CA-G.R. SP No.

80608
DECISION
Section 4, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which
governs appeals from the SEC to this Court, provides that:
SEC. 4. Period of appeal.- The appeal shall be taken
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the award, judgment, final
order or resolution, or from the date of its last publication if
publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of
petitioners motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in
accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a
quo. Only one motion for reconsideration shall be allowed.
Based on the foregoing, since the Rules of Procedure of the
Securities and Exchange Commission explicitly prohibits the filing of
a motion for reconsideration of its decision, the petitioner has fifteen
(15) days from notice of the SEC Resolution within which to timely file
this petition for review. However, the petitioner in this case instead of
directly filing a petition for review upon receipt of the assailed SEC
Resolution which was on May 29, 2003, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the said resolution. Being a prohibited pleading,
the filing thereof did not toll the running of the prescriptive period to
file this petition for review. Hence, when petitioner filed its Motion for
Extension of Time to File Petition for Review on November 19, 2003
and this petition for review on December 3, 2003, the SEC Resolution
had already become final and executory, the fifteen-day reglementary
period to file a petition for review having already lapsed. This is in
accord with the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of
Land Bank of the Philippines vs Ascot Holdings and Equities, Inc.
et.al., viz:
Under Section 8 (3), Rule 1 of the Interim Rules of
Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies Under R.A. No.
8700, motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of judgment or order,
or for re-opening of trial are prohibited pleadings in said case. Hence,
the filing by petitioner of a motion for reconsideration before the trial
court did not toll the reglementary period to appeal the judgment via a
petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended. As a consequence, the CA has no more
jurisdiction to entertain the petition for review which Land Bank
intended to file before it, much less to grant the motion for extension
of time for the filing thereof.

CA-G.R. SP No. 80608

DECISION
The prohibited motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner
with the trial court did not suspend the period to appeal the RTCs
Judgment of Match 15, 2006. Consequently, that Judgment became
final and executory 15-days thereafter. When petitioner filed a motion
for extension to file a petition for review in the CA on July 25, 2006, or
one hundred twenty four (124) days after it received the RTC
judgment, there was no more period to extend. Given these
undeniable facts, the CA cannot be faulted for denying petitioners
motion for extension. There is no abuse, much less grave abuse, of
discretion to speak of.
Petitioner insists, however, that the CA committed grave abuse
of discretion in denying its motion for extension because the
prohibited pleading it filed in the trial court was still sufficient to
suspend the running of the reglementary period to appeal in the
interest of substantial justice. Unfortunately, there is a scarcity of law
or jurisprudence to support petitioners novel theory. It is obvious that
a prohibited pleading cannot toll the running of the period to appeal
since such pleading cannot be given any legal effect precisely
because of its being prohibited.
In Sebastian and Cardenas v. Morales, et al., we held:
Under Rule 1, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, liberal construction of the Rules is the controlling principle
to effect substantial justice. This, litigations should, as much as
possible, be decided on their merits and not on technicalities. This
does not mean, however, that procedural rules are to be ignored or
disdained at will to suit the convenience of a party. Procedural law
has its own rationale in the orderly administration of justice, namely,
to ensure the effective enforcement of substantive rights by providing
for a system that obviates arbitrariness, caprice, despotism, or
whimsically in the settlement of disputes. Hence, it is a mistake to
suppose that substantive law and procedural law are contradictory to
each other, or as often suggested, that enforcement of procedural
rules should never be permitted if it would result in prejudice to the
substantive rights of the litigants.
Hence, rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except
only when for persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a

CA-G.R. SP No. 80608

DECISION
litigant for an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply
with the prescribed procedure
Procedural rules setting the period for perfecting an appeal or
filing an appellate petition are generally inviolable. It is doctrinally
entrenched that appeal is not a constitutional right but a mere
statutory privilege. Hence, parties who seek to avail of the privilege
must comply with the statutes or rules allowing it. The requirements
for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period specified in
the law must, as a rule, be strictly followed. Such requirements are
considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays, and
are necessary for the orderly discharge of the judicial business. For
sure, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period
set by law is not only mandatory, but jurisdictional as well. Failure to
perfect an appeal renders the judgment appealed from, final and
executory.
We must stress that the bare invocation of the interest of
substantial justice is not a magic wand that will automatically compel
this Court to suspend procedural rules. Procedural rules are not to be
belittled or dismissed simply because their nonobservance may have
resulted in prejudice to a partys substantial rights. Like all rules, they
are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of
reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice
not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtfulness is not
complying with the procedure prescribed. The Court reiterated that
rules of procedure, especially those prescribing the time within which
certain acts must be done, have often been held as absolutely
indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly
and speedy discharge of business. Indeed, in no uncertain terms, the
Court held that the said rules may be relaxed only in exceptionally
meritorious cases. This case is not one of those.
At this point, We could very well dismiss outright this instant
petition and need not discuss the issues raised by the petitioner.
Nonetheless, in an effort to write finis to the controversy, We shall
discuss the substantive issues of the petition.
The petitioner contends that it was denied of opportunity to
present its potent evidence before the SEC since there was no
mention of any notice of or actual hearing therein.