ON THE CONSISTENCY AND THE COMPLETENESS OF ARITHMETIC

I. M. R. Pinheiro1

Abstract:

In this paper, we destroy one more idol in Logic: Arithmetic is actually both complete and

consistent. As a side result, we propose a new set of axioms for Arithmetic, and it is going to be

a set of infinite cardinality instead of a set with cardinality five. We explore at least six major

issues in Mathematics: Russell’s Paradox, Gödel’s most famous assertion, Peano’s axioms,

inclusion relation basics, coordinate system of reference, and the parallels problem.

Key-words:

Peano, Arithmetic, completeness, consistency, complete, consistent, natural, proposition,

premise, parallels, inclusion, set, statement, denotation, Gödel.

1. Introduction:

It has always surprised us that something that seems so clear, Arithmetic, has generated so much

scientific debate by the time of Gödel, Church, Turing, and so many others. Because of this, we

have decided to investigate the issue further.

Before we proceed, we must make sure that the readers understand that whenever we make use

of the sigmatoid 'Arithmetic', we actually refer to the word as it is used by the vast majority of

the scientific authors. As a reference for what we mean, please visit [Causey 2006], p. 232

(basically, the natural numbers plus the operations that return values inside of the natural

1 Postal Address: Po Box 12396, A’Beckett st, Melbourne, Victoria, 8006. E-mail: mrpprofessional@yahoo.com
I. M. R. Pinheiro (31 pages) 1
numbers set).

In this paper, we actually wish for providing a definite proof that Arithmetic does not suffer from

any possible problems: No inconsistencies, no incompleteness, nothing.

We base ourselves in already published research, collecting bits and pieces here, as well as in our

own argumentation.

As a plus, we start writings on a `parallel world' for Mathematics, that is, an `alternative abstract

space'.

Our sequence of presentation is:

2. Gödel's assertions on Arithmetic;

3. Propositions, axioms, statements: How to tell the difference;

4. Some of Gödel's developments on his assertions on Arithmetic;

5. Some of Gödel's thoughts on axiomatic systems;

6. The human factor and the so striking, surprisingly unnoticed, differences between what is

human and what is passive of mechanization;

7. Other philosophers whose reasoning seems to match Gödel's somehow;

8. Conclusions;

9. References.

2. Gödel's assertions on Arithmetic

Gödel has allegedly written, according to some (see, for instance, [Darling 2004], p. 136), that if

an axiomatic system may contain Arithmetic then it must have to be either incomplete or

inconsistent.
Truth is that he never said that. Gödel has actually stated that the system, which is strong enough

for the Elementary Arithmetic of the natural numbers, would be syntactically incomplete2 and

that the consistency of Arithmetic could not be proved inside of itself (see [Jacquette 2002], for

instance, p. 327).

In the lines that follow, we will go through each one of the parts involved in Gödel's assertions

on Arithmetic.

3. Propositions, axioms, and statements: How to tell the difference?

A declaration, in English, when seen by `scientific’ eyes, may be a proposition, a simple

statement, or an axiom.

Axioms are all the assertions that cannot be proven, all we assume to be true, and they

form, in a mandatory way, the fundamental stones for any mathematical theory.

A statement that does not hold logical value is simply a statement, whilst those with logical value

will be called propositions (they actually refer to them as premises these days).

For instance, uttering `uh’: `Uh’ is a statement, a declaration, but never a proposition, for nothing

may be inferred logically from that.

However, `the chair is blue’ is an assignment to chair of a match in the color spectrum and,

therefore, a proposition, or almost, once everything in language is context-dependent (to be a

scientific statement, that is, a proposition, we would actually need to specify this shade of blue

technically, let’s say shade 55 in the color spectrum of factory X, and also the sort of chair it

2 A system that is syntactically complete allows any proposition to be proved either true or false by considering

the axioms of the system itself.

I. M. R. Pinheiro (31 pages) 3
refers to (like model, origin, and etc.)).

Another interesting point is: If we have `the chair is blue’, `the table is red’, `my sister is too old’

and `I am then going to invite only Sue’, the first two may be just statements, for they hold no

mandatory logical value for the conclusion, which seems to be deriving solely from the fact that

the sister is, indeed, too old. Notice that if we increase the context size, that situation may

change, for logical situations are almost as dynamic as real life: `The chair is blue’, `the table is

red’, `my sister is too old’, `therefore I am going to invite only Sue’, `because red and blue are

colors for kids’. Now, the addition of another sentence made it all logically necessary for the

conclusion, so that they are now all propositions.

Statement, involving Arithmetic, would be, for instance, `adding two numbers is merging the

sets corresponding to the number of units of counting of one number with the other, and then

providing the merging referent as response’. This is a statement of definition, and therefore a

clear proposition (logical value, foundational) for the operation of summing.

Another statement would be, for instance, that which assigns a number to a certain set of units of

counting. Such a statement would also be a proposition (foundational definition, even an axiom).

Thus, only with the natural numbers, there is an infinite number of them, and they are essential

for Arithmetic to be sound: The elements to be added. This way, Peano was simply teasing us

when he came up with only five axioms for Arithmetic over the natural numbers: Someone has

obviously forgotten to state that, apart from the designations for units of counting, we hold five

axioms in Arithmetic (see [Causey 2006] , p. 232, for instance). Besides, Peano has also

forgotten to spell out the nature of the 'successor' function, and that is essential for us to single

out our usual successor function, for there are infinitely many functions, which could be named

`successor', and still satisfy his axioms, even adding two units, or getting the successor of the
successor, making use of the term as in the English language.

4. Some of Gödel's developments on his assertions on Arithmetic

The proof of how impossible it is to `count’ the binary infinite sequences apparently generates

Gödel’s (1906-1978, see [E. Weissten 1996], for instance) proof for incompleteness. Cantor,

between 1873 and 1891, devised very particular proofs for this fact (see [George Cantor 1890]).

Gödel has also claimed that any well-built formula (built according to the well-posedness theory

for formulae in Arithmetic) in Arithmetic would have a Gödel number, that is, a string of

numbers, corresponding to it.

