliament if the interim
Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010. However, there is no
counterpart provision for the present members of the House of Representatives even if their term of office will
all end on 30 June 2007, three years earlier than that of half of the present Senators. Thus, all the present
members of the House will remain members of the interim Parliament after 30 June 2010.
The term of the incumbent President ends on 30 June 2010. Thereafter, the Prime Minister exercises all the
powers of the President. If the interim Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30
June 2010, the Prime Minister will come only from the present members of the House of Representatives to
theexclusion of the present Senators.
The signature sheets do not explain this discrimination against the Senators. The 6.3 million people who
signed the signature sheets could not have known that their signatures would be used to discriminate
against the Senators. They could not have known that their signatures would be used to limit, after 30
June 2010, the interim Parliament's choice of Prime Minister only to members of the existing House of
Representatives.
An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full text of the
proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. That
is why the Constitution requires that an initiative must be "directly proposed by the people x x x in a
petition" - meaning that the people must sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the nation's fundamental law, the writing of the text of the
proposed amendments cannot be hidden from the people under a general or special power of attorney to
unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals.
The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. This
Court trusts the wisdom of the people even if the members of this Court do not personally know the people
who sign the petition. However, this trust emanates from a fundamental assumption: the full text of the
proposed amendment is first shown to the people before they sign the petition, not after they have
signed the petition.
In short, the Lambino Group's initiative is void and unconstitutional because it dismally fails to comply with the
requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution that the initiative must be "directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition."

ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or
(2) A constitutional convention.
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The first mode is through
Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is through a constitutional convention.
The third mode is through a people's initiative.
Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to "[A]ny amendment to, or revision
of, this Constitution." In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only to
"[A]mendments to this Constitution." This distinction was intentional as shown by the following deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission:
MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.
May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the Commission that pursuant to the mandate given
to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the
proposed provision governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete
committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to this
Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. This proposal was suggested on
the theory that this matter of initiative, which came about because of the extraordinary developments this year,
has to be separated from the traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The
committee members felt that this system of initiative should be limited to amendments to the
Constitution and should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from
the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. x x x x

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through
Initiatives

xxxx

A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its
revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and revisions to
the Constitution. Article XVII of the Constitution provides:

MS. AQUINO: [I] am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a separate section in the
Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of realigning
Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section as if it
were a self-executing provision?

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MR. SUAREZ: We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of initiative is
limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision which contemplates a total
overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense that was conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO: In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes (a)
and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas, the process of initiation to amend,
which is given to the public, would only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ: That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee.
MS. AQUINO: I thank the sponsor; and thank you, Madam President.

receive in the Assembly the two-third's majority vote of both houses required by Article XVII, Section 2, and
hence failed of adoption, x x x.

xxxx

Whether it be a revision or a new constitution, it is not such a measure as can be submitted to the people
through the initiative. If a revision, it is subject to the requirements of Article XVII, Section 2(1); if a new
constitution, it can only be proposed at a convention called in the manner provided in Article XVII, Section 1. x
xxx

