Regala vs Sandiganbayan (Canon 15. Rule 15.

02)
Facts :PCGG field a case against Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. for the
recovery of ill-gotten wealth. Among the defendants were the
ACCRA Law Firm and Raul Roco, also a part of ACCRA. Case
alleged that Cojuangco and defendants conspired in setting
up through the use of coco levy funds numerous banks; that
ACCRA acted as dummies. ACCRA performed legal services for
clients, with the incidental services where its members acted
as stockholders.
In the process, members of ACCRA acquired information
relative to assets of clients and their personal and business
circumstances .PCGG excluded Raul Roco from the complaint
as party-defendant because of his undertaking that he will
reveal the identity of the principals for whom he acted as
nominee-stockholder in the companies involved.
Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution denying the
exclusion of ACCRA members in the complaint as partydefendants.
Motion for reconsideration denied. Petitioners contend: that
the exclusion of Roco as party-defendant grants him a
favorable treatment,on the pretext of his alleged undertaking
to divulge the identity of his client, giving him an advantage
over ACCRA members; that lawyers are prohibited from
revealing the identity of their principal.
Issue: W/N privileged communication between atty and client
may be asserted in refusing to disclose the name of ACCRAs
clients? Yes.
Held: Petitioners inclusion as co-defendants is merely being
used as leverage to compel them to name their clients and
consequently to enable PCGG to nail these clients -> thus
PCGG has no valid cause of action against Petitioners and
should exclude them from the complaint. An atty is more than
a mere agent or servant because he possesses special powers
of trust and confidence reposed on him by his client. If the
price of disclosure is too high, or if it amounts to selfincrimination, then the flow of information would be curtailed,
thereby rendering the right to counsel practically nugatory.
An effective lawyer-client relationship is largely dependent
upon the degree of confidence which exists between lawyer
and client which in turn requires a situation which encourages
a dynamic and fruitful exchange and flow of information.
General rule: a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and
refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client
IN RE: SYCIP,
Facts:Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by
the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on
May 5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving partners of Atty.
Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying that
they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms,
the names of partners who had passed away. In the Court's
Resolution of September 2, 1976, both Petitions were ordered
consolidated.
Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments:
1.
Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from
continuing its business under a firm name which includes the

name of a deceased partner; in fact, Article 1840 of the Civil

Code explicitly sanctions the practice when it provides in the
last paragraph that:
The use by the person or partnership continuing the business
of the partnership name, or the name of a deceased partner
as part thereof, shall not of itself make the individual property
of the deceased partner liable for any debts contracted by
such person or partnershipNo local custom prohibits the
continued use of a deceased partner's name in a professional
firm's name;
2
There is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at
least in the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the
name of a law firm necessarily Identifies the individual
members of the firm.
ISSUE: WON law firms may continue to use the names of
deceased partners in their firm names
Held: NO. In regards to the last paragraph of Article 1840 of
the Civil Code cited by petitioners, supra, the first factor to
consider is that it is within Chapter 3 of Title IX of the Code
entitled "Dissolution and Winding Up." The Article primarily
deals with the exemption from liability in cases of a dissolved
partnership, of the individual property of the deceased partner
for debts contracted by the person or partnership which
continues the business using the partnership name or the
name of the deceased partner as part thereof. What the law
contemplates therein is a hold-over situation preparatory to
formal reorganization.
Secondly, Article 1840 treats more of a commercial
partnership with a good will to protect rather than of a
professional partnership, with no saleable good will but whose
reputation depends on the personal qualifications of its
individual members. Thus, it has been held that a saleable
goodwill can exist only in a commercial partnership and
cannot arise in a professional partnership consisting of
lawyers.
It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom
permits or allows the continued use of a deceased or former
partner's name in the firm names of law partnerships. Firm
names, under our custom, Identify the more active and/or
more senior members or partners of the law firm. A glimpse at
the history of the firms of petitioners and of other law firms in
this country would show how their firm names have evolved
and changed from time to time as the composition of the
partnership changed.
Daroy vs Legaspi (Canon 16. Rule 16.01)
Facts: The evidence shows that the complainants hired the
respondent in May, 1962 to represent them in the intestate
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the spouses
Aquilino Gonzaga and Paz Velez-Gonzaga. The complainants,
together with their brother, Vivencio, who was abroad, were
adjudged as one of the six groups of heirs of the late Gonzaga
spouses, their deceased mother, Consuelo Gonzaga-Legaspi,
being a daughter of the spouses. The heirs in a joint petition
dated April 11, 1969, which the respondent signed as counsel
for the complainants, agreed that the coconut land left by the
decedents would be divided into six equal parts, that the
administrator be authorized to sell the land, and that, after
payment of the obligations of the estate, the net proceeds
would be distributed among the six groups of heirs. The