Gödel has apparently assigned a number to each mathematical symbol, consequently succeeding

in translating any mathematical formula into strings of those numbers, so that formula x, from

Arithmetic, would have G(x) as Gödel’s representation (see [Henry 2003]).

After mimicking the work performed by Cantor, Gödel ends up with a new formula, allowed by

the system for containing its allowed symbols, what proves that the number of formulae

available is higher than the ability of counting them via natural numbers. Gödel then (apparently,

according to a few) claims this proves that there will always be a well-formed formula, in

Arithmetic, which is not passive of deduction from the already existent formulae, so that this

particular formula is unprovable inside of any system with a finite number of axioms.

▬► THIS ASSERTION SEEMS UNREASONABLE.

The symbols used in a mathematical formula are not, necessarily, in direct correspondence with
I. M. R. Pinheiro (31 pages) 5
the meaning of the formula: One may get several different formulae that represent the same

information, for instance, or the same English statement.

Thus, this is the first argument clearly against his claimed-to-be conclusion.

The second argument is that the deduction of a formula does not have to do with the symbols of

the previous formulae, but with the information content.

For instance:

`5+2=7’ is the same as `7-2=5’ and etc.

`For all tables of color shade 57, there are table cloths of color shade 45’ is the same as `there is

no table of color shade 57 to which there is no table cloth of color shade 45’.

We then have different symbols for each variation of the same information content, yet only one

statement with that information content should be listed in our enumeration, for that is already

the information intended: Basic mistakes when trying to fit the English language inside of

Mathematics in bijection.

5. Some of Gödel's thoughts on axiomatic systems

One of the arguments used by Gödel to prove the incompleteness of the axiomatic system, which

could possibly contain Arithmetic, has to do with a special sentence. It goes like this:

`P does not have a proof in axiomatic system T’.

Call the previous sentence P (see [Kleene et al. 1986] , p. 6).

It is claimed that if a statement claims itself not to be provable then we have a sentence that
cannot be proved either false or true inside of the system under consideration. If we write that as:

`This statement does not have a proof in T’ and we consider the possible truth values of it,

according to Classical Logic, we end up with either `if the statement is true then it does not have

a proof in T’ or `if the statement is false then it does have a proof in T’, but its claim is that it

does not have a prove in T and, therefore, there is contradiction emerging from the possibilities,

or from both possible interpretations attained under Classical Logic. The confusion that Gödel

suffers from is not different from that suffered by people taking the Sorites seriously, as we have

explained before (see [Pinheiro 2006-2009b]). Basically, the English words may be applied to

more than one object, in the same sentence, with no mistake, but the scientific words cannot.

It is not because the writing `this statement does not have a proof in T’ is also labeled `statement’

in English, that is, we may apply the word for both cases (that of `this statement does not have a

proof in T’ and the own original statement the problem refers to, which is not mentioned in detail

in the sentence), that the word points to the same reference in both cases: There is a `time’ issue,

which is being disregarded, going on there. If one uses the word `statement’, that is like `x’ (for

Mathematics), when repeated in a mathematical sentence: Rigid and inhuman, to make it short.

Basically, `this’, in English, fits any possible thing seen by the speaker by the time they utter the

sentence containing that word. Of course, the same dynamics contained in Statistics, a human

Science, is present in real life: Everything is updated and considers continuous modifications in

the world of reference. Notwithstanding, for Mathematics, one only develops reasoning if

`freezing’ things at precise time t, that is, if making use of Einstein’s coordinate system with a

fixed time t implied, but possibly not stated clearly, each time the process occurs.

Another primordial point to be made is that regarding the well-posedness theory for Science:

`Well-posedness’ is a mandatory quality of a problem that is seen as passive of scientific

I. M. R. Pinheiro (31 pages) 7
analysis. Words such as `this’ need to appear, in a scientific text, accompanied by what they refer

to, in order to allow of scientific analysis. One thing will always be true: If it is vague in

language (see [Sorensen 2006], for instance, to learn more about vagueness), it is definitely

unsuitable for Science the way it is. First of all, one must master the language, be able to write

expressions and sentences, which will make everyone who reads them see what they see, to then

being able to translate univocally, as the well-posedness principle demands, that into scientific

lingo.

Ambiguity, or vagueness, besets any possible scientific analysis, especially in Mathematics, a

Classic Logic environment. Therefore, a sentence, as described above, is not `ready’ for logical

analysis yet and could not, possibly, be included as a proposition of the system under

consideration.

Now, suppose we specify `this’ to mean what is being written by the time we write: Interesting

that the only way to do it is writing

`X cannot be proven in system T’.

Calling this sentence X makes the statement logically incorrect, for one cannot use the same

place holder/variable to refer to different objects of reference in the same mathematical

statement. If the sentence is true then X cannot, indeed, be proven in T. If it is false, `X can be

proven in system T’ and, therefore, the statement bears no logical confusion whatsoever. Notice,

as well, that Einstein’s world (according to our sources here listed) of reference is also implied

here (whatever is taken to be X will also hold a time coordinate as a mathematical locator, that is,

the `thing’ X points to may only be precisely `located' if at least four coordinates are attached to
it as descriptors).

6. The human factor and the so striking, surprisingly unnoticed, differences between what

is human and what is passive of mechanization.

There should be a way of making it possible for Mathematics, instead of only Physics and

Statistics, to include human factors in its analysis. For instance, some text books are annoying

and seem to demand that the student draw an expected scene (expected by the person writing the

problem only), which will be necessary for the addressing of the problem. However, the

`imagination’ of the writer of the problem cannot, ever, be a mathematical entity. Recalling the

most basic rule of well-posedness (solve all inside of the smallest context that may embed the

whole problem and its expression), that of context, this sort of problem would be located, as

minimum placement, either in Statistics or in Physics, only for requiring `imagination’ derived

from `personal interpretation’ of the words given by the `maker’ of the problem: One can see

that, even with severely limited constraints on all variables involved, not only mathematical

errors in formulation are found in unacceptable number, in already refereed work, but possible

unwanted interpretation of the intended problem (not deviation from the expected solution, but

understanding of it) is likely to happen, imagine with loosest scope of all (that involving not only

the imagination of the reader, but the imagination of the own problem maker!). We do think that

such things cannot ever be marked with a `right’ or a `wrong’, which is not passive of discussion.

