of
the
Philippines
SUPREME
COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 6295
September 1,
1911
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiffappellee,
vs.
IGNACIO
CARLOS, defendantappellant.
A.
D.
Gibbs
for
appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Harvey for
appellee.P
PER CURIAM:
The information filed in this case is as
follows:
The undersigned accuses Ignacio Carlos
of the crime of theft, committed as
follows:
That on, during, and between the 13th
day of February, 1909, and the 3d day of
March, 1910, in the city of Manila,
Philippine Islands, the said Ignacio
Carlos, with intent of gain and without
violence or intimidation against the
person or force against the thing, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously, take, steal , and carry away
two thousand two hundred and seventythree (2,273) kilowatts of electric
current, of the value of nine hundred
and nine (909) pesos and twenty (20)
cents Philippine currency, the property
of the Manila Electric Railroad and
Light Company, a corporation doing
business in the Philippine Islands,
without the consent of the owner
thereof; to the damage and prejudice of
the said Manila Electric Railroad and
Light Company in the said sum of nine
hundred and nine (909) pesos and
twenty (20) cents Philippine currency,
equal to and equivalent of 4,546 pesetas
Philippine currency. All contrary to law.
(Sgd.)
L.
M.
SOUTWORTH,
Prosecuting Attorney.
f.
13
c.
Com
Cisco
router;
800
router;
g.
Meridian
5
1
Subscribers
Personal
Computer
Unit[;]
Computers[;]
Printer[;
and]
h. 1 Flatbed Scanner[.]
12. We also noticed that these routers
are connected to the Meridians
subscriber unit ("SU ) that has an
outdoor antenna installed on the top of
the roof. Meridians SU and outdoor
antenna are service components used to
connect with wireless broadband
internet access service of Meridian
Telekoms.
xxxx
18. During the site inspection [at No. 38
Indonesia
St.,
Better
Living
Subdivision], we noticed that the
protector of each telephone line/number
xxx were enclosed in a fabricated
wooden cabinet with safety padlock.
Said wooden cabinet was situated on the
concrete wall inside the compound near
the garage entrance gate. The telephone
inside the wiring installations from the
protector to the connecting blocks were
grant the
petition.
personal
property,
tangible
or
intangible, corporeal or incorporeal,
capable of appropriation can be the
object of theft. 40 This jurisprudence, in
turn, applied the prevailing legal
meaning of the term personal property
under the old Civil Code as anything
susceptible of appropriation and not
included in the foregoing chapter (not
real property). 41 PLDTs telephone
service or its business of providing this
was appropriable personal property and
was, in fact, the subject of appropriation
in an ISR operation, facilitated by means
of the unlawful use of PLDTs facilities.
In
this
regard,
the
Amended
Information inaccurately describes the
offense by making it appear that what
[Laurel] took were the international long
distance telephone calls, rather than
respondent
PLDTs
business.
xxxx
Indeed, while it may be conceded that
international long distance calls, the
matter alleged to be stolen xxx, take the
form of electrical energy, it cannot be
said that such international long
distance calls were personal properties
belonging to PLDT since the latter could
not have acquired ownership over such
calls. PLDT merely encodes, augments,
enhances, decodes and transmits said
calls using its complex communications
infrastructure and facilities. PLDT not
being the owner of said telephone calls,
then it could not validly claim that such
telephone calls were taken without its
consent. It is the use of these
communications facilities without the
consent of PLDT that constitutes the
crime of theft, which is the unlawful
taking of the telephone services and
business.
Therefore, the business of providing
A2
probable
cause.53
However,
what
distinguishes Columbia from
the
present
case
is
the
focus
of Columbias legal
rationale. Columbias focus was not on
whether the facts and circumstances
would reasonably lead to the conclusion
that an offense has been or is being
committed and that the objects sought
in connection with the offense were in
the place to be searched the primary
points of focus of the present
case. Columbias focus was on whether
the evidence presented at
the
time the search warrant was
applied
for
was
sufficient to
establish the facts and circumstances
required for establishing probable cause
to
issue
a
search
warrant.
Nonetheless, Columbia serves as a neat
guide for the CA to decide the
respondents' certioraripetition.
In Columbia, the Court applied the
principle of nonretroactivity of its
ruling
in 20th Century
Fox, whose
finality was not an issue, in reversing a
the
stare
decisis
aspect
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 184079
April 17,
2013
SPS. ARMANDO SILVERIO, SR.
AND
REMEDIOS
SILVERIO, Petitioners,
vs.
SPS. RICARDO AND EVELYN
MARCELO, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 184490
SPS. EVELYN AND RICARDO
MARCELO, Petitioners,
vs.
SPS. ARMANDO SILVERIO, SR.
AND
REMEDIOS
SILVERIO, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before the Court are twin petitions for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended.
The petition1 in G.R. No. 184079 was
filed by petitioners spouses Armando
Silverio, Sr. and Remedios Silverio to
assail the Decision2 dated March 18,
2008 and Resolution3 dated August 12,
2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 98105. The CA had
affirmed the Decision4 dated November
7, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Paraaque City, Branch 258, in
Civil Case No. 06-0099, which in turn,
affirmed the Decision5dated September
6, 2005 of the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), Branch 78 in Civil Case No.
2004-271. The Paraaque MeTC,
Branch 78, had ordered petitioners to
demolish the improvements they have
introduced in Lot No. 3976, Paraaque
Cad. 299 (Lot 3976), to peacefully
surrender possession of the same to
respondents spouses Ricardo and
Evelyn Marcelo and to pay P1,000 per
month from May 20, 2004 until they
have done so. The court a quo likewise
directed
petitioners
to
pay
respondents P20,000 as attorneys fees
plus P3,000 per appearance of the
latters counsel and costs.
Meanwhile, the petition6 in G.R. No.
184490 was filed by petitioners spouses
Evelyn and Ricardo Marcelo to contest
the Decision7 dated March 27, 2008 and
Resolution8 dated September 1, 2008 of
the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 98713. The CA
had reversed and set aside the
Decision9 dated December 29, 2006 of
the RTC of Paraaque City, Branch 257,
in Civil Case
No. 06-0237, which in turn, affirmed in
toto the Decision10 dated April 25, 2006
of the MeTC of Paraaque City, Branch
77, in Civil Case No. 2004-269. The
Paraaque MeTC, Branch 77, had
ordered respondents Armando Silverio,
Sr. and Remedios Silverio to vacate the
Marcelo Compound in Lot 3976 and to
surrender
possession
thereof
to
petitioners. The court a quo likewise
directed
respondents
to
pay
petitioners P1,000 per month from May
20, 2004 until they have completely
moved out of said property, P10,000 as
attorneys fees and costs.
The factual antecedents of these
consolidated petitions are culled from
the records.
G.R. No. 184079
On July 12, 2004, respondents spouses
Ricardo and Evelyn Marcelo filed a
Complaint11 for
unlawful
detainer
against petitioners spouses Armando
Silverio, Sr., and his mother, Remedios
Silverio. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 2004-271 before the MeTC of
Paraaque City, Branch 78.
Respondents represented themselves as
the lawful owners and possessors of Lot
3976, a residential land with an area of
5,004 square meters located in Marcelo
Compound,
Philip
St.
Ext.,
Multinational Village, Paraaque City.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., concurring:
I concur completely with the excellent
ponencia of Mr. Justice Gutierrez and
will add the following observations only
for emphasis.
It is clear that the respondents have
failed to show the President's legal
authority to sell the Roppongi property.
When asked to do so at the hearing on
these petitions, the Solicitor General was
at best ambiguous, although I must add
in fairness that this was not his fault.
(P100,000.00) under
the
Revised
Administrative Code of 1917, has
been deleted from Section 48 of the
1987 Administrative Code. What Section
48 of the present Administrative Code
refers to isauthorization by law for the
conveyance. Section 48 does not purport
to be itself a source of legal authority for
conveyance of real property of the
Government. For Section 48 merely
specifies the official authorized to
execute and sign on behalf of the
Government the deed of conveyance in
case of such a conveyance.
Secondly, examination of our statute
books shows that authorization by law
for disposition of real property of the
private domain of the Government, has
been granted by Congress both in the
form of (a) a general, standing
authorization
for
disposition
of
patrimonial
property
of
the
Government; and (b) specific legislation
authorizing the disposition of particular
pieces of the Government's patrimonial
property.
Standing legislative authority for the
disposition of land of the private domain
of the Philippines is provided by Act No.
3038, entitled "An Act Authorizing the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources to Sell or Lease Land of the
Private Domain of the Government of
the Philippine Islands (now Republic of
the Philippines)", enacted on 9 March
1922. The full text of this statute is as
follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in
Legislature assembled and by the
authority of the same:
SECTION 1. The Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources (now Secretary
of the Environment and Natural
Resources) is hereby authorized to sell
or lease land of the private domain of
the Government of the Philippine
resulted
to
(sic)
his
death." 15 Furthermore, emphasis should
be laid on the fact that despite his
recurring illness, Santiago took the
necessary steps to protect his interest
over the lot in controversy: he lost no
time in verifying the validity of the
cancellation of the award by the
MHAI 16 and filed charges in court
against Felicisimo Dayot, father of the
private respondent and actual occupant
of the lot. 17
Thus, the Minister of Natural Resources
correctly ruled that:
... There was no abandonment on the
part of the appellee (Santiago), for
abandonment is not considered as such
even if possession is intermittent and
not continuous, if such is due to
circumstances not imputable to the
possessor. Mere non-use does not
necessarily constitute abandonment. It
cannot be inferred from non-use alone.
The temporary absence of the appellee
from the lot should not be taken against
the tenability of his claim because such
is mainly attributable to his poverty,
aggravated by his recurring illness which
later resulted to his death ... . 18
Even assuming arguendo that private
respondent was not aware of the flaws in
her title, her possession of the lot, and
by proxy, at that, could not rise above
the prior possession of Felino T.
Santiago, who, during such possession
was able to comply with the
requirements set by law for the purchase
of the lot. Thus, at the time of entry of
private respondent into said lot, the sale
in favor of Felino T. Santiago had
already been consummated thru the
execution of the Sales Contract. Only the
issuance of the Deed of Conveyance and
the Transfer Certificate of Title which
had then become ministerial on the part
of the Director of Lands, remained to
perfect his title thereto.
notorious
possession
by
their
predecessors-in-interest of an alienable
land of the public domain for more than
30 years. According to them, what was
essential was that the property had been
"converted" into private property
through prescription at the time of the
application without regard to whether
the property sought to be registered was
previously classified as agricultural land
of the public domain.
As earlier stated, we denied the petition
for review on certiorari because
Malabanan failed to establish by
sufficient evidence possession and
occupation of the property on his part
and on the part of his predecessors-in
interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
In their motion for reconsideration, the
petitioners submit that the mere
classification of the land as alienable or
disposable should be deemed sufficient
to convert it into patrimonial property of
the State. Relying on the rulings in
Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos,7 Menguito
v. Republic8 and Republic v. T.A.N.
Properties, Inc.,9 they argue that the
reclassification of the land as alienable
or disposable opened it to acquisitive
prescription under the Civil Code; that
Malabanan had purchased the property
from Eduardo Velazco believing in good
faith that Velazco and his predecessorsin-interest had been the real owners of
the land with the right to validly
transmit title and ownership thereof;
that consequently, the ten-year period
prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil
Code, in relation to Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree, applied in
their favor; and that when Malabanan
filed the application for registration on
February 20, 1998, he had already been
in possession of the land for almost 16
years reckoned from 1982, the time
SO ORDERED.[17]
The RTC upheld respondents-claimants
right to have their occupied lands titled
in their name. It ruled that neither
Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular
No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in
Boracay were inalienable or could not be
the subject of disposition.[18] The
Circular itself recognized private
ownership of lands.[19]The trial court
cited Sections 87[20] and 53[21] of the
Public Land Act as basis for
acknowledging private ownership of
lands in Boracay and that only those
forested areas in public lands were
declared as part of the forest reserve.[22]
The OSG moved for reconsideration but
its motion was denied.[23] The Republic
then appealed to the CA.