probate court approved that agreement in its order of April

29, 1969.
The land was sold. Fermina Legaspi-Daroy came to know of
the sale only when the respondent wrote a note dated
November 28, 1969 to her father, Teofilo Legaspi, wherein he
stated "that the money we have deposited may be withdrawn
on December 8, 1969 at 9:00 o'clock". The respondent
advised Teofilo Legaspito see him on that date so that the
money could be withdrawn (Exh. B).
The complainants were not able to get the money on
December 8 because the respondent on December 7 sent to
Mrs. Daroy a telegram countermanding his prior advice and
directing here to go to Cagayan de Oro City on December 10,
a Wednesday, to receive the money (Exh. C). On December 9,
a certain Atty. Sugamo sent a handwritten note to Mrs. Daroy
advising her not to go to Cagayan de Oro City on December
10 because according to the respondent "his postdated
checks can be paid and/or collected either Thursday or Friday
yet" (Exh. D).
Issue: WON respondent should be disbarred?
Held: Yes. A lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to
delay any man for money or malice and is bound to conduct
himself with all good fidelity to his clients. He is obligated to
report promptly the money of his clients that has come into
his possession. He should not commingle it with his private
property or use it for his personal purposes without his client's
consent. He should maintain a reputation for honesty and
fidelity to private trust (Pars. 11 and 32, Canons of Legal
Ethics).
Money collected by a lawyer in pursuance of a judgment in
favor of his clients is held in trust and must be immediately
turned over to them (Aya vs. Bigornia, 57 Phil. 8,
11).1wph1.t
Section 25, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that when
an attorney unjustly retains in his hands money of his client
after it has been demanded, he may be punished for
contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his
official transactions and he is liable to a criminal prosecution.
A lawyer may be disbarred for any deceit, malpractice or
other gross misconduct in his office as attorney or for any
violation of the lawyer's oath (Ibid, sec. 27).
"The relation between an attorney and his client is highly
fiduciary in its nature and of a very delicate, exacting and
confidential character, requiring a high degree of fidelity and
good faith" (7 Am. Jur. 2d 105). In view of that special
relationship, "lawyers are bound to promptly account for
money or property received by them on behalf of their clients
and failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. The
fact that a lawyer has a lien for fees on money in his hands
collected for his clients does not relieve him from the duty of
promptly accounting for the funds received." (Syllabus, In re
Bamberger, 49 Phil. 962).
Hilado vs David ( Canon 22. Rule 22.02)
Facts: Petitioner alleged that she and the counsel for the
defendant had an attorney-client relationship with her when,
before the trial of the case, she went to defendants counsel,
gave him the papers of the case and other information