The day mathematicians and logicians understand that whatever they do reaches only 20% of

human life, at most, and never the actual life, only an imagined life, where everything is perfect

and logical, they will definitely put far more work in order to refine whatever they write and say
I. M. R. Pinheiro (31 pages) 9
to others. As another simple example, a Mathematics teacher has proposed, as a final exam

question, an exam which was supposed to tell who was `able’ to chase further Mathematics

studies and who was not: A man is observing a painting from a distance of 1m. His eye reaches

the top of the frame at an angle of 20 degrees. The line between his eye and the bottom of the

frame is a straight line. What is the length of the frame?

Sad enough, the student who was told to be `able’ had imagined a right triangle. However, the

student who was marked as `impossible to ever be able to learn Mathematics’ had chosen his

triangle to form more than ninety degrees with the wall and actually wrote: I am sorry, but your

problem is not good enough for me to have a single answer. Nonetheless, I will provide you with

a few alternatives: It is possible that the eye of the observer forms ninety degrees, case in which

a line is drawn from the bottom of it and the line is parallel to the line of the surface of the floor.

I then have 20+90+70, what makes sense. In this case, I will get an easy answer, for there is one

meter of distance involved (one side) and I know all angles. Nonetheless, if I make him sit,

supposing he were standing in the previous situation, the angle will be larger than 90 degrees

(still possible, for 20+100+60 is also 180, for instance). In this case, I do not know how much

larger... .I then cannot infer anything else.

The teacher has written `unable to learn Mathematics because I have given him several exercises,

all repetition, I taught nothing else in class, so he is supposed to assume it was ninety degrees

and make the calculations, but he has never made the calculations, only wrote remarks!’

Oh, well, so Logic does not matter more than Mathematics? We all had this thought as premise,

however: That everything from Mathematics could actually be made by means of words only,

that is, without a single symbol, but not vice-versa.

Of course the teacher is wrong and problems in Mathematics cannot be based in their own heads,
or teachings, they must be solely based on what is written, for that is what any person assesses as

valid: Whatever is written, if anything written has been given. Imagination, or habit, is obviously

not a mathematical entity. If there are more allowed interpretations, there is no single possible

right answer, and if there is more than one, we have allowance for anything to happen, including

the student not doing anything. She asked for the dimension of the frame, but one could easily

reply, using Logic, that such does not exist because there can only be one, however we get more

than one using different reasoning trends, what creates inconsistency, what blocks any reasoning

in Classical Logic and stops the flow of the solution, or what entitles any response (in conflict,

everything implies: Explosion Law in Classical Logic).

Unfortunately, Mathematics may only encompass the abstract world. If ever referring to humans,

the problem must contain a drawing of reference for that fact, so that the human part of the

problem is fully fit inside of the world of Mathematics. One cannot simply add a more complex

entity to a Mathematics problem and believe it will be passive of solution there. If the own entity

extrapolates the boundaries of Mathematics, it cannot be solved there, as we have explained in

[M. R. Pinheiro 2007], with the well-posedness theory for Philosophy.

It really does not matter how many coordinates we create, in terms of reference: The complexity

of a human being cannot, ever, be reduced to Mathematics, as we have proved in [M. R. Pinheiro

2007], for not even the verbal expression of a human being there fits.

Basically, as we express in the second article of ours on the Sorites solution, it is important, in

Science, more than anywhere else, the `why’ we do things. If we overlook this step, there is no

real progress, just illusionary, or delusional, progress.

7. Other philosophers whose reasoning seem to match Gödel's somehow

I. M. R. Pinheiro (31 pages) 111
1
In another absurd trial, but more refined than the case with P, we find some people referring to

Russell as if Russell (see [A. D. Irvine 2003], for instance) thought a special set R, supposed to

contain normal sets, and those normal sets are defined as sets that do not contain themselves

(what, per se, is already absurd thought), to pose a problem to Mathematics, and not solely to

language and those who are experts in it.

Basically, they claim that Russell has stated that if R is normal then it does not contain itself, but

if it is normal, it should also be inside of itself.

This is all ridiculous, and even primary students who are good in the English language are able to

see the fallacy involved: There is a temporal problem there, a very clear one. Mathematics is the

static picture of everything done in Statistics for a good reason: Time does matter!

Basically, whilst R is not built, there is no R to be analyzed. Therefore, R cannot, ever, possibly,

contain itself whilst it is still being defined. On the other hand, once defined, it cannot be

changed, because it has become an axiom of the system involved, for it is a definition. What that

means is that we cannot actually, formally, perhaps mention a name in terms of that set (thinking

the way we have been induced to think this far, as from what has been considered up to now): It

is an unnameable sort of set. If mentioned, only via elements and its definition. Why? Because

giving it a name will create the same sort of inconsistency present in the case of the variable X

from our earlier writing here. It is true that the set of natural numbers contains itself? No! Never.

Basically, when it is being formed, we give it a name (or assign it to a pointer), which is `natural

numbers`. A set has to be more than its elements: A set is a pair (name; {elements}). Getting rid

of the confusion is essential work!

Mathematics teachers seem to have been teaching wrong for ages: A set is equal to another if it is

contained in the other and the other is contained in itself (or some of them, anyway). The truth of
all is found at [H. Langston 2008]: They are equal if and only if they are equal. This way, a set

could never, possibly, contain itself, for itself is an axiom of assignment `(name; elements)’ and

not only a letter, which, in principle, is an empty place holder. A set containing itself is humanly

impossible and Mathematics has been created by human beings: Whatever they cannot see,

Mathematics will not see either!

Write a set by time t: This is an operation that is never completed if you are still writing it. You

only know what the set is by its last element. In case you then add the whole set as an element, to

be coherent and claim that the set then contains itself you need now to add everything as a last

element of it (`last’ not being relevant here), what will create an infinite loop and, as

Mathematics loves, it may only be true in its limit of inclusion, that is: In this case, it will never,

realistically, be true, but we get tired and say it is possible where we cannot see, just like in the

case of the parallels meeting at infinity.

