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UMI Number: 3175630

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Table of Contents

Abstract.................................................................................................................. i
Acknowledgements.............................................................................................. iii
Introduction ...........................................................................................................1
Historical Context ..............................................................................................1
Monastic Colleges and Buddhist Education ......................................................9
Epistemology and Negative Dialectics ............................................................13
Buddha-Nature ................................................................................................15
Summary of Contents......................................................................................18
Interpretive Context .........................................................................................24
Chapter 1: Buddha-Nature and the Unity of the Two Truths ...............................27
Introduction......................................................................................................27
Mi-phams Synthesis .......................................................................................31
Two Truths ......................................................................................................35
Buddha-Nature as the Unity of Appearance and Emptiness ...........................45
Buddha-Nature as the Definitive Meaning.......................................................56
Conclusion.......................................................................................................63
Chapter 2: Yogcra, Prsagika, and the Middle Way .....................................64
Introduction......................................................................................................64
Middle Way and Mind-Only .............................................................................64
Foundations of Yogcra ................................................................................67
Svtantrika-Prsagika ...................................................................................73
Dialectical Ascent ............................................................................................90
Conclusion.......................................................................................................99
Chapter 3: The Present Absence......................................................................101
Introduction....................................................................................................101
Other-Emptiness in the Jo-nang....................................................................102
Other-Emptiness and the Nying-ma: Lo-chen Dharma r ............................115

Another Emptiness? Emptiness of Self/Other ...............................................122

Delineating Phenomena and Suchness ........................................................125
Delineating Emptiness...................................................................................135
Emptiness as the Unity of Appearance and Emptiness.................................141
Conclusion.....................................................................................................149
Chapter 4: Buddha-Nature and the Indivisible Ground and Fruition..................151
Introduction....................................................................................................151
Delineating the Views on Buddha-Nature......................................................151
Buddha-Nature as Heritage, Buddha-Nature as the Ground.........................160
Delineating Appearance and Reality .............................................................170
Establishing Buddha-Nature: The Immanent Buddha ...................................180
Establishing Appearances as Divine .............................................................189
Buddha-Nature and a Difference Between Stra and Mantra .......................200
Buddha-Nature as the Ground of the Great Perfection .................................212
Conclusion.....................................................................................................214
Concluding Remarks.........................................................................................216
Document 1 ......................................................................................................221
Introduction....................................................................................................221

Lions Roar: Exposition of Buddha-Nature ........................................................221

1. Stating Other Traditions ............................................................................224
2. Presenting Our Own Authentic Tradition ...................................................228
1. The Meaning of the First Verse Because the body of the perfect Buddha
is radiant ...................................................................................................228
2. The Meaning of the Second Verse Because suchness is indivisible ...235
3. The Meaning of the Third Verse Because of possessing heritage ......239
1. Refuting the View that [the Basic Element] is Truly Established and Not
Empty ............................................................................................................245
2. Refuting the View that [the Basic Element] is a Void Emptiness ...............247
3. Refuting the Apprehension of [the Basic Element] as Impermanent and
Conditioned ...................................................................................................248

Document 2 ......................................................................................................261
Introduction....................................................................................................261

Notes on the Essential Points of [Mi-phams] Exposition [of Buddha-Nature] ...261

Document 3 ......................................................................................................272
Introduction....................................................................................................272
Excerpt from Roar of the Fearless Lion [48.2-97.4] ..........................................272
1. The Subject of the Extensive Discussion Here, an Explanation of the
Progression of Profound Points of the Ground, Path, and Fruition of the Stra
Perfection Vehicle .........................................................................................273
1. The Manner of the Teaching of the Profound Abiding Reality of the Definitive
Meaning of the Perfection Vehicle.................................................................274
1. The Progression of the Wheels of Doctrine which are the Means of Teaching
the Definitive Meaning of the Abiding Reality ................................................274
1. The Wheels of Doctrine Indicated in the Sadhinirmocanastra ..........274
1. Presenting Scripture...........................................................................274
2. Establishing the Reason for That Being the Way It Is ........................279
2. The Wheels of Doctrine Indicated in the Dhravararjaparipcch ...289
1. Presenting Scripture...........................................................................289
2. Establishing [the Reason for That Being] the Way It Is ......................293
3. In Accord with That, the Way They are Indicated in the Nirva[stra] and
so forth [75.5].............................................................................................296
1. Presenting Scripture...........................................................................296
1. Presenting Scripture from the Nirvastra ....................................296
2. Presenting Scripture from the Agulimlyastra............................298
2. Establishing through Reasoning That Being the Way It Is..................300
3. An Appended Identification of the Scriptural Collections of Definitive
Meaning .................................................................................................306
2. The Way that These Commentaries on Buddhas Viewpoint are Supreme
......................................................................................................................307
Bibliography ......................................................................................................313

Tibetan Sources ............................................................................................313

Non-Tibetan Sources ....................................................................................318

Abstract
This dissertation addresses the relationship between metaphysical
presence and absence (emptiness) in Buddhism through a focus on the
Nying-ma tradition as articulated in the works of Mi-pham (ju mi pham

rgya mtsho, 1846-1912), a great synthesizer of Buddhist doctrine and

Nying-ma philosophy.

I draw widely from his writings on Yogcra,

Madhyamaka, and tantra to discuss the significance of an ontological

ground (gzhi), or Buddha-nature, as the central theme in his overall
interpretative scheme. Mi-pham was a prolific writer on a variety of topics,
and had a remarkable ability to synthesize diverse strands of thought.
The tradition of the Nying-ma is a complex one, and there are many
divergent and competing voices that lay claim to the tradition. I will try to
present important facets of this central theme in Mi-phams philosophy of
Nying-ma, and show how he uses a dialectic of presence and absence
around which he discusses a unified ground.
Mi-pham was a prominent figure in the Tibetan non-sectarian (ris

med) movement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. He

most notably brought esoteric Nying-ma doctrines into conversation with
the exoteric scholastic discourses of his day.

Mi-pham formulates the

Nying-ma tradition of his predecessors Long-chen-pa (klong chen rab

byam, 1308-1364) and Rong-zom (rong zom chos kyi bzang po, ca. 11th
c.) in response to traditions of other-emptiness, through which he
distinguishes his Nying-ma tradition.
Buddha-nature is a theme in Mi-phams work that has a strong
association with tantra in the Nying-ma tradition. His affirmation of the
presence of Buddha-nature as intrinsic within the ground of existence
shares predominant characteristics of the discourses of tantra in the
Nying-ma tradition and, in particular, the Great Perfection (rdzogs chen).
The Great Perfection is an antischolastic textual and meditative tradition
that consistently evades systematic analysis, and in a fundamental way is
antithetical to abstract conceptual determination. Mi-pham creatively

ii
formulates the esoteric discourses that have defined the Nying-ma
traditionthe

Great

Perfection

and

the

tantric

tradition

of

the

Guhyagarbhain terms of central exoteric discourses of Buddhism:

Buddha-nature, the Middle Way, and Buddhist epistemological systems.
This dissertation explores a range of topics within Mi-phams thought to
underscore Buddha-nature and a dialectic of presence and absence as a
central thread that runs through his interpretative system.

iii

Acknowledgements
While I was studying in graduate school, I had the fortune of
sharing a house for some time with Khen-po Ye-shey-trin-ley, who was
instrumental in fostering my appreciation for the works of Mi-pham. I also
lived for one semester in Charlottesville with a Jo-nang scholar, Khen-po
Tsul-trim-dar-gyey, and spent my first two years of coursework living in
two separate houses each with a Ge-luk scholar, Ge-shey Tar-d and Geshey

Ten-zin-dar-gyey.

Additionally,

while

was

writing

my

comprehensive exams, I had the opportunity to study with Tulku Nyi-magyal-tsen while he was in residence at the University of Virginia for one
semester.

I was very fortunate to have had close contact with these

scholars while doing my academic studies.

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Chkyi Nyima
Rinpoche, and his late father, Tulku Urgyen, without whom I would not
have had the inspiration to take on such a study. Also, I would like to
thank my advisor, Professor Jeffrey Hopkins, whose legacy of academic
scholarship of Buddhism is difficult to fathom. Professor David Germano
has also helped me over the years in many significant ways. Professors
Hopkins and Germano have both consistently challenged me to further my
understanding of texts and traditions in critical and creative ways. I would
also like to thank the other members of my dissertation committee,
Professors Karen Lang and Robert Hueckstedt, each of whom has kindly
shared their expertise and gave me valuable advice.
My studies were made possible due to many learned Tibetan
scholars who I would like to thank in the order that I met them (by sect for
ease of identification): Nying-ma scholarsthe late Nyo-shul Khen-po
Jam-yang-dor-jey, Khen-po Ch-dzd, the late Khen-po Cha-dral, the late
Khen-po Pen-tsey, Khen-po Nyi-ma-tn-drup, Khen-po Shey-rap-zang-po,
Khen-po Cham-pa-lo-dr, Khen-po Nam-drl, Khen-po Shey-rap-dor-jey,
Khen-po Pe-ma-shey-rap, Khen-po Ktyyana, Khen-po Wang-chuk-s-

iv
nam, and Khen-po Ye-shey-dor-jey; Jo-nang scholarsA-ku Rap-gyey,
the late Khen-po Yn-ten-zang-po, Khen-po Nga-wang-dor-jey, and Khenpo Shey-rap; Sa-kya scholarsKhen-po Ch-ying-lhn-drup, Khen-po
Cham-pa-tn-ten, and Khen-po A-pey; Ka-gyd scholarsThrangu
Rinpoche, Khen-po Pe-ma-gyal-tsen, Khen-po Tup-ten-ye-shey, and
Khen-po Shey-rap--zer. All these teachers, and others not mentioned,
shared with me their vast learning with great kindness.
My interest in the academic study of Buddha-nature was sparked
by my undergraduate professor, Sallie King, who I would like to thank as a
teacher, friend, and mentor. I would also like to thank Robert Pryor and
Tara Doyle, with whom I first encountered Buddhist Studies on an abroad
program they developed in Bodh Gaya with Antioch College. I would like
to express my appreciation for the Rangjung Yeshe Institute, the Centre
for Buddhist Studies at Kathmandu University, for providing an institution
that

offered

me

the

invaluable

opportunity

to

study

Buddhism

simultaneously with traditional Buddhist and academic scholars. I would

also like to thank my students whom I taught the Tibetan language to
there, who stimultated me to deepen my knowledge of the language. I
owe a special thanks to Professor John Dunne, who tutored me in Tibetan
when I was first traveling in India after college. Also, I owe thanks to
Adam Pearcy and Thomas Doctor, with whom I benefited from numerous
conversations about Mi-pham. Also, Thomas along with Erik Schmidt, are
two Danish translators who taught me Tibetan while I was in Nepal, and
who have tirelessly provided translations into English over the years. I
would also like to thank Professors Tom Tillemans and John Makransky
for their excellent advice to me. Additionally, I thank Professor Karma
Phuntsho, whose correspondences have helped my understanding of Mipham.
I would also like to express my gratitude to my collegues at the
University of Virginia, to Jann Ronis and James Gentry in particular, who

v
read early drafts of this dissertation and have given me excellent support
as scholars and friends. I would also like to thank Nawang Thokmey, a
South Asian librarian at the University of Virginia, for helping me locate
Tibetan texts; Gene Smith, who introduced me to Jo-nang teachers and
texts; and Paul Hackett for his help with digital Tibetan texts.
I am grateful to Fulbright-Hays for providing me with the research
grant to do fieldwork in Nepal and India for this dissertation. Also, FLAS
Awards, Ellen Bayard Weedon Travel Awards, and funding from the Dean
of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences at the University of Virginia
have supported my research at Virginia and in Tibet. I would also like to
thank the Yinshun Foundation for contributing funding during my
coursework.
Last but not least, I would like to express my heart-felt gratitude to
my parents, without whom none of this would be possible, and my wife,
Jasmine, whose love and patience has guided me through it all.

To my parents, my wife, and to anyone whose hair stands on end upon hearing
about emptiness

Introduction
Historical Context
In the nineteenth century a remarkable non-sectarian (ris med)
movement developed in the southeastern Tibetan province of Kham
(khams).

Alliances of a ritual, intellectual, literary, and institutional

character formed among the traditions of the Ka-gyd (bka brgyud), Sakya (sa skya), and Nying-ma (rnying ma) following the political
ascendancy of the Ge-luk (dge lugs) tradition in Central Tibet. The nonsectarian movement engendered an intellectual and literary renaissance
driven by a wave of creative doctrinal syntheses and new institutional
movements towards formalized monastic education.

The Nying-ma

tradition came to play a particularly influential role in the movement, and a

central figure and primary architect of the time was Mi-pham (ju mi pham

rgya mtsho, 1846-1912), whose works will be discussed in this

dissertation.
The Nying-ma identifies its origins within the dynastic period of the
eighth century, although a self-conscious Nying-ma tradition, known as the
old school, actually developed in response to attacks on the legitimacy of
its translations by the Sar-ma tradition, the new schools, which began to
develop in Tibet from the activities of the famous translator Rin-chenzang-po (rin chen bzang po, 958-1055) in the eleventh century.

The

efforts to affirm the legitimacy, and superiority, of the Nying-ma tradition

can be seen from early on, such as in the works of Rong-zom (rong zom

chos kyi bzang po, ca. 11th c.) and Nyang-ral (myang ral nyi mai od gzer,
1124-1192).
The Nying-ma, with a textual tradition of translations dating back to
the early dissemination of Buddhism in Tibet, claim a distinctive
connection with the imperial age of Tibeta theocratic polity populated by
the enlightened figures of the Dharma King Tri-song-de-tsen (khri srong

ldeu btsan), Padmasambhavaand translators who had a privileged

access to a living tradition of Buddhism from India before it was curtailed

2
by the Muslim invasions in the eleventh century.

The Nying-ma have

been able to periodically reinvigorate their tradition over the years to serve
the contingencies of history through their close lineage (nye brgyud) of
revealed teachings. In the close lineage, Buddhist canonical teachings
are not limited to a specific set of texts, nor a specific individual in history,
but remain within a tradition of an ongoing revelation, that in principle is
open to anyone, at anytime.
Before Mi-pham, the Nying-ma tradition was largely defined by their
esoteric transmissions, particularly those of the Guhyagarbhatantra, a
tantra that was not included in the Buddhist canon compiled in Tibet in the
fourteenth century by proponents of the new schools of translations.
While many scholars of the Nying-ma tradition certainly studied the
exoteric texts of Buddhist stras and stras, they did not commonly write
commentaries that focused on such exoteric texts. This was an important
part of Mi-phams contribution to the Nying-ma tradition.
Rong-zom and Long-chen-pa are Mi-phams main Tibetan sources
for his works. Rong-zom composed a commentary on the main tantra of
the Nying-ma tradition, the Guhyagarbhatantra,1 and in his Establishing

Appearances as Divine,2 he notably uses Buddhist logic, exemplifying a

unique relationship between tantra and Buddhist logic in Nying-ma
exegesis. Long-chen-pa (klong chen rab 'byam, 1308-1364) also wrote a
commentary on the Guhyagarbhatantra,3 and is renowned for his writings
on the Great Perfection, such as the Seven Treasuries (mdzod bdun).
Mi-pham wrote catalogues (dkar chag) for the publications of the collected
works of Rong-zom and the Seven Treasuries of Long-chen-pa.4 The
Rong-zom, rgyud rgyal gsang bai snying po dkon cog grel, Rong-zoms Collected
Works vol. 1 (Sichuan: Nationalities Press, 1999), 33-253.
2 Rong-zom, gsang snags rdo rje theg pai tshul las snang ba lhar bsgrub pa, Rong-zoms

Collected Works, vol. 1 (Sichuan: Nationalities Press, 1999), 557-568.

3 Long-chen-pa, phyogs bcu mun sel, (reproduced from a dzom zylographic edition),
(Paro: Ngodup, 1975).
4 Kn-zang-ch-drak (sa manta bhadra dharma kirti), Mi-phams Essential Hagiography

and Catalogue of Works (gangs rii khrod kyi smra bai seng ge gcig po jam dgon mi

3
influences of Rong-zom and Long-chen-pa are prominently reflected in Miphams works, particularly Long-chen-pa and the tradition of the Great
Perfection.

In many ways, his works can be seen as an extended

commentary upon the writings of Long-chen-pa.5

Another important figure in the Nying-ma tradition was Lo-chen
Dharma r (lo chen dharma r, 1654-1717). Lo-chen and his brother,
Ter-dak-ling-pa (gter bdag gling pa gyur med rdo rje, 1646-1714), both of
whom took ordination from the fifth Dalai Lama, were important figures in
the transmission of the Nying-ma canon (bka ma).6 Ter-dak-ling-pa
founded the Nying-ma monastery of Min-drl-ling (o rgyan smin sgrol

gling) in the Iron-dog year (1670).7 Lo-chen also wrote texts on the
Guhyagarbhatantra,8 as well as a commentary on the three vows by Ngari Pa-chen (nga ri pa chen padma dbang rgyal, 1487-1542),9 which we

pham rgya mtshoi rnam thar snying po bsdus pa dang gsung rab kyi dkar chag snga
gyur bsan pai mdzes rgyan), Mi-phams Collected Works, vol. 8 (hung), 672.2-672.5.
John Pettit translates a portion of this hagiography in Beacon of Certainty, 23-39. The
author of this text is unclear. Pettit attributes the author to Khen-po Kn-pal, Mi-phams
student; however, he states that there is some doubt that Khen-po Kn-pal is in fact the
author. See John Pettit, Beacon of Certainty (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1999), 27;
467n.59.
Throughout Mi-phams works, we find references to Long-chen-pas writings. Mi-pham
also wrote texts that were explicit commentaries on Long-chen-pas texts: three short
texts that include commentaries on the twelfth and eighteenth chapters of the yid bzhin
mdzod, and an overview (spyi don) of Long-chen-pas commentary on the
Guhyagarbhatantra.
6 Dud-jom Rin-po-chey (bdud joms jigs bral ye shes rdo rje, 1904-1988), bdud joms
chos byung (Sichuan: Nationalities Press, 1996), 399-410; 497.
7 Nyo-shul Khen-po (smyo shul mkhan po jam dbyangs rdo rje, 1931-1999), nor bu
baiduryai phreng ba (rang bzhin rdzogs pa chen poi chos byung rig dzin brgyud pai
rnam thar ngo mtshar nor bu baiduryai phreng ba), vol. 2 (Thimbu: Indraprastha Press,
5

1996), 504.1-504.2.
8 Lo-chen Dharma r, gsang bdag zhal lung and gsang bdag dgongs rgyan.
9 Lo-chen Dharma r, dpag bsam snye ma (sdom pa gsum rnam par nges pai grel pa
legs bshad ngo mtshar dpag bsam gyi snye ma), (Bylakuppe: Ngagyur Nyingma
Institute).

4
will address in the context of discussing the view of other-emptiness
(gzhan stong) in contrast to Mi-phams representation of emptiness.
A central issue concerning the status of other-emptiness is a
recurring dialectical tension between presence and absence, which in
Buddhist terms gets expressed in various ways such as appearance and
emptiness, conventional and ultimate truth, Buddha-nature and emptiness,
and other-emptiness and self-emptiness. This issue can be seen to have
a history extending back to India in the competing depictions of a qualified
(sagua) or unqualified (nirgua) absolute. A major tension in Tibetan
thought is found between the positions that the ultimate truth must be a
simple emptinessa negationin contrast to the positively-framed
depictions of ultimate reality as a divine presence existing at the heart of
all, the Buddha-nature.

Across this spectrum we find a wide array of

positions.
The most famous proponents of other-emptiness are found within
the Jo-nang (jo nang) tradition, and Dol-po-pa (dol po pa shes rab rgyal

mtshan, 1292-1361) in particular.10 We will discuss Dol-po-pas view of

other-emptiness in chapter 3, as well as look into a Jo-nang scholar of the
last century, Khen-po Lo-dr-drak-pa (dzam thang mkhan po blo gros

grags pa, 1920-1975).

Khen-po Lo-dr-drak-pa is from Dzam-thang

(dzam thang) in Eastern Tibet, where a prominent Jo-nang monastery has

remained active to the present day.
Tsong-kha-pa (tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa, 1357-1419) and
his Ge-luk followers had been major critics of the Jo-nang, the emblematic
tradition of other-emptiness.

Tsong-kha-pa, in contrast to the Jo-nang

depiction of emptiness, consistently held to the notion that the ultimate

10

An excellent source for the life and works of Dol-po-pa is found in Cyrus Stearns, The

Buddha from Dolpo: A Study of the Life and Thought of the Tibetan Master Sherab
Gyaltsen (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999).

5
truth is necessarily a mere absence.11 We will see how other discourses
on emptiness offer a less delimited portrayal of ultimate reality.
A central concern here is the nature of philosophical reasoning and
intellectual inquiry into Buddhist scriptural traditions, within both esoteric
and exoteric discourses. Mi-pham articulated a distinctive Nying-ma view
on a variety of exoteric topics through his interpretative framework drawing
on the Nying-mas own esoteric tradition of the Great Perfection (rdzogs

chen).

He incorporated esoteric discourses of Mantra (sngags)

characteristic of his Nying-ma predecessors, particularly themes found

within the Guhyagarbhatantra, into his commentaries on Indian stras.
An important part of Mi-phams works is found within the relationship
between the Great Perfection and the exoteric discourses of epistemology
(tshad ma, prama), the Middle Way (dbu ma, madhyamaka), and
Buddha-nature in particular.
Mi-pham integrated aspects of the Buddhist epistemological
tradition with a view of Mantra, and portrayed the view of the Great
Perfection as compatible with Prsagika-Madhyamaka.

The Great

Perfection is the Nying-ma traditions highest esoteric teaching and

Prsagika-Madhyamaka is the philosophy commonly accepted in Tibet
as the highest exoteric view. Through this, Mi-pham affirms the Nying-ma
as not only a tradition of tantric exegesis and ritual practice, but also as
grounded within the rigorous intellectual traditions of Buddhist exoteric
philosophy.
Kong-trul (kong sprul yon tan rgya mtsho, 1813-1899), one of Miphams teachers, was another important figure in the non-sectarian
movement. In particular, his Encyclopedia of Knowledge (shes bya kun

khyab) is a tremendous resource on different views and systems of

thought in Tibet.

Gene Smith credits Kong-truls Encyclopedia of

See for instance Tsong-kha-pa statement that: The ultimate truth is posited as solely
the negation of truth [that is, inherent existence] upon a subject that is a basis of
negation... Tsong-kha-pa, lam rim chung ba, 396.6: don dam bden pa ni dgag gzhi chos

11

can la bden pa bkag pa tsam la jog pai phyir.

Knowledge as likely the earliest statement of nonsectarian thought.12

Kong-trul played an important role in bringing together various
compilations of numerous scholars in Tibet.
Mi-pham is a unique figure in the non-sectarian movement because
he was not endorsed as an incarnate lama (sprul sku), at least not while
alive. Also, unlike many prominent figures of his day, such as Kong-trul,
Jam-yang-khyen-tsey-wang-po (jam dbyangs mkhyen brtse dbang po,
1820-1892), and Chok-gyur-ling-pa (mchog gyur bde chen gling pa, 1829
1870), Mi-pham neither discovered earth treasure texts (sa gter), nor
wrote commentaries on them.13 Rather, he wrote numerous commentaries
on a variety of diverse topics, ranging from logic, poetics, the Middle Way,
Yogcra, medicine, astrology, including a sex-manual (dod pai bstan

bcos, kmastra); he was a prolific Tibetan monk to say the least.14 He

also wrote on Tibetan translations of Indian texts, including tantras from
the new schools (gsar ma),15 the Guhyagarbhatantra of his own Nying-

Gene Smith, Among Tibetan Texts (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2001), 237.
Mi-pham did write a topical outline (sa bcad) for a treasure text of Chok-gyur-ling-pa,
the lam rim ye shes snying poi bsdus don ldeb, Mi-phams Collected Works, vol. 8
(hung), (sde dge ed.). Another short text Mi-pham wrote concerning the treasure tradition

12

13

describes how to tell good treasure revealers from charlatans. See Mi-pham, gter ston
brtag ba chu dwangs nor bu, Mi-phams Collected works, vol. 14, 475-487. For a critical
edition, translation, and analysis of this text, see Andreas Doctors dissertation, The
Tibetan Treasure Literature: A Study of the Revelations of the Visionary Master Mchog
gyur bde chen gling pa (1829 1870), (University of Calgary, 2003). It is noteworthy
that Mi-pham states: I also have no hope for the fortune of a new treasure doctrine
because I know that there is not the slightest thing missing (ma chog pa rdul rtsam med)
from stras, tantras, and commentarial treatises. Mi-pham, rab gsal de nyid snang byed
(gzhan byis brtsad pai lan mdor bsdus pa rigs lam rab gsal de nyid snang byed),
published in spyod jug sher grel ke ta ka (Sichuan: Nationalities Press, 1993), 339: gsar

du gter gyi chos skal la re baang med de/ mdo rgyud dgongs grel dang bcas pa di dag
gis ma chog pa rdul tsam med par shes pa lags.
14

For detailed description of the breadth of Mi-phams writings, see Karma Phuntsho,

Miphams Dialectics and the Debates on Emptiness (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005),

13-19. See also Smith, Among Tibetan Texts, 229-233.
15 For instance, his massive two-volume commentary on the Klacakra, as well his other
compositions on Hevajra, Guhyasamja, Cakrasavara, et al.

7
ma tradition, and Buddha-nature, which will be the focus of this
dissertation.
Mi-pham was born to an aristocratic family in Der-gey (sde dge) in
Eastern Tibet.16 He became a novice monk when he was twelve years old,
entering the monastery of Ju-mo-hor-zang-ch-ling (ju mo hor gsang chos

gling), a branch of She-chen (zhe chen) monastery connected with the

lineage of Min-drl-ling.17 He studied with a number of prominent teachers
of the non-sectarian movement, including Jam-yang-khyen-tsey-wang-po,
Pal-trul (dpal sprul o rgyan chos kyi dbang po, 1808-1887), and Kongtrul.18
A number of scholarly works on Mi-pham have emerged over the
past decade.

One example is Karma Phuntshos recently published

Miphams Dialectics and the Debates on Emptiness. He discusses Miphams works in light of polemical exchanges with Ge-luk scholars, and
his work is an excellent source for Mi-phams treatment of emptiness.
Also, John Pettits Beacon of Certainty, which is a translation of one of Miphams texts (nges shes sgron me) with an annotated commentary, offers
biographical information and provides a good general background to
central issues in Mi-phams writings.
Another book-length study of Mi-pham was done by Paul Williams,
whose work deals with the notion of reflexive awareness (rang rig) in Miphams commentary on the ninth chapter of the Bodhicaryvatra.19
Williams makes a case that Mi-pham can be understood as a proponent of
other-emptiness.20 Matthew Kapstein, however, questions the usefulness
of the indigenous labels of self-emptiness and other-emptiness in
Kn-zang-ch-drak, mi pham rgya mtshoi rnam thar snying po bsdus pa, 627.4-628.4.
17 Ibid., 629.4-629.5.
18 Details of Mi-phams life can be found in an English translation of Mi-phams
16

hagiography, along with a summary of Mi-phams life and works, in John Pettit, Beacon of
Certainty, 19-39.
19 Paul Williams, The Reflexive Nature of Awareness: A Madhyamaka Defence. (London:
Curzon Press, 1998).
20

See Paul Williams, The Reflexive Nature of Awareness, 199-206.

8
interpreting Buddhist thought, and cites a danger in overly generalizing
these categories. As an alternative, he suggests that it is important to
document the precise usages of such terms as they are used by the
indigenous traditions.21 In chapter 3, I have tried to document some ways
in which other-emptiness and self-emptiness have been used by the
specific Jo-nang and Nying-ma authors I address, in order to further the
understanding of how emptiness is represented in these traditions in
general, and Mi-phams position in particular.
There has been little written concerning the explicit topic of
Buddha-nature in the Nying-ma tradition, particularly in Mi-phams works.
I aim to clarify this central topic in his works. In this dissertation, I discuss
the fundamental role of Buddha-nature in Mi-phams interpretation of a
variety of Buddhist discourses. In particular, I present how he shows the
compatibility of esoteric discourses, such as the Great Perfection, with the
exoteric discourses of valid cognition (tshad ma, prama) and the Middle
Way within his exegesis of Buddha-nature. By addressing a wide range of
these issues, I frame the topic of Buddha-nature in a way that can help us
better understand its central place in Mi-phams works.
We will also discuss Pd-pa Tulku (bod sprul mdo sngags bstan

pai nyi ma, 1900/1907-1959), a scholar from the eastern region of Central
Tibet called Dak-po (dwags po), who commented on Mi-phams works.
Pd-pa Tulku was a student of Khen-po Kn-pal (kun bzang dpal ldan,
1870/2-1943) from Ge-gong (ge gong) monastery, who was Mi-phams
direct disciple.22 Khen-po Kn-pal was the first professor (mkhan po)
appointed to the monastic college at Ka-tok (ka thog) monastery, the
Nor-bu-lhn-po monastic college (bshad grwa nor bu lhun po), or the
tantric college of one hundred scriptures (rgyud sde bshad grwa gzhung

brgya ma) founded by Mi-pham, along with Ka-tok Situ (ka thog si tu

Matthew Kapstein, Are We All Gzhan stong pas? Journal of Buddhist Ethics, 7
(2000), 121.

21

22

Nyo-shul Khen-po, nor bu baiduryai phreng ba, vol. 2, 354.4-356.2.

chos kyi rgya mtsho, 1880-1923/5) in the Fire-horse year (1906).23

Extending from this monastic college at Ka-tok, twenty-five monastic
colleges were subsequently founded through Ka-tok Situs work.24
Pd-pa Tulku taught at the monastic college at She-chen
monastery. Among his students were the recently deceased Khen-po Dazer (mkhan zla zer), and Khen-po Pen-tsey (padma tshe dbang lhun

grub). Khen-po Da-zer came to teach in the monastic college of the Palyul (dpal yul) tradition in Mysore, India (the Nyagyur Nyingma Institute)
before he returned to teach at the r Singha monastic college (shri singha

bshad grwa) at Dzok-chen (rdzogs chen) monastery in Tibet.25 Khen-po

Pen-tsey also taught at the r Singha monastic college and in India and
Nepal.26
Before we turn to the roles of valid cognition, the Middle Way, and
the Great Perfection in relation to Buddha-nature, we will first discuss Miphams contributions to Nying-ma exegesis within the context of the nonsectarian movement.

In particular, we will look at his work within the

context of the development of monastic education in Kham in the late

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Monastic Colleges and Buddhist Education

Several monastic colleges (bshad grwa) were constructed during
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the Kham region of Eastern
Tibet, which was the strongest monastic presence and the epicenter of the
non-sectarian movements activity.

r Singha college, constructed at

Dzok-chen monastery by Gyal-sey Shen-pen-tha-yey (rgyal sras gzhan

phen mtha yas, 1800-1855?), was particularly influential. Gyal-sey Shenpen-tha-yey rebuilt Dzok-chen monastery with the support of the rulers of

Ibid., 225.2-225.3; 263.3-263.5; 352.4-352.6.

24 Ibid., 263.3-265.3.
25 Ibid., 356.2-357.5.
23

26

Ibid., 359.6-360.4.

10
Der-gey, among others, after it was destroyed by an earthquake in the
Water-tiger year (1842).27
Khen-po Shen-ga (mkhan po gzhan dga, gzhan phan chos kyi

snang ba, 1871-1927), who was recognized as a reincarnation of Gyal-sey

Shen-pen-tha-yey, taught at the monastic college at Dzok-chen. He also
founded eighteen monastic colleges such as the colleges of Kham-jey
(khams bye) below Dzong-sar (rdzong gsar) monastery, at Pal-pung (dpal

spungs), Dri-kung (bri gung), and Kye-gu-do (skye dgu mdo).28 Khen-po
Shen-ga compiled textbooks for monastic colleges comprising interlinear
commentaries (mchan grel) on the thirteen great scriptures (gzhung

chen mo bcu gsum), Indian treatises that were considered to be the

important texts representing the spectrum of major Buddhist discourses
namely, madhyamaka, vinaya, abhidharma, and the five treatises of
Maitreya (byams chos sde lnga).29 In these works, he concerns himself
with an exposition upon Indian sources, not the Tibetan layers of
commentary, in an attempt to interpret the Indian texts on their own
terms.30 Khen-po Shen-gas commentaries can be seen as a means to
circumvent sectarian disputes by appealing to Indian originals rather than
some

specific

strand

of

over

one

thousand

years

of

Tibetan

commentary.31
Gyal-wang Ch-kyi-nyi-ma (rgyal dbang chos kyi nyi ma), History of Dzok-chen
Monastery (mdo khams rdzogs chen dgon gyi lo rgyus nor bui phreng ba), (Delhi:
Konchhog Lhadrepa, 1986), 138.3-142.2. See also Tulku Thondup, Masters of Meditation
and Miracles (Boston: Shambhala, 1996), 177; 198-199.
28 Nyo-shul Khen-po, nor bu baiduryai phreng ba, vol. 2, 395.2-395.5.
29 See Georges Dreyfus, The Sound of Two Hands Clapping, 129-130. Dreyfus,
however, misidentifies the thirteen texts by including Dharmakrtis Pramavrttika,
which is not one of the thirteen, instead of ntidevas Bodhicaryvatra, which is.
30 In his colophon of his interlinear commentary of the Madhyamakvatra, Khen-po
Shen-ga states that he wrote his commentary without mixing even a hair of the individual
opinions of the Tibetan masters (bod gyi slob dpon so soi dod pa dang spu tsam yang
ma bsres par), and in his commentary on the Uttaratantra, that he did not make anything
up himself (rang bso med par). Cited from Masters thesis of Achim Bayer, The Life and
Works of mKhan-po gZhan-dga (1871-1927), (University of Hamburg, 2000), 57.
27

31

See Smith, Among Tibetan Texts, 232-233.

11
Nyo-shul Khen-po (smyo shul mkhan po jam dbyangs rdo rje,
1931-1999) relates two traditions of explanation in the Nying-ma tradition:
(1) the transmission (bka babs pa) of Khen-po Shen-ga, which is the
manner of explanation of the Indian scriptures such as the thirteen great
scriptures, and (2) the transmission of Mi-pham, which is the manner of
explanation mainly based on Tibetan commentaries such as Long-chenpa, Rong-zom, and Nga-ri Pa-chen. He states that traditions stemming
from Ka-tok follow mainly the latter tradition.32
Nyo-shul Khen-po quotes Mi-pham as stating that his own works
were composed to ensure the legacy (pha phog tu bzhag) of the Nying-ma
tradition in future generations, whereas Khen-po Shen-gas transmission
maintains the viewpoint of Candrakrti and both Rong-zom and Longchen-pa as the life-force (srog tu bzung), and spreads the continuum of
explanation and practice in all directions.33 Mi-phams works thus
maintain a stronger sectarian identity than Khen-po Shen-gas; his own
works explicitly draw from the works of Rong-zom and Long-chen-pa.
Mi-pham was encouraged to write commentaries on the major
Indian and Tibetan treatises by his teacher, Jam-yang-khyen-tsey-wangpo.34 Unlike the other prominent sectarian traditions in Tibet, the Nying-ma

32

Nyo-shul Khen-po, nor bu baiduryai phreng ba, vol. 2, 266.6-267.3: snga gyur phyogs

dir rgya grel dang bod grel gyi bshad pai gsung rgyun chen po khag gnyis bzhugs pa
las/ dang po gzhung chen bcu gsum sogs rgya gar mkhas pai legs bshad rgya gzhung gi
bshad tshul mkhan chen gzhan phan snang bar bka babs pa dang/ rong klong rnam
gnyis dang mnga ris pa chen sogs bod kyi gzhung grel rnams gtso cher jam mgon mi
pham rin po cher bka babs pa las bshad srol phyi ma gtso bor gdan sa di nas byung ba
mang ngo.
33 Ibid., 393.1-393.4: jam dgon mi pham rin po ches kho bos gzhung grel di tsam
brtsams pa rnams snga gyur pai bstan par phyi rabs rnams la rgyal bstan rin po che yun
du gnas pai pha phog tu bzhag pa yin/ dpal ldan zla grags dang rong klong rnam gnyis
kyi dgongs pa srog tu bzung ste phyogs kun tu bshad sgrub kyi rgyun spel ba la gzhan
dga rin po cher dka babs pa di rgyal sras gzhan phan pai sngon gyi thugs smon dang
skye sprul yin pai dbang gis yin zhes.
34 Mi-pham, dbu ma rgyan rtsa grel (dbu ma rgyan gyi rnam bshad jam dbyangs bla ma
dgyed pai zhal lung), published in dbu ma rgyan rtsa grel (Sichuan: Nationalities Press,
1990), 494: jam dbyangs mkhyen rtsei dbang po zhes snyan pai ba dan srid par yongs

12
did not have an authoritative commentarial corpus on the central exoteric
Buddhist treatises from India before Mi-pham. Mi-pham invigorated the
non-sectarian movement, and his Nying-ma tradition in particular, by not
only restating the textual traditions of the past, but through actively
appropriating his own Nying-ma tradition. He encouraged followers of the
Nying-ma tradition to study and contemplate the texts of their own tradition
and not blindly follow hearsay.35 Such a self-conscious approach to the
Buddhist textual tradition can be seen as a general characteristic of the
non-sectarian movement.
In contrast to the uniquely Nying-ma identity concerning exoteric
scholasticism that Mi-pham forged for Nying-ma monasteries in Kham,
several Nying-ma monasteries in Am-do (a mdo), including the Do-drup
(rdo-grub) tradition, adopted a Ge-luk stra exegesis for their exoteric
curriculum while maintaining Nying-ma tantric studies as their esoteric
base.36 The reliance upon Ge-luk stra exegesis, however, became a
target of Mi-phams polemical works.

Although Mi-pham promoted an

inclusivist agenda characteristic of the non-sectarian movement, he

affirmed a strong Nying-ma identity.
Many of Mi-phams works came to be adopted within the curriculum
of Nying-ma monastic colleges.

For instance, the curriculum of the

Ngagyur Nyingma Institute in Mysore, India, which is currently the largest

Nying-ma monastic college in exile, includes Mi-phams commentaries on
Indian treatises such as the Abhidharmakoa, the Madhyamaklakra,
the Pramavrttika, the Mahynastrlakra, the ninth chapter of the

su grags pa de nyid kyis/ rgya bod kyi grel pai yig cha rnams gnang nas zhib tu ltos la
brel bshad cig gyis zhes.
35 Ibid., 446: mkhan slob chos gsum gyi rjes jug snga gyur pa rnams/ rgyal bai bka dri
med dang/ rgyan drug rjes brangs dang bcas pai gzhung bzang po snga gyur di tsam
gda bas/ thos bsam de la byas pa chog gi gzhan zer rjes brjod la dga ba tsam gyis ci
bya.
36 Georges Dreyfus, The Sound of Two Hands Clapping: The Education of a Tibetan
Buddhist Monk (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2003), 148; Anne Klein, Meeting the Bliss
Queen (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995), 150; 262n.2.

13

Bodhicaryvatra, and the Kvydara. Also, their curriculum includes his

commentaries on Long-chen-pas Wish-Fulfilling Treasury (yid bzhin

mdzod) and Guhyagarbha commentary, as well Mi-phams compositions

such as Gateway to the Scholars (mkhas jug), Sword of Supreme

Knowledge (shes rab ral gri), Beacon of Certainty (nges shes sgron me),
and Lions Roar: Exposition of Buddha-Nature (stong thun seng gei nga

ro), among others.37 His works have come to play a prominent role in
Nying-ma monastic education.

Epistemology and Negative Dialectics

We will now turn to the Indian heritage of the Buddhist traditions of
Tibet. Representations of exoteric Buddhist discourse in Tibet have been
dominated by the commentaries of Dharmakrti (600-660) and Candrakrti
(540-600).

It is important to not only recognize this fact, but also to

acknowledge its implications for how Buddhism is interpreted in Tibet. In

Tibet, the negative dialectics of the Middle Way are typically identified with
Candrakrtis interpretation of Ngrjuna, and systematic epistemology is
associated with Dharmakrti.

These two figures are also held to be

authoritative commentators on a univocal doctrine of Buddhism. Despite

Candrakrtis

explicit

criticism

of

Buddhist

epistemologists

in

his

Prasannapad,38 Buddhists in Tibet have integrated the theories of

The curriculum of the Nyagyur Nyingma Institute is printed in a pamphlet published at

the monastery that I got there, entitled snga gyur mtho slob mdo sngags rig pai byung
gnas gling gi sgrig gzhi rtsa khrims chen po, 19-33. See also Dreyfus, The Sound of Two
Hands Clapping, 128-132.
38 Ngrjuna also targets the epistemological systems of prama in his
Vigrahavyvartan v.30-51. See Sanskrit edition and Engish translation of these verses
in Kamaleswar Bhattacharya, The Dialectical Method of Ngrjuna (Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass, 1990), 15-21; 114-124. For a discussion of Candrakrtis critiques of
epistemology, see Dan Arnolds dissertation, Mmsiks and Mdhyamikas against the
Buddhist Epistemologists: A Comparative Study to Two Indian Answers to the Question
of Justification (University of Chicago, 2002).
37

14
Candrakrti and Dharmakrti in unique ways.39 Within this integration, there
is a tension between the epistemological system-building on the one hand,
and deconstructive negative dialectics on the other. The integration of
an epistemological system within the Middle Way is an important part of
Mi-phams philosophical edifice.

He calls the integration of these two

systems the intertwined necks of the lions of the Middle Way and valid
cognition (dbu tshad seng ge mjing bsnol).40
Along with Candrakrti and Dharmakrti, another important Indian
figure for Mi-pham is ntarakita (ca. 8th c.), who synthesized
components of epistemology with the Middle Way in a system of
Yogcra-Madhyamaka.

Mi-pham

explains

that

ntarakitas

Madhyamaklakra is a treatise that demonstrates the essential point of

all Mahyna, stra and tantra.41 He states:42
Such a scripture as this is the universal path of the Mahyna,
integrating the viewpoints of the scriptures of the two chariot
traditions like water mixed with water. In particular, both (1)
ultimate valid cognition in the way that Ngrjuna asserts and (2)
conventional valid cognition in the way that Dharmakrti asserts are
combined as one taste in the great ocean of reason.

Dreyfus cites three ways in which Tibetan commentators have integrated Candrakrti
and Dharmakrti: (1) those who see Dharmakrtis view as inferior to Candrakrtis, (2)
39

those who view Dharmakrti as a Proponent of the Middle Way, and (3) those who
synthesize Dharmakrtis Yogcra with Candrakrtis Middle Way. Dreyfus, Recognizing
Reality, 428.
40 Mi-pham, dbu ma rgyan rtsa grel, 77. My translation follows Karma Phuntshos
suggestion of two lions intertwining their necks, but I have not seen a pictorial image of
this. Karma Phuntsho, Miphams Dialectics and the Debates on Emptiness, 18. See also
Khen-po Pal-den-shey-rap (dpal ldan shes rab), don rnam nges grel pa shes rab ral grii
grel pa shes rab nyi zla bar bai sgron me (Varanasi: Nyingmapa Students Welfare
Committee, 2000), 26.
41 Ibid., 75: theg chen mdo sngags mtha dag gi bzhed pai rtsa bar gyur bai gnad ston

pa ni gzhung di yin.
42 Ibid., 76: di lta bui gzhung ni theg chen spyii lam po che yin te/ shing rta rnam pa
gnyis kyi gzhung dgongs pa chu bo gcig dres su sbyar zhing/ khyad par don dam pai
tshad ma dpal ldan klu yis ji ltar bzhed pa dang/ tha snyad kyi tshad ma dpal chos kyi
grags pas ji ltar bzhed pa gnyis rigs pai rgya mtsho chen po ro gcig tu skyil.

15
ntarakitas system of Yogcra-Madhyamaka is important for Mi-pham
in significant ways: not only does Yogcra play a fundamental role in his
systematic presentation of exoteric Buddhism, but it plays an important
role in the narrative structure of the Buddhist pathproviding a foundation
of wisdom as the ground and fruition of the Buddhist path. Moreover, the
synthetic approach of Yogacara is instrumental in the way that Mi-pham
incorporates various systems of Buddhist thought in Tibet.

Buddha--Nature
Buddha
We will now turn to the topic of Buddha-nature by exploring its
meanings and history within Indian texts and academic studies.

An

etymology of the term Buddha-nature (tathgatagarbha)43 reflects the

variable status and complexity of the subject-matter.

The Sanskrit

compound tath + gata, meaning the thus gone one (i.e., Buddha), is the
same spelling as the compound tath + gata, meaning the thus come
one; the term reveals the dual-quality of a transcendent Buddha thus
gone, and an immanent Buddha thus come. Also, garbha can mean
embryo, womb, and essence. On the one hand, as an embryonic
seed, it denotes a latent potentiality to be developed, and the subsequent
consummation in the attainment of Buddhahood. As a womb, it connotes
a comprehensive matrix, or an all-embracing divine presence in the world
to be discovered.
Academic scholars have described Buddha-nature in a number of
ways.

David Ruegg addresses a dual-function of Buddha-nature in a

dialectic between a soteriological point of view, in which the absolute is

immanent in all beings, and a gnoseological point of view, in which it is
altogether transcendent.44 In this way, Buddha-nature is at once a future

The term sugatagarbha the essence (garbha) of the one gone well (sugata) is also
used as a synonym for the tathgatagarbha. Tathgata, Sugata, are synonymous with
Buddha.
44 David Seyfort Ruegg, On the Knowability and Expressibility of Absolute Reality in
43

Buddhism, (IBK 20, no. 1, 1971).

16
potential for transcendence, and at the same time immanently present.
Buddha-nature thus functions as a mediating principle spanning both the
absolute and phenomenal worlds.
Another term for the Buddha-nature is heritage (gotra). Ruegg
cites three main meanings of the term heritage in Buddhist usage: (1)
mine, matrix; (2) family, clan, lineage; (3) germ, seed. He also mentions
that the term gotra is designated extensionally as a soteriological or
gnoseological category, and intensionally as the spiritual factor that
determines the classification into that category.45 The topic of Buddhanature also is a basis for promoting one vehicle (ekayna) of the
Buddha, an inclusivist system of the Mahyna that incorporates all
Buddhist traditions. The role of Buddha-nature as the single heritage of all
beings distinguishes the Buddha-nature from Vijnavda (Mind-Only)
traditions that accept five distinct heritages within three final vehicles
(rvaka, pratyekabuddha, bodhisattva).
Florin Sutton delineates three other roles of Buddha-nature: from a

theoretical point of view, Buddha-nature is an extension of the Self/no-self

debate, providing the Yogcras with a positive platform of defense
against both the Hindu Eternalists and the Buddhist Nihilists; from a

didactic (or practical) point of view, it functions as an intermediate step

between a narrowly defined notion of Self (tman) and a more thorough
understanding of no-self (antman); and from an ethical point of view, it
provides a philosophical basis for altruism in the Mahyna.46 Sutton also
explains Buddha-nature to function in three ways: (1) as an essence, an
underlying ontological Reality, or essential nature behind phenomena;
(2) as an embryo or seeda dynamic, evolving potential; and (3) as a
matrix or womb, an intermediate meaning (between the first two

David Seyfort Ruegg, The Term Gotra and the Textual History of Ratnagotravibhga,
(BSOAS 39, 1976: 341-363), 341-342.
46 Floirin Giripescu Sutton, Existence and Enlightenment in the Lakvatra-stra: A
45

Study in the Ontology and Epistemology of the Yogcra School of Mahyna Buddhism
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1991), 76-78.

17
meanings),

equated

with

the

universal

ground

consciousness

(layavijna).47
Buddha-nature, as a pure essence abiding in temporarily obscured
living beings, is a considerable diversion from the negative language
found in many other Buddhist texts, and as well is a language that is
strikingly similar to the very positions that Buddhists often argue against.
The unchanging, permanent status attributed to Buddha-nature is certainly
a radical departure from the language emphasizing impermanence within
the discourses of early Buddhism.

Such language demonstrates a

decisive break from the early Buddhist triad of impermanence (anitya),

suffering (dukha), and selflessness (antman). The Uttaratantra,48 the
first known commentarial treatise to deal explicitly with this topic, states:
The qualities of purity (ubha), self (tman), bliss (sukha), and
permanence (nitya) are the transcendent results49 Such affirmations
are conspicuously absent in many other Buddhist texts. However, these
terms are found in stras such as the Lakvatra, Gaavyha,

Agulimlya, rml, and the Mahparinirva, where they are used to

describe the Buddha (tathgata), the Truth Body (dharmakya) and the
Buddha-nature.50 Furthermore, the Lakvatra uses the term supreme
Brahman to describe the ultimate state of existence (nihbhva para

brahma).51

Ibid., 52; 76.

48 The major Buddha-nature Stras were translated into Tibetan around the ninth-century,
during the early dissemination period. The Uttaratantra was not translated into Tibetan
until the eleventh-century, by Ngok Lo-den-shey-rap (ngog blo ldan shes rab, 10591109).
47

Uttaratantra 1.35: gtsang bdag bde dang rtag nyid kyi/ /yon tan pha rol phyin pa bras.
In theg pa chen po rgyud bla mai bstan bcos, published in rgyud bla ma rtsa grel
49

(Sichuan: Nationalities Press, 1997), 6.

50 Cyrus Stearns, The Buddha from Dolpo: A Study of the Life and Thought of the Tibetan
Master Sherab Gyaltsen (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999), 49.
51 Cited from Hajime Nakamura, A History of Early Vednta Philosophy (Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass, 1983), 154.

18
The reconciliation of such statements in the Uttaratantra with
depictions of emptiness in Candrakrtis Madhyamakvatra is a central
part of Mi-phams exegesis.

Mi-pham weaves together aspects of

Dharmakrti, Candrakrti, and the Uttarantantra in an interpretation through

which he offers his exegesis of Buddhist doctrine.
While the Perfection of Wisdom (prajpramit) Stras can be
seen to function as an overturning of early Buddhist literature in its
depictions of all phenomena being empty, Buddha-nature Stras mark
another radical inversion with the use of tman in its depictions. This
language has been said to have soteriological shock value, to uproot
reified conceptions of emptiness.52 Nathan Katz has fittingly termed this
phenomenon of contradictory claims as hermeneutical shock.53 The
tension between the discourses of presence, as in the Buddha-nature
Stras, and emptiness, in the Perfection of Wisdom Stras, is a rich
source from which divergent interpretations grew, and one that has a long
history in the developments of Buddhist discourse. In this light, opposed
opinions and sectarian debates can be seen as creating and maintaining
the dynamic vitality of Buddhist traditions.

Summary of Contents
This dissertation discusses the tension between affirmations and
denials of ultimate reality. It focuses on the status of Buddha-nature, a
ground of being that may be said to be at once the domain of
metaphysics, theology, and philosophical anthropology.

I gather Mi-

phams writings on Buddha-nature from a variety of sources to more fully

address the role of Buddha-nature in his works. In doing so, I aim to show
that Buddha-nature plays a fundamental role in his works, and fill a gap in

Sallie King, Buddha Nature (Albany: SUNY Press, 1991), 104-107.

53 Nathan Katz, "Tibetan Hermeneutics and the Yna Controversy," in Contributions on
Tibetan and Buddhist Religion and Philosophy, E. Steinkeller and H. Tauscher (eds.),
52

(Wein: Arbeitskreis fur Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, 1983), 110.

19
academic scholarship on the study of Buddha-nature in the Nying-ma
tradition.
Chapter 1 discusses Mi-phams interpretation of Buddhist stras in
terms of the wheels of doctrine (chos khor, dharmackra) and two
truths. The chapter begins by looking at how Long-chen-pa represents
the three wheels of doctrine, and then turns to how Mi-pham integrates the
middle wheel and the last wheel of doctrines through his interpretation of
Buddha-nature.

This chapter introduces Mi-phams depiction of two

models for the two truths. One two-truth model is in terms of appearance
and emptiness (snang stong bden gnyis), and the other is in terms of
authentic and inauthentic experience (gnas snang bden gnyis)whether
or not appearances accord with reality. The first model can be seen as
dealing with ontology, or what is, and the latter model can be seen as
dealing with epistemology, or the way we know.

Through these two

models of the two truths, Mi-pham shows the compatibility of emptiness

and Buddha-nature.
The chapter also discusses theories of interpretation based on the
categories of definitive meaning (nges don) and provisional meaning
(drang don). We will see how Pd-pa Tulku describes the two-truth model
according to Candrakrtis Madhyamakvatra, as concerning appearance
and emptiness. He aligns this model with the middle wheel of doctrine, for
which the explicit teaching is emptiness; as such, any appearance is
necessarily a relative truth.

In contrast, he depicts the two truths

according to the Uttaratantra as the model of authentic/inauthentic

experience, in accord with the two truths in Buddha Nature Stras of the
last wheel of doctrine. In this case, the ultimate truth is not only emptiness
because appearances that accord with reality are the ultimate truth, as is
the subject that experiences reality authentically. Conversely, inauthentic
experience and distorted modes of being are relative. Through integrating
both models of two truths from the Madhyamakvatra and the

Uttaratantra, appearance/emptiness and authentic/inauthentic experience

respectively, we will see how Buddha-nature is the ultimate truth as

20
authentic

experience

and

the

unity

of

the

two

truths

of

appearance/emptiness.
Chapter 2 discusses the Middle Way in contrasting depictions of
Yogcra and Prsagika-Madhyamaka. It begins by introducing some
fundamental themes in Yogcra discourse, such as the three natures
(mtshan nyid gsum) and the five principles (chos lnga). We will see how
in Yogcra, wisdom (ye shes) is held to be the ultimate truth, in contrast
to consciousness (rnam shes). We then look at Prsagika and see how
Mi-pham delineates Prsagika from Svtantrika. In his delineation, he
makes a distinction between two types of ultimate truth: the categorized
ultimate (rnam grangs pai don dam) and the uncategorized ultimate
(rnam grangs ma yin pai don dam). The categorized ulimate is emptiness
that is known conceptually and the uncategorized ultimate is emptiness
that is beyond language and thought.
In the contexts of language and thought, the two truths are distinct;
however, the two truths are not distinguished in the context of nonconceptual meditative equipoise (mnyam bzhag). Mi-pham delineates the
Prsagika as a discourse emphasizing the uncategorized ultimate, in
accord with the perspective of wisdom in meditative equipoise.

In

contrast, he depicts the Svtantrika as a discourse emphasizing the

categorized ultimate, in the context of post-meditation (rjes thob) where
the two truths are divided and the ulimate truth can only be conceptually
known. We come to see how he makes a distinction between wisdom, as
the context emphasized by Prsagika, and ordinary consciousness, as
the context emphasized by Svtantrika.
Mi-pham also depicts Prsagika as a sudden means to eliminate
conceptual constructs, in contrast to the progressive path emphasized in
Svtantrika. Other than different means for understanding the ultimate
truth, however, he does not delineate a distinct view for Prsagika that is
different from Svtantrika. He emphasizes the compatibility of Prsagika
and Svtantrika by stating that the unique object of negation for the
Prsagika is only the conception of the two truths as distinct. In this way,

21
Mi-pham emphasizes the unity of the two truths as a characteristic of
Prsagika discourse.
Chapter 3 explores Mi-phams depiction of emptiness in more
detail. In particular, it addresses the categories of self-emptiness (rang

stong) and other-emptiness (gzhan stong).

The chapter begins by

introducing depictions of self-emptiness and other-emptiness in the works

of two Jo-nang scholars: Dol-po-pa and Khen-po Lo-dr-drak-pa. Then it
looks into the representations of self-emptiness and other-emptiness in
the works of a Nying-ma author, Lo-chen Dharma r.

By discussing

these different depictions of emptiness, we are able to provide some

contrast with Mi-phams descriptions of emptiness and ultimate reality.
This chapter concludes that Mi-pham is a proponent of self-emptiness in
terms of the way he defines himself.
We will see that Mi-pham emphasizes the unity of emptiness and
appearance without accepting an appearance that is not empty, or an
emptiness that does not appear. He also consistently emphasizes that
emptiness is beyond any conceptual or linguistic reference. Mi-pham
argues that any conception of emptiness is not the genuine emptiness. He
represents genuine emptiness as beyond dichotomies such as existence
and non-existence, or substrate and quality. He also makes an important
distinction between conventional assertionswhere things appear to be
distinct and are said to exist as suchand assertions concerning the
ultimate in which no divisions are made.
Chapter 4 addresses the explicit topic of Buddha-nature. We come
to see how Mi-pham depicts Buddha-nature as the suchness (chos nyid)
of mind and reality.

Buddha-nature, like emptiness, is the unity of

appearance and emptiness. Mi-pham contrasts his view of Buddha-nature

from other views and adopts a view of Buddha-nature that reflects Longchen-pas depiction of the ground (gzhi) of the Great Perfection. Buddhanature thus represents the ground of indivisible truthprimordially pure
(ka dag) and spontaneously present (lhun grub).

22
This chapter discusses Mi-phams use of reasoning to establish the
existence of Buddha-nature. We see how the reasoning that he uses
draws upon the epistemological tradition of valid cognition. His use of
reasoning to establish the presence of Buddha-nature is similar to the
reasoning he uses to establish the purity and divine nature of
appearances in the Resultant Vehicle (bras bui theg pa) of Mantra. The
use of valid cognition to establish appearances as divine is a unique
quality of the Nying-ma tradition, as Mi-pham states, which he attributes to
the works of Rong-zom.
In chapter 4, we also explore how Mi-pham delineates two types of
conventional valid cognition, based on confined perception (tshur

mthong) and pure vision (dag gzigs), respectively. His two conventional
valid cognitions are similar to his two ultimate valid cognitions, those that
concern the categorized and uncategorized ultimate, in that the division is
grounded in two distinct modes of understanding: (1) a delimited,
conceptual mode of mind and (2) an inconceivable mode of wisdom. We
see again how he juxtaposes conceptual mind and non-conceptual
wisdom. In this way, Mi-pham integrates an epistemological system of
valid cognition with what is beyond conceptual frameworks.

He

incorporates valid cognition into his exegesis of the Great Perfection. In

this integration, ordinary reason is only a provisional means of knowledge
whereas wisdom is acknowledged to be present from the beginning.

23
In the course of the chapters, we will see that the monistic54
resolution of duality is central to Mi-phams exegetical system. A common
theme in his exegesis is a two-fold schema, with an ultimately false
dichotomy of two opposed factors and a third element that emerges from
their dissolution.

Two provisionally opposed factors, such as the two

truths, sasra and nirva, subject and object, appearance and

emptiness, etc., are resolved in a synthesis in which each of the two
distinctions are ultimately untrue, because they are actually indivisible
from the beginning.

The process of recognizing the indivisible reality,

however, goes through a virtual detour of a dichotomy, and thus such a

system is not a simple monism but is better described as a dialectical

monism.55 The detour through ultimately unreal dichotomies is a process

that involves everything that falls under the rubric of conventional truth
all that can be physically acted upon, verbally spoken of, and mentally
thought about. In Mi-phams depictions of the indivisible reality, these
provisional divisions are part of a process towards the complete realization
of the single ultimate truth of indivisible reality.

54

Caveat: I use the term monism to describe an important aspect of Mi-phams view;

however, we should bear in mind a distinction between monism and non-dualism. See
for instance, Sallie King, Buddha Nature (Albany: SUNY Press, 1991), 99-115. Monism
is an affirmation of a single reality (closure) and non-dualism is a negation of the entire
framework of single/plural (open-ended) without affirming either/or/both/neither. We can
thus say that the non in non-dualism is an existential negation, or an illocutionary denial.
Although Mi-phams view certainly has such a non-dual character, I use the term
monism to evoke the important aspect of his emphasis on unity (zung jug). Mi-pham
states: The meaning of unity is the single sphere of equal taste of all dualistic
phenomena. Mi-pham, gnyug sems book 3, 743.4: gnyis chos thams cad ro gcig ni zung
jug gi don.
This term is used in a different context by Jean Paul Sartre in Critique de la Raison
Dialectique (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1960); English edition translated by Alan SheridanSmith in Critique of Dialectical Reasoning (London: NLB, 1976), 1. To my knowledge,
this term was first used in the context of Buddhism by Robert Magolia in Derrida on the
Mend (Indiana: Purdue University Press, 1984).
55

24

Interpretive Context
I have found the tradition of hermeneutics a fruitful avenue to
approach Mi-phams Buddhist discourse. Paul Ricoeurs characterization
of

post-critical

hermeneutics,

as

the

reconciliation

of

critical

consciousness with the notion of a sacred cosmos, is of particular

interest:56
Thus, hermeneutics, an acquisition of modernity, is one of the
modes by which that modernity transcends itself, insofar as it is
forgetfulness of the sacred. I believe that being can still speak to
meno longer, of course, under the precritical form of immediate
belief, but as the second immediacy aimed at by hermeneutics.
This second navet aims to be the postcritical equivalent to the
precritical hierophany.
The possibility of a post-critical approach to being is a fruitful subject to
bring into conversation with Buddhism.

Critical consciousness, as a

provisional means by which modernity transcends itself, potentially can

bring religious meaning into new lightthe aim of a post-critical second
navet. Through such an approach, critical consciousness and religious
meaning do not necessarily have to be polarized into a dichotomous
relationship of mutual incompatibility.
Explanatory procedures such as science, logic, grammar, etc. all
involve a process of distanciation that abstracts meaning from its
necessary context as a unique moment of human experience. Such a
methodology allows for a critical perspective that is useful as an
explanatory procedure to provide a level of accountability to descriptions.
However, left to itself, as in the case of the object of the reductively
scientific modern consciousness, such procedures falsely delimit the
extent of semantic possibility to something that necessarily remains apart
from a subjective mode of being (including the potential relationship with
the sacred) in an event of understanding.

56

Without the component of

Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, translated by Emerson Buchanan (New York:

Harper and Row, 1967), 352.

25
understanding, explanatory procedures by themselves ignore the
semantic grounding in subjectivity, and restrict the potential for meaning to
the limits of the model.57 Thus, the potential for evoking an enriched
understanding of oneself and ones relationships with others and the world
are barren in an enterprise that does not take into account the concrete
act of participationthe sine qua non for the possibility of meaning.
I suggest that Buddha-nature can be seen as a topic orientated in
both the objective and subjective domains of meaning, or in other words,
as not only the domain of philosophy (or science), or religion.

Such

distinctions are bounded up with modern (Northwest European) cultural

traditions and are not always helpful in a dialogue with another cultural
tradition.

An alternative approach to interpretation beyond such

dichotomous discourses as religion and philosophy, mythos and logos, the

premodern and the modern, etc., aims to allow for another kind of
meaningful discourse to unfold; it aims to put the discourses of (post-)
modernity and Buddhism into conversation.
In any case, a dissertation on a topic that may have otherwise been
more elegantly indicated in a short poetic verse, stated by someone who
embodies its meaning, can be seen as an interrogation of Buddha-nature.
Buddha-nature has been traditionally explained as an ineffable sacred
presence, disclosed in narrative and poetic forms in the volumes of
scriptures and oral instructions of living Buddhist traditions. With this in
mind, the nature of the genre of dissertation, the form of discourse, is in
some way at odds with its content. Nevertheless, I see Buddha-nature as
a topic that speaks to meaningful, significant issues and find that such a
systematic analysis in an academic paper can serve as a valuable tool to
promote understanding.

A point of comparison here is with John Searles distinction between syntax and
semantics within the philosophy of mind, and how syntax alone cannot account for
semantics. See John Searle, Minds, Brains, and Programs, published in The Minds I,
Daniel Dennet and Douglas Hofstadter (eds.), (New York: Basic Books, 1981), 353-382;
57

originally published in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (1980): 417-424.

26
Aspects of Buddha-nature that I discuss broach topics that certain
advocates of the Buddhist tradition consider esoteric and inappropriate for
the causal consumption of the uninitiated. For this, please forgive my
audacity and any misrepresentations that result from my failure to convey
such topics that may have otherwise resonated with deeper significance in
the words of an accomplished scholar.

However, I feel that to avoid

important aspects of Buddha-nature out of respect for the secrecy of the

esoteric tradition would not have done justice to the integrity of my
representation of the significance of Buddha-nature in Mi-phams works.
Moreover, his interpretation of Buddha-nature is quite fluid across exoteric
and esoteric discourses, and the esoteric/exoteric distinction is not rigidly
pronounced. Furthermore, by raising issues from esoteric texts I do not
wish to express a lack of concern for tradition, but I aim to move forward a
dialogue between culturesacademics and Buddhistsa real possibility
only when both traditions have unhindered voices (and perhaps more
importantly, open ears) to fully participate in the conversation.
In conclusion, I will try to present Buddha-nature in a scholarly way
that allows for a meaningful encounter with what is arguably the most
central topic of Buddhism. My agenda is to present an interpretation of
Buddha-nature that can be considered in a light of understanding that
avoids the pitfalls of a nave nostalgia for a premodern vision of sacred
unity, as well as a cool-objectivity of disembodied reason in a modern
world of dispassionate truths. I approach the study of Buddhism grounded
in what may be called a postmodern subjectivity, in terms of how I
approach the relationship between a critical consciousness and a
participation in a meaningful existence within a sacred cosmos. Thus, I
leave this as a product of my academic endeavor in Buddhist Studies, in a
voice that may (not) be located some place in between the objective
perspective of a scholar and a subjective perspective of an insider.

27

Chapter 1: BuddhaBuddha-Nature and the Unity of the Two

Truths
Introduction
A central concern for Buddhists, in Tibet and elsewhere, is the
nature of ultimate reality. Conflicting depictions of ultimate reality, and
how the ultimate should be best expressedthrough negation or
affirmationis a contested issue in Mahyna Buddhism. In particular,
this issue concerns the relationship between the affirmations of a true
presence of wisdom on the one hand, and the negating discourse of
emptiness, as evinced in scriptures such as the Perfection of Wisdom
Stras, on the other. The competing interpretations of the relationship
between descriptions of ultimate realityas a presence and an absence
are fueled by the polysemy of Buddhist scriptures and the agenda to
systematize them into a comprehensive whole.58 This is clearly evident in
how traditions in Tibet interpret Buddhist stras in terms of three wheels of
doctrine, and in particular, how they distinguish between the middle
wheel and the last wheel.
An influential scripture for interpreting scriptures for Buddhists in
Tibet is the Sadhinirmocanastra,59 the scripture explaining the intent,
within which the Buddha gives guidelines for interpreting scriptures. A
section of this text outlines three distinct wheels of doctrine, offering a
resolution to the conflicting literal statements of Buddhist teachings. The
following citation from this text is a common source for the delineation of
Buddha's teaching into three sections:60

The Peking edition of the Tibetan canon of Buddhas Word in translation (bka gyur) is
108 volumes, and the translated commentaries (bstan gyur) contain 3626 texts in 224

58

volumes!
59 P.774 (Peking ed.), vol. 29.
60 Tibetan and English editions printed in John Powers, Wisdom of the Buddha: the
Sadhinirmocana Mahyna Stra (Berkeley: Dharma Publishing, 1995), 138-141.
Above translation, and all subsequent translations unless otherwise noted, are mine.

28
Thereupon, the bodhisattva Paramrthasamudgata said to the
Blessed One (bcom ldan das), Initially, the Blessed One at Deer
Park, in the region of Vras, taught the four noble truths to the
ones who fully engage in the vehicle of the Auditors (nyan thos).
He fully turned the miraculous and amazing wheel of doctrine in a
way unlike anything that had been turned in this world before by
anyone, human or deity. Furthermore, this wheel of doctrine that
the Blessed One turned is surpassed, affords an occasion [of
refutation], is the provisional meaning, and is the subject of dispute.
Based on the essencelessness of phenomena, and based
on non-arising, unceasing, primordial peace, and naturally
complete nirva, the Blessed One turned the greatly miraculous
and amazing second wheel of doctrine, with the feature of the
discourse of emptiness, for those who fully engage in the
Mahyna. Furthermore, this wheel of doctrine that the Blessed
One turned is surpassed, affords an occasion [of refutation], is the
provisional meaning, and is the subject of dispute.
However, based on the essencelessness of phenomena,
and based on non-arising, unceasing, primordial peace, and
naturally complete nirva, for those who fully engage in all of the
vehicles, the Blessed One taught the completely amazing and
miraculous third wheel endowed with the excellent differentiation.
This wheel of doctrine turned by the Blessed One is unsurpassed,
affords no occasion [of refutation], is the definitive meaning, and is
not the subject of dispute.
Long-chen-pa (klong chen rab 'byam, 1308-1364), an important figure in
shaping the Nying-ma tradition, characterizes the first two wheels of
doctrine as involving what is to be abandoned, and the last wheel as
affirming what is:61

Long-chen-pa, sems dang ye shes kyi dri lan, 377.5-378.5: dka dang po bden pa bzhii
chos kyi rnam grangs las/ /gtso bor las dang po pa dang blo cung zad dman pa rnams
jug pa la dgongs te/ spang gnyen gyi rim pas nyams su len pai thabs gsal bar gsungs
shing/ /bka bar pa mtshan nyid med pai chos kyi rnam grangs las/ /gtso bor cung zad
sbyang pa dang dbang po bring po rnams jug pai rim pa la dgongs te/ /ngo bo nyid med
pai rnam grangs kyi gnyen po la bdag tu dzin pa rnams skye ba med par gsungs la/
/bka tha ma nges pa don gyi chos kyi rnam grangs las/ gtso bor yongs su rdzogs pai
theg pa rnams dang dbang po rnon po rnams jug pai rim pas gshis la ji ltar gnas pai
rnam grangs rgya cher gsungs te/ dang pos khor bai mtshan nyid spang bya las ldog
61

29
The first Word, the category of the doctrine of the four truths (bden
pa bzhii chos), is mainly intended for the application of novices and
for those with slightly inferior intellects; it clearly teaches the
methods of practicing the stages of abandonment and remedy.
The middle Word, the category of the doctrine of signlessness
(mtshan nyid med pai chos), is mainly intended for the stages of
application of those who have trained slightly and have mediocre
faculties; it teaches the antidote of the category of naturelessness
and the apprehensions of self as non-arising. The last Word, the
category of the doctrine of the definitive meaning (nges pa don gyi
chos), is mainly [intended] for the stages of application of those
who fully [train in all] vehicles and for those of sharp faculties; it
extensively teaches the category of the basic nature as it is (gshis
la ji ltar gnas pa). The first [Word] shows the path that counteracts
what is to be abandonedthe character of sasra. The middle
[Word] shows, from what is to be abandoned, the abandonment of
cognitive obscurations (shes sgrib) through the nature of
apprehension lacking essence.
The last [Word] shows the
essential nature (snying po) as it is.
In this way, he shows a progression of the three wheels of doctrine in
which the first two wheels show what is to be abandonedthe character
of sasra and cognitive obscurationsand the last wheel shows what is,
the essential nature. Similarly, in his auto-commentary of his Resting in

the Nature of Mind, Long-chen-pa also states that the three wheels of
doctrine are intended for those of differing capacities: the first wheel is
intended for those of inferior faculties (dbang po dman pa), the middle
wheel is intended for those of mediocre faculties (dbang po bring po), and
the last wheel is intended for those of sharp faculties (dbang po rnon

po).62 Long-chen-pa again shows the preeminence of the last wheel in his
auto-commentary of hisTreasury of Words and Meanings:63
pai lam bstan/ bar bas spang bya las dzin pai rang bzhin ngo bo med pas shes sgrib
spang bar bstan/ tha mas yin lugs snying por bstan te.
62 Long-chen-pa, sems nyid ngal gsoi grel pa, 330.3-330.5.
63 Long-chen-pa, tshig don mdzod, 897.1-897.4: bcom ldan das kyis bka khor lo gsum
du gsungs pa las gnas di ni tha ma don dam rnam par nges pai chos kyi khor lor
gsungs pa yang khyod kyis ma shes/ stong nyid rkyang pa don dam yin na/ khor lo gsum
la tha dad du bstan paang ji ltar thad de/ stong nyid drang don du gsungs kyi de yang

30
From the three wheels of doctrine taught by the Victorious One, this
topic was taught in the last wheel that ascertains the ultimate, yet
you have failed to understand this. If solely emptiness were the
ultimate, then what sense does it make that the Buddha taught
three wheels separately? He taught emptiness as a provisional
meaning, with the intention of merely negating fear of the abiding
reality, and apprehension of self by novices.
Long-chen-pa argues that solely emptiness, a mere absence, is not the
ultimate. He states here that the topic of the last wheel of doctrine is the
ultimate and that emptiness is a provisional meaning. Distinguishing the
category of the definitive meaning, (nges don) as opposed to provisional
meanings (drang don), is a common way Buddhists differentiate what is
really true from what is only provisionally, or heuristically, true. In his autocommentary of his Resting in the Nature of Mind, Long-chen-pa says that
emptiness is not the definitive meaning:64
Although you fixate upon no-self and emptiness, these are merely
antidotes to the self and the non-empty; they are not the definitive
meaning.
Also, in the Treasury of Philosophies, Long-chen-pa states:65
Seeing the nature of that which is the expanse (dbyings) of the
ultimate truth is called seeing the ultimate truth, the ultimate truth
is not an emptiness that is nothing whatsoever. That [emptiness] is
taught to immature beings and to novices as an antidote to egoclinging, etc. In actuality, it should be known that the luminous and

gnas lugs kyis skrag pa dang/ las dang po pas bdag tu dzin pa dgag tsam la dgongs pa
ste. See also David Germano, Treasury of Words and Meanings, (unpublished
manuscript), 66.
64 Long-chen-pa, sems nyid ngal gsoi grel pa, 330.6-331.1: khyed kyi bdag med pa

dang/ stong pa nyid la zhen paang bdag dang mi stong pai gnyen po tsam yin gyi nges
pai don ni ma yin te.
65 Long-chen-pa, grub mtha mdzod, 898.2-898.5: deang don dam pai bden pa dbyings
yin la/ dii rang bzhin mthong bas don dam bden pa mthong zhes byai/ cir yang med pai
stong nyid kyang don dam bden pa ma yin no/ deang byis pa so so skye bo dang/ las
dang po dag bdag tu zhen pai gnyen por bdag med pa la sogs pa bstan pa yin gyi/ don
la dbyings od gsal ba dus ma byas shing lhun grub tu yod pa shes par bya ste.