relevant thereto, although she was not able to pay him legal
fees. That respondents law firm mailed to the plaintiff a
written opinion over his signature on the merits of her case;
that this opinion was reached on the basis of papers she had
submitted at his office; that Mrs. Hilado's purpose in
submitting those papers was to secure Attorney Francisco's
professional services. Atty. Francisco appeared as counsel for
defendant and plaintiff did not object to it until (4) months
after. Then, plaintiff moved to dismiss the case between her
and defendant.
Issue: Was there an attorney-client relationship between
plaintiff and Atty. Francisco?
Held: YES. In order to constitute the relation a professional
one and not merely one of principal and agent, the attorneys
must be employed either to give advice upon a legal point, to
prosecute or defend an action in court of justice, or to prepare
and draft, in legal form such papers as deeds, bills, contracts
and the like.
To constitute professional employment it is not essential that
the client should have employed the attorney professionally
on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer
should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it
material that the attorney consulted did not afterward
undertake the case about which the consultation was had. If a
person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any
kind, consults with his attorney in his professional capacity
with the view to obtaining professional advice or assistance,
and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such
consultation, then the professional employment must be
regarded as established.
An attorney is employed-that is, he is engaged in his
professional capacity as a lawyer or counselor-when he is
listening to his client's preliminary statement of his case, or
when he is giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is
drawing his client's pleadings, or advocating his client's cause
in open court. An acceptance of the relation is implied on the
part of the attorney from his acting in behalf of his client in
pursuance of a request by the latter.
That only copies of pleadings already filed in court were
furnished to Attorney Agrava and that, this being so, no secret
communication was transmitted to him by the plaintiff, would
not vary the situation even if we should discard Mrs. Hilado's
statement that other papers, personal and private in
character, were turned in by her. Precedents are at hand to
support the doctrine that the mere relation of attorney and
client ought to preclude the attorney from accepting the
opposite party's retainer in the same litigation regardless of
what information was received by him from his first client.
An attorney, on terminating his employment, cannot
thereafter act as counsel against his client in the same
general matter, even though, while acting for his former
client, he acquired no knowledge which could operate to his
client's disadvantage in the subsequent adverse employment
"A retaining fee is a preliminary fee given to an attorney or
counsel to insure and secure his future services, and induce
him to act for the client. It is intended to remunerate counsel
for being deprived, by being retained by one party, of the
opportunity of rendering services to the other and of receiving
pay from him, and the payment of such fee, in the absence of
an express understanding to the contrary, is neither made nor

received in payment of the services contemplated; its

payment has no relation to the obligation of the client to pay
his attorney for the services which he has retained him to
perform."
Guerrero vs Hernando (Canon 17)
Facts: In behalf of eleven plaintiffs, Atty. Hernando filed in the
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte a complaint for partition
against Mrs. Guerrero. After the complaint was filed, seven of
the plaintiffs impleaded in that case, who are Mrs. Guerrero's
cousins, namely, (1) Felicidad B. Reyes-Fonacier, (2) Rosario B.
Reyes-Concepcion, (3) Violeta B. Reyes-Samonte, (4) Mamerta
B. Reyes-Mercado, (5) Mercedes B. Reyes, (6) Federico B.
Reyes and (7) Concepcion B. Reyes, filed manifestations in
court, expressing their surprise because they were included as
plaintiffs although they never authorized Atty. Hernando to
represent them (Civil Case No. 3717-II, Ilocos Norte CFI, Mateo
H. Reyes, et al vs. Mercedes R. Vda. de Guerrero). By reason
of those manifestations, Mrs. Guerrero charged Atty. Hernando
with misconduct or malpractice.
To refute the charge, Atty. Hernando explained that he was
engaged by Mateo H. Reyes to file the complaint for partition;
that Mateo directed him to include as co-plaintiffs the
aforenamed persons, who are his nephew and nieces and who
were interested in the subject-matter of the action; that four
of those persons executed a special power of attorney
designating Mateo as their representative in that litigation
(Exh. H or 1); that Mateo told him that the special power of
attorney of his other nieces had already been mailed and he
would receive it in due course, and that after the said persons
revoked the power of attorney and manifested that they were
disinclined to appear as plaintiffs, he (Atty. Hernando)
amended the complaint by dropping them as plaintiffs and
impleading them as defendants.
Mrs. Guerrero also charged respondent Hernando with having
indicated in the jurat of a tenancy contract, as the residence
certificate of Tranquilino Bernardo, the residence certificate
corresponding to Antonio Raymundo. That contract was
presented in evidence in the aforecited partition case.
Issue: WON Atty. Hernando should be disciplined and be
disbarred?
Held: Yes. It is incontrovertible that as a notary Atty. Hernando
made it appear in the jurat of the tenancy contract, which was
subscribed and sworn to before him by Evaristo Juan and
Tranquilino Bernardo (and wherein Mrs. Guerrero was an
instrumental witness), that Residence Certificate No. A2893960 was issued to Bernardo on January 20, 1963 and that
Juan's residence certificate was also issued on January 20,
1963, whereas, according to the records of the internal
revenue office at Laoag City Residence Certificate No. A2893960 was issued to Raymundo on January 15, 1963 and
Juan's residence certificate was also issued on that same date.
Atty. Hernando in his answer claimed that the erroneous entry
regarding the number of Bernardo's residence certificate was
a "purely harmless" "clerical or topographical" (should be
typographical) error which did not concern Mrs. Guerrero and
which did not affect the integrity of the document.
We find Atty. Hernando guilty of misconduct as a notary in
making it appear in the jurat of a tenancy contract that affiant
Tranquilino Bernardo exhibited to him a residence certificate