Basically, set B given, B containing B is only achieved when n is infinity for the progressive set

of inclusions of the previous set development in the current updated set. See:

Bo={a1,…,an}

B1={a1,…,an,{a1,…,an}}

B2={a1,…,an,{a1,…,an},{a1,…,an,{a1,…,an}}}

Bn Є Bn ,

that is: lim Bn Є Bn when n goes to infinity (this is also a confusional statement, it is just better

than stating that a set may contain itself, what is absurd. The statement lim Bn Є Bn , when n
I. M. R. Pinheiro (31 pages) 113
3
goes to infinity, is confusional because it mixes Physics with Mathematics, that is, human

perception with rigid Science, what is not scientifically sound for Mathematics. It is all about

what we are able to cope with, our speed in writing, and the actual truth (just like the parallels

case); It is all about what we are able to see at a time, in a single picture, with no further

thinking, and the actual truth. Basically, infinity fits a slice of any size in a ruler, as small as we

wish for (or as small as our eyes need). If we take parallels in a slice of the ruler, they will reach

infinity in the reals, yet they will never meet, proving the own thought to be as absurd as the

thought of a set containing itself.

A set is not what it refers to; Mathematics has defined a set as a pair of elements instead. And, as

explained earlier on in this paper, if (R; {elements of R}) is our result, and we say that R=(R;

{elements of R}), then it is all wrong, mathematically writing, because that R would have to point

to two different entities3 in Mathematics at the same instant of time: One is a set and its name,

the other is a reassignment of reference to the same name (R), fact that makes the statement bring

inconsistency to Mathematics, therefore make it be of unacceptable nature for Mathematics. This

fact has to place R in the 5th dimension (the one of the infinity case4): The axiom of formation

3 Notice that (R; elements) is an axiom, even if temporary, and (R; (R; elements)) is another one.

4 From [P. Schwarz 2008], we infer: To the three existent spatial dimensions, Einstein has added time, so that

we would have four dimensions for each object, in terms of references to locate its points.

From [Zwiebach 2004], we infer: String Theory has come to make it possible that we hold even more than

eleven dimensions for each minuscule part of each object.

In Mathematics, we are able to build abstraction over abstraction, so that it is possible to go creating new spaces

and new dimensions without even justification, what is apparently the main criticism to the Superstring Theory.

However, the well-posedness principle for Mathematics would oblige us to stick only to those dimensions that

are actually necessary for the most objective description of an object as possible, everything else being passive of
brings the pair. Once the pair is axiomatized5, one may use only the name as a reference to the

pair formed. Now, is R normal in the correct case? No, R is abnormal, and no doubts about it!

Therefore, writing R={A, B, C, …, R}, where A, B, C, and … are replacing all possible original

elements of the set R is actually incorrect, for the name would have to be another name, or we

are using Maple, where such is possible: We cannot, in Mathematics, have this occurring at the

same time, once after the new set, containing an axiom and the previous R, starts being formed,

becoming part of perhaps exercises of reasoning in Mathematics, but not of proposed theories.

This way, we actually hold four needed dimensions, that we know are needed for sure, in any mathematical

description of objects (see, for instance, [Rucker 1985], p. 145).

As for our work here, we seem to be working a single step away from what is not tangible, what we write about

being supposed to be the own connection, if any exists, between what may be seen by a rigid piece of the

Science, Mathematics, and what may be experienced by a human being from a physical/chemical point of view.

The 5th dimension may then be the coordinate to refer to this physical/chemical world.

We are placing infinity in the 'extraphysical' world, where nothing and nobody can really get. If we divide by

zero, we get infinity; if we divide something by infinity, we get zero. Therefore, zero is actually found `married

to' infinity somehow, as exotic as it may seem (the `all' with the `nothing'), at least in the 5th dimension. This is a

case for the Möbius band reasoning, that is, what Priest has claimed to like in 2000, the Ontological

Paraconsistency (where things may 'be' and 'not be' at the same time). Basically, in Mathematics, we say that

something divided by infinity has become zero but, in the actual world, it can only be the case that the thing has

become the own infinity, for now we hold the same physical object split into infinitely many units of whatever it

has become (if all things are continuous, they all may be split into infinitely many pieces for the cardinality of

the ruler is infinity in every 'infinitesimal' piece of it, in terms of the population of numbers, or fractions (in the

English language sense) of the material. Once there is a bijection between any piece of the ruler and infinity,

then the division has to be possible and the result is obviously not zero. Notwithstanding, the piece is so

minuscule that our eyes see it as `zero' would be seen. In the Mathematics, we write it has become zero but, in

the physical world, it can only have become the own infinity, for now we hold the same physical object split into
I. M. R. Pinheiro (31 pages) 115
5
we cannot give it the same name of an already existing set, it has to be another name. It cannot,

ever, happen at the same time. Only Maple may account for that with the `:=’ symbol. Such a

symbol means: Forget the previous definition of R, it is now such, and that is when R stops

existing as before and starts existing as now defined, otherwise inconsistency (not allowed in

Mathematics, ever). Another way of seeing the just mentioned fact is: We would have to give

infinitely many units of whatever it has become. That world, of infinity, is not accessible yet not even via

Physics, as far as we know. We mathematically force the result to be `zero', then, an entity from Mathematics,

even because Mathematics cannot change the nature of the material, only Physics may account for that. The

world of reference for Mathematics is pre-fixed, from the start of the analysis, and, in it, one thing may not

become another, for it does not have enough tools in its systems to account for that. Once what we see, from the

world of Mathematics, is nothing left, only because we are also stupid enough to attach things to our observation

when it is Mathematics, it is told to be zero. However, zero what? Zero units of whatever that was there before!