31
clear expanse exists as unconditioned and spontaneously present
(lhun grub).
In these texts, Long-chen-pa explicitly states that solely emptiness is not
the ultimate truth.

Mi--phams Synthesis
Mi
Mi-pham takes Long-chen-pas explanations as a foundation for his
interpretation that integrates the middle and last wheels of doctrine. Mipham does not relegate the status of either emptiness in the middle wheel

or wisdom in the last wheel of doctrine as a provisional meaning. Rather,

he argues that both are definitive:66
Therefore, the emptiness taught in the middle wheel and the
[Buddha-]body and wisdom67 taught in the last wheel should be
integrated as a unity of emptiness and appearance. Without
dividing or excluding the definitive meaning subject matters (skor
rnams) of the middle and last wheels, both should be held to be the
definitive meaning in the way of just this assertion by the
omniscient Long-chen-pa.
Mi-pham, bde gshegs snying poi stong thun chen mo seng gei nga ro, in Mi-phams
Collected Works (sde dge ed.), vol.4, 586.2-586.4: khor lo bar bar bstan pai stong pa

66

nyid dang / tha mar bstan pai sku dang ye shes dag snang stong zung du chud par bya
dgos pas/ bar ba dang tha mai nges don gyi skor rnams dbye gsal [readbsal] med par
gnyis ka nges don du kun mkhyen klong chen pas bzhed pa di kho na ltar bzung bar
bya. The same text is found in Mi-phams Uttaratantra commentary compiled by his
students (theg pa chen po rgyud bla mai bstan bcos kyi mchan grel mi pham zhal lung),
Mi-phams Collected Works, vol. 4, 382.1-382.2.
67 I use the singular for body (sku) and wisdom (ye shes) because I feel that it conveys
Mi-phams interpretation better than the plural. The singular represents the quality that
the multiple wisdoms and bodies (2 or 5 wisdoms and 2, 3, or 4 bodies) are internal
divisions based on aspectual features of what is essentially indivisible. Mi-pham states
regarding wisdom(s) as follows: Although the consummate wisdom is the identity of the
unity of the expanse and awareness, free from duality and conceptuality...divided from its
contradistinctive aspects (ldog chas phye), there are said to be the enumeration of five
wisdoms. Mi-pham, rab gsal de nyid snang byed , 354-355: mthar thug gi ye shes ni

dbyings rig zung du jug pai bdag nyid gzung dzin rnam rtog dang bral yangldog chas
phye na ye shes rnam pa lngas rnam grangs su gsungs. See also Mi-pham, leu bco
brgyad pai tshig grel, 570.2-570.3.

32
Mi-pham cites Long-chen-pa as a source to support his interpretation of
the unity of emptiness and wisdom as the definitive meaning of the middle
and last wheels.68 Mi-pham explains that the last wheels status as the
definitive meaning does not refer to everything taught in the last wheel, but
specifically concerns the teaching of Buddha-nature:69
Even though the reasoning that analyzes the ultimate establishes
the emptiness of all phenomena, it does not negate the qualities of
[Buddha-]nature, because although the sublime qualities exist, they
are also claimed to be essentially empty. Therefore, the meaning
demonstrated by the middle wheel that all the phenomena of
thorough affliction and complete purification (kun byang gi chos)
are taught to be empty is established as such because Buddhanature is also the nature of emptiness. However, since this
teaching of [Buddha-]naturecharacterized as neither conjoined
with, nor separable (du bral med) from the appearances of the
empty-natured [Buddha-]body and wisdomis the viewpoint of the
definitive meaning stras of the last wheel, then by merely this fact
One of Mi-phams teachers, Kong-trul, also states that both wheels are definitive: The
middle and last wheels are both equally the definitive meaning(s); there is said to be a
difference of: [in the former] eliminating the temporary conceptual concepts and [in the
latter] the definitive meaning indicating the consummate mode of subsistence. Kong-trul,
shes bya kun khyab, 686: khor lo bar tha nges don yin mnyam yin la/ gnas skabs spros
68

pa gcod pa dang/ mthar thug gnas lugs ston pai nges don gyi khyad par du bzhed do.
69 Mi-pham, stong thun seng gei nga ro, 585.4-586.2: don dam rigs pas chos thams cad
stong pa nyid du grub kyang des snying poi yon tan gog par mi gyur te yon tan bla na
med par yod kyang ngo bo stong par di pas yang zhal gyis bzhes pai phyir ro/ /des na
khor lo bar bas bston don kun byang gi chos thams cad stong par bstan pa ni de de
bzhin du grub ste bde gshegs snying poang stong pa nyid kyi rang bzhin yin pai phyir ro/
/on kyang stong pai rang bzhin can gyi sku dang ye shes kyi snang ba dang du bral
med pas khyad par du byas pai snying po bstan pa di khor lo tha mai nges don gyi mdo
sde rnams kyi dgongs pa yin pas/ tshul de tsam gyi cha nas khor lo bar pa las lhag pai
phyir/ mdo sde dgongs grel las khor lo tha mai don la mchog tu sngags paang khor lo
tha mar gtogs tshad ma yin gyi snying po bstan pai nges don gyi phyogs nas de ltar
gsungs. This text (with slight variation) is also found in Mi-phams theg pa chen po rgyud
bla mai bstan bcos kyi mchan grel mi pham zhal lung, Collected Works (sde dge ed.),
vol. 4, 381.2-382.1. See also, Pd-pa Tulku, lta grub shan byed grel pa (lta grub shan
byed gnad kyi sgron mei tshig don rnam bshad jam dbyangs dgongs rgyan), published
in lta grub shan byed gnad kyi sgron mei rtsa grel (Sichuan: Nationalties Press, 1996),
92-93.

33
it is superior to the middle wheel. Although the meaning of the last
wheel is praised in the stras and commentaries, [this does] not
[refer to] everything in the last wheel, but it is spoken in this way
concerning the definitive meaning position of demonstrating the
[Buddha-]nature.
Mi-pham says that the last wheel is superior to the middle because of the
distinctive teaching of Buddha-nature as inseparable from the empty
appearances of the Buddha-body and wisdom. He explains that through
integrating the middle and last wheels of doctrine as non-contradictory in
this way, such an understanding of Buddha-nature becomes the crucial
point within the quintessential instructions (man ngag gi gnad) of the
Vajrayna:70
By maintaining both of these [wheels] to be the definitive meaning,
there is not only no contradiction that one [wheel] must be held as
the provisional meaning, but having integrated them, through the
Buddha-nature as such becoming the meaning of the causal
continuum (rgyu rgyud),71 there is the essential point of the
quintessential instructions of the Vajrayna. Therefore, you should
know how the teachings of the Buddha converge on this single
essential point and that this consummate meaning is the single
viewpoint of the Sublime Ones such as Ngrjuna and Asaga, for
it
can
be
clearly
understood
through
[Ngrjunas]

70

Mi-pham, stong thun seng gei nga ro, 586.4-586.6: de gnyis gcig nges don byas na

gcig drang don bya dgos pai gal ba med par ma zad/ zung du tshogs par byas nas bde
gshegs snying po de lta bu la rgyu rgyud kyi don du byas nas rdo rje theg pai man ngag
gi gnad byung bas sangs rgyas kyi bstan pa de dag gnad gcig tu bab par shes dgos
shing/ mthar thug gi don di la klu thogs rnam gnyis sogs phags pa rnams dgongs pa
gcig ste chos dbyings bstod pa dang sems grel la sogs pa dang/ rgyud bla mai grel pa
sogs kyis gsal bar rtogs pai phyir.
71 The causal continuum (rgyu rgyud), or ground-continuum (gzhi rgyud), is the first of a
three-fold division, along with method-continuum (thabs kyi rgyud), or path-continuum
(lam rgyud), and result-continuum (bras bui rgyud). Sources for this three-fold division
are found in the exegeses upon the Guhyagarbhatantra, as well as the
Guhyasamjatantra. See dissertation by Nathaniel Garson, Penetrating the Secret
Essence Tantra: Context and Philosophy in the Mahyoga System of rNying-ma Tantra
(University of Virginia, 2004), 55-56; 96.

34

Dharmadhtustotra,

Bodhicittavivaraa, etc.,
commentary on the Uttaratantra and so forth.

and

[Asagas]

Through his interpretation of Buddha-nature, Mi-pham shows the

compatibility of the middle wheel and last wheel, as well as the
convergence of Ngrjuna and Asaga upon a single viewpoint.

The

inseparable unity of Buddha-nature and emptiness is a central issue for

Mi-pham:72
The single essential point of all the doctrines of stras and tantras
is only this all-pervasive Buddha-naturewhen speaking, the
Sugata teacher sometimes elucidated the essence (ngo bo) of the
Buddha-nature by means of teaching emptiness, and at other times
elucidated the nature (rang bzhin) of the Buddha-nature through the
aspect of teaching the [Buddhas] qualities of the powers and so
forth as a primordial endowment. These two need to be unified
without contradiction; however, due to the influence of not having
found conviction in the extremely profound of profound essential
pointsthe indivisibility of the two truthssome people view the
Buddha-nature as a permanent phenomenon that is not essentially
empty, while others, holding onto a mere void, remain in the
denigrating position of a view of annihilation that cannot posit the
primordial endowment of the inseparable qualities of wisdom.
Mi-pham states that it is important to integrate as non-contradictory the
Buddhas teachings of emptiness, which elucidate the essence of Buddhanature, with the teachings of the primordial endowment of qualities, which
elucidate the nature of Buddha-nature.73 He reveals that the essential

72

Mi-pham, stong thun seng gei nga ro, 564.2-565.3: mdo dang sngags kyi chos kun gyi

gnad gcig pu ni kun khyab bde gshegs snying po di kho na yinston pa bde bar gshegs
pas gsung gi skabs la lar stong pa nyid bstan pai sgo nas bde gshegs snying poi ngo bo
gsal bar mdzad/ la lar stobs sogs yon tan ye ldan du bstan pai cha nas bde gshegs
snying poi rang bzhin gsal par mdzad de/ de gnyis gal med zung du thug pa dgos bden
kyang/ bden gnyis dbyer med pai gnad zab pa las shin tu zab pa la yid ches ma rnyed
pai dbang gis/ la las ni bde gshegs snying po ngo bo mi stong pai rtag par blta/ la las ni
stong rkyang tsam la bzung nas sku dang ye shes kyi yon tan bral med ye ldan du bzhag
tu med pai chad lta skur debs kyi phyogs la gnas par gyur.
73

Thus, Anne Klein misrepresents Mi-pham when she makes the false claim that Mi-

pham does not take the Perfection of Wisdom teaching of emptiness of the second wheel

35
point to the resolution of the issue of Buddha-nature and emptiness is the
indivisibility of the two truths.

Two Truths
A central theme in Buddhism is the doctrine of two truths: (1) the
ultimate (don dam) and (2) the relative (kun rdzob), or conventional (tha

snyad), truth. An important part of Mi-phams interpretation is his unique

model that renders the two truths in two distinct ways:74
There are two ways in which the two truths are stated within the
[Buddhas] Word and stras: (1) from the perspective of valid
cognition analyzing the ultimate abiding reality (don dam gnas
lugs), emptiness is called ultimate and appearance is called
relative and (2) from the perspective of conventional valid
cognition analyzing the mode of appearance (snang tshul), the
subjects and objects of the incontrovertible accordance between
the modes of appearance and subsistence [i.e., authentic
experience] are called ultimate and the opposite [i.e., inauthentic
experience] are called relative.
Mi-pham describes one two-truth scheme as a dichotomy of appearance
and emptiness.

In the division of the two truths within this scheme,

emptiness is the only ultimate and all appearances are relative.

He

defines the relative and ultimate as follows:75

as the literal expression of the final view; but rather, he takes Buddha-nature of the last
wheel. Anne Klein, Mental Concentration and the Unconditioned: A Buddhist Case for
Unmediated Experience, in Robert Buswell and Robert Gimello (eds.), Paths of
Liberation (Kuroda Institute: University of Hawaii Press, 1992), 272.
74 Mi-pham, dbu ma rgyan rtsa grel, 55-56: bka dang bstan bcos rnams na bden gnyis

jog tshul gnyis su gnas te/ gnas lugs don dam la dpyod pai tshad mai dbang du byas
de/ stong pa la don dam dang/ snang ba la kun rdzob ces bzhag pa dang/ snang tshul la
dpyod pa kun tu tha snyad pai tshad mai dbang du byas te/ gnas snang mthun pa mi
bslu bai yul dang yul can la don dam dang/ ldog phyogs la kun rdzob tu jog pai tshul
gnyis. See also Mi-pham, brgal lan nyin byed snang ba, 549; Pd-pa Tulku, stong thun
gnad kyi zin thun (digital input from She-chen monastery in Nepal), 11.4-12.2.
75 Mi-pham, sher grel ke ta ka, 6: kun rdzob ni skye sogs kyi rang bzhin du med bzhin
der snang ba sgyu ma dang rmi lam skra shad lta bui snang tshul di yin la/ snang ba dei
rang bzhin brtags na skye sogs kyi rnam par dben pai gnas tshul don dam pa yin te.

36
The relative is the mode of appearance which is like an illusion, a
dream, or a floating hairwhile lacking intrinsic nature, appearing
that waylike production, etc. The ultimate is the mode of
subsistence lacking production, etc., when the nature of those
appearances are analyzed.
This two-truth scheme equates emptiness with the ultimate and
appearances with the relative.
Pd-pa Tulku (bod sprul mdo sngags bstan pai nyi ma, 1900/19071959), an influential commentator on Mi-phams works, explains the two
truths as appearance/emptiness by means of the evaluated object (gzhal

don)76 of ultimate valid cognition being authentic or not (yang dag yin
min):77
The two truths are divided by means of appearance and emptiness
through the evaluated object of ultimate valid cognition analyzing
the mode of subsistence being authentic or not: emptiness, which is
the authentic evaluated object, is ultimate truth; appearances,
which are not authentic, are relative.
The two truths here are delineated by means of ultimate valid cognition;
emptiness is the authentic object of evaluation. Upon ultimate analysis of
phenomena, nothing is found, as Mi-pham states:78
The phenomena that are the realm of thought and speech, when
analyzed are lacking; therefore, they are empty like an illusion and
are never able to withstand analysis.

The object that is evaluated by means of ultimate valid cognition is the ultimate
ontological status of the objectits status as inherently existent or not.

76

77

Pd-pa Tulku, lta grub shan byed grel pa, 120: gnas tshul la dpyod pa don dam dpyod

pai tshad mas gzhal don yang dag yin min gyi sgo nas/ gzhal don yang dag pai stong
nyid la don dam bden pa dang/ yang dag min pai snang ba la kun rdzob ces snang stong
gi sgo nas bden pa gnyis su dbye bar mdzad do.
78 Mi-pham, sher grel ke ta ka, 11: sems dang ngag gi spyod yul du gyur pai chos de ni
brtags na rnam par dben pas sgyu ma bzhin du stong pa yin gyi dpyad bzod pa nam
yang mi srid do.

37
Such analysis negates whatever the mind takes as a perceived object: An
object which the mind takes as support that cannot be refuted by Middle
Way reasoning is impossible.79 Emptiness, as the lack of inherent nature
in the face of ultimate analysis, does not disrupt appearances, but is the
necessary condition for appearance. Mi-pham states:80
All phenomena are just dependent arisings: existent entities are
dependent productions (brten nas skyes ba) and non-entities are
dependent imputations (brten nas btags pa). In this way, all
phenomena that are comprised by dependent arisings lack inherent
nature because if they had inherent nature, dependent arisings
would not be reasonable.
Existent entities arise in dependence upon something else; they are
dependent arisings. Non-entities, like space, are also dependent
because they are imputed in dependence upon entities.81
Appearances are not found when they are analyzed; therefore, they
are empty.

In the appearance/emptiness dichotomy of two truths,

distinguishing emptiness as the ultimate truth and appearance as the

relative truth, the two truths are in actuality an inseparable unity. Mi-pham
states: If there is no appearance, then there is also no emptiness of that

Mi-pham, dbu ma rgyan rtsa grel, 368: blos rten cha bai yul gang yin pa dbu mai rigs
pas sun phyin mi nus pa mi srid.
80 Mi-pham, yid bzhin mdzod grub mtha bsdus pa, 483.5-483.6: chos kun rten cing brel
bar byung ba tsam ste/ dngos po rnams brten nas skye ba dang/ dngos med rnams
brten nas btags pao/ de ltar rten brel gyis bsdus pai chos thams cad rang bzhin med de/
rang bzhin yod na brten nas byung ba mi thad la. See also Mi-pham, gnyug sems book
3 (gnyug sems zur dpyad skor gyi gsung sgros thor bu rnams phyogs gcig tu bsdus rdo
rje rin po chei phreng ba), Mi-phams Collected Works (sde dge ed.) vol. 24, 742.1742.2; Khen-po Kn-pal, blo gros snang bai sgo byed, published in nges shes sgron me
rtsa grel (Sichuan: Nationalities Press, 1997), 155.
79

See also Mi-phams discussion of the genuine evaluated object posited exclusively as
entities capable of performing a function (gzhal bya mthsan nyid pa don byed nus pai
81

dngos po kho na la jog pa) in Mi-pham, dbu ma rgyan rtsa grel, 82-83.

38
[appearance]. Mutually, both appearance and emptiness are such that
one is impossible without the other; if there is one, there is the other.82
Mi-pham describes the relative and the ultimate as being
essentially

the

same

with

different

contradistinctions

in

the

appearance/emptiness model of the two truths:83

From the perspective of supreme knowledges (shes rab) analysis
of what is authentic,
Both appearance and emptiness
Together present, together absentare asserted as the same
entity (ngo bo gcig)
Divisible into different contradistinctions (ldog pa tha dad).
He further states:84
All appearances are mere imputations
Emptiness85 is also merely imputed by the mind.
Thus, the two truths are not actually distinct but are only conceptually
distinct, in other words, they are two sides of the same coin. He also
states:86

82

Mi-pham, dbu ma rgyan rtsa grel, 407: gal te snang baang med na dei stong paang

med pas/ stong pa dang snang ba gnyis po phan tshun gcig med na gcig mi srid la/ gcig
yod na gcig yod pas.
83 Mi-pham, nges shes sgron me, 27: yang dag dpyod pai shes rab ngor/ /snang dang
stong pa di gnyis po/ /yod mnyam med mnyam ngo bo gcig/ /ldog pa tha dad dbye bar
dod. Tsong-kha-pa also depicts the relationship between the two truths as the same
entity with different contradistinctions, like an impermanent phenomenon and a product
Tsong-kha-pa, dgongs pa rab gsal (Sarnath: Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies,
1998), 176: ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad pa byas pa dang mi rtag pa lta bu.
84 Mi-pham, nges shes sgron me, 27: snang kun btags pa tsam zhig la/ /stong paang blo
yis btags pa tsam.
85 Emptiness here should be understood as the emptiness as only a quality of
appearance, not emptiness as the unity of emptiness and appearance. This is an
important distinction for Mi-pham which will be discussed in chapter 3.
86 Mi-pham, dbu ma rgyan rtsa grel, 57: snang ba dang kun rdzob don du gcig ste/ snang

ni snang yang snang ba ltar bden par grub pa med pa la go dgos/ bden pa med ces rjod
pa des kyang phyin ci log gi snang ba yin par ston mi dgos te/ stong pa yin pa la bden pa
med ces btags pa go dgos/ de de ltar snang ba ltar grub/ snang ba ltar bden na kun

39
Appearing and relative are the same in meaning because
appearance should be understood as appearing yet not truly
established as it appears. One should understand that the phrase
not truly existent also does not have to indicate erroneous
appearances, because not truly existent designates what is
empty. If it [appearance] were established the way it appeared and
were true as it appeared, then the designation relative87 would not
be appropriate. In that way it would not be empty and the manner
of the impossibility of a non-empty entity being an object of
knowledge is authentically established by reason; therefore, it is
impossible within this sphere of what can be known (shes byai
khong) for a phenomenon to be exclusively one part which is
detached from both appearance and emptiness.
In this way, emptiness and dependently arising phenomena are coextensive. For Mi-pham, there is nothing that appears and is not empty,
nor is there any emptiness that does not appear; they are equally present
or equally absent:88
If there is appearance, the emptiness of that [appearance] is
designated as emptiness, but the meaning of emptiness is not a
lack of appearance such as a horn of a rabbit; because that is non-

rdzob ces gdags par mi rung la/ de ltar na mi stong bar gyur zhing/ mi stong pai dngos
po zhig shes byar mi srid pai tshul rigs pas yang dag par grub pa des na shes byai
khong di na snang stong gnyis ris su chad pai phyogs gcig kho nar gyur pai chos zhig
mi srid la.
87 The word I translate as relative (kun rdzob, savti), reflects only one of its meanings,
interdependentit also has the meanings conventional and concealing, as
expressed by Candrakrti in his Prasannapad. Here Mi-pham is stressing the
concealing connotation. Although the term relative does not express the full range of
meanings of kun rdzob, I use the single term relative to maintain consistency in
translation. For a discussion of the meaning of kun rdzob, see Guy Newland, The Two
Truths, 76-80.
88 Mi-pham, gzhung spyii dka gnad, 431.4-432.2: snang ba yod na de stong pa la stong

nyid du btags kyi/ snang ba med pa ri bong gi rwa la sogs pa ni stong pa nyid kyi don ma
yin te/ tha snyad du med pa yin pas/ ri bong gi rwa rwa stong gi tha snyad sbyar yang
gtan med kyi don yin no/ stong pa nyid ni tha snyad du yod pai chos rnams kyi chos nyid
yin tedes na stong pa nyid di tha snyad du yod pai chos thams cad kyi rang bzhin nam
gnas lugs su bsgrub par bya ba yin gyi/ tha snyad du med pa zhig gi chos nyid du bsgrub
bya ni gtan min no.

40
existent conventionally, the words emptiness of horn is applied to
the rabbit horn, but it is [just] the meaning of utter absence (gtan
med). Emptiness is the suchness (chos nyid) of all conventionally
existent phenomena...Therefore, this emptiness is what is to be
established as the intrinsic nature, or abiding reality, of all
conventionally existent phenomena; it is not at all to be established
as the suchness of that which does not exist conventionally.
Here Mi-pham describes emptiness as not something else that is separate
from conventionally existent phenomena.

Furthermore, Mi-pham cites

Long-chen-pa stating that when ascertaining the emptiness of a

phenomenon, it does not help if the phenomenons emptiness is
(erroneously) thought to be something differentjust as it does not affect
the presence of anger towards an enemy to know that space is empty:89
In the Precious Wish-fulfilling Treasury, when refuting the traditions
of those who accept appearance and emptiness as different, such
as the master rgupta in the class of lower Svtantrikas,90 the
powerful victor, Long-chen-rap-jam states reasons that (1) an
emptiness that is not an appearance is impossible as either of the
two truths, (2) nor is it suitable to be realized, and (3) if [emptiness
and appearance are] different, [emptiness] is not reasonable to be
an antidote for what is abandoned because knowing the emptiness
Mi-pham, rab gsal de nyid snang byed, 262: rgyal bai dbang po klong chen rab byams
kyis yid bzhin rin po chei mdzod du/ rang rgyud og mai bye brag slob dpon dpal sbas
sogs snang stong tha dad du dod pa dag gi lugs bkag pai skabs su/ snang ba ma yin
pai stong pa bden pa gnyis char mi srid pa dang/ rtogs byar mi rung ba dang/ tha dad du
gyur na spang gnyen du mi thad de/ dgra la zhe sdang skyes pa la nam mkha stong par
shes pas mi phan pa ltar/ gzhi rdzun snang la zhen nas logs su stong par zhes pas ci
yang mi phan pai de drai stong pa de rtogs pa la dgos pa med par gyur pai rigs pa
gsungs pa bzhin no. See Long-chen-pa, yid bzhin mdzod grel, vol. 2, 1125.2-1126.2.
See also Mi-pham, grub mtha mdor bsdus, 480.3-481.4; and a statement by Mi-phams
89

student, Khen-po Kn-pal, which is nearly verbatim as Mi-phams translated above, in

Khen-po Kn-pal, blo gros snang bai go byed, 74-75.
Mi-pham delineates two types of lower Svtantrikas (rang rgyud og ma) in his
summary of the philosophies (grub mtha) of Long-chen-pas yid bzhin mdzod: those who
establish illusion by reason (sgyu ma rigs grub pa) and those who hold the two truths as
different (snang stong tha dad pa). Mi-pham, grub mtha mdor bsdus, 479.5-479.6. The
higher Svtantrika (rang rgyud gong ma) refer to masters such as Jnagarbha,
90

Kamalala, and ntarakita. Mi-pham, grub mtha mdor bsdus, 481.4.

41
of something else, while holding onto the ground of false
appearance, does not help at allas it does not help to know the
emptiness of space when anger arises towards an enemy, there is
no purpose in realizing such an emptiness.
In Mi-phams appearance/emptiness model, only what appears (or is
perceived) is empty; there is no substrate of emptiness that is beyond
perceptible reality:91
There is no ultimate apart from the relative,
There is no relative at all other than the ultimate.
Whatever appears is necessarily empty,
Whatever is empty necessarily appears
Because appearance that is not empty is impossible
And emptiness as well is not established without appearance.
Mi-pham depicts the quality of emptiness as an essential property of all
objects of knowledge.

In this way, he preserves the integrity of the

Buddhist claims to the universality of emptiness in the middle wheel of

doctrine.
The ultimate truth is not privileged in the two truths as
appearance/emptiness because the two truths here are not actually
distinct.

Thus,

in

this

characterization

of

the

two

truths

as

emptiness/appearance, neither of the two truths is superior to the other:92

The unreal appearances are called relative and the emptiness
that is the lack of intrinsic nature is called ultimate. Without being
regarded with a qualitative difference (rtsis che chung med), both of
these are equally applied [to all phenomena] from form to

91

Mi-pham, nges shes sgron me, 27: kun rdzob spangs pai pha rol na/ /don dam med la

don dam pa/ /spangs pai kun rdzob gzhan med nyid/ /gang snang stong pas khyab pa
dang/ gang stong snang bas khyab pa ste/ /snang na mi stong mi srid cing/ /stong deang
ma snang mi grub phyir.
92 Mi-pham, dbu ma rgyan rtsa grel, 57-58: mi bden pai snang ba la kun rdzob ces
gdags shing/ rang bzhin ma grub pai stong pa la don dam zhes btags pa/ de gnyis po la
rtsis che chung med par gzugs nas rnam mkhyen gyi bar du mgo snyoms su sbyor ba di
shes na shes byai khong na de las shes rgyu gal che ba gcig kyang med par nges so.

42
omniscience. If you know this, there is certainly nothing more
important to know within the sphere of what can be known.
The unity of appearance and emptiness is an important part of Mi-phams
interpretation that we will return to again.
In his other scheme, Mi-pham represents the two truths not as
appearance/emptiness, but as a dichotomy of appearances in accord or
not with the mode of subsistence (i.e., authentic/inauthentic experience).
In this scheme, emptiness is not the only ultimate because appearances
can be both ultimate and relative. The two truths as authentic/inauthentic
experience are not delineated from the perspective of ultimate analysis,
but from a conventional perspective:93
Both the objects and subjects for which the mode of appearance is
in accord with the mode of subsistence are ultimate and both the
subjects and objects for which the modes of appearance and
subsistence are not in accord are relative should be posited as
such due to being conventionally deceptive or non-deceptive.
Furthermore, Pd-pa Tulku states:94
Also, concerning analyses of the manner of appearance, by means
of its evaluated object being authentic or not at the time of
evaluation from the perspective of conventional valid cognition, the
two truths are divided: (1) being the authentic mode of the abiding
reality, both appearance and emptiness are ultimate, such as the
emptiness-object and the wisdom-subject for which appearance is
in accord with the mode of subsistence, and (2) being an
inauthentic mode of appearance, the aspects of distortion are
93

Mi-pham, gzhung spyii dka gnad, 465.3-465.4: gnas tshul dang snang tshul mthun

par gyur bai yul yul can gnyis ka don dam/ gnas snang mi mthun pai yul yul can gnyis
ka kun rdzob tu bzhag pa ni/ tha snyad du bslu mi bslui dbang gis de ltar jog dgos te.
See also Mi-pham, dbu ma rgyan rtsa grel, 56.
94 Pd-pa Tulku, lta grub shan byed grel pa, 122: snang tshul la dpyod pa dag kyang tha
snyad tshad mas gzhal tshe dei gzhal don yang dag yin min gyi sgo nas yang dag pai
gnas lugs gang zhig gnas snang mthun par gyur pai yul stong nyid yul can ye shes lta
bu snang stong gnyis ka don dam dang/ yang dag min pai snang lugs gang zhig gnas
snang mi mthun par gyur pai yul yul can lta bu khrul pai cha kun rdzob tu jog pai sgo
nas bden pa gnyis su dbyer mdzad do.

43
relative, such as the subjects and objects for which appearance is
not in accord with the mode of subsistence.
In this scheme, the ultimate is defined as authentic experience95 (gnas

snang mthun)literally, appearance in accord with the way it is (and the

subject that experiences it as such). The relative is the opposite of this,
inauthentic experience (gnas snang mi mthun)appearance that does
not accord with the way it is (and the subject that experiences it as such).
In the two-truth model of authentic/inauthentic experience, the two
truths are not the same, but are a hierarchythe ultimate truth is
undistorted truth while the relative truth is distorted and false.

This

treatment of relative truth reflects the meaning of relative (kun rdzob,

savti) as concealing. In this two-truth model, there is a context where

the ultimate truth is privileged above the relative truth and is not just the
empty quality of appearance. Mi-pham relates this dichotomy of two truths
to the dichotomy of sasra and nirvana:96
It is suitable to posit that all phenomena of nirva, which are
attained through the power of appearance in accord with [the mode
of] subsistence, are ultimate; and that all phenomena of sasra,
which arise through the power of appearance that does not accord
with [the mode of] subsistence, are relative.
He clearly states two ways in which the two truths are to be understood:
(1) as emptiness and appearance and (2) as what is distorted and what is
undistorted:97
This Tibetan word for perception (snang ba) also means appearance. Appearance
connotes an objective aspect and perception connotes a subjective aspect of
perceived appearance. In attempt to convey both aspects of perceived-appearance,
and translate the import of its meaning here, I use the word experience.

95

96

Mi-pham, gzhung spyii dka gnad, 466.2-466.3: gnas snang mthun pai stobs kyis thob

pai myang das kyi chos thams cad don dam yin la/ mi mthun pai stobs kyi byung bai
chos thams cad kun rdzob tu bzhag rung.
97 Ibid., 452.2-452.4: snang ba kun rdzob kyi phyogs su gtogs pai chos laang/ khrul ma
khrul bslu mi bslui khyad phyed dgos kyi/ kun rdzob yin tshad khrul snang yin mi dgos
so/ /don dam pai ming btugs [read btags] tshad stong rkyang yin mi dgos te/ kun rdzob
dang don dam la gzhal lugs kyi ming so sor ong bai tshul gnyis di mdo dang bstan bcos

44
The appearances which are included in the relative also need to be
distinguished as distorted or undistorted, deceptive or nondeceptivenot everything that is relative must necessarily be a
distorted appearance. Nor must everything with the name ultimate
be solely empty because the two ways to arrive at the distinctive
names in [two] manners of assessing the relative and ultimate are
widely proclaimed in the great stras and stras.
In this way, Mi-pham depicts two models of the two truths.
Mi-pham accommodates the presence of wisdom in his second two
truth-scheme of authentic/inauthentic experience. Thereby, he does not
reduce the ultimate truth to a mere absence, nor does he categorically
reject the presence of wisdom (authentic experience) as ultimate. By this,
descriptions of ultimate truth are not limited to only negations, but the
presence of wisdom can be affirmed as ultimate truth because wisdom is
ultimateas an authentic and undistorted experience of realityin the
two-truth model of authentic/inauthentic experience.

In this way, this

model provides a context for asserting the ultimate truth as a non-distorted

reality (and not just a negation of distortion).
Mi-pham validates non-conceptual wisdom as ultimate truth due to
its presence in ultimate reality. While doing so, he also preserves the
appearance/emptiness two-truth scheme and a context for the critique of
the ontological status of all reality, including the presence of wisdom. Mipham does not curtail the universality of emptiness, he states: The latter
ultimate [authentic experience] also is empty of essence.98 In this way, he
synthesizes two models of two truths. We can see that instead of an
either/or interpretation of the presence of wisdom and emptiness, Mipham adopts a both/and position by means of these two models of two
truths:99
chen po rnams la yongs su grags pa yin no. See also Karma Phuntsho, Miphams
Dialectics and the Debates on Emptiness, 114-120.
98 Mi-pham, dbu ma rgyan rtsa grel, 56: phyi mai don dam yin kyang ngo bo stong pa yin
la.
99 Mi-pham, rab gsal de nyid snang byed, 304: gzhung chen po rnams su bden pa gnyis
kyi jog tshul mi dra ba gnyis bshad pai dang po gnas tshul skye med la don dam dang/

45
In the great scriptures there are two ways in which the two truths
are posited: (1) the term ultimate designates reality as non-arising
and the term relative designates the conventional mode of
appearance, and (2) in terms of conventional apprehension, the
term ultimate designates both the subject and object of authentic
experience (gnas snang mthun) and the term relative designates
both the subject and object of inauthentic experience. In this
manner, whether in stra or in tantra, the term ultimate also
applies to the subject...although the terms ultimate and relative
are the same in these two systems, the way of presenting the
meaning is different. Therefore, if one does not know how to
explain having made the distinction between the viewpoints of each
respective system, the hope of fathoming the great scriptures will
be dashedlike a mind, narrow like the eye of a needle, measuring
space.
The two systems of two truths support Mi-phams interpretation of the
compatibility of the emptiness taught in the middle wheel and the wisdom
taught in the last wheel as both the definitive meaning. Thus, emptiness
as the ultimate truth in Mi-phams appearance/emptiness model supports
his exegesis of emptiness in the middle wheel of doctrine and the unity of
the two truths. The inclusion of wisdom as ultimate truth in Mi-phams
authentic/inauthentic experience model supports his exegesis of wisdom
in the third wheel of doctrine, as will be shown below.

Buddha--Nat
Nature
Buddha
ure as the Unity of Appearance and Emptiness
Buddha-nature is a topic discussed in both the Madhyamakvatra
and the Uttaratantra, two important exoteric Buddhist texts of Indian
stra. The former represents a systematic commentary on the stras of

snang tshul tha snyad la kun rdzob kyi ming gis bstan pa de yin la/ gnyis pa gnas snang
mthun par gyur pai yul dang yul can gnyis ka la don dam dang/ mi mthun par gyur pai
yul dang yul can gnyis ka la kun rdzob kyi ming gis bstan pa ni tha snyad nye bar bzung
bai dbang du yin la/ lugs dii dbang du byas na mdo sngags gang yin kyang yul can
laang don dam gyi ming jug pa dang...lugs de gnyis kun rdzob dang don dam zhes ming
mthun yang don gyi rnam gzhag byed tshul mi dra bas so soi lugs kyi dgongs pa phye
nas chad ma shes na gzhung chen po rnams khab mig ltar dog pai blos nam mkha
gzhal bas jal re zad par gyur ro.

46
the middle wheel of doctrine, and the latter is a commentary on stras of
the last wheel of doctrine. We will see how Pd-pa Tulku, following Mipham, brings these two treatises together around the topic of Buddhanature.
Pd-pa Tulku describes Candrakrtis description of the ultimate in
the Madhyamakvatra, the object of authentic seeing, as the ultimate
truth of the two truths as appearance/emptiness:100
The viewpoint of the root text and [auto-]commentary of Candrakrti,
which is the meaning-commentary on the great stra, the
Prajmlamadhyamaka[-krik], is also the two truths as
appearance and emptiness; it is not seen otherwise. From the
Madhyamakvatra:101
[Buddha] said that all entities found by authentic and false
seeing are apprehended as two essences:
That which is the object of authentic seeing is suchness,
false seeings are relative truths.
Authentic seeing, which is only the emptiness that is an object of
the wisdom of meditative equipoise, is posited as ultimate; false
seeings are all aspects of appearance, like an illusion or a dream,
posited as relative. Such an emptiness, which is the ultimate truth,
is ascertained through ultimate valid cognition which analyzes the

Pd-pa Tulku, lta grub shan byed grel pa, 121-122: bstan bcos chen mo dbu ma rtsa
ba shes rab kyi don grel zla bai gzhung rtsa grel gyi dgongs pa yang snang stong gi
bden pa gnyis po di las gzhan du ma dmigs te/ jug pa las/ dngos kun yang dag rdzun
par mthong ba yis/ /dngos rnyed ngo bo gnyis ni dzin par gyur/ /yang dag mthong yul
gang de don dam de/ /mthong ba rdzun pa kun rdzob bden par dod/ /zhes yang dag
mthong ba mnyam bzhag ye shes kyi yul du gyur pai stong nyid kho na don dam du
bzhag cing/ mthong ba rdzun pa sgyu ma rmi lam lta bui snang cha thams cad la kun
rdzob tu bzhag cing/ de lta bui stong nyid don dam bden pa de mtha bzhi skye gog sogs
gnas lugs la dpyod pa don dam dpyod pai tshad mas gtan la phab par mdzad kyi/ de las
gzhan du snang tshul la dpyod pa tha snyad dag pai tshad mas khor ba kun rdzob dang/
myang das don dam du jog pai bden gnyis kyi rnam bzhag dbu ma rigs tshogs dang/
jug pa rtsa grel sogs las ni tshig gcig kyang mi byung bas na/ snang stong gnyis su
dbye tshul di ni gzhung de dag gi dgongs pa bla na med par grub bo.
101 Candrakrti, Madhyamakvatra 6.23: dngos kun yang dag rdzun pa mthong ba yis/
dngos rnyed ngo bo gnyis ni dzin par gyur/ yang dag mthong yul gang de de nyid de/
mthong ba rdzun pa kun rdzob bden par gsung. Published with autocommentary in dbu
ma la jug pai rang grel, 104. See also Guy Newland, The Two Truths, 95.
100

47
mode of subsistence [through] the negation of production through
the four extremes (mtha bzhi skye gog), etc. However, there is not
a single word in the Collection of Reasonings (rigs tshogs) of the
Middle Way, or the root text and [auto-]commentary of the
Madhyamakvatra, that is a presentation that posits the two truths
in which the ultimate [is] nirva and the relative [is] sasra by
means of pure conventional valid cognition analyzing the mode of
appearance. Therefore, it is established that this manner of
dividing the two truths as appearance/emptiness is the
unsurpassed viewpoint of these scriptures.
In this way, Pd-pa Tulku states that Candrakrti delineates the two turths
as

appearance/emptiness.

He

also

characterizes

the

appearance/emptiness model of the two truths as the viewpoint of the

middle wheel of doctrine:102
In this way, the manner of positing the two truths by means of
appearance and emptiness is the viewpoint of the profound
definitive stras of the middle Word of signlessness such as the
extensive, middling, and condensed Mother [Perfection of Wisdom
Stras] because of mainly teaching the topic (brjod bya)the
positing of all appearances from form to omniscience as relative
phenomena, and emptiness, which is the non-established essence
of those, as the ultimate truth.
In contrast, Pd-pa Tulku characterizes the authentic/inauthentic model of
two truths, appearance according with the mode of subsistence or not, as
the manner of positing the two truths in the definitive meaning stras of
the last wheel:103

102

Pd-pa Tulku, lta grub shan byed grel pa, 120: de ltar snang stong gi sgo nas bden

pa gnyis su bzhag pai tshul di ni nges don zab mo yum rgyas bring bsdus gsum sogs
bka bar ba mtshan nyid med pai mdo sde rnams kyi dgongs pa yin te/ gzugs nas rnam
mkhyen bar gyi snang ba thams cad kun rdzob chos can du bzhag ste/ de dag gi ngo bo
ma grub pai stong nyid don dam bden pa brjod bya gtso bor bstan pai phyir te.
103 Ibid., 122-123: de ltar gnas snang mthun mi mthun gyi sgo nas bden pa gnyis su jog
pai tshul di ni/ snying poi mdo bcu lta bu bka khor lo tha mai nges don gyi mdo sde
rnams las/ nges don bde gshegs snying poi khyad par stong cha nas yul chos kyi
dbyings ngo bo stong par rnam thar sgo gsum ldan gyi bdag nyid dang/ snang cha nas
yul can ye shes kyi rang bzhin od gsal ba mkhyen brtse nus pai yon tan dang dbyer med

48
In this way, the manner of positing the two truths by means of
appearance according with the mode of subsistence or not is [the
viewpoint] of the definitive meaning stras of the last Word, such as
the ten [Buddha-]nature Stras, for which the distinction of the
definitive meaning Buddha-nature:
from the empty aspect (stong cha nas), is the nature endowed
with the three gates of liberation, the essentially empty objective
expanse of phenomena (yul chos kyi dbyings); and from the
aspect of appearance (snang cha nas), is inseparable with the
qualities of knowledge, love, and powers, the natural luminous
clarity (rang bzhin od gsal ba) of the subjective wisdom (yul can
ye shes)is asserted as the ultimate which is appearance in
accord with the mode of subsistence, and
the aspect of adventitious defilements, the distorted
appearances which are the nature of sasrathe subjects
and objects that are the separable aspects that do not abide in
the foundation (gshis la ma zhugs) of realityare asserted as
the relative which are appearances that do not accord with the
mode of subsistence.
Pd-pa Tulku says here that from the aspect of emptiness, Buddha-nature
is the objective expanse of phenomena which is essentially empty. From
the aspect of appearance, Buddha-nature is the subjective wisdom that is
not empty of the inseparable qualities of naturally luminous and clear
wisdom, yet is empty of the adventitious defilements of the nature of the
distorted appearances of sasra.
Pd-pa Tulku further expands upon Mi-phams delineation of the
two models of truth in his interpretation of Buddha-nature. Pd-pa Tulku
states that in terms of appearance in accord with the mode of subsistence
(the two truths as authentic/inauthentic experience), Buddha-nature is
ultimate; in terms of the two truths as appearance/emptiness, Buddhanature is both of the two truths:104
gyur pa gnas snang mthun pai don dam dang khrul snang khor bai rang bzhin dri ma
glo bur bai cha yul yul can thams cad gnas lugs gyi gshis la ma zhugs pai rnam par
dbyer yod pa gnas snang mi mthun pai kun rdzob tu bzhed de.
104 Ibid., 126: rigs khams snying po sogs kyi snang stong gi cha gnyis ka gnas snang
mthun pai cha nas don dam du bzhag mod kyang/ on kyang snang cha nas kun rdzob

49
Both aspects of appearance and emptiness of [phenomena] such
as [Buddha-]nature are posited as [only] ultimate from the aspect of
appearance in accord with the mode of subsistence; however, from
the aspect of appearance, there is a manner of positing the
appearing aspect as relative and the empty aspect as ultimate, so it
is both the truths of [the two-truths as] appearance and emptiness.
In the former model of appearance/emptiness, Buddha-nature is only the
ultimate

truth

as

authentic

experience;

in

the

latter

model

of

authentic/inauthentic experience, Buddha-nature is both the relative and

ultimate truth because Buddha-nature is empty and it appears.105
Pd-pa Tulku states that traditions that only accept the two truths
as

appearance/emptiness,

without

accepting

the

two

truths

as

dang/ stong cha nas don dam du dbye bai tshul gyis snang stong gi bden pa gnyis char
yod do. See also, Pd-pa Tulku, stong thun gnad kyi zin thun, 11.4-12.2.
Pd-pa Tulku also shows how both of Mi-phams two-truth models of
appearance/emptiness and authentic/inauthentic experience apply to the inner-tantras
(nang rgyud) of Nying-ma. In the former delineation of the two truths as
appearance/emptiness, in terms of what is found from the perspective of ultimate valid
cognition being authentic or not, he states that from the aspect of appearance: in
Mahyoga, the relative is great purity, in Anuyoga, the relative is the maala of the three
divine supports (gtan gsum), and in Atiyoga, the relative is the spontaneously present
105

ground-appearance. Likewise, from the aspect of emptiness: in Mahyoga, the ultimate

is great equality, in Anuyoga, the ultimate is the primordial maala as it is (ye ji bzhin

pai dkyil khor), and in Atiyoga, the ultimate is the nature of the primordially present
ground-expanse. Furthermore, in the latter two-truth model of authentic/inauthentic
experience, from the perspective of conventional valid cognition of pure vision, Pd-pa
Tulku states that from the aspect of whether experience is authentic or not: in Mahyoga,
the indivisibility of the truths of purity and equality is the ultimate and is called the great
seven ultimate treasures (don dam dkor bdun chen po), the opposite of the ultimate is
called the relative of imputed confusion (khrul pa btags pai kun rdzob), in Anuyoga, the
great ultimate that is the unity of the two truths is called the maala of the awakened
mind (byang chub sems kyi dkyil khor), the opposite of the ultimate is called the relative
of impure confusion (ma dag khrul pai kun rdzob), and in Atiyoga, that which abides as
the ground of the unity of primordial purity and spontaneous presence is called the
ultimate truth of self-existing wisdom (rang byung ye shes don dam bden pa), while the
phenomena of confused dualistic perception are called the relative of impure groundappearance (gzhi snang ma dag pai kun rdzob). Pd-pa Tulku, lta grub shan byed grel

pa, 120-124.

50
authentic/inauthentic experience, have cast away the profound meaning of
Buddha-nature and tantra:106
These days, the two truths of appearance and emptiness is only
widely known, but it is rare to perceive one who knows the profound
two truths of whether or not appearance accords with the mode of
subsistence (i.e., authentic/inauthentic experience). It appears that
the positions that accept the inseparability of appearance and
emptiness are cast far away: such as the presentation of the
profound meaning intended by the definitive meaning stras and
tantras, Buddha-naturethe unity of appearance and emptiness
as ultimate, and the Mahyoga traditions presentation of the
indivisibility of purity and equality as the ultimate truth.
His polemical claim apparently addresses the widespread dominance of
Ge-luk commentaries that emphasize a model of the two truths as
appearance/emptiness.
Pd-pa Tulku says that the tradition of Prsagika accepts both
two-truth models:107
In the scriptures of the Prsagika tradition, as was just explained,
since the commentaries on the middle Word, such as the
Collection of Reasonings and the root text and [auto-]commentary
of the Madhyamakvatra, posit the two truths by means of
appearance and emptiness, and the commentaries on the last
106

Ibid., 119: deng dus snang stong gi bden pa gnyis zhes yongs su grags pa tsam las

gnas snang gi bden gnyis zab mo mkhyen pa ni shin tu dkon par snang zhing tshul des
nges don mdo rgyud kyi dgongs don zab mo bde bar gshegs pai snying po snang stong
zung jug don dam du bzhag pa dang/ ma h yo gai lugs kyi dag mnyam bden pa dbyer
med don dam bden par jog pa sogs snang stong dbyer med don dam du bzhed pai
phyogs rnams ring du byas pa snang ngo.
107 Ibid., 125: thal gyur pai lugs kyi gzhung du ni bshad ma thag pa ltar bka bar pai
dgongs grel rigs tshogs dang/ jug pa rtsa grel sogs las ni/ snang stong gi sgo nas jog
par mdzad cing/ bka tha mai dgongs pa rgyud bla ma rtsa grel sogs kyis ni gnas snang
mthun mi mthun gyi sgo nas bden gnyis jog par mdzad pas bden gnyis kyi jog tshul
gnyis ka gal med gnad gcig tu gzhal gyi[s] bzhed kyi gang rung kho na las gzhan spang
bar ma mdzad pai phyir ro/ /rgyu mtshan de nyid kyi phyir na jug pa rtsa grel sogs zla
bai gzhung dang/ rgyal tshab chen po byams mgon mchog gi rgyud bla mai gzhung
gnyis ka yang/ theg chen thal gyur pai gzhung du gal med gnad gcig tu gyur pa lags so.
See also Pd-pa Tulku, lta grub shan byed grel pa, 127.

51
Word, such as the root text and commentary of the Uttaratantra,
posit the two truths by means of whether or not appearance is in
accord with the mode of subsistence, both manners of positing the
two truths are accepted as one essential point without
contradiction; only accepting either one and rejecting the other is
not done. For this very reason, both: (1) scriptures of Candrakrti,
such as the root and [auto-]commentary of the Madhyamakvatra,
and (2) the Uttaratantra scripture of the supreme, great regent
Maitreyantha, also are within one essential point, without
contradiction, scriptures of the Mahyna Prsagika.
Pd-pa Tulku states that Candrakrti delineates the two truths as
emptiness/appearance, while the Uttaratantra delineates the two truths as
whether or not appearance is in accord with the mode of subsistence (i.e.,
authentic/inauthentic experience).

He argues that both texts have the

same viewpoint. Furthermore, in his Notes on the Essential Points of [Mi-

phams] Exposition [of Buddha-Nature], Pd-pa Tulku states:108

If it is asked, Well, which is the manner of positing the two truths in
the Prsagika tradition? Both are posited without contradiction.
Moreover,
Candrakrti,
emphasizing
the
former
[appearance/emptiness model], elucidates the empty essence of all
phenomena. The Uttaratantra, although emphasizing the latter
[authentic/inauthentic experience model], is in accord with the
former because the nature of emptiness is established as luminous
clarity.
Therefore, this is the reason why both the
Madhyamakvatra and the Uttaratantra fall to one essential point,
without contradiction, as Prsagika scriptures.
Pd-pa Tulku explains that the nature of emptiness is luminous clarity; this
is the reason why there is no contradiction between Candrakrtis

108

Pd-pa Tulku, stong thun gnad kyi zin thun, 12.2-12.5: on na thal gyur pai lugs la

bden gnyis jog tshul di gnyis gang yin zhe na/ di gnyis ka gal med du jog ste/ de yang
zla bas dang pos rtsal du bton te chos thams cad kyi ngo bo stong pa nyid gsal bar
mdzad/ rgyud blas phyi ma rtsal du bton kyang snga ma dang dgongs mthun du grub ste/
stong pai rang bzhin od gsal ba grub pa des na jug pa dang rgyud bla gnyis ka thal
gyur bai gzhung du gal med gnad gcig tu babs pai rgyu mtshan de yin.

52

Madhyamakvatra and the Uttaratantra as both Prsagika texts.109

Thus, Buddha-nature, as the unity of emptiness luminous clarity, is an
important

topic

around

which

Pd-pa

Tulku

synthesizes

the

Madhyamakvatra and the Uttaratantra, and establishes them both as

Prsagika texts.
A stanza that is frequently cited to support that Buddha-nature is
not empty is found in the Uttaratantra:110
The basic element (khams) is empty of those adventitious
[phenomena] that have the character of separability,
But not empty of the unexcelled properties that have the character
of inseparability.
Mi-pham glosses this stanza as follows:111
All of the faults of sasra arise from the deluded mind which
apprehends a personal self or a self of phenomena (nga dang chos
kyi bdag tu dzin pa). Since this deluded mind also is adventitious
like clouds in the sky, from the beginning neither mixing nor
polluting the luminous clarity of the primordial basic nature (gdod
mai gshis od gsal), these faults are individually distinguished from
the basic element and are suitable to be removed. Therefore, the
essence of the basic element is empty of these faults; it is
untainted. Without depending on the polluting delusion, within the
natural state (rang gi ngang gis) of its own luminous clarity and the

Mi-pham considers the Uttaratantra as a Middle Way text but does not delineate it as
exclusively Prsagika. Khen-po Ktyyana, private conservation, 2004.
110 Uttaratantra 1.158: rnam bdyer bcas pas mtshan nyid can/ /blo bur dag gis khams
stong gi/ /rnam dbyer med pai mtshan nyid can/ /bla med chos kyis stong ma yin.
Published in theg pa chen po rgyud bla mai rtsa grel (Sichuan: Nationalities Press,
1997), 20.
111 Mi-pham, stong thun seng gei nga ro, 577.1-577.3: khor bai nyes pa thams cad ni
109

nga dang chos kyi bdag tu dzin pa khrul pai sems las byung la/ khrul sems de yang
gdod mai gshis od gsal la ye nas ma gos ma dre par mkha la sprin ltar glo bur ba yin
pas skyon de dag ni khams dang so sor byed cing bral rung ba yin pas khams kyi ngo
bo la skyon des stong pa ste ma gos pa yin la/ khrul pas bslad pa la mi ltos par rang gi
ngang gis od gsal zhing chos kun gyi de kho na nyid du zhugs pai rang byung gi ye shes
les [read la] rnam dbyer byar med pai mthar thug gi yon tan rnams kyi khams de mi
stong ste/ rang gi ngo bo la bral med kyi gshis yin pas nyi ma dang zer bzhin no.

53
self-existing wisdom (rang byung gi ye shes) that remains as the
suchness (de kho na nyid) of all phenomena, it is not empty of that
which is inseparable, the basic element of consummate qualities,
because in its own essence this is the basic nature (gshis) from
which it is inseparablelike the sun and light rays.
Mi-pham states that that the basic element (Buddha-nature) is empty of
adventitious defilements yet not empty of the consummate qualities.
These consummate qualities are inseparable with the suchness of
phenomena that is luminous clarity and self-existing wisdom.
Pd-pa Tulku explains that the first half of the stanza from the

Uttaratantra quoted above shows distorted phenomena of duality as

relative, and the second half shows Buddha-nature as ultimate:112
Moreover, also in the context of the Mahynottaratantra, But not
empty of the unexcelled properties that have the character of
inseparability, shows as ultimate: the luminous clarity that is the
self-effulgence (rang mdangs) of the empty essence, the Buddhanature, the heritage (rigs) which is the basic element, inseparable
with the qualities of the Truth Body (chos sku) that is a freed effect
(bral bras); and, The basic element is empty of those adventitious
[phenomena] that have the character of separability, shows as
relative: the defilements which do not abide in the foundation, the
distorted phenomena of perceived-perceiver [duality], which are
separable through the power of training in the path of the antidote.
Pd-pa Tulka shows that the Uttaratantra demonstrates Buddha-nature,
the unity of luminous clarity and emptiness, as ultimate. Since both the
empty and appearing aspects are ultimate in this context, Buddha-nature
also reflects the ultimate truth as authentic experience.

112

Pd-pa Tulku, lta grub shan byed grel pa, 124: gzhan yang theg pa chen po rgyud

bla mai skabs su yang/ rnam dbyer med pai mtshan nyid can/ /bla med chos kyis stong
ma yin/ /zhes ngo bo stong pai rang gdangs od gsal ba bral bras chos skui yon tan
dang dbyer med pai rigs khams bde gshegs snying po don dam du bstan cing/ rnam
dbyer bcas pai mtshan nyid can/ /blo bur dag gis khams stong gis [read gi]/ /zhes dri ma
gshis la ma zhugs pa gnyen poi lam bsgom stobs kyis dbyer yod pai gzung dzin khrul
pai chos kun rdzob tu bstan.

54
In addition to the stanza from the Uttaratantra, another source to
support the interpretation of the empty quality of Buddha-nature is found
within Candrakrtis auto-commentary on the Madhyamakvatra (6.95).
Mi-pham cites this passage in the context of refuting the view that
Buddha-nature is truly established and not empty.113 In this citation,
originally found in the Lakvatrastra, Mahmati asks the Buddha how
Buddha-nature is different from the Self proclaimed by non-Buddhists, and
the Buddha answers as follows:114
Mahmati, my Buddha-nature teaching is not similar to the nonBuddhists declaration of Self. Mahmati, the Tathgatas, Arhats,
and completely perfect Buddhas teach Buddha-nature as the
meaning of the words: three gates of liberation, nirva, the final
reality, non-arising, etc. For the sake of immature beings who are
frightened by selflessness, they teach by means of Buddha-nature.
Pd-pa Tulku states that from the empty aspect, Buddha-nature is not like
the Self of the non-Buddhists, because it is inseparable from the great
emptiness distinguished by the three gates of liberation (i.e., empty
essence, signless cause, wishless effect). He says that from the aspect of
appearance, Buddha-nature is not without qualities, as in the tradition of
the Nirgrantha,115 because it has a nature with the qualities of luminous
clarity distinguished by knowledge, love, and powers:116
See Mi-pham, stong thun seng gei nga ro, 589.3-590.2.
Candrakrti under Madhyamakvatra 6.95, in dbu ma la jug pai rang grel, 196. See
also D.T. Suzuki (trans.), The Lakvatra Stra (London: Routledge, 1968), 68-69;
Jeffrey Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1983), 615-616.
115 The Nirgrantha, which Pd-pa Tulku refers to as the Sky-clad Ones (nam mkha gos
can), are also known as the Nudists (gcer bu pa). The Nirgrantha refers to the Jain
tradition. Mi-pham also references the Nirgrantha in distinguishing Buddha-nature from a
113

114

mere absence in a citation from the Mahparinirvastra. He states: Merely the aspect
of an existential negation (med dgag) is not suitable as nirva, again from the scripture
[Mahparinirvastra]: Emptiness, emptiness no matter where you search, you still
find nothing at all. The Nirgrantha also have nothing at all, but liberation is not like that.
Mi-pham, stong thun seng gei nga ro, 573.5-573.6.
116 Pd-pa Tulku, lta grub shan byed grel pa, 95: snang cha nas nam mkhai gos can

pai lugs ltar ma yin par rang bzhin od gsal bai yon tan mkhyen brtse nus gsum gyi

55
From the aspect of appearance, unlike the Nirgrantha, [Buddhanature] is distinguished by the qualities of the luminous nature
knowledge, love, and powers; and from the empty aspect, unlike
the Self of the non-Buddhists, [Buddha-nature] is distinguished by
the essence of great emptinessthe three gates of liberation.
Pd-pa Tulku shows that Buddha-nature is not like the Self of the nonBuddhists due to the empty aspect. The emphasis on the empty aspect of
Buddha-nature

reflects

the

ultimate

in

the

two

truths

of

appearance/emptiness that Pd-pa Tulku delineates as the manner that

Candrakrti posits the two truths. The unity of the empty and appearing
aspects of luminous clarity reflects the ultimate in the two-truths of
authentic/inauthentic experience as Pd-pa Tulku delineates the manner
that the two truths are posited in the Uttaratantra.

Thus, through Mi-

phams two-fold depiction of the two truths, Pd-pa Tulku synthesizes

Candrakrtis treatment of Buddha-nature in the Madhyamakvatra with
the description from the Uttaratantra.
Furthermore, Pd-pa Tulkus teacher and Mi-phams student, Khenpo Kn-pal (kun bzang dpal ldan, 1870/2-1943), states in his commentary
on Mi-phams Beacon of Certainty (nges shes sgron me):117
In general, if the essence of Buddha-nature were not empty, it
would not be different from the permanent Self of the nonBuddhists; therefore, the nature of the three gates of liberation was
taught. Also, if the wisdom of luminous clarity did not exist, being
an utterly void emptiness like space, there would be no difference
from the Nirgrantha; therefore, the unconditioned wisdom of
luminous clarity was taught. Thus, the definitive scriptures (nges

khyad par du byas pa de yang stong cha nas mu stegs byed kyi bdag ltar ma yin par ngo
bo stong pa chen po rnam thar sgo gsum gyi khyad par du byas pa.
117 Khen-po Kn-pal, blo gros snang bai sgo byed, 69: spyir de bzhin gshegs pai snying
po rang gi ngo bos mi stong par gyur na phyi rol pai rtag bdag dang khyad par med pas
rnam thar sgo gsum gyi rang bzhin du bstan pa dang/ od gsal bai ye shes kyang med
pas stong pa phyang chad nam mkha lta bur gyur na gcer bu pa dang khyad par med
pas od gsal bai ye shes dus ma byas par bstan pas ston pai bka bar tha nges pai lung
gis ngo bo stong pa dang rang bzhin gsal bar bstan pa.

56

pai lung) of the middle and last Word of the teacher show the
empty essence and the natural clarity.

Thus, the meaning of Buddha-nature, like the meaning of emptiness, is

explained as not only an absence, but as the unity of appearance, or
clarity, and emptiness.

Buddha--Nature as the Definitive Meaning

Buddha
Pd-pa Tulku describes such a Buddha-nature as the definitive
meaning. He shows the criteria for distinguishing the definitive meaning
from a provisional meaning by stating that it is a provisional meaning if the
literal teaching has three features: (1) a basis within an [other] intention
(dgongs gzhi), (2) a purpose (dgos pa), and (3) explicit invalidation (dngos

la gnod byed):118
Concerning the manner of positing the provisional and the definitive
in general, stras are provisional meanings when the meaning of
the literal teaching has all three complete: a basis with an [other]
intention, a purpose, and explicit invalidation. The opposite of this
is posited as the definitive meaning.
Pd-pa Tulku states that in accordance with the viewpoint of the

Samdhirjastra, Candrakrti explained the distinction of provisional and

definitive meanings by means of what is and is not invalidated by ultimate
valid cognition. As such, stras that mainly express emptiness as the
explicit topic are said to be the definitive meaning, and stras that mainly
express relative truths (i.e., appearances) are provisional meanings:119

Pd-pa Tulku, stong thun gnad kyi zin thun, 13.4-13.5: spyir drang nges jog tshul la
sgra ji bzhin pai bstan don la/ dgongs gzhi dgos pa dngos la gnod byed gsum tshang bai
mdo de drang don dang/ de las ldog pa nges don du jog go. See also Pd-pa Tulku, lta
grub shan byed grel pa, 89.
119 Ibid., 13.5-14.4: des na mdo ting dzin rgyal po sogs kyi dgongs pa ltar/ zla bas don
dam dpyod byed kyi tshad mas gnod pa yod med kyi sgo nas don dam stong nyid brjod
byai gtso bor ston pai mdo nges don dang/ tha snyad kun rdzob brjod byai gtso bor ston
pai mdo drang don du bzhed de/ mdo gang de nyid ma yin bshad don can/ /kun rdzob
gsung paang shes nas drang bya zhing/ /stong nyid don can nges don shes par gyis/
118

57
Therefore, in accord with the viewpoint of the Samdhirjastra and
so forth, by means of what is or is not invalidated by valid cognition
analyzing the ultimate, Candrakrti accepts stras that mainly
express the topic of emptiness as the definitive meaning, and
stras that mainly express the topic of the conventional, [or]
relative, truths as provisional meanings:
Whatever stras have the meaning that does not explain
thusness
Know those to also explain the relative, what is provisional.
Know those that have the meaning of emptiness as the
definitive meaning.120
Therefore, the manner of positing is by means of the topic: the first
Word is provisional, the middle is definitive, and the last is a mix of
provisional and definitive meanings. Hence, it does not follow that
a meaning taught in a stra that Candrakrti has said to be a
provisional meaning is necessarily non-existent conventionally
because all presentations of relative truth are the expressed
meanings of a provisional meaning.
Thus, according to Pd-pa Tulku, it does not follow that whatever is a
provisional

meaning

is

necessarily

non-existent

conventionally.

Furthermore, Pd-pa Tulku states:121

The manner of positing the topic as the definitive meaning by
means of appearance and emptiness in the middle Word is as
follows: by means of the object found by valid cognition analyzing
the ultimate, emptiness, being supremely authentic or not, there is
the way of dividing the two truths in which relative phenomena are
[posited] from the aspect of appearance and ultimate phenomena
zhes gsungs so/ des na brjod byai dbang gis bka dang po drang don dang/ bar ba nges
don/ tha ma drang nges phyed mai tshul du jog go/ /dei phyir zla bas drang don du
bzhag pai mdo yis bstan don yin na tha snyad du med pas ma khyab ste/ kun rdzob
bden pai rnam bzhag thams cad drang don gyi brjod don yin pai phyir ro.
120 Madhyamakvatra 6.97.
121 Pd-pa Tulku, lta grub shan byed grel pa, 90: brjod bya snang stong gi sgo nas bka
bar ba nges don du bzhed tshul ni/ stong nyid don dam dpyod byed kyi tshad mai rnyed
don yang dag mchog gyur yin min gyi sgo nas/ snang bai cha la kun rdzob kyi chos
dang/ stong pai cha la don dam pai chos kyi bden pa gnyis su dbye tshul las mdo gang
zhig stong pa nyid don dam bden pa brjod byai gtso bor dngos bstan gyi bka khor lo bar
ba sher phyin gyi mdo rnams nges don.

58
are [posited] from the empty aspect. From this, stras with
emptiness, the ultimate truth, as the main topic of explicit teaching
(dngos bstan)the Perfection of Wisdom Stras of the middle
wheelare the definitive meaning.
Pd-pa Tulku states that in terms of ultimate valid cognition, the ultimate is
posited from the aspect of emptiness, and the relative are posited from the
aspect of appearance. The ultimate truth is the empty quality, and thus
the definitive meaning in this context is delineated as the stras that have
the explicit teaching of emptiness as their main topic.

Pd-pa Tulku

explains that this is the way that the definitive meaning is delineated in the
middle wheel, and by Candrakrti, but not in the last wheel.
Pd-pa Tulku explains that the commentaries on the last wheel,
such as the Uttaratantra and the Dharmadhtustotra,122 explain the
distinction between the provisional and definitive meaning by means of
what is and is not invalidated by the conventional valid cognition of pure
vision.

In this way, Buddha-nature, as appearance in accord with the

mode of subsistence, is the definitive meaning:123

In accordance with stras that show the heritage, the basic element
(rigs khams), by the example of cleansing a jewel, the Uttaratantra
and the Dharmadhtustotra and so forth, by means of whether
there is or is not invalidation through the [conventional] valid
cognition of pure vision in accord with what is found by the valid
cognition of pure vision, stras that teach the consummate
definitive meaning, Buddha-nature, are asserted as the definitive
meaning. Hence, the last Word teachings in which the definitive
meaning Buddha-nature is the topicthe nature of inseparable
appearance and emptiness and the ultimate that is appearance in

P. 2010, vol. 46.

123 Pd-pa Tulku, stong thun gnad kyi zin thun, 14.4-15.3: rigs khams nor bu sbyong pai
122

dpes bstan pai mdo yis bstan don ltar/ rgyud bla ma dang chos dbyings bstod pa sogs
kyis dag pai gzigs pa tshad mas gnod pa yod med kyi sgo nas dag gzigs tshad mas
rnyed don ltar mthar thug nges don bde gshegs snying po bstan pai mdo rnams nges
don du bzhed pa/ des na nges don bde gshegs snying po snang stong dbyer med kyi
rang bzhin gnas snang mthun pai don dam brjod byar bstan pai bka tha ma nges don
du bzhed de/ dag gzigs tshad mas rnyed don yin pai phyir.

59
accord with the mode of subsistenceare the definitive meaning
because [Buddha-nature] is the object found by the valid cognition
of pure vision.
Here Pd-pa Tulku states that doctrines of the last wheel explain the
distinction between the provisional and definitive meanings by means of
what is and is not invalidated by the conventional valid cognition of pure
vision (authentic vs. inauthentic experience).

Thus, in terms of

appearance in accord with the mode of subsistence (authentic

experience), Buddha-nature, as the topic of an indivisible appearance and
emptiness, is the definitive meaning.

Furthermore, Pd-pa Tulku

states:124
The manner of positing the topic as the definitive meaning by
means of appearance in accord with the mode of subsistence in the
last Word is as follows: by means of the object found by the
conventional valid cognition of pure [vision] being supremely
authentic or not, there is the way of dividing the two truths in which
relative phenomena are [posited] from the aspect of being
appearance that does not accord with the mode of subsistence,
and ultimate phenomena are [posited] from the aspect of being
appearance that accords with the mode of subsistence. From this,
the stras with luminous clarity, the ultimate truth, as the main topic
of explicit teachingthe stras teaching Buddha-nature of the last
wheelare the definitive meaning.
In this way, the Buddha-nature Stras of the last wheel are also definitive.
Thus, it is not only emptiness that is definitive, but the definitive meaning
is stated in terms of the indivisibility of appearance and emptiness as
known when reality is experienced authentically, when appearance
accords with the mode of subsistence.