MR. MAAMBONG: My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line 1 refers to
"amendments." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he
made the distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by Section 1.
So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision."
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.31 (Emphasis supplied)
There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction
between "amendment" and "revision" of the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that only
Congress or a constitutional convention may propose revisions to the Constitution. The framers intended,
and wrote, that a people's initiative may propose only amendments to the Constitution. Where the intent and
language of the Constitution clearly withhold from the people the power to propose revisions to the
Constitution, the people cannot propose revisions even as they are empowered to propose amendments.
This has been the consistent ruling of state supreme courts in the United States. Thus, in McFadden v.
Jordan,32 the Supreme Court of California ruled:
The initiative power reserved by the people by amendment to the Constitution x x x applies only to the
proposing and the adopting or rejecting of 'laws and amendments to the Constitution' and does not
purport to extend to a constitutional revision. x x x x It is thus clear that a revision of the Constitution may
be accomplished only through ratification by the people of a revised constitution proposed by a convention
called for that purpose as outlined hereinabove. Consequently if the scope of the proposed initiative measure
(hereinafter termed 'the measure') now before us is so broad that if such measure became law a substantial
revision of our present state Constitution would be effected, then the measure may not properly be submitted
to the electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon by a constitutional convention, and the writ sought by
petitioner should issue. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled in Holmes v. Appling:33
It is well established that when a constitution specifies the manner in which it may be amended or revised, it
can be altered by those who favor amendments, revision, or other change only through the use of one of the
specified means. The constitution itself recognizes that there is a difference between an amendment and a
revision; and it is obvious from an examination of the measure here in question that it is not an amendment as
that term is generally understood and as it is used in Article IV, Section 1. The document appears to be based
in large part on the revision of the constitution drafted by the 'Commission for Constitutional Revision'
authorized by the 1961 Legislative Assembly, x x x and submitted to the 1963 Legislative Assembly. It failed to

While differing from that document in material respects, the measure sponsored by the plaintiffs is,
nevertheless, a thorough overhauling of the present constitution x x x.
To call it an amendment is a misnomer.

Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a people's initiative can only propose amendments to
the Constitution since the Constitution itself limits initiatives to amendments. There can be no deviation from
the constitutionally prescribed modes of revising the Constitution. A popular clamor, even one backed by 6.3
million signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the specific modes prescribed in the Constitution itself.
As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled in In re Initiative Petition No. 364:34
It is a fundamental principle that a constitution can only be revised or amended in the manner
prescribed by the instrument itself, and that any attempt to revise a constitution in a manner other
than the one provided in the instrument is almost invariably treated as extra-constitutional and
revolutionary. x x x x "While it is universally conceded that the people are sovereign and that they have
power to adopt a constitution and to change their own work at will, they must, in doing so, act in an orderly
manner and according to the settled principles of constitutional law. And where the people, in adopting a
constitution, have prescribed the method by which the people may alter or amend it, an attempt to change the
fundamental law in violation of the self-imposed restrictions, is unconstitutional." x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
This Court, whose members are sworn to defend and protect the Constitution, cannot shirk from its solemn
oath and duty to insure compliance with the clear command of the Constitution that a people's initiative
may only amend, never revise, the Constitution.
The question is, does the Lambino Group's initiative constitute an amendment or revision of the Constitution?
If the Lambino Group's initiative constitutes a revision, then the present petition should be dismissed for being
outside the scope of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a constitution. One of
the earliest cases that recognized the distinction described the fundamental difference in this manner:
[T]he very term "constitution" implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, and the provisions
contained therein for its revision indicate the will of the people that the underlying principles upon
which it rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a like permanent and
abiding nature. On the other hand, the significance of the term "amendment" implies such an addition or

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change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an improvement, or better carry out the purpose
for which it was framed.35 (Emphasis supplied)
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the principle
of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters the
substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the
constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes
without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the
constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific provision being amended.
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like in our
Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The
quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the
'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions." 36 The
court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution. The main
inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic
governmental plan as to amount to a revision."37 Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government
is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, "a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan" includes
"change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches." 38 A change in the nature of
the basic governmental plan also includes changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of government and the
system of check and balances."39
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not merely an
amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's proposed changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on the
Legislature and Article VII on the Executive - affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire
Constitution.40Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from
presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three great co-equal
branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of
powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a UnicameralParliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive branches is a
radical change in the structure of government.
The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the separation of
powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of
Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the
Constitution.
By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a UnicameralParliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of
Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment. On the face alone of the Lambino Group's
proposed changes, it is readily apparent that the changes will radically alter the framework of government
as set forth in the Constitution. Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a leading member of the Constitutional
Commission, writes:

An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. The guiding original
intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet
new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to be
dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplates a re-examination of the
entire document, or of provisions of the document which have over-all implications for the entire document, to
determine how and to what extent they should be altered. Thus, for instance a switch from the presidential
system to a parliamentary system would be a revision because of its over-all impact on the entire
constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral system be
because of its effect on other important provisions of the Constitution.41 (Emphasis supplied)
In Adams v. Gunter,42 an initiative petition proposed the amendment of the Florida State constitution to shift
from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. The issue turned on whether the initiative "was defective and
unauthorized where [the] proposed amendment would x x x affect several other provisions of [the]
Constitution." The Supreme Court of Florida, striking down the initiative as outside the scope of the initiative
clause, ruled as follows:
The proposal here to amend Section 1 of Article III of the 1968 Constitution to provide for a Unicameral
Legislature affects not only many other provisions of the Constitution but provides for a change in the
form of the legislative branch of government, which has been in existence in the United States Congress
and in all of the states of the nation, except one, since the earliest days. It would be difficult to visualize a
more revolutionary change. The concept of a House and a Senate is basic in the American form of
government. It would not only radically change the whole pattern of government in this state and tear
apart the whole fabric of the Constitution, but would even affect the physical facilities necessary to
carry on government.
xxxx
We conclude with the observation that if such proposed amendment were adopted by the people at the
General Election and if the Legislature at its next session should fail to submit further amendments to revise
and clarify the numerous inconsistencies and conflicts which would result, or if after submission of appropriate
amendments the people should refuse to adopt them, simple chaos would prevail in the government of this
State. The same result would obtain from an amendment, for instance, of Section 1 of Article V, to provide for
only a Supreme Court and Circuit Courts-and there could be other examples too numerous to detail. These
examples point unerringly to the answer.
The purpose of the long and arduous work of the hundreds of men and women and many sessions of the
Legislature in bringing about the Constitution of 1968 was to eliminate inconsistencies and conflicts and to
give the State a workable, accordant, homogenous and up-to-date document. All of this could disappear very
quickly if we were to hold that it could be amended in the manner proposed in the initiative petition
here.43 (Emphasis supplied)
The rationale of the Adams decision applies with greater force to the present petition. The Lambino Group's
initiative not only seeks a shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature, it also seeks to merge the
executive and legislative departments. The initiative in Adams did not even touch the executive department.
In Adams, the Supreme Court of Florida enumerated 18 sections of the Florida Constitution that would be
affected by the shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. In the Lambino Group's present initiative, no

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less than 105 provisions of the Constitution would be affected based on the count of Associate Justice
Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.44 There is no doubt that the Lambino Group's present initiative seeks far more radical
changes in the structure of government than the initiative in Adams.
The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between "amendment" and "revision" is only one of
procedure, not of substance. The Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative body drafts and proposes
changes to the Constitution, substantive changes are called "revisions" because members of the
deliberative body work full-time on the changes. However, the same substantive changes, when proposed
through an initiative, are called "amendments" because the changes are made by ordinary people who do
not make an "occupation, profession, or vocation" out of such endeavor.
Thus, the Lambino Group makes the following exposition of their theory in their Memorandum:
99. With this distinction in mind, we note that the constitutional provisions expressly provide for both
"amendment" and "revision" when it speaks of legislators and constitutional delegates, while the same
provisions expressly provide only for "amendment" when it speaks of the people. It would seem that the
apparent distinction is based on the actual experience of the people, that on one hand the common people in
general are not expected to work full-time on the matter of correcting the constitution because that is not their
occupation, profession or vocation; while on the other hand, the legislators and constitutional convention
delegates are expected to work full-time on the same matter because that is their occupation, profession or
vocation. Thus, the difference between the words "revision" and "amendment" pertain only to the
process or procedure of coming up with the corrections, for purposes of interpreting the constitutional
provisions.
100. Stated otherwise, the difference between "amendment" and "revision" cannot reasonably be in
the substance or extent of the correction. x x x x (Underlining in the original; boldfacing supplied)
The Lambino Group in effect argues that if Congress or a constitutional convention had drafted the same
proposed changes that the Lambino Group wrote in the present initiative, the changes would constitute a
revision of the Constitution. Thus, the Lambino Group concedes that the proposed changes in the
present initiative constitute a revision if Congress or a constitutional convention had drafted the
changes. However, since the Lambino Group as private individuals drafted the proposed changes, the
changes are merely amendments to the Constitution. The Lambino Group trivializes the serious matter of
changing the fundamental law of the land.
The express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution contradict the Lambino
Group's theory. Where the intent of the framers and the language of the Constitution are clear and plainly
stated, courts do not deviate from such categorical intent and language. 45 Any theory espousing a
construction contrary to such intent and language deserves scant consideration. More so, if such theory
wreaks havoc by creating inconsistencies in the form of government established in the Constitution. Such a
theory, devoid of any jurisprudential mooring and inviting inconsistencies in the Constitution, only exposes the
flimsiness of the Lambino Group's position. Any theory advocating that a proposed change involving a radical
structural change in government does not constitute a revision justly deserves rejection.
The Lambino Group simply recycles a theory that initiative proponents in American jurisdictions have
attempted to advance without any success. In Lowe v. Keisling,46 the Supreme Court of Oregon rejected
this theory, thus:

Mabon argues that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to changes to the constitution proposed by
initiative. His theory is that Article XVII, section 2 merely provides a procedure by which the legislature
can propose a revision of the constitution, but it does not affect proposed revisions initiated by the
people.
Plaintiffs argue that the proposed ballot measure constitutes a wholesale change to the constitution that
cannot be enacted through the initiative process. They assert that the distinction between amendment and
revision is determined by reviewing the scope and subject matter of the proposed enactment, and that
revisions are not limited to "a formal overhauling of the constitution." They argue that this ballot measure
proposes far reaching changes outside the lines of the original instrument, including profound impacts on
existing fundamental rights and radical restructuring of the government's relationship with a defined group of
citizens. Plaintiffs assert that, because the proposed ballot measure "will refashion the most basic principles of
Oregon constitutional law," the trial court correctly held that it violated Article XVII, section 2, and cannot
appear on the ballot without the prior approval of the legislature.
We first address Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2(1), does not prohibit revisions instituted by
initiative. In Holmes v. Appling, x x x, the Supreme Court concluded that a revision of the constitution may not
be accomplished by initiative, because of the provisions of Article XVII, section 2. After reviewing Article XVII,
section1, relating to proposed amendments, the court said:
"From the foregoing it appears that Article IV, Section 1, authorizes the use of the initiative as a means of
amending the Oregon Constitution, but it contains no similar sanction for its use as a means of revising the
constitution." x x x x
It then reviewed Article XVII, section 2, relating to revisions, and said: "It is the only section of the constitution
which provides the means for constitutional revision and it excludes the idea that an individual, through the
initiative, may place such a measure before the electorate." x x x x
Accordingly, we reject Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to constitutional
revisions proposed by initiative. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, this Court must reject the Lambino Group's theory which negates the express intent of the framers
and the plain language of the Constitution.
We can visualize amendments and revisions as a spectrum, at one end green for amendments and at the
other end red for revisions. Towards the middle of the spectrum, colors fuse and difficulties arise in
determining whether there is an amendment or revision. The present initiative is indisputably located at the far
end of the red spectrum where revision begins. The present initiative seeks a radical overhaul of the existing
separation of powers among the three co-equal departments of government, requiring far-reaching
amendments in several sections and articles of the Constitution.
Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without affecting any other
section or article, the change may generally be considered an amendment and not a revision. For example, a
change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years47 is an amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a
change reducing Filipino ownership of mass media companies from 100 percent to 60 percent is an