Thus, the nature of the matter of the object under consideration has been fixed in time and will be kept until the

end of the analysis in any mathematical setup. Oh, well, the world of infinity can fit Mathematics, as in the ruler,

even several times. However, its nature is different from that of the Cartesian Plane: It has to be located in an

extra dimension of some sort... : It is the world that is not represented precisely in language yet. If it is only

graphical, it is incomplete, once Mathematics must be able to define each one of its elements with precision,

primarily in language, and, if possible, in pictures, not the opposite. Mathematics is obviously about symbols and

calculations, inferences, and etc., and we still do not hold infinity fully dealt with in the axiomatic world. If we

try, we will go human, what ruins all: Infinity is the figure we cannot reach ever (a person might not be able to

reach a figure in a ruler for physical impairment, so that is not good enough as a universal definition). Perhaps

we can do better: Infinity is what goes beyond any mathematical figure (spirit also does…). One can see it is not

a `mathematical entity’. At the same time it is, for we even deal with it and understand its occurrence! So, it must

be an extramathematical being, similar to those from Metaphysics, a piece of the Science which deals with

whatever goes beyond Physics, by definition. It is not `ethical’, then, to include infinity, or mix it, with purely

mathematical elements. One would, perhaps, ask: Do we have to change the Cartesian Plane? Infinity seems to
another name to the set and that would create eternal, or infinite, number, of steps, with new

names all the way through, and a new set always containing the previous foundational axiom or

part of it (as shown earlier on here: Notice that {elements of the set} does not imply that the

name of the set is included inside of the newly formed set as an element…). Thus, if

mathematicians and logicians can spell and speak, write and read, they cannot get updated or see

be reached `infinitely’ many times in a single unit step on an axis there… . The answer is no, because we are not

writing about it there and we never will, for it is not something we can write about: As soon as we state

something like `as x goes to infinity then the function goes to zero’, we must read that as `as x goes somewhere

else, where we cannot see, the function will be, in that world, zero’. Where is infinity? Not on the graph! If it

were on the graph, we would have a precise number for it, or close, and, therefore, it would be the limit of the

function when x goes to that particular number (we see) from the graph, not infinity. We believe it is trivial to

understand that if you are able to locate a particular point in a graph, you are able to draw a vertical line, forming

a right angle with the x axis, to determine precisely where the point is located on the x axis, with very little

mistake, so that it will never be infinity, no matter how much we try (the universe of the rulers cannot reach

infinity, of course). Why? Because it is our own eyes and hands which have built the ruler and our hands, eyes,

and instruments, cannot go beyond a certain thickness, what will beset any trial of going places we are unable to

locate precisely, or almost precisely, in the ruler. Infinity is where both the finger and the ruler cannot point and,

therefore, no computer program either, for the grid for the computer screen has also been built based on what we

can deal with, for we are those building the machines, with our own logic. All that means is that infinity might

be there, and that fact will not make of the Cartesian graph something inconsistent. However, claiming it is there

will make our mathematical discourse inconsistent, so that it is better, for our own sake, to always state that the

world of infinity does not fit the world of the Cartesian graphs, and is not accessible to us physically (yet?), but it

is accessible to our abstract entities, for the numbers must definitely know who infinity is, the same way the

souls will always know the way to God. Thus, we could perhaps have a coordinate system with five elements (3

from the 3D Cartesian, 1 for time, and 1 for infinity), where the infinity coordinate would accuse 0 if it does not

count or 1 if present in the geometric description of the point of reference. Infinity may appear in any of the
I. M. R. Pinheiro (31 pages) 117
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the time issue (so far). Conclusion: We are all problematic, but mathematicians and logicians, so

far, are realistically lunatic, unable to acknowledge the mandatory presence (not necessarily in an

explicit way) of the time coordinate!

Basically, a set that is still being defined cannot be a member of itself because even the own set

under analysis does not know who it is!

Only after a set is defined and the foundational axiom has been created, what means a clear

association now exists, which, if supposed to last, has to be equal to a pair containing both the

original reference system coordinates, so that the coordinate for infinity should bear at least 2 (two) place

holders, instead of one, in order for us to know what axis it refers to. Even though infinity is reached several

times between one real number and another, we are unable, at this point in time, to come up with even one

practical example in which mathematical reasoning would lead us to refer to any of those infinities there, in

between. For this reason, the system last suggested, as reference, seems to be complete to account for the

Mathematics world so far. Interesting enough, it is one more dimension if not activated, but it becomes two extra

dimensions as soon as activated, that is, as soon as the progression of the figures `calls’ for it, establishing the

needed connection, which does not exist that far (that is why we state infinity would be the closest the

mathematical world could possibly get to the human world: Transcendence... . It is definitely not inside of

Mathematics (perhaps yet), yet there is a primary trial of `boxing’ it there). Now, there is a difference between

this fact and the assertion that the world of Mathematics is then incomplete, or inconsistent, because of such: It

is, perhaps, missing quite a few axioms for the element infinity, what may mean simply changing the reference

system, as suggested here, from now onwards, what we shall soon endeavour to do.

5 Thus, we are actually spelling out what Mathematics has left to be `implied' in this sort of situation. Every

time someone creates a set, the mathematical steps involved are: 1) Determining the elements of the set; 2)

Choosing a name or accepting the duty of having to always repeat the whole set when referring to it; 3)

(Foundational Axiom) Once the previous items have been addressed, we hold name := (name of the set;

{elements of the set}), that is, every time the name of the set is mentioned, there is reference to a physically

delimited area containing those elements from the Foundational Axiom, and vice-versa.
name and the elements of the set, we know what the set `is’. How can the set be included in itself

before we know what it is? Interesting that if that were ever true, a person would also be

contained in themselves, just like the set of Russian dolls (see [Dale Group 2001], for instance)!

Is it not obvious that such is not possible at all? A person is, at most, equal to themselves,

trivially! If adding a finite, but large, number of Russian interpolating dolls, the difference

between the last insertion and that before the last may make our (faulty, always) perception `see’

as if the Russian doll, indeed, contained itself (remember that the properties of the being do

include its size, on top of everything else). Why? Human perception fails, always, what means

that not even there the assertion will ever be true. Mixing things (human universe with

Mathematics6), as it is usual for the statements involving infinity (not in the case of the limits for

Calculus: There, it is obvious that the limit will be reached when the infinity step over the real

numbers is taken), may lead us to confused, or hybrid, talk and writing. With Maple (inside of

the machine world), we may then simply re-define R, update, and keep the name, but if with

(inside of the world of) Mathematics, we are now obliged to come up with a new name, so that

the set from 3 pm will be called R, for instance, but the set of 3 pm and one second has to be at

least R' and so on so forth. It is either Mathematics, and everything is scientifically defined, or it

is language and we discuss it there, as explained in [M. R. Pinheiro 2007].