124

Pd-pa Tulku, lta grub shan byed grel pa, 91: brjod bya gnas snang gi sgo nas bka

tha ma nges don du bzhed tshul ni/ rnam dag tha snyad tshad mai rnyed don yang dag
mchog gyur yin min gyi sgo nas gnas snang mi mthun pai cha kun rdzob kyi chos dang/
gnas snang mthun pai cha don dam pai chos kyi bden gnyis dbyer med tshul las/ mdo
gang zhig od gsal don dam bden pa brjod byai gtso bor dngos bstan gyi bka khor lo tha
ma snying po bstan pai mdo rnams nges don du bzhed.

60
Pd-pa Tulku argues that there is no contradiction in the
delineations of what is definitive in the two wheels of doctrine because
they are not based on the same criterion: the middle wheel describes the
definitive meaning in terms of the ultimate qua empty aspect of empty
appearance, what is validated by ultimate valid cognition. The last wheel,
however, explains what is definitive in terms of the ultimate qua authentic
experience, what is validated by the conventional valid cognition of pure
vision. He states that the two manners are completely compatible:125
In short, as for the topic of the middle and last Word, based on the
distinctive manner of stating (mdzad) the main topic of the explicit
teachingBuddha-nature from the aspect of appearance or the
expanse of phenomena (chos kyi dbyings) from the empty aspect
there are two ways of positing the middle wheel as the definitive
meaning and the last wheel as the definitive meaning. Based on
the level of emphasis upon the topic (brjod bya gtso che chung gi
sgo nas), other than just the distinctive way in which they are
respectively distinguished temporarily (gnas skabs), as for the
consummate meaning, the two are also accepted within a single
essential point, without contradiction, as definitive meaning stras.
In this way, Pd-pa Tulku states that stras of both the middle and last
wheels are the definitive meaning. The main topic that is explicitly taught
in the last wheel is Buddha-nature from the appearing aspect, while in the
middle wheel it is the expanse of phenomena from the empty aspect.
Both express the same consummate meaning, yet are distinguished by
emphasizing one or another aspect, the empty or appearing aspect.
Furthermore, Pd-pa Tulku depicts the middle wheel as eliminating the

125

Ibid., 93: mdor na bka bar tha gnyis brjod bya/ snang cha bde gshegs snying po dang

stong cha chos kyi dbyings dngos bstan gyi brjod byai gtso bor mdzad tshul gyi khyad
par las drang nges rnam par dbye bai tshul gyi sgo nas/ bka khor lo bar ba nges don du
jog pa dang/ tha ma nges don du jog pai rang bzhin dag ni/ gnas skabs brjod bya gtso
che chung gi sgo nas so sor dbye tshul kyi khyad par tsam las mthar thug gi don la gnyis
kaang nges don gyi mdor gal med gnad gcig tu bzhed pa lags so.

61
extreme of permanence and the last wheel as eliminating the extreme of
annihilation:126
The supreme definitive meaning of the middle wheel
Is the expanse of phenomena endowed with the three gates of
liberation.
The mind is devoid of mind because
The essence of mind itself abides as empty.
From the two truths as appearance and emptiness
The ultimate emptiness is the supreme freedom from constructs,
Since it is the object found by the valid cognition that analyzes the
ultimate,
It is free from the extreme of the truth of permanent entities.
The supreme definitive meaning of the last wheel
Is the heritage of the Buddha endowed with knowledge, love, and
powers.
The nature of mind is luminous clarity
That nature abides as the great luminous clarity.
From the two truths of authentic/inauthentic experience,
Since it is the object found by pure conventional valid cognition,
It is free from the extreme of annihilation as nothing at all.
The supreme non-contradiction of the middle and last wheels
Is the unity of appearance and emptinessthe basic element of the
essential nature (snying poi khams).
From the purity and impurity of mind itself,
It abides as the great dependent arising of compassionate
resonance (thugs rjes).
The supreme meaning of the non-contradiction of the two truths
Pd-pa Tulku, lta grub shan byed gnad kyi sgron me, published in lta grub shan byed
gnad kyi sgron mei rtsa grel (Sichuan: Nationalties Press, 1996), 36-37: khor lo bar pai
nges don mchog/ /rnam thar gsum ldan chos kyi dbyings/ /sems la sems ma mchis pa
ste/ sems nyid ngo bo stong par gnas/ /snang stong chos kyi bden gnyis las/ /stong nyid
don dam mtha bral mchog /don dpyod tshad mai rnyed don phyir/ /rtag dngos bden pai
mtha las grol/ /khor lo tha mai nges don mchog /mkhyen brtse nus ldan bde gshegs
rigs/ sems kyi rang bzhin od gsal bai/ /rang bzhin od gsal chen por gnas/ /gnas snang
chos kyi bden gnyis las/ /gnas snang mthun pai don dam mchog /rnam dag tshad mai
rnyed don phyir/ /cang med chad pai mtha las grol/ /khor lo bar tha gal med mchog
/snang stong zung jug snying poi khams/ /sems nyid dag dang ma dag las/ /thugs rjes
rten byung chen por gnas/ /snang stong dang ni gnas snang gi/ /bden gnyis gal med don
gyi mchog /tshur mthong tshad mai yul min phyir/ /glo bur spros chos kun las grol. See
also, Pd-pa Tulku, lta grub shan byed grel pa, 206-208.
126

62
Of appearance/emptiness and authentic/inauthentic experience,
Since it is not the domain of confined valid cognition,
It is free from all adventitiously constructed phenomena.
He asserts that the non-contradiction of the two modes of two truths
eliminates all adventitiously constructed phenomena. The integration of
the middle and last wheels of doctrine is an important way that Pd-pa
Tulku distinguishes the Nying-ma tradition:127
Therefore, in the tradition of the Great Middle Way, in accord with
the meaning of the viewpoint of stras such as the
Akayamatistra,128 and the great stras such as the
Madhyamakvatra, the middle Word is accepted as the definitive
meaning; and in accord with the meaning of the viewpoint of stras
such as the Dhravararja,129 and the great stras such as the
Uttaratantra, the stras of the last wheel that teach Buddha-nature
are accepted as the definitive meaningthe meaning of the
viewpoint within a single essential point, without contradiction, is
the general [way of] Nying-ma scriptures (snying gzhung spyi).
Pd-pa Tulku states that such an integration of the middle and last wheels
of doctrine as both the definitive meaning is a feature of general Nyingma scriptures.
In contrast to Pd-pa Tulkus two criteria for the definitive meaning,
Mi-pham uses a general criterion to delineate the definitive meaning:
Definitive meaning stras are those that indicate a non-referential
emptiness (dmigs pa med pai stong nyid), and the stras that indicate a

127

Pd-pa Tulku, lta grub shan byed grel pa, 92: des na dbu ma chen poi lugs la blo

gros mi zad pa sogs kyi mdo dang jug pa rtsa grel sogs bstan bcos chen poi dgongs
don ltar bka bar ba nges don du bzhed pa dang/ gzungs dbang rgyal po sogs kyi mdo
dang rgyud bla sogs bstan bcos chen poi dgongs don ltar bka tha mai snying po bstan
pai mdo rnams nges don du bzhed pai dgongs don gal med gnad gcig tu rnying gzhung
spyi.
128

P. 842, vol. 34.

129

P. 814, vol. 32.

63
relative referent object are provisional.130 As we will see in the following
chapters, the qualification of emptiness as non-referential delineates
emptiness as not simply an empty quality, but as a unity of emptiness and
appearance that is known in authentic experience.
Pd-pa Tulku highlights the inclusive quality of Mi-phams
interpretive system through integrating the statements of emptiness in the
middle wheel with Buddha-nature in the last wheel.

He states that

although all of the great scholars of the old and new traditions ultimately
have the same viewpoint, at times for the purpose of destroying the aspect
of thorough affliction (kun nyon phyogs joms pa) and at other times to
increase the aspect of complete purification (rnam byang phyogs phel

ba), they emphasize the empty aspect or the appearing aspect in their
distinctive commentaries.131

Conclusion
Mi-pham formulates an interpretation of Buddhist doctrine that
clearly articulates two models of the two truths.

Through this, he

describes the emptiness in the middle wheel and the Buddha-nature in the
last wheel as both the definitive meaning and the ultimate truth. Through
Mi-phams depiction of Buddha-nature, the two wheels do not cancel each
other out, but are mutually illuminating. His interpretation represents a
dialectic of emptiness and presence at the heart of his Nying-ma exegesis.

130

Mi-pham, rab gsal de nyid snang byed, 419: dmigs pa med pai stong nyid ston pa de

dag nges don gyi mdo sde yin la/ dmigs pa can kun rdzob ston pa drang don du mdo di
nyid kyis bstan.
131 See Pd-pa Tulku, lta grub shan byed grel pa, 68. Khen-po Kn-pal also makes a
similar statement in his commentary on Mi-phams nges shes sgron me. See Khen-po
Kn-pal, blo gros snang bai sgo byed, 70.

64

Chapter 2: Yogcra, Prsa

Prsagika,
ika, and the Middle Way
Introduction
This chapter will address in more detail the relationship between
affirmations and denials of ultimate reality in Mi-phams writings. Before
we go further into the explicit topic of Buddha-nature, we will discuss here
the empty-aspect as presented in the Middle Way. Central themes of Miphams interpretation can be seen in his depiction of the relationship
between Yogcra and Prsagika.

We will begin by looking at the

central role of Yogcra in Mi-phams works, where he presents the two

truths as a dichotomy of authentic/inauthentic experience. We will then
turn to some significant features of his distinction of Prsagika, and
explore his formulations of emptiness and the Middle Way.

In his

depiction of Prsagika, Mi-pham emphasizes the unity of the two truths

as appearance/emptiness in authentic experience.
Mi-phams work should be understood within the orbit of the
tradition of the Great Perfection inherited from Long-chen-pa. Thus, we
will see how his representations of the exoteric discourses of Yogcra
and Prsagika are informed by the Great Perfection, and the distinction
between mind (sems) and wisdom (ye shes) in particular.

Mind--Only
Middle Way and Mind
Mi-pham not only says that Mind-Only is the highest conventional
presentation132 but also that asserting the conventional as Mind-Only is
established as the general way for all Mahyna.133 He characterizes

Mi-pham, dbu ma rgyan rtsa grel, 50: tha snyad kyi rnam bzhag rtse mor gyur pa
sems tsam yin. See also Mi-pham, dbu ma rgyan rtsa grel, 85.
133 Mi-pham, dbu ma rgyan rtsa grel, 66: tha snyad sems tsam du dod pa di theg chen
132

spyi lugs la grub pa yin no.

65
Proponents of Mind-Only to assert a non-dual reflexive awareness as truly
existent:134
There are also two [bodhisattva vehicles]: (1) Proponents of the
Middle Way, who have perfected the view of selflessness, and (2)
Proponents of Mind-Only, who have not perfected the subtle
selflessness of phenomena due to asserting a non-dual reflexive
awareness as truly existent (gnyis stong gi rang rig bden par khas
len).
Mi-pham distinguishes Mind-Only from the Middle Way in terms of the
belief in the true establishment of consciousness. He states: The debate
between the Middle Way and Mind-Only is not about external objects
existing or not, but the debate is about consciousness being truly
established or not.135 Furthermore, he says:136
The manner of Mind-Only is very much the true nature of
conventional reality (kun rdzob tha snyad kyi de kho na nyid);
however, the aspect of clinging (zhen pai cha) to the nature of a
self-luminous consciousness as truly established is what is to be
negated.
Thus, the reification of a cognitive presenceclinging to the nature of
consciousness as truly establisheddifferentiates the Middle Way and
Mind-Only.

Mi-pham, spyi don od gsal snying po, 407: de laang bdag med kyi lta ba yongs su
rdzogs pa dbu ma pa dang/ gnyis stong gi rang rig bden par khas len pas chos bdag phra
ba ma rdzogs pai sems tsam pa gnyis su yod do. Kong-trul presents a similar
134

distinction: The main difference between the two schools of Mahyna is whether or not
the self-aware, self-illuminating cognition free from perceived-perceiver duality is
accepted as ultimately established. Kong-trul, shes bya kun khyab, 550: gzung dzin

gnyis kyis stong pai shes pa rang rig rang gsal don dam du grub par dod pa dang mi
dod pa theg chen sde gnyis kyi khyad par gyi gtso bo yin te.
135 Mi-pham, dam chos dogs sel, 544-545: dbu sems gnyis phyi don yod med la mi rtsod
kyang/ rnam shes bden par grub ma grub la rtsod pa yin.
136 Mi-pham, dbu ma rgyan rtsa grel, 48: sems tsam pai tshul di kun rdzob tha snyad kyi
de kho na nyid shin tu bden mod/ on kyang dii rnam shes rang gsal gyi rang bzhin la
bden grub tu zhen pai cha de dgag bya yin no.

66
In his commentary on the Dharmadharmatvibhga, Mi-pham
affirms the similarity of the traditions of Mind-Only and the Middle Way:137
Thus, when the appearance of apprehended [objects] is
established to not have an essence that is separate from the
apprehending [subject], the appearance of the apprehending
subject is also established as non-existent. If [one wonders] why, it
is because the apprehending [subject] is established in
dependence upon the apprehended [object]; it is never established
on its own. In this way, if Proponents of Mind-Only have to realize
the lack of all duality, the awareness free from subject and object,
naturally luminous and clear, inexpressible and non-distinct from
the nature of the thoroughly established nature free from the twofold self, then it is needless to mention that the Proponents of the
Middle Way realize this!...Merely the slight philosophical assertion
that posits the essence of ineffable cognition as truly established
remains to be negated; authentic Proponents of the Middle Way
assert the unity of the primordially pure luminous clarity of ones
mind and the emptiness of that non-dual cognition. Therefore,
other than the distinction of whether this slight fixation is eliminated
or not (zhen pai gnad phra mo zhig chod ma chod kyi khyad par
las), the Middle Way and Mind-Only are mostly the same in terms
of the practices of meditative equipoise and post-meditation.

Mi-pham, chos chos nyid rnam byed grel pa (chos dang chos nyid rnam byed grel
pa ye shes snang ba), Mi-phams Collected Works (sde dge ed.) vol. 4, 626.2-627.2: de
ltar gzung bar snang ba de ni rang gi ngo bos dzin pa las gzhan du med par grub na/
dzin par snang ba de yang med par grub bo/ /de cii phyir na dzin pa ni gzung ba la ltos
te grub kyi yan gar du nam yang mi grub po/ de ltar na gzung ba dang dzin pa gnyis kyi
rnam pa thams cad dang bral te yul dang yul can med pai rig pa rang bzhin gyis od gsal
ba brjod du med pa tsam ni bdag gnyis kyis stong pai yongs grub de bzhin nyid dang tha
mi dad pa de ni sems tsam pas kyang rtogs dgos na dbu ma pas lta ci smos so...brjod
med kyi shes pa de yi ngo bo la bden grub du jog tshul gyi grub mtha phra mo tsam zhig
lhag mar lus pa de nyid rigs pas sun phyungs te gzung dzin med pai shes pa nyid kyang
bden pa med pai stong pa dang zung du zhugs pai rang sems gdod nas dag pai od
gsal nyid du dod na dbu ma yang dag pa yin te/ des na theg chen dbu sems di gnyis
zhen pai gnad phra mo zhig chod ma chod kyi khyad par las/ mnyam rjes kyi nyams len
phyogs dra ba lta bur ong bas. An edition of Mi-phams complete commentary on the
Dharmadharmatvibhga, along with an English translatation, can be found in Jim Scott,
Maitreyas Distinguishing Phenomena and Pure Being (Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications,
137

2004).

67
Thus, we can see that the distinction between Mind-Only and the Middle
Way does not concern the presence of a non-dual cognition, but rather the
position that such a cognition is truly established. We will return in the
next chapter to see how Mi-pham delineates the relationship between
wisdom and mind, and the status of such cognitions as reflexive
awareness (rang rig) and innate mind (gnyug sems).

Foundations of Yogcra
Mi-pham wrote commentaries on many texts that are often
characterized as Yogcra138 in addition to the works that he wrote on
texts that emphasize the negative dialectics of the Middle Way.139 This
shows the importance he placed on the Yogcra traditions. Mi-pham
cites a verse from the Lakvatrastra that states that all of the
Mahyna is contained within four topics: the five principles, the three
natures, the eight consciousnesses, and the two-fold selflessness:140
All of the Mahyna is contained within
The five principles and the three natures
The eight consciousnesses and
The two meanings of selflessness [person and phenomena].
The five principles are: (1) name (ming), (2) property (rgyu mtshan), (3)
concept (rnam rtog), (4) authentic wisdom (yang dag pai ye shes), (5)

For instance, Mahynastrlakra, Mahynasagraha, Abhidharmasamuccaya,

Madhyntavibhga, Dharmadharmatvibhga, Viatik, Triik.

138

Mi-phams own most important Middle Way commentaries are on the

Madhyamaklakara and the ninth chapter of the Bodhicaryvatra. Much of Mi-phams
Middle Way views can be found in the three rejoinders (brgal lan rnam gsum), that he
wrote in response to criticisms of his commentaries on these two texts. The
139

commentaries on texts such as the Madhyamakvatra, the Madhyamakakriks, and

the Uttaratantra, which are included within Mi-phams collected works, were assembled
from his notes and outlines by his students.
140 Lakvatrastra: chos lnga dang ni rang bzhin gsum/ /rnam shes brgyad po nyid dag
dang/ /bdag med don ni rnam gnyis por/ /theg chen thams cad bsdus pa yin. Cited in Mipham, dbu ma rgyan rtsa grel, 58; See also Mi-pham, chos chos nyid rnam byed grel

pa, 611B.1-611B.4.

68
thusness (de bzhin nyid).141 Name refers to the nominal designation and
property (etymologically reason [for the designation]) refers to the basis
of designation. Mi-pham states: Name is the mere imputation through
terms such as pillar and pot. Property is the terms basis of imputation
such as the property of supporting pillars and the appearance of the
bulbous object.142 He describes these first two of the five principles as the
imagined nature (kun btags, parikalpita), among the three natures,
because they are the dualistic appearances within the realm of words and
thought: These two [name and property] are the imagined nature because
they are dualistic perceived-perceiver appearances of the domain of
language and thought; when analyzed they are not truly existent.143
Mi-pham characterizes the third principle, concept, as the eight
consciousnesses: Concept is the collection of eight consciousnesses.144
Among the three natures, he says that concept is exclusively the
dependent nature (gzhan dbang, paratantra) because it is the basis of
appearance for a myriad of strictly conventional appearances: This
[concept] is exclusively the dependent nature because it is the basis of the
appearances

of

the

manifold

appearances

which

are

strictly

conventional.145 Furthermore, he characterizes the dependent nature as

conceptual mind:146
141
142

Mi-pham, dbu ma rgyan rtsa grel, 58.

Mi-pham, dbus mtha rnam byed grel pa, 709.5-709.6: ming ni ka ba dang bum pa

sogs brdai sgo nas btags pa tsam mo/ rgyu mtshan ni ming gi gdags gzhi gdung degs
sogs kyi don byed pa dang/ lto ldir ba la sogs par snang ba lta buo.
143 Mi-pham, dbu ma rgyan rtsa grel, 59: de gnyis ni kun btags yin te sgra rtog gi spyod
yul can gzung dzin gnyis su snang ba brtags na mi bden pai phyir ro.
144 Mi-pham, dbus mtha rnam byed grel pa, 709.6-710.1: rnam par rtog pa ni rnam shes
tshogs brgyad do.
145 Mi-pham, dbu ma rgyan rtsa grel, 59: de ni gzhan gyi dbang nyid yin te tha snyad
tsam du snang ba sna tshogs kyi snang gzhir gyur pao. Strictly conventional (tha snyad
tsam) apparently means exclusively within the domain of what can be said, thought, or
acted upondualistic experiences. Mi-pham characterizes what is conventional as that
which can be known, expressed, and acted upon. Mi-pham states: The conventional is
posited as what is known, expressed, and acted upon by means of the mind, speech, and
body. Mi-pham, mkhas pai tshul la jug pai sgo, published in mkhas jug (Qinghai:

69
In the perspective of thoroughgoing conceptuality (kun tu rtog pai
ngor), while there is dualistic appearance, the awareness that
exclusively appears as such, but is not established in duality, is
called the dependent nature. It is the basis for the arising of
distortion, the imagined nature.
Mi-pham states that the last two of the five principles, thusness and
authentic wisdom, refer respectively to the objective (yul) and subjective
(yul can) components of the thoroughly established nature (yongs grub,

parinipanna), the last of the three natures: These latter two, subject
[authentic wisdom] and object [suchness], are said to be thoroughly
established (yongs su grub).147
Mi-pham describes thusness, as the expanse of phenomena that
is the lack of intrinsic nature in all phenomena: Thusness is the expanse
of phenomena that is the lack of any intrinsic nature of the two-fold self in
these phenomena comprised by the internal and external.148 He explains
authentic wisdom as the reflexive awareness that is the subject free from
the imagination of the unreal (yang dag min rtog): The individual reflexive
awareness, the subject free from the imagination of the unreal which
assimilates that [thusness], is authentic wisdom149 Authentic wisdom,
free from the imagination of the unreal (yang dag min rtog dang bral), is

Nationalities Press, 1994), 129: tha snyad de la shes brjod jug gsum du bzhag pa ni
sems dang ngag dang lus kyi sgo nas so.
146 Mi-pham, dbus mtha rnam byed grel pa, 669.5-669.6: kun tu rtog pai ngor gzung

dzin gnyis su snang ba yod kyang/ ji ltar snang ba de kho na ltar gnyis su grub pa ma yin
pai rnam par rig pa la gzhan dbang zhes bya ste kun brtags khrul pa skye bai gzhi yin
pai phyir.
147 Mi-pham, dbu ma rgyan rtsa grel, 59: phyi ma yul yul can di gnyis ni yongs su grub
zhes bya ste.
148 Ibid., 59: phyi nang gis bsdus pai chos de dag la bdag gnyis kyi rang bzhin cung zad
grub pa med pai chos kyi dbyings ni de bzhin nyid yin la.
149 Ibid., 59: dei rjes su zhugs pa yang dag min rtog dang bral bai yul can so so rang rig
pa ni yang dag pai ye shes zhes byao.

70
thereby distinguished from mind (sems) because Mi-pham explains
imagination of the unreal to mean the dualistic experience of mind:150
What is the imagination of the unreal? It is all minds (sems) and
mental states (sems byung) of the three realms that have the
dualistic experience of a perceived [object] and a perceiver.
In this way, his distinction of the thoroughly established nature reflects a
distinction between wisdom and mind.
Mi-pham states that the domain of pure wisdom is only the
thoroughly established nature, not the other two natures:151
The exclusive object of pure wisdom is not the imagined and
dependent natures, but is said to be only the thoroughly established
nature because when that [thoroughly established nature] is the
realm of experience (spyod yul du byas), appearance accords with
the mode of subsistence.
As appearance in accord with the mode of subsistence, the thoroughly
established nature is ultimate. Thus, Mi-pham explains that among the
three natures, only the thoroughly established nature is ultimate:152
The ultimate (don dam pa) or the ultimate meaning (dam pai don)
is only the thoroughly established nature among the three natures;
the other two are not: (1) because [the thoroughly established
nature] is of the nature of non-dual experience beyond ordinary
consciousness and expression, or (2) because only this is
appearance in accord with the mode of subsistence.

Mi-pham, dbus mtha rnam byed grel pa, 669.5-669.6: yang dag ma yin kun rtog ces
bya ba gang yin na/ de ni gzung dzin gnyis su snang ba can/ khams gsum gyis bsdus pa
yi sems dang sems byung ba thams cad do.
151 Ibid., 709.3-709.4: dag pai ye shes kyi yul nyid kun btags dang gzhan dbang gnyis ma
yin la/ yongs grub gcig bu kho na yin par brjod de/ de spyod yul du byas tshe gnas snang
mthun pai phyir.
152 Ibid., 706.5-707.1: don dam paam dam pai don ni ngo bo nyid gsum gyi nang nas
yongs grub gcig pu yin gyi gzhan gnyis ma yin te/ gnyis snang med pai rang bzhin can
tha mal pai zhes brjod las das paam/ gnas snang mthun pa ni di kho na yin pai phyir.
150

71
Here, the thoroughly established nature is delineated as ultimate due to
being authentic experience, which Mi-pham also describes as the nature
of

non-dual experience.

In

this

way, the

distinction

between

consciousness (rnam shes) and wisdom (ye shes) is one way that he
delineates the two truths:153
The subject of appearance in accord with the mode of subsistence
is called wisdom, being free from duality; consciousness is the
apprehending [subject] of appearance that does not accord with the
mode of subsistence, being dualistic.
We can see that the ultimate as appearance in accord with the mode of
subsistence characterizes the two truths in this context.
In addition to the ultimate as appearance that accords with the
mode of subsistence, Mi-pham also maintains the empty quality of such
an ultimate when he says that the thoroughly established nature is not
truly established:154
These latter two, subject [authentic wisdom] and object [suchness],
are said to be thoroughly established (yongs su grub) not because
of an essence that is truly established (bden grub), but are
designated with that name because of being the unerring reality
(yin lugs ma nor bas).
Mi-pham

states

that:

The

two

selflessnesses

and

the

eight

consciousnesses also are comprised within the five principles; and these
five [principles] are also comprised within the three natures.155 Thus, Mipham effectively claims that all Mahyna can be contained within the
three-natures, a frequent Yogcra depiction.
153

Mi-pham, gzhung spyii bka gnad, 466.6-467.1: gnas snang mthun par gyur pai yul

can la ye shes zhes bya ste gzung dzin med pao/ mi mthun par dzin pa la rnam shes
zhes bya ste gzung dzin can no.
154 Mi-pham, dbu ma rgyan rtsa grel, 59-60: phyi ma yul yul can di gnyis ni yongs su
grub zhes bya ste/ ngo bo bden par grub pa ni min gyi yin lugs ma nor bas na tshig de
skad bla dwags su btags pa yin no.
155 Mi-pham, rab gsal de nyid snang byed, 270: bdag med gnyis dang/ rnam shes tshogs
brgyad kyang chos lngai nang du du la/ de lnga yang rang bzhin gsum gyi nang du dus.

72
We will turn to Mi-phams discussion of Prsagika after we
consider the statements of another of Mi-phams predecessors, Ge-tsey
Pa-chen (dge rtse pa chen, gyur med tshe dbang mchog grub, 17611829), a Nying-ma scholar from Ka-tok (ka thog) monastery. Ge-tsey
Pa-chen states that suchness is truly established (bden grub) due to
being what is experienced by the undistorted wisdom of the Sublime
Ones:156
Thus, the suchness that is the empty-ground of all phenomena
Is truly established because it is just what is experienced
By the undistorted wisdom of the Sublime Ones, and
Permanent, steadfast, and eternal because it is unchanging.
Ge-tsey Pa-chen also states that the middle wheel explains relative
phenomena as self-empty, and the last wheel explains the ultimate as
other-empty.

He describes the Great Perfection in terms of the three

natures of Yogcra, with the empty-ground as the thoroughly established

nature:157
Of the three stages of the wheel of the Victorious Ones doctrine
The first teaches the relative and causality as incontrovertible
The second teaches the self-empty relative and
The third teaches the profound suchness, the other-empty ultimate.
The awareness wisdom of liberationthe great thoroughly
established nature is freed from
The objects of delusion that appear yet do not existthe imagined
nature, and

Ge-tsey Pa-chen, rgyal bstan khor lo gsum dgongs pa gcig tu rtogs pa ston pa bzhi
ldan gyi gtam, Collected Works, vol.1 (Sichuan ed.), 119.4-119.5: de phyir chos kun

156

stong gzhii chos nyid gang/ /phags pa rnams kyi ye shes ma khrul bas/ /nyams su
myong bya nyid phyir bden par grub/ /gyur ba med phyir rtag brtan ther zug go.
157 Ge-tsey Pa-chen, rgyal bstan khor lo gsum dgongs pa gcig tu rtogs pa ston pa bzhi
ldan gyi gtam, Collected Works vol.1 (Sichuan ed.), 116.3-116.5: di na rgyal bai chos
khor rim gsum gyi/ /dang pos kun rdzob rgyu bcas bslu med dang/ /gnyis pas kun rdzob
rang stong gsum pa yis/ /don dam gzhan stong chos nyid zab mo bstan/ /yul gyi khrul
snang med bzhin kun tu brtags/ /yul can khrul sems tshogs brgyad gzhan dbang las/
/rnam grol rig pai ye shes yongs grub che/ /di ni nges don rdzogs chen khyad par chos.

73
The subjects of deluded mind which are the eight collections [of
consciousness]the dependent nature,
This is the definitive meaning, the distinctive doctrine of the Great
Perfection.
Mi-pham also treats the dependent nature as consciousness and the
thoroughly established nature as wisdom. However, we will see how he
portrays Prsagika as (also) compatible with the Great Perfection. We
now will turn to Mi-phams position on the Middle Way in relation to
Prsagika.

Svtantrika--Prsa
Prsa
Svtantrika
gika
In his depiction of the Prsagika-Svtantrika distinction, we will
explore how Mi-pham juxtaposes consciousness and wisdom, and the
conceptual and the non-conceptual.
Prsagika-Madhyamaka

as

We will see that he represents

discourse

that

emphasizes

what

transcends conceptuality. Svtantrika, on the other hand, emphasizes the

component of dialectical inquiry, a discourse at play within the conceptual
structures of thought. Svtantrika plays an important role in Mi-phams
systematic interpretation, but following Long-chen-pa,158 he embraces
Prsagika as representing the highest view of exoteric Buddhism. We
will first turn to Mi-phams representation of ultimate truth in order to
introduce his discussion of Prsagika.
The distinction between a conceptual negation and a negation that
is free from all conceptual constructs is a central part of Mi-phams
explanation of ultimate truth. The former refers to a mere absence as a
negative representation of the ultimate, the categorized ultimate.

Long-chen-pa affirms that Prsagika is the summit of the dialectical vehicle: The
summit of the dialectical vehicle of the Mahyna, Prsagika-Madhyamaka. Longchen-pa, yid bzhin mdzod grel, 1141.3: mtshan nyid theg pa chen poi rtse mo dbu ma
158

thal gyur.

In

74
contrast to this mere non-existence, the uncategorized ultimate is the
freedom from all conceptual constructs:159
Ultimate truth which is categorized, merely a negation as an
absence of true establishment, is an object of mind and an object of
language. The uncategorized is the unity of appearance and
emptiness that does not fall to the side of either appearance or
emptiness. It is signified by the words such as unity of the two
truths, freedom from constructs, the Middle Way, but these are
merely indicators, like the finger pointing to the moon, the meaning
is far beyond the domain of language and mind.
The uncategorized is indicated by words such as the unity of two truths,
but its meaning defies affirmation and negation.
Mi-phams division of ultimate truth into the categorized and

uncategorized ultimate reflects two distinct ways of understanding. The

first is in the perspective of a post-meditation (rjes thob) of determinate
experience, in which the two valid cognitions (conventional and ultimate)
ascertain emptiness and appearance separately. The second is in the
perspective of reality from a non-conceptual state of meditative equipoise
(mnyam bzhag) in which the two truths are indivisible:160
In short, in accord with the meaning found in meditative equipoise
beyond thoughts and words, in the context of (dbang du byas) the

159

Mi-pham, dbu ma rgyan rtsa grel, 366: don dam rnam grangs pa bden grub med par

dgag pa tsam ni bloi yul yin sgrai yul yin/ rnam grangs min pa la ni snang stong re rei
phyogs su ma lhungs pai snang stong zung jug bden gnyis zung jug spros bral dbu ma
sogs ming btags pa ni mtshon byed tsam ste mdzub mos zla ba bstan pa dang dra ba
las don du sgra rtog gi yul las shin du das pa yin no.
160 Ibid., 54: mdor na mnyam bzhag sgra dang rtog pai yul las das pai gzhal don ltar
mthar thug gi gnas tshul bden pa dbyer med kyi dbang du byas na ni bden gnyis phye mi
dgos pas di ltar snang bai chos thams cad ye nas yod med yin min sogs dgag sgrub kyi
khas len gang yang med pas ciang mi gsung bai tshul gyis lan btab pa dang dra bar
yang dag par na tha snyad thams cad las das shing brjod du med pa dang spros pa
dang bral ba dang mnyam pa nyid kyi phyir khas len med par grub kyang/ rjes thob sgra
rtog gi yul du gyur pa snang tshul gyi dbang du byas te gzhi lam bras bu sogs kyi rnam
gzhag zhig rang gis bsam zhing gzhan laang smra dgos na ni tshad ma gnyis phye ste
dgag sgrub kyi tshul la jug pa las da ba mi srid do.

75
indivisible truth that is the consummate reality, the two truths do not
need to be distinguished. Therefore, as when replying in the
manner of not saying anything at all, non-assertion is established in
the authentic [condition] free from all conventionsinexpressible,
free from constructs, equalitybecause all phenomena appear as
such from the beginning free from any assertions whatsoever, such
as negations and affirmations that are existential (med) or
predicative (min). However, in the context of the way things
appear, the objects of thoughts and words in post-meditation, if one
needs to reflect upon the presentations of the ground, path, and
fruition, etc., and also speak to others, the two valid cognitions are
divided, and it is impossible to deviate from operating by way of
affirmation and negation.
There are no assertions, positive or negative, in the context of the way
things arethe indivisible truthin meditative equipoise free from
conceptual engagement. However, in the way things appear in postmeditation, one operates by means of thoughts and words when the two
truths are divided.

Mi-pham states that as long as the aspects of

appearance and emptiness are distinct, there is conceptual apprehension

and there are assertions:161
Hence, due to the fact that (1) the aspect of an existential negation
(med dgag), which is the emptiness of true existence that merely
eliminates the object of negation, and (2) the aspect of dependent
arising separately exist as if separate and distinct, this manner also
has apprehensions and assertions.
He distinguishes the mere aspect of a negation, in which emptiness is
separate from appearance, from the indivisible truth of empty appearance,
in which emptiness is indivisible with dependent arising. He makes this
delineation in a distinction between a mere absence (med pa tsam) and
the lack of intrinsic nature (rang bzhin med pa):162
Ibid., 360-361: des na dgag bya bcad tsam gyi bden stong med dgag gi cha dang/
rten byung gi cha so sor rang sa na ma dres par yod pa lta bui phyir na lugs de la dzin
paang yod khas len kyang yod la.
162 Ibid., 91: deang las dang po pai dgag bya bkag pai med rkyang tsam zhig blo yul du
char srid kyang/ dbu mas dpyad pa gnad du song bai gang zag gis/ rang bzhin med pa
161

76
Moreover, although it is possible for a mere absence that is the
elimination of the object of negation to appear in a novices mind, a
person who has gone to the essential point through Middle Way
analysis will distinguish well between the lack of intrinsic nature and
a mere absence. Through doing so, a mode of apprehension,
distinguished by the certainty that an absence of intrinsic nature
and a dependent arising are indivisible in meaning, will be an
antidote that clears away the precipice-like extremes of
permanence and annihilation. However, as long as it is together
with an affirming or negating mode of apprehension (dzin stangs),
it will not be the nature that is free from the conceptual constructs of
the four extremes.
A mere absence is a negation, a conceptual mode of apprehension.
However, the meaning of the indivisibility of dependent arising and the
lack of intrinsic nature is beyond negation and other such (conceptual)
modes of apprehension.
In this way, Mi-pham creates a space for the absolute
transcendence of an ultimate truth that is free from conceptual modes of
apprehension and free from constructs (spros bral):163
This elimination of the object of negation, the entity, is merely a
reflected image in the mind, an other-exclusion (gzhan sel)164 that
excludes existence, and therefore does not go beyond conceptual
constructs.
Negations are relegated to the categorized ultimate because the freedom
from constructs is beyond negation and affirmation. Since emptiness as
the categorized ultimate is an object of thought and linguistic utterance, it

dang/ med pa tsam gyi khyad legs par phyed pai sgo nas/ rang bzhin med pa dang rten
byung don du dbyer med pai nges shes khyad par can gyi dzin stangs ni/ g.yang sa lta
bu rtag chad kyi mtha gnyis sel bai gnyen po yin mod/ ji srid dgag sgrub kyi dzin stangs
dang bcas pa de srid du rnam par rtog pai spros pa mtha bzhi bral bai rang bzhin ma
yin no.
163 Ibid., 362: dngos po dgag bya rnam par bcad pa di ni yod pa bsal bai gzhan sel rtog
pai gzugs brnyan tsam yin pas spros pa las ma das la.
164 Other-exclusion (anypoha) refers to how words represent meaning in the discourse
of Buddhist epistemology (prama) through negative reference.

77
is merely a relative truth: The emptiness that is an existential negation is
posited as relative in relation to the genuine ultimate which is free from all
conventions.165 Emptiness that is the uncategorized ultimate, however, is
not a negation.
In his article assessing Mi-phams position in relation to
Prsagika-Madhyamaka, Dreyfus insightfully portrays the categorized
ultimate as an issue of the limits of linguistically-bound expressions:166
Moreover, a negation exists only in opposition to an affirmation.
Hence, if emptiness were a negation, it would have to exist on the
same level as other conventional phenomena and would be just
another elaboration, a phenomenon captured by the dichotomies
such as is and is notsuch descriptions cannot be taken
literally, for they are still prisoners of the essentialist temptation to
pin down reality through determinate description. To conceive of
ultimate truth as being merely the fact that phenomena do not exist
intrinsically is to assume a negative essence and to remain captive
of binary oppositions.
Mi-pham depicts a qualitative difference between the two ultimates by
describing the categorized ultimate within the context of novices:167
The context such as the analysis whether the ultimate is within the
domain of mind or not refers to the uncategorized ultimate; the
categorized ultimate is not the expressed meaning because the
categorized ultimate is in the context of a novice progressively
engaging in emptiness from merely a conceptual perspective. As
such, it cannot roam in the territory of a mind like the nonconceptual meditative wisdom of a Sublime One, for which duality
165

Mi-pham, dbu ma rgyan rtsa grel, 332: stong nyid med dgag nyid stha snyad kun bral

gyi don dam mtshan nyid pa la ltos te kun rdzob tu bzhag gi rnam grangs pai don dam
gyi zla bo kun rdzob de ga la yin te dei dbang du na don dam yin no.
166
167

Dreyfus, Would the True Prsagika Please Stand?, 323.

Mi-pham, brgal lan nyin byed snang ba, 544: bloi spyod yul yin min dpyad pa sogs kyi

skabs su rnam grangs min pa la brjod kyi rnam grangs pai don dam la brjod don med de/
rnam grangs pai don dam ni las dang po pas stong nyid la rim gyis jug pai skabs su rtog
ngor byas pa tsam las phags pai mnyam bzhag ye shes rtogs [read rtog] bral lta bu
gnyis snang nub pai blo la kho dra ba rgyu bai sa ga la yod de/ khor los sgyur pai khri
la mu to ba dug pai dbang med pa bzhin no.

78
has subsided, like a beggar that has no power to sit on the
universal emperors throne.
The categorized ultimate concerns a perspective within a conceptual
framework. We can say that for Mi-pham, such a framework is observed
in the context of discursive (i.e., conceptual) inquiry, whereas it does not
apply in a context of the uncategorized ultimate. In this way, he portrays a
provisional nature to conceptual frameworks:168
For a conventional phenomenon, other than asserting that it is
either existent or non-existent, permanent or impermanent, etc., it is
not suitable to say that it is both or neither [existent and nonexistent]. At the time of expressing the non-assertion of the four
extremes as the reality that transcends conventions and has
completely pacified constructs, is it not extremely absurd if one
must refute the Buddhas Word [which describes a reality that
transcends conventions] by means of introductory logic primers
(bsdus tshan gyi gzhung)?
In this way, Mi-pham suggests that laws of ordinary logic are trumped by
the authority of scriptures (and the experience of meditative equipoise).
Mi-pham delineates the categorized and uncategorized ultimate
also in terms of the subject (yul can) as well as the object (yul):169

168

Mi-pham, rab gsal de nyid snang byed, 265: tha snyad kyi chos la yod paam med pa

rtag mi rtag sogs gang rung du khas len pa las/ gnyis ka dang gnyis min du smra ba mi
rung ngo/ tha snyad las das pa spros pa nye bar zhi bai gnas lugs la mtha bzhii khas
len med par brjod tshe/ bsdus tshan gyi gzhung gis sangs rgyas kyi bka sun byin dgos
pa ni ha cang yang thal ma ches sam. See also Karma Phuntsho, Miphams Dialectics
and the Debates on Emptiness, 93.
169 Ibid., 303-304: yul can gyi dbang du byas na gnyis snang log ma log gi sgo nas rnam
grangs min pa dang yin pai don dam gyi tha snyan [read snyad] kyang thad par bdag
cag gis kyang dod de yul gyi dbang du byas na spros pa nyi tshe bai spyod yul dang
bral ba dang/ spros pai spyod yul mtha dag dang bral ba de gnyis la don dam gnyis poi
khyad par du bshad cing/ yul can gyi dbang du byas na spros bral gyi don la ji lta bar
gzigs nas gnyis snang log pai yul can de la rnam grangs min pai don dam pa dang/ de
las gzhan du gnyis snang dang bcas pa la rnam grangs pai don dam gyi brda mdzad pa
yod de.

79
We also assert that in terms of the subject, whether or not dualistic
experience has been removed or not, the names categorized and
uncategorized are appropriate. In terms of the object, the
difference between the two ultimates is the freedom from a partial
domain of constructs and the freedom from the entire domain of
constructs. In terms of the subject, having seen the meaning of the
freedom from constructs as it is, the subject that has removed
dualistic experience is called the uncategorized ultimate, and
oppositely, [the subject] with dualistic experience is called the
categorized ultimate.
Mi-pham describes the two contexts of the ultimate as categorized or
uncategorized in terms of the object: (1) whether it is free from constructs
partially, or (2) free from all constructs, and in terms of the subject:
whether dualistic apprehension is present or not.

Both subjects and

objects within the realm of conceptual experience are called categorized.

The

subjects

and

objects

beyond

conceptual

experience

are

uncategorized.
Mi-pham associates discourse on the uncategorized ultimate with
meditative equipoise:170
At the time that Prsagikas explain with an emphasis on the
uncategorized ultimate, the great Middle Way free from assertions,
it is in the context based upon ultimate analysis...ascertaining all
that appears in accord with sacred domain (dam pai spyod yul) of
meditative equipoise free from constructs and without reference
(dmigs pa med pa).
Mi-pham cites the distinction between the discourses emphasizing a
context of meditative equipoise or post-meditation as the difference
between Svtantrika and Prsagika:171

170

Mi-pham, brgal lan nyin byed snang ba, 472: thal gyur pas rnam grangs min pa khas

len thams cad bral bai dbu ma chen po rtsal du bton nas bshad pai tshe don dam dpyod
pa gzhir bzhag gi dbang du byas te...ji ltar snang ba thams cad spros bral dmigs pa med
pa mnyam gzhag dam pai spyod yul dang mthun par gtan la bebs pa yin te.
171 Mi-pham, dbu ma rgyan rtsa grel, 102: dei phyir thal rang de dag mnyam bzhag bden
gnyis ro gcig pai ye shes dang/ rjes thob bden gnyis so sor byed pai shes rab la rtsal du
bton nas chad pai tshul de ltar yin par shes par bya.

80
Therefore, one should know Prsagika and Svtantrika as they
are the manners of explanation emphasizing: (1) wisdom of
meditative equipoise for which the two truths are one taste, and (2)
supreme knowledge of post-meditation for which the two truths are
distinctively discerned.
Mi-pham associates the wisdom of meditative equipoise with the manner
of explanation emphasized in Prsagika. In contrast, a post-meditative
perspective where the two truths are separately discerned is associated
with the manner of explanation emphasized in Svtantrika. He depicts the
main distinction of Prsagika and Svtantrika as follows:172
The defining characteristic (mtshan nyid) of Svtantrika is
explanation that emphasizes the categorized ultimate together with
assertions. The defining characteristic of Prsagika is explanation
that emphasizes the uncategorized ultimate free from all assertions.
In the context of positing the defining characteristics for these two,
positing a distinction such as whether or not [phenomena] are
established by their own character conventionally, and the manners
of forming evidence (gtan tshigs), etc. are merely ancillary divisions
subsumed within the defining characteristics above. Also, due to
this [emphasis on the categorized or uncategorized] itself, which
was just explained, is also the key point of:
whether or not there are assertions
whether or not there is acceptance of establishment by own
character conventionally
the manner of forming evidence establishing the lack of intrinsic
nature as a consequence or an autonomous [syllogism]
whether or not the operator ultimately is used for the object of
negation.

Ibid., 99: rnam grangs pai don dam khas len dang bcas pa de rtsal du bton nas chad
pa rang rgyud pai mtshan nyid yin la/ rnam grangs ma yin pai don dam khas len kun bral
rtsal du bton nas chad pa thal gyur ba yin pa shes par byao// di gnyis kyi mtshan nyid
jog pai skabs su tha snyad du rang mtshan gyis grub pa dod mi dod dang gtan tshigs
god tshul sogs kyi khyad par phyes te jog pa ni yan lag gi dbye ba tsam ste gong gi
mtshan nyid dir du ba yin te/ khas len yod med/ tha snyad du rang mtshan gyis grub pa
zhal gyis bzhes mi bzhes/ rang bzhin med sgrub kyi gtan tshigs thal rang du god tshul/
dgag bya la don dam gyi khyad par sbyar mi sbyar gyi gnad kyang bshad ma thag pai
tshul de nyid kyi dbang gis yin no.

172

81
Mi-pham

identifies

the

categorized

ultimate

truth

with

discourse

emphasized by Svtantrika. In contrast, he identifies this uncategorized

ultimate truth, a perspective where no position (khas len kun bral) is held,
with the discourse emphasized by Prsagika.
He describes the transcendent quality of the ultimate as

uncategorized in the discourse emphasized in Prsagika, while

maintaining an ultimate truth that can be conceptually discerned in the
discourse emphasized in Svtantrika.

Thus, discourse within the

discursive contexts of post-meditation, as expressible in terms of syllogism

and analytical inquiry, is the emphasis of the Svtantrika.
For Mi-pham, the view of Prsagika is not necessarily different
from that of the Svtantrika: If Prsagika texts only indicated the
categorized ultimate [and not the uncategorized], then among the two,
Prsagika and Svtantrika, Svtantrika would have to be accepted as a
higher viewpoint.173 Thus, the Svtantrika texts also can indicate the
uncategorized ultimate, but the emphasis is placed on the categorized
ultimate.
The Prsagika and Svtantrika respectively emphasize discourses
within the contexts of: (1) the way things are seen by wisdomthe unified
truth, and (2) the way things appear to consciousnessdistinguished as
two truths:174
Thus, the meaning of the consummate ultimate
Is without assertion, but in the way of appearance
Each of the two truths are also conventionally asserted.
However, compared with the reality of the indivisible two truths
[The two truths] are merely separate in the manner of appearance.
173

Mi-pham, brgal lan nyin byed snang ba, 576: thal gyur bai gzhung gis rnam grangs

pai don dam tsam las mi ston na/ thal rang gnyis las dgongs pa rang rgyud pa mtho bar
khas len dgos te.
174 Mi-pham, nges shes sgron me, 42: de ltar gnas lugs mthar thug don/ /khas len med
kyang snang tshul la/ /tha snyad bden gnyis so sor yang/ /khas blang yod de de gnyis
kyang/ /bden gnyis dbyer med gnas lugs la/ /ltos na so soi snang tshul tsam/ /dbyer med
don mthong ye shes la/ /ltos na tshad ma gnyis po yang/ /gnyis tshei gnas yin de gcig
gis/ /bden gnyis dzin pa mi srid phyir.

82
Compared with the wisdom that sees the indivisible meaning,
Both of the valid cognitions are also
A partial domain because
It is impossible for one to apprehend the two truths.
Mi-pham distinguishes two contexts of the Middle Way as (1) wisdom, free
from constructs in meditative equipoise, and (2) consciousness, within the
domain of thoughts and language in post-meditation:175
The uncategorized ultimate free from all assertions appears as the
object of meditative equipoise of a Sublime One, and the
categorized ultimate appears in the subsequent certainty [of postmeditation]; the former is the domain of wisdom and the latter is the
domain of consciousness...In this way, there is a great essential
point here that applies to the [difference between] the nominal
(btags pa ba) and genuine (mtshan nyid pa) ultimates, and postmeditation and meditative equipoise. If this is understood, one can
also understand the essential point of whether or not apprehension
has deconstructed (zhig).
Based on the distinction between consciousness and wisdom there are
the two ultimatesthe nominal (categorized) ultimate and the genuine
(uncategorized)and the two contexts of post-meditation and meditative
equipoise.

Mi-pham also distinguishes the contexts of wisdom and

consciousness as: the subtle (phra ba) and gross (rags), and the
great (che) and lesser (chung) Middle Way:176
The distinction I make
Differentiate between two: the Middle Way of the path and

175

Mi-pham, brgal lan nyin byed snang ba, 473: rnam grangs min pa khas len thams cad

dang bral bai don dam phags pai mnyam gzhag gi yul du snang zhing/ rnam grangs pai
don dam rjes kyi nges pa la snang la snga ma ye shes dang phyi ma rnam shes kyi
spyod yul yin..de ltar don dam btags pa ba dang mtshan nyid pa gnyis po dang mnyam
rjes sbyar rgyu dir go bai gnad chen po yod cing di go na lta bai dzin stangs zhig ma
zhig gi gnad kyang go nus.
176 Mi-pham, nges shes sgron me, 42-43: nged kyis khyad par phyes nas su/ /shan byed
lam gyi dbu ma dang/ /dngos gzhi mnyam bzhag dbu ma gnyis/ /rags dang phra baam
rgyu bras sam/ /rnam shes ye shes gnas skabs kyi/ /dbu ma che chung khyad phyes
nas.

83
The Middle Way of meditative equipoise, the main part (dngos
gzhi):
The gross and subtle, or the causal and resultant
The distinction is made between the great and lesser Middle Ways
Which are the contexts of consciousness or wisdom.
He states that the lesser Middle Way, together with assertions and the two
truths distinct, is designated as the Middle Way due to it being the cause
of the Middle Way:177
Therefore, the Middle Way together with assertions
Of the respective two truths
Is the lesser Middle Way of alternation,
Which is the designation of a cause with the name of the result.
Mi-pham states that the Middle Way with assertions is the lesser Middle
Way, in which the two truths are separate and known in alternation. The
domain of thought and language is the causal Middle Way, which is given
the name Middle Way due to being a cause of the Middle Way. The
resultant Middle Way is the meditative equipoise of wisdom.
The key distinction between Mi-phams two contexts of (nonconceptual)

meditative

wisdom

and

(conceptual)

post-meditative

consciousness is precisely how he distinguishes key themes related to the

Prsagika-Svtantrika distinction such as: (1) whether or not there are
assertions,178 (2) whether or not the operator ultimately is needed to
modify what is negated, (3) whether or not commonly appearing objects
are accepted (chos can mthun mong bar snang ba),179 (4) whether or not
Ibid., 47: de phyir bden gnyis so so yi/ /khas len dang bcas dbu ma de/ /bras ming
rgyu la btags pa yi/ /res jog dbu ma chung ngu yin.
178 Mi-pham, dbu ma rgyan rtsa grel, 99, opt. cit.
179 Mi-pham states: In the perspective of authentic visiona perspective like the sight of
the absence of floating hairs for which nothing at all is foundthere are no commonly
177

appearing objects; and due to that essential point, an operator [e.g., ultimately] does not
need to be applied to the object of negation. Mi-pham, dam chos dogs sel, 503: yang

dag pai gzigs ngor ci yang ma rnyed pa skra shad med pai mthong ba lta bui ngor chos
can mthun snang med pa dang/ gnad de las dgag bya la khyad par sbyar mi dgos pa.
See also Mi-pham, dam chos dogs sel, 502.

84
autonomous syllogisms are appropriate in the ascertainment of the
ultimate,180 and (5) whether or not apprehension (dzin stangs) is present
in the ascertainment of the ultimate.181 Within the realm of thought and
language: there are assertions, the operator ultimately is applied when
negating (conventionally existent) phenomena, there are commonly
appearing objects, and autonomous syllogisms and apprehension can be
used to ascertain the (categorized) ultimate.
Mi-pham describes the style of explanation in Svtantrika as
gradual and the Prsagika as sudden; otherwise, he says that they have
the same consummate viewpoint (dgongs pa):182
Other than the manner of explaining the meaning of the freedom
from constructs gradually or instantaneously, in the end, [both
Svtantrika and Prsagika] have the same viewpointthat very
freedom from constructs.
He claims that the unique object of negation of the Prsagika is the
perception of the two truths as distinct, and that there is nothing more to
be developed in Prsagika beyond that:183
In this way, one should know that the Prsagikas unique object of
negation is the aspect of apprehending the two truths as distinct
because if the Svtantrikas were free from this object of negation of
conceiving the two truths as distinct, then other than that view,
there would not be the slightest thing to develop for even the
Prsagikas, etc.
Mi-pham depicts the Svtantrikas as emphasizing an approach to
emptiness when the two truths remain distinct, a context of the conceptual

Mi-pham, dbu ma rgyan rtsa grel, 99, opt. cit.

181 Mi-pham, brgal lan nyin byed snang ba, 473, opt. cit.
182 Mi-pham, rab gsal de nyid snang byed, 253: spros bral gyi don rim dang cig car gyi
chad tshul tsam las mthar thug spros bral nyid du dgongs pa gcig par dod pas.
183 Mi-pham, dbu ma rgyan rtsa grel, 97: de ltar bden gnyis so sor zhen pai cha de thal
180

gyur bai dgag bya thun mong ma yin pa yin te/ gal te rang rgyud pa dag bden gnyis so
sor zhen pai dgag bya dang bral bar gyur na/ thal gyur ba sogs laang lta ba de las
skyed cung zad kyang don rgyu med par shes par bya ste.

85
mind and language. Discourse on the categorized ultimate, in which the
two truths are distinct, is the emphasis of the Svntantrika.184
Prsangikas emphasize the discourse of the uncategorized
ultimate, yet without making a distinction between the categorized and
uncategorized ultimate. Mi-pham states:185
One should know that in this context of Prsagika, since the
emphasis is on the great Middle Way which is a unity and free from
constructs, there is no two-fold distinction of the categorized and
uncategorized ultimates.
Thus, oddly enough, we are confronted with a paradox that the defining
characteristic of Prsagika, explanation with an emphasis on the noncategorized ultimate, is based on a distinction of a non-categorized
ultimate that the Prsagikas themselves do not accept in such discourse!
In any case, such distinctions fall within the discursive contexts of postmeditation, whereas there are no distinctions in the wisdom of meditative
equipoise.
Mi-pham primarily delineates the Prsagika in terms of discourse
on the ultimate.

He also states that the valid establishment of

conventionally existent phenomena is an implication of the conception of

the two truths as distinct for Svtantrikas:186
Due to the essential point that at the time Svtantrikas explain with
an emphasis on the categorized ultimate, accepting the ultimate as
This is a difference between Mi-phams and Long-chen-pas depictions of Prsagika,
as Khen-po Nam-drl points out, because at the time of debate, Long-chen-pa says that
the Prsagikas have no assertions, yet Mi-pham says that there are assertions of
conventional existence and ultimate non-existence in that (discursive) context. Khen-po
Nam-drl, nges shes sgron me tape 17a.
185 Mi-pham, sher grel ke ta ka, 9: thal gyur bai skabs dir zung jug spros pa dang bral
184

bai dbu ma chen po nyid rtsal du don pas dii lugs la rnam grangs dang rnam grangs
min pai don dam gnyis su dbye ba med par shes par byao.
186 Mi-pham, brgal lan nyin nyed snang ba, 472: rang rgyud pas rnam grangs pai don
dam rtsal du bton nas chad pai skabs su don dam bden stong tsam la bzhed pa dang/
tha snyad tshad grub bzhed pai gnad kyis khas len dang bcas pai dbu ma rjes kyi nges
pa dang mthun par gtan la phab pa yin la.

86
a mere emptiness of true existence and the conventional as validly
established (tha snyad tshad grub), they ascertain the Middle Way
in accordance with post[-meditation] certainty together with
assertions.
As long as the conventional and ultimate perspectives remain distinct,
conventional phenomena are established by valid cognition. However, Mipham rejects the view that an assertion that conventional phenomena are
established from their own side (rang ngos nas grub pa) entails that
conventional

phenomena

are

truly

established

(bden

grub)

for

Svtantrikas.187 He says that true establishment is determined only from

the perspective of ultimate analysis:188
At the time of ultimate analysis, if even the slightest phenomenon is
found to be established from its own side, it would be truly
established. The Svtantrikas also do not accept anything to be
established from its own side from the perspective of ultimate
analysis; if they did, they would not be suitable to be Proponents of
the Middle Way, nor would they possess the path of liberation.
Although an object may appear to be established by its own
essence from the perspective of conventional analysis, by this how
would it be truly established? Conventions need to be validly

187

Such a view is held in the Ge-luk tradition. Tsong-kha-pa argues that Prsagikas are

distinct from Svtantrika due to the rejection of inherent existence conventionally: The
Svtantrika-Madhyamaka and the Prsagika-Madhyamaka are not distinguished by
means of whether or not the operator ultimately is applied to the object of negation;
rather, there is a difference in whether or nor they negate the nature of essential
establishment conventionally. Tsong-kha-pa, lam rim chen mo, 668-669: des na dbu ma

rang rgyud pa dang thal gyur ba gnyis dgag bya la don dam gyi khyad par sbyar mi
sbyar gyi sgo nas mi phyed kyang rang gi ngo bos grub pai rang bzhin tha snyad du gog
mi gog gi khyad par yod pas.
188 Mi-pham, brgal lan nyin byed snang ba, 474-475: don dam dpyod pas dpyad pai tshe
yul rang ngos nas grub pa rdul tsam rnyed naang de bden grub du gyur mod/ don dam
dpyod pai ngor rang ngos nas grub pa ni rang rgyud pas kyang khas mi len la len na dbu
ma par mi rung zhing thar bai lam yang de la med par gyur ro/ tha snyad dpyod pai ngor
yul rang gi ngo bos grub par snang yang des yul de bden grub du ga la gyur te tha snyad
tshad mas grub pa thad dgos la/ de tha snyad dpyod byed kyi ngor yang ma grub na
gang duang grub par mi gyur ro.

87
established; if they were not established even from the perspective
of conventional analysis, they would never be established.
Mi-pham argues that although an object may appear to be established by
its own essence from the perspective of conventional analysis, this does
not entail that it is truly established (from the perspective of either
conventional or ultimate analysis).
Mi-pham asserts that Svtantrikas accept conventional production
that is established by valid cognition and that such production is not
invalidated by ultimate valid cognition:189
This conventional production is accepted to be validly established
(tshad grub) by Svtantrikas, and this is not invalidated [for them]
even by ultimate analysis because through holding onto the
negation of ultimate production, they think that if there were no
production conventionally, then conventional truth would be nonexistent. When Prsagikas examine by means of ultimate
analysis, there is nothing at all that withstands analysis.
Nothing withstands Prsagika analysis. Thus, conventional production
does not even exist conventionally when ascertaining the uncategorized
ultimate where there is no dichotomy of conventional and ultimate
perspectives apprehending the two truths as distinct. Mi-pham states:190
In this way, upon analysis through the manner of the four extremes,
the reasoning that ascertains that production not only does not exist
ultimately, but does not exist even conventionally, ascertains the
primordially non-arising and unceasing nature of these dependently

189

Mi-pham, rab gsal de nyid snang byed, 314: tha snyad kyi skye ba di rang rgyud pas

tshad grub tu dod cing don dam dpyod pas dpyad kyang de la gnod pa med de/ don dam
par skye ba gog pao zhes bzung nas tha snyad du skye ba med na tha snyad bden pa
med par gyur ro snyam du dgongs pao/ thal gyur bas don dam dpyod pas dpyad na
dpyad bzod du yod pa gang yang med do.
190 Ibid., 306-307: de ltar mtha bzhii tshul gyis dpyad na skye ba ni don dam par ma zad/
tha snyad du yang med par gtan la phab pai rigs pa des di ltar rten byung gi snang ba
bslu med du yod pa di rnams ye nas skye ba dang gag pa med pai rang bzhin du gtan
la phab pa yin pas/ rnam grangs pai bden med tsam las das te rnam grangs min pai
don dam bden gnyis dbyer med spros bral chos kyi dbyings nyid du bstan pa yin no.

88
arisen appearances that incontrovertibly exist in this way.
Therefore, the uncategorized ultimate, beyond the mere absence of
true existence that is the categorized [ultimate], is indicated as the
indivisibility of the two truthsthe freedom from constructswhich
is the expanse of phenomena itself.
The reason for not accepting the existence of production even
conventionally is due to the context of indicating the uncategorized
ultimate; the negation of production is unqualified as either ultimate or
conventional because there is no such distinction between the two truths
in the expanse of phenomena itselfthe uncategorized ultimate.
Pd-pa Tulku explains that negating appearances while dividing the
two truths is an over-extension of the object of negation. However, this is
not the case when the two truths are not divided:191
If having divided the two truths one also negates appearance, there
also ensues the fault of the over-pervasion (khyab ches bai skyon)
of the object of negation. However, due to the essential point of not
dividing the two truths, there is not only no ensuing fault of the overpervasion of the object of negation, but it is this which hits the
essential point that evokes the genuine indivisibility of the two
truths.
When the two truths are not divided, there is no fault of over-pervasion
when negating appearance.
Mi-pham does not assert the necessity of a difference between
Svtantrika and Prsagika on the conventional level.192 Rather, he

191

Pd-pa Tulku, stong thun gnad kyi zin thun, 7.3-7.4: bden gnyis phyed te snang ba

yang bkag na/ dgag bya khyab ches bai skyon jug kyang bden gnyis ma phyes pai gnad
kyi[s] dgag bya khyab ches pai skyon mi jug pa ma zad bden gnyis dbyer med mtshan
nyid pa ong bai gnad di thug.
Mi-phams position resembles Go-ram-pa, who states explicitly that the PrsagikaSvtantrika distinction is not made concerning the presentation of conventional truth: In
192

the presentation of the conventional, Prsagika and Svtantrika are not distinguished
because Prsagikas also accept autonomous reasons in the presentation of the
conventional. Go-ram-pa, lta bai shan byed, 109: thad snyad kyi rnam bzhag la/ thal

rang gi khyad par byed pa ni min te/ tha snyad kyi rnam bzhag la rang rgyud kyi gtan
tshigs thal gyur ba rnams kyis kyang khas len pai phyir te.

89
emphasizes the compatibility of the Svtantrika and Prsagika
discourses.193 Furthermore, he depicts Prsagika as an approach similar
to the manner of ascertaining primordial purity (ka dag) in the Great
Perfection:194
The viewpoint of Candrakrtithe profound view in which the
fictional marks (rdzun ris) of convention dissolve into the expanse
since all these appearances are pure just as they areis similar to
the manner of ascertaining primordial purity in the scriptures of the
Great Perfection.
He also shows a parallel between the emptiness of Prsagika and
primordial purity in the Great Perfection:195
To conclusively settle upon (bdar sha chod pa) primordial purity
One needs to perfect the view of Prsangika;
From only the aspect of being free from constructs
The two196 are said to not be distinct.
Mi-pham does not develop a Prsagika account of conventional reality in the way
that he does the Yogcra position. His lack of development of a Prsagika position on
conventional reality can be seen as a reflection of his commitment to Yogcra.
However, rather than this fact being necessarily due to a preference for Yogcra over
Prsagika, I think that it may concern the fact that his delineation of Prsagika is
193

antithetical to the foundationalist and discursive presumptions that system-building

discourses such as Yogcra involve. Prsagika can allay the problems of Mind-Onlys
idealist position, and other such rational explanations of reality, by simply rejecting the
foundationalist premises of discursive practices as such. An implication of this
interpretation is that in order to engage in a systematic description of conventional reality,
one must take on a non-Prsangika (e.g., Svtantrika, Yogcra, etc.) position.
194 Mi-pham, dbu ma rgyan rtsa grel, 76: dpal ldan zla bai dgongs pa snang ba di kun

thad kar rang sar dag pas tha snyad kyi rdzun ris dbyings su yal bai zab moi lta ba ni/
rdzogs chen gyi gzhung nas ka dag gtan la bebs tshul dang mtshungs.
195 Mi-pham, nges shes sgron me, 19: ka dag bdar sha chod pa la/ /thal gyur lta ba mthar
phyin dgos/ /spros bral tsam gyi cha nas ni/ /de gnyis khyad par med do gsungs.
The primordial purity of the Great Perfection and the emptiness of the Prsangika
freedom from constructs. Khen-po Kn-pal states: It is said that there is not the slightest
distinction between the two: (1) primordial purity of the Great Perfection and (2) the
freedom from constructs, which is the emptiness of the Prsagika, from the aspect of
the expanse of phenomenas being empty of essence. Khen-po Kn-pal, blo gros snang
196

bai sgo byed, 129: rdzogs chen ka dag dang thal gyur bai stong pa nyid spros bral de

90

We will now turn to Mi-phams description of a progressive approach to

understanding the Middle Way.

Dialectical Ascent
Mi-pham explains that it is difficult for ordinary beings to see the
ultimate truth instantaneously, and describes a study and contemplation
approach as a manner to progressively negate the four extremes:197
Through a direct manner (car phog tshul) of instantaneously
negating
The constructs of the four extremes,
It is difficult for ordinary beings
To see the innate expanse that transcends the mind.
Therefore, negating the constructs of the four extremes
In alternation is the way of the view of study and contemplation.
In contrast to the instantaneous approach that characterizes the
Prsagika method and the Great Perfection, Mi-pham presents a gradual
approach in the way of study and contemplation.
Mi-pham outlines a process of those who progressively engage in
the meaning of non-conceptuality (rnam par mi rtog pai don la rim gyis

jug pa dag) in a four-fold scheme that he calls the four stages of the
dawning of the Middle Way (dbu mai char rim bzhi): empty (stong),
unity (zung jug), freedom from constructs (spros bral), equality
(mnyam pa nyid).198 He states that individuals cannot reach an
gnyis la khyad par ci yang med do zhes yul chos kyi dbyings ngo bos stong pai cha nas
gsungs so. The underlined text, printed in the edition, delineates Mi-phams words in the
nges shes sgron me which Khen-po Kn-pal gives an interlinear commentary upon.
197 Mi-pham, nges shes sgron me, 17: mtha bzhii spros pa cig car du/ /khegs pa blo das
gnyug mai dbyings/ /so soi skye boi sa nyid na/ /car phog tshul gyis mthong dka bas/
/mtha bzhii spros pa res jog tu/ /gog pa thos bsam lta bai lugs.
198 Mi-pham, dbu ma rgyan rtsa grel, 408-410; 95. The text in the dbu ma rgyan rtsa
grel is nearly verbatim as the text in the spyi don od gsal snying po, 461-462. See also
Yn-tan-gya-mtsho (yon tan rgya mtsho, fl. 19th c.), yon tan rin po chei mdzod kyi grel pa
bden gnyis gsal byed zla bai sgron ma) vol. 3, 80.1-80.5. See also Karma Phuntsho,
Miphams Dialectics and the Debates on Emptiness, 150.

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understanding of the higher stages until they have ascertained the former
stages: These four are such that in dependence upon the former, the
manner of the latter is engaged; without gaining certainty in the former,
one will not ascertain the latter.199
Mi-pham says that the first stage, empty, is arrived at by a novice
who analyzes objects, such as pots, in terms of whether they are singular
or plural, etc. When a phenomenon cannot be found when analyzed, it is
discovered that the phenomenon is not establishedempty.

As

phenomena are analyzed, they are not found, so they are empty;
however, phenomena incontrovertibly appear from the perspective of nonanalysis:200
When a novice properly investigates by means of the reasons
which establish emptiness, such as [the reason of] one and many,
through contemplating the meaning of the non-established pot and
so forth, he thinks that the abiding reality is non-establishment itself
because although existing in the perspective of non-analysis,
nothing is found when analyzed. Therefore, in a manner alternating
appearance and emptiness, the empty quality (stong pai rnam pa)
dawns.
At the stage of empty, Mi-pham states that the non-establishment of
apparent phenomena is thought to be the mode of subsistence, and one
alternates between the two modalities of appearance (when not analyzing)
and emptiness (when analyzing).
The next phase, unity, is understood when the non-existence of
phenomena is itself recognized as a mere imputation, not truly established

199

Mi-pham, spyi don od gsal snying po, 462: de bzhi po snga ma snga ma la brten nas

phyi ma phyi mai tshul la jug gi/ snga ma la nges par ma rnyed bar phyi ma gtan la pheb
pa mi byung ngo.
200 Ibid., 461: las dang po bas gcig du bral sogs stong nyid sgrub pai rigs pa rnams kyis
tshul bzhin brtags tshe/ bum sogs ma grub pai don la bsams nas/ ma dpyad pai ngor
yod kyang dpyad na mi rnyed pai phyir/ ma grub pa nyid gnas lugs so snyam pas snang
stong res jog gi tshul du stong pai rnam pa zhig char.

92
in reality.

One gains certainty that while appearing, phenomena are

empty, and while empty, they appear:201

By contemplating that the non-existence of phenomena also is just
a mere imputation not actually established, or the manner that
things appear while empty from the beginning, one generates the
distinctive certainty that while empty, they appear and while
appearing, are emptylike [a reflection of] the moon in water. At
that time, the absence of intrinsic nature and dependent arising
dawn as non-contradictorythe understanding of unity (zung jug
tu go ba).
At the stage of unity, the non-contraction of the empty nature of
phenomena and their dependent arising is the understanding of unity.
One comes to understand that from the beginning, appearances of
phenomena are inseparable from their emptinesses.
Mi-pham states that in the next phase, freedom from constructs,
one gains certainty in the manner that the twothe lack of intrinsic nature
and the dependent arisingare not essentially different. A freedom from
constructs dawns as the natural deconstruction (rang sar zhig) of
conceptual cognitions that distinctively apprehend emptiness as a
negation, and phenomena as the basis of negation:202
By generating certainty in the manner that the two, the lack of
inherent nature and dependent arising, although different in the
manner of expression by two phrases, are indivisible without the
slightest essential differencethe thought that apprehends
appearance as the basis of negation, which is affixed with an object
of negation that is eliminated, naturally deconstructs; there dawns
Ibid., 461: dei tshe dei med pa nyid kyang btags pa tsam las don la ma grub paam/
ye nas stong bzhin du snang ba yin pai tshul la bsam pas chu zla ltar snang bzhin stong
la stong bzhin snang bai nges pa khyad par can skye ste/ dei tshe rang bzhin med pa
dang rten byung gal med du shar baam zung jug tu go ba zhes bya.
202 Ibid., 461: rang bzhin med pa dang rten byung de gnyis tshig gis brjod tshul la tha dad
yod kyang ngo ba la tha dad cung zad med par dbyer med pai tshul la nges shes bskyed
pas/ dgag gzhi snang ba dang dgag bya bcad pa sbyar nas dzin pai rnam rtog rang sar
zhig ste/ dgag sgrub bsal bzhag med par sor bzhag tu nus pa lta bui spros bral gyi rnam
par char.
201

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the qualities of a freedom from constructs (spos bral gyi rnam par
char), such as the ability to remain naturally free from negation and
affirmation, adding and removing.
At the stage of freedom from constructs, the lack of intrinsic nature and
dependent arising are known to be not essentially different; other than
different ways of expression,203 they are indivisible.
The last stage is equality. Through becoming accustomed to a
freedom from constructs, all notions of duality become no longer present
as impinging upon the mind. Mi-pham states:204
Through becoming familiar with such a freedom of constructs again
and again, all aspects of dualistic phenomena, in which one
observes a domain of partiality (ris chad kyi dmigs pai spyod yul)
concerning particular objects (chos can) and their distinctive
suchnesses (chos nyid), are purified. Through the generation of
the distinctive certainty in the nature of all phenomena as equality,
one reaches completion.
The fourth stage, equality, is thus an all-encompassing eradication of
dualistic notions.
In contrast to the analytical approach of the way of the view of
study and contemplation (thos bsam bta bai lugs), another method, a
quintessential instructions approach,205 does not require much analysis.