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amendment and not a revision.48 Also, a change requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for
election to the Presidency is an amendment and not a revision. 49
The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or articles of the Constitution other
than the specific provision being amended. These changes do not also affect the structure of government or
the system of checks-and-balances among or within the three branches. These three examples are located at
the far green end of the spectrum, opposite the far red end where the revision sought by the present petition is
located.
However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A change in a single
word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an amendment. For example, the
substitution of the word "republican" with "monarchic" or "theocratic" in Section 1, Article II 50 of the Constitution
radically overhauls the entire structure of government and the fundamental ideological basis of the
Constitution. Thus, each specific change will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects
other provisions, as well as how it affects the structure of government, the carefully crafted system of checksand-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the existing Constitution.
Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a constitution, a deliberative
body with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision. A revision requires harmonizing not
only several provisions, but also the altered principles with those that remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions
normally authorize deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions to undertake
revisions. On the other hand, constitutions allow people's initiatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable
deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake only amendments and not revisions.

The irreconcilable inconsistency envisioned in the proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions is not
between a provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and a provision in the proposed changes. The
inconsistency is between a provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the "Parliamentary system of
government," and the inconsistency shall be resolved in favor of a "unicameral parliamentary form of
government."
Now, what "unicameral parliamentary form of government" do the Lambino Group's proposed changes
refer to the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand models, which are among the few countries
withunicameral parliaments? The proposed changes could not possibly refer to the traditional and wellknown parliamentary forms of government the British, French, Spanish, German, Italian, Canadian,
Australian, or Malaysian models, which have all bicameral parliaments. Did the people who signed the
signature sheets realize that they were adopting the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand
parliamentary form of government?
This drives home the point that the people's initiative is not meant for revisions of the Constitution but only for
amendments. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system requires
harmonizing several provisions in many articles of the Constitution. Revision of the Constitution through a
people's initiative will only result in gross absurdities in the Constitution.
In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not an amendment.
Thus, the present initiative is void and unconstitutional because it violates Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution limiting the scope of a people's initiative to "[A]mendments to this Constitution."
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions states:
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the exception
of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby be amended and
Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and
renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the
Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall be amended to conform with a
unicameral parliamentary form of government; x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The basic rule in statutory construction is that if a later law is irreconcilably inconsistent with a prior law, the
later law prevails. This rule also applies to construction of constitutions. However, the Lambino Group's draft
of Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions turns on its head this rule of construction by stating that in case of
such irreconcilable inconsistency, the earlier provision "shall be amended to conform with a unicameral
parliamentary form of government." The effect is to freeze the two irreconcilable provisions until the earlier
one "shall be amended," which requires a future separate constitutional amendment.
Realizing the absurdity of the need for such an amendment, petitioner Atty. Lambino readily conceded during
the oral arguments that the requirement of a future amendment is a "surplusage." In short, Atty. Lambino
wants to reinstate the rule of statutory construction so that the later provision automatically prevails in case of
irreconcilable inconsistency. However, it is not as simple as that.

The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people's initiative to amend the Constitution. There is
no need to revisit this Court's ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in
essential terms and conditions" to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or
reversal of Santiagowill not change the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court must decline to
revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the requirements of the
Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution.
This Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of a statute if the case before the Court
can be resolved on some other grounds. Such avoidance is a logical consequence of the well-settled doctrine
that courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the case can be resolved on some other
grounds.51
Nevertheless, even assuming that RA 6735 is valid to implement the constitutional provision on initiatives to
amend the Constitution, this will not change the result here because the present petition violates Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution. To be a valid initiative, the present initiative must first comply with Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution even before complying with RA 6735.
Even then, the present initiative violates Section 5(b) of RA 6735 which requires that the "petition for an
initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of

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registered voters as signatories." Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requires that the people must sign the "petition x
x x as signatories."
The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition of 25 August 2006 or the amended petition of 30 August
2006 filed with the COMELEC. Only Atty. Lambino, Atty. Demosthenes B. Donato, and Atty. Alberto C.
Agra signed the petition and amended petition as counsels for "Raul L. Lambino and Erico B.
Aumentado, Petitioners." In the COMELEC, the Lambino Group, claiming to act "together with" the 6.3
million signatories, merely attached the signature sheets to the petition and amended petition. Thus, the
petition and amended petition filed with the COMELEC did not even comply with the basic requirement of RA
6735 that the Lambino Group claims as valid.