On December 9, 2004, the appellate
court affirmed in toto the RTC decision,
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing
premises, judgment is hereby rendered
by us DENYING the appeal filed in this
case and AFFIRMING the decision of
the lower court.[24]
hoist
five
(5)
OF THE ESTABLISHED
OF PETITIONERS IN
OWNER OVER THEIR
AREAS IN BORACAY,
IMMEMORIAL OR AT
III.
IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION
OF
THEIR
AREAS
AS
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE UNDE
R SEC 6,
CA
141
[AN]
INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE
FOR PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN
TITLE UNDER
THE TORRENS SYSTEM?
IV.
IS THE
ISSUANCE
OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22,
2006, VIOLATIVE OF THE PRIOR
VESTED
RIGHTS
TO
PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERSOVER
THEIR
LANDS
IN
BORACAY,
PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION OR
IS PROCLAMATION 1064 CONTRARY
TO SEC. 8, CA 141, OR SEC. 4(a) OF RA
6657.
V.
lands
In
any
case,
the
assumption
in Ankron and De
Aldecoa was
not
absolute. Land classification was, in the
end, dependent on proof. If there was
proof that the land was better suited for
non-agricultural uses, the courts
could adjudge it as a mineral or timber
land
despite
the
presumption. In Ankron, this Court
stated:
In the case of Jocson vs. Director of
Forestry (supra), the Attorney-General
admitted in effect that whether the
particular land in question belongs to
one class or another is a question of
fact. The mere fact that a tract of land
has trees upon it or has mineral within it
is not of itself sufficient to declare that
one is forestry land and the other,
mineral land.There must be some proof
of the extent and present or future value
of
the
forestry
and
of
the
minerals. While, as we have just
said, many definitions have been given
for agriculture, forestry, and mineral
lands, and that in each case it is a
question of fact, we think it is safe to say
that in order to be forestry or mineral
land the proof must show that it is more
valuable for the forestry or the mineral
which it contains than it is for
agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No.
1148.) It is not sufficient to show that
there exists some trees upon the land or
that it bears some mineral. Land may be
classified as forestry or mineral today,
and, by reason of the exhaustion of the
timber or mineral, be classified as
agricultural land tomorrow. And viceversa, by reason of the rapid growth of
timber or the discovery of valuable
minerals, lands classified as agricultural
today may be differently classified
tomorrow. Each
case
must
be
decided upon the proof in that
particular case, having regard for
[103]
there
has
been
no
previous
classification of public forest [referring,
we repeat, to the mass of the public
domain which has not been the subject
of the present system of classification
for purposes of determining which are
needed for forest purposes and which
are not] into permanent forest or forest
reserves or some other forest uses
under the Revised Forestry Code, there
can be no reclassification of forest
lands to speak of within the meaning of
Section 4(a).
Thus, obviously, the prohibition in
Section 4(a) of the CARL against the
reclassification of forest lands to
agricultural lands without a prior law
delimiting the limits of the public
domain, does not, and cannot, apply to
those lands of the public domain,
denominated as public forest under the
Revised Forestry Code, which have not
been
previously
determined,
or
classified, as needed for forest purposes
in accordance with the provisions of the
Revised Forestry Code.[127]
Private claimants are not entitled
to apply for judicial confirmation
of imperfect title under CA No.
141. Neither do they have vested
rights over the occupied lands
under the said law. There are two
requisites for judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete title under CA
No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land by
himself or through his predecessors-ininterest under a bona fide claim of
ownership since time immemorial or
from June 12, 1945; and (2) the
classification of the land as alienable
and disposable land of the public
domain.[128]
of
to
of
of
of
1. GLORIA JARALVE
2.
EDGARDO
JARALVE
3. SERAFIN UY, JR.
4. SHELLA UY
5.NIMFA LAGNADA
6.
PANTALEON
SAYA-ANG
7. ATTY. DANILO
DEEN
AND
ZENAIDA DEEN
8. ERIC ANTHONY
DEEN
9.
MA.
RAMAS
EMMA
10.
STARGLAD 82,0
INTERNATIONAL
square mete
AND
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
11. ANNIE TAN
10,0
square mete
12.
TEOTIMO
5,0
CABARRUBIAS
square mete
13.
MA.
RAMAS
14.
DACLAN
EMMA 68,5
square mete
JESSICA
10,000
square
meters.40
LUCAS
and
SWORNSTATEMENT
I, Anastacio C. Cabalejo, forest officer,
after having been duly sworn to under
oath according to the law do hereby
depose and say that I personally
projected and verified the area and the
result is the basis of the aforementioned
certification.
[signed]
ANASTACIO
C.
CABALEJO
FORESTER III
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before
me
this
12[th]
day
of
April 1996, at Cebu City, Philippines.
[signed]
ILUMINADO
C.
LUCAS
Community
Environment
and
Natural Resources Officer48
Aggrieved, the petitioner and three of
the private oppositors appealed the
decision of the RTC to the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78633,
positing the following assignment of
errors:
1. Raised by private oppositors
Gertrudes N. Tabanas-Singson, Lourdes
N. Tabanas, Francisco N. Tabanas, and
Vicente N. Tabanas (Heirs of Agaton
Tabanas):
I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT APPLICANTS HAVE
A REGISTERABLE TITLE TO THE
PARCEL OF LAND HEREIN APPLIED
FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION OF
TITLE AND CONFIRMING THE SAME
AND ORDERING ITS REGISTRATION
UNDER CA 141, AS AMENDED BY P.D.
1529
OVER
THE
LAND
DENOMINATED AS SGS-07-000307,
IN
ACCORDANCE
WITH
THE
RESPECTIVE
TECHNICAL
DESCRIPTIONS.
II.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
ORDERING
THAT
ONCE
THE
DECISION BECOMES FINAL, THE
DECREE
AND
ORIGINAL
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE BE ISSUED
IN THE NAME OF THE APPLICANTS x
x x.49
2. Raised by petitioner Republic of the
Philippines:
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN
GRANTING
RESPONDENTSAPPLICATION
FOR
REGISTRATION DESPITE THE FACT
THAT THE AREA COVERED BY THE
APPLICATION IS CLASSIFIED AS
TIMBERLAND AND THEREFORE
UNALIENABLE.50
No costs.
SO ORDERED.[8]
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved by the Decision, the private
oppositors and the Republic, through
Assistant Prosecutor Josue A. Gatin,
filed an appeal with the CA, which
reversed the trial court's findings in its
Decision dated June 23, 2005. The CA
ruled that the classification of lands of
[7]
Petitioners
filed
a
motion
for
reconsideration, which was denied by
the CA in a Resolution dated November
17, 2005. Hence, the present petition
with the following issues:
I
Another
recent
case,
Diaz
v.
Republic,75 also held that possession
even for more than 30 years cannot
ripen into ownership.76 Possession is of
no moment if applicants fail to
sufficiently and satisfactorily show that
the subject lands over which an
application was applied for was indeed
an alienable and disposable agricultural
land of the public domain. It would not
matter even if they declared it for tax
purposes. In Republic v. Heirs of Juan
Fabio,77the rule was reiterated. Thus:
Well-entrenched is the rule that unless a
land is reclassified and declared
alienable and disposable, occupation in
the concept of an owner, no matter how
long, cannot ripen into ownership and
be registered as a title. Consequently,
respondents could not have occupied the
Lot in the concept of an owner in 1947
and subsequent years when respondents
declared the Lot for taxation purposes,
or even earlier when respondents'
predecessors-in-interest possessed the
Lot, because the Lot was considered
inalienable from the time of its
declaration as a military reservation in
1904. Therefore, respondents failed to
prove, by clear and convincing evidence,
that the Lot is alienable and disposable.
Public lands not shown to have been
classified as alienable and disposable
land remain part of the inalienable
public domain. In view of the lack of
sufficient evidence showing that the Lot
was already classified as alienable and
disposable, the Lot applied for by
respondents is inalienable land of the
public
domain,
not
subject
to
registration under Section 14(1) of PD
1529 and Section 48(b) of CA 141, as
amended by PD 1073. Hence, there is no
need to discuss the other requisites
dealing with respondents' occupation
and possession of the Lot in the concept
of an owner.
should
pay
a
monthly
rental
of P10,000.00. PEA then directed its
contractor, the Philippine National
Construction Corporation, to enter the
property and begin the necessary
engineering works on the Coastal Road.
In a letter dated May 28, 1985, PEA
requested SADC either to donate or sell
the property to the government.
On October 22, 1985, SADC replied by
offering to sell the property to PEA.
SADCs asking price wasP1,288,980.00
plus P400,000.00 as compensation for
the house and other improvements
thereon that were destroyed during the
construction of the Coastal Road.
On January 7, 1987, PEA informed
SADC it has no plan to buy the whole
lot, but only the 1,131 square meter
portion above sea level. PEA then asked
SADC to submit proofs of ownership
and costs of the improvements which
were demolished.
Negotiations then ensued between the
parties. However, for the past twenty
(20) years, they failed to reach an
agreement.
On October 2, 2000, SADC asked PEA
to pay compensation equivalent to the
current zonal value plus interest of ten
percent (10%) per annum and a monthly
rental of P10,000.00, also with the same
interest. These sums, according to
SADC, could be considered just
compensation for the governments use
of the property since 1985 until
September 2000 and thereafter.
The following month, PEA inquired
from the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) District 53, Alabang, Muntinlupa
City the zonal value of the SADC
property. It submitted to the BIR the
appraisal reports prepared by two (2)
independent licensed appraisers.
On April 6, 2001, petitioner Julita
Tan acquired the property from
SADC.1a\^/phi1.net
SO ORDERED.
PEA timely filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied by the
trial court in its Order6 dated April 14,
2004.
PEA then elevated the matter to the
Court of Appeals by way of a petition
for certiorari, prohibition,
and
mandamus.
On July 6, 2005, the Court of Appeals
rendered its Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for
certiorari and prohibition is hereby
GRANTED while that of mandamus is
hereby DENIED (sic). Accordingly, the
assailed Orders, dated December 16,
2003 and April 14, 2004, are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Public
respondent is hereby ordered to DESIST
from enforcing the assailed Orders.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner
filed
a
motion
for
reconsideration. In a Resolution dated
December 12, 2005, the Court of
Appeals denied the same.
Hence, the present petition anchored on
these twin issues: Whether the Court of
Appeals erred in sustaining PEAs
petition for certiorari and prohibition
and in dismissing that for mandamus;
and in holding that the just
compensation for petitioners property
should be based on the BIR zonal
valuation in 1985 when petitioner
entered
the
subject
property.1awphi1.nt
The first issue involves the nature of the
two Orders of the trial court dated
December 16, 2003 and April 14, 2004.
The Order of December 16, 2003
directed PEA to pay petitioner just
compensation
in
the
sum
ofP94,380,000.00. The Order of April
14, 2004 denied PEAs motion for
reconsideration. Are these orders final
or interlocutory?
Railroad
Co.
v.
Velasquez[13] and Province of Tayabas
v. Perez.14 Then in Manila Railroad Co.
v. Caligsahan,15 we held that "to be
exactly just, the compensation should be
estimated at the time of the taking."
Subsequently, in Republic v. Vda. de
Castellvi,16 we
ruled
that just
compensation is determined as of
the date of the taking of the
property or the filing of the
complaint, whichever came first.