when in fact he did not do so. Such misrepresentation is

unquestionably censurable and justifies disciplinary action
against the respondent as a member of the bar and as a
notary public (Cf. National Bureau of Investigation vs. Morada,
112 Phil. 717; Viuda de Veloso vs. Madarang, 61 Phil. 773).
The respondent violated the mandate in his attorney's oath to
"obey the laws" and "do no falsehood" (Form 28, Appendix of
the Rules of Court).
Uy vs Gonzales (Canon 15. Rule 15.01)
Facts: William S. Uy filed before this Court an administrative
case against Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales for violation of the
confidentiality of their lawyer-client relationship. The
complainant alleges:
Sometime in April 1999, he engaged the services of
respondent lawyer to prepare and file a petition for the
issuance of a new certificate of title. After confiding with
respondent the circumstances surrounding the lost title and
discussing the fees and costs, respondent prepared, finalized
and submitted to him a petition to be filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Tayug, Pangasinan. When the petition was about
to be filed, respondent went to his (complainants) office at
Virra Mall, Greenhills and demanded a certain amount from
him other than what they had previously agreed upon.
Respondent left his office after reasoning with him. Expecting
that said petition would be filed, he was shocked to find out
later that instead of filing the petition for the issuance of a
new certificate of title, respondent filed a letter-complaint
dated July 26, 1999 against him with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Tayug, Pangasinan for Falsification of
Public Documents.
On April 9, 1999, he submitted to complainant a draft of the
petition for the lost title ready for signing and notarization. On
April 14, 1999, he went to complainants office informing him
that the petition is ready for filing and needs funds for
expenses. Complainant who was with a client asked him to
wait at the anteroom where he waited for almost two hours
until he found out that complainant had already left without
leaving any instructions nor funds for the filing of the petition.
Complainants conduct infuriated him who prompted him to
give a handwritten letter telling complainant that he is
withdrawing the petition he prepared and that complainant
should get another lawyer to file the petition.
Respondent maintains that the lawyer-client relationship
between him and complainant was terminated when he gave
the handwritten letter to complainant; that there was no
longer any professional relationship between the two of them
when he filed the letter-complaint for falsification of public
document; that the facts and allegations contained in the
letter-complaint for falsification were culled from public
documents procured from the Office of the Register of Deeds
in Tayug, Pangasinan.[5]
In a Resolution dated October 18, 2000, the Court referred the
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
Issue: WON Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility?
Held: No. Practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of
court, which requires the application of law, as well as legal
principles, practice or procedure and calls for legal knowledge,