Ibid., 461: tshig gi brjod tshul la tha dad yod kyang ngo bo la tha dad cung zad med.
Mi-pham also depicts emptiness and appearance as conceptually distinctessentially
the same with different contradistinctions (ngo bo gcig [la] ldog pa tha dad): Both
appearance and emptinesstogether present, together absentare asserted as the
same entity, divisible into different contradistinctions. Mi-pham, nges shes sgron me, 27:

203

snang dang stong pa di gnyis po/ /yod mnyam med mnyam ngo bo gcig/ /ldog pa tha dad
dbye bar dod.
204 Mi-pham, spyi don od gsal snying po, 462: de drai spros bral la yang nas yang du
goms pas/ chos can re re ba la ltos pai chos nyid so so lta bui ris chad kyi dmigs pai
spyod yul gnyis chos kyi rnam pa thams cad dag nas chos thams cad rang bzhin mnyam
pa nyid la nges shes khyad par can skye bas mthar phyin to.
Mi-pham describes two methods of realization: (1) through certainty generated
through the explanations of one who sees the definitive meaning, a scholar with
205

extensive study, contemplation, and meditation, or (2) through having the nature of mind

94
Certain people of sharp faculties are able to instantly gain certainty in the
meaning of the equality of emptiness and appearance by engaging in
simple analysis, such as observing that the mind does not arrive from
anywhere, abide in someplace, or go anywhere:206
Some people of sharp faculties, through analyzing the mind [in
terms of] only arising, abiding, and going, instantly generate
certainty in the meaning of the equality of appearance and
emptiness through the sole power of experiencing the nature of the
three gates of liberation, which is the emptiness of the three
cause, essence, and effect.
This is an analysis often found in meditation instructional manuals (khrid

yig); such contemplations also may involve searching for the mind in terms
of shape, form, etc. However, Mi-pham is critical of what he sees as
misappropriations of such an uncritical approach. He states:207
Since the mind has no form
It is impossible for anybody to see the mind as having color, etc.
It is a mistake to think that one has recognized emptiness
By merely not seeing the mind to have color.
In this, we can see how a distinction can be made between uncritical
views: an uncritical view that has not sufficiently engaged analysis (pre-

pointed out well by a teacher, even without great knowledge of training in study and
reflection, who has experience in the quintessential instructions. See gnyug sems book 1
(gnyug sems od gsal bai don rgyal ba rig dzin brgyud pai lung bzhin brjod pa rdo rje
snying po), Mi-phams Collected Works (sde dge ed.), vol. 24, 355.3-356.2. Khen-po
Nam-drl contrasts the quintessential instructions approach (man ngag lugs) with the
studying and contemplation approach (thos bsam lugs).
206 Mi-pham, spyi don od gsal snying po, 461: dbang rnon kha cig sems la byung gnas

gro gsum tsam dpyad pas rgyu bras ngo bo nyid gsum gyis stong pai rnam thar sgo
gsum gyi rang bzhin du myong bai stobs tsam las snang stong mnyam nyid kyi don la
gcig car du nges pa skye baang yod mod. See also Yn-tan-gya-mtsho, yon tan rin po
chei mdzod kyi grel pa bden gnyis gsal byed zla bai sgron ma, vol. 3, 79.6-80.1.
207 Mi-pham, nges shes sgron me, 14: sems ni gzugs can ma yin pas/ /sus kyang mdog
sogs mthong mi srid/ /ma mthong tsam la stong pa nyid/ /ngo phrod snyam na shin tu
gol.

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critical), and an uncritical view that has (post-critical). Mi-pham makes
such a distinction regarding the meaning of not apprehending anything
(cir yang mi dzin):208
At the time of sustaining the actual view
Some people say, Do not apprehend anything.
The meaning of Do not apprehend anything
Is two-fold: (1) good understanding and (2) misconception.
The first is a freedom from the constructs of the four extremes,
In the presence of a Sublime Ones wisdom
Since nothing at all remains
Apprehension naturally subsides
Like seeing the open, clear sky.
The second is oblivion, the tradition of Hva-shang.
By resting blankly without analysis
With no clarity-aspect of special insight,
One remains like an ordinary stone at the bottom of the ocean.
For example like the statement nothing at all
For a Proponent of the Middle Way seeing absence
And one aspiring to an absence that is an absence of form,
Although in mere words these are the same,
The meanings are as different as the earth and space.
Mi-pham delineates two meanings for not apprehending anything in a
similar way that he makes a distinction between the apparent sameness of
two uncritical views. While they resemble each other due to the fact that
they sound the same, he depicts an important and radical difference.
Furthermore, he states that the bad view of not apprehending anything
(cir yang mi dzin lta ngan pa) does not eliminate obscurations:209
208

Ibid., 13: lta bai dngos gzhi skyong bai dus/ /kha cig ci yang mi dzin zer/ /cir yang mi

dzin zhes pai don/ /legs par rtogs dang log rtog gnyis/ /dang po mtha bzhii spros bral
te/ /phags pai ye shes kyi dun na/ /gang yang gnas pa med mthong bas/ /dzin stangs
ngang gis zhig pa ste/ /stong gsal mkha la lta dang mtshungs/ /gnyis pa dran med hva
shang lugs/ /ma dpyad tse ner bzhag pa yis/ /lhag mthong gsal bai cha med par/ /mtsho
gting rdo bzhin tha mal gnas/ /dper na ci yang med ces pa/ /dbu mas med par mthong ba
dang/ /gzugs med med par mos pa ltar/ /tshig tsam mtshungs pa di dag kyang/ /don la mi
mtshungs gnam sa bzhin.
209 Ibid., 17: cir yang mi dzin lta ngan la/ /dngos po cir yang ma grub pai/ /nges shes
skye ba ga la yod/ /des na sgrib pa spong mi nus/ /de phyir di gnyis khyad par yang/ /du

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How can the bad view of not apprehending anything
Generate certainty in the non-establishment of any entity?
That [bad view of not apprehending anything] cannot abandon
obscurations.
Therefore, the difference between these two also
Is known through the manner of the development of abandonment
and realization,
As fire [is known] through the evidence of smoke.
Since ordinary idiot meditation (blun sgom tha mal pa)
Is not a cause for abandonment and realization,
It is an obstacle to the cultivation of virtue.
He states that a distinction between the correct view and ordinary idiot
meditation can be seen in the fruits of practicethe development of
abandonment and realization. Mi-pham consistently emphasizes such a
distinction and affirms a central place of certainty (nges shes) induced by
reasoned analysis (rigs pas rnam dpyod). He states:210
One may think, It is not suitable to grasp at any extreme! And
throw away the certainty induced by reasoned investigation that is
the source of the nectar of profound emptiness, the antidote for all
diseases within existence. Thinking that it is not suitable to engage
the mind, when you dwell as in a thick darkness of oblivion (dran
med), it is difficult to view, see, conceive, or experience this
profound truth (chos).
Mi-pham also stresses the importance of reason in distinguishing the
meanings of such terms as freedom from constructs (spros bral) in
Buddhism, from the same terms used by non-Buddhists. He states:211

bai rtags las me bzhin du/ /spang rtogs bog skyed tshul las shes/ /gang phyir blun sgom
tha mal pa/ /spangs dang rtogs pai rgyu min la/ /yon tan skye pai gegs yin phyir.
210 Mi-pham, dbu ma rgyan rtsa grel, 88: mtha gang duang zhen mi rung ngo zhes
smras na/ srid pai rims nad mtha dag gi gnyen po stong nyid zab moi bdud rtsii byung
gnas rigs pai rnam dpyod gyis drangs pai nges shes ni bor te/ ji yang yid la byas na mi
rung ngo snyam du dran med mun pai thibs por zhugs pa de lta bus na/ chos zab mo di
lta zhing mthong ba rtog cing nyams su myong dka ba yin te.
211 Ibid., 471-472: des na tshig tsam la sgyu ma lta bu dang/ dngos po med pa dang/
spros bral sogs zer yang/ rigs pas drangs pai nges shes phu thag chod pai sgo nas nyi

97
Therefore, although [we share] the mere words such as illusory,
non-entity, freedom from constructs, it does not help to not know
the manner that the Buddhist emptiness is superior to the limited
emptiness of non-Buddhists through a firm conclusion (phu thag
chod) with certainty induced by reason...Although the words may
be similar, Buddhists and non-Buddhists cannot be separated by
words; the difference in the profound essential point is like the earth
and space.
Moreover, Mi-pham says that statements that Buddhists do not need
reasoned analysis are the words of a demon:212
The Buddha...taught the mode of subsistence of entities without
error and according to fact. His followers also need to ascertain the
way it is by reason (rigs pas); this is the unerring tradition of
kya[-muni]. However, saying that in the inner science [of
Buddhism] (nang rig pa la) one does not need reasoned analysis in
general, and valid cognition, etc. in particular, is a frightful spell of a
demon that obstructs the practice of the excellence to be
experienced, which is the valid cognition of the Buddhas Word
purified by the three analyses (dpyad pa gsum gyis dag pa).213
We saw above how Mi-pham represents the (uncategorized) ultimate truth
as transcending linguistic and conceptual structures of thought; however,

tshe bai stong pa mu stegs rnams kyi bla na phags pai de bzhin gshegs pai stong pa
nyid kyi tshul ma shes na ciang mi phan la...phyi nang gi grub mtha di tshig tsam gyi
phye mi nus par zab moi gnad gnam sa ltar mi mtshungs pa yod.
212 Mi-pham, dbu ma rgyan rtsa grel, 347: sangs rgyas...dngos poi gnas tshul ma nor bar
don bzhin bstan pa yin la/ rjes jug rnams kyis kyang de bzhin rigs pas gtan la phab dgos
pa ni shkyai ring lugs ma nor ba yin gyi/ spyir rigs pas dpyad pa dang/ khyad par du
tshad ma sogs nang rig pa la mi mkho zhes zer ba ni/ dpyad pa gsum gyis dag pai sangs
rgyas kyi bka tshad mai myang bya phun sum tshogs pa nyams su bstar ba la bar du
gcod pai bdud kyi gsang tshig rngam chen po ste.
This refers to the process of determining the validity of a scripture. The three
analyses are: (1) that the demonstration of what is evident (mngon gyur) is not
invalidated by direct perception (mngon sum), (2) that the demonstration of what is
hidden (lkog gyur) is not invalidated by inference (rjes dpag), and (3) that the
demonstration of what is extremely hidden (shin tu lkog gyur) is not contradicted
213

(internally) by previous or later statements.

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valid cognition, reasoned analysis, and a conceptual understanding of the
ultimate also plays an important role for Mi-pham:214
The genuine ultimate is not merely an absence, but is free from the
constructs of the four extremes. However, there is no method to
realize the great ultimate without the categorized ultimate, which is
the mere absence of a true existence of entities that abides as an
other-exclusion (gzhan sel)the object of a conceptual mind. The
term ultimate is used because it is the method, or cause, of
realizing that [genuine ultimate].
He advocates a conceptual approach to the ultimate as a means to
transcend conceptuality.

Furthermore, he states that as long as

experience remains as a dualistic participation of an internal subject with

external objects, the incontrovertible law of causality will be at work
accordingly:215
Someone may think, If all phenomena are unreal (mi bden pa) and
like an illusion, then it is not reasonable to train in even the path,
generosity, etc. It would be like toiling to buy an illusory horse,
what is the use?!... [In response] The appearing factor of sasra
and nirva is incontrovertible due to the power of dependent
arising. Therefore, until the [dualistic] engagement of subject and
object has dissolved into the expanse, for that long, these
appearances are uninterrupted and are harmful or helpful to
sentient beings.
Thus, the unreality of phenomena does not entail a lack of causality.

214

Mi-pham, dbu ma rgyan rtsa grel, 360: don dam mtshan nyid pa ni med rkyang tsam

ma yin te/ mtha bzhii spros bral yin naang gzhan sel gyi rtog pai bloi yul na gnas pai
dngos poi bden med tsam po ba rnam grangs pai don dam di med na don dam chen po
rtogs pai thabs med la/ de rtogs byed kyi thabs sam rgyu yin cing de la gtogs pa yin pas
don dam zhes brda sbyar ba yin te.
215 Mi-pham, sher grel ke ta ka, 15-16: chos thams cad mi bden pa sgyu ma lta bu yin na
sbyin sogs lam laang slob par mi rigs te sgyu mai rta nyo bai ngal ba lta bu dis ci bya
zhe na/...khor das kyi snang cha rgyu ma lta bu ni rten brel bai dbang gis bslu med du
yod pa des na ji srid gzung dzin gyi jug pa dbyings su ma nub kyi bar du sems can
rnams la snang ba di rgyun mi chad cing phan gnod byed pa yin pas.

99
In Mi-phams work, we can see a dialectical216 tension between
two paths: (1) a conceptual, or gradual, path of reason and (2) a nonconceptual path of wisdom. These two paths reflect a distinction between:
(1) consciousness, a realm of discursive inquiry within a conceptual
framework and (2) wisdom, a realm beyond concepts. Mi-pham brings
these seemingly incompatible discourses into a conversation that is a
theme that runs throughout his interpretation.

Such a dialectic is a

prominent feature of Mi-phams Nying-ma Buddhism.

Conclusion
Mi-phams discussion of Yogcra and Prsagika draws upon a
distinction between (non-conceptual) wisdom and (conceptual) mind.
Yogcra plays an important role in Mi-phams depiction of the ultimate
truth as wisdoms authentic experience (appearance in accord with the
mode of subsistence), but he affirms that the manner of Prsagika is in
accord with ascertaining primordial purity in the Great Perfection, the
pinnacle of his own Nying-ma tradition. Prsagika discourse emphasizes

216

A unique quality of what I find to be Mi-phams use of a dialectic is that it seems to

fall between: (1) a Hegelian dialectic, in which there is a synthesis in a final resolution
(closure), and (2) a Ricoeurian or Derridian dialectic, where the two seemingly opposed
sides of the dialectic are not resolved and the dialectical tension remains (open-ended).
Mi-phams dialectic is closed in that he affirms a monistic unity as the ontological ground
of existence; however, it is open in that he maintains contexts for the deconstruction of
reified notions of such a ground. Furthermore, an open-ended quality of his dialectic is
present due to the fact that he contextualizes his affirmations and denials of reality within
particular perspectives of discourse; hence, he does not affirm only one mode of
discourse as the sole representation of truth. In this way, we can see a unique dialectic
in Mi-phams system that accommodates a certain level of open-ended dialectical inquiry
within the closure of an ultimately indivisible ground. For a discussion of Ricoeurs
dialectic, see Paul Ricoeur, Language and Discourse and Explanation and
Understanding, published in Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of
Meaning (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1976), 1-23; 71-95. For a
defense of the word dialectic to describe a central part of Tibetan philosophical praxis,
see Kenneth Liberman, Dialectical Practice in Tibetan Philosophical Culture (Lanham,
MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), 58-59.

100
the uncategorized ultimate, a discourse which accords with the experience
of wisdoms meditative equipoise, the unified truth of the two truths not
conceived as separate.

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Chapter 3: The Present Absence

Introduction
Emptiness is a central topic in Mahyna Buddhism and is also an
extremely complex one.

This chapter addresses further Mi-phams

interpretation of emptiness, which is a central component within his

representation of Buddha-nature.

We will discuss two aspects of

emptiness: (1) as a quality and (2) as a substrate of reality. We will also

explore a third meaning of emptiness in Mi-phams description: as the
unity of appearance and emptiness.
In the last chapter we discussed the categorized ultimate,
emptiness as a conceived absence of true existence.

In the case of

emptiness that is the categorized ultimate, the empty aspect is conceived

as a quality of phenomena. As such, a phenomenon (chos) is the emptyground (stong gzhi), or locus of suchness (chos nyid). Another way such
emptiness can be conceived is as a lack of something in something else
emptiness as an absence in some location.

As such, the location of

absence is empty of something that does not exist there, in which the
existing substrate becomes an empty-ground, or locus of suchness, that is
empty of a phenomenon. I will call this representation of emptiness a
locative absence. We can see how both of these conceptions of
emptiness imply a relationship between a quality and a substrate, and how
the referents of quality and substrate are interchangeable: both
phenomena and suchness can mutually be conceived as either the emptyquality or the empty-substrate. For example, in the case of the emptiness
of a phenomenon such as a pot, emptiness can be thought of as the
empty-quality of the pot, in which the pot is the empty-ground; or,
emptiness can be thought of as the empty-ground of the pot-quality, in
which emptiness itself is the empty-ground of the pot.
We will see how Mi-pham addresses these two aspects of
emptiness: as a quality of appearance and as an empty-ground. We will
also see how he depicts emptiness as beyond the dichotomy of (1)

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emptiness as an absent quality distinct from appearance and (2)
emptiness as an empty-ground distinct from appearance. We will then be
able to better appreciate his portrayal of the meaning of emptiness as the
unity of emptiness and appearance, as well as see how he represents the
relationship between phenomena and suchness.

In order to further

explore Mi-phams depiction of emptiness, we will first discuss a Jo-nang

portrayal of other-emptiness (gzhan stong) to provide a context for
contrast with Mi-phams exegesis.

Other--Emptiness in the Jo
Jo--nang
Other
Dol-po-pa (dol po pa shes rab rgyal mtshan, 1292-1361) clearly
delineates two types of emptinesses in his Ocean of Definitive Meaning:
That which exists within the abiding reality (gnas lugs la) is other-empty
(gzhan stong), and that which does not exist within the abiding reality is
self-empty (rang stong).217 Dol-po-pa depicts emptiness as a locative
absence, an emptiness of something in another:218
The fifteenth, the emptiness of non-entities, is the meaning of the
frequent statement, that which does not exist in something, that
something is empty of that. That which is the emptiness of own
entity is the relative self-emptiness. The sixteenth, the emptiness
that is the nature of non-entities, is the meaning of the frequent

Dol-po-pa, ri chos nges don rgya mtsho, 194.6: gnas lugs la yod pa ni gzhan stong
dang med pa ni rang stong ngo.
218 Ibid., 300.5-300.6: bco lnga pa dngos po med pa stong pa nyid ni gang zhig gang na
med pa de des stong ngo zhes yang yang gsungs pai don te rang gi dngos po stong pa
nyid gang yin pa kun rdzob rang stong ngo/ /bcu drug pa dngos po med pai de nyid
stong pa nyid ni de la lhag mar gyur pa gang yin pa de ni dir rtag tu yod pao/ /zhes yang
yang gsungs pai don te gzhan gyi dngos po stong pa nyid gang yin pa don dam gzhan
stong ngo. Translation adapted from Jeffrey Hopkins, The Mountain Doctrine: Ocean of
217

Definitive Meaning, (Unpublished translation), 219.

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statement, that which remains always exists here.219 That which is
the emptiness of another entity is the ultimate other-emptiness.220
Dol-po-pa delineates two types of emptiness.

He characterizes: (1)

relative self-emptiness as the absent phenomena in a location and (2)

ultimate other-emptiness as the remaining location of the absence. Dolpo-pa delineates earlier statements of Buddhist doctrine (i.e., first and
middle wheels) of emptiness as the non-existence of one thing in another;
he portrays later statements (e.g., last wheel) of non-emptiness as what
remains as always existing.

In this way, he shows how Buddhist

scriptures are not contradictory:221

Dol-po-pas frequent statement can be found in Vasubandhus definition of

emptiness in his commentary on the Madhyntavibhga under verse 2, T.4027 (Tarthang
Tulku ed.), 510.2-510.3.
220 Sixteen types of emptiness are found in the Perfection of Wisdom Stras, referenced
in Mahdhyamakvatra 6.180; see dbu ma la jug pa rang grel, 301. Mi-pham states that
the emptiness of non-entites (dngos po med pai stong pa nyid) is a negation of
perceiver-perceived duality through exclusion (rnam bcad du khegs), and that the
emptiness which is the nature of non-entities (dngos po med pai dngos bo nyid kyi stong
pa nyid) is established through inclusion (yongs gcod du grub). Mi-pham, dbu mtha
rnam byed grel pa, 673.5-674.1; 679.3-679.5. Kong-trul states that these last two
219

emptinesses necessarily encompass the other fourteen emptinesses (khyab byed du gro
dgos) and are conceptually distinct (ldog pas phye ba). He states: The emptiness of nonentities is posited from the aspect of the negation of the object of negationthe imagined
phenomena and the imagined self; the emptiness which is the nature of non-entities is
posited from the aspect of the existence of the entity of the suchness of phenomena and
self implied within (shul na) the elimination of that object of negation. Kong-trul, shes bya
kun khyab, 706: dgag bya kun brtags kyi chos dang bdag bkag pai cha nas dngos po

med pai stong pa nyid dang/ dgag bya de bkag pai shul na chos nyid kyi chos dang
gang zag gi dngos po yod pas cha nas dngos po med pai ngo bo nyid stong pa nyid du
bzhag go.
221 Dol-po-pa, ri chos nges don rgya mtsho, 88.2-88.3: sngar gdul byai dbang gis thar pa
la sogs pa thams cad med cing stong pa dang bdag med pa la sogs par gsungs pa ni
gang zhig gang na med pa la dgongs pa yin la/ phyi nas mi stong pa dang bdag yod pa la
sogs par gsungs pa rnams ni med pai lhag ma gang yin pa la dgongs pa yin pas gsung
rab snga phyi gal dra yang legs par brtags na mi gal ba. Translation adapted from
Jeffrey Hopkins, The Mountain Doctrine: Ocean of Definitive Meaning, (Unpublished
translation), 89.

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The earlier statements due to the perspective of trainees that all
liberation and so forthdo not exist, are empty, selfless, and so
forth are in consideration of the non-existence of something in
something else, whereas the later statements of non-emptiness,
the existence of self, and so forth are in consideration of that which
is the remainder of that non-existence (med pai lhag ma).
Therefore, although earlier and later scriptures seem to be
contradictory, when analyzed well, they are not contradictory.
He says that later statements of non-emptiness refer to what is the
remainder of non-existence. Thus, an empty-ground is the remainder of
the location of absence. Such a negation is a predicative negation (ma

yin dgag), a negation that implies something else.222 Dol-po-pa depicts a

A predicative negation is characterized as an explicit negation that implicates

something else; for instance, like the classic example, the fat Devadatta does not eat
during the day. This negation implies something else, namely, that Devadatta eats at
night. In contrast, an existential negation does not imply anything else, for instance
Brhmins should not drink alcohol. Sanskrit Grammarians (Patajalis Mahbhya)
described the distinction between the two negations as follows: the existential negation
(prasajya-pratiedha) is what negates a verb, and the predicative negation (paryudsapratiedha) is what negates a noun. Grammarians also noted that predicative negations
can be put into a compound (samsa) and existential negations cannot. Sanskrit, like
English, makes a clear distinction between sentences (vkya) and words (pada): a
222

sentence (vkya) was defined by Ktyyana as: that which possesses a finite verb
(eka-ti vkyam), and Pini defined a word (pada) in Pinistra 1.4.14 as that which
has either a verbal inflection or a nominal inflection (suptianta padam). Therefore,
according to this grammatical distinction, since negations of verbs are existential and
cannot be compounded, existential negations are always negations of finite verbs.
Hence, according to Ktyyanas definition, we can say that existential negations are
strictly negative sentences. However, unlike Sanskrit and Engish, the Tibetan language
has a separate verb to represent existential (yod) and predicative (yin) usage, yet there is
no syntactic distinction between nouns (nominalized verbs) and finite verbs in Tibetan.
Consequently, there is not a strong distinction between sentences (tshig, ngag) and
words (tshig, ming) in Tibetan. For example, the Tibetan phrase gser ma yin pa can be a
sentence: [It] is not gold, or it can be a nominal phrase: the non-gold [thing]...
However, the distinction between existential and predicative negations is not simply a
grammatical distinction in Tibetan, for compounded negations such as an-tman (bdag
med) take the existential verb, even though such a compounded, nominal (non-verbal)
negation is grammatically a predicative negation in Sanskrit. Sanskrit Grammarians
references above cited from B. K. Matilal in Is Prsaga a Form of Deconstruction? in

105
predicative negation within the ground of an existential negation (med

dgag):223
A predicative negation exists within the ground (gzhi la) of an
existential negation, and wisdom complete with all innate qualities,
thoroughly established and pervading space, abides within the
ground which from the beginning is naturally pure and relinquished
of all faults.
Dol-po-pa states that a predicative negation exists within the ground of an
existential negation and wisdom abides within the ground from the
beginning. In this way, wisdom is the ground of negation. He asserts a
presence of ultimate qualities abiding within the ground of emptiness: All
qualities of the ultimate, the empty-ground...abide forever within the
abiding reality.224 Dol-po-pa also presents the ground of emptiness as the
Buddha: The omnipresent expanse of phenomenathe ground free from
all extremes such as existence and non-existence, and so forthis the
Buddha that is the abiding reality (gnas lugs kyi sangs rgyas).225 Thus,
Dol-po-pa states that an ultimate mind exists within the abiding reality:226

Mind, Language and World (London: Oxford, 2003), 267; originally published in Journal
of Indian Philosophy 20 (1992), 345-362; Bimal Krishna Matilal, Logic, Language, and
Reality (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1985), 399-400.
223 Dol-po-pa, ri chos nges don rgya mtsho, 88.3-88.4: med dgag gi gzhi la ma yin dgag
yod pai phyir dang/ skyon thams cad kyis gdod nas rang bzhin gyis dag cing spangs pai
gzhi la gnyug mai yon tan thams cad tshang bai ye shes mkha khyab yongs su grub par
bzhugs pai phyir ro.
224 Ibid., 434.6: stong gzhi don dam gyi yon tan...thams cad gnas lugs la rnam yang
bzhugs pai phyir. See also Jeffrey Hopkins, The Mountain Doctrine: Ocean of Definitive
Meaning, (Unpublished translation), 296.
225 Ibid., 313.7-314.1: yod med la sogs pai mtha thams cad dang bral bai gzhi chos kyi
dbyings kun tu gro ba ni gnas lugs kyi sangs rgyas so. Translation adapted from Jeffrey
Hopkins, The Mountain Doctrine: Ocean of Definitive Meaning, (Unpublished
translation), 230.
226 Ibid., 366.6-366.7: don dam gyi sems ni gnas lugs la yod pai sems so/ /kun rdzob kyi

sems ni gnas lugs la med pai sems so/ /dei phyir sems gang zhig yod pai sems zhes pa
don dam byang chub gyi sems rang bzhin od gsal ba ste. See also Jeffrey Hopkins, The
Mountain Doctrine: Ocean of Definitive Meaning, (Unpublished translation), 252.

106
Ultimate mind is a mind that exists within the abiding reality (gnas
lugs la yod); relative mind is a mind that does not exist within the
abiding reality (gnas lugs la med). Therefore, the mind which is
existent mind is the ultimate mind of awakening (byang chub gyi
sems), natural luminous clarity.
Dol-po-pa depicts a cognitive presence, an ultimate mind, within the
abiding reality. Furthermore, Dol-po-pa describes this ground as Buddhanature: Moreover, this which is thusness, the Buddha-naturehaving
many synonyms such as suchness, and so forthis the ground of all
phenomena.227 Dol-po-pa emphasizes the existence of Buddha-nature as
the ground of phenomena.

He also affirms the existence, or rather,

negates the non-existence, of a pure self (bdag dag pa), the self which he
says is the great identity of the Buddha (sangs rgyas kyi bdag nyid chen

po):228
Within the abiding reality (gnas lugs la), the ultimate body of
attributes is not non-existent because [within the abiding reality]
thusness which is pure self, the self which is the great identity of
Buddha, is not severed. Within the abiding reality, relative form
bodies (kun rdzob gzugs sku) do not exist because [within the
abiding reality] not any relative phenomena are established.
Dol-po-pa depicts relative phenomena as utterly non-existent in the
abiding reality. In this way, the relative is portrayed as appearance that
does not accord with the mode of subsistence. He states that relative
phenomena are consciousness distortions of reality:229
Ibid., 166.4-166.5: gzhan yang chos nyid la sogs pa rnam grangs mang po can gyi
bde gsheg [read gshegs] snying po de bzhin nyid gang yin pa de nyid chos thams cad kyi
gzhi yin pai phyir. See also Jeffrey Hopkins, The Mountain Doctrine: Ocean of Definitive
Meaning, (Unpublished translation), 112.
227

228

Ibid., 431.5-431.6: gnas lugs la don dam chos sku med pa ma yin te de bzhin nyid

bdag dag pai bdag tu gyur pa sangs rgyas kyi bdag nyid chen poi bdag ma chad pai
phyir/ /gnas lugs la kun rdzob gzugs sku yod pa ma yin te kun rdzob kyi chos gang yang
ma grub pai phyir. Translation adapted from Jeffrey Hopkins, The Mountain Doctrine:
Ocean of Definitive Meaning, (Unpublished translation), 293.
229 Ibid., 483.7-484.1: des na sems can rnams kyis las snang khrul pa di ni sems can pa

nyid kyi dgos chos yin gyi/ gnas lugs la ri bong gi rwa dang mo sham kyi bu dang nam

107
Therefore, these karmic appearances mistaken by sentient beings
are necessary phenomena for only sentient beings, but they are
utterly impossible within the abiding reality (gnas lugs la), like the
horns of a rabbit, the child of barren woman, a sky-flower, and so
forth.
Dol-po-pa claims that the view that relative phenomena exist within the
abiding reality is the extreme of existence (yod pai mtha), a
superimposition, and the view that the ultimate qualities of wisdom do not
exist is the extreme of non-existence (med pai mtha), a denigration:230
Whereas relative phenomena do not at all exist within the abiding
reality (gnas lugs la), the extreme of existence is the
superimposition that they do. Whereas the irreducible (cha med),
omnipresent wisdom of the expanse of phenomena always abides
pervading everywhere, the extreme of non-existence is the
denigration that it does not exist, is not established, and is empty of
its own essence. That which is the middle (dbus) free from those
extremes is the ground free from all extremes such as existence
and non-existence, superimposition and denigration, permanence
and annihilation, and so forth, due to which it is the consummate
Great Middle Way (dbu ma chen po).
Dol-po-pa portrays the Great Middle Way as free from the extremes of
existence and non-existence, superimposition and denigration. He also

mkhai me tog la sogs pa ltar gtan mi srid pai phyir. See also Jeffrey Hopkins, The
Mountain Doctrine: Ocean of Definitive Meaning, (Unpublished translation), 394.
230 Ibid., 303.6-303.6: yod pai mtha ni kun rdzob kyi chos rnams gnas lugs la gtan nas

med pa yin yang yod do zhes sgro dogs pa gang yin pao/ /med pai mtha ni chos kyi
dbyings kyi ye shes cha med kun gro kun la khyab par rtag tu bzhugs kyang med cing
ma grub la rang gi ngo bos stong ngo zhes skur debs pa gang yin pao/ /mtha de dag
dang bral bai dbus gang yin pa de ni yod med dang sgro skur dang rtag chad la sogs pa
mtha thams cad dang bral bai gzhi yin pai phyir dbu ma chen po mthar thug pa ste.
Translation adopted from Jeffrey Hopkins, The Mountain Doctrine: Ocean of Definitive
Meaning, (Unpublished translation), 177. See also Dol-po-pas bka bsdu bzhi pai rang

grel, cited in Stearns, The Buddha from Dolpo, 248n.11.

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depicts a third category (phung po gsum pa) of knowledge that is beyond
dichotomies:231
Those who state that all objects of knowledge are strictly limited to
two, entities and non-entities, simply do not realize suchness, the
ultimate abiding reality, because although it is an object of
knowledge (shes bya), it is neither an entity nor a non-entity.
Consequently, it is also established as just a third category, an inbetween (bar ma) or middle (dbus ma).
Through affirming a third category, an in-between, Dol-po-pa portrays an
object of knowledge that is neither an entity nor a non-entity.
We can see that in Dol-po-pas depiction of emptiness, there is no
emptiness of suchness; suchness is unique because there is no ground
that is empty of suchness:232
An emptiness of everything does not occur because an emptiness
of suchness does not occur. A ground that is empty of all
phenomena occurs; it is suchness. A ground that is empty of
suchness does not occur because that is invalidated by an
immeasurable [number] of extremely absurd consequences.
Therefore, empty of all and empty of all phenomena are extremely
different because within the abiding reality (gnas lugs la) there is an
emptiness of phenomena but not an emptiness of suchness. This
repudiates the assertion that phenomena and suchness are the
231

Ibid., 313.1-313.2: shes bya thams cad dngos po dngos med gnyis su kha tshon chos

par smra ba rnams kyis ni chos nyid don dam pai gnas lugs ma rtogs pa nyid du zad de/
de ni shes bya yin yang dngos po dang dngos med gang yang ma yin pai phyir ro/ /des
na de ni phung po gsum pa dang dbus maam bar ma nyid du yang grub bo. See also
Jeffrey Hopkins, The Mountain Doctrine: Ocean of Definitive Meaning, (Unpublished
translation), 230.
232 Ibid., 384.4-384.5: thams cad kyis stong pa mi srid de chos nyid kyis stong pa mi srid

pai phyir ro/ chos thams cad kyis stong pai gzhi ni srid de chos nyid do/ chos nyid kyis
stong pai gzhi ni mi srid de ha cang thal ba dpag tu med pas gnod pai phyir ro/ des na
thams cad kyis stong pa dang chos thams cad kyis stong pa ni khyad par shin tu che ste/
gnas lugs la chos kyi[s] stong yang chos nyid kyis mi stong pai phyir ro/ dis ni chos dang
chos nyid ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad du dod pa dang/ tha dad gtan med du dod pa
yang bsal ba yin te/ de gnyis ni ngo bo gcig pa bkag pai tha dad yin pai phyir.
Translation adapted from Jeffrey Hopkins, The Mountain Doctrine: Ocean of Definitive
Meaning, (Unpublished translation), 262-263.

109
same with different contradistinctions and also the assertion that
they are utterly non-distinct (tha dad gtan med du dod pa) because
the two are different [in the sense of] negating that they are one
entity (ngo bo gcig pa bkag pai tha dad).
Dol-po-pa makes a distinction between emptiness of all and emptiness of
all phenomena: the abiding reality is empty of phenomena but is not empty
of suchness. He states that the empty-ground of phenomena is suchness
but that there is no empty-ground of suchness. In this way, suchness is
not a quality because it has no substrate; thus, suchness is only a

substrate. Moreover, Dol-po-pa claims that suchness is not related to

phenomena in a way that the two are essentially the same with different
contradistinctions (i.e., as conceptually distinct). Nor are phenomena and
suchness utterly non-distinct.

Rather, phenomena and suchness are

different in the sense of negating that they are one entity. We will see
how Mi-pham portrays the relationship between phenomena and
suchness below, but first we will look further into the Jo-nang tradition.
A twentieth-century Jo-nang scholar, Khen-po Lo-dr-drak-pa
(dzam thang mkhan po blo gros grags pa, 1920-1975), defines selfempty as follows: Self-empty refers to the claim that an existential
negation, which is the absence of true establishment, is the consummate
ultimate.233 He characterizes a proponent of other-emptiness as
follows:234
A proponent of other-emptiness refers to: (1) one who claims that
the ultimate non-dual wisdom, the empty-ground, is not empty of its
own essence, and from the beginning is empty of all that is other
Khen-po Lo-dr-drak-pa, blo gsal yid kyi rgyan bzang (phyi nang grub mthai rnam
bzhag gi bsdus don blo gsal yid kyi rgyan bzang), in Collected Works, vol. 10 (dzam
thang ed.), 243.7-244.1: dgag bya bden grub bkag tsam gyi med dgag de stong nyid
mthar thug tu smra bas na rang stong zhes brjod do.
234 Ibid., 270.6-270.7: stong gzhi don dam gnyis med kyi ye shes de rang ngos nas mi
stong par gzhan gzung dzin sogs spros pa mtha dag gis gdod nas stong pa dang/ kun
rdzob glo bur gyis bsdus pai chos rnams don dam gzhan gyi ngo bos stong pai steng du
kun rdzob rang gi ngo bos kyang stong par smra bas na dbu ma gzhan stong pa zhes
brjod.
233

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the conceptual constructs such as a perceived-perceiver [duality],
and (2) in addition to claiming that adventitious phenomena
comprising the relative are empty of the essence of the extrinsic
ultimate (don dam gzhan gyi ngo bos stong), relative [phenomena]
are also said to be empty of their own essences.
Khen-po Lo-dr-drak-pa describes a proponent of other-emptiness as one
who claims that the ultimate is not empty of its own essence but is empty
of all conceptual constructs.

Additionally, he says that proponents of

other-emptiness not only claim that relative phenomena are empty of the
extrinsic ultimate, but they also say that relative phenomena are empty of
their own essences.

Thus, his characterization of other-emptiness

explicitly affirms the claim that relative phenomena are empty of their own
essences.
Like Dol-po-pa, Khen-po Lo-dr-drak-pa states that reality is not
reduced to simply a mere emptiness; he says that a predicative negation
abides within the ground of an existential negation:235
The consummate reality is not reduced to the non-establishment of
everything or simply a mere emptiness that is a non-existence;
within the ground of an existential negation, an emptiness of all
relative constructs, the ultimate suchness of luminous clarity, which
is a predicative negation, abides from the beginning.
He affirms that the ultimate suchness of luminous clarity abides from the
beginning within an emptiness of relative constructs. Thus, he portrays an
existential negation as contained within a predicative negation. The way
that other-emptiness incorporates relative phenomena as empty of their
own essences is a crucial point. Without affirming such emptiness, the
traditions of other-emptiness become characterized as accepting a nave

235

Khen-po Lo-dr-drak-pa, jigs med gdong lngai nga ro (rgyu dang bras bui theg pa

mchog gi gnas lugs zab moi don rnam par nges pa rje jo nang pa chen poi ring lugs jigs
med gdong lngai nga ro), (Dharamsala: LTWA, 1993), 88.1-88.2: mthar thug pai yin lugs
thams cad med cing ma grub pai stong rkyang tsam du zad pa ma yin par kun rdzob
spros pas stong pa med dgag gi gzhi la ma yin dgag gi od gsal bai chos nyid don dam
ye nas bzhugs pas.

111
metaphysical realism that conflicts with a Buddhist view, particularly the
view of emptiness expressed in the middle wheel of doctrine.
Khen-po Lo-dr-drak-pa makes a distinction between Middle Way
followers of the middle wheel (khor lo bar bai rjes brang gi dbu ma pa),
a category under which he classifies the position of self-emptiness, and
Middle Way followers of the last wheel (khor lo tha mai rjes brang gi

dbu ma pa), which he identifies with the position of other-emptiness.236 In

his Roar of the Fearless Lion, he characterizes the middle wheel of
doctrine as mainly expressing the categorized ultimate, which he calls the
temporary definitive meaning (gnas skabs kyi nges don). He says that
the last wheel mainly expresses the uncategorized ultimate, the
consummate definitive meaning (nges don mthar thug pa):237
The mode of the relative is what is principally the topic (brjod bya)
of the first [wheel], the mode of the categorized ultimate is what is
principally the topic of the middle [wheel], and the consummate
uncategorized definitive meaning is what is clearly, principally the
topic of the last [wheel]. Hence, the stras of provisional and
definitive meaning are posited in that way in consideration of what
is the topic in the sequence of the three wheels in general, from the
aspect of taking the provisional meaning, the temporary definitive
meaning, and the consummate definitive meaning [respectively,] as
what is principally the topic.
Furthermore, he states that the Buddha merely taught half of the
definitive meaning (nges don phyed tsam) in the middle wheel of doctrine,

236
237

Khen-po Lo-dr-drak-pa, blo gsal yid kyi rgyan bzang, 242.6-243.6; 268.1-270.7.
Khen-po Lo-dr-drak-pa, jigs med gdong lngai nga ro, 60.6-61.2: kun rdzob kyi tshul

gtso bo dang poi brjod bya dang rnam grangs pai don dam gyi tshul gtso bo bar bai
brjod bya dang rnam grangs min pai nges don mthar thug pa gsal bar gtso bo tha mai
brjod byar byas pas khor lo gsum po rim par brjod bya spyi la bsam na drang bai don
dang gnas skabs kyi nges don dang mthar thug gi nges don gtso bor bjod byar byed pai
cha nas de lugs su drang nges kyi mdor jog pa yin.

112
but he revealed the ultimate definitive meaning (nges don don dam) in the
last wheel:238
In the first [wheel], the relative was taught in the manner of the
ordinary four truths; in the middle [wheel], the expanse free from
the constructs of all signs (mtshan mai spros pa) was taught,
merely half of the definitive meaning; in the last [wheel], the
ultimate definitive meaning was taught, the ground-expanse free
from constructs, the great wisdom.
Khen-po Lo-dr-drak-pa depicts the expanse free from constructs of all
signs as merely half of the definitive meaning, and states that the
ultimate definitive meaningthe ground-expanse free from constructs, the
great wisdomwas taught in the last wheel. Furthermore, he states that
the ultimate truth is shown to be truly existing (bden par yod pa) in the last
wheel of doctrine, the wheel of doctrine of the thorough differentiation of
the ultimate (don dam rnam par phye pai chos khor):239
In the last [wheel,] the wheel of doctrine of the thorough
differentiation of the ultimate, for disciples of sharp and extremely
mature faculties who had trained their mental continuums through
all the vehicles, he mainly taught, through elegantly differentiating:
(1) the ultimate truth itself as truly existing, meaning that it is
permanent, steadfast and eternal in the perspective of the wisdom
of the Sublime Ones (phags pa) because it is the primordially
unchanging essence of the indivisible expanse and awareness
(dbyings rig dbyer med); and (2) relative phenomena comprising
the perceiving [subjects] and perceived [objects] as not truly
existing, meaning that they are primordially non-arising like
238

Ibid., 51.6-52.1: dang por kun rdzob thun mong bden bzhii tshul dang bar bar mtshan

mai spros pa kun bral gyi dbyings nges don phyed tsam dang tha mar spros bral gyi gzhi
dbyings ye shes chen po nges don don dam.
239 Ibid., 50.4-50.6: tha ma don dam rnam par phye pai chos khor ni gdul bya theg pa
mtha dag gis rgyud spyangs zin pai dbang rnon shin tu smin pa rnams la phags pai ye
shes kyi gzigs ngoi don dam bden pa nyid dbyings rig dbyer med kyi ngo bo gdod ma
nas gyur ba med pai phyir rtag brtan ther zug pai bden par yod pa dang/ kun rdzob
gzung dzin gyis bsdus pai chos rnams ni don dam dei rnam gyur tsam me long gi
gzugs brnyan ltar gdod nas ma skyes pai bden med du so sor legs par phyes nas gtso
bor gsungs.

113
reflections in a mirrormerely expressions (rnam gyur) of the
ultimate.
In this way, the last wheel distinguishes the ultimate truth that truly exists
from relative phenomena that do not truly exist. Moreover, Khen-po Lodr-drak-pa does not differentiate between the scriptures of the last wheel
of doctrine as Mind-Only Stras and those of the Great Middle Way:240
There is no difference between the stra collections (mdo sde) of
those two [Mind-Only and Great Middle Way] because aside from
the mere distinction between better and worse ways of explaining
the viewpoint (dgongs pa) of one stra, actually there are no stras
to be distinctly posited. For example, although the Vaibhikas and
the Sautrntikas do not have different stra collections, [the
difference] is merely how they adopt a viewpoint (dgongs pa len
lugs).
He does not make a distinction between Mind-Only Stras and BuddhaNature Stras in the last wheel; he makes a distinction based on a
viewpoint, not based on texts. Khen-po Lo-dr-drak-pa distinguishes the
Great Middle Way from what he describes as Mind-Only Realists (dngos

smrai sems tsam) as follows:241

It does not follow that the subject (chos can), the supreme stras of
the last Word, the [Buddha-]Nature Stras and so forth, become the
tradition of the Mind-Only Realists through the mere teaching that

Ibid., 84.4-84.6: de gnyis la mdo sde tha dad med pa yin te/ mdo sde gcig la dgongs
pa grel tshul bzang ngan gyi khyad tsam ma gtogs don mdo so sor jog rgyu med pai
phyir/ dper na bye mdo gnyis la mdo sde tha dad med kyang dgongs pa len lugs tsam yin
pa bzhin.
241 Ibid., 63.3-63.6: snying poi mdo sogs bka tha mai mdo mchog rnams chos can/
khyod dag spyis gnyis med ye shes bden grub tu bstan pa tsam gyis dngos smrai sems
tsam pai rang lugs su mi gyur te/ tha mai bstan don gyi ye shes bden grub dang dngos
smrai sems tsam lugs kyi gzhan yongs bden grub gnyis bden par grub lugs gtan nas mi
dra bai khyad par chen po yod pai phyir/ der thal/ tha mai bstan don gyi ye shes ni
spros bral rang rig dam pai yul du gshes [read gshis] kyi gnas lugs su bden pas na bden
grub dang/ sems tsam lugs kyi gzhan yongs bden grub ni rnam par shes pai snang cha
las ma das pai grub pai mtha las bzhag pa yin pas mtshan ma bden dngos su dmigs
pai dgag bya yin pai cha nas khyad che. See also Ibid., 214.6-223.6.
240

114
generally the non-dual wisdom is truly established (bden grub)
because there is a great difference in the utterly dissimilar ways of
establishing as true (1) the truly established wisdom that is the
subject of the teaching of the last wheel and (2) the truly
established dependent and thoroughly established natures of the
tradition of the Mind-Only Realists. This is so because (1) the
wisdom that is the subject of the last teaching is truly established
due to being true in the abiding reality of the basic nature as the
object of ultimate reflexive awareness free from constructs; and (2)
since the truly established dependent and thoroughly established
natures of the Mind-Only tradition are posited from a philosophy
(grub pai mtha) that is not beyond the appearance factor of
consciousness, from the aspect of [their] observing signs as true
entities (mtshan ma bden dngos su dmigs) which is an object of
negation [in our tradition]there is a manner of great difference.
Khen-po Lo-dr-drak-pa says that the manner that wisdom is truly
established in the Great Middle Way is different from the manner of true
establishment for Mind-Only Realists. Mind-Only Realists assert the truly
established dependent and thoroughly established natures from a
philosophy that observes signs as true entities.

Wisdom in the Great

Middle Way, on the other hand, is said to be truly established due to being
true in the abiding reality as the object of ultimate reflexive awareness free
from constructs.
Thus, we can see a difference between the ways that the
dependent and thoroughly established natures are depicted by Mind-Only
Realists and the Great Middle Way. Here we can also see a difference
between two ways of identifying the empty-ground (stong gzhi): (1) as the
thoroughly established nature or (2) as the dependent nature. Dol-po-pa
claims that the dependent nature is the empty-ground of the imagined
nature temporarily (re zhig).

He identifies the thoroughly established

nature with suchness, the final (mthar) empty-ground:242

242

Dol-po-pa, ri chos nges don rgya mtsho, 192.3-193.3: re zhig gzhan dbang du gtogs

pai phung po khams dang skye mched rnams kun btags bdag dang bdag gi bas stong
pai gzhi gsungs kyang mthar stong gzhi gzhan dbang gis kyang stong pai zhi chos nyid
yongs grub yin...de ltar kun btags kyi stong pai gzhi ni gzhan dbang ngo/ zhan dbang gi

115
Temporarily, it is said that the aggregates, constituents, and sensefields, which are contained within the dependent nature, is the
ground that is empty of the imagined nature, the self, and selfpossessions (bdag gi ba). In the end (mthar), the ground that is
empty of even the dependent nature is suchness, the thoroughly
established nature...In this way, the ground that is empty of the
imagined nature is the dependent nature. The ground that is empty
of the dependent nature is the thoroughly established nature. A
ground that is empty of suchness, the thoroughly established
nature, is utterly impossible because it is the suchness that abides
as spontaneously present, all the time and everywhere.
Although the dependent nature is temporarily the ground of the
aggregates and so forth, the final empty-ground is the thoroughly
established nature, which is the ground of the dependent nature. Dol-popa states that a ground that is empty of the thoroughly established nature
is impossible because it the suchness that abides everywhere, all the
time. In this way, it is the ground of the existent and the non-existent.

Other--Emptiness and the Nying

Nying--ma
ma:: Lo
Lo--chen Dharma r
Other
We will now consider a discussion of other-emptiness in the works
of Lo-chen Dharma r (lo chen dharma r, 1654-1717). Through this we
can begin to explore the view of emptiness in the Nying-ma tradition in
general, and see the relationship between Lo-chens Nying-ma view and
the view of other-emptiness as presented by the Jo-nang tradition. This
will allow us to better understand Mi-phams interpretation of emptiness,
as well as help us assess his treatment of other-emptiness.
Lo-chen delineates self-emptiness and other-emptiness as two
manners of eliminating constructs (spros pa gcod lugs). He states:243
stong pai gzhi ni yongs grub po/ chos nyid yongs grub kyis stong pai gzhi ni gtan mi srid
de/ de ni nam yang gang naang lhun grub tu bzhugs pa de bzhin nyid yin pai phyir.
243 Lo-chen Dharma r, dpag bsam snye ma (sdom pa gsum rnam par nges pai grel pa
legs bshad ngo mtshar dpag bsam gyi snye ma), (Bylakuppe: Ngagyur Nyingma
Institute), 373.5-373.6: spros pa gcod lugs la/ rang stong dang/ gzhan stong gnyis las/
rang stong ni/ chos can ji ltar snang ba di dag snang tsam nyid nas rang rang gi ngo bos
stong pas med dgag gi stong nyid don dam par bzhed.

116
Concerning the manner of eliminating constructs there are two:
self-emptiness and other-emptiness: [proponents of] self-emptiness
assert that the emptiness that is an existential negation is ultimate
because however quality-bearers (chos can) may appear, they are
empty of their own essences right from their mere appearance.
He states that proponents of self-emptiness assert an existential negation
as ultimate. As for other-emptiness, Lo-chen delineates two traditions of
identifying the empty-ground due to a difference in asserting all objects of
knowledge: (1) in terms of the three natures or (2) condensing objects of
knowledge into two, the imagined and the thoroughly established
natures:244
In the traditions of the Middle Way that ascertain other-emptiness,
due to the difference of asserting all objects of knowledge within the
three natures or condensing objects of knowledge into the imagined
and thoroughly established natures, there are two ways of
identifying the subject (chos can): (1) in Yogcra texts, the emptyground (stong gzhi) is the dependent nature, the imagined nature is
the object of negation, and the emptiness of the imagined nature in
the dependent nature is the thoroughly established nature; (2) in
texts such as the Uttaratantra, suchness, the thoroughly
established nature, is empty of the imagined nature. Therefore, in
the essence of the thoroughly established naturewhich is the
ultimate expanse and the suchness of mindthere are no
defilements to remove, nor previously absent qualities to newly
establish, because it is primordially pure by nature and has qualities
that are spontaneously present.
Lo-chen describes two traditions of other-emptiness for which he
delineates (1) the empty-ground in Yogcra texts as the dependent

244

Ibid., 374.1-374.5: gzhan stong du gtan la bebs pai dbu ma pa rnams la/ shes bya

thams cad mtshan nyid gsum du dod pa dang/ kun brtags dang yongs grub gnyis su
bsdu bai khyad par las/ chos can ngos dzin tshul mi dra ba gnyis byung ste/ rnal byor
spyod pai gzhung du/ stong gzhi gzhan dbang dgag bya kun btags kyis stong pai yongs
grub tu bshad pa dang/ rgyud bla ma sogs las chos nyid yongs grub dgag bya kun brtags
kyis stong par gsungs so/ des na yongs grub sems kyi chos nyid don dam pai dbyings
dii ngo ba la dor byai dri ma dang sngar med kyi yon tan gsar du sgrub tu med de/ ye
nas rang bzhin gyis rnam par dag cing yon tan lhun grub yin pai phyir.

117
nature which is empty of the imagined nature and (2) the suchness which
is empty of the imagined nature in texts such as the Uttaratantra. In this
way, he makes a distinction that includes a distinction of texts, in contrast
to the Jo-nang.
Lo-chen also makes statements that resemble what we see in the
Jo-nang presentations.

Similar to Khen-po Lo-dr-drak-pas statement

that the middle wheel is merely half the definitive meaning (nges don

phyed tsam),245 Lo-chen states that in his own tradition, the middle wheel
is half-definitive and half-provisional (drang nges phye ma), or definitive
for the time being (gnas skabs pai nges don):246
Although there are a lot of discordant assertions regarding what are
the definitive or provisional [meanings] of the middle and last
[wheels], since there is no scripture of stra that clearly states that
the middle [wheel] is the definitive meaning and the last [wheel] is a
provisional meaning, and [this] also would contradict the intended
meaning of the examples of the patients medicine and learning to
read, my tradition asserts that the middle [wheel] is half-definitive
and half-provisional, or definitive for the time being, and the last
[wheel] itself is the definitive meaning because it is clearly
explained in stras such as the Sadhinirmocanastra, the
Mahparinirvastra, and the Agulimlyastra.
Lo-chen says that there is no scripture that clearly states that the middle
wheel is definitive and the last is a provisional meaning247; as such it
245
246

Khen-po Lo-dr-drak-pa, jigs med gdong lngai nga ro, 51.6-52.1, opt. cit.
Lo-chen Dharma r, dpag bsam snye ma, 290.5-291.2: bar tha gnyis drang nges

gang yin la bzhed pa mi mthun pa mang yang/ bar ba nges don dang phyi ma drang don
du gsal bar ston pai mdo sdei lung med cing/ nad pai sman dang yi ge slob pai dpei
dgongs don dang yang gal bas/ rang lugs ni bar pa drang nges phyed maam gnas
skabs pai nges don dang/ tha ma nyid nges don du dod de/ mdo sde dgongs pa nges
grel dang/ myang das chen po dang/ sor phreng gi mdo sogs las gsal bar bshad pai
phyir.
Kong-trul states that the traditions that accept the middle wheel as the consummate
definitive meaning and the last wheel as mainly teaching provisional meanings are
proponents of naturelessness (ngo bo nyid med par smra ba); he adds that such a
claim has no explicit source in scriptures (lung khung dngos med) and its legitimacy is
247

argued through reasoning (rigs pas thad pa sgrub). Kong-trul, shes bya kun khyab, 686.

118
would conflict the meaning of the examples of learning to read
[progressively]248 and medicine.249 He affirms that his tradition asserts the
last wheel as the definitive meaning.250
Lo-chen shows a difference between the middle and last wheels of
doctrine in terms of the view of what is to be experienced in meditation
(sgom pas nyams su myong byai lta ba). He states:251
Regarding the view of what is to be experienced in meditation,
according to the explicit teaching of the middle wheel explained in
the way of [Ngrjunas] Collection of Reasonings (rigs tshogs),
since the definitive meaning is accepted as an existential negation,
meditating on nothing whatsoever is said to be meditation on
emptiness, and seeing nothing at all is said to be the realization of
suchness. According to the viewpoint (dgongs pa) of the last wheel
explained in the way of the texts of Maitreya, Asaga and [half]brother [Vasubandhu], as well in Ngrjunas Collection of
The example of progressively learning to read can be found in Ngrjunas Ratnaml
v.394-396. See Jeffrey Hopkins translation in Advice for Living and Liberation:
Ngrjunas Precious Garland (Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion Publications, 1999), 284.
249 Buddha-nature and medicine can be found in Long-chen-pas citations of the
Mahparinirvastra, in which Buddha-nature is explained as a teaching after the nonexistence of self in the way that bile is smeared on an infants mothers breast to stop him
from drinking breast milk while he digests the medicine (no-self), and later he is given the
248

milk (Buddha-nature). See Long-chen-pa, sems nyid ngal gsoi grel pa, (sems nyid ngal
gsoi grel pa shing rta chen po), published in rdzog pa chen po ngal gso skor gsum dang

rang grol skor gsum (reproduction of a dzom xylographic edition), (Gangtok, 1999),
331.1-332.5; see English translation in Tulku Thondup, Practice of Dzogchen (Ithaca:
Snow Lion Publications, 1996), 245-246; reprint of Buddha Mind (Ithaca: Snow Lion
Publications, 1989). See also citation in Long-chen-pa, tshig don mdzod, 897.4- 899.2.
The three stras Lo-chen cites are also the stras that Khen-po Lo-dr-drak-pa cites
to support the last wheel as the definitive meaning. Khen-po Lo-dr-drak-pa, jigs med
gdong lngai nga ro, 49.5; 79.3. See translation of Khen-po Lo-dr-drak-pa below in
Document 3.
250

251

Lo-chen Dharma r, dpag bsam snye ma, 377.1-377.4: sgom pas nyams su myong

byai lta ba la/ khor lo bar pai dngos bstan rigs tshogs su bkral ba ltar na/ nges don med
dgag la bzhed pas/ ci yang mi sgom pa la stong nyid sgom pa dang/ ci yang ma mthong
ba la de kho na nyid rtogs par chad/ khor lo tha mai dgongs pa byams chos kyi gzhung
thogs med sku mched kyis bkral ba dang klu sgrub zhabs kyis bstod tshogs su/ gzung
dzin gnyis med kyi ye shes nyid sgom pas nyams su myong byar bshad cing/ de nyid
gsang sngags kyi rgyud sde zab mo rnams dang yang dgongs pa mthun pa yin no.

119
Praises (bstod tshogs), meditating on just the wisdom which is free
from duality is what is to be experienced, and this also accords with
the viewpoint of the profound tantras of Secret Mantra.
Lo-chen depicts two views of what is to be experienced in meditation: (1)
according to the explicit teaching of the middle wheel, in which the
definitive meaning is accepted as an existential negation, meditation on
emptiness is said to be meditating on nothing whatsoever and seeing
nothing at all is said to be the realization of suchness and (2) according to
the viewpoint of the last wheel and profound tantras, meditating on
wisdom which is free from duality is what is to be experienced. Thus, we
see a difference between the middle and last wheel in terms of the
practice of meditation.
Furthermore, Lo-chen cites Long-chen-pa as saying in the Wish-

Fulfilling Treasury (yid bzhin mdzod) and the Treasury of Philosophies

(grub mtha mdzod) that it is not contradictory that the Prsagika method
is more effective when ascertaining what is to be identified in study, and to
accept the self-reflexive wisdom free from duality when ascertaining what
is to be experienced in meditation:252
If one thinks, In the scriptures such as the Treasury of
Philosophies and the root and [auto-]commentary of the WishFulfilling Treasury, is it not a contradiction that: (1) in the context of
identifying what is to be ascertained by means of study,
Prsagika-Madhyamaka is established as the pinnacle of the
252

Ibid., 377.4-378.4: grub mtha mdzod dang yid bzhin mdzod rtsa grel la sogs pai

gsung rab rnams su thos pas gtan la dbab bya ngos dzin pai skabs su dbu ma thal gyur
ba rgyui theg pa chen poi rtse mor sgrub par mdzad cing/ sgom pa nyams myong gis
gtan la bebs pai skabs rnams su myong bya gzung dzin gnyis dang bral bai so so rang
rig pai ye shes la bzhed pa gnyis mi gal lam snyam na/ mi gal te/ so skyei sar lta ba
thos bsam gyis gtan la bebs pai tshe bloi mtshan dzin gzhig dka bas/ de thos bsam las
byung bai shes rab kyis gog par byed pa la/ sgro dogs gcod byed kyi rig pa thal gyur ba
rno bai phyir dang/ yang sgom byung nyams myong gis gtan la bebs pai skabs su khor
lo tha mar gsungs pai dbu mai lta ba de nyid zab cing ches bzang ba yin te/ dbyings
rang bzhin gyis rnam par dag pa don dam pai bden pa rang byung gi ye shes de nyid
chos thams cad kyi gdod mai gnas lugs yin pa gang zhig gsang sngags kyi rgyud sde
zab mo rnams nas bshad pai lta bai nyams len dang yang mthun pai phyir.

120
causal vehicle of Mahyna and (2) in the contexts of
ascertainment by means of meditative experience, reflexive wisdom
free from perceiver-perceived [duality] is asserted? There is no
contradiction because it is difficult for an ordinary being to
deconstruct the reifications (mtshan dzin gzhig) of the mind at the
time of ascertaining the view by means of study and contemplation.
Therefore, in negating these [reifications of the mind] through the
supreme knowledge that arises through study and contemplation,
Prsagika is a sharper awareness (rig pa) that cuts through
superimpositions. Also, at the time of ascertaining by experience
(nyams myong gis) [the wisdom] that arises in meditation, the view
of the Middle Way taught in the last wheel itself is profound and
much better because: (1) the naturally pure expanse, the ultimate
truth that is the self-existing wisdom (rang byung gi ye shes), is
itself the primordial mode of subsistence of all phenomena, and (2)
it is also in accord with the practice of the view that is accepted in
the profound tantras of Secret Mantra.
Here we see a distinction based on two contexts: (1) study and
contemplation and (2) meditation.

In the contexts of study and

contemplation, Prsagika-Madhyamaka is portrayed as a sharper means

of cutting through superimpositions.

However, in the contexts of

meditation, the view of the Middle Way taught in the last wheel is said to
be better because (1) self-existing wisdom is itself the primordial mode of
subsistence and (2) that view accords with the practice of the view that is
accepted in the profound tantras.
Dol-po-pa also makes a distinction in the applied practice of the
meaning of the last two wheels:253
Although the meaning of the last two wheels of doctrine are the
same as the Vajrayna, when they are practiced, one sets in

253

Dol-po-pa, ri chos nges don rgya mtsho, 181.2-181.4: khor lo phyi ma gnyis dang rdo

rje theg pai don gcig mod kyi nyams su len pa na la zlo ba chos nyid zab mo la khor lo
bar ba dang thun [read mthun] par rtog med spros bral du mnyam par bzhag nas rjes
thob tu shan byed pai tshe chos rnams la yang dag par so sor rtog pa na khor lo tha ma
dang rdo rje theg pa las gsungs pa bzhin du legs par rnam par phye ste. Translation
adopted from Jeffrey Hopkins, The Mountain Doctrine: Ocean of Definitive Meaning,
(Unpublished translation), 130-131.

121
equipoise in the conclusive (la zlo ba) profound suchness free from
constructs in accord with the middle wheel, and then when making
distinctions in post-meditation, one individually discriminates
phenomena in an authentic way, at which time one makes
identifications upon differentiating well in accord with what is said in
the last wheel and in the Vajrayna.
Dol-po-pa affirms that the meaning of both wheels is the same as the
Vajrayna, yet he makes a distinction between the ways the last two
wheels of doctrine are practiced. He depicts a practice in accord with the
middle wheel as setting in equipoise in the suchness free from constructs.
In post-meditation, he states that one makes distinctions in accord with
what is said in the last wheel and in the Vajrayna. In this way, both the
middle and last wheels are compatible with the Vajrayna in different
contexts. We can see how Dol-po-pas distinction resembles Mi-phams
depiction of Prsagika as the context of meditative equipoise and
Svtantrika as the context of post-meditation. Here, post-meditation is
associated with the last wheel.
Lo-chen also states how certain practices of his tradition accord for
the most part with Ngrjuna; however, he raises a question as to whether
the view in the Nying-ma tradition is in accord with Ngrjuna:254
In general, due to the essential point that the manner of taking the
bodhisattva vow stated in the tantras of Secret Mantra, and also the
enumerated trainings (bslab byai rkang grangs), are in accord for
the most part with the tradition of Ngrjuna, our tradition of old
translations following the master Padmasambhava appears to be in
accord with Ngrjuna also in the ritual practice (cho gai phyag
Lo-chen Dharma r, dpag bsam snye ma, 296.1-296.5: spyir gsang sngags kyi rgyud
sde rnams las gsungs pai byang sdom thob tshul dang/ dei bslab byai rkang grangs
kyang phal cher klu sgrub kyi lugs dang mthun par byung bai gnad kyis rang cag slob
dpon chen po padma sa bha wai rjes su jug pa snga gyur gyi ring lugs pa rnams kyi
sems bskyed kyi cho gai phyag bzhes kyang n gardzu na dang mthun par snang mod/
on kyang lta ba ni der ma nges te/ klu sgrub kyi bstod tshogs dang mi gal yang gtso bor
thogs med sku mched kyis ji ltar bkral ba dang mthun te/ rnam grangs ma yin pai don
dam med dgag la mi byed par ma yin dgag gi stong nyid la byed pai phyir dang/ khor lo
tha ma nges don du bzhed pai phyir ro.
254

122

bzhes) for generating the mind of awakening. However, it is not

certain that the [Nying-ma] view is [in accord with] his because
even though it does not contradict Ngrjunas Collection of
Praises, [the Nying-ma] for the most part (phal cher) are in accord
with the way that Asaga and his [half-]brother [Vasubandhu]
explain because of (1) taking (byed) the uncategorized ultimate as
not an existential negation, but taking it as an emptiness that is a
predicative negation, and (2) accepting (bzhed) the last wheel as
the definitive meaning.
Lo-chen suggests that the fact that the Nying-ma (1) accept the last wheel
as the definitive meaning and (2) take a predicative negation as the
uncategorized ultimate problematizes a simple identification with the view
of Ngrjuna. We will now turn to Mi-phams interpretation of emptiness
and see how he aligns his view with the Nying-ma tradition.

Emptinesss? Emptiness of Self/Other

Another Emptines
Mi-pham places himself within the tradition of Ngrjuna, Rongzom, and Long-chen-pa.

He states: I dont have any burden of

establishing the view of other-emptiness; [I am] in accord with the texts of

Ngrjuna, Long-chen-pa, and Rong-zom.255 He also wrote a text that
explicitly defends a view of other-emptiness, called Lions Roar: Asserting

Other-Emptiness,256 in which he states:257

First it is necessary to ascertain the lack of intrinsic nature of all
phenomena in accordance with the scriptures of the protector
Ngrjuna; because if this is not known, one will not be able to
ascertain the manner that relative [phenomena] are empty from
their own side (kun rdzob rang ngo[s] nas stong tshul) and the

Mi-pham, dam chos dogs sel, 521: bdag la gzhan stong sgrub pai khur kyang med/
rong klong rnam gnyis klu sgrub gzhung dang mthun.
256 Mi-pham, gzhan stong khas lan seng gei nga ro, Mi-phams Collected Works (sde dge
ed.) vol. 12. See English translation in John Pettit, Beacon of Certainty, 415-427.
257 Ibid., 361.3-361.4: dang po mgon po klu sgrub kyi gzhung bzhin du chos thams cad
255

rang bzhin med par gtan la bebs dgos te/ de ma shes na kun rdzob rang ngo[s] nas
stong tshul dang/ don dam gzhan gyis stong tshul gtan la mi pheb pas/ thog mar spros
bral so sor rang gis rig par bya bai gtan la dbab par byao.

123
manner that the ultimate is empty of what is other (don dam gzhan
gyis stong tshul). Therefore, one should first ascertain the freedom
from constructs which is what is known reflexively (so sor rang gis
rig bar bya ba).
Here Mi-pham delineates two manners of emptiness: (1) the manner that
relative phenomena are empty of their own essences and (2) the manner
that the ultimate is empty of what is other. He states that first one should
ascertain the freedom of constructs, the lack of intrinsic nature of
phenomena in accordance with the scriptures of Ngrjuna. Furthermore,
he states: Certainty in the equality of appearance and emptinessthe
Great Perfectionis seen only through the excellent scriptural tradition of
Ngrjuna.258
We will begin to assess Mi-phams view of emptiness by looking at
the positions of other-emptiness he critiques. Mi-pham characterizes the
position of other-emptiness as leaving an empty-ground (stong gzhi bzhag

nas gzhan stong pa).259 He distinguishes the meaning of emptiness from

that which is delineated as only a locative absence, an absence of one
thing in another:260
If a pot is not empty from its own side (rang ngos nas), but is empty
of another phenomenon, this is not sufficient (go mi chod) as the
emptiness of a pot itself. Just as a cow is absent in a horse, but
this is not sufficient as the emptiness of a horse itself; or while the
horn of an ox is empty of a rabbit horn, this is not sufficient as the
Mi-pham, dbu ma la jug pai grel pa (dbu ma la jug pai grel pa zla bai zhal lung dri
me shel phreng), Mi-phams Collected Works vol. 1, 813.6: snang stong mnyam par nges

258

shes rdzogs pa che/ /klu sgrub gzhung lugs bzang po kho nas mthong.
259 Mi-pham, nges shes sgron me, 6. Khen-po Nam-drl states that any emptiness with a
substrate (stong gzhi) is only a limited (nyi tshe ba) emptiness. Khen-po Nam-drl, nges
shes sgron me tape 11b.
260 Mi-pham, gzhung spyii dka gnad, 545.4-545.6: bum pa rang ngos nas ma stong na
chos gzhan gyis stong pas bum pa nyid stong pai go mi chod de/ rta la ba lang med
kyang/ rta rang nyid stong pai go mi chod pa dang gnag gi rwa ri bong rwas stong yang/
gnag gi rwa stong pai go mi chod pa bzhin no/ lang kar gshegs pa las stong pa bdun gyi
nang nas tha chad pa lha khang dge dun gyis stong pa lta bu di spang par bya zhes
gsung.