OK, so just to make it shorter: Even wondering about the possibility of a set containing itself is

insane… : If it ever did, it would be there as an element, what means already defined by the time

6 Our special assertion on the 5th dimension: It is actually true that, if Mathematics holds anything that could be

told to hold close-to-human nature, that something, connecting what is human with what is so much machine-

like, must have to do with the concept infinity, which is the closest mathematical idea (as for the numbers’

perspective) to that of transcendence (as for human beings’ perspective).

I. M. R. Pinheiro (31 pages) 119
9
of `pointing’; what cannot, ever, be the case. A name is a complex entity and, as soon as we

associate it with a complex entity, we understand that time of baptism is extremely relevant (as

relevant as a nuclear bomb at our door!). A person is born little, they then grow: They keep their

name only in the English language. Mathematically, and scientifically, however, they are a

different being each, and every, even thousandth part of second (the complexity of a being

cannot, ever, be described scientifically, never in real time…, it will never be possible: By the

time the machine produces reading it is already something else, obviously and trivially. When a

human eye, for instance, observes a fetus, the image arriving to mind differs substantially from

the current image: It is already another image7.... .And, to make it worse, the machine time also

differs from the other two. The same scale of mistake we find involving the baby in the tummy,

the machine, the observer/reader of the scan, and, finally, the doctor, we find involving the

translation entities (writer, reader, translator, actual text, and etc.), as we have pointed out

before). If we understand this and accept it all as what gives relevance to life, what makes it

interesting, we will also understand how trivial Mathematics is in this so complex universe, or

how trivial IT SHOULD BE, anyway: It is all about static pictures of things that will change all

the time, so that it is always wrong for real life and will never be good enough for those who are

really nasty about correctness. Notwithstanding, it is perfect for the abstract world if laws of

definition, which sustain its perfection, are finally respected. Otherwise, even there, it will fail

7 Interesting enough that this is like an example for parallel worlds: A world is that which is mathematically

happening, which is never going to be accessed by the being reading it, and another world is what the `readers of

the world’ read through their own limited perception. And there is still the possible `Matrix’ effect (reference to

the last movie of the series): An actual high chance that the world is yet another thing, which is not the actual

world, time wise, or the world perceived by the vast majority of people (or the vast majority of its readers).
and produce inconsistencies.

On the same realm of things (see [A. D. Irvine 2003], for instance), we find another gem: `From

P we may infer logically P Ú Q, but from  P and P Ú Q, we will infer Q’. They mention this

as a big deal. Sincerely, at the same point in time, either you have P or its negation. How is it

possible, IN MATHEMATICS (!), having both, please? What are the mathematical entities

which would be there and not be, at the same time, as Ontological Paraconsistency would like to

defend as an actual possibility: Whatever is not, is obviously something else than whatever is! If

they do not occur at the same point in time, how can that generate any problem in any deduction?

Logic is, once more, just like the well-written, or the well-posed, mathematical problems, or

even logical: Attached to a context, a context which is human, and that is all the own humans

may deal with… . It does include, obviously, minimum human environmental conditions (time,

location, participants of relevance, and probably other conditions even, which we are currently

unable to mention). A few mathematical entities may exist per se, of course, and so they will,

most of the time, such as triangles we create from our own imagination, or circles, or functions:

Whatever is abstraction over abstraction, already axiomatized in full, will be passive of creation

by us with no context. In this case, we must keep in our minds the `trigger rule’: If human

matters are implied by the time of the assertions then it is not abstraction over abstraction.

What is P? P must be an assignment of some sort, must mean a previous axiom, even if

temporary, that is, something for that specific problem. Show us then a P, which is a

mathematical entity, that `may be’, and `may be not’, at same point in time, as well as the same

conditions, and we will believe this is a problem for scientists to worry about. By the time it is

not true anymore, it cannot be the same P: That is trivial! P must bear the four point reference,

always, at least, even if such is not spelled out in the statements!

I. M. R. Pinheiro (31 pages) 221
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Apparently, Russell has created a complex theory to explain all this, and called it `theory of

types’. Once more, scientists show incompetence in understanding life and language in depth:

Things are simple, Science aims simplicity, most basic principle of it, but both life and language

are not accessible via Science, at most part of them is.

Now, once we know, we are back to what we have stated before: The mathematical prohibition

of naming two things the same way. The English words might be the same, but we must either

write them all or use a different name in Mathematics, for they are not even close to being the

same in Mathematics. The confusion is always generated by some superficial understanding of

either the English language or the basic logical principles. In English, we can do it, but not with

variables (and the name of a set, as usually seen in mathematical technical lingo, happens to be a

variable)!

It is interesting to see that, nowadays, some mathematical journals oversee this sort of

incorrectness, or absence of perfection, in mathematical proofs, and even accept the writing of

the computer program Maple, which allows the same variable to become itself plus one, for

instance.

That is OK for computation purposes, but one must remember the origins of the variables and the

fact that they may only hold one assignment at a time, not two in the same logical proposition.

And, even in Maple, by the time x becomes x+1, x disappears and will never be recovered from

the system. Thus, Maple is not against the mathematical principles (thanks all), only those

making use of it mistakenly, or of its symbols.

With this, the argumentation used by Gödel to prove incompleteness is knocked down.

To be able to utter that X cannot be proven in T, we obviously would have to exhibit the value of

X, which we are not able to do so far.

In fact, First Order Arithmetic has already been proved to be complete (see [D Jabcquette 1991],

for instance).

They then claim that the Second Order Arithmetic (that involving quantifiers) is not complete,

providing a reason for Gödel to be correct.

Second Order Arithmetic is obviously not complete because to create a `for all’ statement, one

does not need to check each element of the first order: The statement may be born in the second

order and be not deductible from whatever existed in the first order because it is impossible to

enumerate all natural numbers, for instance, in the clearest case. If we tie the application of the

quantifiers to what we may count, however, then quantifiers may be included in Arithmetic and

we do then have completeness. For instance, take A={a, b, c, d}. If we claim that `a belongs to

the set of natural numbers and so do b, c and d’, we then have a valid logical inference: `For all

x, x inside of A, it is true that x is also inside of the set of natural numbers’. And there is no doubt

about what is included in A and what is not, so that any assertion about A is easily told to be true,

or false, in those regards.