training and experience. While it is true that a lawyer may be

disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be
wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good
demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court,
complainant failed to prove any of the circumstances
enumerated above that would warrant the disbarment or
suspension of herein respondent.
Notwithstanding respondents own perception on the matter, a
scrutiny of the records reveals that the relationship between
complainant and respondent stemmed from a personal
transaction or dealings between them rather than the practice
of law by respondent. Respondent dealt with complainant only
because he redeemed a property which complainant had
earlier purchased from his (complainants) son. It is not refuted
that respondent paid complainant P340,000.00 and gave him
ample time to produce its title and execute the Deed of
Redemption. However, despite the period given to him,
complainant failed to fulfill his end of the bargain because of
the alleged loss of the title which he had admitted to
respondent as having prematurely transferred to his children,
thus prompting respondent to offer his assistance so as to
secure the issuance of a new title to the property, in lieu of
the lost one, with complainant assuming the expenses
therefor.
As a rule, an attorney-client relationship is said to exist when
a lawyer voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the
consultation of a person, who in respect to a business or
trouble of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view of obtaining
professional advice or assistance. It is not essential that the
client should have employed the attorney on any previous
occasion or that any retainer should have been paid, promised
or charged for, neither is it material that the attorney
consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which
the consultation was had, for as long as the advice and
assistance of the attorney is sought and received, in matters
pertinent to his profession.
Rilloraza vs Eastern Telecommunications Phil Inc
(Canon 20. Rule 20.01)
Facts: The basic issue submitted for consideration of the Court
is whether or not petitioner is entitled to recover attorney's
fees amounting to Twenty Six Million Three Hundred Fifty
Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy Nine Pesos and Ninety One
Centavos (P26,350,779.91) for handling the case for its client
Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Makati, though its services were
terminated in midstream and the client directly compromised
the case with the adverse party.
Issue: whether or not petitioner is entitled to recover
attorney's fees amounting to Twenty Six Million Three Hundred
Fifty Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy Nine Pesos and Ninety
One Centavos (P26,350,779.91) for handling the case for its
client Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc.
Held: No. First, petitioner contends that Atty. Rilloraza initiated
the filing of the complaint. When a client employs the services
of a law firm, he does not employ the services of the lawyer
who is assigned to personally handle the case. Rather, he
employs the entire law firm. In the event that the counsel
appearing for the client resigns, the firm is bound to provide a
replacement. Thus, RADA could not claim to have initiated the
filing of the complaint considering that ETPI hired SAGA. What

is more, on September 17, 1987, ETPI paid SAGA the amount

of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,00.00)
Second, petitioner claims that under the retainer agreement
However, the retainer agreement has been terminated. True,
Attorney Rilloraza played a vital role during the inception of
the case and in the course of the trial. We cannot also ignore
the fact that an attorney-client relationship between petitioner
and respondent no longer existed during its culmination by
amicable agreement. To award the attorneys' fees amounting
to 15% of the sum of One Hundred Twenty Five Million Six
Hundred Seventy One Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Six
Pesos and Four Centavos (P125,671,886.04) plus Fifty Million
Pesos (P50,000,000.00) paid by PLDT to ETPI would be too
unconscionable. ETPI entered into a compromise agreement
when it ended the services of petitioner and through the effort
of ETPI's new lawyers, the law firm Romulo, Mabanta,
Buenaventura, Sayoc and De los Angeles.
Whether there was bad faith in the substitution of the lawyers
to avoid compliance with the retainer agreement could only
be determined after a trial of the case on the merits.
This decision, however, should not be interpreted as to
impose upon petitioner any additional burden in collecting its
attorney's fees. The petitioner must avail itself of the proper
remedy in order to forestall the possibility of any injustice on
or unjust enrichment of any of the parties.
Government vs Wagner
Facts: There are two branches to the appeal in this case. As
between the Government of the Philippine Islands and J. O.
Wagner, Catherine Cleland Wagner, and J. J. Murphy,
represented by counsel, the issue is the amount of the refund
which the Government should make to the defendants as a
condition to rescission of the contract of sale. As between the
Government and J. O. Wagner and Catherine Cleland Wagner,
represented by other counsel, the issue is the jurisdiction of
the courts over the persons of these defendants.
That this court has not seen fit to take up and decide at the
outset of this decision the challenge to its jurisdiction and the
jurisdiction of the trial court, discloses how little the long and
complicated arguments of the intervenors have impressed the
members of the court.
When these proceedings were initiated, service was made on
J. J. Murphy as the owner of a one-half undivided interest in
the property, and on J. J. Murphy as the attorney-in-fact for the
Wagners, the owners of the remaining one-half interest.
Counsel was engaged by Murphy, who represented the
defendants both in the trial court and in this court without
objection. It was only after the record had been returned to
the trial court for the taking of further evidence that the
jurisdiction of the court was impugned. The trial court
overruled such objection, as likewise did this court, but
subsequently we permitted counsel to intervene to elucidate
his position.
Issue: WON intervention may be allowed?
Held: No. "Know all men by these presents, that we, J. O.
Wagner and Catherine Cleland Wagner, husband and wife,
citizens of the United States of America now residing at
Baguio, subprovince of Benguet, Mountain Province, Philippine
Islands, have made, constituted, and appointed, and by these