The Court of Appeals, in its challenged
Decision, held that PEAs taking of
petitioners property occurred in 1985.
Even if PEA requested permission to
enter the subject property and petitioner
granted such request on condition that
PEA should pay a monthly rental
of P10,000.00, "it does not change the
fact that there was taking of the
property for public use." Consequently,
the compensation should be computed
on the basis of the zonal value of the
property at that time (1985) which
was P2,900.00 per square meter per
letter dated July 12, 2001 of the BIR to
PEA.
The Court of Appeals is wrong. PEAs
entry into the property with the
permission of SADC, its previous owner,
was not for the purpose of expropriating
the property. Records show and as
stressed by Mr. Justice Renato C.
Dacudao of the Court of Appeals in his
Dissenting Opinion, SADC allowed PEA
to enter the land on condition that it
should
pay
a
monthly
rental
of P10,000.00. Thereafter, PEA, in a
letter dated May 28, 1985, requested
SADC to donate or sell the land to the
government. On October 22, 1985,
SADC responded, offering to sell the
land
to
PEA
for P1,288,980.00,
plus P400,000.00 representing the
value of the improvements destroyed by
PEA when it entered the property.
vs.
VEGA
(GR
No.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This is a Rule 45 Petition filed by the
Republic of the Philippines (petitioner
Republic), through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), questioning the
Decision of the Court of Appeals,
[1]
which affirmed a lower courts grant of
an application for original registration of
title covering a parcel of land located in
Los Baos, Laguna.
The facts of the case as culled from the
records of the trial court and the
appellate court are straightforward and
without much contention from the
parties.
On 26 May 1995, respondents Carlos R.
Vega, Marcos R. Vega, Rogelio R. Vega,
Lubin R. Vega and Heirs of Gloria R.
Vega namely, Francisco L. Yap, Ma.
Winona Y. Rodriguez, Ma. Wendelyn V.
Yap and Francisco V. Yap, Jr.
hereby
confirmed
and
ordered
registered in the names of [petitioners]
Preciosa, Angelita, [and in the names of
their other siblings] Crisostomo, and
Alfredo, all surnamed Buenaventura,
free from all liens and encumbrances.
ONCE THIS DECISION has become
final, let another one issue directing the
Land Registration Authority to issue the
corresponding decree.
Let copies of this [D]ecision be
furnished to the adjoining owners, Land
Registration
Authority,
Land
Management Bureau, Office of the
Solicitor General, Sec. of Public Works
and Highways, Department of Agrarian
Reform,
the
Director,
Forest
Management
Bureau,
Chairman
Metropolitan
Manila
Development
Authority, DENR [Department of
Environment and Natural Resources],
South CENRO, Land Management
Sector, City Mayor of Paraaque and
Registry of Deeds, Paraaque City.11
Feeling
aggrieved
with
the
aforementioned Order of the trial court,
the Republic appealed to the Court of
Appeals. According to the Republic,
petitioners failed to prove continuous,
open,
exclusive
and
notorious
possession by their predecessors-ininterest and by themselves; hence, the
trial court erred in granting petitioners
application for registration of the
subject property. The Republic prayed
for the reversal of the Order of the trial
court and for the dismissal of the
application for registration filed by
petitioners.
On 23 August 2004, the Court of
Appeals rendered a Decision in favor of
the Republic, thus, overturning the
Order of the court a quo. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads as:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED
and the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 274, Paraaque City
1948.
The
failure
to
present
documentary
evidence
proving
possession earlier than 1948 was
explained by Filma Salazar, Records
Officer of the Provincial Assessors
Office, who testified that the records
were lost beyond recovery due to the
outbreak
of
World
War
II.
Notwithstanding
the
absence
of
documents executed earlier than 1948,
the spouses Fortuna contend that
evidence exists indicating that Pastora
possessed
the
lot
even
before
1948. First, Tax Declaration No. 8366
does not contain a statement that it is a
new
tax declaration. Second, the
annotation found at the back of Tax
Declaration No. 8366 states that this
declaration
cancels
Tax
Nos.
10543[.]14Since Tax Declaration No.
8366 was issued in 1948, the cancelled
Tax Declaration No. 10543 was issued,
at the latest, in 1947, indicating that
there was already an owner and
possessor of the lot before 1948. Third,
they rely on the testimony of one
Macaria Flores in LRC No. 2373. LRC
No. 2373 was also commenced by the
spouses Fortuna to register Lot Nos.
4462, 27066, and 27098,15which
were also originally owned by Pastora
and are adjacent to the subject Lot No.
4457. Macaria testified that she was
born in 1926 and resided in a place a few
meters from the three lots. She stated
that she regularly passed by these lots
on her way to school since 1938. She
knew the property was owned by
Pastora because the latters family had
constructed a house and planted fruitbearing trees thereon; they also cleaned
the area. On the basis of Macarias
testimony and the other evidence
presented in LRC No. 2373, the RTC
granted
the
spouses
Fortunas
application for registration of Lot Nos.
survey
plan,22 which
states:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This survey is inside alienable and
disposable area as per Project No. 13
L.C. Map No. 1395 certified August 7,
1940. It is outside any civil or military
reservation.23
It also relied on the Certification
dated July 19, 1999 from the DENR
Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) that there
is, per record, neither any public land
application filed nor title previously
issued
for
the
subject
24
parcel[.] However,
we
find
that neither
of
the
above
documents is evidence of a
positive act from the government
reclassifying the lot as alienable
and disposable agricultural land
of
the
public
domain.
Mere notations appearing in
survey plans are inadequate proof
of
the
covered
properties
alienable
and
disposable
character.25 These notations, at the
very least, only establish that the land
subject
of
the
application
for
registration falls within the approved
alienable and disposable area per
verification through survey by the
proper
government
office. The
applicant, however, must also
present a copy of the original
classification of the land into
alienable and disposable land, as
declared by the DENR Secretary or
as
proclaimed
by
the
President.26 In Republic v. Heirs of
Juan Fabio,27 the Court ruled that
[t]he applicant for land registration
must prove that the DENR Secretary
had approved the land classification
and released the land of the public
domain
as
alienable
and
raised
in
the
petition.
ORDERED.
Carpio,
(Chairperson),
Del
Castillo,
Perez,
and PerlasBernabe, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 200454, October 22, 2014
HOLY
TRINITY
REALTY
&
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. VICT
ORIO DELA CRUZ, LORENZO
MANALAYSAY,
RICARDO
MARCELO, JR. AND LEONCIO DE
GUZMAN, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Land on which no agricultural activity is
being conducted is not subject to the
coverage of either Presidential Decree
No. 27 or Republic Act No. 6657
(Comprehensive
Agrarian
Reform
Law).
The Case
The petitioner appeals the decision
promulgated on July 27, 2011, 1 whereby
the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the
decision issued by the Office of the
President (OP) on March 1, 2010, 2 and
reinstated the order of the OIC-Regional
Director of the Department of Agrarian
Reform in Regional Office III rendered
on August 18, 2006.3
Antecedents
Subject of the controversy is a parcel of
land located in Brgy. Dakila, Malolos,
Bulacan (Dakila property) registered in
the name of Freddie Santiago under
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T103698 of the Registry of Deeds of
Bulacan with an area of 212,500 square
meters. The Dakila property used to be
tenanted by Susana Surio, Cipriano
Surio, Alfonso Espiritu, Agustin Surio,
Aurelio
Surio,
Pacifico
Eugenio,
Godofredo Alcoriza, Lorenza Angeles,
T-73015
T-73016
T-73017
T-73018
T-73019
T-73020
T-73021
Name
of Area
Tenant/Successor (sq. m.)
Susana Surio
186
Cipriano Surio
150
Alfonso Espiritu
300
Agustin Surio
300
Aurelio Surio
264
Pacifico Eugenio
300
Godofredo Alcoriza 300
Lorenza Angeles
300
Ramon Manalad
300
Toribio
M.
300
Hernandez
Emerciana
300
Montealegre
Pedro Manalad
300
Celerino Ramos
300
Cecilia L. Martin
300
Pablo dela Cruz
300
Aurelio dela Cruz
300
Julita Leoncio
300
Anicia L. de Guzman
Ramon Centeno
300
Miguel Centeno
300
TOTAL
4,500
lots,8 to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
TCT No.
81618
81619
81620
81621
73022
73023
TOTAL
prohibited
transaction
under
Presidential Decree No. 27, Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 665718 and DAR
Administrative Order No. 1, Series of
1989; and that the petitioner was
disqualified from acquiring land under
Republic Act No. 6657 because it was a
corporation.19
Aggrieved, the petitioner assailed the
order
through
its
Motion
to
Withdraw/Quash/Set Aside,20 citing lack
of jurisdiction and denial of due process.
It argued that the letter request was in
the nature of a collateral attack on its
title.
Pending resolution of the Motion to
Withdraw/Quash/Set
Aside,
the
Register of Deeds issued emancipation
patents (EPs) pursuant to the order of
the
OIC-Regional
Director.
The
petitioners titles were canceled and EPs
were issued to the respondents as
follows:21
TCT No.
Emancip
Are
ation
Beneficiar a
Patent y/ies
(sq
No.
m)
00783329 Victorio
50,0
dela Cruz
00
00783330 Lorenzo
50,0
Manalaysay 00
00783331 Ricardo
50,0
Marcelo, Jr. 00
00783332 Leoncio de 54,8
Guzman
10
T-2007EP22
T-2008EP23
T-2009EP24
T-2010EP25crala
wred
T-2011- 00783334 Gonzalo
EP26
Caspe
T-2012- 00783333
EP27
2,40
1
839
for
Agrarian
Reform.
TENANTS
OF
THE
DAKILA
PROPERTY; B.) THE SALE AND
TRANSFER OF TITLES IN THE NAME
OF
PETITIONER
HAVE
NOT
HERETOFORE BEEN NULLIFIED
EITHER BY THE DARAB CENTRAL
OFFICE OR THE REGULAR COURTS;
C.) THE BONAFIDE TENANTS OF THE
DAKILA PROPERTY HAVE VALIDLY
SURRENDERED THEIR TENANCY
RIGHTS IN FAVOR OF PETITIONERS
PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST;
D.)
THE DAKILA PROPERTY WAS NO
LONGER TENANTED AND, FURTHER,
WAS NO LONGER SUITABLE TO
AGRICULTURE, AT THE TIME OF ITS
COVERAGE
UNDER
AGRARIAN
REFORM, ITS ACTUAL USE BEING
ALREADY RESIDENTIAL
II
WHETHER
OR
NOT
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
LIKEWISE ERRED IN FAILING TO
RULE ON THE ILLEGALITY OF THE
MANNER BY WHICH THE DAR
CAUSED THE SUMMARY COVERAGE
OF THE DAKILA PROPERTY UNDER
THE CARP, ITS EXTRA-JUDICIAL
CANCELLATION OF PETITIONERS
TITLES WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF
LAW,
AND
ITS
PREMATURE
ISSUANCE
OF
EMANCIPATION
PATENTS
IN
FAVOR
OF
RESPONDENTS
III
WHETHER
OR
NOT
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRONEOUSLY
APPLIED
THE
PROVISIONS OF RA 6657 IN
RESOLVING
THE
SUBJECT
PETITION, EVEN THOUGH THE DAR
PLACED THE SUBJECT DAKILA
PROPERTY UNDER THE COVERAGE
OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 27
IV.
WHETHER
OR
NOT
HEREIN
RESPONDENTS
PETITION
FOR
REVIEW A QUO OUGHT TO HAVE
BEEN DISMISSED OUTRIGHT BY THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH
SECTION 4, RULE 7 OF THE 1997
REVISED
RULES
OF
CIVIL
PROCEDURE.37
The petitioner argues that the CA
ignored issues vital to the complete
determination of the parties respective
rights over the Dakila property.