This way, there is at least one sentence, which is not provable, from the second order: `For all’

may only be inferred from another `for all’ or from `there is not a single element which does

not…’.

If one defines Arithmetic to only be that of the first order then it is complete. Apparently, the

problem held by many researchers in the area, in what regards completeness, is the rejection of

the induction process as a foundational axiom to support conclusions. The other issue some have

had was Russell’s issue, on sets of sets.

Oh, well, bad on them, who did not read the Bible of Mathematics with the Bible of the English

language, at the same time, so that it is all compatible.

I. M. R. Pinheiro (31 pages) 223
3
Induction (going from a small sample to `for all', in an inference, instead of testing one by one)

is a better reason than Russell’s paradox (again, is there any actual paradox? We start thinking

they are all like The Parallax Mistake: Only an equivocated observation –superficial- of things),

in terms of Science. However, it is pretty clear that induction does generate correct conclusions

and one may easily go from conclusion to theorem if told there has been induction and vice-

versa, so that there is both soundness and completeness going on there.

One cannot simply state Arithmetic is incomplete, or inconsistent, or any system containing it: A

proof is necessary. Nonetheless, we had proof of the opposite and all examples, in the sense they

would like to have seen, have been proven wrong here.

If a true sentence, that is, a proposition, sound in Mathematics (well-posedness) is ever found to

exist, but it is not passive of deduction via the system rules, then one of these things has to be

true: The person uttering that proposition has incurred in a fallacy or the system is incomplete, in

the sense that it should have included that proposition as axiom of foundation, what simply

means `include that proposition in the set of axioms of the system and re-build it’.

The vast majority of the confusional thoughts regarding Arithmetic comes from superficial

analysis of the concept of axiom.

They call axiom from Arithmetic, for instance, the fact that any number summed to zero is the

own number, that is: x+0 = x (see [Storrs McCall 2008] , as a possible source).

Interesting that this is part of the statements defining the operation of summing: It is trivially

included there.

Thus, if we take the statements of definition as axioms, we have that automatically! (This fact

makes the axiom invalid, for it is redundant, and well-posedness demands smallest amount of

axioms as possible, once they are unprovable in the system: Undesired presences).
x = y -> Sx = Sy is another axiom of Arithmetic (see [Storrs McCall 2008], for instance).

Easy to see how the last axiom is also a direct consequence of the statement of definition the way

we have written it.

There is a basic mistake, solidified with time, which appears in the Arithmetic theory: The own

definitions have to be axioms of the system, but they usually do not include them there. Included,

however, as we propose, perhaps we get no inconsistency, or incompleteness, or thoughts going

on about those issues.

Inconsistency means we may infer two conclusions, fully contradictory, from the same set of

premises/propositions (a premise is like an English statement for us, as before explained. It may,

or may not be, a proposition, which is something context-dependent, as also explained before in

this very paper. One may wonder why we state a premise is like an English statement. The

reason behind that is that the word premise is used by several people, outside of Science, to mean

whatever they hold as a paradigm. Good scientific terms must hold maximum uniqueness as

pointers, so that `premise` could not be a good one for that end).

That would be a very weird assertion to be made about Arithmetic. As far as we know, such a

contradictory set of conclusions has never been mentioned in the literature.

And, in fact, Gentzen, 1936, has proven the consistency of Arithmetic (see [E F Robertson

2005], for instance).

With this, what remains to Gödel to wish for is that Arithmetic were incomplete.

Incompleteness, in a logical system, means that it is not the whole set of possible logical

statements which may be proved inside of the own system, that is, there will always be a possible

statement, from the allowed set of propositions (well-formed, according to rules of the system),

which may not be proven to be true, or false, using the postulates of the system.
I. M. R. Pinheiro (31 pages) 225
5
With Arithmetic, such a statement does not exist (induction should trivially ALSO be part of the

axiomatic system for Arithmetic).

Interesting that it suffices renaming things to what they actually are, and there is no statement not

passive of being proven true, or false, in Arithmetic.

For instance, the initial assignment of names to numbers, to the actual sets containing the units of

counting, is arbitrary and, therefore, could not be seen as anything different from `naming’

things: It is baptizing objects from our imagination with something we can refer to in written, or

spoken, language. Baptism may only be considered axiom, once it is an arbitrary assignment:

There is no possible logical universal agreement on baptism, but it has to be imposed upon things

so that we can talk, and write, about those things the name refers to. As it is necessary for the

theory to be referred to, it must be included in the set of axioms for that system. Therefore, for

Arithmetic, it will be the whole set of the natural numbers: An infinite number of axioms added

to our previously 5 axioms (as for the literature here mentioned)!

Peano has then performed a careless job presenting only a reduced number of axioms for the

natural numbers when there is actually an infinite number of them.

8. Conclusion

Arithmetic is both complete and consistent, but it misses having an exhaustive listing of axioms

of real value. Any claim opposing either the completeness or the consistency of Arithmetic must

be accompanied by other counter-examples, different from the ones so far, all of those having

been proven to be equivocated, mostly for the same reason (shortage of understanding of the

human factors by those doing Mathematics or Logic). The work performed by people like Frege
and Russell is of primordial importance for any piece of the Science: The right language for

communications, or the adequate technical lingo. Unless a scientist is eternally on Earth, how

can Science ever progress without the most objective lingo of all? What matters is

communicating things to the level Science demands, that is, so that any person, simply reading

the paper of someone else, will understand everything to the maximum detail, no matter who

they are, as long as they have been adequately introduced to the rigors of Science. A paper may

only be good, as minimum condition, if the majority of the people in Science, or Science literate

people, may assess it. Those defending the opposite, that the good thing to do is `hiding’, is

`making it mysterious’, are obviously committing crimes against human kind, which are as

repulsive as torture, brain-washing, and slavery: They cannot, ever, be considered scientists at

all. Prizes to scientists must consider a primary rule: Simplicity and ponderability (as well as

accessibility). Why? Because if even with a whole editorial board we get papers like those we

mention (see our work on S-convexity), imagine if we intentionally limit the amount of people

who are able to criticize/read them? The vast majority of the scientists does not have time to

spare criticizing the research of others, that is, to contribute to another person’s research