124
emptiness of an ox horn.
Among the seven types of
261
emptinesses
stated in the Lakvatrastra, it is inferior (tha
chad pa)such as a temples emptiness of a spiritual community
(dge dun); it is to be abandoned.
Mi-pham states that the lack of one thing in another is inferior and is not
sufficient as the meaning of emptiness. He explains that an emptiness of
another does not necessarily contain an emptiness of itself. Long-chen-pa
also cites in his Wish-Fulfilling Treasury the statement from the

Samdhirjastra that: An emptiness of one thing in another is a lesser

(tha shal) emptiness.262 However, in his auto-commentary of Resting in

the Nature of Mind, Long-chen-pa cites Asagas commentary on the

Uttaratantra263 in an approving portrayal of Buddha-nature as the absence
of something in another:264

The Dictionary of Internal Knowledge (nang rig pai tshig mdzod) delineates the seven
emptinesses (stong nyid rnam pa bdun) as: (1) emptiness of defining character, (2)

261

emptiness of the nature of entities, (3) emptiness of existence, (4) emptiness of nonexistence, (5) emptiness which is the inexpressibility of all phenomena, (6) great
emptiness which is the ultimate wisdom of Sublime Ones, (7) emptiness of something in
another. Pur-bu-tse-ring (phur bu tshe ring) (ed.), nang rig pai tshig mdzod (Beijing:
Nationalities Press, 1994), 515: 1. mtshan nyid stong pa nyid/ 2. dngos poi rang gzhin
stong pa nyid/ 3. srid pa stong pa nyid/ 4. mi srid pa stong pa nyid/ 5. chos thams cad
brjod du med pa stong pa nyid/ 6. don dam pa phags pai ye shes stong pa chen po nyid/
7. gcig gis gcig stong pa nyid.
262 Long-chen-pa, yid bzhin mdzod grel, vol. 2, 1095.1: gcig la gcig med pa rnams ni
stong pa nyid rnams kyi tha shal lo.
263 See Asagas commentary on Uttaratantra 1.155 in theg pa chen po mdo sdei rgyan
dang rgyud bla rtsa grel (Beijing: Nationalities Press, 1998), 201-202. This text is nearly
the same as Vasubandhus definition of emptiness referred to above, in his commentary
on the Madhyntavibhga under v.2, T.4027 (Tarthang Tulku ed.), 510.2-510.3.
264 Long-chen-pa, sems nyid ngal gsoi grel pa, 334.3-334.5: de bzhin gshegs pai snying

po ni rnam par dbye ba yod pa/ bral ba shes pa/ nyon mongs pai sbubs thams cad kyis
ni stong pa yin la/ rnam par dbye ba med pa bral mi shes pa bsam gyis mi khyab pai
sangs rgyas kyi chos gangi klung gi bye ma snyed las das pa ni mi stong ngo zhes so/
de ltar gang zhig gang na med pa de ni des stong ngo zhes yang dag par rjes su mthong
la/ gang zhig der lhag par gyur pa de ni/ de la rtag par yod do zhes yang dag pa ji [lta] ba
bzhin du shes so zhes so.

125
While Buddha-nature is empty of all that is divisible, separable, and
disturbed, it is said to be not empty of the inconceivable, indivisible,
and inseparable qualities of Buddha which are more numerous than
the sands of the river Ganges. In this, one sees authentically that
which does not exist in something, that something is empty of that;
and one authentically knows as it is that which remains always
exists there (de la).265
We can see a similarity between the depictions of a locative absence (1)
as an inferior view of emptiness and (2) as Buddha-nature. Perhaps a
distinction can be made between the two as to whether or not the
emptiness of another also contains within it an emptiness of itself. We will
see how Mi-pham distinguishes his view of Buddha-nature from mistaken
conceptions of it in the next chapter. Here we will discuss his delineation
in terms of emptiness.

Through this, we will be able to explore his

description of emptiness and the relationship between phenomena and

suchness. First, we will discuss his treatment of the ultimate in the view of
other-emptiness.

Delineating Phenomena and Suchness

Mi-pham states that in the view of other-emptiness, the ultimate
itself ultimately exists.

In contrast, he says that in the view of self-

emptiness nothing ultimately exists.

With this distinction, he identifies

himself with the tradition propounding self-emptiness:266

It is interesting to note that the word used is there (de la), as found in the translation
of Asagas Uttaratantra commentary, rather than here (dir) as in Dol-po-pa usage and
the Tibetan translation of Vasubandhu; there is more abstract, or more removed, than
herehere in this context can be seen to evoke more of the immanent presence of
Buddha-nature. Vasubandhus Madhyntavibhga commentary under v.2: di lhag ma
yod pa gang yin pa de ni dir yod. Vasubandhus Sanskit: yad punaratrvaiam bhavati
tat sadihsti. Published in Ramchandra Pandeya, Madhyntavibhga-stra (Delhi:
265

Motilal Banarsidass, 1999/1971), 9; Tibetan translation from T.4027, 510.2.

266 Mi-pham, gzhung spyii dka gnad, 450.2-450.3: rang stong pai lugs la don dam par

med pa sha stag pas/ don dam par yod pai chos mi srid la/ gzhan stong pai lugs la/ don
dam par med na kun rdzob dang/ don dam par yod la don dam rang nyid yin pai phyir ro/
rang lugs rab lan du gsal te rang stong smra bai lugs so.

126
In the tradition of self-emptiness, since there is only the ultimately
non-existent, an ultimately existing phenomenon is impossible. In
the tradition of other-emptiness, what is ultimately non-existent is
the relative, and what is ultimately existent is the ultimate itself. My
tradition is clear in the Rap-sel Rejoinder (rab lan),267 the tradition
propounding self-emptiness.
Mi-pham states that there is only the ultimately non-existent in the tradition
of self-emptiness. He states that nothing exists ultimately as non-empty in
this tradition.

Mi-pham identifies his tradition with the tradition

propounding self-emptiness; and thus he denies that anything ultimately

exists.
When we consider Mi-phams depiction of emptiness in light of selfemptiness and other-emptiness, we can see that according to Khen-po
Lo-dr-drak-pas definitions of a proponent of self-emptiness (claiming an
existential negation as the consummate ultimate) and other-emptiness
(claiming wisdom as as not empty of its own essence),268 Mi-pham is a
proponent of neither self-emptiness nor other-emptiness!
according

to

Lo-chens

definitions

of

self-emptiness

However,
and

other-

emptiness,269 we see how Mi-pham can be said to be a proponent of both

self-emptiness and other-emptiness! Thus, in order to make sense of Miphams interpretation of emptiness in relationship to the doctrines of selfemptiness and other-emptiness, we need to identify what these terms
mean in the works of the respective authors that use them. Mi-pham
defines himself as a proponent of self-emptiness in accord with his
definition of the term.270

rab gsal de nyid snang byed is the name of a text that Mi-pham wrote in response to
the criticism of Pa-ri-lo-zang-rap-sel (dpa ris blo bzang rab gsal, 1840-1910) concerning

267

Mi-phams commentary on the ninth chapter of the Bodhicaryvatra (sher leu grel pa
nor bu ke ta ka).
268 Khen-po Lo-dr-drak-pa, blo gsal yid kyi rgyan bzang, 243.7-244.1; 270.6-270.7, opt.

cit.
269
270

Lo-chen Dharma r, dpag bsam snye ma 373.5-373.6; 374.1-374.5, opt. cit.

There is some dispute among interpreters of Mi-pham, among Tibetan and non-

Tibetan scholars, as to whether Mi-phams view accords with other-emptiness or with

127
Although Mi-pham states that emptiness is the ultimate truth, he
does not affirm that anything, even emptiness, ultimately exists.
Furthermore, he says: The manner of establishing the ultimate of otheremptiness is by means of whether or not appearance accords with the
mode of subsistence.271 In Mi-phams delineation of the two models of the
two

truths

(i.e.,

appearance/emptiness

and

authentic/inauthentic

experience), he states that appearance in accord with the mode of

subsistence

(authentic

experience)

is

called

ultimate

from

the

perspective of conventional valid cognition:272

From the perspective of conventional valid cognition analyzing the
mode of appearance, the subjects and objects of the
incontrovertible accordance between the modes of appearance and
subsistence are called ultimate and the opposite are called
relative.
Thus, according to this delineation, the ultimate in other-emptiness is
ultimate from the perspective of conventional valid cognition. Moreover,
Mi-pham argues that the perspective of conventional valid cognition
cannot establish something to be not empty of its own essence. He states
that what is not empty of its own essence cannot be established by either
the conventional or ultimate valid cognitions:273
self-emptiness. It is first of all important to pay close attention to what these terms mean
in the contexts they are used. For a discussion of competing interpretations of Mi-phams
view, see Matthew Kapstein, Are We All Gzhan stong pas? Journal of Buddhist Ethics,
7 (2000): 105-125; Paul Williams, A Response to John Pettit, Journal of Buddhist
Ethics, 6 (1999): 1-11; John Pettit, Review of Altruism and Reality, Journal of Buddhist
Ethics, 6 (1999): 1-14.
271 Mi-pham, gzhung spyii bka gnad, 450.3-450.4: gzhan stong gi don dam sgrub tshul
de gnas snang mthun mi mthun gyi dbang du byas.
272 Mi-pham, dbu ma rgyan rtsa grel, 55-56, opt. cit.
273 Mi-pham, stong thun seng gei nga ro, 591.1-591.3: rang gi ngo bo mi stong par bden

par grub pa la chos gzhan gyi chos nyid du rung ba sogs rnam pa kun tu mi srid cing don
dam dpyod pai tshad mas gtan la phab pai grub bras su yang mi btub ste chos thams
cad bden med du dpyod pai lag rjes la bden grub gcig grub pa ni snang ba las mun pa
ltar gnas ma yin pai phyir ro/ /tha snyad dpyod pai tshad mas kyang bden grub mi grub
ste/ dei ngor bden par grub kyang de tsam gyis chos de mi stong par rnam pa kun tu

128
Not empty of its own essence, being truly established it is
completely impossible to be the suchness of an extrinsic
phenomenon (chos gzhan gyi chos nyid), etc. It also cannot be the
result of an ascertainment of valid cognition analyzing the ultimate
because the result of evidence for something truly established is
unacceptable, as a handprint [result] of the analysis of the lack of
true existence of all phenomenalike darkness [arising] from light.
True establishment is not established by conventional valid
cognition either because even though [it may appear to be] truly
established from that [conventional] perspective, by merely this
there is never an ability to establish phenomena to be non-empty.
Without being able to be established by the two valid cognitions,
the means of establishment has gone the way of a [non-existent]
space-flower; therefore, establishing this becomes meaninglessly
tiresome.
Mi-pham states that something truly established and not empty of its own
essence cannot result from ultimate valid cognition, which establishes the
lack of true existence. Nor can conventional valid cognition establish
something to be not empty of its own essence, even though it may appear
that way from a perspective of conventional valid cognition.
However, in his Lions Roar: Assertion of Other-Emptiness, Mipham shows how a view of a non-empty ultimate can be supported. He
argues that just as someone may assert that true establishment is to be
negated, but not its absence, in a similar way, one can assert that the
distorted relative is to be negated, but not the undistorted ultimate:274
The assertion that although true establishment is negated, the
absence of true existence is not negated, not to be negated, nor is
appropriate to be negated, is similar to [the assertion that] although
the relative distortions are negated, the undistorted ultimate is not
negated, not to be negated, nor is suitable to be negated.

grub mi nus pai phyir ro/ /tshad ma gnyis kyis sgrub ma nus par gyur pa la sgrub byed
nam mkhai me tog gi rjes su gro bas de sgrub pa don med kyi ngal par zad do.
274 Mi-pham, gzhan stong khas len seng gei nga ro, 370.3-370.4: bden grub khegs kyang
bden med mi khegs mi gog bkag mi rung bar dod pa ltar/ kun rdzob khrul pa rnams
khegs kyang don dam ma khrul pa mi khegs mi gog bkag mi rung bar mtshungs so.

129
Mi-pham argues that an assertion that one should not negate the absence
of true existence is similar to the assertion that one should not negate the
ultimate itself. In this way, Mi-pham shows a similarity between the two
claims that: (1) the absence of true existence (the ultimate in the
appearance/emptiness two-truth model) is not to be negated and (2) the
undistorted ultimate (the ultimate in the authentic/inauthentic experience
two-truth model) is not to be negated. Furthermore, he uses a similar
parallel consequence in his response to a hypothetical qualm:275
If a [conventional phenomenon like a] pot, were empty of pot, then
would it not be that a pot would not be a pot, and thus a pot would
not exist conventionally? [Response:] So be it. Hence, in the same
way, if the ultimate truth were empty of ultimate truth, then the
ultimate truth would not be ultimate truth, and thus the ultimate
would not exist even conventionally.
Mi-pham again shows how a consequence that is used to defend the
conventional existence of phenomena also can support a defense of the
(conventionally existent) ultimate truth: he shows the conventional nonexistence of the ultimate as an absurd consequence that would follow if
the ultimate truth were empty of ultimate truth. In this way, he shows how
an assertion that the ultimate truth is (conventionally) not empty of itself is
supported by the same logic that is used to defend a pots conventional
non-emptiness of itself. In doing so, Mi-pham depicts how affirmations of
the ultimate can be conventionally true, a move on par with an assertion
that emptiness conventionally exists.
In this way, we can see how a distinction can be made between
ultimate truth and ultimate existence.

In the contexts when such

distinctions are made, a similar distinction can be made between

conventional truth and conventional existence.

275

For instance, Mi-pham

Ibid., 374.5-374.6: bum pa bum pas stong na bum pa de bum pa min par gyur bas

bum pa tha snyad du med par mi gyur ram zhe na/ gyur du chug ste/ de lta na/ don dam
bden pa don dam bden pas stong na/ don dam bden pa don dam bden pa min par gyur
zhing/ don dam pa tha snyad du yang med par gyur ba mtshungs so.

130
shows that a pot is not empty of pot in terms of the conventional: In terms
of the conventional, I assert that a pot is not empty of pot, because if it
were empty conventionally, the pot would become non-existent.276
Moreover, Mi-pham states that from a conventional perspective, a pot is
truly established (bden grub) as a pot: A pot is necessarily truly
established as pot through conventional valid cognition, just like the truth
of causality and the truth of the three jewels.277 According to Mi-pham,
what is conventional is the realm of thought, words, and physical actions:
The conventional is posited as knowable, expressible, and applicable by
means of the mind, speech and body.278 Thus, a pot can be said to be a
conventionally existent phenomenon (since it can be thought, expressed,
and applied) and a conventional truth (from the aspect of its appearance).
Also, the emptiness of the pot, as an empty quality which is a referent of
thought and expression, can be said to be the [categorized] ultimate truth
and conventionally existent.

Although Mi-pham does not make this

distinction explicit in this way, we can see how such a distinction can be
made in his treatment of existence (yod pa) and truth (bden pa).279
Mi-pham, dbu ma la jug pai grel pa, 539.6: tha snyad kyi dbang du byas na/ bum pa
bum pas mi stong par dod de/ tha snyad du de stong na bum pa med par gyur. Tsong-

276

kha-pa makes a similar statement: The statement that: That a pot is not empty of pot,
but empty of true existence is an other-emptiness; therefore, a pot empty of pot is the
assertion of self-emptiness is utterly unreasonable because: if a pot were empty of pot, a
pot would have to be non-existent in itself, and if it were non-existent in itself, it would be
non-existent everywhere else, too; therefore, a pot would [absurdly] be utterly nonexistent. Tsong-kha-pa, dgongs pa rab gsal, 213: bum pa bum pas mi stong bar bum pa

bden pas stong pa ni/ gzhan stong yin pas bum pa bum pas stong pa ni rang stong yin no
zhes smra ba ni gtan nas mi rigs te/ bum pa bum pas stong na bum pa la bum pa med
dgos na/ rang la rang med na gzhan su la yang med pas bum pa gtan med par gyur ro.
277 Ibid., 540.1: tha snyad tshad mas bum pa bum pa nyid du bden par grub dgos te las
bras bden pa dang dkon mchog gsum bden pa bzhin no. See also Karma Phuntsho,
Miphams Dialectics and the Debates on Emptiness, 101.
278 Mi-pham, mkhas jug, 129: tha snyad de la shes brjod jug gsum du bzhag pa ni sems
dang ngag dang lus kyi sgo nas so.
For a discussion of this distinction in the works of Tsong-kha-pa, see Guy Newland,
The Two Truths, 93-94; Thupten Jinpa, Self, Reality and Reason in Tibetan Philosophy,

279

152-153.

131
Mi-pham delineates the criterion for existence through an
epistemological definition: via valid cognition, conventional or ultimate:280
In short, the conventional [existence] of that which is established to
exist in the perspective of conventional valid cognition cannot be
refuted by anyone at all. The conventional existence of that which
is invalidated by conventional valid cognition cannot be established
by anyone at all. Nobody at all can affirm that something is
ultimately existent which has been established to not exist by
ultimate valid cognition.
We can see a distinction in Mi-phams descriptions of ultimate truth
through his reliance on the framework of valid cognition.
Moreover,

distinction

between

ultimate

existence

and

conventional existence also plays a part in Mi-phams depiction of

reflexive awareness (rang rig) and the universal ground (kun gzhi). He
states

that

reflexive

awareness

and

the

universal

ground

are

conventionally existent, not ultimately existent:281

In the ascertainment of the ultimate, reflexive awareness and the
universal ground are not necessary.
However, they are
indispensable (med du mi rung) in the analysis of a conventional
presentation; and moreover, if it is established by valid cognition
analyzing the conventional, there is no reason to negate it, saying
it does not conventionally exist.

280

Mi-pham, dbu ma rgyan rtsa grel, 74-75: mdor na tha snyad kyi tshad mai ngor yod

par grub na de tha snyad du sus kyang dgag mi nus la/ tha snyad pai tshad mas gnod pa
yod na de tha snyad du yod par sus kyang sgrub mi nus shing/ don dam pai tshad mas
med par grub pa de don dam par yod do zhes sus kyang sgrub mi nus.
281 Mi-pham, sher grel ke ta ka, 31: don dam pa gtan la bebs pa la rang rig dang kun
gzhi mi dgos mod/ tha snyad kyi rnam bzhag dpyod pa la med du mi rung zhing tha
snyad dpyod pai tshad mas grub na de tha snyad du med ces gog pai rigs pa ni med
do. See also Pd-pa Tulku, lta grub shan byed grel pa, 187.

132
He argues that the universal ground and reflexive awareness, while not
necessary in the ascertainment of the ultimate, are indispensable in an
analysis of conventional reality.282
Conventional existence also plays a role in the way that Mi-pham
shows how conventions such as innate mind (gnyug sems) and great
bliss (bde ba chen po) can be compatible with Prsagika:283
In general in the Prsagika tradition, the collection of six
consciousnesses is accepted, and there is no presentation of
reflexive awareness and so forth, as it is clear from their texts. Yet
how is it that just because there is no assertion conventionally in
that [tradition] that one must necessarily understand that [these]
definitely do not exist conventionally? For example, like the fact
that although there is no point in using conventions such as innate
mind and great bliss in the Prsagika tradition, it is not that these
are conventionally unreasonable.
Through the status of existing conventionally, he shows how such
conventions as reflexive awareness, innate mind, and great bliss are not
necessarily incompatible with the Prsagika tradition.

282

Mi-pham states that in the end, inference (rjes dpag) comes down to direct perception

(mngon sum), and direct perception to reflexive awareness; hence, reflexive awareness
is indispensable when asserting a presentation of valid cognition of confined perception.
Mi-pham, dbu ma rgyan rtsa grel, 208. Regarding the universal ground, Mi-pham states
that the universal ground, along with the other consciousnesses, all need to be accepted
to account for their transformation into the five wisdoms according to stra and tantra.
Mi-pham, rab gsal de nyid snang byed, 356-357. The universal ground becomes the
wisdom of the expanse of phenomena (chos dbyings ye shes), the universal ground
consciousness becomes the mirror-like wisdom (me long lta bui ye shes), the afflicted
mind becomes the discriminating wisdom (so sor rtog pai ye shes), the mental
consciousness becomes the wisdom of equality (mnyam nyid ye shes), and the five
sense consciousnesses become the accomplishing wisdom (bya ba grub pai ye shes).
283 Mi-pham, brgal lan nyin byed snang ba, 561: spyir dbu ma thal gyur pai lugs la rnam

shes tshogs drug tu bzhes pa dang/ rang rig gi rnam bzhag sogs ma mdzad pa ni rang
gzhung na gsal mod/ der tha snyad du zhal bzhes med pa tsam zhig gis tha snyad du
med nges su go dgos pai nges pa ga la yod de/ dper na thal gyur pai lugs la gnyug
sems dang bde ba chen po sogs kyi tha snyad sbyar don med kyang de dag tha snyad
du mi thad pa ma yin pa bzhin no.

133
Furthermore, in a compilation of Mi-phams oral instructions entitled

Trilogy of Innate Mind (gnyug sems skor gsum), Mi-pham states that
conventionally, suchness is called the great permanence (rtag pa chen

po), but that this does not designate a permanent entity or an

impermanent entity:284
Although suchness, together with the appearances that arise from
the self-expression of suchness (chos nyid kyi rang rtsal), are all
ultimately beyond the extremes of entities and non-entities,
conventionally, there is the designation (tha snyad byed) the great
permanence; it is neither a momentary impermanent entity, nor a
permanent, steadfast (ther zug) entity. Although it is unchanging, it
is not a mere absence that is a non-entity either. Therefore, since
the basis of imputation (gdags pai gzhi) of great permanence
exists, it is not like the assertion of non-entities as permanent
because when the imputation of the permanence of [non-entities]
such as space is analyzed, even though it exists as the mere
inverse of impermanence (mi rtag pa las log pa), there is no basis
of imputation at all for permanence.
Mi-pham affirms that conventionally there is the designation great
permanence and the basis of its designation exists.
Mi-pham also delineates the ultimate and conventional in a
description of the relationship between mind (sems) and wisdom. In this,
we see how Mi-pham depicts the relationship between phenomena (chos

can) and suchness (chos nyid): The suchness of consciousness is

Mi-pham, gnyug sems, book 2 (gnyug sems od gsal gyi don la dpyad pa rdzogs pa
chen po gzhi lam bras bui shan byed blo gros snang ba), Mi-phams Collected Works
(sde dge ed.), vol. 24, 476.1-476.4: chos nyid dang chos nyid kyi rang rtsal las shar bai
snang ba dang bcas pa thams cad don dam par dngos dngos med kyi mtha las das
kyang/ tha snyad du rtag pa chen poi tha snyad byed de/ skad cig mai mi rtag pai dngos
poang min/ rtag pa ther zug dngos poang min/ gyur ba med kyang dngos med stong
kyang yang min pas/ rtag pa chen por gdags pai gzhi yod pas dngos med la rtag par
dod pa dang mi dra ba ste/ mkha sogs rtag par gdags pa la dpyad na mi rtag pa las log
tsam yod kyang/ rtag par gdags pai gzhi gang yang med do.
284

134
wisdom.285 He states that mind and wisdom are conventionally not the
same, but ultimately are not different:286
Therefore, the two: (1) phenomena, which are the eight collections
of consciousness, and (2) the wisdom that is suchness (chos nyid
kyi ye shes), which is the nature of those [consciousnesses], are
not asserted as either the same or different. As Long-chen-rap-jam
stated in accordance with the words in the Sadhinirmocana:
The character (mtshan nyid) of the conditioned realm and
the ultimate,
Is the character free from being the same or different;
Thus, those who conceive [them] as the same or different
Have entered into an improper view.
Therefore, conventionally, the two are not the same because (1)
wisdom, the suchness of mind, is not realized by merely realizing
the mind and (2) [mind and wisdom] are phenomena and suchness.
Ultimately, they are not different because, due to the nature of mind
being wisdom (1) when wisdom is realized, the mind is also not
observed as different from that [wisdom] and (2) when wisdom is
realized, the mind arises as self-liberated.
Mi-pham states that consciousness and wisdom are not said to be the
same conventionally, because they are related as phenomena and
suchness; however, ultimately they are not different, because the nature
of mind itself is wisdom. Furthermore, he says:287

285
286

Ibid., 446.5-446.6: rnam shes kyi chos nyid ni ye shes so.

Ibid., 447.2-448.1: des na rnam shes tshogs brgyad chos can dang/ dei rang bzhin

chos nyid kyi ye shes gnyis ni/ gcig tha dad gang duang khas blangs bya min par/
dgongs grel las/ du byed khams dang don dam mtshan nyid ni/ /gcig dang tha dad bral
bai mtshan nyid te/ gcig dang tha dad du yang gang rtog pa/ /de dag tshul min lta la
zhugs pa yin/ /zhes gsungs pai lung bzhin klong chen rab byams kyis gsungs la/ dei
phyir de gnyis tha snyad du gcig ma yin te/ sems rtogs pa tsam gyis sems kyi chos nyid
ye shes mi rtogs pa dang/ chos dang chos nyid yin pa sogs kyi phyir ro/ don dam par tha
dad min te/ sems kyi rang bzhin ye shes yin pas/ ye shes rtogs dus sems kyang de las
tha dad du ma dmigs pai phyir dang/ ye shes rtogs tshe sems rang grol du char ba. See
also, Mi-pham, stong thun seng gei nga ro, 585.1-585.2.
287 Mi-pham, gnyug sems book 1, 372.3-372.4: ye shes ni sems las byung ba ma yin te/
sems kyi gnas lugs rang bzhin od gsal yin pas/ dngos po kun gyi chos nyid stong pa nyid
ni dngos poi gnas lugs yin gyi dngos po las byung ba min pa ltar go dgos.

135
One should understand that wisdom does not arise from mind, but
is the abiding reality of mind, due to being the natural luminous
clarity; in the way that emptiness, suchness, does not arise from
entities, but is the abiding reality of all entities.
In this way, Mi-pham depicts the relationship between mind and wisdom in
the same way as he describes the relationship between phenomena and
suchnessneither the same nor different; that is, neither (conventionally)
the same nor (ultimately) different. As with mind and wisdom, neither
sasra and nirva, nor the two truths as authentic/inauthentic
experience, are a unity in conventional terms; the presence of one entails
the absence of the other. Mi-pham states: It is not at all possible to
conventionally be both the mistaken sasra and the unmistaken
nirva.288 Thus, the two truths are a unity in terms of the two truths as
appearance/emptiness, but the two truths as authentic/inauthentic
experience is a different case.

Delineating Emptiness
Mi-pham critiques mistaken conceptions of suchness as an emptyground. In his commentary on the Madhyamaklakra, he argues:289
Without gaining certainty in primordial purity, merely an
impassioned thought (snying la brnag pa) of a ground that is neither
existent nor non-existent will bring you nowhere. If you hold onto
such a ground, which is empty of both existence and nonexistence, as separate and established by its own essence,
whether it is called the inconceivable Self, Brahma, Viu, vara,
wisdom, etc., it is merely a different name for a similar [mistaken]
Mi-pham, gzhan stong khas len seng gei nga ro, 369.3: khrul pai khor ba dang ma
khrul pai myang das gnyis ka yin pa tha snyad du nam yang mi srid la.
289 Mi-pham, dbu ma rgyan rtsa grel, 471: ka dag la nges pa ma rnyed par yod paang
min med paang min pai gzhi zhig snying la brnag pa tsam gyis ni gar yang mi phyin te/
de dra bai yod med gnyis kyis stong pai stong gzhi logs su ngo bos grub par bzung na/
dei ming la bsam mi khyab pai bdag gam/ tshangs paam/ khyab jug gam/ dbang phyug
gam/ ye shes sogs ji btags kyang ming tsam las don dra ba yin no/ mtha bzhii spros
bral gyi gnas lugs so so rang rig par bya bai od gsal rdzogs pa chen po ni de dra ba
zhig yin tshod mi gda bas.
288

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meaning. The abiding reality that is free from the four extremes
the luminous clarity of the Great Perfection which is realized
reflexivelyis not at all like that.
Mi-pham claims that without gaining certainty in primordial purity, holding
onto an empty-ground as the abiding reality is not the correct view.
Furthermore, he states:290
Although traditions may claim to be free from extremes, in the end
since they constantly depend (mu brten) upon a conceptual
reference (blo yi gtad so) for a Self, or Brahma, etc., how could this
manner be the Middle Way?
Mi-pham distinguishes the manner of the Middle Way as beyond
conceptual reference. He says that the middle (dbus) is not a referent
object (mi dmigs pa): The middle expresses the lack of reference to any
extreme.291 Furthermore, he states: It is said that the middle should not
be identified as a referent object that abides like the space between two
aligned pillars; the middle is not what is observed (mi dmigs par).292 In
contrast to Dol-po-pas depiction of suchness as a third category, Mi-pham
emphasizes emptiness as beyond reference and conceptuality.

freedom from constructs is a central part of Mi-phams characterization of

emptiness.
Mi-pham also claims: Middle Way reasoning will inevitably refute
whatever object the mind takes as support (rten cha bai yul).293 He
depicts the meaning of emptiness as distinct from determinate
conceptions of a metaphysical referent. Thus, emptiness is not what is

Ibid., 470-471: lugs de dag kyang mtha dang bral ba skad du chad kyang/ mthar
gtugs na bdag gam tshangs pa sogs blo yi gtad so zhig la mu brten nas yod pas dbu mai
tshul ga la yin.
291 Mi-pham, rab gsal de nyid snang byed, 294: dbus zhes pa mtha gang laang mi dmigs
pa la brjod.
292 Ibid., 291: dbus zhes pa ka ba gnyis bsgrig gi bar mtshams lta bu dmigs pa can zhig la
gnas par bya bai yul du ngos ma bzung ste/ dbus mi dmigs par gsungs.
293 Mi-pham, dbu ma rgyan rtsa grel, 368: blos rten cha bai yul gang yin pa dbu mai
rigs pas sun phyung mi nus pa mi srid.
290

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held as either (1) a substrate, or (2) a quality of absence. In his Lions

Roar: Asserting Other-Emptiness, Mi-pham states:294

Just as the assertion of the absence of true existence can become
an incorrigible view (gsor mi rung bai lta ba) of emptiness as a
reified sign (mtshan mar zhen pa) of a non-entity, similarly, the
assertion of a freedom from constructs can become an incorrigible
view in which emptiness is a referent object (dmigs pa) of an
ineffable entity.
Mi-pham argues that emptiness can be reified as a sign of a non-entity;
similarly, it can become a referent object of an ineffable entity.

He

emphasizes that suchness is beyond conceptual reference:295

As long as the mind remains with reference (dmigs pa can) or with
a perceiver-perceived [duality] (gzung dzin dang bcas pa),
appearance does not accord with the mode of subsistence;
suchness is not the object of a mind with a perceiver-perceived
[duality].
Appearance does not accord with the mode of subsistence when the mind
remains with reference or is dualistic. Thus, the ultimate, or suchness, is
not an object of a dualistic mind. Furthermore, he states:296
Those who emphatically claim that an inferential cognition
analyzing the ultimate, or a wisdom that realizes the ultimate
through direct perception, sees the essence of an object or even
finds it, no matter how much they refute other-emptiness, the heart
294

Mi-pham, gzhan stong khas len seng gei nga ro, 368.4-368.5: bden med khas blangs

pas stong nyid dngos por med pai mtshan mar zhen pai gsor mi rung bai lta bar gyur
ba dang/ spros bral khas blangs pas stong nyid ni brjod du med pai dngos por dmigs pai
lta bar gyur ba mtshungs so.
295 Mi-pham, rab gsal de nyid snang byed, 375: ji srid dmigs pa can nam gzung dzin
dang bcas pai blo la gnas pa de srid du gnas snang mi mthun te/ chos nyid ni gzung
dzin dang bcas pai bloi yul min no.
296 Ibid., 545: don dam dpyod pai rjes dpags sam don dam mngon sum rtogs pai ye shes
kyi yul gyi ngo bo di zhes rnyed paang gzigs so zhes nan gyis khas len pa de dag gis
gzhan stong ji ltar bkag kyang rang gi zhe phug gzhan stong gis dbang byas pa ma tshor
ba tsam du zad do. See also Karma Phuntsho, Miphams Dialectics and the Debates on
Emptiness, 165.

138
of their own view (zhe phug) has fallen under the power of otheremptiness (gzhan stong gis dbang byas pa) and they just dont
know it.
In this way, Mi-pham characterizes the ultimate as that which transcends
thought and language:297
The ultimate mode of subsistence of entitiesfree from all
extremes of existence, non-existence, both, and neitheris
therefore not the domain of mind; mind and language are relative,
not ultimate.
Mi-pham describes the ultimate mode of subsistence as beyond the
domain of mind. He states that conventionally the ultimate can be said to
be an object of knowledge, but not ultimately:298
Conventionally, based on taking the meditative equipoise of the
Sublime Ones as the subject and the expanse of phenomena as
the object, it is suitable to say [the ultimate] is an object of
knowledge (shes bya); however, if this [ultimate] is said to be
ultimately what is apprehended or known by a meditative equipoise
without perceiver-perceived [duality]are these words not explicitly
and implicitly in contradiction? Moreover, the claim that the ultimate
is an object of knowledge, because the basis of division of the two
truths is objects of knowledge, is also by exclusion (rnam gcod du);
here it is [said to] not [be] an object of knowledge determined by
inclusion (yongs gcod du); therefore, there is no contradiction. If
one accepts that [the ultimate] is also an object of knowledge
determined by inclusion, then emptiness is asserted as an entity.

Mi-pham, sher grel ke ta ka, 11: dngos poi gnas tshul don dam pa ni yod pa dang/
med pa dang/ gnyis ka/ gnyis min gyi mtha kun dang bral bas na blo yi spyod yul min te/
blo dang sgra ni kun rdzob yin gyi don dam pa ma yin pai phyir ro.
298 Ibid., 13: tha snyad du ni phags pai mnyam bzhag yul can dang/ chos kyi dbyings yul
du byas pa la brten nas shes bya yin no zhes brjod rung gi don dam par gzung dzin med
pai mnyam bzhag gis di gzung byaam shes bya yin zer na tshig de dngos shugs mi gal
lam/ yang bden gnyis kyi dbye gzhi shes bya yin pas don dam shes byar khas blangs pa
de yang rnam bcod du yin la/ dir shes bya min pa ni yongs gcod du yin pas mi gal te/
yongs gcod duang shes byar khas len na stong nyid dngos por zhal gyis bzhes par gyur.
297

139
He states that the ultimate asserted as an object of knowledge is an object
of knowledge by exclusion; it is known through explicitly negating what it is
not.299 The ultimate cannot be an object of knowledge as determined by

inclusionthrough affirming what it isbecause that would turn

emptiness into an entity. Furthermore, Mi-pham states that the assertions
that the ultimate both is and is not an object of knowledge are not
necessarily a contradiction when the former is the ultimate that can be
known through exclusion and the latter is the ultimate that cannot be
known through inclusion.
The delineation of the ultimate as not the domain of mind is found
in a description of the two truths from ntidevas Bodhicaryvatra:300
The relative and the ultimate, these are asserted as the two truths.
The ultimate is not the domain of mind; the [domain of] mind is
relative.
Pd-pa Tulku states that the defining characteristic (mtshan nyid) of the
ultimate is expressed by means of exclusion (rnam gcod) by ntideva in
the Bodhicaryvatra, and by means of inclusion (yongs gcod) by
Candrakrti in the Madhyamakvatra:301
In the root text and [auto-]commentary of the Madhyamakvatra,
the defining characteristic of the ultimate is posited by means of
inclusion; in the context of the wisdom chapter of the
Tsong-kha-pa claims that the basis of division of the two truths is objects of
knowledge: There are many ways of asserting the basis of division of the two truths;
here it is done as objects of knowledge. Tsong-kha-pa, dgongs pa rab gsal, 176: bden
pa gnyis kyi dbye gzhi la dod tshul mi dra ba mang mod/ dir shes bya la bya ste. See
also Guy Newland, The Two Truths, 59.
300 ntideva, Bodhicaryvatra 9.2: kun rdzob dang ni don dam ste/ /di ni bden pa gnyis
su dod/ /don dam blo yi spyod yul min/ /blo ni kun rdzob yin par brjod. Published in
byang chub sems dpai spyod pa la jug pa rtsa ba dang grel ba (Sichuan: Nationalities
299

Press, 1990), 103.

301 Pd-pa Tulku, lta grub shan byed grel pa, 131: jug pa rtsa grel du/ yongs gcod kyi

sgo nas don dam pai mtshan nyid jog par mdzad pa dang/ spyod jug sher leu skabs su
rnam gcod kyi sgo nas/ don dam pai mtshan nyid bstan zhing/ gzhung gnyis kar yongs
gcod kyi sgo nas kun rdzob bden pai mtshan nyid bstan.

140

Bodhicaryvatra, the defining characteristic of the ultimate is

indicated by means of exclusion. Both scriptures indicate the
defining characteristic of the relative by means of inclusion.
Pd-pa

Tulku

states

that

the

ultimate

delineated

in

the

Madhyamakvatrathe object of authentic seeingis indicated by

means of inclusion. The ultimate delineated in the Bodhicaryvatranot
the domain of mindis indicated by means of exclusion.

Both texts

indicate the relative by means of inclusion, namely, false seeings in the

Madhyamakvatra and the [domain of] mind in the Bodhicaryvatra.302

Pd-pa Tulku describes the relationship between the two truths in
the Svtantrika traditions categorized ultimate as the same with different
contradistinctions (ngo bog cig la ldog pa tha dad), only conceptually
distinct. In the Prsagika tradition, based on the uncategorized ultimate,
he states that the two truths are neither one nor many (gcig du bral).
Also, he says that there is another way the relationship is described, by
means of whether or not it is established in the abiding reality (gnas lugs

la grub ma grub), which is the two truths of authentic/inauthentic

experience as the objects of conventional valid cognition of pure vision
(tha snyad dag gzigs tshad mai yul).303

Candrakrti, Madhyamakvatra 6.23: [Buddha] said that all entities found by

authentic and false seeing are apprehended as two essences: That which is the object of
authentic seeing is suchness, false seeings are relative truths. opt. cit.
303 Pd-pa Tulku, lta grub shan byed grel pa, 142: spyir rang rgyud pai lugs kyi rnam
302

grangs dpyod pai tshad mai yul gyi don dam la ltos pai bden gnyis gzhir bzhag na/ bden
gnyis ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad du rnam par dbye ba las os med kyang/ mthar thug
thal gyur lta bai lugs kyi rnam grangs ma yin pa dpyod pai tshad mai yul du gyur pai
don dam la ltos pai bden pa gnyis ni ngo bo gcig du bral du bzhed pa lags so/ /on kyang
skabs ga zhig tu ni/ tha snyad dag gzigs tshad mai yul du gyur pai gnas snang chos kyi
bden gnyis ni/ gnas snang mthun pai rang bzhin dag pa myang das kyi chos dang mi
mthun pai rang bzhin ma dag khor bai chos gnyis gnas lugs la grub ma grub kyi sgo nas
dngos po med pa ltar gcig pa bkag pai zhal bzhes mdzad do/ /on kyang stong thun sogs
las ni khor das gnyis chos can chos nyid kyi tshul du gcig du bral gyi zhal bzhes kyang
snang ngo.

141
In general, based upon the Svtantrika traditions ultimate that
depends upon two truthswhich is an object of the valid cognition
analyzing the categorized [ultimate]it is not appropriate for the
two truths to be divided other than as essentially the same with
different contradistinctions. However, the two truths that depend
upon the consummate Prsagika traditions view of the ultimate
which is the object of valid cognition analyzing (dpyod pa) the
uncategorizedare asserted as neither one nor many. Moreover,
in certain contexts, the two truths of phenomena that appear in
accordance with the mode of subsistencewhich are the objects of
conventional valid cognition of pure visionby means of whether or
not they are established in the mode of subsistence, the two: (1)
the phenomena of nirva, which are the natural purity of
appearance in accord with the mode of subsistence, and (2) the
phenomena of sasra, which are the natural impurity of
appearance that does not accord with the mode of subsistence, are
asserted, like a non-entity, as the negation of being one (gcig pa
bkag pa). However, in [Mi-phams] Exposition [of Buddha-Nature]
and so forth, the twosasra and nirvaappear to also be
asserted as neither the same nor different in the manner of qualitybearer (chos can) and suchness (chos nyid).
Pd-pa Tulku states that Mi-pham, in texts such as the Lions Roar:

Exposition of Buddha-Nature, asserts the relationship between the two

truths as neither the same nor different. We saw above how Dol-po-pa
articulates the relationship between suchness and phenomena are
different in the sense of negating that they are one entity (ngo bo gcig pa

bkag pai tha dad);304 and furthermore, how he states that a predicative
negation exists within the ground of an existential negation.305 We will now
assess how Mi-pham depicts existential and predicative negations.

Emptiness as the Unity of Appearance and Emptiness

Mi-pham states that an emptiness that is understood as separate
from appearance is a predicative negation. He claims that a predicative

304

Dol-po-pa, ri chos nges don rgya mtsho, 384.4-384.5, opt. cit.

305

Dol-po-pa, ri chos nges don rgya mtsho, 88.3-88.4, opt. cit.

142
negation does not have the meaning of unity because it establishes the
essence of another phenomenon (chos gzhan gyi ngo bo sgrub):306
The indication that entities lack intrinsic nature is an existential
negation because a predicative negation establishes the essence
of another phenomenon; as such it does not have the meaning of
unity. Although appearances are designated as lacking intrinsic
nature, if this is understood to mean something empty separate
from appearance, even though it may be called an existential
negation it has become a predicative negation. Appearance itself
appears while non-existent, it is a unitymarvelousthus, through
abiding as the ineffable indivisibility of appearance and emptiness,
it is beyond the mind because it is free from negation and
affirmation in the consummate meaning (mthar thug gi don).
Mi-pham asserts that the indication that entities lack intrinsic nature is an
existential negation.

He says that an emptiness that is separate from

appearance is not an existential negation, but is in fact a predicative

negation because such a conception establishes the essence of another
phenomenon.307 He thus depicts existential negations as better indicators
of emptiness than predicative negations.308 In this way, he emphasizes
that emptiness is beyond mind. As such, appearance itself appears while
Mi-pham, dbu ma rgyan rtsa grel, 380-381: dngos po rang bzhin med par bstan pa ni
med par dgag pa ste/ ma yin dgag ni chos gzhan kyi ngo bo sgrub pas de dra la zung
jug gi don med la/ snang ba rang bzhin med par gdags paang/ snang ba las logs na
stong rgyu yod pa lta bur go na med dgag zer yang ma yin dgag tu song ba yin la/ snang
ba nyid med bzhin snang ba ni zung jug ste ngo mtshar che zhing/ de ltar snang stong
dbyer med brjod bral du gnas pas na mthar thug gi don la dgag sgrub dang bral bas blo
das pa yin no.
306

We can see a similar distinction between existential negations in the way that Khenpo Nam-drl depicts an existential negation negating one extreme (mtha gcig dgag pai
med dgag) and an existential negation free from [all] extremes (mtha bral med dgag).
Khen-po Nam-drl, nges shes sgron me tape 3a.
308 Thus, we can see that Anne Klein misrepresents Mi-pham when she uses him to
support her overly generalized claim that: For Rnying-ma [Nying-ma], the significant
unconditioned is not a mere negation but an affirming negative (paryudsapratiedha,
ma yin dgag). Anne Klein, Mental Concentration and the Unconditioned: A Buddhist
Case for Unmediated Experience, in Robert Buswell and Robert Gimello (eds.), Paths of
307

Liberation (Kuroda Institute: University of Hawaii Press, 1992), 270.

143
non-existent and emptiness is not delimited to merely the quality of
absence separate from appearance, or to a substrate that is detached
from phenomena.
Mi-pham states that in terms of only the manner of emptiness, the
Nying-ma view is an existential negation, and adds that Candrakrti and
Rong-zom (rong zom chos kyi bzang po, ca. 11th c.) both affirm the great
emptiness of primordial purity:309
It is said that the Ge-luk (dge ldan) view is an existential negation,
Other traditions speak of a predicative negation
If one asks, Which is the tradition of the early translations [of
Nying-ma]?
Considering only the manner of emptiness
When questioned [what is the Nying-ma view], it is only an
existential negation.
The glorious Candrakrti in the Noble Land [of India]
And Rong-zom-ch-zang in Tibet
Established with one viewpoint and one voice
The great emptiness of primordial purity.
Mi-pham affirms that concerning only the manner of emptiness, the Nyingma view is an existential negation. However, he also states that since
wisdom transcends the mind and is not the domain of thoughts and words,
there is no partiality for existential negations or predicative negations,
emptiness or appearance:310
Since wisdom transcends the mind,
It is inconceivable by an extrinsic thought (rtog pa gzhan).
Since it is not an object of language or thought
Mi-pham, nges shes sgron me, 5: dge ldan lta ba med dgag zer/ /gzhan rnams ma yin
dgag tu smra/ /snga gyur ring lugs gang zhes na/ /stong tshul kho na bsam nas ni/ /dri na
med dgag nyid yin te/ /phags yul dpal ldan zla ba dang/ /bod na rong zom chos bzang
gnyis/ /dgongs pa gcig dang dbyangs gcig gis/ /ka dag stong pa chen po bsgrubs.
310 Ibid., 49: sems das ye shes yin pai phyir/ /rtog pa gzhan gyis bsam mi khyab/ /de ni
sgra rtog yul min phyir/ /med dgag ma yin dgag sogs dang/ /tha dad dang ni snang stong
sogs/ /ris su chad pa med pa ste. Brackets in nges shes gron me translations, here and
below, are taken from glosses in Khen-po Kn-pals interlinear commentary, blo gros
snang bai sgo byed.
309

144
There is no partiality for (ris su chad pa med)
Existential negations or predicative negations,
Difference, appearance or emptiness, etc.
Furthermore, Mi-pham states:311
From the perspective of the great wisdom of unity
The elimination of the object of negation by non-existent
Implies neither a mere existential absence nor a predicative
negation
What other phenomenon is there to imply by negation?
Both of these are merely mental imputations
I assert neither as the [consummate] meaning.
Mi-pham distinguishes the view from the perspective of wisdom as neither
an existential negation nor a predicative negation.

In this way, he

represents emptiness in the view of wisdom as not a negation (since it is

not the referent of thought or words). However, he describes the negative

language used to express emptiness as only an existential negation:312

In the context of indicating emptiness (stong pa nyid ston pai skabs
su), the negation of form, etc. is only an existential negation. Since
a predicative negation is also in the end a fixation upon an entity
(dngos por zhen pas), it is not suitable to be the meaning of
emptiness. Therefore, while it is an existential negation, due to
appearing as an unfailing dependent arising, it is the unity of
emptiness and appearance so any apprehension of negation or
affirmation should deconstruct (gzhig).
He states that an indication of emptiness (e.g., the negating language
expressed) is only an existential negation because a predicative negation

311

Mi-pham, nges shes sgron me, 5: zung jug ye shes chen poi ngor/ /med ces dgag

bya bkag shul gyi/ /med rkyang dang ni ma yin zhes/ /bkag shul chos gzhan ci zhig phen/
de gnyis blo yis brtag pa tsam/ /don la gnyis kar khas mi len.
312 Mi-pham, sher grel ke ta ka, 10: stong pa nyid ston pai skabs su gzugs la sogs pa
dgag pa ni med dgag kho na yin te/ ma yin par bkag kyang mthar gtugs na dngos por
zhen pas stong nyid kyi don du mi rung bas med par dgag pa yin bzhin du/ rten byung
bslu med du snang bas snang stong zung du jug pas na dgag sgrub kyi dzin stangs zhig
gzhig dgos te.

145
is in the end a fixation upon an entity.

Thus, Mi-pham suggests that

emptiness represented by a predicative negation is a reification of

emptiness, not the authentic emptiness.
In any case, Mi-pham argues that in order to recognize the ultimate,
it is necessary to reach a firm conclusion (phu thag chod) on the absence
of true existence: In order to recognize the own face of the ultimate, one
must reach a firm conclusion on the absence of true existence.313
Moreover, he explains that it does not help to merely aspire to an
absence, without knowing the manner of its absence. He uses as an
analogy in the way that just thinking, there is no snake does not remedy
the confusion of seeing a multi-colored rope as a snake, but through
seeing the manner of its absence, the confusion is relinquished:314
Based on this clinging to the entities of self and other
One continuously enters the stream of [cyclic] existence.
The antidote that averts these
Is the mode of apprehension of the absence of self.
Moreover, without knowing the manner of its absence
Wishing for its absence does not help,
Like when a multi-colored rope is mistaken for a snake
It does not help to think there is no snake, but
When the manner of its absence is seen, it is abandoned.

Mi-pham, nges shes sgron me, 14: don dam rang ngo shes pa la/ /bden stong phu
thag chod pa dgos. We find a similar statement by Tsong-kha-pa: Realization of special
insight (lhag mthong) will not occur without the certainty of the view that has reached a
firm conclusion (phu thag chod) on the meaning of the absence of self. Tsong-kha-pa,
lam rim chen mo (Qinghai: Nationalities Press, 2000/1985), 783: bdag med pai don la
phu thag chos pai lta bai nges pa med na lhag mthong gi rtogs pa mi skye ste. See also
Thupten Jinpa, Self, Reality and Reason in Tibetan Philosophy (London:
RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 179.
314 Mi-pham, nges shes sgron me, 15-16: bdag gzhan dngos dzin dir brten nas/ /srid pai
313

chu bo brgyud mar jug /di dag zlog pai gnyen po ni/ /bdag med pa yi dzin stangs yin/
/de yang med tshul ma shes par/ /med par mos pas mi phan te/ /thag khrar sbrul du khrul
ba la/ sbrul med snyam pas mi phan kyang/ /med tshul mthong na spangs pa bzhin. The
example of the snake can be found in the Madhyamakvatra 6.141, in dbu ma la jug
pai rang grel, 262.

146
The antidote that eradicates clinging to the entities of self and other is the
apprehension of the absence of self. However, Mi-pham argues that an
emptiness that is apprehended solely as an absence is not the abiding
reality:315
Only in the beginning, if a lack of true existence is not taught, there
will be no method to extract (jil ba) the beginningless habit of the
mistaken apprehension of entities; and if merely that [lack of true
existence] is taught as the ultimate, some narrow-minded (blo
chung ba) people will think, the mere absence that is the
elimination of the object of negation is the abiding reality! Grasping
at emptiness, this will become an incorrigible view. There are two
ways to grasp also: grasping at emptiness as an entity and
grasping at emptiness as a non-entity.
The absence of true existence is taught to eliminate the mistaken
apprehension of entities.

However, the mere absence that is the

elimination of the object of negation is not the abiding reality. Thus, the
empty quality conceived as distinct from an empty substrate is not the
meaning of emptiness. In this way, Mi-pham distinguishes his view from a
view of emptiness as a substrate or a quality.
Mi-pham clearly delineates two contexts for the interpretation of
words such as abiding reality (gnas lugs), emptiness (stong nyid),
suchness (chos nyid), freedom from constructs (spros bral), the
expanse of phenomena (chos dbyings), ultimate (don dam).

He

states:316

315

Mi-pham, dbu ma rgyan rtsa grel, 88: thog ma kho nar bden med du ma bstan na ni

thog med nas goms pai dngos dzin phyin ci log jil bai thabs med la/ de tsam zhig don
dam du bstan na ni blo chung ba kha cig dgag bya bkag pai med pa tsam gnas lugs so
snyam du stong pa nyid la zhen nas gsor mi rung bai lta bar gyur la/ zhen tshul laang
stong nyid la dngos por zhen pa dang dngos med du zhen pa gnyis yod.
316 Mi-pham, nges shes sgron me, 51: dngos po stong pai gnas lugs dang/ /bden gnyis
dbyer med gnas lugs gnyis/ /ming gcig na yang don la ni/ /khyad par gnam sa bzhin du
mchis/ /de bzhin chos nyid chos dbyings dang/ /stong nyid spros bral gog pai mtha/
/don dam la sogs smra mtshungs kyang/ /mthar thug dang ni nyi tshe bai/ /khyad par che
phyir skabs so so/ /phye nas ma nor bshad bya ste.

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Abiding reality that is the emptiness of entities and
Abiding reality that is the indivisible two truths
Although both are the same word,
The meanings are as distinct as the earth and space.
Likewise, suchness, expanse of phenomena,
Emptiness, freedom from constructs, limit of cessation,
Ultimate, etc., are similar expressions, yet
Since the distinction is vast
Between the consummate and the partial,
Having delineated the distinctive context,
They should be explained without error.
He states that it is important to recognize two distinctive meanings of
emptiness, etc., in their appropriate contexts because the two meanings of
such terms are as different as the earth and space. One is partial,
referring to the emptiness of entities. The consummate meaning refers to
the unity of appearance and emptiness.
Mi-pham distinguishes: (1) emptiness as a distinctive quality of
appearance from (2) emptiness as the indivisible truth of the unity of
emptiness and appearance:317
Both the emptiness of true existence (bden stong) and the
appearance of dependent arising, which are the components of a
division into two truths, are separate from the aspect of merely a
contradistinction (ldog pa tsam gyi cha nas tha dad). However, just
as impermanent phenomenon and product, are not objectively (don
gyi dngos poi steng) separate, the pair of appearance and
emptiness, being essentially of an indivisible nature within the
uncontrived fundamental abiding reality that does not abide in any
extreme, is called the indivisible truth or the unity of the two
truths.
Mi-pham states that a phenomenons emptiness of true existence is
essentially the same as its appearancethe two are only distinguished
Mi-pham, brgal lan nyin nyed snang ba, 543: bden gnyis su phye ba ya gyal gyi bden
stong dang rten byung gi snang ba gnyis po ldog pa tsam gyi cha nas tha dad kyang/ ji
ltar byas pa dang mi rtag pa don gyi steng na tha dad med pa bzhin/ stong dang snang
gnyis po ngo bo dbyer med pai rang bzhin mtha gang duang mi gnas pa bcos min gshis
kyi gnas lugs de la bden pa dbyer med dam bden gnyis zung jug ces bya ste.
317

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conceptually, as different contradistinctions. In the mode of subsistence,
they are indivisible as the unity of the two truths. However, unity is not to
be understood (only) as a combination of the two aspects of appearance
and emptiness:318
The appearance that is the object of conventional valid cognition,
The emptiness that is the object of ultimate analysis, and
The unity that is the aspect of the combination of those two,
Since they are objects of words and concepts
They are transcended in meditative equipoise.
The unity that is understood as the aspect of a combination of (1)
appearance, the object of conventional valid cognition, and (2) emptiness,
the object of ultimate analysis, is still within the domain of language and
concepts. Thus, distinct valid cognitions only apply in the context of postmeditation. Such conceptions are transcended in meditative equipoise.
Although appearance and emptiness are contradictory in the context of
conventional valid cognition, Mi-pham affirms that in the perspective of
wisdom, emptiness and appearance are not contradictory:319
Since this is the context of presenting
The objects seen by conventional valid cognition,
Existence and non-existence are contradictory in that perspective,
[but]
The two truths existing upon one entity is not contradictory
Due to being the object of wisdom.
Emptiness and appearance are mutually exclusive in the context of
conventional valid cognition, but not for wisdom.

Wisdom is beyond

dichotomies and perceives the unity of appearance and emptiness.

318

Mi-pham, nges shes sgron me, 49: snang ba tha snyad tshad mai yul/ /stong pa don

dam dpyod pai yul/ /zung jug de gnyis dres pai cha/ /de rnams sgra rtog yul yin phyir/
/de las das pai mnyam bzhag ni.
319 Ibid., 35: dir ni mthong don tha snyad pai/ /tshad mai rnam bzhag skabs yin pas/ /dei
ngor yod med gal ba ste/ /dngos gcig steng gi bden pa gnyis/ /mi gal ye shes yul yin
phyir.

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Thus, the empty quality alone is not what is meant by terms such
as suchness, ultimate, and emptiness; these terms refer to the
indivisible unity of appearance and emptiness.

In this way, the

consummate meaning of suchness is only unity:320

Awareness (rig pa) and luminous clarity (od gsal) are posited from
the aspect of appearance, but are not separate from emptiness.
Also, emptiness is not separate from appearance. In meaning,
unity alone is suchness; it is thoroughly important that neither
emptiness nor appearance on its own is the great suchness, the
consummate ultimate. From here the essential points of all the
stras and tantras are unraveled.
Mi-pham affirms that suchness, as the unity of emptiness and
appearance, is an important point through which the meaning of all the
stras and tantras can be known. Thus, suchness refers to unity: The
abiding reality is the unity of appearance and emptiness from the
beginning.321

Conclusion
We have seen how Mi-pham critiques two misconceptions of
emptiness (1) as solely an absence separate from appearance and (2) as
a location that is separate from appearance. These two conceptions of
emptiness, emptiness as solely a quality or a substrate, are within the
domain of mind.

In contrast, the consummate meaning of emptiness

cannot be known by the mind because it is the domain of wisdom. In this

way, emptiness as such is beyond the quality/substrate dichotomy; the
consummate emptiness is the unity of emptiness and appearance.

320

Mi-pham, gnyug sems book 3, 599.3-599.5: rig pa dang od gsal ni snang bai cha nas

bzhag kyang stong pa dang mi phyed la/ stong pa nyid zer yang snang ba dang mi phyed
kyi/ don la zung jug kho na chos nyid yin gyi snang stong re re ba chos nyid chen po
mthar thug gi don dam min pa kun tu gal cheo/ di las brtsam ste mdo sngags kun gyi
gnad grol lo.
321 Mi-pham, gzhung spyii dkai gnad, 431.3: gnas lugs ni ye nas snang stong zung jug
yin.

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While conventionally there can be said to be a referent of
emptiness, and a difference between quality and substrate, ultimately,
emptiness is not a referent object and there is no difference between
quality and substrate. Thus, emptiness does not refer to an empty-ground
separate from appearance, nor is it only a quality of an appearance
distinct from that appearance; emptiness refers to the indivisible unity of
emptiness and appearance. Mi-pham emphasizes unity as the meaning
of emptiness. This is also the meaning of Buddha-nature which we will be
the explicit focus of discussion in the next chapter.

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Chapter 4: BuddhaBuddha-Nature and the Indivisible Ground

and Fruition
Introduction
Buddha-nature is a unifying theme woven throughout Mi-phams
interpretations of Buddhist doctrines; it is forged as the common ground of
sasra and nirva, and the unifying principle of transcendence and
immanence. Mi-pham depicts Buddha-nature as the unified suchness of
reality, in the same way that he depicts emptiness. Mi-phams integration
of Buddha-nature and emptiness reflects the tradition of the Great
Perfection, traditionally viewed as the esoteric summit of the Nying-ma
tradition to which he belonged.
While emptiness is also the meaning of Buddha-nature, this chapter
will discuss the explicit topic of Buddha-nature.

The primordial

endowment of the qualities of Buddha in sentient beings is a central part

of Mi-phams presentation of Buddha-nature. We will begin by looking at
how Mi-pham distinguishes his view of Buddha-nature from others views
of Buddha-nature. We will then assess his depiction of Buddha-nature in
light of Long-chen-pas representation of the ground (gzhi) of the Great
Perfection, followed by a discussion of Mi-phams treatment of Buddhanature within his distinction of appearance and reality. We then turn to Miphams arguments for the existence of Buddha-nature and explore
implications of his use of language and reasoning to affirm what he
acknowledges to conflict with ordinary perception. In conclusion, we will
see that the ground of the Great Perfection, the unity of primordial purity
and spontaneous presence, most fully represents Mi-phams interpretation
of Buddhist doctrine.

Delineating the Views on BuddhaBuddha-Nature

We will begin our discussion by first looking at Mi-phams text
entitled Lions Roar: Exposition of Buddha-Nature.

In this text, he

positions his view of Buddha-nature in contrast to others views. We will

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see how he contrasts his view from depictions of Buddha-nature (1) as
truly established and not empty, (2) as a mere void (phyan chad)
emptiness, or (3) as impermanent and conditioned.
Mi-pham first criticizes the interpretation of a non-empty Buddhanature that is truly established, as we saw in the last chapter:322
Also by reasoned analysis, due to the essential point that Buddhanature is essentially empty, it impartially appears in all aspects of
quality: it is suitable to be the suchness of mind, all-pervasive
everywhere, permanent as long as time, inconceivable. However,
while not empty of its own essence, being truly established it is
completely impossible to be the suchness of an extrinsic
phenomenon (chos gzhan gyi chos nyid), etc. It also cannot be the
result of an ascertainment of valid cognition analyzing the ultimate
because the result of evidence for something truly established is
unacceptable, as a handprint [result] of the analysis of the lack of
true existence of all phenomenalike darkness [arising] from light.
True establishment is not established by conventional valid
cognition either because even though [it may appear to be] truly
established from that [conventional] perspective, by merely this
there is never an ability to establish phenomena to be non-empty.
Without being able to be established by the two valid cognitions,
the means of establishment has gone the way of a [non-existent]
space-flower; therefore, establishing this becomes meaninglessly
tiresome.
In this way, Mi-pham argues that a non-empty Buddha-nature cannot be
established by either of the two valid cognitions. The prominent role of

322

Mi-pham, stong thun seng gei nga ro, 590.6-591.4: rigs pas dpyad na yang bde

gshegs snying po ngo bo stong pa yin pai gnad kyis sems kyi chos nyid du rung ba/ yul
thams cad khyab pa/ dus ji srid du rtag pa/ bsam gyis mi khyab pa/ yon tan rnam pa
thams cad par ris med du char ba yin gyi/ rang gi ngo bo mi stong par bden par grub pa
la chos gzhan gyi chos nyid du rung ba sogs rnam pa kun tu mi srid cing don dam dpyod
pai tshad mas gtan la phab pai grub bras su yang mi btub ste chos thams cad bden
med du dpyod pai lag rjes la bden grub gcig grub pa ni snang ba las mun pa ltar gnas
ma yin pai phyir ro/ /tha snyad dpyod pai tshad mas kyang bden grub mi grub ste/ dei
ngor bden par grub kyang de tsam gyis chos de mi stong par rnam pa kun tu grub mi nus
pai phyir ro/ /tshad ma gnyis kyis sgrub ma nus par gyur pa la sgrub byed nam mkhai
me tog gi rjes su gro bas de sgrub pa don med kyi ngal par zad do.

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valid cognition is a distinctive feature of Mi-phams portrayal of Buddhanature. We addressed his arguments against a non-empty reality apart
from phenomena in the last chapter, so we will not discuss this further
here.
Mi-pham also argues against the interpretation of Buddha-nature as
a mere absence, the aspect of minds lack of true establishment.323 He
agrees that if the mind were truly established, there would be no potential
to be a Buddha (sangs rgya mi rung). However, since all things, even
physical objects like rocks, are empty of true existence, the mere absence
of true existence is not sufficient to establish that such things are potential
Buddhas:324
The [assertion that] the essential point of the lack of true existence
establishes the potential to be a Buddha is also nonsense.
Although it is true that if the mind were truly established, there
would simply be no potential to be a Buddha, even so, in lacking
true establishment, [the potential of] being Buddha is undetermined
because even though all phenomena, earth, rocks, etc., also lack
true existence, who is able to establish that everything that lacks
true existence is a potential Buddha?

We can see how Mi-pham distinguishes a distinctive Nying-ma view through his
treatment of Buddha-nature, by positioning his view in contrast to assertions
characteristic of the Jo-nang and Ge-luk Prsagika. Such an interpretative move that
Mi-pham makes in his Lions Roar: Exposition of Buddha-Nature resembles the structure
of Go-ram-pas Delineating the Views (lta bai shan byed) in which Go-ram-pa places his
Sa-kya view, which he aligns with the proponents of a freedom from constructs as the
Middle Way (mtha bral la dbu mar smra ba) in contrast to the two extremes of the
proponents of eternalism as the Middle Way (rtag mtha la dbu mar smra ba) of the Jonang and the proponents of annihilationism as the Middle Way (chad mtha la dbu mar
smra ba) of the Ge-luk. See Go-ram-pa, lta bai shan byed, 3.
324 Mi-pham, stong thun seng gei nga ro, 568.4-569.1: bden stong yin pai gnad kyis
323

sangs rgya rung yin par sgrub paang bab col te/ sems bden grub yin na sangs rgya mi
rung ba tsam yin pa bden kyang/ bden grub med pa yin na sangs rgya bai nges pa med
de/ sa rgo [read rdo] la sogs pa chos thams cad kyang bden med yin kyang/ bden med
yin tshad sangs rgya rung bar sus sgrub par nus.

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In his Trilogy of Innate Mind, Mi-pham also affirms that a mere existential
negation is not suitable to be identified as the meaning of Buddhanature:325
In general, the mere aspect of an existential negation that is the
emptiness of true existence is not suitable as the Buddha-nature
because there is no cognitive quality (mkhyen cha) in that;
therefore, it is not the meaning of Buddha-nature.
He argues that the meaning of Buddha-nature is not merely an absence
because the essence of an existential negation has no cognitive quality.
In this way, Buddha-nature is an intrinsic cognitive presence, similar to
what we saw last chapter in Dol-po-pas depiction. Also, Mi-pham states
in his Lions Roar: Exposition on Buddha-Nature:326
Calling such an existential negation Buddha-nature is a senseless
assertion because it becomes a heritage (rigs) shared with Auditors
and Self-Realized Ones (nyan thos); but through this, the potential
to be a Buddha is not established because: (1) there is no ability in
merely this to establish any legitimacy (thad pa) for the occurrence
of omniscient wisdom after abandoning cognitive obscurations
(shes sgrib) and (2) since there is no cognitive quality within the
essence of an existential negation, it is impossible for that to know
anything whatsoever even at the time of being a Buddha.
If Buddha-nature were solely an absence, it would not establish the
potential to be a Buddha because there is no cognitive quality within the

Mi-pham, gnyug sems book 3, 579.1-579.2: spyir bden stong med dgag gi cha tsam
bde gshegs snying por mi rung ste/ de la mkhyen cha med pas bde gshegs snying poi
don med.
326 Mi-pham, stong thun seng gei nga ro, 568.6-569.2: med dgag de dra la bde gshegs
snying po zhes dod pa don med de/ di nyan rang dang thun mongs pai rigs su gyur gyi/
dis sangs rgya rung mi grub ste di tsam la shes sgrib spangs nas rnam pa thams cad
mkhyen pai ye shes byung bai thad pa gang yang sgrub mi nus pa dang/ med dgag
rang gi ngo bo la mkhyen cha med pas sangs rgyas dus kyang des ci yang mkhyen mi
srid pai phyir.
325

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essence of an existential negation.

If the heritage327 were merely an

absence of existence, there would be no means to legitimate the presence

of a Buddhas wisdom; such wisdom does not occur from a void absence.
Moreover, a heritage that is a mere negation would be a heritage shared
with Auditors and Self-Realized Ones, not the heritage that is the potential
to be a complete and perfect Buddha.
Furthermore, Mi-pham states that it is not reasonable to think of
heritage as a mere absence that is the potential for the transformation of a
sentient being into a Buddha.
conditioned,

functional

It is due to the aspect of being a

entity

that

transformations

take

place

conventionally. However, the aspect of absence is not what is said to

affect change conventionally, just as a seeds lack of true existence
which is unconditioned and lacking functional capacitycan never be
somehow transported to a sprout:328
The mere categorized emptiness (stong pa rnam grangs pa) does
not at all have the meaning of heritage because from the
perspective of your thinking, if you assert that this heritage is the
potential to newly produce [a Buddha] when conjoined with the
conditions of the pathlike a seed that is transported (go pho ba)
to a sproutdespite now having no qualities of Buddha
whatsoever, then it is not reasonable that there be any such quality
[of potential transformation] in the contradistinctive aspect (ldog
cha) of an existential negation that is an emptiness of true
existencewhich is an unconditioned phenomenon that lacks the
Mi-pham uses heritage (rigs) and Buddha-nature (bde gshegs snying po)
interchangeably in this context. For Mi-pham as well as Long-chen-pa, we will see that
heritage has a smaller range of reference because it refers specifically to Buddhanature at the time of obscured sentient beings. Buddha-nature can refer to both
contexts of Buddhas and sentient beings.
328 Mi-pham, stong thun seng gei nga ro, 568.2-568.4: stong pa rnam grangs pa tsam la
rigs kyi don gang yang med de/ khyod kyi bsam ngor rigs dis sa bon myur gu [read myu
gur] go pho ba bzhin du da lta sangs rgyas kyi yon tan ci yang med kyang/ lam rkyen
327

gyis zin na gzod gyur rung yin par dod na/ bden stong med dgag gi ldog cha de dus ma
byas don byed nus pas stong pa la de drai khyad par gang yang thad pa med de/ dus
byas sa bon gyi cha ni tha snyad du myu gur gnas gyur rung gi sa bon gyi steng gi bden
med kyi cha ni myu gur gnas gyur ba nam yang mi srid pa bzhin no.

156
ability to perform a functionbecause the aspect of a conditioned
seed conventionally may transform into a sprout, yet the aspect of a
seeds lack of true existence can never transform into a sprout.
He states again that a mere absence is not the meaning of heritage.
Without having any qualities whatsoever, it is not reasonable for a mere
lack of true existence, which is unable to perform any function, to be the
heritage that is the potential to be a Buddha.
Moreover, Mi-pham states that rather than conceiving the heritage
as a mere absence, it would be better to conceive it as a conditioned
potential in all beings. A conditioned potentialsuch as knowledge of
benefit and harm, and love for ones own childrencan be seen to
progressively develop into the love, wisdom, and powers of a Buddha. In
a conception of heritage as this kind of impermanent entity, heritage is
efficacious, unlike a heritage conceived as an impotent negation:329
In considering this manner of the transforming conditioned heritage
(gnas gyur dus byas kyi rigs), rather than asserting an existential
negation as the heritage, it is better to assert a seed of wisdom,
love, and powers in the mental-continuums of all beings from
beginningless timeeven wild beasts, ogres, etc. possess such
[qualities] of love for their children and recognition of benefit and
harmsuch that when further developed, through conjoined with
the path and freed from obstacles, it is merely that which is the
potential to become a Buddha endowed with limitless knowledge,
love, and powers; because once the causality of production is
necessitated (skyed byed gyi rgyu bras yin dgos phan chad), to
disregard the momentary entity which is a productive cause and
assert an unconditioned, unproductive non-entity as the cause is
indeed astonishing!

329

Ibid., 569.2-569.5: gnas gyur dus byas kyi rigs kyi tshul di yid la mdza na/ sems can

thams cad kyi sems kyi rgyud na thog ma med pa nas yod pai mkhyen brtse nus gsum
gyi sa bon/ gcan gzan dang srin po sogs kyang rang gi bu la brtse ba dang/ phan gnod
ngo shes pa sogs yod pa de/ lam gyis zin nas gegs bral te je phal du song ba na tshad
med pai mkhyen brtse nus gsum mnga ba sangs rgyas su gyur rung ba tsam la dod na
med dgag la rigs su dod pa las de legs te/ skyed byed kyi rgyu bras yin dgos phan chad/
skad cig can dngos por gyur pai rgyu skyed byed yin pa bor nas/ dngos med dus ma
byas skyed byed min pa la rgyur dod pa ni ya mtshan pai gnas so.

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In terms of transformation that necessitates a causal relationship of
producer and produced, Mi-pham states that it is better to assert a
momentary entity as the heritage rather than a mere negation. We will
see below that he asserts the qualities of wisdom to be a primordial
endowment of the ground. The qualities are not a new production; hence,
there is no such causal relationship. Before we look into his depiction, first
we will conclude his refutations of others views of Buddha-nature.
Mi-pham also argues against a (Sa-kya)330 position that heritage is
the abiding reality that is the indivisibility of emptiness and the clarity of
mind (sems).