Firstly, the CA should have ruled on the
propriety of issuing the EPs. In view of
the pending petition before the DARAB,
the DAR should have withheld the
issuance of the EPs. Even granting that a
final decision had already been rendered
by the DARAB, the issuance of the EPs
remained premature inasmuch as the
DAR had not yet commenced any court
proceedings for the cancellation of the
petitioners title. Accordingly, the
petitioners title remained indefeasible
and could not be disturbed by the
collateral orders by the OIC-Regional
Director and the DAR Secretary.
with
the Rules
of
Court.
x
x
x
In cases where regular courts or quasijudicial
bodies
have
competent
jurisdiction,
agrarian
reform
beneficiaries or identified beneficiaries
and/or their associations shall have legal
standing and interest to intervene
concerning their individual or collective
rights and/or interests under the CARP.
xxxx
II.
Courts can pass upon matters
agree
in
part
with
the
CA.
Furthermore,
there
are
several
supporting documents which a tenantfarmer must submit before he can
receive the Emancipation Patent, such
as:
a.
Application
for
issuance
of
Emancipation Patent;cralawlawlibrary
b. Applicant's (owner's)
Certificate
of
Land
copy of
Transfer.
deprive
the
landowner
of
its
constitutional right to due process.
The Court has carefully explained
in Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals that the taking under the CARL
is an exercise of police power as well as
of eminent domain. The taking of the
landholding by the State effectively
results in the surrender by the
landowner of its title and physical
possession to the beneficiaries. Hence,
compensation should be given to the
landowner prior to the taking. This is
the clear-cut directive of Section 16(e) of
Republic Act No. 6657 which mandates
the DAR to take immediate possession
of the land only after full payment and
to thereafter request the Register of
Deeds to transfer title in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines, and later on
to
the
intended
beneficiaries.
However, there was no evidence of
payment prior to the cancellation of the
petitioners TCTs submitted here. The
requirement of prior payment was found
in Republic Act No. 6657 and
Presidential Decree No. 27, under which
full payment by the intended beneficiary
was a condition prior to the award of an
EP. We have explicitly pronounced
in Corua
v.
Cinamin78 that
the
emancipation of tenants does not come
free. The transfer of lands under
Presidential Decree No. 27 remained
subject to the terms and conditions
provided in said law. In Paris v.
Alfeche,79 we
said:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x. Section 2 of PD 266 states:
After the tenant-farmer shall have fully
complied with the requirements for a
grant of title under Presidential Decree
No. 27, an Emancipation Patent and/or
Grant shall be issued by the Department
of Agrarian Reform on the basis of a
duly
approved
survey
plan.
ORDERED.
to
Exchange
Real
x x x x[23]
Under this provision, in order that
petitioners application for registration of
title may be granted, they must first
establish the following: (1) that the
subject land forms part of the disposable
and alienable lands of the public domain
and (2) that they have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the same
under a bona fide claim of ownership,
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
[24]
Applicants must overcome the
presumption that the land they are
applying for is part of the public domain
and that they have an interest therein
sufficient to warrant registration in their
names arising from an imperfect title.[25]
In the instant case, petitioners did not
adduce any evidence to the effect that
the lots subject of their application are
alienable and disposable land of the
public domain. Instead, petitioners
contend that the subject properties
could no longer be considered and
classified as forest land since there are
building structures, residential houses
and even government buildings existing
and standing on the area. This, however,
is hardly the proof required under the
law. As clarified by this Court in Heirs of
Jose Amunategui v. Director of
Forestry,[26] a forested area classified as
forest land of the public domain does
not lose such classification simply
because loggers or settlers may have
stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of
land classified as forest land may
actually be covered with grass or planted
with crops by kaingin cultivators or
other farmers. Forest lands do not have
to be on mountains or in out-of-the-way
places. The classification of land is
descriptive of its legal nature or status
and does not have to be descriptive of
what the land actually looks like.
[27]
Unless and until the land classified
by
the
then
Bureau
of
Forestry. Evidently,
therefore, the
subject lots were declared alienable and
disposable only on October 30,
1986. Prior to that period, the same
could not be the subject of confirmation
of imperfect title. Petitioners possession
of the subject forest land prior to the
date when it was classified as alienable
and disposable is inconsequential and
should
be
excluded
from
the
computation of the period of possession.
[32]
To reiterate, it is well settled that
possession of forest land, prior to its
classification as alienable and disposable
land, is ineffective since such possession
may not be considered as possession in
the concept of owner.[33]The adverse
possession which can be the basis of a
grant of title in confirmation of
imperfect title cases cannot commence
until after forest land has been declared
and alienable.[34]
Much as this Court wants to conform to
the States policy of encouraging and
promoting the distribution of alienable
public lands to spur economic growth
and remain true to the ideal of social
justice, our hands are tied by the laws
stringent safeguards against registering
imperfect titles.[35] Here, petitioners
failed
to
present
well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence necessary to
prove
their
compliance
of
the
requirements under Section 48(b) of
C.A. No. 141. Hence, the Court of
Appeals did not err in dismissing their
application for confirmation and
registration of title.
WHEREFORE,
the
petition
is
hereby DENIED. The Decision dated
August 26, 2005 and the Resolution
dated February 13, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67430 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
With costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Committee
on
Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises,
and the Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers and Investigations,
conducted a joint investigation. The
Senate Committees reported the results
of their investigation in Senate
Committee Report No. 560 dated
September 16, 1997.7 Among the
conclusions of their report are: (1) the
reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to
AMARI under the JVA are lands of the
public domain which the government
has not classified as alienable lands and
therefore PEA cannot alienate these
lands; (2) the certificates of title
covering the Freedom Islands are thus
void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President
Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential
Administrative Order No. 365 creating a
Legal Task Force to conduct a study on
the legality of the JVA in view of Senate
Committee Report No. 560. The
members of the Legal Task Force were
the Secretary of Justice,8 the Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel,9 and the
Government Corporate Counsel.10 The
Legal Task Force upheld the legality of
the JVA, contrary to the conclusions
reached by the Senate Committees.11
On April 4 and 5, 1998, the Philippine
Daily
Inquirer and Today published
reports that there were on-going
renegotiations between PEA and AMARI
under an order issued by then President
Fidel V. Ramos. According to these
reports, PEA Director Nestor Kalaw,
PEA Chairman Arsenio Yulo and retired
Navy Officer Sergio Cruz composed the
negotiating panel of PEA.
On April 13, 1998, Antonio M. Zulueta
filed before the Court a Petition for
Prohibition with Application for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order
and
Preliminary
Injunction docketed as G.R. No. 132994
the
Executive
Department
had
an affirmative statutory duty under
Article 2 of the Civil Code24 and Section 1
of Commonwealth Act No. 638 25 to
publish the presidential decrees. There
was, therefore, no need for the
petitioners in Taada to make an initial
demand from the Office of the
President. In the instant case, PEA
claims it has no affirmative statutory
duty to disclose publicly information
about its renegotiation of the JVA. Thus,
PEA asserts that the Court must apply
the
principle
of
exhaustion
of
administrative remedies to the instant
case in view of the failure of petitioner
here to demand initially from PEA the
needed information.
The original JVA sought to dispose to
AMARI public lands held by PEA, a
government corporation. Under Section
79 of the Government Auditing
Code,26 the disposition of government
lands to private parties requires public
bidding. PEA was under a positive
legal duty to disclose to the public
the terms and conditions for the
sale of its lands. The law obligated
PEA to make this public disclosure even
without demand from petitioner or from
anyone. PEA failed to make this public
disclosure because the original JVA, like
the Amended JVA, was the result of
a negotiated contract, not of a public
bidding. Considering that PEA had an
affirmative statutory duty to make the
public disclosure, and was even in
breach of this legal duty, petitioner had
the right to seek direct judicial
intervention.
Moreover,
and
this
alone
is
determinative of this issue, the principle
of
exhaustion
of
administrative
remedies does not apply when the issue
involved is a purely legal or
constitutional question.27 The principal
issue in the instant case is the capacity
any proposedcontract,
effectively
truncating a basic right enshrined in the
Bill of Rights. We can allow neither an
emasculation of a constitutional right,
nor a retreat by the State of its avowed
"policy of full disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest."
The right covers three categories of
information which are "matters of public
concern," namely: (1) official records;
(2) documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions and decisions;
and (3) government research data used
in formulating policies. The first
category refers to any document that is
part of the public records in the custody
of government agencies or officials. The
second category refers to documents and
papers
recording,
evidencing,
establishing, confirming, supporting,
justifying or explaining official acts,
transactions or decisions of government
agencies or officials. The third category
refers to research data, whether raw,
collated or processed, owned by the
government and used in formulating
government policies.
The information that petitioner may
access on the renegotiation of the JVA
includes
evaluation
reports,
recommendations, legal and expert
opinions, minutes of meetings, terms of
reference and other documents attached
to such reports or minutes, all relating
to the JVA. However, the right to
information does not compel PEA to
prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and
the like relating to the renegotiation of
the JVA.34 The right only affords access
to records, documents and papers,
which means the opportunity to inspect
and copy them. One who exercises the
right must copy the records, documents
and papers at his expense. The exercise
of the right is also subject to reasonable
regulations to protect the integrity of the
public records and to minimize
Governor-General,
upon
recommendation by the Secretary
of
Agriculture
and
Natural
Resources, shall from time to time
declare what lands are open to
disposition or concession under
this Act."
Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be
declared open to disposition or
concession which have been
officially delimited or classified x x
x.
xxx
Sec. 55. Any tract of land of the public
domain which, being neither timber nor
mineral land, shall be classified
as suitable
for
residential
purposes or for commercial,
industrial, or other productive
purposes other than agricultural
purposes, and shall be open to
disposition or concession, shall be
disposed of under the provisions of this
chapter, and not otherwise.
Sec. 56. The lands disposable under
this title shall be classified as
follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the
Government by dredging, filling,
or other means;
(b) Foreshore;
(c) Marshy lands or lands covered
with water bordering upon the shores or
banks of navigable lakes or rivers;
(d) Lands not included in any of the
foregoing classes.
x x x.
Sec. 58. The lands comprised in
classes (a), (b), and (c) of section
fifty-six shall be disposed of to
private parties by lease only and
not otherwise, as soon as the
Governor-General,
upon
recommendation by the Secretary
of
Agriculture
and
Natural
Resources, shall declare that the
same are not necessary for the
government
permission.
However,
thereclaimed land could become
private land only if classified as
alienable agricultural land of the
public domain open to disposition
under CA No. 141. The 1935 Constitution
prohibited the alienation of all natural
resources except public agricultural
lands.
The Civil Code of 1950
The Civil Code of 1950 readopted
substantially the definition of property
of public dominion found in the Civil
Code of 1889. Articles 420 and 422 of
the Civil Code of 1950 state that
"Art. 420. The following things are
property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such
as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
and bridges constructed by the State,
banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of
similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State,
without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for
the development of the national wealth.
x x x.
Art. 422. Property of public dominion,
when no longer intended for public use
or for public service, shall form part of
the patrimonial property of the State."
Again, the government must formally
declare that the property of public
dominion is no longer needed for public
use or public service, before the same
could be classified as patrimonial
property of the State.59 In the case of
government reclaimed and marshy
lands of the public domain, the
declaration of their being disposable, as
well as the manner of their disposition,
is governed by the applicable provisions
of CA No. 141.