To allow such change in the fundamental law is to set adrift the Constitution in unchartered waters, to be
tossed and turned by every dominant political group of the day. If this Court allows today a cavalier change in
the Constitution outside the constitutionally prescribed modes, tomorrow the new dominant political group that
comes will demand its own set of changes in the same cavalier and unconstitutional fashion. A revolving-door
constitution does not augur well for the rule of law in this country.
An overwhelming majority 16,622,111 voters comprising 76.3 percent of the total votes cast53
approved our Constitution in a national plebiscite held on 11 February 1987. That approval is the
unmistakable voice of the people, the full expression of the people's sovereign will. That approval
included the prescribed modes for amending or revising the Constitution.

The Lambino Group's logrolling initiative also violates Section 10(a) of RA 6735 stating, "No petition
embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; x x x." The proposed Section
4(4) of the Transitory Provisions, mandating the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or
revisions to the Constitution, is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift in the form of government. Since
the present initiative embraces more than one subject matter, RA 6735 prohibits submission of the initiative
petition to the electorate. Thus, even if RA 6735 is valid, the Lambino Group's initiative will still fail.

No amount of signatures, not even the 6,327,952 million signatures gathered by the Lambino Group, can
change our Constitution contrary to the specific modes that the people, in their sovereign capacity, prescribed
when they ratified the Constitution. The alternative is an extra-constitutional change, which means subverting
the people's sovereign will and discarding the Constitution. This is one act the Court cannot and should
never do. As the ultimate guardian of the Constitution, this Court is sworn to perform its solemn duty to defend
and protect the Constitution, which embodies the real sovereign will of the people.

4. The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse of Discretion in Dismissing the Lambino Group's
Initiative

Incantations of "people's voice," "people's sovereign will," or "let the people decide" cannot override the
specific modes of changing the Constitution as prescribed in the Constitution itself. Otherwise, the
Constitution the people's fundamental covenant that provides enduring stability to our society becomes
easily susceptible to manipulative changes by political groups gathering signatures through false promises.
Then, the Constitution ceases to be the bedrock of the nation's stability.

In dismissing the Lambino Group's initiative petition, the COMELEC en banc merely followed this Court's
ruling inSantiago and People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v.
COMELEC.52 For following this Court's ruling, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the COMELEC.
On this ground alone, the present petition warrants outright dismissal. Thus, this Court should reiterate
its unanimous ruling in PIRMA:
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the public
respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied with
the dispositions in the Decisions of this Court in G.R. No. 127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its
Resolution of June 10, 1997.
5. Conclusion
The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, deserves the utmost respect and obedience of all the
citizens of this nation. No one can trivialize the Constitution by cavalierly amending or revising it in blatant
violation of the clearly specified modes of amendment and revision laid down in the Constitution itself.

The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the "people's voice." However, the Lambino Group
unabashedly states in ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification of their petition with the COMELEC,
that "ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria MacapagalArroyo for constitutional reforms." The Lambino Group thus admits that their "people's" initiative is an
"unqualified support to the agenda" of the incumbent President to change the Constitution. This forewarns the
Court to be wary of incantations of "people's voice" or "sovereign will" in the present initiative.
This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to defend and protect the Constitution. The Constitution, which
embodies the people's sovereign will, is the bible of this Court. This Court exists to defend and protect the
Constitution. To allow this constitutionally infirm initiative, propelled by deceptively gathered signatures, to
alter basic principles in the Constitution is to allow a desecration of the Constitution. To allow such alteration
and desecration is to lose this Court's raison d'etre.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.
SO ORDERED

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