Mi-pham acknowledges that he would agree with this

depiction if mind were understood to refer to wisdom (ye shes) as

distinguished from consciousness (rnam shes). However, he does not

Tulku Nyi-ma-gyal-tsen informed me that this was an argument against a Sa-kya

position. Ngawang Jorden explains Buddha-nature as the indivisibility of the emptiness
and clarity of mind as the view of the Sa-kya scholar, Go-ram-pa in Buddha-nature:
Through the Eyes of Go rams pa bsod rnams seng ge in Fifteenth-Century Tibet (Ph.D.
Thesis, Harvard University, 2003), 125. Jorden cites the Sa-kya scholar Mang-th (mang
thos klu sgrub rgya mthso, 1523-1596) from a manuscript of a commentary on Go-rampa in his thesis, p.124n.252: In short, the unity of clarity and emptiness is posited as
Buddha-nature because sasra and nirva are comprised within the mind (sems) and
330

the mind also is free from constructs, empty of true existence; therefore, the abiding
nature of objects primordially abides as the unity of clarity and emptiness, (translation
mine) from Mang-th, rnam bshad nor bui phreng ba, 87: mdor na gsal stong zung jug la

gzhi bde gshegs snying por jog pa yin te/ khor das kyi chos rnams sems su dus shing/
sems de yang mtha bzhii spros pa dang bral bai bden stong yin pas/ yul gyi gnas lugs
gsal stong zung jug tu ye nas gnas pai phyir ro. Another Sa-kya scholar, kya Chokden (kya mchog ldan, 1427-1508), portrays Buddha-nature as a predicative negation
(ma yin dgag) and the consummate definitive meaning: That which has the name
Buddha-nature is the consummate definitive meaning, the luminous clarity which is the
nature of mind; moreover, it is a predicative negation, not an existential negation because
it expresses the meaning of the emptiness endowed with all supreme aspects. kya
Chok-den, dbu ma rnam par nges pa'i chos kyi bang mdzod lung dang rigs pa'i rgya
mtsho, Collected Works, vol. 14 (Thimphu, Bhutan: Kunzang Tobgey, 1975), 393.5393.7: nges don mthar thug pa ni bde bar gshegs pai snying po zhes bya bai ming can

sems rang bzhin gyis od gsal ba de nyid yin la/ dir yang ma yin dgag pa yin gyi/ med par
dgag pa ni ma yin te/ rnam pa mchog dang ldan pai stong pa nyid ces bya bai don du
bshad pai phyir.

158
agree if one of the elements of the unity is the aspect of impermanent
consciousness, which is thought of as something that progressively
transports to a Buddha (rim gyis sangs rgyas su go pho ba):331
If one thinks, [Heritage] is not posited having distinguished the two
truths because heritage is asserted as the abiding reality that is the
indivisibility of (1) the quality-bearer (chos can), which is the clarity
of mind, and (2) suchness (chos nyid), which is emptiness. If this
also is asserted as the unconditioned, immutable wisdom, which is
wisdom as distinguished from consciousness, then since this is
established as such by scripture and reasoning, then it certainly is
[heritage]. However, making the claim that the quality-bearer that is
a unity with emptiness is the aspect of momentary consciousness,
then thinking this progressively transports to a Buddha is
senseless because it would [absurdly] follow that the heritage
would have both a conditioned and an unconditioned aspect. That
being the case, the unconditioned, which has no use or ability,
would become the nominal heritage (rigs btags pa ba), and the
conditioned would become the genuine heritage (rigs mtshan nyid
pa) capable of producing effects. Consequently, the viewpoint of all
of the Mahyna Strasasserting that the unconditioned naturally
abiding heritage (rang bzhin gnas rigs) is the expanse of
phenomenawould be relinquished.
He argues that by asserting an impermanent consciousness as a
fundamental component of heritage, and thinking that this is what is
progressively transported to a Buddha, entails that the heritage would
have both a conditioned and an unconditioned aspect. In such a case,
although the heritage may be called unconditioned, he argues that it would

331

Mi-pham, stong thun seng gei nga ro, 569.6-570.3: gal te bden gnyis so sor phye nas

mi jog ste/ chos can sems kyi gsal ba dang chos nyid stong pa nyid dbyer med pai gnas
lugs rigs su dod do snyam na/ di yang rnam shes ye shes kyi zla phye bai ye shes gyur
med dus ma byas la dod na ni de ltar lung dang rigs pas grub pai phyir shin tu yin mod
kyi/ stong pa dang zung du jug rgyui chos can de rnam shes skad cig mai cha di zhe la
bzhag nas di rim gyis sangs rgyas su go phoo snyam pa ni gyi na ste/ rigs la dus byas
dang dus ma byas kyi cha gnyis yod par thal zhing/ de lta na dgos nus med pai dus ma
byas ni rigs btags pa ba dang/ dus byas ni bras bu skyed nus kyi rigs mtshan nyid par
gro bas rang bzhin gnas rigs dus ma byas chos kyi dbyings la bzhed pai theg chen gyi
mdo sde kun gyi dgongs pa stong [read stor] par zad do.

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actually be the conditioned ability to produce an effect that would be the
genuine heritage, and this would conflict with the viewpoint of all the
Mahyna Stras, which claim that the unconditioned naturally abiding
heritage is the expanse of phenomena. We can see here that Mi-pham
emphasizes the naturally abiding heritage as the genuine heritage, as
opposed to the developing heritage (skye gyur rigs), which is the
appearance of development. This emphasis is important in his argument
below for the primordial endowment of the qualities of Buddha.
In contrast to the characterization of heritage as the unity of

consciousness and emptiness, in his Gateway to the Scholars (mkhas

jug), Mi-pham depicts the naturally abiding heritage as the unity of selfexisting wisdom (rang byung gi ye shes) and the expanse of
phenomena:332
The naturally abiding heritage is Buddha-nature: its essence is the
unconditioned, self-existing wisdom unified with the empty and
aware expanse of phenomena that is inseparable from the Buddhabody and wisdom from the beginning.
Mi-pham characterizes self-existing wisdom as follows:333
Wisdom is designated as self-existing [literally, self-arising] due
to the aspect of it being wisdom that does not arise from another
nor from a cause; it does not arise from itself nor is it a new
occurrence because it is non-arising.
Wisdom as a presence that is not produced anew is a central part of his
depiction of Buddha-nature. We will now take a closer look at Mi-phams
view of Buddha-nature and discuss his own depiction of heritage.

332

Mi-pham, mkhas jug, 296: rang bzhin du gnas pai rigs ni de bzhin gshegs pai snying

po ste/ dei ngo bo ni gdod nas sku dang ye shes dang dbyer med pai chos kyi dbyings
rig stong zung du jug pa rang byung gi ye shes dus ma byas pa.
333 Mi-pham, gnyug sems book 3, 741.2-741.3: ye shes yin la gzhan byung ngam rgyus
byung min pai cha nas rang byung btags kyi/ rang las rang skyes dang/ gsar byung gnyis
kai byung baam skyes pa min te ma skyes pas so.

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Buddha--Nature as Heritage, Buddha

Buddha--Nature as the Ground
Buddha
We will begin our discussion by first addressing how Mi-pham
describes the manner that heritage exists in beings. This will help us to
better understand how he represents the essence of heritage as such. Mipham identifies heritage with the essential nature (snying po) and says
that heritage is the suchness of mind that abides in the manner of an
extract (bcud) or essential core (snying po) enclosed by adventitious
defilements:334
In terms of the own essence (rang gi ngo bo) of the abiding reality,
all phenomena are encompassed within the expanse (klong du
chud) of suchness and the own essence of suchness abides,
without arising or ceasing, as an equality; without temporal
distinctions such as the past or future, or aspects such as the good
or bad, here or there, self or other, greater and lesser, in sasra
and nirva, etc.the expanse of phenomena is the unchanging
(pho gyur med), single sphere (thig le nyag gcig). Although the
abiding reality is as such, in accord with the perspective of the
appearances of adventitious delusion, even when bodies (lus),
minds (sems), and domains (yul) of the three realms of sasra
appear in this way and the nature of suchness is not seen, it is not
that suchness does not exist; it exists without deviating in the
slightest from its own nature. Therefore, although the suchness of
mind is as such, it is not actualized (mi mgnon) due to being
enclosed by adventitious defilements. Even so, it abides in the
manner of an extract or an essential core in the center and is called
the heritage or the essential nature (snying po); for example, it is
334

Mi-pham, stong thun seng gei nga ro, 587.2-588.1: gnas lugs rang gi ngo boi dbang

du byas na chos thams cad chos nyid de yi klong du chud cing chos nyid rang gi ngo bo
la skye gag med par mnyam pa nyid du gnas la khor das la sogs pai bzang ngan dang/
phar rol tshu rol bdag dang gzhan che dang chung ba sogs kyi cha dang/ snga phyii dus
kyi khyad par sogs med de chos dbyings thig le nyag gcig pho gyur med pao/ gnas lugs
la de ltar yin kyang khrul pa glo bur bai snang ngo dang bstun na di ltar khams gsum
khor bai lus sems yul gyi snang ba shar nas chos nyid kyi rang bzhin mi mthong bai
tshe naang/ chos nyid ni med pa ma yin te rang gi rang bzhin las g.yo ba cung zad
kyang med par yod pas na/ sems kyi chos nyid de lta bu glo bur gyi dri mas sbubs su
byas nas mi mngon yang bcud dam dbus na snying poi tshul gyis gnas pa la rigs sam
snying po zhes brjod de/ dper na sa og gi gter la sogs pai dpe dgus mtshon nas shes
par bya.

161
known by illustration through the nine metaphors such as the
underground treasure, etc.
He states that heritage is illustrated through the nine metaphors.335 He
characterizes the heritage as the suchness of mind that is not actualized,
or not manifest; it abides as an extract or essential core. In his Trilogy of

Innate Mind, Mi-pham also calls this suchness of mind Buddha-nature:336

Existing in the minds of all sentient beings in the manner of
suchness on the occasion when obscurations dwell as suitable to
be removed, it is called Buddha-nature because when this
suchness of mind is realized, one becomes a Buddha (sang rgya
bar byed).
He explains that when the suchness of mind is realized, one becomes a
Buddha.
Mi-phams treatment of Buddha-nature should be considered in
light of Long-chen-pas works, so we will turn now briefly to Long-chen-pa.
Long-chen-pa states that the Buddha is not an effect that is newly
produced. In his Treasury of Philosophies, Long-chen-pa describes two
types of effects: (1) a produced effect and (2) a freed effect:337

The nine metaphors are found in Uttaratantra 1.96-97: like the Buddha in a lotus, like
honey in a beehive, like grain in a husk, like gold in a dirt heap, like a treasure under a
paupers house, like a sprout that grows from a small seed, like a statue wrapped in an
old cloth, like a king in the womb of an ugly woman, like gold in the earth; rgyud bla ma
rtsa grel, 12-13. Richard King points out that with the exception of two examples
representing the Buddha-nature as an undeveloped cause, the example of the king in the
womb and the seed, the other seven examples depict the Buddha-nature as a fully
developed concealed essence. See Richard King, Early Advaita Vednta and Buddhism
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1995), 208.
336 Mi-pham, gnyug sems book 1, 392.6-393.2: sems can thams cad kyi sems la chos
335

nyid kyi tshul du yod cing sgrib pa spang rung du gnas pai skabs na bde gshegs snying
po zhes bya ste/ sems kyi chos nyid de rtogs pas sangs rgya bar byed pai phyir ro.
337 Long-chen-pa, grub mtha mdzod, 877.4-877.5: sangs rgyas deang bral bai rgyu
bras las/ bskyed bya skyed byed kyi rgyu bras kyis bsgrubs pa ma yin te ye nas lhun
gyis grub pai phyir.

162
The Buddha also is a freed effect from a freeing cause (bral bai
rgyu bras), and is not established as a produced effect by a
producing cause (bskyed bya skyed kyi rgyu bras) because the
Buddha is spontaneously present from the beginning.
Long-chen-pa describes Buddha as a freed effect because the Buddha is
spontaneously present from the beginning. A freed effect is not newly
produced, but is simply made manifest when the conditions that obscure it
are removed. Moreover, Long-chen-pa states in his auto-commentary of
his Treasury of the Expanse of Phenomena:338
One may think, Does the Buddha-body and wisdom not arise from
the accumulations of merit and wisdom? It is said as follows: the
two accumulations, from the beginning already complete with the
qualities of emptiness and appearance, are called spontaneously
present (lhun grub) because the adventitious accumulations, which
are the mere aspect of the conditions that remove the defilements,
are merely designated as the two causal accumulations (rgyu
tshogs gnyis)just as the washcloth and cleanser that clean a dirty
gemstone are called the causes of seeing the gem.
Furthermore, Long-chen-pa says that the suchness of mind of a sentient
being is endowed with the qualities of Form Bodies (gzugs sku) from the
aspect of appearance, and endowed with the qualities of the Truth Body
(chos sku) from the aspect of its emptiness.

He states in his auto-

commentary of his Resting in the Nature of Mind:339

Long-chen-pa, chos dbyings mdzod grel, 117.1-117.4: bsod nams dang ye shes kyi
tshogs las byung ba ma yin nam zhe na/ smras pa tshogs gnyis ni ye nas snang ba dang/
stong pai yon tan du rdzogs zin pa la lhun grub ces brjod de/ glo bur du bsags pa de ni
dri ma sel byed kyi rkyen gyi cha tsam la rgyu tshogs gnyis zhes btags pa tsam ste/ nor
bu dri mas gos pa khrus ras dang dag chal gyis phyi ba la/ nor bu mthong bai rgyu brjod
pa bzhin no.
339 Long-chen-pa, sems nyid ngal gsoi grel pa, 312.4-312.6: sems can pai dus na sems
kyi chos nyid la snang cha nas gzugs skui yon tan dang/ stong cha nas chos skui yon
tan rdzogs par ldan yang dri mas bsgribs pas mngon sum du mi bsal bai phyir khams
sam rigs zhes btags shing/ sangs rgyas pai tshe dri ma mtha dag dang bral bas byang
chub ces brjod kyang/ ngo bo sems nyid kyi nus pa rdzogs par snang mi snang tsam las
dang po sems can gyi dus na med pai yon tan phyis gsar du bskyed par dod pa ni ma
yin te/ pho gyur med pai phyir.
338

163
At the time of a sentient being, the suchness of mind is completely
endowed with the qualities of the Form Bodies from the aspect of
appearance, and the qualities of the Truth Body from the aspect of
emptiness. However, due to being obscured by defilements, it is
not clearly manifest so it is called the basic element (khams) or
heritage, and due to being free from all defilements at the time of
being a Buddha it is called awakening (byang chub); even so,
since it is unchanging (pho gyur med), other than the essence, the
potential (nus pa) of mind, completely appearing or not, it is not
asserted that qualities that were first non-existent at the time of a
sentient being are newly produced later.
Long-chen-pa states that the suchness of mind is not manifest due to the
obscurations of defilements. At that time, it is called basic element or
heritage and when free from defilements at the time of a Buddha, it is
called awakening.

He claims that there are no essential qualities of

mind, which at first do not exist, that are newly produced at the time of a
Buddha. Furthermore, Long-chen-pa states in his Responses to Mind and

Wisdom:340
These days most virtuous spiritual friends (dge bai bshes gnyen)
and all meditators (sgom chen) are in accord in advocating the
ground as a mere absence that is nothing at all, which is not in
accord with the viewpoint of the meaning of the essential nature
(snying poi don). Through practicing a ground that is nothing at all,
the Buddha endowed with all qualities will not arise (1) because the
threeground, path, and fruitionare confused and (2) because
the Buddhawith qualities that are unconditioned and
spontaneously presentis manifested (mgnon du gyur) as a freed
effect (bral bai bras bu). Therefore, the view of the summit of
existence appears to be in accord with them; here we assert

340

Long-chen-pa, sems dang ye shes kyi dri lan, 380.3-381.1: ding sang ni dge bai

bshes gnyen phal dang/ sgom chen kun mthun par/ stong rkyang ci yang med pa la gzhi
byed pa ni snying poi don gyi dgongs pa dang mi nthun te/ ci yang med pai gzhi nyams
su blangs pas bras bu sangs rgyas yon tan thams cad dang ldan pa mi byung ste/ gzhi
lam bras bu gsum dzol bai phyir ro/ sangs rgyas de ni dus ma byas shing lhun gyis
grub pai yon tan can bral bai bras bu mngon du gyur pa zhig yin pai phyir ro/ des na
srid rtsei lta ba dang de dag mthun par snang ngo/ dir dus ma byas shing lhun gyis grub
pai od gsal ba nyid gzhir dod pa yin no.

164
luminous clarity itselfunconditioned and spontaneously present
as the ground.
In this way, Long-chen-pa asserts a ground that is not a mere absence.
Rather, he affirms the ground as luminous clarityunconditioned and
spontaneously present. Long-chen-pa states: The ground is the wisdom
of luminous clarity that exists within oneself at the time of being a sentient
being.341 Moreover, he states:342
The meaning of the ground is explained as follows: The suchness
of luminous clarity from the beginning is unconditioned and
spontaneously present. From the side of emptiness, it is free from
all constructed extremes like space because it is not at all
established as an entity or a sign (mtshan ma), nor is it at all
confined (ma chad) to sasra or nirva, etc. From the side of
clarity, it is spontaneously present and luminously clear like the
disks (dkyil khor) of the sun and moon, endowed from the
beginning with the nature of the [Buddha-]body and wisdom. These
two [emptiness and clarity] are neither conjoined nor separable
within the suchness abiding from the beginning.
Long-chen-pa characterizes the ground as a unity of emptiness and
clarity.

He uses the descriptive metaphors such as being empty like

space and clear like the sun. Long-chen-pa also describes an ultimate
universal ground (don gyi kun gzhi) in his auto-commentary of his Wish-

Fulfilling Treasury: The basic element is called the ultimate universal

ground because it co-exists with the unconditioned qualities of the

341
342

Ibid., 379.2: sems can pai dus kyi od gsal bai ye shes rang la yod pa ni gzhio.
Ibid., 379.4-379.6: gzhi don bshad pa ni/ ye nas od gsal ba chos nyid dus ma byas

shing lhun gyis grub pa stong pai ngos nas dngos po dang mtshan ma gang duang ma
grub cing khor ba dang mya ngan las das pa la sogs pa gang duang ma chad pas spros
pai mthar thams cad dang bral ba nam mkha lta bu/ gsal bai ngos nas sku dang ye
shes kyi rang bzhin ye ldan du lhun gyis sgrub cing od gsal ba nyi zlai dkyil khor lta bu/
de gnyis kaang du bral med pai chos nyid du ye nas gnas pa.

165
naturally pure nirva.343 He says that this ground is the support for both
sasra and nirva, and identifies it with Buddha-nature:344
Due to abiding as the expanse neither conjoined with, nor
separable from the Buddha-body and wisdom, it is Buddha-nature;
due to supporting all phenomena of sasra and nirva, it is the
abiding reality called the ultimate universal ground; it is
unconditioned and abides as the great primordial purity. Moreover,
it supports the phenomena of sasrakarma and disturbing
emotionsin the manner of a non-support (rten pa med pai tshul),
as the sun and space support cloud formations, they abide within
its state without contact or connection with the basis. In meaning
(don la), since there is no intrinsic nature, support and supported
are not established; since it appears as such it is so designated [as
the support].
Long-chen-pa explains that the ground supports all phenomena of
sasra and nirva. He states that the ground supports the phenomena

343

Long-chen-pa, yid bzhin mdzod grel, vol. 2, 1066.6-1067.1: khams ni rang bzhin gyis

dag pa mya ngan las das pa dus ma byas pai yon tan dang lhan cig pas don gyi kun
gzhi zhes bzhag pa yin no.
344 Long-chen-pa, yid bzhin mdzod grel, vol. 1, 151.4-152.2: sku dang ye shes du bral
med pai dbyings su gnas pas bde bar gshegs pai snying po/ khor das kyi chos rnams
brten pas gnas lugs don gyi kun gzhi zhes bya ste/ dus ma byas shing ye nas rnam dag
chen por gnas pao/ /de yang khor bai chos las dang nyon mongs pa rnams rten pa med
pai tshul gyis brten pa ni/ nyi mkhai ngos na sprin phung brten pa ltar/ gzhi la ma reg ma
byar la dei ngang la gnas pa ste/ don la rang bzhin med pas rten dang brten par ma
grub bzhin du brten par snang bas brtags pa ste. Long-chen-pa follows this description
with a quote from the Uttaratantra 1.55-57: In the way that the earth abides in water, and
water in wind, wind completely abides in space, while space does not abide in wind,
water, or earth; in the same way the aggregates, constituents, and faculties abide in
karma and disturbing emotions, karma and disturbing emotions constantly abide in the
distorted mind, and the distorted mind completely abides in the purity of mind, while the
nature of mind does not abide in any phenomena. rgyud bla ma rtsa grel, 8: sa ni chu la

chu rlung la/ /rlung ni mkha la rab tu gnas/ /mkha ni rlung dang chu dag dang/ /sa yi
khams la gnas ma yin/ /de bzhin phung po khams dbang rnams/ /las dang nyon mongs
dag la brten/ /las dang nyon mongs tshul bzhin min/ /yid la byed la rtag tu gnas/ /tshul
bzhin ma yin yid byed ni/ /sems kyi dag pa la rab gnas/ /sems kyi rang bzhin chos rnams
ni/ /thams cad la yang gnas ma yin. See also, Long-chen-pa, sems dang ye shes kyi dri
lan, 384.2-384.4.

166
of sasra in the manner of a non-support; it is merely designated as
the support (conventionally), but since there is no intrinsic nature, support
and supported are not established (ultimately).
Long-chen-pa makes a distinction between his assertionthat
wisdom is simply the ground made manifestfrom those who accept
wisdom as a new development, a product of real transformation. He says
that the proponents of Mind-Only accept that the eight collections of
consciousness are transformed (gnas gyur) into wisdom. However, he
asserts that consciousnesses are removed and the self-existing wisdom
just becomes manifest (mngon pa tsam), being merely imputed as a
transformation:345
Proponents of Mind-Only assert that the collection of eight
consciousnesses itself transforms into wisdom; here, the selfexisting wisdom is merely made manifest through removing the
consciousnesses, which is designated as a transformationthe
difference between the two is vast.
Thus, he states that the appearance of the Buddha-body and wisdom are
the suchness of mind, only to be manifested. The transformation from
consciousness to wisdom is just a designation.
We can see how Mi-phams descriptions of Buddha-nature reflect
Long-chen-pas description of the ground.

Mi-pham also refers to

Buddha-nature as the abiding reality of the ground of the primeval

beginning (ye thog gi gzhi):346
Buddha-nature is not a mere absence; it is emptiness and luminous
clarity. It is the abiding reality of the ground of the primeval
beginning of all phenomena, the abiding reality that is the indivisible

345

Long-chen-pa, yid bzhin mdzod grel, vol. 2, 1420.4-1420.5: sems tsam pas kun gzhi

tshogs brgyad de nyid gnas gyur bas ye shes su dod la/ dir de dag bsal bas rang byung
gi ye shes mngon pa tsam la gnas gyur du btags pa gnyis khyad par shin tu cheo.
346 Mi-pham, gzhung spyii dka gnad, 453.4-453.5: gshegs snying ni stong kyang tsam
min te/ stong nyid od gsal yin/ de chos thams cad kyi ye thog gzhi yi gnas lugs yin/ zung
jug bden pa dbyer med kyi gnas lugs rnam kun mchog ldan gyi stong nyid yin la.

167
truth of unity, the mode of subsistence that is the emptiness
endowed with all supreme aspects.
Mi-pham describes the ground of the primeval beginning as the
consummate suchness: The luminous clarity of the ground of the
primeval

beginningthe

primordial

abiding

reality

itselfis

the

consummate suchness.347
Mi-pham explains that self-existing wisdom is made manifest
(mngon du gyur); it is not produced by a cause.

In his Lions Roar:

Exposition of Buddha-Nature, he says that even though the Truth Body

appears to be a new production when the obscuring conditions are
removed, it is a freed effect (bral bai bras bu):348
Self-existing wisdom is not produced by a cause because actually,
the Truth Body freed from adventitious defilements is a freed effect.
Although it appears to be newly produced by a cause, it merely
appears as such in the way of appearance for those who are
untransformed (gnas ma gyur pai snang tshul); in terms of the
actual meaning, in the essence of the Truth Body, which is the
nature of suchness without arising or disintegration, from the
beginning all phenomena areas an equalitythe actual Buddha
(mngon par sangs rgyas pa), primordially nirva, naturally
luminous and clear, etc. This consummate viewpoint of the
profound stras is a topic that is difficult to fathom for pure beings
(dag pai sems dpa), needless to mention ordinary people!
He states that the new development of the Truth Body is only in the way of
appearance for those who are untransformed; in the actual meaning, he

Mi-pham, gnyug sems book 1, 357.4: ye thog gzhii od gsal gdod mai gnas lugs de
nyid ni chos kun gyi chos nyid mthar thug yin.
348 Mi-pham, stong thun seng gei nga ro, 596.5-597.2: rang byung gi ye shes rgyu las
347

skyes par mi gyur te/ yang dag par glo bur dri bral gyi chos sku de bral bai bras bur
song ba yin la/ rgyu las gsar du skye ba ltar snang ba yang gnas ma gyur pai snang
tshul la de ltar snang bar zad kyi/ yang dag pai don du chos nyid kyi rang bzhin chos kyi
skui ngo bo la skye jig med par chos thams cad gdod nas mnyam pa nyid du mngon par
sangs rgyas paam/ gzod ma nas zhi ba mya ngan las das pa/ rang zhin gyis od gsal ba
sogs zab moi mdo sde rnams kyi dgongs pa mthar thug di dag pai sems dpa rnams kyi
kyang bsam par dka bai gnas yin na phal pas lta ci smros.

168
affirms that all phenomena are primordially Buddha in the essence of the
Truth Body, which is the suchness all phenomena.
In his Trilogy of Innate Mind, Mi-pham states that the qualities of
Buddha-nature at the time of the ground (i.e., at the time of a sentient
being) are merely a potential to exist as manifest:349
The manifest appearance of the qualities of omniscient wisdom (ji
snyed pai don kun mkhyen pai yon tan) has the endowment of

two-fold purity, not only natural purity.350 However, the qualities of

that [omniscient wisdom] have to be asserted as present from the
beginning, like the example of the knife [in a sheath], etc.
Therefore, one should know that at the time of the ground (gzhii
dus na), the qualities of Buddha-nature are only potential to be
manifestly existent (mngon du yod rung ba tsam).
He states that the primordial qualities of wisdom are an intrinsic
endowment, like a knife has the ability to cut, a mirror to reflect, and a
gemstone to shine:351

Mi-pham, gnyug sems book 2, 538.5-539.1: ji snyed pai don kun mkhyen pai yon tan
mngon du snang ba ni dag pa gnyis ldan la yod kyi/ rang bzhin rnam dag tsam la med
kyang/ dei yon tan ye ldan du khas len dgos par ral grii dpe sogs bzhin no/ des na gzhii
dus na bde gshegs snying po la yon tan mngon du yod rung tsam du shes par byao.
349

The two-fold purity is (1) natural purity, or primordial purity, and (2) purity which is
freed from the adventitious [defilements] (glo bur bral dag). The two purities are
350

alternatively rendered as pure of the two obscurations (sgrib pa gnyis dag pa). The
tshig mdzod chen mo entry for two-fold purity (dag pa gnyis ldan) reads: Free from the
two obscurations, cognitive obscurations and the obscurations of disturbing emotions
the state of Buddha (nyon mongs pa dang shes byai sgrib pa gnyis dag pa ste sangs
rgyas kyi go phang). Such a description reflects a more general interpretation and does
not evoke the primordial purity that is an important part of Mi-phams and Long-chen-pas
particular Nying-ma exegesis; it does not highlight a discovery model of the path as
opposed to a developmental model. I draw these contrasting terms from Anne Kleins
provocative discussion of these two models in Anne Klein, Meeting the Bliss Queen
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1995), 63-76.
351 Mi-pham, gnyug sems book 2, 537.1-537.3: stobs sogs kyi yon tan ye ldan/ ral gri

tshad ldan la gcod pai yon tan/ me long dwangs pa la gzugs snang bai yon tan/ nor bu
od dang dgos dod rtsol bai yon tan ye nas rang chas lhun grub tu yod kyang/ ral gri
shub dang me long sgrom du chud pa/ nor bu dam gos bzhin no/ dei sgrib pa bsal na
yon tan gsar bskyed min yang/ mngon du snang ba gsar skye ltar snang ngo.

169
The primordial endowment of qualities such as the powers are
spontaneously present by nature from the beginning [like] the
quality of a functional knife to cut, the quality of a clear mirror to
shine reflected forms, and the quality of a gem to be luminous and
bestow desires; however, they are like the knife in a sheath, the
mirror put in the box, and the gem covered with mud. When the
obscurations are cleared, the qualities do not newly arise, but
appear manifest as if newly arisen.
Mi-pham describes the qualities of a Buddhas mind, such as powers, etc.,
as spontaneously present from the beginning. Yet like the qualities of a
knife in a sheath, etc., when the qualities are obscured they are not
evident.

Thus, the qualities may appear to newly arise when their

obscurations are removed, they do not newly arise; they are simply made
manifest. Furthermore, Mi-pham states in his Difficult Points of Scriptures

in General:352
If it is asked, Well, do the continuums of sentient beings such as
dogs and pigs have the wisdom with the ten powers? The Buddhanature of their continuums from the beginning has the qualities of
wisdom with the ten powers because these are the qualities of its
suchness. Therefore, if there is the basic element, there are
qualities; however, [the qualities] are not manifestlike a knife has
the ability to cut, even so, the ability to cut is not manifest when put
in a sheath; and a mirror has the quality to potentially shine
reflected forms, even so, it does not manifestly shine when put in a
box.

352

Mi-pham, gzhung spyii dka gnad, 454.2-454.5: on na khyi dang phag sogs sems can

rnams kyi sems kyi rgyud la stobs bcui ye shes yod dam zer na/ stobs bcui ye shes kyi
yon tan dei rgyud kyi gshegs snying la ye nas yod de/ kho rang gi chos nyid kyi yon tan
yin pas khams yod na yon tan yod mod kyi mngon du mi gyur te/ ral gri la gcod pai bya
ba yod kyang/ shub tu chud pa la gcod pai bya ba mngon gyur du med pa dang/ me long
la gzugs brnyan char rung gi yon tan yod kyang sgrom du bcug pa la mngon gyur du mi
char ba dang dra ste.

170
In this way, Mi-pham describes heritage as the suchness of mind,
endowed from the beginning with the qualities of Buddhas wisdom,
together with the ten powers.353

Delineating Appearance and Reality

We will now discuss Buddha-nature in terms of (1) how it is the
abiding reality, or mode of subsistence, and (2) how it appears, the mode
of appearance. The two truths as authentic/inauthentic experiencethe
concording modes of appearance and subsistenceis the means by
which Buddha-nature is affirmed as the ultimate truth.
We will first look to Mi-phams description of the own essence (rang

gi ngo bo) of Buddha-nature from his Lions Roar: Exposition of BuddhaNature:354

The own essence of Buddha-nature is free from all conceptual
constructs such as existence and non-existence, permanence and
annihilation; it is the equality of the single sphere of indivisible truth
(bden pa dbyer med thig le nyag gcig).

The Dictionary of Internal Knowledge (nang rig pai tshig mdzod) references ten
powers listed in the Vinaya as: (1) the power of knowing what is and is not correct (gnas
dang gnas ma yin), (2) the power of knowing the ripenings of karma, (3) the power of
knowing various inclinations (mos pa), (4) the power of knowing thorough affliction and
353

complete purification, (5) the power of knowing faculties that are supreme and those that
are not, (6) the power of knowing the path of all transmigrations (thams cad gro bai lam),
(7) the power of knowing various dispositions (khams sna tshogs), (8) the power of
remembering previous existences (sngon gyi gnas), (9) the power of knowing death,
transference, and birth, and (10) the power of knowing the exhaustion of contamination
(zag pa). nang rig pai tshig mdzod, 671: 1. gnas dang gnas ma yin mkhyen pai stobs/ 2.
las kyi rnam par smin pa mkhyen pai stobs/ 3. mos pa sna tshogs mkhyen pai stobs/ 4.
kun nas nyon mongs pa dang rnam par byang bai mkhyen pai stobs/ 5. dbang po
mchog dang mchog min mkhyen pai stobs/ 6. thams cad gro bai lam mkhyen pai stobs/
7. khams sna tshogs mkhyen pai stobs/ 8. sngon gyi gnas rjes su dran pai stobs/ 9. chis
ba dang pho ba dang skye ba mkhyen pai stobs/ 10. zag pa zad pa mkhyen pai stobs
so. An alternative enumeration of ten powers is found in the Mahvyupatti.
354 Mi-pham, stong thun seng gei nga ro, 598.2-598.3: bde bar gshegs pai snying po

rang gi ngo bo ni yod med rtag chad la sogs pai spros pa thams cad bral ba bden pa
dbyer med thig le nyag gcig mnyam pa nyid de.

171
Mi-pham describes Buddha-nature as free from all conceptual constructs,
in the same language he uses to describe emptiness qua the consummate
suchness that we saw in the last chapter. Buddha-nature, like emptiness,
is the suchness of all phenomena. He also depicts Buddha-nature with
affirming descriptive words such as the single sphere of indivisible truth.
He calls Buddha-nature the great unconditioned in his Lions Roar:

Exposition of Buddha-Nature:355
Even though partial cognitions (shes pa nyi tshe ba) that cognize
objects are necessarily impermanent, the wisdom that is the onetaste (ro gcig) of the knower and known, the one with the spacevajra pervading space (mkha khyab mkha yi rdo rje can), is not
like that [impermanent cognition] because in the state (ngang) of
unchanging luminous clarity, which is the self-effulgence (rang
gdangs) of the unconditioned, all the phenomena of nirva and
sasra are incorporated (ub chub); hence, reasoning that
analyzes the consummate [reality] (mthar thug dpyod pai rig shes)
establishes that there is primordially no arising or ceasing in the
essence of that. Therefore, wisdom such as this is the great
unconditioned, which does not abide in either extreme of being
conditioned or unconditioned, because it is not at all like a mere
non-entity. Since entities and non-entities are phenomena and are
dependent arisings, or dependent imputations, when authentically
analyzed they are hollow, fake, lies, and deceptions; Buddhanature is the great unconditioned, the suchness of all phenomena

Ibid., 575.1-575.6: yul shes pai shes pa nye tsho [read nyi tshe] ba la mi rtag pas
khyab kyang/ shes dang shes bya ro gcig pai ye shes mkha khyab mkha yi rdo rje can
ni de dang mi dra ste/ dus ma byas pai rang gdangs od gsel [read gsal] mi gyur bai
ngang der khor das kyi chos kun ub chub pas na dei ngo bo la skye gags ye nas med
par mthar thug dpyod pai rig shes kyis grub pai phyir ro/ des na de dra bai ye shes de
ni dus byas dang dus ma byas kyi mthar gang laang mi gnas pai dus ma byas chen po
ste/ dngos med rkyang pa dang gtan mi dra la/ dngos dngos med gnyis ka chos yin
zhing/ de dag brten nas skyes paam brten nas btags pai phyir na yang dag par dpyad
na dus byas dang gsog gsob rdzun pa bslu ba yin la/ bde gshegs snying po ni dngos
dngos med kyi chos nyid dus ma byas chen po yang dag par mi bslu ba yin te/ rtsa ba
shes rab las/ rang bzhin dag ni bcos min dang/ gzhan la ltos pa med pa yin/ zhes dang/
dngos dang dngos med dus byas yin/ mya ngan das pa dus ma byas/ zhes gsungs pa
bzhin no.
355

172
that are entities or non-entities, which is authentically nondeceptive. As is said in the Mlamadhyamakakrik [15.2]:
Nature is uncontrived,
And does not depend on another.
And [25.13],
Entities and non-entities are conditioned,
Nirva is unconditioned.
Mi-pham explains that partial cognitions are necessarily impermanent;
wisdom, however, is beyond the dichotomies of permanent entities and
impermanent non-entities. He supports his argument with citations from
Ngrjuna describing nirva as unconditioned. In this way, he argues
that Buddha-nature is the great unconditionedthe suchness of all
phenomena that are entities or non-entities. In this way, his statements
again resemble Dol-po-pas depiction of the unique status of suchness as
a third category of knowledge that is neither an entity nor a non-entity.
Moreover, Mi-pham states that there is no arising or ceasing of
dualistic phenomena in the basic nature (gshis la) that abides without ever
changing. He adds that this basic nature can also be called permanent
because it (1) exists and (2) is not momentary:356
To an untransformed one who has dualistic perception, there is the
incontrovertible and undeniable appearance of inequalityall the
changing, adventitious defilements suitable to be removed,
occurring sequentially as arising and ceasing moments, sasra
and nirva, good and bad, etc.; however, the basic nature abides
as the great equality in which arising, ceasing, and dualistic
phenomena are not established. All spatial aspects (phyogs kyi
cha) and temporal changes (dus kyi gyur ba) are incorporated
within that state. This exists as the domain of a Sublime Ones
356

Ibid., 595.4-596.1: gyur bcas glo bur bral rung gi dri ma gang dag skad cig mai skye

gag rim gyis byung ba dang/ khor das dang bzang ngan la sogs pai mi mnyam pa di ni
gnas ma gyur pai gnyis snang can la de ltar bslu med bsnyon med du snang yang/ gshis
la skye gag dang gnyis chos ma grub par mnyam pa chen por gnas pa/ dei ngang du
phyogs kyi cha dang dus kyi gyur ba thams cad ub chub cing/ de ni phags pa rnams kyi
so so rang rig pai ye shes kyi yul du yod pa yin cing/ dus gsum gyi gyur bas bslad med
pas na de la rtag pa chen poi tha snyad cis mi gtags te/ yod pa gang zhig skad cig gi
skye gag can min pai phyir ro.

173
individual reflexive awareness wisdom and there is no pollution by
the changes of the three times. So why not give this the name
great permanence? [It is designated as such] because (1) it
exists and (2) it does not arise and cease momentarily.
Mi-pham affirms that the basic nature exists, and it does not arise and
cease momentarily; therefore, it can be called permanent by definition of
what it means to be permanent. He denies, however, that suchness is an
entity (dngos po). He states that when suchness is evaluated from its own
side, it is neither observed as a conditioned entity nor an unconditioned
non-entity. Mi-pham explains as follows in his Trilogy of Innate Mind:357
When evaluated in terms of suchness from its own side, it is
observed as neither of the twoa conditioned entity or an
unconditioned non-entitybecause suchness, not abiding in the
extremes of either the conditioned or the unconditioned, is known
through individual reflexive awareness...At the time when primordial
suchness is actualized as a Buddha, the wisdom body of the great
permanencelike a vajra that never deviates from the expanse of
phenomenais the great unconditioned; it is not conditioned.
However, in terms of its mode of appearance (snang tshul gyi
dbang du byas), it is posited as newly arisen from the aspect of
being a freed effect of previous training on the path; and it is
posited as conditioned from the aspect of progressively engaging in
enlightened activity (phrin las) for beings to be trained (gdul bya),
etc.you will be freed from the web of doubt when you distinguish
the respective intended meanings in accord with what is generally
proclaimed in scriptures.

Mi-pham, gnyug sems, book 1, 404.6-405.6: chos nyid rang ngos nas gzhal na/ dus
byas dngos po dang dus ma byas dngos med gnyis kar mi dmigs te/ chos nyid dus byas
dang dus ma byas kyi mtha la mi gnas pa so so rang rig par bya ba yin cing...gdod mai
chos nyid mngon du gyur pa sangs rgyas kyi dus na/ chos kyi dbyings de las nam yang
mi g.yo bai rdo rje lta bu rtag pa chen po ye shes kyi sku ni dus ma byas chen po yin te
dus byas ma yin mod/ di la snang tshul gyi dbang du byas na sngar lam sgom pai bral
bras yin pai cha nas gsar byung dang/ gdul bya rnams phrin las rim can du jug pai cha
nas dus byas lta bur jog pa sogs lung spyi la grags pa ltar so soi dgongs don shan
phyed na the tshom gyi drwa ba bral bar gyur ro.
357

174
He states that suchness from its own side is neither conditioned nor nonconditioned; it is the great unconditioned free from extremes. However,
in terms of the way of appearance, it is posited as newly arisen from the
aspect of being a freed effect. It is also posited as conditioned from the
aspect of the progressive engagement in enlightened activity for beings to
be trained. In this way, Mi-pham distinguishes the mode of subsistence,
where all is undivided, from the mode of appearance, where everything
appears distinctly.

Furthermore, he explains in his Trilogy of Innate

Mind:358
Although it is as such, most others assert that the essence of the
Buddha-body and wisdom is impermanent and that it is a
permanent continuity (rgyun gyis rtag pa). Those who accept the
intrinsic nature of the fruitional emptiness (bras bui stong pa nyid)
that is endowed with all supreme aspects (rnam kun mchog ldan) of
Buddha-body and wisdom assert as follows: the own essence of
the Buddha-body and wisdom is permanent, but in the mode of
appearance of those to be trained, it is an impermanent continuity
as is said in the Stra That Gathers the Viewpoints (mdo dgongs
dus); in this way, in terms of the abiding reality as it is (gnas lugs ji
lta bai dbang du byas), while no phenomena subsumed within the
three times at all deviates from the non-arising, unceasing equality
in the fundamental nature, all phenomena that exist (ji snyad pai
chos kun) appear as unmixedsuch as self and other, sasra
and nirva, conditioned and unconditioned phenomena,
phenomena of the past, present, and future. These two are such
that through holding one position, the other need not be rejected;
358

Ibid., 405.6-406.6: de ltar yang gzhan phal mo ches sangs rgyas kyi sku dang ye shes

ngo bo mi rtag la rgyun gyis rtag par dod/ sku dang ye shes rnam kun mchog ldan bras
bui stong nyid kyi rang bzhin du dod pa dag gis/ sku dang ye shes rang gi ngo bos rtag
kyang/ gdul byai snang tshul la rgyun gyis mi rtag par dod de mdo dgongs dus las
gsungs pa bzhin no/ /de ltar gnas lugs ji lta bai dbang du byas na dus gsum gyis bsdus
pai chos gang yang gshis la skye gag med par mnyam pa nyid las ma g.yos bzhin du/
bdag dang gzhan/ khor ba dang myang das/ dus byas dang dus ma byas/ das dang da
lta ma ongs pai chos sogs ji snyed pai chos kun ma dres par char ba di gnyis gcig gi
phyogs bzung nas gcig spang mi dgos par/ zab mo brgyad dang rtogs tshul gsungs pa
dang mtshungs par bden gnyis gal med kyi go don legs par shar ba rnams la theg chen
mdo rgyud kyi dgongs pa rnams la the tshom med pai nges shes bde blag tu skye ba yin
no.

175
as similar to the discourses of the eight profundities (zab mo
brgyad) and the manner of realization (rtogs tshul),359 for the ones
in which the understood meaning of the non-contradicton of the two
truths has radiantly360 dawned (legs par shar), a certainty that is
free from doubt in the viewpoints of Mahyna Stras and tantras
easily arises.
In distinction to the way others assert the essence of wisdom as
impermanent, Mi-pham affirms a view that the own essence of wisdom is
permanent. While according to the mode of subsistence, nothing ever
wavers from the non-arising and unceasing equality all phenomena,
everything appears distinctly and unmixed according to the mode of
appearance. Mi-pham shows that these two perspectives need not be in
conflict, such that if one holds a position according to the abiding reality as
it is, then one must reject the mode of appearance, and vice versa. He
shows that both views can be held in their respective contexts. He adds
here that understanding the meaning of the non-contradiction of the two
truths is a key point in understanding the viewpoints of stras and tantras.
In this context, he appears to be suggesting that the unity of the two truths
does not only refer to the unity of the two truths as appearance/emptiness
but also to the unity of the two truths as the concording modes of
appearance/subsistence.
In any case, Mi-pham states that it is important to distinguish: (1)
the way reality is, where appearance and existence are asserted to be
primordially Buddha, and (2) the way things conventionally appear, where
wisdom appears as a new development:361

I have not identified what the eight profundities and manner of realization refer to.
360 I have used the word radiantly here because I feel that it is a more evocative
translation of legs, which literally means good or excellent; I find that radiant is a better
descriptive word to positively qualify a dawning (char ba), which is the verb that Mi-pham
uses here that literally means to arise, to appear, to dawn.
361 Mi-pham, gnyug sems book 2, 449.3-449.5: gnas lugs don dam pai dbang du byas na
359

snang srid ye sangs rgyas par khas len zhing de ltar bsgom dgos kyang/ snang lugs tha
snyad kyi dbang du byas na/ gzhi sangs rgya rung gi rigs dang/ lam nyams su len pai

176
Although in terms of the ultimate abiding reality (gnas lugs don dam
pai dbang du byas), appearance and existence are asserted to be
primordially Buddha and one should meditate as such, in terms of
the conventional way of appearance (snang lugs tha snyad kyi
dbang du byas), supreme knowledge makes the distinction of three:
(1) the ground, the heritage which is the potential to be a Buddha,
(2) the path, which is the occasion of practice, and (3) the fruition,
which is the consummation of purity; this is accepted all the way up
to the Great Perfection.
He affirms the three contexts of: (1) the ground, as the heritage which is
the potential to be a Buddha, (2) the path, the occasion of practice, and (3)
the fruition, the consummation of purity. He affirms that such a distinction
is accepted throughout Buddhist traditions, including the Great Perfection.
In the context of meditation, however, he advocates meditation done in
accordance with the mode of subsistence.
Mi-pham

also

explains

consciousness and wisdom.

these

three

contexts

in

terms

of

In terms of the mode of appearance, he

delineates three contexts (gnas skabs): (1) the impure (ma dag), which is
the function (las byed pa) of only consciousness, (2) the impure/pure (ma

dag dag pa), which is the function of a mix of consciousness and wisdom,
and (3) the extremely pure (shin tu dag pa), which is the function of only
wisdom:362

skabs dang/ dag pa mthar phyin pai bras bu gsum du shes rab kyis shan byed du yod
pa ni rdzogs pa chen poi bar gyis dod de.
362 Ibid., 518.1-519.1: chos nyid dbyings kyi ngo ba la sgrib pa ye nas med par grub pas
kyang/ gnas tshul gzhi bras dbyer med du grub pas ye sangs rgyas pai dgongs pa gtan
la phebs shing/ snang tshul la goms rtsal rdzogs pai tshe na gnas snang mthun pai tshul
gyis mngon du gyur pas yang tshang rgya baang yin te/ de gnyis mi gal lo/ /spros kun
ye nas sam ka nas dag pa dang/ rang bzhin od gsal bai gdangs dbyer med pai chos
nyid de ni khor das kun la khyab pas/ chos nyid ci yang ma yin las cir yang char rung
bai phyir/ khor das dbyer med mnyam pa nyid chos kyi skur lhun gyis grub pao/ /dei
phyir khor das kyi snang ba sna tshogs pai cho phrul tshad med pa ci bsgyur kyang/ de
dag rnam shes dang ye shes kyi byed pa kho na las byung ste/ snang tshul du/ rnam
shes kho nas las byed pa ma dag gzhi yi skabs/ rnam shes ye shes dre nas las byed pa
ma dag dag pa gnyis ldan lam gyi skabs/ ye shes kho nas las byed pa shin tu rnam dag
pai bras bui skabs te gnas skabs gsum du dbyer yod.

177
Although from the beginning there are no obscurations in the
essence of the expanse of suchness, since the ground and fruition
are established as indivisible, the mode of subsistence is
ascertained as the viewpoint of the Buddha (sangs rgyas pai
dgongs pa); and in the mode of appearance when perfecting the
strength (rtsal rdzogs) of meditation, one also becomes the Buddha
again through actualizing the concordant modes of appearance and
subsistence.
These two are not a contradiction because
suchnesswhich is the indivisibility of (1) the effulgence (gdangs)
of natural luminous clarity and (2) the primordial purity of all
constructs from the beginningpervades all of sasra and
nirva; hence, from suchness, which is nothing whatsoever,
anything can arise. The equality of sasra and nirva is
spontaneously present as the Truth Body! Therefore, whatever the
transformations of the limitless miraculous displays arethe
various appearances of sasra and nirvathey all arise from
only the functions of consciousness and wisdom. Hence, in the
mode of appearance, there is a division of three contexts: (1) the
context of the impure ground, which is the function of only
consciousness, (2) the context of the path endowed with both the
impure and pure, which is the function of consciousness and
wisdom having been mixed, and (3) the context of the extremely
pure fruition, which is the function of only wisdom.
In this way Mi-pham affirms the indivisibility of the ground and fruition in
the mode of subsistence while he delineates three contexts of the ground,
path, and fruition in the mode of appearance.

The three contexts of

impure, impure/pure and extremely pure are found in the Uttaratantra, in

terms

of

(1)

impure

sentient

beings,

both

impure

and

pure

bodhisattvas, and completely pure Tathgatas, the Buddhas.363

Mi-pham states that one should make distinctions in accord with the
way things appear, the mode of appearance, while at the time of

363

Uttaratantra 1.47: According to the progression of impure, impure/pure, and

extremely pure, they are called sentient beings, bodhisattvas, and Tathgatas. rgyu
bla ma rtsa grel, 8: ma dag ma dag dag pa dang/ /shin tu rnam dag go rims bzhin/ /sems

can byang chub sems dpa dang/ /de bzhin gshegs pa zhes brjod do.

178
conclusively settling (la zloi tshe), one should do so in accord with the
way reality is, the mode of subsistence:364
In terms of the mode of appearance, since one asserts (1) the
ground as natural purity and (2) the fruition as qualified by the purity
that is freed from the adventitious [defilements], it is not that there is
no distinction. However, when conclusively settling, one should
ascertain in accord with the mode of subsistence because if one
does not, sasra itself will not be realized as nirva. Even
though when making distinctions one accords with the mode of
appearance, by that, the equality of sasra and nirva within the
abiding reality is not negated because there is no impurity within
the mode of subsistence.
He states that one should make distinctions in accord with the mode of
appearance and ascertain the abiding reality, or conclusively settle, in
accord with the mode of subsistence. Even though distinctions are made
in accord with the way things appear, that does not negate the equality of
sasra and nirva because there is no impurity within the mode of
subsistence. Furthermore, if one always makes distinctions even when
conclusively settling, then sasra itself will not be realized as nirva
the modes of appearance and subsistence will not accord.
In this way, Mi-pham delineates two contexts: in terms of the mode
of subsistence, where there are no distinctions and the two truths are
indivisible, and in terms of the mode of appearance, where appearances
arise as unmixed and distinctions are made.

While there are no

distinctions within the mode of subsistence, he distinguishes what is true

364

Mi-pham, gnyug sems book 2, 542.3-543.1: snang tshul gyi dbang du byas na/ rang

bzhin rnam dag gzhi dang/ glo bur bral dag gi khyad par du byas pai dbyings bras bur
dod pas khyad med pa min yang/ la zloi tshe gnas tshul ltar gtan la bab dgos kyi/ de ma
phab na/ khor ba nyid myang das su mi rtogs so/ /shan byed pai tshe snang tshul ltar
yin yang/ des gnas lugs la khor das mnyam nyid yin paang mi khegs te/ gnas tshul la
ma dag pa med pas so.

179
from what is not in the context of making distinctions. In his Lions Roar:

Exposition of Buddha-Nature, Mi-pham states:365

However, in the context of differentiating well by means of the valid
cognition analyzing the conventional, the reality of entities in the
mode of apprehension of undistorted supreme knowledge is
conventionally:
Knowing the truth as truthsuch as knowing the undeceiving
path of the Sublime Ones (phags pai lam)
Knowing the false as falsesuch as knowing those who profess
liberation through meditating on the self to be misguided
Knowing the impermanent as impermanentknowing all
conditioned entities to be momentary
Knowing the permanent as permanentknowing that Buddhanature, the self-existing wisdom totality of [ultimate] aspects
(rnam pa thams cad pa), never changes
Knowing the non-existent as non-existentsuch as knowing
that the appearances of self and perceived-perceiver [duality]
are not intrinsically established
Apprehending the existent as existentsuch as knowing (1) the
mode of appearance of dependent arising, which is
incontrovertible causality (rgyu bras) and (2) the spontaneously
present qualities of suchness, the Buddha-nature, naturally
abiding in all sentient beings;
Therefore, through knowing and abiding as such, vast qualities are
attained because this is the non-deluded root of virtue.

365

Mi-pham, stong thun seng gei nga ro, 599.1-599.5: on kyang tha snyad dpyod pai

tshad mas shan legs par byed pai skabs su bden pa la bden par shes pa phags pai lam
mi bslu bar shes pa lta bu dang/ mi bden pa la mi bden par shes pa bdag bsgoms pas
grol bar smra ba la log par shes pa lta bu dang/ mi rtag pa la mi rtag par shes pa dus
byas kyi dngos po thams cad skad cig mar shes pa dang/ rtag pa la rtag par shes pa bde
gshegs snying po rang byung gi ye shes rnam pa thams cad pa mi gyur bar shes pa
dang/ med pa la med par shes pa bdag dang gzung dzin du snang ba rang bzhin ma
grub par shes pa lta bu dang/ yod pa la yod par dzin pa rgyu bras bslu med rten brel gyi
snang tshul dang/ sems can thams cad la chos nyid bde gshegs snying po lhun gyis grub
pai yon tan rang bzhin gyi gnas par shes pa lta bu la sogs pa ni tha snyad du dngos poi
yin lugs la phyin ci ma log pai shes rab dzin stangs yin pas de ltar shes shing bzhugs pa
las yon tan rgya chen po thob ste gti mug med pai dge bai rtsa ba yin pai phyir ro.

180
In this way, he delineates what exists and what does not conventionally in
accord with the perspective of higher knowledge. Through the delineation
of appearance and reality, Mi-pham argues a position that affirms the
primordial endowment of the qualities of a Buddha without incurring the
consequence that all beings necessarily are manifest Buddhas.

Buddha--Nature: The Immanent Buddha

Establishing Buddha
We will now look at the reasons Mi-pham puts forward to establish
that all beings possess Buddha-nature. In his Lions Roar: Exposition of

Buddha-Nature, Mi-pham bases a discussion of Buddha-nature around a

stanza from the Uttaratantra, in which he explains three verses as reasons
for the existence of Buddha-nature in all beings.

The verse from

Uttaratantra 1.27 reads as follows:366

Because the body of the perfect Buddha is radiant,
Because suchness (de bzhin nyid) is indivisible,
Because of possessing heritage;
Therefore, all beings always possess the essential nature of
Buddha (sangs rgyas rnying po).
We will look at Mi-phams exegesis of this stanza in some detail, then we
will explore in more depth some of the implications of his use of reason to
establish Buddha-nature:367
The meaning of the first verse is as follows: since the Truth Body,
the consummate body of a complete and perfect Buddha, as such
with the qualities equal to [the extent of] space, later is made clear,
radiant, or manifest from a former continuum of a thoroughly
bounded (ching ba kun ldan) ordinary being; therefore, the
Ibid., 567.4-567.5: rdzogs sangs sku ni phro phyir dang/ /de bzhin nyid dbyer med
phyir dang/ /rigs yod phyir na lus can kun/ /rtag tu sangs rgyas snying po can. Published
in rgyud bla ma rtsa grel, 6.
366

Ibid., 572.3-572.3: rkang pa dang poi don ni/ yang dag par rdzogs pai sangs rgyas
kyi sku mthar thug pa chos kyi sku yon tan nam mkha dang mnyam pa de lta bu/ sngon
tha mal pa ching ba kun ldan du gyur pai gang zag gi rgyud de las phyis gsal baam/
phro baam/ mngon du gyur pa yod pas na da lta nas sems can gyi rgyud na bde gshegs
snying po yod ces bsgrub pa yin no.
367

181
statement presently the Buddha-nature exists in the continuums of
all sentient beings is established.
He explains the first verse of the stanza as a reason that proves the
cause, Buddha-nature, from the effect, the Buddha. He argues that if a
future effect is establishedthat is, the Truth Body of the Buddha which is
the unconditioned and unchanging ultimate truththen the cause also
presently must be the nature of the Truth Body present in all beings in the
manner of suchness:368
If the wisdom of the consummate Truth Body is established by
scriptures of definitive meaning stras and reasoning analyzing the
consummate [reality] to be the nature of the immutable ultimate
truth, completely pervading nirva and sasra, an equality, and
unconditioned; then the cause, which is able to actualize that at one
time (nam zhig), is presently the nature of the wisdom Truth Body
abiding in the manner of suchness without decrease or increase.
Although it may or may not be actualized in the mode of
appearance free or not free from adventitious defilements, there is
not even the slightest qualitative or temporal difference in the mode
of subsistence because it is the intrinsic nature of the immutable
unconditioned. In the Uttaratantra [1.51]:
As it was before so it is later
The immutable suchness.
And [1.63],
The luminous clarity that is the nature of mind
Is immutable like space.
It is undisturbed by adventitious defilements
Such as attachments that arise from the imagination of the
unreal.
368

Ibid., 575.6-576.4: mthar thug chos skui ye shes de ni srid zhi kun khyab dang

mnyam pa nyid dang dus ma byas pa dang/ gyur med don dam pai rang bzhin du nges
pa don gyi mdo sdei lung dang mthar thug dpyod pai rigs pas grub pa na/ de nam zhig
mngon du gyur rung gi rgyu de ni da lta nas ye shes chos skui rang bzhin chos nyid kyi
tshul du bri gang dang bral bar bzhugs pa de nyid la/ blo bur gyi dri ma bral ma bral gyi
snang tshul la mngon du gyur ma gyur yod kyang/ gnas tshul la snga phyir bzang ngan
gyi khyad par til tsam med de/ gyur med dus ma byas kyi rang bzhin yin pai phyir te/
rgyud bla ma las/ ji ltar sngar bzhin phyis de bzhin/ gyur ba med pai chos nyid do/ zhes
dang/ sems kyi rang bzhin od gsal gang yin pa/ /de ni nam mkha bzhin du gyur med de/
yang dag min rtog las byung dod chags sogs/ glo bur dri mas de nyon mongs mi gyur.

182

He argues that since there cannot be the slightest qualitative or temporal

difference in the nature of the immutable unconditioned, then the nature
cannot be different at the time of the effect and at the time of the cause.
In the mode of appearance, however, this reality may or may not be
actualized due to the presence of adventitious defilements that obscure
reality.369 Mi-pham compares the mind that does not realize the suchness
of reality to consciousness in a dream:370
Although the suchness that is the luminous and clear wisdom
pervades everything without distinction, when this adventitious
delusion arises in ones mind, the basis of designation of sasra
is only this deluded mind together with its object (yul); due to this
delusion, ones suchness is not known as it is. For example, when
sleeping, due to the power of solely the mental-consciousness,
unrestricted (mu med) appearances arise such as the body,

We can see this first argument in general as a teleological argument for the
immanence of the divine: if a future is acknowledged when beings are united with a
perfect and unchanging divinity, then that unchanging divinity must also in some way
participate in the present world because any change between pre- and post-union would
by definition contradict the unchanging divinity. A current trend in theology, called
panentheism (lit. God-in-everything) addresses issues of the relationship between the
369

divine and the world in terms such as inextricable intertwining. The discourses of
panentheism are fruitful to consider in light of Mi-phams depictions of Buddha-nature.
For a concise introduction to some of the central issues in panentheism, see Michael W.
Brierley, Naming a Quiet Revolution: The Panentheistic Turn in Modern Theology, in
Philip Clayton and Arthur Peacocke (eds.) In Whom We Live and Move and Have Our
Being: Panentheistic Reflections on Gods Presence in a Scientific World (Grand Rapids,
Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2004), 1-15.
370 Mi-pham, stong thun seng gei nga ro, 578.2-578.5: chos nyid od gsal bai ye shes

kun la khyad med par yod kyang/ rang sems khrul pa glo bur ba di skyes pai tshe khrul
sems yul dang bcas pa di tsam khor bai gdags gzhi yin la khrul pa de[s] rang la yod pai
chos nyid ji lta ba bzhin du mi shes te/ dper na gnyid kyi dus na yid kyi shes pa gcig bui
dbang gis lus dang yul dang mig shes la sogs pai snang ba mu med pa byung la/ de dus
yul yul can so sor dzin cing dmigs kyi/ yid shes kho rang gis rang gi yin lugs gzung dzin
tha dad du ma grub pa shes mi nus la/ ma shes kyang yin lugs de las gzhan du gyur pa
med pa dang/ chos thams cad stong pa nyid du gnas kyang de ltar yin pa tsam gyis kun
gyis rtogs dgos pa ma yin ba bzhin te gnas snang mi mthun pai khrul pa srid pai phyir
ro.

183
objects, and eye-consciousness, etc. At that time, although the
subject and object are observed and apprehended separately, the
mental-consciousness itself is not able to know its own mode of
being (yin lugs), in which the perceived [object] and the perceiving
[subject] are not established as different; even though it is not
known, there is nothing other than that mode of being. Likewise, all
phenomena abide as emptiness; even so, merely being as such
does not entail that everyone realizes this because there is the
possibility of delusionappearances that do not accord with the
mode of subsistence.
He argues that just because the luminous and clear wisdom pervades
everyone does not mean that everyone must realize this, just as all
phenomena being empty does not entail that phenomena are realized as
such by everyone.371 He calls the argument in the first verse a reasoning
of dependency (ltos pai rigs pa),372 proving the cause from the effect:373
The evidence (rtags) of a clear manifestation of the Truth Body at
the time of the fruition establishes that the heritage, primordially
endowed with qualities, exists at the time of the cause because
there is no temporal causality (snga phyi rgyu bras) in the mode of
subsistence; however, in dependence (ltos) upon the mode of
appearance, it is necessarily posited as cause and effect.
Therefore, proving the cause from the effect is called reasoning of
dependency.

371

We will see that Mi-pham uses this type of reasoning to also establish the great
purity (dag pa chen po) of all appearances. Mi-pham, spyi don od gsal snying po, 457459, cited below.
372 Mi-pham explains each of the first three verses of the stanza from the Uttaratantra in
terms of three of the four types of reasons from the Sadhinirmocanastra. See
Sadhinirmocanastra, in Powers, Wisdom of Buddha, 284-285. These same three
reasons are found in Rong-zoms Establishing Appearances as Divine. See Rong-zom,
snang ba lhar bsgrub, Rong-zoms Collected Works, vol. 1 (Sichuan: Nationalities Press,
1999), 560-561. See also Kapstein, Mi-phams Theory of Hermeneutics, in Buddhist
Hermeneutics, ed. Donald Lopez (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1988), 155-157.
373 Mi-pham, stong thun seng gei nga ro, 578.6-579.2: bras dus kyi chos sku mngon du

gsal pai rtags kyis rgyu dus kyi rigs yon tan ye ldan can yod par sgrub pa ste/ gnas tshul
la snga phyi rgyu bras su med kyang snang tshul la ltos nas rgyu bras su bzhag dgos
pai phyir bras bu las rgyu bsgrub pa ltos pai rigs pa zhes bya ba yin no.

184
He states that a clear manifestation of the Truth Body is posited as the
effect of a cause in the mode of appearance; however, this is not the case
within the way things arein the mode of subsistence. In the mode of
subsistence, the heritage, primordially endowed with qualities, is not the
prior cause of a later effect. Mi-pham continues his explanation of the
second verse of the stanza:374
The meaning of the second [verse], because suchness is
indivisible, is as follows: since all phenomena of sasra and
nirva are of one taste (ro gcig)indivisible within the great
primordial luminous clarity of the emptiness that is the abiding
realityBuddhas and sentient beings also are ultimately indivisible
due to the equality of existence and peace (srid zhi mnyam pa
nyid). Therefore, although appearing as emanated sentient beings
(sprul pai sems can) due to adventitious delusion, it is established
by the reasoning of the nature of things (chos nyid kyi rigs pa) that
there is not the slightest deviation from the ultimate suchness of
abiding reality; hence, the possession of the essential nature of
Buddha (sangs rgyas kyi snying po) is certain.
He says that sentient beings appear as emanated due to delusion that is
adventitious, but in reality there is no deviation from the suchness of
reality. Due to the indivisibility of sasra and nirva within the abiding
reality, Buddha and sentient beings are ultimately indivisible. He calls this
verse reasoning of the nature of things, or more literally, reasoning of
suchness. Effectively, he is giving the reason for Buddha-nature as:
because that is just the way things are, perhaps like a response to a
question why fire is hot and burningbecause it is. We will consider Mi-

374

Ibid., 579.2-579.4: rkang pa gnyis pa/ de bzhin nyid dbyer med phyir dang/ zhes pai

don ni/ khor das kyi chos thams cad gnas lugs stong pa nyid gdod mai od gsal chen
por dbyer med ro gcig pas na/ sangs rgyas dang sems can kyang don dam par dbye ba
med de srid gzhi mnyam pa nyid do/ /dei phyir khrul pa glo bur bas sprul pai sems can
ltar snang ba rnams kyang gnas lugs don dam pai chos nyid las cung zad kyang ma
g.yos par chos nyid kyi rigs pas grub pas na sangs rgyas kyi snying po can du nges.

185
phams use of reasoning below after we address his explanation of the
third verse:375
The meaning of the third [verse], because of possessing heritage,
is as follows: all sentient beings have the heritage that is the
potential to be a Buddha because it is established that (1)
defilements are adventitious and suitable to be relinquished and (2)
the Truth Body primordially endowed with qualities exists in
everything without distinction. In this way, the possession of the
heritage that is the potential to be a Buddha entails that these
embodied beings (lus can) are possessors of Buddha-nature
because (1) there is a context of them being a Buddha and (2)
since the Buddhas Truth Body is also established as essentially
unconditioned, there is no temporal or qualitative distinction
[between the Truth Body and Buddha-nature] from the aspect of the
essence. This third reason, knowing the production of the effect
from the cause, is reasoning of efficacy (bya ba byed pai rigs pa).
Here, due to the mere presence of the cause, the emergence of an effect
is not merely inferred because, due to the essential fact that it is
impossible that the heritage would ever diminish in the event of becoming
a Buddha (sangs rgya ba), (1) the heritage that is the suchness itself
(chos nyid de bzhin nyid) is unchanging, (2) at the time of the effect there
is no qualitative difference in the essence, and (3) no matter how long the
duration of the adventitious defilements is, they are suitable to be
separate.

375

Mi-pham, stong thun seng gei nga ro, 583.1-583.5: rkang pa gsum pa rigs yod phyir

na/ zhes pai don ni/ sems can thams cad la sangs rgya rung gi rigs yod de/ dri ma glo
bur ba spang rung du grub cing/ yon tan ye ldan gyi chos sku kun la khyad med par yod
par grub pas so/ /de ltar sangs rgya rung gi rigs yod na lus can de dag sangs rgyas kyi
snying po can du nges te/ de dag sangs rgyas pai gnas skabs yod la/ sangs rgyas chos
sku de yang ngo bo dus ma byas su grub pas snga phyi la bzang ngan gyi khyad par
ngo boi cha nas med pai phyir ro/ rigs pa gsum pa dis rgyu las bras bu skyed par shes
pa bya ba byed pai rigs pa yin no/ /dir rgyu yod tsam gyis bras bu byin par dpog pa
tsam min te/ chos nyid de bzhin nyid kyi rigs la gyur ba med pa dang/ de bras dus ngo
bo la bzang ngan med pa dang/ glo bur bai dri ma rnams yun ji ltar ring yang bras [read
bral] rung yin pas rigs de sangs rgya ba la nam yang chud za ba mi srid pai gnad kyis
so.

186
Mi-pham agues here that all beings have the potential to be a
Buddha because (1) defilements are advantageous; they are accidental
and contingentnot inherent within the nature of beingsand (2) the
Truth Body pervades everything without distinction. The possession of
heritage that is the potential to be a Buddha is called reasoning of
functionality; it is a reason that infers the effect from the cause.
Moreover, Mi-pham argues that this reason is not merely an
inference of the emergence of an effect because the effect, in essence, is
immanent due to there being no qualitative difference in the essence of a
sentient being and a Buddha.

Since suchness is unchanging, a

continuityor common groundof sentient beings and Buddhas is

necessitated.

Thus, in essence, beings presently participate in the

changeless and timeless nature of the Buddha. In this light, heritage can
be seen as somewhat like a divine spark in beings. To conclude, Mi-pham
summarizes the three reasons for all beings possessing Buddha-nature as
follows:376
In this way, (1) the existence of the cause, heritage, is essentially
not distinct from the Truth Body at the time of the fruition, and (2) if
the Truth Body at the time of the fruition exists, then at the time of
sentient beings it [the heritage that is essentially the Truth Body]
also necessarily exists without increase or decrease, and (3)
although there is the imputation of causality and temporality, in
meaning, the expanse of phenomena is one taste within the
immutable essence; the three reasons establish that all sentient
beings are possessors of Buddha-nature due to the authentic path
of reasoning that is engaged by the power of fact (dngos poi stobs
kyi zhugs pai rigs pa).

376

Ibid., 583.5-584.1: de ltar rgyu rigs yod pa de bras dus kyi chos sku dang ngo bo

khyad med dang/ bras dus kyi chos sku yod na de sems can gyi dus naang phel bri
med par yod dgos pa dang/ rgyu bras dang snga phyir btags kyang don la chos dbyings
gyur med kyi ngo bor ro gcig pai rigs pa de gsum gyis sems can thams cad de bzhin
gshegs pai snying po can du grub ste dngos poi stobs kyis zhugs pai rigs pa yang dag
gi lam nas so.

187
In this way, he puts forward reasons by the power of fact to support
Buddha-nature.
It does not take a trained logician, in Buddhist logic or modern logic,
to see that the status of these as reasons is quite spurious. The first
reason is based on the assumption of a Buddha, and the last reason is
based on another assumption of traditionthe possession of heritage. At
best, in consideration of the second reason, the indivisibility of suchness,
one could take a skeptical approach towards the experience of a
differentiated world. However, even if one were to find the indivisibility
hypothesis a workable description of reality, all beings could be said to
share the undivided nature of a Buddha if one were to accept the
assumption of the existence of a Buddha, which brings us back to
assumptions of tradition, not reason. We can see here that Mi-pham is
involved in an intricate scholastic project of reconciling reason and
tradition. We will explore further implications of this in Mi-phams use of
reason to establish appearances as divine (lha). First we will look at Pdpa Tulkus discussion of these three reasons.
Pd-pa Tulku takes up Mi-phams three reasons and describes the
first reason as evidence that is a result (bras rtags) and the last two as
evidence of [identical] nature (rang bzhin gyi rtags):377
There are three reasonings that establish Buddha-nature: (1)
reasoning of dependency [investigating] the effect, (2) reasoning of
the nature of things [investigating] the essence, and (3) reasoning
of efficacy [investigating] the cause. Moreover, the first is evidence
that is an effect and the latter two are evidence of [identical]
intrinsic nature. The first, through putting forward as evidence the
377

Pd-pa Tulku, stong thun gnad kyi zin thun, 17.5-18.1: gshegs snying sgrub byed kyi

rigs pa la/ bras bu ltos pai rigs pa dang/ ngo bo chos nyid kyi rigs pa dang/ rgyu bya ba
byed pai rigs pa dang gsum gyi[s] gru ba [read sgrub]/ de yang dang po bras rtags dang/
phyi ma gnyis rang bzhin gyi rtags yin/ dang po dag gnyis ldan gyi bras bu rtags su bkod
nas ngo bo ye dag gis [read gi] sangs rgyas yod par sgrub cing ngo bo ye dag dang/ dag
pa gnyis ldan gyis sangs rgyas gnyis ldog cha tha dad kyi sgo nas jog go sems can
sangs rgyas yin zhes pa rang bzhin rnam dag gi sangs rgyas yin pas sems kyi chos nyid
yin gyi dei bras bu min pas rgyu la bras gnas kyi skyon med do.