Like the Civil Code of 1889, the Civil
Code of 1950 included as property of
public dominion those properties of the
State which, without being for public
(4) Exercise
supervision
and
control over forest lands, alienable
and disposable public lands,
mineral resources and, in the process of
exercising
such
control,
impose
appropriate taxes, fees, charges, rentals
and any such form of levy and collect
such revenues for the exploration,
development, utilization or gathering of
such resources;
xxx
(14) Promulgate rules, regulations
and guidelines on the issuance of
licenses, permits, concessions,
lease agreements and such other
privileges
concerning
the
development, exploration and
utilization
of
the
country's
marine, freshwater, and brackish
water and over all aquatic
resources of the country and shall
continue to oversee, supervise
and police our natural resources;
cancel or cause to cancel such privileges
upon failure, non-compliance or
violations of any regulation, order, and
for all other causes which are in
furtherance of the conservation of
natural resources and supportive of the
national interest;
(15) Exercise exclusive jurisdiction
on
the
management
and
disposition of all lands of the
public domain and serve as the
sole agency responsible for
classification,
sub-classification,
surveying and titling of lands in
consultation
with
appropriate
agencies."80 (Emphasis supplied)
As manager, conservator and overseer of
the natural resources of the State, DENR
exercises "supervision and control over
alienable and disposable public lands."
DENR
also
exercises
"exclusive
jurisdiction on the management and
disposition of all lands of the public
domain." Thus, DENR decides whether
context,
be
considered
as
essentially obiter. Meralco, in short,
decided no constitutional question.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible
error in the appealed judgment of the
Intermediate Appellate Court, the same
is hereby affirmed, without costs in this
instance.
SO ORDERED.
Feria, Yap, Fernan, Alampay, Cruz,
Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 171514
July 18,
2012
REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
DOMINGO ESPINOSA, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari
from the Decision1 dated November 11,
2004 and Resolution2 dated February
13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 72456.
On March 3, 1999, respondent Domingo
Espinosa (Espinosa) tiled with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Consolacion, Cebu an application3 for
land registration covering a parcel of
land with an area of 5,525 square meters
and situated in Barangay Cabangahan,
Consolacion, Cebu. In support of his
application, which was docketed as LRC
Case No. N-81, Espinosa alleged that:
(a) the property, which is more
particularly known as Lot No. 8499 of
Cad. 545-D (New), is alienable and
disposable; (b) he purchased the
property from his mother, Isabel
Espinosa (Isabel), on July 4, 1970 and
the latters other heirs had waived their
rights thereto; and (c) he and his
predecessor-in-interest had been in
possession of the property in the
concept of an owner for more than thirty
(30) years.
not
suffice.
As
Section
14(2)
categorically provides, only private
properties may be acquired thru
prescription and under Articles 420 and
421 of the Civil Code, only those
properties, which are not for public use,
public service or intended for the
development of national wealth, are
considered private. In Heirs of Mario
Malabanan v. Republic,26 this Court held
that there must be an official declaration
to that effect before the property may be
rendered susceptible to prescription:
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil
Code states that "property of public
dominion, when no longer intended for
public use or for public service, shall
form part of the patrimonial property of
the State." It is this provision that
controls how public dominion property
may be converted into patrimonial
property susceptible to acquisition by
prescription. After all, Article 420(2)
makes clear that those property "which
belong to the State, without being for
public use, and are intended for some
public service or for the development of
the national wealth" are public
dominion property. For as long as the
property belongs to the State, although
already classified as alienable or
disposable, it remains property of the
public dominion if when it is "intended
for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth."
(Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, there must be an express
declaration by the State that the public
dominion property is no longer intended
for public service or the development of
the national wealth or that the property
has been converted into patrimonial.
Without such express declaration, the
property, even if classified as alienable
or disposable, remains property of the
public dominion, pursuant to Article
420(2), and thus incapable of
custodian
of
such
official
record.1wphi1 These facts must be
established to prove that the land is
alienable and disposable.35 (Citation
omitted)
Based on the foregoing, it appears that
Espinosa cannot avail the benefits of
either Section 14(1) of P.O. No. 1529 in
relation to Section 48(b) of the PLA or
Section 14(2) of P.O. No. 1529. Applying
Section 14(1) of P.O. No. 1529 and
Section 48(b) of the PLA, albeit
improper, Espinosa failed to prove that:
(a) Isabel's possession of the property
dated back to June 12, 1945 or earlier;
and (b) the property is alienable and
disposable. On the other hand, applying
Section 14(2) of P.O. No. 1529, Espinosa
failed to prove that the property is
patrimonial. As to whether Espinosa was
able to prove that his possession and
occupation and that of Isabel were of the
character prescribed by law, the
resolution of this issue has been
rendered unnecessary by the foregoing
considerations.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE and
GRANTED.
The
Decision
dated
November 11, 2004 and Resolution
dated February 13, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72456 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
Domingo Espinosa's application for
registration of title over Lot No. 8499 of
Cad. 545-D (New) located at Barangay
Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 129682
March 21, 2002
NESTOR PAGKATIPUNAN and
ROSALINA
MAAGASPAGKATIPUNAN, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and
REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the
decision1 of the Court of Appeals
nullifying the decision of the Court of
First
Instance
of
Gumaca,
Quezon2 which confirmed petitioners
title over the lots subject of the instant
petition. Petitioners further seek to
annul and set aside the resolutions3 of
the Court of Appeals denying their
urgent motion to recall the judgment
entered4 in the land registration case.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Sometime
in
November
1960,
petitioners
predecessors-in-interest,
spouses Getulio Pagkatipunan and
Lucrecia Esquires, filed with the Court
of First Instance of Gumaca, Quezon an
application for judicial confirmation and
registration of their title to Lots 1 and 2
of Plan Psu-174406 and Lots 1 and 2 of
Plan Psu-112066, all located in San
Narciso, Quezon.5
On May 4, 1961, the Court of First
Instance entered an order of default
against the whole world, except spouses
Felicisimo
Almace
and
Teodulo
Medenilla who were given ten (10) days
to file their written opposition as
regards Lot No. 2 of Plan Psu-174406.
Upon
motion
of
petitioners
predecessors, Lot No. 2 of Plan Psu174406 was removed from the coverage
of the application. The remaining parcel
of land covered by Lot No. 1 has an area
of 3,804.261 square meters.
On June 15, 1967, the Court of First
Instance promulgated a decision
confirming petitioners title to the
property. On October 23, 1967, OCT No.
O-12665 was issued in the name of
petitioners.1wphi1.nt
Almost eighteen (18) years later, or on
September 12, 1985, the Republic of the
Philippines filed with the Intermediate
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 171875
THE HON. ANGELO T. REYES
(formerly Hon. Elisea G. Gozun),
in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Environment and
Natural
Resources
(DENR), Petitioner,
vs.
PAPER INDUSTRIES CORP. OF
THE
PHILIPPINES
(PICOP), Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The cause of action of PICOP Resources,
Inc. (PICOP) in its Petition for
Mandamus with the trial court is clear:
the government is bound by contract, a
1969 Document signed by then
President Ferdinand Marcos, to enter
into an Integrated Forest Management
Agreement (IFMA) with PICOP. Since
the remedy of mandamus lies only to
compel an officer to perform a
ministerial duty, and since the 1969
Document itself has a proviso requiring
compliance with the laws and the
Constitution, the issues in this Motion
for Reconsideration are the following:
(1) firstly, is the 1969 Document a
contract enforceable under the NonImpairment Clause of the Constitution,
so as to make the signing of the IFMA a
ministerial duty? (2) secondly, did
PICOP comply with all the legal and
constitutional requirements for the
issuance of an IFMA?
To recall, PICOP filed with the
Department of Environment and
Natural
Resources
(DENR)
an
application to have its Timber License
Agreement (TLA) No. 43 converted into
an IFMA. In the middle of the
processing of PICOPs application,
however, PICOP refused to attend
further meetings with the DENR.
Instead, on 2 September 2002, PICOP
AND
A
SEVEN-YEAR
REFORESTATION PLAN FOR THE
YEARS UNDER REVIEW.
ii.
PICOP FAILED TO COMPLY WITH
THE
PAYMENT
OF
FOREST
CHARGES.
iii.
PICOP DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE
REQUIREMENT
FOR
A
CERTIFICATION FROM THE NCIP
THAT THE AREA OF TLA 43 DOES
NOT
OVERLAP
WITH
ANY
ANCESTRAL DOMAIN.
iv.
PICOP FAILED TO HAVE PRIOR
CONSULTATION
WITH
AND
APPROVAL FROM THE SANGUNIAN
CONCERNED, AS REQUIRED BY
SECTION 27 OF THE REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 7160, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF
1991.
v.
PCIOP FAILED TO SECURE SOCIAL
ACCEPTABILITY
UNDER
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1586.
IV
THE MOTIVATION OF ALVAREZ IN
RECALLING THE CLEARANCE FOR
AUTOMATIC
CONVERSION
HE
ISSUED ON 25 OCTOBER 2001 WAS
NOT DUE TO ANY SHORTCOMING
FROM PICOP BUT DUE TO HIS
DETERMINATION
TO
EXCLUDE
28,125
HECTARES
FROM
THE
CONVERSION AND OTHER THINGS.
On 15 December 2008, on Motion by
PICOP, the Third Division of this Court
resolved to refer the consolidated cases
at bar to the Court en banc. On 16
December 2008, this Court sitting en
banc resolved to accept the said cases
and set them for oral arguments. Oral
arguments were conducted on 10
February 2009.
ATTY. AGABIN:
Yes.
JUSTICE TINGA:
And PICOP devoted quite a number of
pages in [its] memorandum to that issue
and so did the Court [in its Decision].
ATTY. AGABIN:
Anyway, your Honor, we beg the Court
to revisit, not to29
Interpretation of the 1969 Document
That Would Be in Harmony with the
Constitution
To remove any doubts as to the contents
of the 1969 Document, the purported
Presidential Warranty, below is a
complete text thereof:
Republic
of
the
Philippines
Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources
OFFICE
OF
THE
SECRETARY
Diliman, Quezon City
D-53, Licenses (T.L.A. No. 43)
Bislig
Bay
Lumber
Co.,
Inc.
(Bislig, Surigao)
July 29, 1969
Bislig
Bay
Lumber
Co.,
Inc.
[unreadable
word]
Bldg.
Makati, Rizal
S i r s:
This has reference to the request of the
Board of Investments through its
Chairman in a letter dated July 16, 1969
for a warranty on the boundaries of your
concession area under Timber License
Agreement No. 43, as amended.
We are made to understand that your
company is committed to support the
first large scale integrated wood
processing complex hereinafter called:
"The Project") and that such support will
be provided not only in the form of the
supply of pulpwood and other wood
materials from your concession but also
by making available funds generated out
of your own operations, to supplement
PICOPs operational sources of funds
and other financial arrangements made
co-production,
joint
venture,
or
production-sharing agreements as the
permissible schemes wherein private
entities may participate in the utilization
of forest products. Since the granting of
timber licenses ceased to be a
permissible scheme for the participation
of private entities under the present
Constitution, their operations should
have ceased upon the issuance of DAO
No. 99-53, the rule regulating the
schemes under the present Constitution.
This would be iniquitous to those with
existing TLAs that would not have
expired yet as of the issuance of DAO
No. 99-53, especially those with new
TLAs that were originally set to expire
after 10 or even 20 or more years. The
DENR thus inserted a provision in DAO
No. 99-53 allowing these TLA holders to
finish the period of their TLAs, but this
time as IFMAs, without the rigors of
going through a new application, which
they have probably just gone through a
few years ago.