presents do make, constitute, and appoint J. J. Murphy, of

Baguio, subprovince of Benguet, Mountain Province, Philippine
Islands, our true and lawful attorney for us and in our name,
place and stead, to use, lease, sell and convey lot numbered
twenty-nine (29) section F, in Baguio townsite, subprovince of
Benguet, Mountain Province, Philippine Islands, of which land
Catherine Cleland Wagner is the recorded owner as
demonstrated by official receipt numbered 792232 (seven
hundred and ninety-two thousand two hundred and thirty-two)
issued by the Director of Lands, on May 3d, 1913, said lot
containing eight thousand and five (8,005) square meters,
and for us and in our names to make, seal, and deliver, and in
any and every way and manner deal in the above-mentioned
property.
"And in short our said attorney, J. J. Murphy, is given full and
complete authority over this aforementioned lot to do as he
may deem best. Giving and granting unto our said attorney
full power and authority to do and perform all and every
lawful act and thing whatever requisite and necessary to be
done in and about the premises as fully to all intents and
purposes as we might or could do if personally present hereby
ratifying and confirming all that our said attorney shall
lawfully do or cause to be done by virtue of these presents.
All that Wilbur S. Wilson and his counsel presented to offset
the authority of Murphy was a cablegram said to have been
sent by the Wagners to Wilson on July 25, 1928,
"We authorize you take all legal means protect our interest lot
29-F, Baguio."cralaw virtua1aw library

J. J. Murphy had, of course, the right to represent his one-half

undivided interest in the land in dispute. He also had the right
under the universal power of attorney to represent the
Wagners. The intention of the parties, which, as in all written
instruments should prevail, was to give Murphy the same
power and authority to deal with the property which the
Wagners might or could have had if personally present. The
usual legal means were adopted to accomplish the object. The
most effective way by which Murphy could preserve the
ownership and possession of his principals property was by
accepting service and by defending the rights of the absent
owners in the courts. Every act of Murphy was taken for the
benefit of the Wagners. Attorney Mueller handled the case for
the defendants as ably and conscientiously as any attorney
could have done. (There can be noted 21 R. C. L., pp. 881882; Lian v. Puno [1915], 31 Phil., 259; 11 Manresa, Cdigo
Civil, 1st ed., p. 455.)
The cablegram constitutes a very slight basis on which to
claim a revocation by the principals of the power of attorney.
Moreover, to set everything aside which has taken place
would prove of no benefit to the parties.
The result is to rule against the attempted intervention by
sustaining the jurisdiction of the courts, and on the merits to
adhere to the appealed decision in its principal aspects.