188
effectthat which is endowed with the two-fold purity (dag pa gnyis
ldan)establishes the existence of the essence of the primordially
pure Buddha; it is posited by means of the two separate
contradistinctive aspects: (1) the Buddha that is the primordial pure
essence and (2) the Buddha that is endowed with the two-fold
purity. Since the statement, sentient beings are Buddhas, is [in
reference to] the Buddha that is natural purity (rang bzhin rnam
dag), it [refers to] the suchness of mind, not the effect which is that
[Buddha endowed with the two-fold purity]; therefore, there is also
no fault of the effect abiding in the cause.
Pd-pa Tulku shows that the relationship of essential identity378 between
sentient beings and Buddhas refers to (1) the suchness of the mind of a
sentient being and (2) the natural purity, or primordial purity, of the
Buddha; it does not refer to the two-fold purity of a Buddha at the time of
the effect when the qualities of a Buddha are manifest. Thus, the actual
Buddha is endowed with the two-fold purity: (1) natural purity and (2)
purity that is the freedom from the adventitious [defilements] (glo bur bral

dag). In the case of the essential identity of a sentient being and Buddha,
Pd-pa Tulku states that it is posited by means of the contradistinctive
aspect, or conceptual distinction, of only the Buddhas natural purity, not
the two-fold purity. Therefore, he concludes that there is no fault here of
accepting an effect as abiding in a cause.379
Evidence of identical intrinsic nature is such that, for example, if it is a dog, then it is
necessarily an animal; or, if it is a product, then it is necessarily an impermanent
phenomenonthe two entities have a relationship of essential identity. Moreover, in the
case of phenomenon and product, the two are equivalent. They are not actually distinct,
but are merely conceptually distinct; they are said to have different contradistinctions.
Also, there are only two types of affirming evidence (sgrub rtags) in Buddhist logic,
corresponding to the two types of relations acceptedcausal relationships and
relationships of essential identity. The observation of a lack of relationship permits the
third of the three types of evidence in Buddhist logic, the evidence of non-observation
(ma dmigs pai rtags). See Bimal Krisna Matilal, The Character of Logic in India (Albany:

378

SUNY Press, 1998), 108-116. See also Karma Phuntsho (slob dpon karma phun
tshogs), tshad ma rigs pai them skas (Bylakuppe, India: Ngagyur Nyingma Institute,
1997), 18-19; 40-44; 72-82.
379 Such concerns show the similarity of Buddha-nature with doctrines that Buddhists
have tended to refute, such as the claim that the effect is present in the cause

189

Establishing Appearances
Appearances as Divine
We will continue to explore Mi-phams use of reasoning by looking
further into his text, the Lions Roar: Exposition of Buddha-Nature. In this
text, Mi-pham states that from the perspective of sentient beings, ordinary
conventional valid

cognition

impermanent, entities.

exclusively observes functional,

thus

However, in the perspective of wisdom,

omniscience is permanent:380
In accord with the mental perspectives of othersthose to be
trained who have not been transformedthe scriptures say that
omniscience is impermanent, and there is reason also in the
Pramavrttika [2.8]:
There is no permanent valid cognition
(satkryavda) and the claim that change is a transformation of a single substance
(parinavda). I should note that Mi-pham affirms that the Skhya (grangs can pa),
the classic exemplar of satkryavda and parinavda, is the best of the non-Buddhist
philosophies (phyir rol pai nang nas grub mtha legs shos). He adds that it has been
said to be very similar to the philosophical slant of the False-Aspectarian Mind-Only
(grub mtha bab sems tsam rnam brdzun pa dang ches nye ba). Mi-pham, dbu ma rgyan
rtsa grel, 248.
380 Mi-pham, stong thun seng gei nga ro, 593.5-594.5: gnas yongs su ma gyur pai gdul

bya gzhan gyi bsam ngo dang bstun te rnam mkhyen mi rtag ces lung las gsungs shing/
rigs pa yang rnam grel las/ tshad ma rtag pa nyid yod min/ /dngos yod rtogs pa tshad
phyir dang/ /shes bya mi rtag pa nyid kyi/ /de mi rtag pa nyid phyir ro/ /zhes gsungs te/
/sems bskyes pa dang stong nyid goms pa la sogs lam gyi rgyu las rnam mkhyen byung
gi rgyu med du byung ba mi rigs pa dang/ de chos thams cad la mngon sum pai tshad
ma yin pai phyir/ tshad ma ste mi bslu bai blo yin na rtag pa zhig med de dngos po yod
pa la de de bzhin jal bai tshad ma yin la/ dei yul shes bya ni mi rtag pa nyid kyi phyir jal
byed tshad ma de yang mi rtag ste rim can du byung gi /rtag pa yin na don byed nus pas
stong par tshad mas grub pai phyir yul jal ba la sogs pai byed pa mtha dag gis stong
par nges pas na rnam mkhyen ni rtag par shin tu mi rigs te mi rtag par grub la/ de bzhin
dngos po thams cad mi rtag pa dang/ dngos med la rtag par btags kyang rtag rgyui gzhi
med pas rtag pa mtshan nyid pai chos gang yang mi rnyed par gyur ro/ /tshul di ni phyi
rol mu stegs can dang/ bsam gyis mi khyab pai chos nyid kyi ngo bor gnas gyur pai tshul
la blo ma sbyangs pai theg pa thun mongs pai ngor de ltar sgrub dgos te/ rnam shes kyi
ngor snang tshul la de las gzhan du char bai thabs ci yang med do/ /on kyang gnas
yongs su gyur pai ye shes kyi gzigs pai dbang du byas na rnam mkhyen rtag par grub
ste.

190
Because the realization of the existence of entities is valid
and
Objects of knowledge are impermanent;
That [omniscient valid cognition] is only impermanent.
Omniscience arises through causes such as the generation of the
mind [of awakening] and meditation (goms) on emptiness because
it is not reasonable to arise without a cause, and that [omniscience]
is valid cognition that is the direct perception of all phenomena. If
valid cognition is a non-deceptive cognition, then there are no
permanent phenomena because it is valid cognition that evaluates
existent entities as they are.
Since its objects are only
impermanent objects of knowledge, then the evaluating valid
cognition also must be impermanent, occurring sequentially,
because it is established by valid cognition that what is permanent
is incapable of functioning; hence, it would certainly be incapable of
all activities such as evaluating objects. Therefore, it is extremely
unreasonable that omniscience is permanent; it is established as
impermanent. Likewise, all entities are impermanent and although
non-entities are designated as permanent, since there is no basis
of something permanent (rtag rgyu gzhi med), there is no genuinely
permanent phenomena found. This fact is necessarily established
as such for the perspectives of non-Buddhist heretics and those of
the common vehicles who have not trained their minds in the
manner of transformation within the essence of inconceivable
suchness (bsam gyis mi khyab pai chos nyid kyi ngo bor gnas gyur
pai tshul) because they have no method whatsoever for the arising
of what is other than the manner of appearance from the
perspective of consciousness (rnam shes). However, as for (dbang
du byas) the vision of thoroughly transformed wisdom (ye shes),
omniscience is established as permanent.
Functional entities are necessarily impermanent phenomena, a claim
made within the Buddhist epistemological system of valid cognition (tshad

ma, prama), where cognition is said to be impermanent because of the

mutually exclusive dichotomy of (1) functional entities and (2) permanent
non-entities,

devoid

of

functional

capacity.

However,

Mi-pham

contextualizes the statements regarding wisdom as impermanent; he says

that the absence of permanent phenomena is necessarily established as
such in the perspectives of non-Buddhists and others who have not
trained their minds in the manner of transformation within the essence of

191
inconceivable suchness. He delimits the necessity of cognition being
permanent to only the perspective of consciousness, not the perspective
of wisdom. Thus, he makes a distinction between appearance and reality
based on consciousness and wisdom, respectively.
Using the language of Buddhist traditions of epistemology, Mi-pham
delineates four perspectives, as four valid cognitionstwo that are
conventional and two that are ultimate.381 We discussed the valid
cognitions of the uncategorized and categorized ultimate in chapter 2; now
we will look into the two conventional valid cognitions.

The two

conventional valid cognitions are respectively based on: (1) confined

perception (tshur mthong), and (2) pure vision (dag gzigs).

Mi-pham

states in his Sword of Supreme Knowledge:382

Since there are appearances that do not accord with [the mode of]
subsistence,
With regards to the conventional also there are two thoroughly
conventional valid cognitions (kun tu tha snyad tshad ma):
Based upon impure confined perception and
Based upon pure vision,
Like a persons eye and a divine eye.

For a discussion of the functions of Mi-phams four valid cognitions, see Matthew
Kapstein, Mi-phams Theory of Hermeneutics, in Buddhist Hermeneutics, ed. Donald
Lopez (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1988), 159. Pd-pa Tulkus presentation of
these four valid cognitions is also discussed in Kennard Lipman, What is Buddhist
Logic? in Tibetan Buddhism: Reason and Revelation, Steven Goodman and Ronald
Davidson (eds.), (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992), 27-39.
382 Mi-pham, don rnam par nges pa shes rab ral gri mchan bcas, Mi-phams Collected
Works, vol. 4, 800.3-800.5: tha snyad la yang gnas snang dag/ /mi mthun snang ba yod

381

pai phyir/ /ma dag tshur rol mthong ba dang/ /dag pai gzigs pa la brten pai/ kun tu tha
snyad tshad ma gnyis/ /mi dang lha yi mig bzhin no. See also Mi-pham, spyi don od gsal
snying po, published in bka brgyad rnam bshad dang spyi don od gsal snying po yang
dag grub pai tshig grel bcas bzhugs (Sichuan: Nationalities Press, 2000), 447: kun du
tha nyad pai tshad ma la gnyis yod de/ tshu rol thong ba la brten pa kun tu tha nyad pai
tshad ma dang/ dag pai gzigs pa la brten pa kun tu tha nyad pai tshad ma gnyis su gnas
pai phyir ro.

192
Similar to the distinction Mi-pham makes between the categorized and the
uncategorized valid cognitions analyzing the ultimate truth, his division of
two types of conventional valid cognition is also based upon two modes of
understanding. The conventional valid cognition of pure vision functions
to affirm a reality that is otherwise inconceivable and conflicting with
ordinary perception. Conventional valid cognition of confined perception,
on the other hand, concerns ordinary modes of being in the world.
Valid cognition is an important means by which Mi-pham affirms his
views. However, he also argues that it is extremely closed-minded (blo

gros shin tu rgya chung ba) to think that only ordinary confined perception
is the consummate conventional reality (tha snyad kyi gnas tshul mthar

thug).383 Thus, ordinary valid cognition is superceded by wisdoms

inconceivable mode of knowledge. In his overview (spyi don) of Longchen-pas commentary on the Guhyagarbhatantra, Mi-pham states:384
The unique object of this latter [conventional valid cognition of pure
vision] is (1) that which appears such that it conflicts with the
objects of ordinary confined perception and (2) that which is an
inconceivable domain such as:
an appearance of as many [Buddha-]fields as dust motes within
the breadth of a single dust mote
a show (ston pa) of many aeons activities in one moment of
time

383
384

Mi-pham, spyi don od gsal snying po, 447.

Ibid., 448: phyi ma di rang yul mthun min ni/ rdul gcig gi khyon la rdul snyed kyi zhing

snang ba/ dus skad cig la bskal pa mang poi mdzad pa ston pa/ chos dbyings gyur med
las ma g.yos bzhin du sprul pai rol pa ston pa/ rnam rtog dang bral bai thugs kyis shes
bya thams cad dus gcig tu mkhyen pa sogs/ bsam gyis mi khyab pai spyod yul gang zhig
tha mal pai tshul mthong gi yul du gal ba lta bur snang. The valid cognition of pure
vision seems to stem from yogic direct perception (rnal byor mngon sum, yogipratyaka),
a special form of awareness among the four types of direct perception. Yogic direct
perception is one of four types of direct perception, the others being sense direct
perception (dbang po mngon sum), mental direct perception (yid kyi mngon sum), and
reflexive awareness direct perception (rang rig mngon sum). We also can see a parallel
here with the two types of dependent nature (gzhan dbang, paratantra), pure and impure,
in Yogcra discourses.

193

showing a display of emanations without wavering from the

immutable expanse of phenomena
knowledge of all objects of knowledge instantly with a nonconceptual mind (thugs).

In this way, the conventional valid cognition of pure vision allows Mi-pham
to provide a context of valid cognition to affirm what is inconceivable. The
two-tiered structure of conventional valid cognitions is his attempt to affirm
a legitimate presence of an inconceivable world without undermining the
grounds for an epistemology of pragmatic truths on the level of worldly
transactions.

In this way, we can see how Mi-phams four-fold

perspectival epistemology integrates (1) two conceptual approaches to

reality, based on confined perception and the categorized ultimate, and (2)
two approaches to reality that defy ordinary conceptual modes of being,
based on pure perception and the uncategorized ultimate. Moreover, he
states:385
In this way, one should be learned (mkhas) in the essential point
that the profound meaningsall phenomena are primordially
Buddha, etc.are not established by only confined perception, yet
are not utterly without a valid means of establishment either.
The role of valid cognition supports Mi-phams agenda to affirm a view in
accord with certainty induced by reason. He disagrees with the position
that the authentic path is incompatible with reason also in his Lions Roar:

Exposition of Buddha-Nature:386
It is necessary to be learned in the essential point of the manner of
accomplishing the path, having expelled the obscured stupidity
(rmongs mtshang brtol) of thinking: Even though it is the authentic

385

Mi-pham, spyi don od gsal snying po, 449: de ltar chos thams cad ye nas sangs rgyas

pa la sogs pa don zab mo rnams tshur mthong kho nas bsgrub pa ma yin zhing/ sgrub
byed tshad ma gtan med paang ma yin par gnad kyi don la mkhas par byao.
386 Mi-pham, stong thun seng gei nga ro, 589.2-589.3: lam rnam dag yin kyang rigs pas
sgrub mi nus te myong bas rtogs dgos so zhes pa dang/ tshur mthong gi lam du ma gyur
na lam yang dag min no snyam pai rmongs mtshang brtol nas lam sgrub tshul gyi gnad
la mkhas par bya dgos so.

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path, since it cannot be proved through reason, it has to be
understood through experience (myong bas rtogs), or, If it is not
the path of confined perception, then it is not an authentic path.
Here we can see that Mi-pham disagrees with the beliefs that (1) the
authentic path cannot be established through reason, but must be realized
through experience, and (2) if it is not the path of confined perception, it is
not authentic. The former reveals his emphasis on establishing a view of
reality that is compatible with reason, whereas the later reveals his appeal
to a higher authority, an authority that is incompatible with, or rather is not
limited to, (ordinary) reason.

Thus, we can see that Mi-phams

epistemology spans stra and tantra.

Pd-pa Tulku states that without the conventional valid cognition of
pure vision, the view of great purity of the relative taught in tantras such as
the Guhyagarbha would be a mere assertion without support. He says
that such divine appearances cannot be established by ultimate valid
cognition because if they were said to exist from the ultimate perspective,
then they would be truly established:387
387

Pd-pa Tulku, lta grub shan byed grel pa, 110: tha snyad dag pai tshad ma med du

zin na/ sgyu phrul gsang bai snying po sogs kyi skabs nas bstan pai kun rdzob dag pa
chen po yod par dam bca ba tsam las sgrub byed kyi tshad ma mi rnyed de/ don dpyod
tshad mas ni de sgrub par mi nus pa tsam du zad/ dei ngor mi stong par yod pa tsam du
smras kyang bden grub du gyur zhing tshul mthong tshad mas ni phung lnga ma dag pa
dang/ sa sra zhing thas pa/ me tsha zhing bsreg pa tsam du grub kyi phung lnga rigs
lnga dang/ byung lnga yum lngai dkyil khor du bsgrub ga la nus. Pd-pa Tulku also
states here that because of the division of two ultimate valid cognitions: by means of
temporarily (re zhig) accepting the valid cognition that analyzes the categorized ultimate,
all the views of the lower vehicles and philosophies are not disregardedfrom the
selflessness of persons in the Vaibhika up to the concordant ultimate (mthun pai don
dam) of the Svtantrika. By means of accepting the valid cognition that analyzes the
uncategorized ultimate, the great empty essence is ascertained without superimposition
or denigrationfrom the great empty ultimate (don dam stong pa chen po) of the
Prsagika, through the great equality (mnyam pa chen po) of Mahyoga, all the way up
to the primordial purity of the ground-expanse (gzhi dbyings ka nas dag pa) of Atiyoga
(the Great Perfection). Similarly, he explains that because of the division of two
conventional valid cognitions: by means of accepting the valid cognition of confined
perception, the mode of appearance of impure phenomena are ascertained without

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As soon as there is no conventional valid cognition of pure vision,
there is no valid cognition found as a means to establish the
existence of the great purity of the relative, as shown in the
Myjla Guhyagarbha and so forth, other than a mere assertion
because (1) ultimate valid cognition is not only simply unable to
establish that; even if it were said to just exist as not empty in that
perspective [of ultimate valid cognition], it would be truly
established, and (2) confined conventional valid cognition
establishes only the impurity of the aggregates, fire to be hot and
burning, and earth to be hard and obstructive, etc. How could
confined conventional valid cognition establish the five aggregates
to be the five Buddha families and the five elements to be the
maalas of the five goddesses?
The divine nature of appearances is not established by ordinary
conventional valid cognition. Pd-pa Tulku shows how the conventional
valid cognition of pure vision functions to affirm the purity of appearances
by establishing the purity of relative phenomenasuch as the five
aggregates as the five Buddha families and the five elements as the
maalas of the five goddesses.388 Furthermore, Pd-pa Tulku states that
such conventional valid cognition is unlike ordinary other-emptiness
(gshan stong phal):389
superimposition or denigrationsuch as aggregates, elements, and sense-fields that
comprise the truths of suffering and origin in the tradition of the vehicle of characteristics
(mtshan nyid theg pa). By means of accepting the pure conventional valid cognition (tha
snyad dag pai tshad ma), the distinctive luminous and clear nature of the great purity of
the relative is established without superimposition or denigrationfrom the luminous
clarity that is the appearing aspect of Buddha-nature, the definitive meaning of the
vehicle of characteristics, through the great purity (dag pa chen po) of Mahyoga, all the
way up to the spontaneous presence of the ground-appearance (gzhi snang lhun gyis
grub) of Atiyoga. Pd-pa Tulku, lta grub shan byed grel pa, 109-110.
388 The five aggregates are: forms, feelings, perceptions, formations, and
consciousnesses; and the five Buddha families are: Tathgata, Vajra, Padma, Ratna, and
Karma. The five elements are: earth, water, fire, wind, and space; and the five
goddesses are: kadhtvvar, Buddhalocan, Paravsin, Mmak, and
Samayatr.
389 Pd-pa Tulku, lta grub shan byed gnad kyi sgron me, 37: don dpyod tshad mas dpyad

bzod bral/ /gzhan stong phal dang di mi dra/ /rnam dag tshad mai rnyed don phyir/
/bden stong phal gyis do zla min.

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This is unlike ordinary other-emptiness
Because [it] cannot bear the analysis of ultimate valid cognition;
Due to being the object found by the valid cognition of pure [vision],
It is not in conflict (do zla) with the ordinary emptiness of true
existence.
Following Mi-pham, Pd-pa Tulku draws from valid cognition to establish
the purity of appearance. Mi-pham also sets forth an argument in the
classical syllogistic form of Buddhist logic to establish the purity of
appearances:390
It follows that the subject, all these appearances, are established in
the mode of subsistence as the maala of the Buddha-body and
wisdom because the Sublime Ones free from distorting pollutants
see [appearances] as pure; like someone with unimpaired vision
seeing a conch as white.
People with undefiled perception see reality as it is, while people infected
by defilements perceive a distorted reality; this is evident in the fact that
ordinarily people see a conch shell as white, while someone with jaundice
sees it as yellow. Mi-pham argues here that even though the way things
appear may not be pure, appearances are pure in a Sublime Ones
undistorted vision.

Furthermore, he shows a parallel here with the

reasons that establish the emptiness of phenomena:391

Mi-pham, spyi don od gsal snying po, 444: di ltar snang ba thams cad chos can/ gnas
tshul la sku dang ye shes kyi dkyil khor du grub ste/ phyin ci log gi bslad pa dang bral
bai phags pa rnams kyis dag par gzigs pai phyir/ mig kyon med pas dung dkar por
mthong ba bzhin. See also nearly verbatim text in Yn-tan-gya-tso, yon tan rin po chei
mdzod kyi grel pa bden gnyis gsal byed zla bai sgron ma, vol. 3, 75.5.
391 Mi-pham, spyi don od gsal snying po, 457-458: dper na chos kun stong par gtan la
bebs pai tshe mi stong pai sgrub byed du/ las rgyu bras dang khor ba dang myang
das kyis chos gang bgod [read bkod] kyang/ sgrub byed de nyid snga ma bsgrub bya
dang mtshungs te kho rang yang rang bzhin ma grub par sgrub nus pas na/ ci tsam mi
stong par bsgrub pai sgrub byed bkod pa thams cad kyang bud shing me la bsnan pa
ltar stong nyid sgrub pai rigs pai grogs su gro bas na [omit repeated gro bas na] stong
pa nyid sun byin pai rigs pa shes byai khongs nas mi snyed pa bzhin du/ /dir yang chos
rnams dag pa min pai sgrub byed du gang dang ji bkod kyang sgrub byed de nyid kho
390

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For example, when ascertaining that all phenomena are empty, no
matter what phenomena are set forth as a means to establish
(sgrub byed) what is not emptycause, effect, sasra, nirva
that very means of establishment is similar to what is established
(bsgrub bya) in the former [i.e., empty]; it also can be proven to lack
intrinsic nature. Hence, whatever is put forward as a means to
establish the non-empty also goes to assist the reasoning that
establishes emptinesslike adding kindling to the fire. Therefore,
just as nothing is found within the sphere of what can be known that
can refute emptiness, here as well, anything whatsoever that is put
forward to establish phenomena to be impure, that very means of
establishment also is itself what is established [i.e., pure].
Therefore, an argument that is able to refute the reasoning that
establishes all phenomena as pure in the mode of subsistence is
not found within the sphere of what can be known.
Mi-pham states that just as all the same reasons that are set forth to show
that reality is not empty (e.g., because there is cause and effect, there is
no emptiness), in fact support the case for emptiness (e.g., lacking
intrinsic nature), in the same way, all the reasons that are set forth to show
that reality is not pure (e.g., because of impure appearance) actually
support the case for purity (e.g., impure appearances appear due to
deluded perception of what is pure).

Moreover, he argues that since

reality does not appear the way it is due to confusion, one must cultivate
the path to actualize it, just as the case with emptiness:392
It does not appear as the mode of subsistence because of arising
from pollutants due to delusion; therefore, in order to remove
delusion one needs to train (goms)just as the nature of all
phenomena is emptiness, even so, one needs to tread the path in
order to actualize that.

rang dag par bsgrub bya yin pas na shes byai khongs na chos kun gnas tshul la dag par
sgrub pai rigs pa la sun byin nus pai gtan tshig mi rnyed de.
392 Ibid., 459: gnas tshul ltar mi snang ba ni khrul pas bslad pa las byung bas na khrul
pa sel phyir lam goms dgos te chos kun gyi rang bzhin stong pa nyid yin kyang/ de
mngon du bya bai phyir lam la gom dgos pa bzhin.

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Mi-pham, along with other Nying-ma exegetes, enlists reason in tantra to
establish what is extremely hidden (shin tu lkog gyur), what is typically
portrayed as the exclusive domain of scriptural authority.393 Buddhist logic
relies upon the foundations of principles of validityinference and direct
perception.

Yet when direct perception no longer presumes ordinary

direct perception, as an implication, we may wonderdo the rules of

inference also change? Do the criteria that determine the correctness of a
syllogism in Buddhist logicthe complete three conditions (tshul gsum

tshang ba)change when the evidence that establishes appearances as

divine is uncertain (ma nges) due to being evidence beyond ordinary
perception? Here we are confronted with tantras peculiar relationship with
Buddhist logic.

In contrast to the certainty induced by reason in the

ascertainment of emptinessa firm conclusion as to the absence of true

existence that Mi-pham emphasizes is necessary in order to understand
primordial purity394in the context of the purity of appearance, reason
appears to play a different role.395
In any case, Mi-pham explicitly affirms that reason alone is not
sufficient; he says that the view that all phenomena are primordially divine
cannot be realized without relying upon scripture and quintessential
instructions (man ngag). Mi-pham states in his Discourse on the Eight

Commands:396

In general explanations of valid cognition, what is evident (mngon gyur) is the domain
of direct perception, what is hidden (lkog gyur) is the domain of inference, and what is
extremely hidden (shin tu lkog gyur) is the domain of scripture.
394 See Mi-pham, dbu ma rgyan rtsa grel, 88; 471-472; and Mi-pham, nges shes sgron
me, 14, opt. cit.
395 It may be that the reason why the logic here does not follow the intersubjective rules
393

for validity (between two parties) is because it is intended for a different use; perhaps in
meditation for subjectively, in a provisional way, evoking what can be known only
individually by reflexive awareness. This is an area where more research needs to be
done, particularly in the use of reasoning surrounding the exegesis and practice of the

Guhyagarbhatantra.
396 Mi-pham, bka brgyad rnam bshad, 43-44: gsang sngags pai gzhung gis chos thams
cad ye nes lha yin no zhes grags pa de ji ltar bsgrub par bya na/ lung dang rig[s] pa man

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Concerning how to establish the proclamation within scriptures of
Secret Mantra that all phenomena are primordially divine; it is to
be established by scripture, reasoning, and quintessential
instruction...without scripture and quintessential instruction, one
cannot ascertain Secret Mantra.
Furthermore, Mi-pham states that conviction (gdengs) in the ultimate is
necessary to have the view that the relative is divine:397
Without the conviction in the ultimate,
Then merely meditating on the relative as divine
Is just an aspiration (mos pa tsam); it is not the view.
The conviction that the relative is divine comes through the realization of
ultimate reality:398
The belief (yid ches) that the relative is divine
Comes through the realization of the ultimate abiding reality;
Otherwise, through abiding in the deluded mode of appearance
How would [the relative] be established as divine?
Furthermore, he argues that even though the claim that reality necessarily
appears as only divine appearance cannot be established; even so, it
cannot be invalidated either through analysis into reality:399
Regarding this, although one cannot singlely establish (phyogs gcig
sgrub)
[The statement that] The expanse of consummate equality
Appears as only divine appearance;
Due to the expanse, which is naturally pure from the beginning,

ngag gsum gyis bsgrub par bya ste...lung dang man ngag med par gsang sngags gtan la
dbab mi nus.
397 Mi-pham, nges shes sgron me, 26: don dam gdeng dang mi ldan par/ /kun rdzob lha
ru bsgom pa tsam/ /mos pa tsam yin lta ba min.
398 Ibid., 28: don dam gnas lugs rtogs pa yis/ /kun rdzob lha ru yid ches kyi/ /gzhan du
khrul bai snang tshul la/ /gnas nas lha ru ji ltar grub.
399 Ibid., 37: de la mthar thug mnyam nyid dbyings/ /lha snang kho nar snang ngo zhes/
/phyogs gcig sgrub par mi nus kyang/ /rang bzhin gdod nas dag pa yi/ /dbyings dang
snang cha ye shes sku/ /du bral med phyir snang bai cha/ /gdod nas lha ru dag pa la/
/gnas lugs dpyad pas kyang mi gnod.

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And the appearing aspect, which is the wisdom body, being neither
conjoined nor separable,
One can neither invalidate the appearing aspectprimordially pure
as divine
Through analysis into the abiding reality.
Mi-pham concludes that it is his tradition of the Nying-ma alone that
establishes the nature of all appearances to be divine through valid
cognition, and he attributes this to the works of Rong-zom:400
Therefore, establishing the nature of all appearances as divine
Through this manner of valid cognition
Is exclusively our tradition of the old translations
The lions roar that is the elegant discourse
Of the omniscient scholar, Rong-zom.
Mi-pham states that the tradition that establishes appearances to be divine
through valid cognition is only his Nying-ma tradition, which he attributes
to Rong-zom. The other main Tibetan scholar with whom Mi-pham aligns
his Nying-ma tradition with is Long-chen-pa.401 We will now turn again
briefly to Long-chen-pa, to introduce Mi-phams depiction of Buddhanature in light of Mantra. We will see how an immanent Buddha-nature in
the Resultant Vehicle of Mantra is distinguished from Buddha-nature in the
Causal Vehicle.

Buddha--Nature and a Difference Between Stra and Mantra

Buddha
Long-chen-pa states that the Causal Vehicle (rgyui theg pa) is so
called because of accepting temporal causality (rgyu bras snga phyi). In
the Causal Vehicle, Buddha-nature is seen as a seed that develops into

400

Ibid., 34: de phyir tshad mai tshul di yis/ /snang kun rang bzhin lhar sgrub pa/ /snga

gyur rang lugs kho na ste/ /kun mkhyen rong zom padi tai/ /legs bshad seng gei nga ro
yin.
401 Mi-pham characterizes his tradition of exegesis on the Guhyagarbhatantra as the
Rong-Long tradition (rong long lugs), the tradition of Rong-zom and Long-chen-pa, in
contrast to the Zur tradition (zur lugs). Mi-pham, spyi don od gsal snying po, 388-389.

201
Buddha.

In Mantra, on the other hand, the essential nature exists as

spontaneously present in all beings:402

It is called the Causal Vehicle because of asserting temporal
causalitydue to accepting that the basic element, the Buddhanature, is merely a seed that is further developed through the
conditions of the two accumulations, by which one attains
Buddhahood; [In contrast,] that essential nature of Mantra exists in
all sentient beingsinherently and spontaneously present
complete with vast qualities.
Mi-pham comments on Long-chen-pas text as follows:403
In the Causal Vehicle, temporal causality is asserted because of
accepting the existence of Buddha-nature as a seed that is further
developed through the conditions of the two accumulations, by
which after a long time one accomplishes the fruition of
Buddhahood; the Vajrayna...professes the philosophy (grub mtha)
of the indivisible cause and fruition.
While this is not the context to go into the details of Mantra and the
differences between the paths of Stra and Mantra,404 it is important for

402

Long-chen-pa, yid bzhin mdzod grel, vol. 2, 1169.4-1170.1: khams bde gshegs snying

po sa bon tu yod pa tsam rkyen tshogs gnyis kyis las gong du phel bas sangs rgyas thob
bar dod pai phyir rgyui theg pa zhes bya ste rgyu bras snga phyir khas len pai phyir ro/
sngags kyi snying po de sems can la rang chas lhun grub tu yon tan rgya chen ma
tshang ba med par yod. Kong-trul also has a nearly verbatim passage as Long-chenpas in Kong-trul, lam rim ye shes snying poi grel pa ye shes snang ba rab tu rgyas ba,
59.6-60.3. Long-chen-pa characterizes the Resultant Vehicle as taking the effect as the
path in Long-chen-pa, grub mtha mdzod, 1032.2-1032.3: bras bu rang dang dra ba lam
du byed pas bras bui theg par gzhag pa.
403 Mi-pham, yid bzhin mdzod kyi grub mtha bsdus pa, 488.1-488.4: rgyui theg par

khams bde gshegs snying po sa bon du yod pa rkyen tshogs gnyis las gong du phel ba
las dus ring zhig bras bu sangs rgyas su grub par dod pas rgyu bras snga phyir khas
len lardo rje theg pas nirgyu bras dbyer med pai grub mthar smrao.
I capitalize Stra as a path, or vehicle, and leave stra uncapitalized as a text.
Although such as distinction is not unproblematic, the metaphor of a vehicle reveals more
of the practical means by which the path is traversed, as opposed to a text or a
philosophical system that simply describes and represents reality. Through this

404

distinction, I wish to point out that the Causal Vehicle of Stra and the Resultant Vehicle

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our discussion of Buddha-nature to address a central aspect of how Mipham shows the superiority of Mantra. Mi-pham expresses a distinction
between Stra and Mantra as follows in his Trilogy of Innate Mind:405
Since most Middle Way meditations have a strong adherence (zhan
shas che) to the emptiness that is a freedom from constructs, they
are like what is said in the Klacakra, that which is free from the
immutable...; here [in Mantra], awareness (rig pa) itself is the
consummate great bliss because of being awareness-wisdom (rig
pa ye shes)the ultimate immutable blisswhich transcends the
eight collections [of consciousness] that are the bases of
designation of mind (blo), awareness (rig), and consciousness
(shes). Therefore, the path of Mantra is superior to Stra.
He states that most Middle Way meditations strongly adhere to emptiness
as a freedom from constructs, whereas in the path of Mantra, awareness
itself is the consummate great bliss. Emptiness concerns the quality of
objects, as well as the cognitions of the subject; however, awareness
specifically concerns subjective cognitions:406

of Mantra should not necessarily be conflated with a different corpus of texts, stras vs.
tantras, but inclusive of a subjective view. Vehicle (theg pa), as a practical means, is
reflected in Mi-phams depiction of vehicle as: A vehicle is like something you ride; when
you remain in it, it takes you to your desired effect. Mi-pham, dbu ma rgyan rtsa grel,
462-463: theg pa ni bzhon pa dang dra ste/ de la gnas na rang dod pai bras bu la phyin

par byed pa yin la.

Mi-pham, gnyug sems book 2, 462.1-462.3: dbu mai sgom phal cher spros pa dang
bral bai stong par zhen shas che bas/ gang zhig gyur med dang bral sogs dus khor nas
gsungs pa ltar la/ dir rig pa nyid bde ba chen po mthar thug yin te/ blo rig shes gsum gyi
gdags gzhi tshogs brgyad las das pai rig pa ye shes don gyi bde chen gyur med yin pai
phyir/ des na sngags lam mdo las phags.
406 Mi-pham, spyi don od gsal snying po, 437-438: mdo sngags kyi khad par yod dam
med ce nas/ gzhal bya chos kyi dbyings spros bral du gtan la bebs pa tsam la khyad
med kyang/ chos dbyings mthong tshul gyis yul can la khyad yod la/ lta ba ni yul can gyi
ngos nas jog pas na khyad shin du cheo/ /de la lta bas gtan la dbab byai yul chos
dbyings de bzhin nyid gcig min na/ chos rnams kyi de bzhin nyid la rigs mi dra bar yod
par thal ba dang/ mdo yi mthong lam gyis de bzhin nyid ma mthong bar thal ba dang/
mtha bzhii spros pa las lhag pai spros pa gcod rgyu rigs pas grub dgos pas na/ mdo
sngags kyi mthong lam chos nyid mngon sum mthong ba la gnad gcig par mkhas grub
thams cad bzhed pa mthun no.
405

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If it is asked, Is there a difference in the views of Stra and Mantra,
or not? Although there is no difference in the mere ascertainment
of the object of evaluationwhich is the expanse of phenomena
free from constructsthere is a difference in the manner of
perceiving the expanse of phenomena, which is the subject (yul
can); since the view is posited from the side of the subject, there is
a great difference [in view].
Regarding this, if the object
ascertained by the viewthe thusness expanse of phenomena
(chos kyi dbying de bzhin nyid)were not the same, then it would
[absurdly] follow that: (1) there would be different types of
thusness(es) of phenomena, (2) Stras path of seeing (mthong
lam) would not perceive thusness, and (3) reasoning would have to
establish a construct to be eliminated (gcod rgyu) in addition to the
constructs of the four extremes; therefore, all scholars and
accomplished adepts (mkhas grub) are in accord in accepting the
single essential point that Stras and Mantras path of seeing
directly perceives suchness.
Mi-pham states that Mantra is not distinct concerning the object, the
expanse of phenomena (yul chos kyi dbyings)407; it is the quality of the

407

Kong-trul states that proponents of self-emptiness claim that the only difference in

Mantra is the subject, and not the object that is free from conceptual constructs; on the
other hand, proponents of other-emptiness claim that there is a difference in the object as
well: Mantra distinguished by the subject, [through] the method of bliss, and not the
object, which is the freedom from constructs, is the tradition of self-emptiness.
Proponents of other-emptiness assert that the object also is not merely the freedom from
constructs, but is endowed with all the supreme aspects, [appearing] like [reflections in a]
divination mirror (pra phab). Kong-trul, shes bya kun khyab, 716: sngags su yul can bde

bai thabs kyis khyad/ /sprod bral yul la khyad med rang stong lugs/ /gzhan stong yul
yang spros bral tsam po min/ /rnam kun mchog ldan pra phab lta bur bzhed. Sa-kya
Paita (sa skya paita, 1182-1251) states that there is no view higher than the
freedom of constructs taught in the Perfection Vehicle: If there were a view superior to
the freedom from constructs of the Perfection [Vehicle], then that view would possess
constructs; if free from constructs, then there is no difference [in view between Mantra
and the Perfection Vehicle]. Sa-kya Paita, sdom gsum rab dbye 3.255: pha rol phyin

pai spros bral las/ /lhag paI lta ba yod na ni/ /lta de spros pa can du gyur/ /spos bral yin
na khyad par med). Edition from Jared Douglas Rhoton (trans.), A Clear Differentiation
of the Three Codes, (Albany: SUNY Press, 2002), 308.

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subject (yul can) that differentiates the respective views of Stra and
Mantra:408
From the aspect of only the freedom from constructs
It is said that these two are not different
In order to avert adherence to emptiness
Great bliss is taught in Mantra.
The non-dual expanse of empty bliss (bde stong)
Is experienced through a manner
That is free from subject and object.
Appearance (snang ba), clarity (gsal ba), and awareness (rig
pa)
Are the synonyms for this bliss (bde ba).
He states that bliss is synonymous with appearance, clarity and
awareness. In this way, he affirms that Mantra is distinguished by means
of the manner of experience free from subject and object. Mantra involves
a new ascription of subjectivity, or rather, a re-cognition. Such wisdom, as
the optimized subjectivity that is dis-covered within, is the unique subject
matter of Mantra.
Moreover, Mi-pham states that if there is bliss, clarity, or awareness
that is separate from emptiness, then that is not suitable as suchness; and
likewise, if there is an emptiness that is distinct from bliss, clarity, or
awareness, then that is not suitable as suchness:409
In the authentic abiding reality, if there is bliss, clarity, or awareness
that is separate from emptiness, then that is counted as an entity; it
is a phenomenon, but is not suitable as suchness and is not
408

Mi-pham, nges shes sgron me, 19: spros bral tsam gyi cha nas ni/ /de gnyis khyad par

med do gsungs/ /stong par zhen pa bzlog phyir du/ /sngags las bde ba chen po bstan/
bde stong gnyis su med pai dbyings/ /yul dang yul can bral ba yi/ /tshul gis nyams su
myong bar byed/ /snang dang gsal dang rig pa gsum/ /bde ba de yi rnam grangs yin.
409 Mi-pham, gnyug sems book 3, 624.5-625.1: yang dag pai gnas lugs la ni stong pa las
logs su gyur pai bde baam gsal ba rig pa zhig yod na/ de dngos poi grangs su bgrang
ste chos can yin gyi chos nyid du mi rung zhing rnam shes kyi sa las ma das so/ bde
baam gsal baam rig pa las tha dad pai stong pa zhig yod na/ de ni dngos med kyi
grangs su bgrang ste/ de yang chos can yin gyi chos nyid du mi rung zhing sems med kyi
cha las ma das so.

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beyond the domain of consciousness (rnam shes kyi sa). If there is
an emptiness that is distinct from bliss, clarity, or awareness, then it
is counted as a non-entity; it also is a phenomenon, but is not
suitable as suchness and is not beyond the aspect of the absence
of mind (sems med kyi cha).
In this way, emptiness is a unity beyond the domain of consciousness and
beyond the mere aspect of the non-existence of mind. Here Mi-pham
emphasizes a continuity between the emptiness taught in stras and the
subjective awareness indicated in the tradition of Mantra.
Pd-pa Tulku affirms a difference between the luminous clarity
taught in the Causal Vehicle and in Mantra by stating that Mantra has the
distinctions of indicating luminous clarity: (1) clearly (gsal ba), (2)
extensively (rgyas), and (3) completely (rdzogs).410 He states:411
Such distinctions are not present in the Causal Vehicle because
[luminous clarity] is not taught other than: (1) as a mere illustration
by means of an example, (2) as a mere brief summary of the
possession of Buddha-nature, and (3) as a mere luminous clarity
that is the suchness of mind.
Although addressed in texts of the middle and last wheels of stra
doctrines, luminous clarity is not as fully developed as it is in Mantra.
Indeed it is the affirmed presence of luminous clarity that is the emphasis
of Mantra. Pd-pa Tulku states:412
In short, the four philosophical systems of the Causal Vehicle
Have the profound distinction (zab khyad) of the manner of
completing the absence of self (bdag med rdzogs tshul);
The four tantra sets of Secret Mantra

410
411

Pd-pa Tulku, lta grub shan byed grel pa, 84.

Ibid., 84: de drai khyad par mtshan nyid theg par med de/ dpei sgo nas mtshon tsam

dang/ sangs rgyas kyi snying po can du mdor bsdus pa tsam dang/ sems kyi chos nyid
od gsal ba tsam kho na las ma bstan pai phyir.
412 Pd-pa Tulku, lta grub shan byed gnad kyi sgron me, 4: mdor na rgyu yi grub mtha
bzhi/ /bdag med rdzogs tshul zab khyad yod/ /gsang sngags rgyud sde rnam pa bzhi/ /lta
ba lhun grub zab khyad yod.

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Have the profound distinction of the view of spontaneous presence
(lta ba lhun grub).
In the philosophies within the Causal Vehicle, in which Prsagika is
supreme, the absence of the self is emphasizedthe emptiness, or
quality of transcendence. In the tantras of Secret Mantra, in which the
Great Perfection is supreme, the emphasis is on the view of spontaneous
presencean immanent presence. In this way, the relationship between
the Causal and Resultant Vehicles can be understood as respectively
emphasizing the transcendence of the unified two truths (emptiness) and
the immanence of the unified two truths (presence). These modalities of
truth are uniquely intertwined in Mi-phams exegesis.
Furthermore, Mi-pham states that although the middle wheel of
stra teaches the ascertainment of a mere unity of appearance and
emptiness, it does not affirm the existence of self-existing luminous clarity,
the Buddha-body and wisdom, that is not produced by the causes of
karma and disturbing emotions (las nyon):413
Also in stra, in the middle wheel all phenomena are ascertained as
a mere unity of the emptiness that is a lack of intrinsic nature and
dependently arising appearance. However, the existence of the
Buddha-body and wisdomthe self-perception (rang snang) of
self-existing luminous clarity which is not produced by the causes of
karma and disturbing emotionswas not taught. Therefore, [in the
middle wheel] the Buddha-body and wisdom must be accomplished
anew by a cause; the accumulations of great compassion are
asserted because the sole realization of emptiness, or suchness,
cannot [accomplish] that.
In this way, Mi-pham shows that the middle wheel affirms the development
of the Buddha-body and wisdom through the causes of the accumulations
413

Mi-pham, gnyug sems book 2, 490.4-491.1: mdo las kyang khor lo bar par chos kun

rang bzhin med pai stong pa dang rten byung gi snang ba zung jug tsam gtan la phab
kyang/ las nyon gyi rgyus ma bskyed pai rang byung od gsal bai rang snang sku dang
ye shes yod par ma gsungs pas/ sku dang ye shes ni gzod rgyus sgrub ste byung gi
stong nyid dam chos nyid rtogs pa tsam gyis de mi nus pas snying rje chen poi tshogs
rdzogs par dod.

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of the merit of great compassion. However, the existence of the Buddhabody and wisdom, as the self-existing luminous clarity not produced by
causes, was not taught.
The last wheel indicates the suchness of mind as primordially
inseparable from the Buddha-body and wisdom; therefore, all living beings
are potential Buddhas because they are pervaded by Buddha-nature, the
heritage of the Mahyna:414
In the last wheel, since the suchness of mind, which is the expanse
of phenomena, is itself taught to be primordially inseparable from
the appearance of the Buddha-body and wisdom, all sentient
beings are pervaded by Buddha-naturethe heritage of the
Mahyna; hence they are potential Buddhas. However, it is
taught in dependence upon the cause of accomplishing the two
accumulationsthe cause which illuminates (gsal byed) that.
Mi-pham explains that the last wheel teaches that the appearance of the
Buddha, which is primordially inseparable from the suchness of mind, is
dependent upon the cause of accomplishing the two accumulations. In
Mantra, however, he explains that there is no newly produced Buddha to
be sought after that is accomplished by a cause:415
In Mantra, the maala of such a primordially pure Buddha
naturally abides as spontaneously present; in merely realizing this
through the method taken as the path (thabs kyis lam du byas), the
Buddha as such (sangs rgyas nyid) is made manifestwithout
needing to search some other place for a Buddha that is newly
established through a cause.

414

Ibid., 491.1-491.2: khor lo tha mar sems kyi chos nyid chos kyi dbyings de nyid sku

dang ye shes kyi snang ba dang ye nas bral med bstan pas sems can thams cad la theg
pa chen poi rigs bde gshegs snying pos khyab pas sangs rgya rung du bstan kyang/ dei
gsal byed kyi rgyur tshogs gnyis sgrub pai rgyu la ltos par bstan.
415 Ibid., 491.3-491.4: sngags su de drai ye nas rnam par dag pai sangs rgyas kyi dkyil
khor rang bzhin lhun grub tu bzhugs pa thabs kyis lam du byas na de rtogs pa tsam gyis
sangs rgyas nyid mngon du gyur gyi rgyus sgrub pai gsar byung gi sangs rgyas logs su
tshol mi dgos par.

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Furthermore, he states that the manner of joining Stra and Mantra has
been said to be the fact that the qualities of Buddha-nature are present
from beginning.

However, he also reveals the difference between

Buddha-nature in Stra and in Mantra:416

In the path of Stra, the qualities of Buddha-nature are said to be
present from the beginning (ye ldan yod), which has been called
the manner of joining Stra and Mantra (mdo sngags mtshams
sbyor). However, regarding that existence, it said [in stra] that
based upon the teachings of the Buddha, it is to be known through
faith, and also by knowing it as such, one abandons the five faults;
yet the intrinsic nature of Buddha-nature (bde gshegs snying poi
rang bzhin) is not explicitly taught to be a path that is ascertained
right now (da lta nas).
Buddha-nature, explicitly shown as a present reality to be ascertained
right now, is not taught in stra, but is fully disclosed in Mantra. In the
path of Stra, Buddha-nature is taught as what is known by faith,417 and is

416

Ibid., 453.5-454.1: mdo yi lam na bde gshegs snying po yon tan ye ldan yod ces

gsungs pa mdo sngags mtshams sbyor gyi tshul du gsungs kyang/ de yod par sangs
rgyas kyi gsungs la brten nas dad pas rtogs bya yin la/ de ltar shes pas kyang nyes pa
lnga spong bar gsungs kyi/ bde gshegs snying poi rang bzhin da lta nas gtan la babs
pai lam dngos su gsungs pa med.
417 In the Uttaratantra, the ultimate truth is said to be understood by faith alone.
Uttaratantra 1.156: The ultimate truth of the self-existing is understood only by faith; the
blazing disk of the sun cannot be seen by the blind. rgyud bla ma rtsa grel, 19: rang
byung rnams kyi don dam de/ /dad pa nyid kyis rtogs bya yin/ /nyi mai dkyil khor od bar
ba/ /mig med pas ni mthong ba med.

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also explained in order to remove five faults.418 Long-chen-pa explains the
five faults as follows:419
If the essential nature of awakening (byang chub kyi snying po) is
not seen to exist within oneself, then these faults will arise: (1) one
may become discouraged, [thinking] someone like myself cannot
become a Buddha, and not generate the mind of awakening; (2)
even if [the awakened mind is] generated, one may disparage
others, [thinking] I am a bodhisattva, others are ordinary, which
will hinder the attainment of the higher path; (3) through holding
onto the extreme of emptiness, one will not engage in the ultimate
nature of the expanse, and thus not apprehend the authentic; (4)
due to falling to an extreme of eternalism or nihilism, one will
disparage the authentic doctrine; (5) by not seeing other sentient
beings and oneself as equal, one will incur the faults of holding onto
self and other...[On the other hand,] by knowing that such a basic
element exists as spontaneously present in oneself and others, one
In the Uttaratantra, heritage is said to be taught in order to remove five faults: (1)
discouragement, (2) disparagement of inferior beings, (3) non-apprehension of the
authentic, (4) denigration of the authentic truth, and (5) considering ourselves superior.
Uttaratantra 1.160: The existence [of the basic element] is taught to relinquish these five
faults: discouragement, disparagement of inferior beings, not apprehending the authentic,
denigration of the authentic truth, considering ourselves superior. rgyud bla ma rtsa grel,
20: sems zhum sems can dman la brnyas pa dang/ /yang dag min dzin yang dag chos la
418

skur/ /bdag cag lhag pai skyon lnga gang dag la/ /yod pa de dag de spong don du
gsungs.
419 Long-chen-pa, grub mtha mdzod, 902.3-905.1: byang chub kyi snying po rang la yod
par ma mthong bas/ bdag lta bus sangs rgyas mi thob ces sems zhum nas byang chub tu
sems mi bskyed pa dang/ bskyed kyang bdag byang chub sems dpa gzhan tha mal pa
zhes sems can la brnyas pas lam gong ma thob pai gegs byed pa dang/ stong nyid
mthar dzin gyi dbang gis don dam pai rang bzhin chos kyi dbyings la mi jug pas yang
dag par mi dzin pa dang/ rtag chad du lhung bas yang dag pai chos la skur ba debs pa
dang/ bdag dang sems can mnyam par ma mthong bas/ bdag gzhan du dzin pai nyes
pa byung ba ste...de lta bui khams rang gzhan la lhun grub tu yod par shes na/ rang gi
sems thar bar bsgrub pa la dka ba med par shes te spro ba dang sems can thams cad la
sangs rgyas bzhin du gus pas tshe ba dang gnod pa med kyi steng du phan dogs pa
dang/ don dam pai dbyings rtogs pai shes rab dang/ gnas lugs mthong bai ye shes
dang/ byams pa tshad med pai dkyil khor rgyas pas gzhan don bsgrub par nus pa
ste...rigs kyi rnam par gzhag pa di ni drang don du mi lta bar/ nges pai don ba zhig tu
bzung ste. See also, Long-chen-pa, sems nyid ngal gsoi grel pa, 328.5-329.6; Mi-pham,
theg pa chen po rgyud bla mai bstan bcos kyi mchan grel, 435.4-437.5.

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will be able to accomplish great benefit for others: (1) one will be
joyous, knowing that the accomplishment of liberating ones mind is
without difficulty; (2) with respect for all sentient beings as
Buddhasin addition to not inflicting harm or hurting themone
will benefit them; one will be able to accomplish the benefit of
others through developing: (3) supreme knowledge that realizes the
ultimate expanse, (4) wisdom that sees the abiding reality, and (5)
the maala of limitless love...this presentation of heritage should
be held as only the definitive meaning, not viewed as a provisional
meaning.
In this way, Long-chen-pa explains the purpose of the teaching of the
basic element to remove the five faults. He shows how such a teaching
has great purpose and affirms that it is the definitive meaning. Mi-pham
explains that the five faults arise because of not hearing about Buddhanature.

He also says that Buddha-nature is the essential point in the

Vajrayna that the nature of mind (sems nyid) is primordially Buddha:420

The five faults arise because of not hearing about Buddha-nature
existing in all sentient beings; this is the essential point of
establishing one consummate vehicle, and this is also the essential
point in the Vajrayna that the nature of mind is primordially
Buddha.
Mi-pham affirms Buddha-nature as a central topic in Buddhism. He states
that: The luminous clarity of the expanse of phenomena, self-existing
wisdom, the luminous clarity of innate mind, and Buddha-nature are the
same meaning; this is the heritage of Buddha.421 Moreover, he says:
Innate mind, Buddha-nature, mind of luminous clarity, ultimate mind of
awakening, self-existing wisdom, and the expanse of phenomena are
distinct contradistinctions by name; but they are not different in

420

Mi-pham, gzhung spyii dka gnad, 456.3-456.4: nyes pa lnga po gshegs snying sems

can thams cad la yod par ma thos pa las byung/ mthar thug theg pa gcig grub pai gnad
la de yin la/ rdo rje theg par sems nyid ye sangs rgyas pai gnad kyang di yin no.
421 Mi-pham, gzhung spyii dka gnad, 455.5-456.1: chos kyi dbyings od gsal lam/ rang
byung ye shes sam/ gnyug sems od gsal lam/ bde gshegs snying po zhes pa rnams don
gcig te/ di sangs rgyas kyi rigs te.

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meaning.422 In this way, the ground, or Buddha-nature, is a common
subject matter of Stra and Mantra. Furthermore, he states:423
Such a ground, from the aspect of emptiness is taught as the
expanse of phenomena, the authentic limit, thusnness, etc., in
stras such as the Perfection of Wisdom; from the aspect of the
endowment of the appearance of the Buddha-body and wisdom,
the word Buddha-nature is used in the [Buddha-]nature Stras;
here in the definitive Mantrayna, it is called the indivisible
appearance and emptiness that is the identity of great purity and
equality, the primordial ground maala.
The common ground of Stra and Mantra is the indivisibility of Buddhanature as appearance and emptiness, purity and equality, primordial purity
and spontaneous presence.

According to Mi-phams depiction, all

Buddhist doctrines indicate this reality, explicitly or implicitly, directly or

indirectly, from different perspectives and in different contexts.

Thus,

statements of emptiness in the middle wheel and statements of the

primordial endowment of the qualities of a Buddha in the last wheel are
not only without contradiction, but are simply two descriptions of one
ground. Furthermore, Mi-pham states:424
If the genuine meaning (don rnal ma) of non-arising that is taught in
stras is understood, then there is no other unified emptiness
endowed with all supreme aspects other than that; therefore, no

422

Mi-pham, gnyug sems book 1, 434.6-435.1: gnyug sems dang/ bde gshegs snying po/

od gsal bai sems dang/ don dam byang chub kyi sems dang/ rang byung gi ye shes
dang/ chos kyi dbyings rnams ming gi ldog pa tha dad kyang/ don la tha mi dad pa yin.
423 Mi-pham, spyi don od gsal snying po, 399: de lta bui gzhi de nyid la stong pa nyid kyi
cha nas rgyal bai yum la sogs pa las chos kyi dbyings dang/ yang dag pai mtha dang/
de bzhin nyid la sogs pai ming gis bstan cing/ sku dang ye shes kyi snang ba dang bcas
pai cha nas snying po bstan pai mdo la sogs pa nas de bzhin gshegs pai snying po
zhes pai ming gis bstan la/ nges don sngags kyi theg pa dir ni snang stong bden pa
dbyer med dag mnyam chen poi bdag nyid gdod ma gzhi yi dkyil khor zhes byao.
424 Mi-pham, gnyug sems book 3, 755.1-755.2: mdo las gsungs pai skye med kyi don
rnal ma rtogs na zung jug rnam kun mchog ldan gyi stong nyid de las gzhan du med pas
mtho mtho zab zab kyi ming ci btags kyang don la de ga rang yin a bo rnams/ di gal che.

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matter what high and profound words are designated, it is just that
meaning, brothers. This is important.
In this way, Mi-pham shows that the genuine meaning of non-arising that
is taught in stras is none other than the meaning of emptiness endowed
with all supreme aspectsthe fully qualified ultimate truth.
Although the immanence of the Buddha is indicated within stras,
and particularly the third wheel doctrines, Buddha-nature as such is most
explicitly affirmed in descriptions found in tantras. Buddha-nature is most
fully articulated in Mi-phams explanations of the view of Vajrayna, and in
particular the Great Perfection, the pinnacle of the Buddhist vehicles.

Buddha--Nature as the Ground of the Great Perfection

Buddha
We will conclude by briefly exploring the Great Perfection, the
summit of the Resultant Vehicle of Mantra, in relation to Buddha-nature.
Mi-pham characterizes the ground in the language of the Great Perfection
as follows:425
The ground itself, from the aspect of lacking any constructs, is
primordially pure. Unlike a mere space-like absence, it is selfluminous without bias (ris med), confinement (rgya chad), or
partiality (phyogs lung)spontaneously present. As the source of
all appearances of sasra and nirva, it is said to be allpervasive compassionate resonance. In the language of the Great
Perfection tantras, it is called the ground abiding wisdom with three
endowments (gzhi gnas kyi ye shes gsum ldan).
The three endowments are empty essence (ngo bo stong pa), which is
primordial purity, natural clarity (rang bzhin gsal ba), which is spontaneous
presence, and all-pervasive compassion resonance (thugs rje kun khyab).
Mi-phams interpretation of Buddha-nature reflects the Great Perfection,
Mi-pham, gnyug sems book 1, 358.1-358.2: gzhi de nyid spros pa gang yang med pai
cha nas ka dag dang/ stong kyang nam mkha lta bu min par rang gsal ris med rgya chad
phyogs lhung med par lhun gyis grub pa/ khor das snang ba kun gyi byung gnas yin pas
thugs rje kun khyab ces gsungs te/ rdzogs chen gyi rgyud kyi chos skad la gzhi gnas kyi
ye shes gsum ldan zhes gsungs.
425

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as seen in his statements in the Lions Roar: Exposition of Buddha-

Nature:426
Due to not existing as they appear, conditioned phenomena that
appear to arise and cease in this way have never tainted the basic
nature of the expanse; therefore, through this essential point that
(1) the primordial purity of the causality of sasra and (2) the
uncontaminated appearances, which are the luminous clarity of the
spontaneously present nature, are neither conjoined nor separable,
the undistorted manner of Buddha-nature should be identified.
Mi-pham associates Buddha-nature with a distinguishing feature of the
Great Perfectionthe unity of primordial purity and spontaneous
presence. His interpretation of Buddha-nature reflects the dual quality of
empty essence and natural clarity of the Great Perfection.427
Pd-pa Tulkus representation of the own essence of heritage also
echoes the Great Perfection:428
The essence of heritage is asserted to be (1) the abiding reality that
is the primordially pure property (chos) of the essential nature (2)
bearing the identity (bdag nyid can) that is the endowment of the
three distinctive qualities (khyad chos gsum ldan)the nature of
empty essence, natural clarity, and all-pervasive compassionate

426

Mi-pham, stong thun seng gei nga ro, 572.1-572.2: di ltar skye zhing gag par snang

bai dus byas rnams ni snang ba ltar ma grub pai phyir dbyings kyi gshis la des gos pa
yod ma myong bas/ khor ba rgyu bras ye nas dag cing rang bzhin lhun gyis grub pai od
gsal zag med kyi snang ba rnams dang du bral med pai gnad dis bde bar gshegs pai
snying poi tshul phyin ci ma log pa ngos zin par bya dgos so.
One should note that in the triad of empty essence, natural clarity, and all-pervasive
compassionate resonance, the word essence (ngo bo) and the word nature (rang
bzhin) are both words that are used to translate the same Sanskrit word, svabhva
intrinsic nature. Thus, if a proponent of self-emptiness is defined as one holding the
427

view that the nature of reality is only empty, then Mi-pham would not be a proponent of
self-emptiness because he asserts the nature of reality as clarity (rang bzhin gsal ba).
428 Pd-pa Tulku, lta grub shan byed grel pa, 205: rigs kyi ngo bo ni gnas lugs ye dag

snying poi chos su gyur pa gang zhig ngo bo stong pa la rang bzhin gsal ba thugs rje
kun khyab kyi rang bzhin ste/ khyad chos gsum ldan gyi bdag nyid can du bzhed pa ste/
mdor bsdus na/ gnas lugs ye dag snying poi chos su gyur pa gang zhig/ khyad chos
gsum dang ldan pa de rigs kyi mtshan nyid du dod do.

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resonance. In short, the defining characteristic of heritage is: the
abiding reality which is the primordially pure property of the
essential nature endowed with the three distinctive qualities.
Pd-pa Tulku also interprets stras in the language of the Great
Perfection. He states that the intended meaning of the middle wheel is the
empty essence, the last wheels intended meaning is natural clarity, and
the non-contradiction of the middle and last wheels demonstrates allpervasive compassionate resonance:429
The intended meaning of the middle wheel is empty essence and
the intended meaning of the last wheel is natural clarity, the [unity
of the] middle and last [wheels] without contradiction indicates allpervasive compassionate resonance.
In this way, the explicit teaching of emptiness in the middle wheel reflects
primordial purity and the presence of wisdom emphasized in the last
wheel reflects spontaneous presence. The unity of the middle and last
wheels, as empty essence and natural clarity, is an all-pervasive
compassionate resonance.

Such a unity is represented in Mi-phams

depictions of emptiness and Buddha-nature.

Conclusion
We saw that Buddha-nature is the potential to be Buddha that
exists as the suchness of all beings minds. Buddha-nature is also the
suchness of reality as the indivisible truth beyond dichotomies. Mi-phams
treatment of Buddha-nature reflects Long-chen-pas description of the
ground. Mi-pham explains that the Buddha is not newly produced, but is
merely made manifest through removing the conditions that obscure its
reality. He makes a distinction between appearance and reality through
which he asserts the primordial endowment of the Buddha as the mode of

429

Ibid., 205-206: ngo bo stong pa khor lo bar ba dang rang bzhin gsal ba tha mai

dgongs don dang/ thugs rjes kun khyab bar tha gal med bstan.

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subsistence, and depicts temporal and qualitative distinctions as the mode
of appearance.
Mi-pham uses reason to affirm his representation of Buddha-nature
and his traditions claims that all appearances are pure by nature. The
reasonings are similar to those that he uses to establish the emptiness of
phenomena.

Indeed, emptiness has the same meaning as Buddha-

nature, but Buddha-nature evokes more of the quality of presence.

However, the full disclosure of Buddha-nature is found in Mantra, where
Buddha-nature is the immanent Buddha, the present reality to be
ascertained right now.

Mi-phams exegesis of Buddha-nature and

emptiness thus reflects the Great Perfection, the pinnacle of Buddhist

vehicles. The unity of primordial purity and spontaneous presence can be
seen in a dialectic of presence and absenceas the two truths of
appearance and emptiness unified as the concordant modes of
appearance and subsistence.

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Concluding
Concluding Remarks
In this dissertation, I have tried to shed some light on the central
place of Buddha-nature across Mi-phams interpretation of a range of
Buddhist doctrines. We have seen how Mi-phams depiction of Buddhanature, as a unified truth, is also reflected in his depiction of emptiness.
Buddha-nature is indivisible with emptiness; as such, Buddha-nature
embodies both the empty and appearing aspects of reality. However, it is
the unity of emptiness and appearance, and the primordial purity and
spontaneous presence of the Great Perfection in particular, that he puts
forward to most fully represent reality.
We saw how Mi-pham delineates two models of the two truths. In
his two-truth model of appearance/emptiness, only emptiness is ultimate
and any appearance is necessarily the relative truth. However, emptiness
also appears. As such, there is another meaning of emptiness other than
solely appearances lack of true existence; it is the unity of appearance
and emptiness.

This unity is expressed by Buddha-nature and is

embodied in authentic experience.

The appearance/emptiness model of the two truths is reflected in
the explicit teachings of emptiness in the middle wheel of doctrine, and
accords with Candrakrtis Madhyamakvatra. The other two-truth model
of authentic/inauthentic experience delineates not only emptiness, but
wisdom and appearances from the perspective of wisdom are also
ultimate.

This latter two-truth model accords with the last wheel of

doctrine and the Uttaratantra, in which Buddha-nature is explicitly taught.

This synthesis of the explicit teachings of the Madhyamakvatra and the

Uttaratantra is an important part of Mi-phams integration of the middle

and last wheels of doctrine.
The

ultimate

within

the

two

truths

distinguished

as

authentic/inauthentic experience is a presence, wheras the ultimate within

the two truths distinguished as appearance and emptiness is an absence.
It is the resonance found in and between both models, the unity of the two

217
truths, that represents Buddha-nature and the dialectic of presence and
absence. The ultimate as only authentic experience has a tendency to be
reified as a truly established presence, as the ultimate status of the nondual cognition of Yogcra. Also, emptiness in the appearance/emptiness
model of two truths also has the danger of becoming reified as an

absence, as solely an absence of true existence. It is within the dialectical

interplay of both two-truth models that Mi-pham represents Buddhanature.
The two truths as authentic/inauthentic experience reflects a
Yogcra delineation of the non-dual wisdom as ultimate, as opposed to
consciousness. This distinction between consciousness and wisdom is an
important distinction in the Great Perfection.

Mi-pham also uses the

distinction between consciousness and wisdom to demonstrate the

difference between Svtantrika and Prsagika.

He shows that

Svtantrika discourse emphasizes the discourse of the categorized

ultimate, the ultimate as known by consciousness. In contrast, Mi-pham
depicts the discourse of Prsagika as emphasizing the uncategorized
ultimate, the domain of wisdom.

In this way, he makes a distinction

between Prsagika and Svtantrika that reflects the tradition of the Great
Perfection.
By affirming wisdom as ultimate, Mi-phams tradition of Great
Perfection can be seen to resemble traditions that affirm some sort of
metaphysical realism, as in absolutist traditions and claims of otheremptiness (that do not include empty-essence as a quality of
phenomena).

However,

Mi-pham

distances

himself

from

nave

metaphysical assertions by emphasizing the ineffable quality of ultimate

reality. He consistently affirms that the ultimate truth is not a referent of
language and thought. He argues that conventionally the ultimate truth
can be said to exist, while ultimately there is no difference between the
two truths. In this way, he argues that the two truths are not actually
distinct. He emphasizes this unity of the two truths in contrast to (1) a
delineation of only the empty quality of phenomena as the ultimate truth,

218
or (2) a position that the ultimate truth is different from relative
phenomena, as if lying somewhere else behind phenomena.
Mi-pham offers an interpretation that he claims is founded upon
reason. He consistently shows that the view of Buddhism is supported by,
and arrived at, via a reasoned analysis. The product of such reason, he
argues, is not necessarily accessible to everyone. He makes a case that
even though certain Buddhist doctrines may appear to contradict reason,
on another level, they accord with the truth. We can see how Mi-pham is
involved in a project of reconciling reason and tradition; he supports the
assumptions of tradition, the Buddhist mythos, with a reasoned procedure.
An important part of Mi-phams critical procedure may be called
skepticism.430 Through reasoning into ultimate reality, he concludes that
temporality is an illusion; Mi-pham portrays temporal and spatial
distinctions as ultimately superimpositions that are not intrinsic to the
understanding reality.

Thus, he parts ways with the temporality of

understanding and the universality of linguistic experience, which are

assumptions of the heremeneutic traditions stemming from Heidegger,
such as found in the works of Gadamer and Ricoeur.
Although the intimate relationship between language and thought,
and the endemic place of conceptual experience is important for Mi-pham,
he uses the dialectic component of philosophy to critique conceptual
experience, thereby reaching the conclusion that temporal and linguistic
experience is the fabric of reification and delusion (the so-called veil of
my), which effectively obscures the unified ineffable truth.

Such a

conclusion is what we may call an optimistic response to skepticism.

Rather than a cynical skepticism or an uncritical, nave optimism, it may
be called a skeptical optimism.
In any case, Mi-pham represents the path of Buddhism through a
process of reasoned analysis, using Buddhist logic as a tool, but not

430

In particular, I refer here to the epistemological critiques of Yogcra discourse as

empirical skepticism and ontological critiques of the Middle Way as logical skepticism.

219
completely subsuming understanding within that conceptual framework
as in the case of a meditative equipoise that is induced by analysis, yet
only preceded by such analysis.

Through such means he affirms a

process of subjectively verified truth, but unlike a scientific method, not

objectively verifiable. In this way, Mi-pham does not reject language or
reason; he portrays them as instrumental to the process of bringing forth
true understanding.
The dialectical component of Mi-phams representation of Buddhanature integrates the analytical inquiry of the discourses of valid cognition
as a provisional means to discovering truth that is intimately grounded in
subjectivity, in Mantra and in the Great Perfection in particular.431 The
unity of the two truths is most fully articulated in Mantra, where the
perceived appearances are pure and the subjective cognition is wisdom.
Mi-phams arguments for Buddha-nature reflect his arguments for
the pure and divine nature of reality.

In contrast to his treatment of

emptiness, he affirms that the divine nature of reality cannot be definitively

ascertained by reason, but also cannot be definitively proven false. Thus,
his claims are grounded in the assumption of a meaningful, divine
existence.
An important part of Mi-phams affirmations of wisdom and the
purity of appearances is his conventional valid cognition of pure vision.

A similar foundation of dialectical inquiry is found in Paul Tillichs mystical apriori in

the context of Christian theology: In both the empirical and metaphysical approaches, as
well as in the much more numerous cases of their mixture, it can be observed that the a
priori which directs the induction and the deduction is a type of mystical
experience...based on an immediate experience of something ultimate in value and being
of which one can be initiatively aware...The theological concepts of both idealists and
naturalists are rooted in a mystical apriori, an awareness of something that transcends
the cleavage between subject and object. And if in the course of a scientific procedure
431

this a priori is discovered, its discovery is only possible because it was present from the
very beginning. This is the circle which no religious philosopher can escape. And it is by
no means a vicious one. Every understanding of spiritual things (Geistwissenschaft) is
circular. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1951), 9.

220
Through a system of four valid cognitionstwo concerning the
categorized/uncategorized

ultimates

and

two

based

on

confined

perception/pure visionMi-pham is able to maintain a rigorous analytical

approach to truth that is situated within the tradition of the Great
Perfection. His affirmations of tradition are unique in that his claims are
not disembodied, but are immanently grounded within a particular
persective. In this way, truth is a monistic unity but it is not monological;
his perspectival system of four-fold valid cognitions accommodates a
dialectical component to an inquiry into reality.

221

Document 1
Introduction
In his Lions Roar: Exposition of Buddha-nature, Mi-pham presents
a concise and lucid discourse on Buddha-nature. The Tibetan text was
completed in 1891, after additional supplements were added to the first
version composed in 1889.432 The Tibetan editions of the text I have
consulted thus far were printed from the same wood-blocksthe Der-ge
edition of Mi-phams collected works.