Such an interpretation would not only
make DAO No. 99-53 consistent with
the provisions of the Constitution, but
would
also
prevent
possible
discrimination against new IFMA
applicants:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DE CASTRO:
I ask this question because of your
interpretation that the period of the
IFMA, if your TLA is converted into
IFMA, would cover a new a fresh period
of twenty-five years renewable by
another period of twenty-five years.
DEAN AGABIN:
Yes, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DE CASTRO:
Dont you think that will, in effect, be
invidious discrimination with respect to
other applicants if you are granted a
fresh period of twenty-five years
extendible to another twenty-five years?
DEAN AGABIN:
countless
future
generations
of
Filipinos, and not just by one logging
company.
The
requirements
of
reforestation and preservation of the
concession areas are meant to protect
them, the future generations, and not
PICOP. Reforestation and preservation
of the concession areas are not required
of logging companies so that they would
have something to cut again, but so that
the forest would remain intact after their
operations. That PICOP would not
accept the responsibility to preserve its
concession area if it is not assured of
tenure thereto does not speak well of its
corporate policies.
Conclusion
In sum, PICOP was not able to prove
either of the two things it needed to
prove to be entitled to a Writ of
Mandamus against the DENR Secretary.
The 1969 Document is not a contract
recognized under the non-impairment
clause and, even if we assume for the
sake of argument that it is, it did not
enjoin the government to issue an IFMA
in 2002 either. These are the essential
elements in PICOPs cause of action, and
the failure to prove the same warrants a
dismissal of PICOPs Petition for
Mandamus, as not even PICOPs
compliance with all the administrative
and statutory requirements can save its
Petition now.
Whether PICOP Has Complied with the
Statutory
and
Administrative
Requirements for the Conversion of the
TLA to an IFMA
In the assailed Decision, our ruling was
based on two distinct grounds, each one
being sufficient in itself for us to rule
that PICOP was not entitled to a Writ of
Mandamus: (1) the 1969 Document, on
which PICOP hinges its right to compel
the issuance of an IFMA, is not a
contract; and (2) PICOP has not
complied with all administrative and
deserve
great
weight.
However,
deserving of even greater weight are the
factual findings of administrative
agencies that have the expertise in the
area of concern. The contentious facts in
this case relate to the licensing,
regulation and management of forest
resources, the determination of which
belongs exclusively to the DENR:
SECTION
4.
Mandate.
The
Department shall be the primary
government agency responsible for the
conservation,
management,
development and proper use of the
countrys environment and natural
resources, specifically forest and grazing
lands, mineral resources, including
those in reservation and watershed
areas, and lands of the public domain, as
well as the licensing and regulation of all
natural resources as may be provided for
by law in order to ensure equitable
sharing of the benefits derived
therefrom for the welfare of the present
and future generations of Filipinos.59
When parties file a Petition for
Certiorari
against
judgments
of
administrative agencies tasked with
overseeing the implementation of laws,
the findings of such administrative
agencies are entitled to great weight. In
the case at bar, PICOP could not have
filed a Petition for Certiorari, as the
DENR Secretary had not yet even
determined whether PICOP should be
issued an IFMA. As previously
mentioned, when PICOPs application
was brought to a standstill upon the
evaluation that PICOP had yet to comply
with the requirements for the issuance
of an IFMA, PICOP refused to attend
further meetings with the DENR and
instead filed a Petition for Mandamus
against the latter. By jumping the gun,
PICOP did not diminish the weight of
the
DENR
Secretarys
initial
determination.
amounting
to P15,056,054.05.72The
same certification shows delayed
payment of forest charges, thereby
corroborating the testimony of SFMS
Evangelista and substantiating the
imposition of penalties and surcharges.
In its Motion for Reconsideration,
PICOP claims that SFMS Evangelista is
assigned to an office that has nothing to
do with the collection of forest charges,
and that he based his testimony on the
Memoranda of Forest Management
Specialist II (FMS II) Teofila Orlanes
and DENR, Bislig City Bill Collector
Amelia D. Arayan, neither of whom was
presented to testify on his or her
Memorandum. PICOP also submitted an
Addendum
to
Motion
for
Reconsideration, wherein it appended
certified true copies of CENRO
Summaries with attached Official
Receipts tending to show that PICOP
had paid a total of P81,184,747.70 in
forest charges for 10 January 2001 to 20
December 2002, including the period
during which SFMS Evangelista claims
PICOP did not pay forest charges (22
September 2001 to 26 April 2002).
Before proceeding any further, it is
necessary for us to point out that, as
with our ruling on the forest protection
and
reforestation
plans,
this
determination of compliance with the
payment of forest charges is exclusively
for the purpose of determining PICOPs
satisfactory performance on its TLA No.
43. This cannot bind either party in a
possible collection case that may ensue.
An evaluation of the DENR Secretarys
position on this matter shows a heavy
reliance on the testimony of SFMS
Evangelista, making it imperative for us
to strictly scrutinize the same with
respect to its contents and admissibility.
PICOP claims that SFMS Evangelistas
office has nothing to do with the
collection of forest charges. According to
private
investors
and
financial
institutions.
99.
The
primary
government
participation is to warrant and ensure
that the PICOP project shall have
peaceful tenure in the permanent forest
allocated to provide raw materials for
the project. To rule now that a project
whose foundations were commenced as
early as 1969 shall now be subjected to a
1991 law is to apply the law
retrospectively in violation of Article 4 of
the Civil Code that laws shall not be
applied retroactively.
100. In addition, under DAO 30, Series
of 1992, TLA and IFMA operations were
not among those devolved function from
the National Government / DENR to the
local government unit. Under its Section
03, the devolved function cover only:
a) Community Based forestry projects.
b) Communal forests of less than 5000
hectares
c) Small watershed areas which are
sources of local water supply.93
We have to remind PICOP again of the
contents of Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution:
Section 2. All lands of the public
domain,
waters,
minerals,
coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are
owned by the State. With the exception
of agricultural lands, all other natural
resources shall not be alienated. The
exploration,
development,
and
utilization of natural resources shall be
under the full control and supervision of
the State. The State may directly
undertake such activities, or it may enter
into co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreements with
Filipino citizens, or corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of
whose capital is owned by such
constitutional
and
statutory
requirements as well as with existing
policy on timber concessions." Thus, if
PICOP proves the two above-mentioned
matters, it still has to prove compliance
with statutory and administrative
requirements for the conversion of its
TLA into an IFMA.
While we have withdrawn our
pronouncements
in
the
assailed
Decision that (1) PICOP had not
submitted the required forest protection
and reforestation plans, and that (2)
PICOP had unpaid forestry charges, thus
effectively ruling in favor of PICOP on
all factual issues in this case, PICOP still
insists that the requirements of an NCIP
certification
and
Sanggunian
consultation and approval do not apply
to it. To affirm PICOPs position on
these matters would entail nothing less
than rewriting the Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act and the Local Government
Code, an act simply beyond our
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE,
the
Motion
for
Reconsideration of PICOP Resources,
Inc. is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 191109
July 18,
2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by the PHILIPPINE
RECLAMATION
AUTHORITY
(PRA),Petitioner,
vs.
CITY OF PARANAQUE, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, on pure questions of law,
assailing the January 8, 2010 Order 1 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 195,
Parafiaque City (RTC), which ruled that
petitioner
Philippine
Reclamation
Authority (PRA) is a government-owned
and controlled corporation (GOCC), a
taxable entity, and, therefore, . not
exempt from payment of real property
taxes. The pertinent portion of the said
order reads:
In view of the finding of this court that
petitioner is not exempt from payment
of real property taxes, respondent
Paraaque City Treasurer Liberato M.
Carabeo did not act xxx without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
warrants of levy on the subject
properties.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
dismissed. The Motion for Leave to File
and Admit Attached Supplemental
Petition is denied and the supplemental
petition attached thereto is not
admitted.
The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is a
government corporation created by
virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1084 (Creating the Public Estates
Authority, Defining its Powers and
Functions, Providing Funds Therefor
and For Other Purposes) which took
effect on February 4,
1977 to provide a coordinated,
economical and efficient reclamation of
lands, and the administration and
operation of lands belonging to,
managed and/or operated by, the
government with the object of
maximizing
their
utilization
and
hastening their development consistent
with public interest.
On February 14, 1979, by virtue of
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 525 issued
by then President Ferdinand Marcos,
PEA was designated as the agency
primarily responsible for integrating,
directing
and
coordinating
all
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED
IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER IS
LIABLE TO PAY REAL PROPERTY TAX
ON THE SUBJECT RECLAIMED
LANDS CONSIDERING
THAT
PETITIONER
IS
AN
INCORPORATED INSTRUMENTALITY
OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
AND IS, THEREFORE, EXEMPT FROM
PAYMENT OF REAL PROPERTY TAX
UNDER SECTIONS 234(A) AND 133(O)
OF REPUBLIC ACT 7160 OR THE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE VIS-VIS
MANILA
INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT AUTHORITY V. COURT OF
APPEALS.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED
IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT
RECLAIMED LANDS ARE PART OF
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AND, HENCE,
EXEMPT FROM REAL PROPERTY
TAX.
PRA asserts that it is not a GOCC under
Section 2(13) of the Introductory
Provisions of the Administrative Code.
Neither is it a GOCC under Section 16,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
because it is not required to meet the
test of economic viability. Instead, PRA
is a government instrumentality vested
with corporate powers and performing
an essential public service pursuant to
Section 2(10) of the Introductory
Provisions of the Administrative Code.
Although it has a capital stock divided
into shares, it is not authorized to
distribute dividends and allotment of
surplus and profits to its stockholders.
Therefore, it may not be classified as a
stock corporation because it lacks the
second requisite of a stock corporation
which is the distribution of dividends
and allotment of surplus and profits to
the stockholders.
these
government-owned
or
controlled
corporations with special charters are
usually organized as stock corporations
just like ordinary private corporations.
In
contrast,
government
instrumentalities vested with corporate
powers and performing governmental or
public functions need not meet the test
of
economic
viability.
These
instrumentalities perform essential
public services for the common good,
services that every modern State must
provide
its
citizens.
These
instrumentalities
need
not
be
economically
viable
since
the
government may even subsidize their
entire
operations.
These
instrumentalities
are
not
the
"government-owned
or
controlled
corporations" referred to in Section 16,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Thus, the Constitution imposes no
limitation when the legislature creates
government instrumentalities vested
with corporate powers but performing
essential governmental or public
functions.
Congress
has
plenary
authority
to
create
government
instrumentalities vested with corporate
powers provided these instrumentalities
perform essential government functions
or public services. However, when the
legislature creates through special
charters corporations that perform
economic or commercial activities, such
entities known as "governmentowned or controlled corporations"
must meet the test of economic viability
because they compete in the market
place.
HONORABLE
MARGARITA
OSMEA,
HONORABLE
AUGUSTUS
PE,
HONORABLE
RICHARD
OSMEA,
HONORABLE
NOEL
WENCESLAO,
HONORABLE
EDUARDO
RAMA,
JR.,
HONORABLE MICHAEL RALOTA,
HONORABLE
JOHN
PHILIP
ECHAVEZ-PO, ATTY. JOSEPH
BERNALDEZ,
ATTY.
JUNE
MARATAS,
ATTY.
JERONE
CASTILLO, ATTY. MARY ANN
SUSON, ATTY. LESLIE ANN
REYES, ATTY. CARLO VINCENT
GIMENA,
ATTY.
FERDINAND
CAETE,
ATTY.