(actually, also deserving another remark: For free?), imagine how rare criticism of good quality

will become if we make it all difficult intentionally? It is obviously a huge favor if a paper of

someone gets to be well criticized before its acceptance, for imagine finding out, in our 500th

published paper, that the logical schemata we have taken for granted to be correct is actually

wrong, and we have been using it in almost all our mathematical proofs? Better falling from the

horse at the beginning of the race than almost at the final line and winning! What we want is that

those, who are top students, find Science a comfortable place to be at, not the exam cheaters

I. M. R. Pinheiro (31 pages) 227

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instead: Do it right and it will be a welcoming place for those who matter (for whoever got

degrees cheating will never love learning, or teaching, and, therefore, will never be ethical),

make it bearable for the good students and everything will then be coherent with the

democratically chosen principles (Science is definitely not a place for everyone, or it should not

be, starting with those who wish to make it inaccessible intentionally).

In short: Let’s do the right thing, not mattering how historically relevant (how do we actually

measure that is another issue: Amount of papers produced? Number of non-thinkers copying?)

the author is. If something is blatantly inconsistent with all foundational theory that far, like the

set-containing-itself-thing, we immediately yell it is, not seeing the king naked and, taking

politeness as excuse, telling others he was dressed with the most modern fabric ever, originating

in top designers' facilities. We go one, or several, wrong steps back, but we re-do it right so that

when we progress it is for real, for it would not be Science otherwise, only schizoid delusion!!
 9. References:

[Storrs McCall 2008] Storrs McCall . The Consistency of Arithmetic, found online at

http://www.mcgill.ca/files/philosophy/The_Consistency_of_Arithmetic.doc, as seen on the 27th

of April of 2008, (2008).

[E F Robertson 2005] J J O'Connor, E F Robertson. The real numbers: Attempts to understand.

Found online at

http://www-history.mcs.st-andrews.ac.uk/HistTopics/Real_numbers_3.html . Accessed on the

27th of April of 2008, (2005).

[D Jabcquette 1991] Mojzesz Presburger, Dale Jabcquette. On the completeness of a certain

system of Arithmetic of whole numbers in which addition occurs as the only operation, Issue

1991, pp. 225 – 233, (1991).

[George Cantor 1890] George Cantor. Uber ein elementare Frage der Mannigfaltigkeitslehre.

Journal of the German Mathematical Union (Deutsche Mathematiker-Vereinigung) (Bd. I, S. 75-

78 (1890-1)), (1890).

[Henry 2003] Informal source: Gödel numbering. Planetmath, accessible via

http://planetmath.org/encyclopedia/GodelNumbering.html, seen on the 27th April 2008. Formal

source: S. G. Shanker. Routledge History of Philosophy, V. IX, p. 26, ISBN: 978-0-415-05776-

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9, (1996).

[Kleene et al. 1986] Eds: S. Feferman, J. D. W. Junior, S. C. Kleene, G. H. Moore, R. M.

Soloway, J. V. Heijenoort. Kurt Gödel Collected Works Volume I Publications 1929-1936.

Oxford University Press, 1986. ISBN-13: 978-0195039641, (1986).

[Pinheiro 2006] M. R. Pinheiro; A Solution to the Sorites, Semiotica, 160 (1/4), (2006).

[Pinheiro 2007] M. R. Pinheiro. A List of Statements Contained in A Solution to the Sorites and

Further Details on the Solution. Submitted, preprint located at

www.geocities.com/illmrpinheiro2, as seen on the 24th of July of 2009, (2007).

[Pinheiro 2009a] M. R. Pinheiro. Promoting the Sorites Paradox to a scientific level. Submitted,

preprint located at www.scribd.com/illmrpinheiro2. Accessed on the 22nd of July of 2009,

(2009).

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www.scribd.com/illmrpinheiro2. Accessed on the 22nd of July of 2009, (2009).

[E. Weissten 1996] E. Weissten. Gödel, Kurt. Eric Weissten’s world of biography, accessible via

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(Summer 2004 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =

http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2004/entries/russell-paradox/. Accessed on the 20th of

April of 2008, (2003).

[P. Schwarz 2008] Informal source: P. Schwarz. Looking for Extra Dimensions,

http://www.superstringtheory.com/experm/exper5.html, as seen on the 01st of May of 2008,

(2008). Formal source: D. Derbes, L. R. Lieber and H. G. Lieber. The Einstein Theory of

Relativity: A Trip to the Fourth Dimension, Paul Dry Books, ISBN-10: 1589880447, (2008).

[Dale Group 2001] Dale Group. Matryoshka Doll (How Products Are Made). Date: January 1,

2001. http://www.encyclopedia.com/beta/doc/1G2-2897000064.htmlHYPERLINK

"http://www.encyclopedia.com/beta/doc/1G2-2897000064.html" . Accessed on the 27th of April

of 2007 (2001).

[H. Langston 2008] H. Langston. Discrete Mathematics, Lecture 2, Logic of Quantified

Statements, Methods of Proof, Set Theory, Number Theory, Introduction and General Good

Times, p. 35, found online at http://www.cs.nyu.edu/courses/summer06/G22.2340-

001/lect/lecture_02.pdfHYPERLINK "http://www.cs.nyu.edu/courses/summer06/G22.2340-

001/lect/lecture_02.pdf" . Accessed on the 1st of May of 2008, (2008).

[Zimmerman 2007] B. Zimmerman, E. Hagedorn, V. Calder, R. Avakian and S. Smith. Number

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[Zwiebach 2004] B. Zwiebach. A first course in string theory. Cambridge University Press,

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[Jacquette 2002] D. Jacquette. A companion to philosophical logic. Blackwell, ISBN:

0631216715, (2002).

[Darling 2004] D. J. Darling. The Universal Book of Mathematics: From Abracadabra to Zeno's

paradoxes. John Wiley & Sons, ISBN: 0471270474, (2004).

[Sorensen 2006] R. Sorensen. Vagueness. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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5054, (2006).

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