ISMAEL
GARAYGAY III, ATTY. LECEL
LLAMEDO AND ATTY. MARIE
VELLE ABELLA, RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
One of the Heirs of Reverend Father
Vicente Rallos (Heirs of Fr. Rallos),
Lucena B. Rallos1 (Lucena), is now
before
this
Court
with
a
petition2 praying for the citation for
indirect contempt of the City of Cebu,
Mayor Michael Rama (Mayor Rama),
the presiding officer and members of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod, and lawyers
from the Office of the City Attorney
(respondents). The instant petition is
anchored on Lucena's allegation that the
respondents impede the execution of
final and executory judgments rendered
by this Court in G.R. Nos. 179662 3and
1941114. G.R. Nos. 179662 and 194111
were among a string of suits which
originated from a Complaint for
Forfeiture of Improvements or Payment
of Fair Market Value with Moral and
Exemplary Damages5 filed in 1997 by the
Heirs of Fr. Rallos before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch
9, against the City of Cebu relative to
two parcels of land6 with a total area of
[T]he
entire
amount
of
Php
44,213,000.00 shall be subjected to a
12% interest per annum to start 40 days
from the date the decision on July 24,
2001 [was rendered] until the amount of
Php 34,905,000.00 was partially paid
by the City of Cebu. After the payment
by the City of Cebu of a partial amount,
the balance shall again be subjected to
12% interest until the same shall have
been fully paid.24
The Heirs of Fr. Rallos assailed the
abovementioned order on the ground
that it effectively modified the final and
executory Decision rendered on July 24,
2001. They likewise sought the
application of Article 221225 of the New
Civil Code and jurisprudence so as to
entitle them to legal interest on the
interest due to them pursuant to the
Decision rendered on July 24, 2001. In
the Order issued on May 20, 2009, the
RTC did not favorably consider the
preceding claims.
A
Petition
for
Certiorari
and
Mandamus26 was then filed by the Heirs
of Fr. Rallos before the CA to challenge
the Orders issued by the RTC on March
16, 2009 and May 20, 2009. The CA
granted the petition after finding that
the two assailed orders effectively
modified the final and executory
disposition made by the RTC on March
21, 2002. The CA likewise ruled that the
case calls for the application of Article
2212 of the New Civil Code, hence, it
directed the City of Cebu to pay interest
at the rate of 12% per annum upon the
interest due, to be computed from the
date of the filing of the complaint until
full satisfaction of the obligation. The CA
stated:
Note that the final and executory
consolidated decision of July 24, 2001
as modified by the final and executory
order of March 21, 2002, clearly
directed herein respondent Cebu City to
SCA
No.
CEB38292
Petition Petition
of
Action
for
Indirec
t
Contem
pt
of
Court
Petition Lucena
er
B.
Rallos
for
Indirect
Contem
pt
Lucina
B.
Rallos
Respon
dents
City of
Cebu
Mayor
Michael
Rama
City
Council
ors
Joy
August
us
Young
Sisinio
Andale
s
Rodrig
o
Abellan
osa
Alvin
Arcilla
Raul
Alcoseb
a
Ma.
Nida
Cabrera
Robert
o
Cabarr
ubias
Alvin
Dizon
Ronald
Cuenco
Lea
Japson
Jose
Daluz
III
Edgard
o
Labella
Margar
ita
Osmen
City of
Cebu
Mayor
Michael
Rama
City
Council
ors
Joy
August
us
Young
Sisinio
Andales
Rodrigo
Abellan
osa
Alvin
Arcilla
Raul
Alcoseb
a
Ma.
Nida
Cabrera
Roberto
Cabarru
bias
Alvin
Dizon
Ronald
Cuenco
Lea
Japson
Jose
Daluz
III
Edgard
o
Labella
Margari
ta
Osmena
August
us
Pe
Richard
a
August
us Pe
Richard
Osmen
a
Noel
Wences
lao
Eduard
o
Rama,
Jr.
Michael
Ralota
John
Philip
Echave
z-Po
City
Attorne
y
Atty.
Joseph
Bernald
ez
Atty.
Jun
Marata
s
Atty.
Jerone
Castillo
Atty.
Mary
Ann
Suson
Atty.
Leslie
Ann
Reyes
Atty.
Carlo
Vincent
Gimena
Atty.
Osmena
Noel
Wences
lao
Eduard
o Rama,
Jr.
Michael
Ralota
John
Philip
Echavez
-Po
Ferdina
nd
Canete
Atty.
Ismael
Garayg
ay III
Atty.
Lecel
Llamed
o
Atty.
Marie
Velle
Abella
pt
in
relation
to their
noncomplia
nce
with
the
directiv
es
contain
ed
in
the
disposit
ive
portion
of the
Consoli
dated
Order
issued
on
March
21,
2002
by the
RTC in
Civil
Case
No.
CEB20388.5
they
perform
the said
act
of
complyi
ng
or
causing
the
complia
nce
with the
specific
directiv
es
contain
ed
in
the
disposit
ive
portion
of the
final
and
executo
ry
Consoli
dated
Order
dated
March
21,
2002.59
Prayer
Prayer
Respon
dents
be
declare
d guilty
of
indirect
contem
Respon
dents,
except
the City
of Cebu,
be
impriso
ned
until
the
entities
within
the
COA's
jurisdiction. Section 2,65 Rule VIII lays
down the procedure in filing money
claims against the Government. Section
4, Rule X provides that any case brought
to the COA shall be decided within 60
days from the date it is submitted for
decision or resolution. Section 1, Rule
XII allows the aggrieved party to file a
petition for certiorari before this Court
to assail any decision, order or
resolution of the COA within 30 days
from receipt of a copy thereof.
This Court, in the case of University of
the Philippines v. Dizon,66 thus held that
despite the existence of a final and
executory judgment validating the claim
against an agency or instrumentality of
the Government, the settlement of the
said claim is still subject to the primary
jurisdiction of the COA. Ineluctably, the
claimant has to first seek the COA's
approval of the monetary claim.67
Without compliance by Lucena and the
Heirs of Fr. Rallos with the provisions of
P.D. No. 1445 and the COA's Revised
Rules of Procedure, their lamentations
that the respondents are unjustly
refusing the execution of the decisions
and orders in Civil Case No. CEB-20388
do not hold any water.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
instant petition is DISMISSED. Further,
on account of Lucena Rallos' act of
forum shopping, the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 14, is
likewise directed to dismiss her petition
for contempt, docketed as SCA No. CEB38292, which she filed against the
respondents.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 134971
March 25,
2004
HERMINIO
TAYAG, petitioner,
vs.
AMANCIA LACSON, ROSENDO
LACSON,
ANTONIO
LACSON,
JUAN
LACSON,
TEODISIA
LACSON-ESPINOSA
and
THE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on
certiorari of the Decision1 and the
Resolution2 of respondent Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 44883.
The Case for the Petitioner
Respondents Angelica Tiotuyco Vda. de
Lacson,3 and her children Amancia,
Antonio, Juan, and Teodosia, all
surnamed Lacson, were the registered
owners of three parcels of land located
in Mabalacat, Pampanga, covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos.
35922-R, 35923-R, and 35925-R,
registered in the Register of Deeds of
San
Fernando,
Pampanga.
The
properties,
which
were
tenanted
agricultural lands,4 were administered
by Renato Espinosa for the owner.
On March 17, 1996, a group of original
farmers/tillers, namely, Julio Tiamson,
Renato Gozun, Rosita Hernandez,
Bienvenido Tongol, Alfonso Flores,
Norma Quiambao, Rosita Tolentino,
Jose Sosa, Francisco Tolentino, Sr.,
Emiliano Laxamana, Ruben Torres,
Meliton Allanigue, Dominga Laxamana,
Felicencia de Leon, Emiliano Ramos,
and another group, namely, Felino G.
Tolentino, Rica Gozun, Perla Gozun,
Benigno Tolentino, Rodolfo Quiambao,
Roman Laxamana, Eddie San Luis,
Ricardo
Hernandez,
Nicenciana
Miranda, Jose Gozun, Alfredo Sosa, Jose
Tiamson, Augusto Tolentino, Sixto
Hernandez, Alex Quiambao, Isidro
Tolentino, Ceferino de Leon, Alberto
Hernandez, Orlando Flores, and Aurelio
Flores,5 individually executed in favor of
the petitioner separate Deeds of
Assignment6 in which the assignees
assigned to the petitioner their
2nd
PAY
MEN
T
CH
EC
TOTAL
K
NO.
P
231
10,62
281
1.54
2.
P
96,00
Renat 10,00 0
o
0
Gozu
n--- - [son
of
Felix
Gozu
n
(dece
ased)]
3.
Rosita
P
14,37
Herna
5,000 4.24
ndez --4.
P
14,46
Bienv 10,00 5.90
enido 0
Tongo
l - - [Son
of
Abun
P
30,621.5
4
106,000.
00
dio
Tongo
l
(dece
ased)]
5.
Alfons
P
o
26,64 231
30,00
Flores
8.40 271
0
----6.
Norm
a
Quia
mbao
----
P
41,50
10,00
1.10
0
7.
Rosita P
22,12
Tolent 10,00
6.08
ino - - 0
---
231
279
231
284
8.
Jose
P
14,86 231
Sosa - 10,00
1.31
291
----- 0
---
231
274
231
285
P
19,374.2
4
24,46
5.90
9.
Franci
P
sco
24,23 231
10,00
Tolent
7.62
283
0
ino,
Sr.
10.
Emili
ano
Laxa
mana
-11.
Rube
n
Torre
56,64
8.40
51,501
.10
32,12
6.08
24,86
1.31
34,23
7.62
s - - - - [Son
of
Maria
no
Torre
s
(dece
ased)]
12.
Melit P
12,94
on
10,00
4.77
Allani 0
gue
231
269
P
22,94
4.77
13.
Domi
nga
Laxa
mana
P
22,26 231
5,000 9.02 275
27,26
9.02
14.
Felice
ncia
de
Leon
10,00
-----0
15.
Emili
ano
Ramo
s
5,000
----------
16.
Felino
10,00
G.
-----0
Tolent
ino
----------
----------
17.
Rica
Gozu
n
5,000 ------
----------
P
P
----- P
10,00 33,58 43,58
0
7.31
7.31
18.
Perla
Gozu
n
10,00
-----0
----------
P
10,00 -----0
19.
Benig
10,00
no
-----0
Tolent
ino
----------
20.
Rodol
10,00
fo
-----0
Quia
mbao
----------
21.
Roma
10,00
n
-----0
Laxa
mana
----------
22.
Eddie
San
Luis
10,00
-----0
----------
23.
Ricar
10,00
do
-----0
Herna
ndez
----------
24.
Nicen
10,00
ciana
-----0
Miran
da
----------
25.
Jose
Gozu
n
10,00
-----0
26.
Alfred 5,000 -----o Sosa
27.
Jose
10,00
-----Tiams 0
on
28.
5,000 -----Augus
----------
to
Tolent
ino
29.
Sixto 10,00
-----Herna 0
ndez
----------
30.
Alex
Quia
mbao
10,00
-----0
----------
31.
Isidro 10,00
-----Tolent 0
ino
----------
32.
Ceferi
-----no de
Leon
231
270
11,37
8.70
------
33.
Albert
10,00
o
-----0
Herna
ndez
----------
34.
Orlan 10,00
-----do
0
Florez
----------
35.
Aureli 10,00
-----o
0
Flores
----------
jurisdiction.
Accordingly,
public
respondent is permanently enjoined
from proceeding with the case
designated as Civil Case No. 10901.22
The CA ruled that the respondents could
not be enjoined from alienating or even
encumbering their property, especially
so since they were not privies to the
deeds of assignment executed by the
defendants-tenants. The defendantstenants were not yet owners of the
portions of the landholdings respectively
tilled by them; as such, they had nothing
to assign to the petitioner. Finally, the
CA ruled that the deeds of assignment
executed by the defendants-tenants
were contrary to P.D. No. 27 and Rep.
Act No. 6657.
On August 4, 1998, the CA issued a
Resolution denying the petitioners
motion for reconsideration.23
Hence, the petitioner filed his petition
for review on certiorari before this
Court, contending as follows:
I
A MERE ALLEGATION IN THE
ANSWER OF THE TENANTS COULD
NOT BE USED AS EVIDENCE OR
BASIS FOR ANY CONCLUSION, AS
THIS ALLEGATION, IS STILL THE
SUBJECT OF TRIAL IN THE LOWER
COURT (RTC).24
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS CANNOT
ENJOIN THE HEARING OF A
PETITION
FOR
PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION AT A TIME WHEN THE
LOWER COURT (RTC) IS STILL
RECEIVING EVIDENCE PRECISELY
TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT
THE
WRIT
OF
PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION BEING PRAYED FOR BY
TAYAG SHOULD BE GRANTED OR
NOT.25
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS CANNOT
USE "FACTS" NOT IN EVIDENCE, TO
ATTY. OCAMPO:
Q : Did you explain to them?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : What did you tell them?
A : I explain[ed] to them, sir, that the
legal impediment then especially if the
Lacsons will not agree to sell their
shares to me or to us it would be hard to
(sic) me to pay them in full. And those
covered by DAR. I explain[ed] to them
and it was clearly stated in the title that
there is [a] prohibited period of time
before you can sell the property. I
explained every detail to them.41
It is only upon the occurrence of the
foregoing conditions that the petitioner
would be obliged to pay to the
defendants-tenants the balance of the
P50.00 per square meter under the
deeds of assignment. Thus:
2. That in case the ASSIGNOR and
LANDOWNER will mutually agree to
sell the said lot to the ASSIGNEE, who is
given an exclusive and absolute right to
buy the lot, the ASSIGNOR shall receive
the sum of FIFTY PESOS (P50.00) per
square meter as consideration of the
total area actually tilled and possessed
by the ASSIGNOR, less whatever
amount received by the ASSIGNOR
including commissions, taxes and all
allowable deductions relative to the sale
of the subject properties.
3. That this exclusive and absolute right
given to the ASSIGNEE shall be
exercised
only
when
no
legal
impediments exist to the lot to effect the
smooth transfer of lawful ownership of
the lot/property in the name of the
ASSIGNEE;
4. That the ASSIGNOR will remain in
peaceful possession over the said
property
and
shall
enjoy
the
fruits/earnings and/or harvest of the
said lot until such time that full payment
of the agreed purchase price had been
made by the ASSIGNEE.42
Puno,
(Chairman),
Quisumbing,
Austria-Martinez,
and
Tinga,
JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 149570. March 12, 2004]
HEIRS OF ROSENDO SEVILLA
FLORENCIO, as represented by
ESTRELLITA FLORENCIO-CRUZ
and
RODRIGO
R.
FLORENCIO, petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF TERESA SEVILLA DE
LEON
as
represented
by
VALERIANA
MORENTE, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the
Joint Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 59698-99 which
affirmed the June 5, 2000 Decisions [2] of
the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 20 in Civil Cases No.
1018-M-99 and 1019-M-99, and the
resolution of the appellate court denying
the
petitioners
motion
for
reconsideration.
The Antecedents
Teresa Sevilla de Leon, owned a
residential lot with an area of 828
square meters located in San Miguel,
Bulacan. The said lot was covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T44349.[3] In the 1960s, De Leon allowed
the spouses Rosendo and Consuelo
Florencio to construct a house on the
said property and stay therein without
any rentals therefor.
On September 26, 1966, De Leon, with
the consent of her husband Luis, leased
the aforesaid parcel of land for P5 per
month to Bienvenido Santos for as long
as the lessor (Teresa de Leon) had an
outstanding loan with the Second
Quezon City Development Bank of
Quezon City but not to exceed the period
of fifteen (15) years.[4] De Leonassigned
her leasehold right in favor of the
Second. As
earlier
pointed
out,
throughout the years, the real estate
taxes on the property continued to be
paid in the name of Teresa Sevilla by the
caretaker Rodolfo Apolinario and
nobody else.There is no showing that the
defendants had previously laid any
claim of title or ownership over the
property and attempted to pay the taxes
thereon.
Third. Although it purports to have been
notarized in the City of Manila by one
Atty. Tirso L. Manguiat, there is no
indication of its existence in the notarial
record of Atty. Manguiat, as per
Certification dated April 23, 1996 (Exh.
L) of the Manila Records Management
and Archives Office. One can only
wonder why from the place of execution
in San Miguel, Bulacan on October 1,
1976, its notarization on the same date
had to be in the City of Manila.
Fourth. The Court has noted, as anyone
can easily do, that the signature
purported to be that of Teresa de Leon
appearing in the deed of donation (Exh.
1-B), is dissimilar to her customary
signatures affixed to her passports
(Exhs. E and E-1). The same is true with
those of Patria Manotoc and Valeriana
L. Morente appearing in the same deed
of donation (Exhs. 1-D and 1-E), with
those of their customary signatures
appearing in their respective passports
(Exhs. F and F-1; G, G-1 and G-2; H, H-1
and H-2; I and I-1 and J and J-1).
And Fifth. There is no explanation given
why since 1976, when the deed of
donation was supposedly executed, up
to the present, the defendants did not
register the same to secure a new title in
their names. In fact, there is no showing
that efforts toward that end were ever
executed.
As it is, the Court holds that the deed of
donation in question is not a credible
piece of evidence to support the
IN
LIGHT
OF
ALL
THE
FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED.
The Decisions of the Regional Trial
Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 20, in
Civil Cases Nos. 1018-M-99 and 1019-M99, and the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 59698-99, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
MARGARITA F. CASTRO,
Petitioner,
- versus -
NAPOLEON A. MONSOD,
Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
[15]
An easement or servitude is an
encumbrance
imposed
upon
an
immovable for the benefit of another
immovable belonging to a different
owner.[26] There are two kinds of
easements according to source. An
easement is established either by law or
by will of the owners.[27] The courts
cannot impose or constitute any
servitude where none existed. They can
only declare its existence if in reality it
exists by law or by the will of the owners.
There are therefore no judicial
easements.[28]
Article 684 of the Civil Code provides
that no proprietor shall make such
excavations upon his land as to deprive
any adjacent land or building of
sufficient lateral or subjacent support.
An owner, by virtue of his surface right,
may make excavations on his land, but
his right is subject to the limitation that
he shall not deprive any adjacent land or
building of sufficient lateral or subjacent
support.
Between
two
adjacent
landowners, each has an absolute
property right to have his land laterally
supported by the soil of his neighbor,
and if either, in excavating on his own
premises, he so disturbs the lateral
support of his neighbors land as to cause
it, or, in its natural state, by the pressure
of its own weight, to fall away or slide
from its position, the one so excavating
is liable.[29]
In the instant case, an easement of
subjacent and lateral support exists in
favor of respondent. It was established
that the properties of petitioner and
respondent adjoin each other. The
residential house and lot of respondent
is located on an elevated plateau of
fifteen (15) feet above the level of
petitioners property. The embankment
and the riprapped stones have been in
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This resolves the instant Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court praying for the
nullification of the Decision [1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated April 25,
2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 60998 and its
Resolution[2] dated September 14, 2005.
The challenged Decision of the CA
reversed and set aside the judgment of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Marikina City, Branch 272 in Civil Case
No. 94-57-MK while its assailed
Resolution denied petitioners' motion
for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
3. DISMISSING
counterclaim.
Subsequently,
herein
petitioners
executed an extra-judicial partition
wherein Lot C was subdivided into three
lots. As a result of the subdivision, new
titles were issued wherein the 370square-meter portion of Lot C-3 is now
denominated as Lot C-1 and is covered
by TCT No. 244447[9] and the remaining
5 square meters of the subject lot (Lot C3) now forms a portion of another lot
denominated as Lot C-2 and is now
covered by TCT No. 244448.[10]
the
defendants'
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[13]
[15]
Revised
memorandum thereof, be in
writing, and subscribed by the
party charged, or by his agent;
evidence, therefore, of the agreement
cannot be received without the writing,
or a secondary evidence of its contents:
(2) The
cession,
repudiation
or
renunciation of hereditary rights or of
those of the conjugal partnership of
gains;
xxxx
(a)
An agreement that by its terms is
not to be performed within a year from
the making thereof;
HEIRS
OF
BIENVENI
ARACELI TANYAG, namely: ARTURO
T. JOCSON AND ZENAIDA T. VELOSO
Petitioners,
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule
45 which
seeks
to
reverse
the
Decision[1] dated August 18, 2006 and
Resolution[2] dated December 8, 2006 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 81224. The CA affirmed the
Decision[3] dated November 19, 2003 of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 267 in Civil Case No. 67846
dismissing petitioners complaint for
declaration of nullity of Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1035,
reconveyance and damages, as well as
respondents counterclaims for damages
and attorneys fees.
Subject of controversy are two adjacent
parcels of land located at Ruhale,
Barangay Calzada, Municipality of
Taguig (now part of Pasig City, Metro
Manila). The first parcel (Lot 1) with an
area of 686 square meters was originally
declared in the name of Jose Gabriel
under Tax Declaration (TD) Nos. 1603
and 6425 issued for the years 1949 and
1966, while the second parcel (Lot 2)
consisting of 147 square meters was
originally declared in the name of
Agueda Dinguinbayan under TD Nos.
6418 and 9676 issued for the years 1966
and 1967.[4] For several years, these
lands lined with bamboo plants
remained undeveloped and uninhabited.
Petitioners claimed that Lot 1 was
owned by Benita Gabriel, sister of Jose
Gabriel, as part of her inheritance as
declared by her in a 1944 notarized
instrument (Affidavit of Sale) whereby
she sold the said property to spouses
Gabriel Sulit and Cornelia Sanga. Said
document states:
1968. Thereupon,
petitioners
took
possession of said property and declared
the same for tax purposes as shown by
TD Nos. 11361, 3395, 120-014-00482,
120-00-014-20-002-000, C-014-00180
and D-014-00182 issued for the years
1969, 1974, 1979, 1985, 1991 and 1994.
[8]
Petitioners
claimed
to
have
continuously, publicly, notoriously and
adversely occupied both Lots 1 and 2
through
their
caretaker
Juana
Quinones[9]; they fenced the premises
and introduced improvements on the
land.[10]
Sometime in 1979, Jose Gabriel, father
of respondents, secured TD No. 120014-01013 in his name over Lot 1
indicating therein an increased area of
1,763
square
meters. Said
tax
declaration supposedly cancelled TD No.
6425 over Lot 1 and contained the
following inscription[11]:
Note: Portions of this Property is Also
Declared
in the name of Araceli C. Tanyag under
T.D.#120-014-00858 686 sq. m.
Also inscribed on TD No. 120-01400858[12] (1979) in the name of Araceli
Tanyag covering Lot 1 are the following:
This property is also covered by T.D.
#120-014-01013
in the name of Jose P. Gabriel
1-8-80
which notation was carried into the
1985, 1990 and 1991 tax declarations, all
in the name of Araceli Tanyag.
On March 20, 2000, petitioners
instituted Civil Case No. 67846 alleging
that respondents never occupied the
whole 686 square meters of Lot 1 and
fraudulently caused the inclusion of Lot
2 in TD No. 120-014-01013 such that Lot
1 consisting of 686 square meters
originally declared in the name of Jose
Gabriel was increased to 1,763 square
meters. They contended that the
issuance of OCT No. 1035 on October
HEIRS
OF
BIENVENI
ARACELI TANYAG, namely: ARTURO
T. JOCSON AND ZENAIDA T. VELOSO
Petitioners,
- versus -