Lions Roar: Exposition of BuddhaBuddha-Nature

By MiMi-pham
[564] namo gurave - Homage to the guru!
The path of reasoning that ascertains the primordially stainless
suchness of mind
As the identity of the definitive meaning hero Majur
Is a continuous onslaught of sharp swords
That cuts the net of thoroughly afflicted existence.
Concerning this, here is the essence (snying po) of the speech of
the Victorious Ones of the three times, the foundational viewpoint (dgongs

pai mthil), and the single essential point of all the doctrines of stras and
tantrasonly this all-pervasive Buddha-nature (bde gshegs snying po).
Since this fact (tshul) is extremely profound, it is said to be difficult to
realize as it is, like a form in the night, even for the great lords on the ten
[bodhisattva] grounds, needless to mention ordinary beings! Moreover,
when speaking, the Sugata teacher sometimes elucidated the essence
(ngo bo) of the Buddha-nature by means of teaching emptiness, and at
other times elucidated the nature (rang bzhin) of the Buddha-nature

432

As stated in the colophon of the text. Mi-pham, stong thun seng gei nga ro, 606.2-

606.4.

222
through the aspect of teaching the [Buddhas] qualities of the powers and
so forth as a primordial endowment. [565] These two need to be unified
without contradiction. However, due to the influence of not having found
conviction (yid ches) in the extremely profound of profound essential
pointsthe indivisibility of the two-truthssome people view the Buddhanature as a permanent phenomenon that is not essentially empty, others,
holding onto a mere void (stong rkyang), remain in the denigrating position
of a view of annihilation that cannot posit the primordial endowment of the
inseparable qualities of wisdom.

Various chatters of refutation and

assertion, like a rumbling ocean, are proclaimed in hopes of establishing

each respective claim. However, fortunate ones who are embraced by the
quintessential instructions of a teacherwithin a state of conviction in the
meaning of the non-contradictory unity of the empty expanse (stong pai

dbying) and the luminous clarity of wisdom (od gsal bai ye shes)as if
their hearts were satisfied by an excellent nectar extractabide in the
pacification of partial fixation on the extremes of either appearance or
emptiness, and speak as follows. [566]
Here in general the valid measure (tshad ma) of the Tathgatas
Word is the authentic, infallible scriptures.

However, to ascertain its

infallibility, the scriptures in general are determined to be authentic by

means of the purity through the three analyses.433 In particular, concerning
the literal meaning indicated by the scripture, it should be regarded as the
definitive meaning through (1) a lack of invalidation by reason434 and (2)
the presence of an authentic means of establishment. Having thrown out
reason, the means of [assessing] the purity of a scripture, it is not
appropriate to solely believe according to whatever is said because it is
This refers to the process of determining the validity of a scripture. The three
analyses are: (1) that the demonstration of what is evident (mngon gyur) is not
invalidated by direct perception (mngon sum), (2) that the demonstration of what is
hidden (lkog gyur) is not invalidated by inference (rjes dpag), and (3) that the
demonstration of what is extremely hidden (shin tu lkog gyur) is not contradicted
(internally) by previous or later statements.
433

434

rig read rigs [566.2].

223
undeniable that generally there are authentic scriptures and bogus (ltar

snang) scriptures, and among authentic scriptures as well there is the

distinction of definitive and provisional [meanings]. Therefore, irreversible
conviction arises in those ordinary beings who, having cut through
misconceptions by study and contemplation, are able to determine the
topics to be engaged by means of the three valid cognitions. Conversely,
if one is not able to determine by ones own valid cognition nor able to
establish for another dissenters perspective, one is like a person, for
whom a ghost is imperceptible (sha za bskal don du song ba) claiming,
There is a ghost in front of here! Words like these have no ability to
generate conviction for oneself or others.
Therefore, discourse in accordance with the path of authentic
reasoning is the manner of learned people (mkhas pa). If established by
reason, dissenters tongues will naturally be curtailed and irreversible joy
will arise in those maintaining ones one position. [567] In a path that is not
established by reason, despite whatever way it may be decorated by
many words,435 heaps of faults will upsurge like water from a geyser (lu

mai chu).
In this, adherence to partiality is discarded through engaging,
undisturbed by conceptuality, in the tradition of the Victorious Ones
together with their lineage of great offspring [bodhisattvas].

When the

manners of demonstrating the presentation of Buddha-nature and the

authentic reasonings to establish them are assessed with an honest
mind,436 the assertion that Buddha-nature (1) is permanent,437 a truly
established [phenomenon] that is essentially non-empty and (2) is a void
(phyan chad) emptiness lacking qualities, both are seen to lack a means
of establishment and a means of invalidation [is present]; and the
existence of the [Buddha-]nature as the basic element of beingsan

sma ba read smra ba [567.1].

glus read blo [567.2].
437 brtag read rtag [567.3].

435
436

224
empty essence with a nature of primordially endowed qualitiesis seen to
lack a means of invalidation and have a means of establishment.
Regarding this, someone may first ask: What is the means of
establishing the existence of the basic element of Buddha-nature in the
continuums of beings? In the Mahynottaratantra [1.24]:
Because the body of a perfect Buddha is radiant,
Because suchness (de bzhin nyid) is indivisible,
Because of possessing heritage;
Therefore, all beings always possess the essential nature of
Buddha (sangs rgyas rnying po).
There are two presentations ascertaining the meaning of this statement by
means of reason: (1) stating other traditions and (2) presenting our own
authentic tradition.

1. Stating Other Traditions [567.5]

The ancient ones in Tibethaving explained the body of the
perfect Buddha is radiant as merely the wisdom Truth body (ye shes chos

sku) encompassing all objects, and suchness as a mere void being similar
in type (rigs dra ba), and possessing heritage as merely the potential to
be a Buddha (sangs rgya rung); they spoke few words, failing to evoke the
crucial point from the position of the essential nature in the Uttaratantra
scripture.
[568] Regarding this, the genuine heritage is not established by
merely the Truth Body encompassing [all] objects because the Buddhas
wisdomwhich

perceives

that

which

is

comprised

by

others

continuumssimply encompassing all objects is present in all entities;

however, merely by this presence there is no reason for all this to become
Buddha. As for the Truth Body of ones own continuum, due to not being
manifest now, the evidence is uncertain (rtags la the tshom za ba). Also,
the mere categorized emptiness (stong pa rnam grangs pa) does not at all
have the meaning of heritage because from the perspective of your
thinking, if you assert that this heritage is the potential to newly produce [a

225
Buddha] when conjoined with the conditions of the pathlike a seed that
is transported (go pho ba) to a sprout438despite now having no qualities
of Buddha whatsoever, then it is not reasonable that there be any such
quality [of potential transformation] in the contradistinctive aspect (ldog

cha) of an existential negation that is an emptiness of true existence

which is an unconditioned phenomenon that lacks the ability to perform a
functionbecause the aspect of a conditioned seed conventionally may
transform into a sprout, yet the aspect of a seeds lack of true existence
can never transform into a sprout.
Moreover, the [assertion that] the essential point of the lack of true
existence establishes the potential to be a Buddha is also nonsense.
Although it is true that if the mind were truly established, there would
simply be no potential to be a Buddha, even so, in lacking true
establishment, [the potential of] being Buddha is undetermined because
even though all phenomena, earth, rocks,439 etc., also lack true existence,
who is able to establish that everything that lacks true existence is a
potential Buddha? Also, asserting as heritage only the ability to remove
obscurations by observing a lack of true existence is nonsense because
by only observing emptiness, without reason for cognitive obscurations
(shes sgrib) to be relinquished, again it is necessary to become decorated
with limitless accumulations according to your position.440 Calling such an
existential negation [569] Buddha-nature is a senseless assertion
because it becomes a heritage shared with Auditors and Self-Realized
Ones (nyan thos); but through this, the potential to be a Buddha is not
established because: (1) there is no ability in merely this to establish any
legitimacy (thad pa) for the occurrence of omniscient wisdom after
abandoning cognitive obscurations and (2) since there is no cognitive
quality within the essence of an existential negation, it is impossible for
that to know anything whatsoever even at the time of being Buddha.
myur gu read myu gur [568.2].
rgo read rdo [568.5].
440 dog read dod [568.6].
438
439

226
Therefore, in considering this manner of the transforming
conditioned heritage (gnas gyur dus byas kyi rigs), rather than asserting
an existential negation as the heritage, it is better to assert a seed (sa

bon) of wisdom, love, and powers in the mental-continuums (sems kyi

rgyud) of all beings from beginningless timeeven wild beasts, ogres, etc.
possess such [qualities] of love for their children and recognition of benefit
and harmsuch that when further developed, through conjoined with the
path and freed from obstacles, it is merely that which is the potential to
become a Buddha endowed with limitless knowledge, love, and powers;
because once the causality of production is necessitated (skyed byed gyi

rgyu bras yin dgos phan chad), to disregard the momentary entity which is
the productive cause and assert an unconditioned, unproductive, nonentity as the cause is indeed astonishing!
Some people think as follows: Everything lacking true existence is
not the heritage, but only the lack of existence that is the nature of mind is
reasonable to be the heritage.
Even if it were the lack of true existence of mind, it would have no
ability for the slightest activity of productionsince the quality-bearers
(chos can), the instants of mind, are potential producers of later
[instances], the unconditioned heritage is seemingly not need by you, so
get rid of it!
If one thinks, [570] [Heritage] is not posited having distinguished
the two truths because heritage is asserted as the abiding reality that is
the indivisibility of (1) the quality-bearer (chos can), which is the clarity of
mind, and (2) suchness, which is emptiness.
If this also is asserted as the unconditioned, immutable wisdom,
which is wisdom (ye shes) as distinguished from consciousness (rnam

shes), then since this is established as such by scripture and reasoning,

then it certainly is [heritage]. However, making the claim that the qualitybearer that is a unity with emptiness is the aspect of momentary
consciousness, then thinking this is progressively transported to a
Buddha is senseless because it would [absurdly] follow that the heritage

227
would have both a conditioned and an unconditioned aspect. That being
the case, the unconditioned, which has no use or ability, would become
the nominal heritage (rigs btags pa ba), and the conditioned would
become the genuine heritage (rigs mtshan nyid pa) capable of producing
effects.

Consequently, the viewpoint of all of the Mahyna Stras

asserting that the unconditioned naturally abiding heritage (rang bzhin

gnas rigs) is the expanse of phenomenawould be relinquished.441

Therefore, in claiming a heritage posited in terms of a produced
effect and a producing cause that the mind is not able to relinquish,
although one may speak of the pure expanse of phenomena as the
naturally abiding heritage, it is nothing but merely the blatant evidence of
the incompatibility442 of ones words and beliefs. Hence, as soon as the
immutable expanse of phenomena is asserted as the heritage of the
Buddha, one should first identify that which is the basis of the designation
of expanse of phenomenathe uncategorized ultimate that is the great
unity of the two truths, the meaning of the thoroughly non-abiding Middle
Way itself. Misidentifying this, to assert [the expanse of phenomena] as
merely the categorized ultimate, like seeing a group of monkeys in a forest
and mistaking them for the gods of [the realm of] thirty-three, [571] what is
not the expanse of phenomena is apprehended443 as the expanse of
phenomena; consequently, all presentations are established as a path of
Mahyna artifice, such as:

the assertion of the Buddhas heritage as that [categorized ultimate]

the meditation of the perfection of wisdom through observing just that

[categorized ultimate]

the assertion of that [categorized ultimate] as the cause of the Natural

Body (ngo bo nyid sku)

This is also taught in this way in [scriptures] such as the Perfection of

Wisdom Stras.
stong read stor [570.4].
ga read gal [570.5].
443 byung read bzung [571.1].
441

442

228
Therefore, the expanse which is the unity of the two truths, the
meaning that is distinct from all the webs of conceptual constructs [and]
known by the individual reflexive awareness, is called the naturally pure
expanse of phenomena and emptiness; this is said in all the Mahyna
Stras and commentaries on the viewpoint to be the genuine heritage of
the Buddha as well as the Natural Body endowed with the two-fold purity.
Hence, this naturally abiding heritage is not suitable to be asserted as
anything other than unconditioned. Being unconditioned, henceforth the
qualities of the Truth Body also are not suitable to be asserted as anything
other than freed effectsby its essential nature it is not reasonable for
itself to cease and produce another effect. Since it is asserted as such by
the great being of the tenth ground, the regent [Maitreya], in the

Uttaratantra and is also clearly stated by the glorious protector, the

sublime Ngrjuna, in the Dharmadhtustotra, our own tradition asserts
the unconditioned expanse of phenomena as the heritage following these
scriptures. This expanse itself is the abiding reality of all phenomena, its
essence lacks arising or ceasing, and [572] it abides as the identity of
indivisible appearance and emptiness; it does not fall to partiality.
Due to not existing as they appear, conditioned phenomena that
appear to arise and cease in this way have never tainted the basic nature
(gshis) of the expanse; therefore, through this essential point that (1) the
primordial purity of the causality of sasra and (2) the uncontaminated
appearances, which are the luminous clarity of the spontaneously present
nature, are neither conjoined nor separable, the undistorted manner of
Buddha-nature should be identified.

2. Presenting Our Own Authentic Tradition [572.2]

1. The Meaning of the First Verse Because the body of the perfect
Buddha is radiant [572.3]
Then for the second part, stating our own tradition, the meaning of
the first verse [because the body of the perfect Buddha is radiant] in the
previous [stanza] is as follows: since the Truth Body, the consummate

229
body of a complete and perfect Buddha, as such with the qualities equal to
[the extent of] space, later is made clear, radiant, or manifest from a
former continuum of a thoroughly bounded (ching ba kun ldan) ordinary
being; therefore, the statement presently the Buddha-nature exists in the
continuums of all sentient beings is established. The justification of how it
is established by this is two-fold: common and extraordinary.
The first444 [common justification] is that sentient beings who
actualize the wisdom Truth Body necessarily have a mind possessing the
heritage which is the potential to be a Buddha because it is unreasonable
as such without a heritage at all, as said in the Dharmadhtustotra [v. 11]:
If there is the basic element, then through action
The pure gold will be seen.
If there is no basic element, then even action
Will only generate disturbing emotions.
The second [extraordinary justification] is a demonstration of the
justification of that [statement that Buddha-nature presently exists in the
continuums of sentient beings].
[573] Someone may think, Although the mind is established as a
mere cause which is the potential to be a Buddha, like the example of
crops potentially growing on a field, how can you establish the distinctive
heritage that is primordially endowed with Buddhas qualities?
This is also established because the Blessed Ones, the Buddhas,
have the wisdom body which is the identity distinguished by the
unconditioned; it is established through scriptures and reasoning that they
do not have the nature of the conditioned and impermanent phenomena.
Regarding this, as for scriptures, in the Mahparinirvastra:
O Monk of perfect discipline, it is better to die than to become a
non-Buddhist by calling the unconditioned Tathgata a conditioned
Tathgata.

444

dngos po read dang po [572.5].

230
And,
Noble child, now see the permanent body of the Tathgata, the
indestructible body, the vajra body, as the Truth Body, not a body of
flesh.
Furthermore,
It is better to die having touched this blazing heap of wood with
your tongue everywhere than to utter the words the Tathgata is
impermanent. Do not heed those words.
Also, merely the aspect of an existential negation is not suitable as
nirva, again from the scripture [Mahparinirvastra]:
Emptiness, emptiness no matter where you search, you still find
nothing at all. The Nirgrantha also have nothing at all, but
liberation is not like that.
And,
That which is liberation is the basic element which is uncontrived; it
is the Tathgata.
[574] And from the Vajracchedik also:
Those who see me as form [and]
Those who hear me as sound
Have entered the wrong path;
They do not see me.
The Buddhas view of suchness,
The guides Truth Body, [and]
Suchness, are not objects of knowledge;
Hence, they cannot be known.
As is shown, [the unconditioned wisdom body of the Buddha] is
extensively taught in the definitive meaning stras.
As for reasoning as well, if the omniscient wisdom itselfthe
consummate fruition of equal taste, non-dual with the primordial expanse
of phenomenawere an impermanent entity that is newly formed by

231
causes and conditions, then there would be the faults of [absurd]
consequences such as:

It would not be the self-existing wisdom

It would not have relinquished the pains of change

It would have the aspects of again ceasing and again arising

It would be deceptive due to disintegrating by its own essence

It would not be the perpetual refuge (1) because of ceasing as soon as

it arises and (2) because there is [only] a limited domain (nyi tshe bar

gnas) where there is a complete gathering of causes

It would not be of equal taste in all phenomena

It would not have transcended all extremes

It would not have ceased such [phenomena] as the taking of a birth

that is of mental nature

It would be without independence, being a dependent entity which is

conditioned

Therefore, by asserting in this way, the view of the vajra body as

impermanent brings about enormous faults; hence, having abandoned this
inferior path, the non-dual wisdom body should be viewed as
unconditioned and as the sacred permanence (rtag pa dam pa).
[575] [One may] think: Through evaluating by means of merely an
awareness that relies upon ordinary confined perception, unconditioned
wisdom is impossible because there is no common locus of a cognition
and a permanent entity.
This is nonsense because even though partial cognitions (shes pa

nyi tshe ba)445 that cognize objects are necessarily impermanent, the
wisdom that is the one-taste (ro gcig) of the knower and known, the one
with the space-vajra pervading space (mkha khyab mkha yi rdo rje can),
is not like that [impermanent cognition] because in the state (ngang) of
unchanging luminous clarity,446 which is the self-effulgence (rang gdangs)

445
446

nye tsho read nyi tshe [575.1-575.2].

gsel read gsal [575.2].

232
of the unconditioned, all the phenomena of nirva and sasra are
incorporated (ub chub); hence, reasoning that analyzes the consummate
[reality] (mthar thug dpyod pai rig shes) establishes that there is
primordially no arising or ceasing in the essence of that.

Therefore,

wisdom such as this is the great unconditioned, which does not abide in
either extreme of being conditioned or unconditioned, because it is not at
all like a mere non-entity. Since entities and non-entities are phenomena
and are dependent arisings, or dependent imputations, when authentically
analyzed they are hollow, fake, lies, and deceptions; Buddha-nature is the
great unconditioned, the suchness of all phenomena that are entities or
non-entities, which is authentically non-deceptive.

As is said in the

Mlamadhyamakakrik [15.2]:
Nature is uncontrived,
And does not depend on another.
And [25.13],
Entities and non-entities are conditioned,
Nirva is unconditioned.
In this way, if the wisdom of the consummate Truth Body is established by
scriptures of definitive meaning stras, and reasoning analyzing the
consummate [reality], to be the nature of the immutable ultimate truth,
completely

pervading

nirva

and

sasra,

an

equality,

and

unconditioned [576]; then the cause, which is able to actualize that at one
time (nam zhig), is presently the nature of the wisdom Truth Body abiding
in the manner of suchness without decrease or increase. Although it may
or may not be actualized in the mode of appearance free or not free from
adventitious defilements, there is not even the slightest qualitative or
temporal difference in the mode of subsistence because it is the intrinsic
nature of the immutable unconditioned. In the Uttaratantra [1.51]:
As it was before so it is later
The immutable suchness.
And [1.63],

233
The luminous clarity that is the nature of mind
Is immutable like space.
It is undisturbed by adventitious defilements
Such as attachments that arise from the imagination of the unreal.
All the phenomena of sasra are changing and unstable, and while there
appears to be transformations within the state of the suchness of all this, it
should be known as was frequently taught that the purity of mind, the
Buddha-nature, is without change, like space.

In this way, the

unconditioned expanse of luminous clarity is naturally pure, untainted by

delusion, and within the self-effulgent basic nature of the non-deluded, the
qualities of fruition, such as the powers, abide without separationlike the
sun and light rays. Furthermore, in the Uttaratantra [1.158]:
The basic element is empty of those adventitious [phenomena] that
have the character of separability
But not empty of the unexcelled properties that have the character
of inseparability.
[577] All of the faults of sasra arise from the deluded mind which
apprehends a personal self or a self of phenomena. Since this deluded
mind also is adventitious like clouds in the sky, from the beginning neither
mixing nor polluting the luminous clarity of the primordial basic nature,
these faults are individually distinguished from the basic element and are
suitable to be removed. Therefore, the essence of the basic element is
empty of these faults; it is untainted. Without depending on the polluting
delusion, within447 the natural state (rang gi ngang gis) of its own luminous
clarity and the self-existing wisdom that abides as the suchness of all
phenomena, it is not empty of that which is inseparable, the basic element
of consummate qualities, because in its own essence this is the basic
nature from which it is inseparablelike the sun and light rays.
In this way, the naturally abiding heritage is established as the
unconditioned essence of the Truth Body primordially endowed with

447

las read la [577.3].

234
qualities. Due to the potential to be a Buddha, the wisdom Truth Body,
without increase or decrease, necessarily resides in the continuums of all
sentient beings because in training in the path, the potential to be a
Buddha is established by the power of fact (dngos stobs kyis grub). Since
the Truth Body at the time of being a Buddha is unconditioned due to the
impossibility of being a conditioned phenomenon newly formed by causes
and conditions, it is established that the essence of the Buddha presently
resides.
Regarding this, some people think, If the essence of the Buddha
presently resides, why does that omniscient wisdom not dispel the
obscurations of those sentient beings? Also, fixating upon the range of
meanings (go yul) of the common vehicle, they think, Since the Buddha is
the effect and sentient beings are the cause, [578] if the effect is present
in the cause, then there is invalidation by reason such as the reasoning
that eating food would [absurdly entail] the eating of excrement.
For you who have not trained in the meaning of the extremely
profound definitive meaning stras, having been guided by merely a
limited understanding of the common scriptures, it is no wonder448 that
such qualms have arisen! However, that [what you have said] is not the
case because although the suchness that is the luminous and clear
wisdom pervades everything without distinction, when this adventitious
delusion arises in ones mind, the basis of designation of sasra is only
this deluded mind together with its object (yul); due to this449 delusion,
ones suchness is not known as it is. For example, when sleeping, due to
the power of solely the mental-consciousness, unrestricted (mu med)
appearances arise such as the body, objects, and eye-consciousness, etc.
At that time, although the subject and object are observed and
apprehended separately, the mental-consciousness itself is not able to
know its own mode of being (yin lugs), in which the perceived [object] and

448
449

khag read khags [578.2].

de read des [578.3].

235
the perceiving [subject] are not established as different; even though it is
not known, there is nothing other than that mode of being. Likewise, all
phenomena abide as emptiness; even so, merely being as such does not
entail that everyone realizes this because there is the possibility of
delusionappearances that do not accord with the mode of subsistence.
Therefore, since450 mind and the wisdom of the essential nature
(snying poi ye shes) are [respectively] phenomenon (chos can) and
suchness (chos nyid), also the Buddha and sentient beings are taught in
terms of the mode of subsistence (gnas tshul) and the mode of
appearance (snang tshul); for this reason, showing the invalidation with
the reason that the effect exists in the cause is simply not understanding
the position. In this way, this reasoning is that the evidence (rtags) [579]
of a clear manifestation of the Truth Body at the time of the fruition
establishes that the heritage, primordially endowed with qualities, exists at
the time of the cause because there is no temporal causality (snga phyi

rgyu bras) in the mode of subsistence; however, in dependence (ltos)

upon the mode of appearance, it is necessarily posited as cause and
effect. Therefore, proving the cause from the effect is called reasoning of
dependency.
2. The Meaning of the Second Verse Because suchness is indivisible
[579.2]
The meaning of the second [verse], because suchness is
indivisible, is as follows: since all phenomena of sasra and nirva are
of one taste (ro gcig)indivisible within the great primordial luminous
clarity of the emptiness that is the mode of subsistenceBuddhas and
sentient beings also are ultimately indivisible due to the equality of
existence and peace (srid zhi mnyam pa nyid).

Therefore, although

appearing as emanated sentient beings due to adventitious delusion, it is

established by the reasoning of the nature of things (chos nyid kyi rigs pa)

450

las read pas [578.5].

236
that there is not the slightest deviation from the ultimate suchness of
abiding reality; hence, the possession of the essential nature of Buddha
(sangs rgyas kyi snying po) is certain.

Stras also state that all

phenomena are primordially luminous clarity, are primordially nirva, and

are primordially the nature of the actual Buddha.
Someone may think, Well, as you previously expressed to another,
if the heritage is established by being merely indivisible as suchness, then
it [absurdly] follows451 that the earth and rocks, etc. also have the
heritage.
If heritage is necessarily posited as the faultless cause452 of a
Buddha

whichthrough

the

complete

abandonment

of

the

two

obscurations that arise due to the power of a deluded minddevelops

awareness (blo) that is not deluded concerning the nature of knowledge
(shes bya), then non-minds, materials such as earth and rocks, do not
possess the accomplishment of the path. [580] Hence, even though
conventionally they are indivisible as suchness, positing their possession
of heritage is not necessitated because earth and rocks, etc. appear due
to the power of mind; the mind does not arise due to the power of external
objects such as the earth and rocks. This should be known as illustrated
by the example of the appearances of a dream and the cognition at the
time of that [dream].

Through knowing that the suchness that is the

Buddha-naturethe uncontaminated naturalness of ultimate virtue

resides in this mind that is the producer of the three realms like wetness
within water, the appearances of sasra and nirva are merely the play
of consciousness and wisdom; therefore, they are not necessarily
separate. Concerning the authentic meaning, we emphatically assert that
all these appearances, not deviating from the state of suchness that is
primordially Buddha, also are not beyond the essential nature (ngang

451

thol read thal [579.5].

452

A cause of a freed effect. Khen-po Pe-ma-shey-rap.

237

tshul453)

of

the

Tathgata.

As

is

said

in

the

condensed

[Prajpramitstra]:
The purity of form should be known as the purity of the fruition.
The purity of form and the fruition are the purity of omniscience.
The purity of omniscience, the effect, and form
Are like spaceindivisible and inseparable.
The purity of the subject (yul can) free from obscurations is the purity, or
nature, of objects (yul) such as form because other than the manner of
perception, which is a progressive freedom from the obscurations of ones
own perception (rang snang), the essential meaning abides primordially
free from obscurations.

Therefore, when the defilements of the basic

element of the subjective awareness are exhausted, being a Buddha, no

impure454 objective entities remain left over, [581] like when an eyedisorder is cured, the distorted images are automatically cleared.
Someone may think, Well, at the time of one person becoming a
Buddha, all impure appearances will be ceased.
It is not so because the obscurations of each individuals own
perception455 obscures his or her own self; there is perception in which
appearance conflicts with the mode of subsistence.
One may think, Well, if appearance is completely in accord with
the mode of subsistence at the stage of the Buddha, then does a Buddha
experience (mnga) all these impure appearances or not? If a Buddha
does, then all phenomena are not actually perfected as Buddha. If not,
then it is impossible for a Buddha to know the path of all transmigrations
(kun tu gro bai lam)456 and so forth.

ngang tshul was explained to be equivalent to rang bzhin by Tulku Nyi-ma-gyal-tsen.

bos read bo ma [580.6].
455 bar snang read rang snang [581.1].
453

454

This is one of the ten powers of a Buddha. Tulku Nyi-ma-gyal-tsen explained this as
knowledge of the path of actions that cause rebirth in the each of the different realms of
456

sasra.

238
The omniscient wisdom effortlessly and spontaneously knows from
within the state of equal taste of itself and the whole entirety of
phenomena of sasra and nirva. In this, while it does not transgress
the vision of the great purity of everything from its own perspective, it
perceives the appearances of the six classes of beings also, in the way
they respectively appear. Due to the power of exhausting all obscurations
of the dualistic appearances of subject and object, all phenomena that
existthrough the essential point of being encompassed within the
expanse (klong du chud pa) of suchness in the manner of an unmixed,
complete entiretyare spontaneously perceived by the wisdom of equal
taste that is free from arising and ceasing. Not to mention beings with
confined perception, this is difficult to fathom for even those abiding on the
[bodhisattva] grounds! Also, the meaning of this fact is explained in the

Bodhisattvapiaka (byang chub sems dpai sde snod):

The equality of all phenomena as equal
Is known by the self-existing [wisdom].
Therefore, the vision of the Tathgatas, [582]
The complete actual Buddhas, are equal.
And,
By the natural luminous clarity of mind known as such, the supreme
knowledge of a single instant of mind is called the unexcelled
complete and perfect awakening of an actual perfect Buddha.
As said in the words of the master Candrakrti:
There are divisions of vessels and no division in space
Likewise, there are divisions of entities yet no divisions in
suchness.
Therefore, understanding authentically the equality of taste
You of good wisdom understand the objects of knowledge
instantly.457

457

Madhyamakvatra 11.11.

239
The great wisdom which is non-dual with the expanse pervades458
everything and effortlessly perceives all phenomena from the state of the
thorough pacification of conceptualitypervasive in the manner of stars
shining in the oceanthis [omniscient] vision is the suchness residing
within the wisdom ground of self-existing luminous clarity due to the power
of exhausting all obscurations and actualizing that [suchness] as it is.
Therefore, by relying on the authentic reasoning of the nature of things
that analyzes the consummate [reality], an irreversible conviction is found;
otherwise, through an evaluation by a limited intellect, I see an influx of
contradictions and a lot of impurity of thoroughgoing conceptuality taken
up, such as:

At he stage of the Buddha, there is no wisdom; or, even though there

is, it is established to be equivalent to an ordinary transient mind

The assertion that the realm of sentient beings is not perceived [by the
Buddhas], or [that Buddhas] have impure perceptions

The lack of ability to establish the equal taste of [the wisdom that
knows] the way things are and [the wisdom that knows] everything that
exists.

3. The Meaning of the Third Verse Because of possessing heritage

heritage
[583.1]
[583] The meaning of the third [verse], because of possessing
heritage, is as follows: all sentient beings have the heritage that is the
potential to be a Buddha because it is established that (1) defilements are
adventitious and suitable to be relinquished and (2) the Truth Body
primordially endowed with qualities exists in everything without distinction.
In this way, the possession of the heritage that is the potential to be a
Buddha entails that these embodied beings (lus can) are possessors of
Buddha-nature because (1) there is a context (gnas skabs) of them being
a Buddha and (2) since the Buddhas Truth Body is also established as

458

bya ba read khyab [582.3].

240
essentially unconditioned, there is no temporal or qualitative distinction
[between the Truth Body and Buddha-nature] from the aspect of the
essence. This third reason, knowing the production of the effect from the
cause, is reasoning of efficacy (bya ba byed pai rigs pa).
Here, due to the mere presence of the cause, the emergence of an
effect is not merely inferred because, due to the essential fact that it is
impossible that the heritage would ever diminish (chud za ba) in the event
of becoming a Buddha (sangs rgya ba), (1) the heritage that is the
suchness itself (chos nyid de bzhin nyid) is unchanging, (2) at the time of
the effect there is no qualitative difference in the essence, and (3) no
matter how long the duration of the adventitious defilements is, they are
suitable to be separate.459
In this way, (1) the existence of the cause, the heritage, is
essentially not distinct from the Truth Body at the time of the fruition, and
(2) if the Truth Body at the time of the fruition exists, then it [the heritage
that is essentially the Truth Body] also necessarily exists without increase
or decrease at the time of sentient beings, and (3) although there is the
imputation of causality and temporality, in meaning, the expanse of
phenomena is one taste within the immutable essence; the three reasons
establish that all sentient beings are possessors of the Buddha-nature due
to the authentic path of reasoning that is engaged by the power of fact.
[584] In this way, through this reasoning that establishes that all
sentient beings have Buddha-nature, there is the establishment of the
non-distinction of consummate liberation, the Tathgata, and the ultimate
abiding reality of all phenomena; furthermore, a single consummate
vehicle is established if it is known to arise through the power of the
Buddha-nature itself. Otherwise, one will part ways with the reasoning
that establishes the single consummate vehicle in the traditions of those
who turn their back on the Mahyna, such as the ones who assert: (1)
Buddha-nature is not in the basic element of sentient beings, (2) it does

459

bras read bral [583.4].

241
not exist at the time of the Buddha, and (3) there are no qualities at the
time of the cause, the qualities are newly possessed at the time of the
effect. Therefore, those who aspire to the topic of the supreme vehicle
should train intelligently with regards to this topic.
In this way, since positing the existence of the basic element
primordially endowed with qualities at the time of sentient beings is a
profound and inconceivable topic, even the Buddha spoke to his audience
in a manner that they should trust his discourse and that it is nondeceptive, even though it is difficult to comprehend by ones own power.
Therefore, since it is taught as the consummate of profundity, smallminded intellectuals consistently make objections to this, no matter how
many faults in dependence upon the conventionalsuch as the
consequence that there would be a common locus of the minds of
Buddhas and sentient beingsthe talk is nonsense.

[585] The

Sadhinirmocanastra states:
The character of the conditioned realm and the ultimate,
Is the character free from being the same or different,
Thus, whoever understands these to be either the same or different
Has entered into a distorted [view].
As is said, (1) the suchness of mind, the basic element which is the
essential nature, and (2) the phenomenon of mind (chos can kyi sems) do
not need to be asserted as either the same or different. Even though the
mode of subsistence is not other than the meaning of suchness, as for the
mode of appearance, there is the possibility of delusion. In this, there is
not only no contradiction, but otherwise there would be faults such as the
nonexistence of liberation or the impossibility for anyone to be deluded.
Thus, because there is appearance that does not accord with the mode of
subsistence, there is the possibility of deluded sentient beings, and
through their relinquishing delusion by the path, the existence of Buddhas
is also established.
Even though the reasoning that analyzes the ultimate establishes
the emptiness of all phenomena, it does not negate the qualities of

242
[Buddha-]nature because although the sublime qualities exist, they are
also claimed to be essentially empty.

Therefore, the meaning

demonstrated by the middle wheel that all the phenomena of thorough

affliction and complete purification (kun byang gi chos) are taught to be
empty is established as such because Buddha-nature is also the nature of
emptiness.

However,

since

this

teaching

of

[Buddha-]nature

characterized as neither conjoined with, nor separable (du bral med) from
the appearances of the empty-natured [Buddha-]body and wisdomis
[586] the viewpoint of the definitive meaning stras of the last wheel, then
by merely this fact it is superior to the middle wheel.

Although the

meaning of the last wheel is praised in the stras and commentaries, [this
does] not [refer to] everything in the last wheel, but it is spoken in this way
concerning the definitive meaning position of demonstrating the [Buddha]nature. This can be clearly ascertained as such through other stras
such as those that teach the basic element of heritage460 through the
example of purifying a jewel.

Therefore, the emptiness taught in the

middle wheel and the [Buddha-] body and wisdom taught in the last wheel
should be integrated as a unity of emptiness and appearance. Without
dividing or excluding461 the definitive meaning subject matters (skor

rnams) of the middle and last wheels, both should be held to be the
definitive meaning in the way of just this assertion by the omniscient Longchen-pa.

By maintaining both of these [wheels] to be the definitive

meaning, there is not only no contradiction that one [wheel] must be held
as the provisional meaning, but having integrated them, through the
Buddha-nature as such becoming the meaning of the causal continuum,
there is the essential point of the quintessential instructions of the
Vajrayna. Therefore, you should know how the teachings of the Buddha
converge on this single essential point and that this consummate meaning
is the single viewpoint of the Sublime Ones such as Ngrjuna and

460
461

rig read rigs [586.2].

gsal read bsal [586.3].

243
Asaga, for it can be clearly understood through [Ngrjunas]

Dharmadhtustotra, Bodhicittavivaraa, etc., and [Asagas] commentary

on the Uttaratantra and so forth. As master Ngrjuna states:
All the stras demonstrating emptiness
That the Victorious One taught [587]
Were all uttered to avert disturbing emotions,
Not to diminish the basic element.462
In this way, the established result of examining through ultimate analysis
is the vajra-like meaning of the consummate indivisible truth. Since the
expanse is impenetrable (mi phyed pa) by intellectual cognition, there is
no grounds for the entrance of faults in dependence upon the ultimate.
Now for the explanation of how these basic elements abide in the
continuums of sentient beings: in terms of the own essence (rang gi ngo

bo) of the mode of subsistence, all phenomena are encompassed within

the expanse (klong du chud) of suchness and the own essence of
suchness abides, without arising or ceasing, as an equality; without
temporal distinctions such as the past or future, or aspects such as the
good or bad, here or there, self or other, greater and lesser, in sasra
and nirva, etc.the expanse of phenomena is the unchanging (pho

gyur med), single sphere (thig le nyag gcig).

Although the mode of

subsistence is as such, in accord with the perspective of the appearances

of adventitious delusion, even when bodies (lus), minds (sems), and
domains (yul) of the three realms of sasra appear in this way and the
nature of suchness is not seen, it is not that suchness does not exist; it
exists without deviating in the slightest from its own nature. Therefore,
although the suchness of mind is as such, it is not actualized (mi mgnon)
due to being enclosed by adventitious defilements. Even so, it abides in
the manner of an extract or an essential core in the center and is called
the heritage or the essential nature (snying po); for example, it is
known by illustration through the nine metaphors such as the underground

462

Dharmadhtustotra v. 22.

244
treasure, etc., as is said. [588] Even though it is posited in three contexts
depending on the adventitious defilements: (1) impure, (2) variously
impure and pure, and (3) extremely pure, there is no distinction in the own
essence of the basic element. In the Uttaratantra [1.28]:
Since the Buddhas wisdom enters into the assembly of sentient
beings,
That nature is stainless and non-dual.
The heritage of Buddha is designated upon that effect,
All beings are said to possess the essential nature of Buddha.
And [1.147],
Its463 nature is the Truth Body,
Suchness, and also the heritage...
And likewise [1.47],
According to the progression of impure, impure/pure,
And extremely pure,
The names sentient beings, bodhisattvas,
And Tathgatas are given.464
Without knowing this, one holds in the mind Buddha-nature [residing] in
some uncertain place in the snare of the aggregates like a juniper berry
supported in a bowlas the character of a mind deluded and non-deluded
associated like light and darkness. One then negates and establishes;
however, in accordance with that there will only be the lamentation of
oneself not having gone at all in the direction of the intended meaning
(dgongs don) of the Mahyna.

Therefore, in a crowd of negative

intellectuals who have not trained in the Mahyna, even though the
discourse of the essential nature is proclaimed, it is futile. Such profound
discourse as this is not to be taught to immature people or heretics
because they are not suitable receptacles to hear this profound doctrine.
463

yang read yi [588.2].

464

The last verse of Mi-phams citation is worded with a slight difference in the

Uttaratantra. See rgyud bla mai rtsa grel, 8.

245
To them, the doctrine should be taught beginning with selflessness and
impermanence and so forth, and that should be established by reasoning.
[589] Otherwise, demonstrating the essential nature is futile because it
cannot be established through only confined perception; hence, it
becomes a topic of superimposition and denigration. If the discourse of
the Buddha-nature is progressively taught to those who have trained from
the lower Buddhist philosophies and have generated a distinctive certainty
in the uncategorized great emptiness, then they will believe.
Therefore, it is necessary to be learned in the essential point of the
manner of accomplishing the path, having expelled the obscured stupidity
(rmongs mtshang brtol) of thinking: Even though it is the authentic path,
since it cannot be proved through reason, it has to be understood through
experience (myong bas rtogs), or, If it is not the path of confined
perception, then it is not an authentic path.
Now, to refute a few wrongly conceived positions with regards to
the nature of the basic element: (1) refuting the view that it is truly
established and not empty, (2) refuting the view that it is a void emptiness,
and (3) refuting the apprehension of it as impermanent and conditioned.

1. Refuting the View that [the Basic Element] is Truly Established and Not
Empty [589.4]
In the Lakvatrastra:
The bodhisattva Mahmati spoke to the Blessed One, How is the
permanent, stable, and eternal Buddha-nature abiding in the
enclosure of defilements, which is spoken in the Buddhas stras,
different from the Self of the non-Buddhists? The non-Buddhists
also speak of a self that is without qualities, etc. In response to the
question, the Blessed One spoke, It is not the same. The Buddhas
show the Buddha-nature in [590] the meanings of the words three
gates of liberation, nirva, and non-arising. In order for
immature beings to abandon the domain of fear due to no-self, by
means of Buddha-nature they demonstrate the realm that is nonappearing and non-conceptual. Mahmati, bodhisattvas and great
beings of the present and future should not fixate upon a self.

246
Moreover, it is said that there is no liberation for one with the notion of
entities. Also, emptiness of other while not empty of its own essence is
not sufficient as emptiness because the emptiness of something in
another is an inferior emptiness among the seven types of emptiness, and
that is said to be abandoned... extensively. Moreover,
Mahmati, the Tathgata is neither permanent nor impermanent. If
it is asked why, it is because in both there are faults.
And,
Constructs are the hold of demons
One should transcend existence and non-existence.
And,
If there is something beyond the supreme truth (chos), nirva,
then that also is like an illusion and a dream...
In accord with the meaning of these scriptures, also by reasoned analysis,
due to the essential point that Buddha-nature is essentially empty, [591] it
impartially appears in all aspects of quality: it is suitable to be the
suchness of mind, all-pervasive everywhere, permanent as long as time,
inconceivable. However, while not empty of its own essence, being truly
established it is completely impossible to be the suchness of an extrinsic
phenomenon (chos gzhan gyi chos nyid), etc. It also cannot be the result
of an ascertainment of valid cognition analyzing the ultimate because the
result of evidence for something truly established is unacceptable, as a
handprint [result] of the analysis of the lack of true existence of all
phenomenalike darkness [arising] from light. True establishment is not
established by conventional valid cognition either because even though [it
may appear to be] truly established from that [conventional] perspective,
by merely this there is never an ability to establish phenomena to be nonempty. Without being able to be established by the two valid cognitions,
the means of establishment has gone the way of a [non-existent] spaceflower; therefore, establishing this becomes meaninglessly tiresome.

247

2. Refuting the View that [the Basic Element] is a Void Emptiness [591.4]
By holding a mere existential negation that is the categorized
ultimate as the basic element, the expanse of phenomena, and emptiness,
those who do not understand the position of the expanse that is a unity of
appearance and emptiness establish contradiction in scriptures that state
the qualities as a primordial endowment. This is extremely inappropriate.
In the Jnamudrsamdhistra (ye shes phyag rgyai ting nge dzin gyi

mdo):
Without longing for truth, seeking gain
Those without restraint claim to be training in awakening.
Later some will come
Who delight in speech and say everything is empty.465
And,
Emptiness is non-arising; no one produced it.
It is not seen, does not arrive, nor move. [592]
Those who abide in reference, saying we train well in emptiness
Those speakers are the thieves of the doctrine.466
And,
Conceptualizing the doctrine of absence
Is the movement that ensnares immature beings.
In the condensed [Prajpramitstra]:
Even in realizing the aggregates are empty, bodhisattvas
Engage in signs without faith in the domain of non-arising.
In the Samdhirjastra:
Existence and non-existence are both extremes
Pure and impure are also extremes;
Therefore, completely abandoning the extremes of both
465

P.799, vol. 32, p. 66, 264b.3-264b.4.

466

P.799, vol. 32, p. 68, 270b.6.

248
The wise do not remain even in the middle.
In the Agulimlyastra:
Alas! There are two [types of] beings who destroy the sacred
doctrine in this world: those who view an extreme emptiness and
those who profess a self in the world. These two destroy the
sacred doctrine and turn the sacred doctrine upside down.
It is often said in the stras and stras that fixating upon emptiness, the
antidote which extracts all views, as an entity or a non-entity is an
incorrigible view and that it is necessary to relinquish all that is not beyond
reference upon anything empty or non-empty. Also, in examining through
reasoning, it is not necessary to say a lot here since it is easy to gain
confidence that merely the designation by a conceptual apprehension of
the elimination of the object of negationthe contradistinctive aspect of an
existential negation only eliminating true establishmenthas not gone in
the direction of the abiding reality which is free from imputations. [593]
The mere aspect of an existential negation that is the emptiness of true
existence is not the genuine expanse of phenomena nor the abiding
reality; however, it is appropriate for novices to contemplate as merely a
gateway to that [abiding reality]. A stra says:
Majur, the merit generated by a bodhisattva who gives the three
jewels467 whatever is needed for a hundred god-years, is surpassed
by the countless greater merit generated by another bodhisattva
who contemplates, for even the time of a finger snap, that in
existence all conditioned phenomena are impermanent, all
conditioned phenomena are suffering, all conditioned phenomena
are empty, all conditioned phenomena are selfless.

3. Refuting the Apprehension of [the Basic Element] as IImpermanent

mpermanent and
Conditioned [593.4]
One may wonder whether the omniscient wisdom that actualizes
the groundthe Buddha-nature as it is, like the sun free from cloudsis
467

dko read dkon [592.2].

249
permanent or impermanent. Sometimes in the stras omniscience is said
to be permanent and sometimes it is also said to be impermanent; the
meaning is as follows: in accord with the mental perspectives of others
those to be trained who have not been transformedthe scriptures say
that omniscience is impermanent, and there is reason also in the

Pramavrttika [2.8]:
There is no permanent valid cognition
Because the realization of the existence of entities is valid and
Objects of knowledge are impermanent
That [omniscient valid cognition] is only impermanent.
Omniscience arises through causes such as the generation of the mind [of
awakening] and meditation (goms) on emptiness [594] because it is not
reasonable to arise without a cause, and that [omniscience] is valid
cognition that is the direct perception of all phenomena. If valid cognition
is a non-deceptive cognition, then there are no permanent phenomena
because it is valid cognition that evaluates existent entities as they are.
Since its objects are only impermanent objects of knowledge, then the
evaluating

valid

cognition

also

must

be

impermanent,

occurring

sequentially, because it is established by valid cognition that what is

permanent is incapable of functioning; hence, it would certainly be
incapable of all activities such as evaluating objects.

Therefore, it is

extremely unreasonable that omniscience is permanent; it is established

as impermanent.

Likewise, all entities are impermanent and although

non-entities are designated as permanent, since there is no basis of

something permanent (rtag rgyu gzhi med), there is no genuinely
permanent phenomena found.

This fact is necessarily established as

such for the perspectives of non-Buddhist heretics and those of the

common vehicles who have not trained their minds in the manner of
transformation within the essence of inconceivable suchness (bsam gyis

mi khyab pai chos nyid kyi ngo bor gnas gyur pai tshul) because they
have no method whatsoever for the arising of what is other than the

250
manner of appearance from the perspective of consciousness (rnam

shes).
However, as for (dbang du byas) the vision of thoroughly
transformed wisdom (ye shes), omniscience is established as permanent
because (1) the arising and ceasing of instances of knowable objects and
(2) also the subjective wisdom arising sequentially and so forth, put
forward to prove the impermanence of that [omniscience], are only the
appearances as such from the perspectives of those who have not
thoroughly transformed. [595] However, in terms of the meaning of the
mode of subsistence, it is not established as only this because when there
is no phenomenon whatsoever that even arises momentarily, then
needless to mention that the sequence of time and so forth, which derive
from that, are not establishedfor example, like the appearances from
ones own perspective in a dream, although there are unrestricted
appearances of various temporal limits (dus kyi mtha) and spatial aspects
(phyogs kyi cha), they are not established as such.

Therefore, the

meaning of the non-arising, unceasing suchness is like that because the

thoroughly transformed consummate wisdom is the wisdom body that is
the indivisibility of the knowing and the object known and at the time
without transformation also, the basic nature of mindsuchness, unity,
naturally luminous clarityis unchanging.
Without distinction as to before and after, it is called the naturally
abiding heritage. To an untransformed one who has dualistic perception,
there is the incontrovertible and undeniable appearance of inequalityall
the changing, adventitious defilements suitable to be removed, occurring
sequentially as arising and ceasing moments, sasra and nirva, good
and bad, etc.; however, the basic nature abides as the great equality in
which arising, ceasing, and dualistic phenomena are not established. All
spatial aspects and temporal changes (dus kyi gyur ba) are incorporated
(ub chub) within that state. This exists as the domain of a Sublime Ones
individual reflexive awareness wisdom and there is no pollution by the
changes of the three times.

So why not give this the name great

251
permanence? [It is designated as such] because (1) it exists and (2) it
does not arise and cease momentarily.
[596] In this way, all objects of knowledge of space and time, all
changing entities and non-entities such as space, are subsumed as an
equal taste within this suchness. However, this suchness is not at all
subsumed within the phenomena that change and so forthfor example,
although clouds are subsumed within space, space is not subsumed
within clouds. Therefore, although the basic naturethe luminous and
clear expanse of great equality that is suchnessis the single self-existing
wisdom that innately abides as naturally pervading all entities, for
someone temporarily defiled, their own nature is not manifest. Through
eliminating the defilements through the power of realization and
abandonment comprised by the five paths, one attains the great wisdom
that is the indivisibility of the knowing and the object known. One attains
the omniscient wisdom that spontaneously knows, without conceptualizing
and without effort, the equal taste that is the basic nature of the suchness
of all cognitionsthe unchanging self-existing wisdom.
However, by this fact, self-existing wisdom is not produced by a
cause because actually, the Truth Body freed from adventitious
defilements is a freed effect (bral bai bras bu). Although it appears to be
newly produced by a cause, it merely appears as such in the way of
appearance for those who are untransformed (gnas ma gyur pai snang

tshul); in terms of the actual meaning, in the essence of the Truth Body,
which is the nature of suchness without arising or disintegration, from the
beginning all phenomena areas an equalitythe actual Buddha (mngon

par sangs rgyas pa), [597] primordially nirva, naturally luminous and
clear, etc. This consummate viewpoint of the profound stras is a topic
that is difficult to fathom for pure beings (dag pai sems dpa), needless to
mention ordinary people! Nevertheless, if proper belief arises, it is praised
as equal to receiving a prophecy of a Non-Returner, so you should aspire
to this fact. In this way, there is merit in viewing the Tathgatas wisdom

252
body as permanent. In the Praantavinicayaprtihryasamdhistra (rab

tu zhi ba rnam par nges pai cho phrul gyis ting nge dzin):
Majur, compared to any noble son or daughter who offers
whatever is desired to the four assemblies468 in each of the worldly
realms of the ten directions for ten million god-aeons, another noble
son or daughter who stirs for the purpose of acting accordingly,
saying, The Tathgata is permanent. The Tathgata is steadfast.
That [latter] one generates countless greater merit than the other.
And in the Mahparinirvastra:
Kyapa, noble sons and daughters should always one-pointedly
persist in these two phrases: The Buddha is permanent and the
Buddha abides.
And,
Whoever persistently perceives that the inconceivable [598] is
permanent is a source of refuge...
Those who view the Tathgatas body as impermanent have not even
gone for refuge, and there are limitless faults in viewing the vajra body as
impermanent, having acknowledged this as is said in the stras, the
authentic meaning should be respected.
In this way, the own essence of Buddha-nature is free from all
conceptual constructs such as existence and non-existence, permanence
and annihilation; it is the equality of the single sphere of indivisible truth
(bden pa dbyer med thig le nyag gcig). In the state of that abiding reality,
seeing as it is the suchness of one-taste of all phenomena of appearance
and existence is the meaning of seeing authentically with nothing to add or
remove. Therefore, free from all grasping is the good view that realizes
the ultimate. In the Bodhipakanirdeastra (byang chub phyogs bstan

pa):
The four assemblies are: (1) fully ordained monks (dge slong), (2) fully ordained nuns
(dge slong ma), (3) male laypersons (dge bsnyen), and (4) female laypersons (dge

468

bsnyen ma).

253
Majur, whoever sees, without duality, the equality (mi mnyam pa
med) of all phenomena as non-dual, sees authentically.469
In the Gaganagajaparipcchstra (nam mkha mdzod kyi zhu pa):
Entities, non-entities, consciousness, and
Whatever abides in the authentic limit
The view of entities and non-entities
Is not held by the wise.
In the Bodhisattvapiika:
Ultimately, there is no phenomenon whatsoever in front of a
Sublime Ones supreme knowledge or wisdom that is any
phenomenon that is thoroughly known, actualized, meditated
[upon], or abandoned.
[599] However, in the context of differentiating well by means of the valid
cognition analyzing the conventional, the abiding reality of entities in the
mode

of

apprehension

of

undistorted

supreme

knowledge

is

conventionally:

Knowing the truth as truthsuch as knowing the undeceiving path of

the Sublime Ones (phags pai lam)

Knowing the false as falsesuch as knowing those who profess

liberation through meditating on the self to be misguided

Knowing the impermanent as impermanentknowing all conditioned

entities to be momentary

Knowing the permanent as permanentknowing that Buddha-nature,

the self-existing wisdom totality of [ultimate] aspects (rnam pa thams

cad pa), never changes

Knowing the non-existent as non-existentsuch as knowing that the

appearances of self and perceived-perceiver [duality] are not
intrinsically established

Apprehending the existent as existentsuch as knowing (1) the mode

of appearance of dependent arising, which is incontrovertible causality

469

P.845, vol. 34, p. 103, 253b.5.

254
(rgyu bras) and (2) the spontaneously present qualities of suchness,
the Buddha-nature, naturally abiding in all sentient beings;
Therefore, through knowing and abiding as such, vast qualities are
attained because this is the non-deluded root of virtue.
Thus, also in stras many doctrines are taught in general and
specific ways. In particular, although a self of persons does not exist, the
Buddha-nature transcending both conceptual constructs of self and no-self
[600] is said to be the great self, and so forth, the supreme qualities of the
perfection of purity, bliss, permanence, and self are taught in order to
know the existent as existentthe unchanging consummate quality of
peace, coolness (bsil ba), and perfection which is the non-abiding great
nirva. In the Mahparinirvastra:
The self is the authentic permanence of whatever it is that is true.
That which is sovereign, unchanging, [and] unmoving is called
self.
Having heard the explanation of the manner of the profound Buddhanature in this way, limitless benefit ensues in merely being inspired (mos

pa). It is said in the Uttaratantra [5.3-5.5]:

An intelligent one aspiring to the domain of the Victorious Ones470
Is a vessel for the accumulation of the qualities of Buddha;
Through manifest joy in the inconceivable qualities
One surpasses the merit of all sentient beings.
Through seeking awakening, one may, with golden fields adorned
with jewels,
Constantly make daily offerings to the Victors of doctrine in
Buddha-fields equal in number to dust motes.
Any other who hears mere words of this, and also is inspired having
heard,
Through this virtue gains much more merit than through generosity.
An intelligent one wishing for awakening, also for many aeons may

470

brgya read rgyal [600.3].

255
Uphold immaculate discipline of body, speech, and mind
effortlessly.
Any other who hears mere words of this, and also is inspired having
heard,
[601] Through this virtue gains much more merit than through
discipline.
One whose concentration drives out the fire of disturbing emotions
of the three realms, may
In meditation on the method of unshaken awakening complete the
perfections of the abodes of the gods and Brahma.
Any other who hears mere words of this, and also is inspired having
heard,
Through this virtue gains much more merit than through
concentration.
Thus, there is great purpose in knowing and aspiring to what is so
profound and difficult to fathom. This demonstration of the discourse of
Buddha-naturethe roar (sgra) of the non-returning lion that is the
essential nature of the supreme vehicleis the excellence of immense
profundity; hence, for those who have little previous training and are
mentally deficient, it is difficult to aspire to. In the Tathgatasagatistra
(de bzhin gshegs pa gro bai mdo):
This wisdom of mine
Is doubted by those with immature minds;
It does not abide,
Like an arrow shot in the sky falling down.471
And in the Sarvavaidalyasagrahastra (rnam pa thag pa bsdus pai

mdo):
Thus, since stupid people go to the lower realms due to the
blessings of demons, they think of the faults of that also. Likewise,
they think of the faults of the spoken doctrines bestowed by the
Tathgata.472

471

P.895, vol. 35, p. 153, 268a.8-168b.1.

472

P.893, vol. 35, p. 125, 197a.8.

256
And in the Brahmadattaparipcch (tshangs pas byin gyis zhu pa):
When the well-spoken doctrine is taught
Those within the realm of evil hold it as unreasonable [602]
Without faith, when doubts in the doctrine are generated
One becomes crazy for billions of aeons.
Through thinking without faith, one becomes an evil-doer;
The mind of an angered one also cannot be protected.
Having abandoned everything with an essence
The faithless hold onto the dregs;
They become boastful and constantly haughty.
The faithless do not bow down to others.473
And,
They contradict with meaningless words
The teachings of the Victorious Ones
Through the defilements, they have doubts and qualms as a nonBuddhist.
Having squandered and contradicted the doctrine,
The faithless even abandon the doctrine.474
In the Dulanigrahstra (tshul chal tshar gcod pai mdo):
riputra, this world will become filled by such unholy beings who
drown in the path of sustenance, are attached to dispute, and harm
themselves and others.
Considering the fact of what has been said, the degenerate time is
booming and those beings born at the end of the teaching, through the
manner of a perverted understanding of the four reliances,475 have come
to mostly denigrate the essential point of the tradition of the supreme
vehicle and contrive the doctrine. It is extremely rare also for a mind to
cherish this which is like the life-force of the path of the Mahyna.
However, through the power of being born at the end of the teachings of
P.826, vol. 33, p. 186, 20b.5-20b.6.
P.826, vol. 33, p. 186, 21a.6-21a.7.
475 Reliance on the doctrine, not individuals; reliance on the meaning, not words; reliance
on the definitive meaning, not provisional meanings; reliance on wisdom, not
consciousness.
473
474

257
the old translation lineage of awareness-holders, I saw and heard many
precious oral instructions of the lineage. [603] Although I am of an age
and intellect that is not mature, I have gained a bit of confidence in this
profound topic through the power of having the good fortune to take upon
the crown of my head the lotus feet of many authentic virtuous spiritual
friends such as the powerful victor and regent of Padma[-sambhava], the
youthful Majur displayed in human form, the omniscient vajra splendor
[Jam-yang-khyen-tsey-wang-po]. In this way, the well-spoken meaning of
the naturally abiding heritagethe expanse of phenomena in the manner
of the thoroughly non-abiding unity free from all extremesis the lions
roar.

In the Brahmavioacintaparipcchstra (tshangs pa khyad par

sems kyis zhus pai mdo):

Divine child, whatever doctrines are spoken without attachment to
anything are the lions roar (seng gei sgra). Those spoken with
attachment to something are not the lions roar; they are foxs
chatter (wai sgra). Teaching a view to be taken up is not the lions
roar.
In the Mahparinirvastra:
Proclaiming the lions roar is definitively stating that all sentient
beings have the nature of Buddha and that the Tathgata is always
abiding and is immutable.
And,
Noble child, although they state the empty topics a lot, they do not
proclaim the lions roar; proclamations in the midst of a large
assembly of wise scholars are proclamations of the great lions
roar. Regarding this, proclaiming the lions roar is not professing
that all phenomena are impermanent, suffering, selfless, and
completely impure; it is professing only that the Tathgata is
permanent, bliss, the self, and completely pure.
[604] It should be known as illustrated by the extensive speech on the
meaning of the example of proclaiming the lions roar.

258
If there is discord with others in speaking the own path of the
Sugatas truthfully as such, since it is a presentation of the authentic path,
do not make others disturbed. In the Madhyamakvatra [6.118]:
The stras demonstrate thusness for the sole purpose of
liberation,
Not for the sake of attachment to analysis and disputation;
If in explaining thusness other scriptures are destroyed
There is no fault.
This manner is also protecting the doctrine. In the Samdhirjastra:
Regarding this, if it is asked, What is protecting the doctrine? It is
defeating those who disparage the doctrine of the Buddha in
accordance with the doctrine.
It is also upholding the doctrine. In the Gaganagajaparipcch:
The character of the doctrine completely upholds
Whatever character the Victorious Ones awakening possesses.
Whoever knows the extent of the stainless [doctrine]
Upholds the doctrine of all the Buddhas.
And,
In this way, upholding the doctrine is repaying the actions of the
Buddhas and also gaining immeasurable merit.
In the Tathgatamahkarunirdeastra (de bshin gshegs pai snying rje

chen po nges par bstan pai mdo):

In this way, closely abiding by the Victorious Ones doctrine and
Through the doctrine, having renunciation and lacking disturbance
(zang zing),
Through this, one upholds the doctrine of the Sugatas and
Repays the actions of all the Buddhas.
[605] And in the Gaganagajaparipcch:
Although expressed for ten billion aeons
There is no limit to Buddhas wisdom.
Likewise, there is no measure to the merit

259
Of upholding the sacred doctrine of the Tathgata.
Thus it is said.
Although I have developed a little confidence here
In the scriptural tradition of the supreme vehicle,
I am young in age and immature in training
Who would rely upon the speech of a crazy monk [like] myself?
These days, following after famous people
And lacking an intellect that discriminates the proper and improper
Most are possessed by the demon of jealousy
I know this is not a time to deliver elegant speeches.
However, with constant devoted worship to the supreme teacher
And exalted deity on the lotus of my heart
The clear aspects of the words and meanings of the excellent
scriptures
Have clearly dawned in the expanse of awareness.
At that time, prolonged joy had arose
In persistent intimacy (goms) with elegant sayings.
At a later time and in another land also
Sacred joy in the Victorious Ones doctrine will become like the
waxing moon.
From this discourse of consummate profundity
The joy that arises in intelligent ones
Is not like the happiness that falls to the extremes of existence or
peace.
Therefore, this is a feast for the gathering of fortunate ones.
May the unity of appearance and emptiness that relinquishes all
grasping,
The lions roar of the supreme vehicle,
[606] Overwhelm the hordes of beasts with bad views, and
May the essential nature of the Victorious Ones teaching spread
across the ten directions!

260
At the request of my brother in the doctrine named Gua, bearing the
treasury of jewels of the three trainings,476 who said, Write an explanation
of because the body of a perfect Buddha is radiant..., whatever comes to
mind, this was precisely written down by the monk Lo-dr-dri-mey (blo

gros dri med). May it be virtuous!

476

The three trainings are: discipline (tshul khrims), meditative stabilization (ting nge

dzin), and supreme knowledge (shes rab).

261

Document 2
Introduction
Pd-pa Tulkus Notes on the Essential Points of [Mi-phams]

Expoistion [of Buddha-Nature] addresses a number of issues found within

Mi-phams Lions Roar: Exposition of Buddha-Nature. The short text is
thematically organized around a list of topics, which are discussed as the
topics are raised. Unfortunately, the only edition of the text that I have had
access to thus far is a photocopy of a digital input of the text that I
obtained from She-chen monastery in Nepal. I included this translation
because it is a useful supplement to the translation of Mi-phams Lions

Roar: Exposition of Buddha-Nature above. Also, I have consistently found

Pd-pa Tulkus systematization of Mi-phams works very helpful.

[Mi--phams] Exposition
Notes on the Essential Points of [Mi
Buddha--Nature]
[of Buddha
By PdPd-pa Tulku
[2] namo guru majurye - Homage to the guru Majur!
The one with the maala of wisdom and love endowed with the
two-fold purity
The natural purity of the essential basic element of awakening [and]
The Truth Body completely devoid of adventitious defilements
Radiant with thousand-fold light [rays] of benefit and happiness, is
[my] object of veneration!
Regarding this, the definitive meaning Buddha-nature [3] is directly and
indirectly the consummate topic of all Stra and Mantra. The meaning
complete with the essential points of all Stra and Mantra is as follows:
due to the essential point477 of the indivisibility of appearance and

477

kyi read kyis [3.2].

262
emptiness, all the essential points of Stra and Mantra are complete in
this, such as:

In the path of Stra, the nature of the Middle Waythe unity of

appearance and emptinessin all the contexts of ground, path, and
fruition are not transgressed; and in particular, there is the essential
point of actualizing the qualities of the path and fruition through
abandoning the two obscurations

[4] In the common unexcelled Mantra, there is the view of the ground
the realization of the indivisibility of purity and equalityand the unity
of the two stages478 of the path; as well as the essential point of
actualizing the qualities of the path and fruition through applying the
key points of the channels (rtsa), winds (rlung), and essences (thig le)

In the uncommon Mantra [the Great Perfection], there is the realization

of the ground, the indivisibility of primordial purity and spontaneous
presence; the path of liberation without hardship through sustaining the
state of cutting through (khregs chod); and the appearances of direct
crossing (thod rgal), which are not produced through the mind or
impure winds.

The following is the manner how the nature of this is realized: while the
aspect of natural purity is directly realized from the first [bodhisattva]
ground, the qualities of the purity that is free from the adventitious
[defilements] is a topic difficult to realize even for the lords on the tenth
ground. The own essence of the object (yul) in the former [natural purity]
does not have the aspects of being seen or not; [5] the latter [purity that is
free from adventitious defilements] is distinguished by the realization
through the power of the adventitious [defilements] of the subject (yul can)
being perfected or not.
Moreover, the manner how its essence is indicated in stras is as
follows: the manner that the middle Word indicates the essential

478

The two stages are: the generation stage (bskyed rim) and the completion stage

(rdzogs rim).

263
emptiness is through indicating the divisions of the quality-bearers (chos

can) such as the twenty emptinesses. Also, from the aspect of suchness,
the expanse of phenomena is taught as the naturally abiding heritage;
thereby, the empty essence is clearly shown.

Since the last Word

indicates the [Buddha-]body and wisdom from the contradistinctive aspect

(ldog cha) of the luminous and clear nature of mind, it also becomes that
which joins Stra and Mantra. However, there is no fault of the absurd
consequence that there would thus be no difference between Stra and
Mantra because the aggregates, constituents, and sense-fields are not
taught [in Stra] as the divine maalas presently in a complete manner.
In accord with the intended meaning of the middle wheel, it abides
as the empty essence when evaluated by the valid cognition that analyzes
the ultimate; therefore, it is free from the extreme of permanence. [6] In
accord with the intended meaning of the last Word, its nature is luminous
clarity when evaluated by the thoroughly conventional valid cognition
based upon pure vision, so it is free from the extreme of non-entity
annihilation. Therefore, it is the great unity free from extremes.
Concerning the meaning of this, there are two valid cognitions
ultimate and conventional analyseswhich ascertain the two truths.
Within the first, there are two: (1) valid cognition that analyzes the
categorized and (2) valid cognition that analyzes the uncategorized.
The

first

[valid

cognition

that

analyzes

the

categorized]

distinguishes the two truths and applies the operator ultimately not
established. Since conventional production by its own characteristics is
not negated, it is limited emptiness; it does not become the genuine
emptiness which is the indivisible two truths because of being distinct and
unmixed with appearance due to: (1) an appearing entity not mixing with
an existential negation that is an absence of true existence and (2) a nonentity that is an existential negation abandoning appearance.

264
[7] The second [uncategorized] is as follows: as is said, Through
this reasoning [production] is not reasonable even conventionally...,479
without dividing the two truths, even mere appearancesfrom form to
omnisciencethrough reasoning are unable to withstand analysis and are
ascertained as the great emptiness.

Therefore, (1) a non-entity

emptiness, which is separate from appearance and (2) an appearance

that is not empty are impossible; hence, it is the genuine unity. If having
divided the two truths one also negates appearance, there also ensues
the fault of the over-pervasion (khyab ches bai skyon) of the object of
negation. However, due to the essential point480 of not dividing the two
truths, there is not only no ensuing fault of the over-pervasion of the object
of negation, but it is this which hits the essential point that evokes the
genuine indivisibility of the two truths.
Second, there are two conventional valid cognitions: (1) thoroughly
conventional valid cognition based upon pure vision and (2) thoroughly
conventional valid cognition based on impure confined perception. [8] The
first is the wisdom of a Sublime Ones continuum and the second is the
mind of an ordinary being; the first is the unmistaken valid cognition and
the second is a mistaken cognition. Therefore, the indicated meaning of
the middle Word as it is should be ascertained as the great emptiness
which is the uncategorized ultimatethe essence of Buddha-nature that
does not in the slightest degree withstand ultimate analysis.

That

emptiness also is not a limited non-entity which is posited from a valid

cognition of confined perception; it is established by the power of fact
(dngos stobs kyis) to be the nature that is neither conjoined with, nor
separable from, appearance and emptiness.

Moreover, its aspect of

appearance also is not like a limited entity posited by confined perception.

It is the object found as it is by the thoroughly conventional valid cognition
based on pure vision in accord with the intended meaning of the last

479

Candrakrti, Madhyamakvatra 6.36.

480

kyi read kyis [7.4].

265
Wordin the way that it appears in accord with the mode of
subsistenceit is ascertained as the identity of the great luminous clarity.
[9] In short, the definitive meaning Buddha-naturethe single
essential point of the non-contradictory viewpoint of the middle and last
Wordsaccords with the statement:
The mind is devoid of mind because
The nature of mind is luminous clarity.
(1) From the aspect of the empty essence, it does not in the slightest
degree withstand analysis in the evaluation of ultimate analysis and (2)
from the aspect of the nature of clarity, it is the object found by the valid
cognition of pure vision; it indicates the unity of appearance and
emptiness which is neither conjoined with, nor separable from, the
[Buddha-]body and wisdom. Otherwise, if it is asserted to be not empty or
to withstand analysis even from the perspective of ultimate analysis, it
becomes a permanent and true existence. Also, if one does not know
how to establish its existence from the perspective of conventional valid
cognition of pure vision, then that heritage is not suitable as anything other
than what has fallen to the extreme of non-entity annihilation.
Therefore, how the valid cognition of pure vision is established is as
follows: [10] Candrakrti states:
Compared to that mind, they both are true;
To the clear vision of objects, they both are also false.481
Since the appearances of the six classes of beings are deluded
perceptions and the perception of pure wisdom is non-deluded, [the latter]
is necessarily the conventional mode of subsistence.
If someone asks, Well, since pure wisdom knows both pure and
impure objects of knowledge, which is the conventional mode of
subsistence?

481

Candrakrti, Madhyamakvatra 6.54.

266
The wisdom that knows all there is (ji lta mkhyen pa) perceives both
the pure and the impure. Although it knows the impure, that is not its own
perception (rang snang) because that is the deluded perception of the six
classes of beings, not the conventional mode of subsistence. In its own
perception, it perceives only great purity and equality; hence, that is
posited as the conventional mode of subsistence.
If someone asks, Well, are all objects of knowledge the nature of
Buddha?
In this context of the vehicle of characteristics (mtshan nyid theg pa), [11]
all appearances such as pots are the minds self-perception (rang snang);
therefore, they are not established in meaning. As is said:
The mind is devoid of mind because
The nature of mind is luminous clarity.
The establishment of the possession of the essential nature of Buddha is
posited as the heritage which is the basic elementthe Buddha-nature.
If is it said, Well, if this is posited as ultimate, it becomes truly
established, and if posited as relative, then because the ultimate Buddhanature states it as ultimate, it is not posited as relative.
In accord with the viewpoint of the great scriptures, there are two
manners: (1) by means of the object found by ultimate valid cognition
being authentic or not, two truths are posited in which the aspect of
appearance is relative and the aspect of emptiness is ultimate; and (2) by
means of the object of conventional valid cognition of pure vision being
authentic or not, nirva, appearance which accords with the mode of
subsistence, is posited as ultimate and [12] sasra, appearance which is
in

discord,

is

posited

as

relative.

According

to

the

former

[appearance/emptiness model], [Buddha-nature] has aspects of both

truths; however, it is posited as ultimate according to the latter
[authentic/inauthentic experience model].
If it is asked, Well, which is the manner of positing the two truths in
the Prsagika tradition?

267
Both are posited without contradiction.

Moreover, Candrakrti,

emphasizing the former [appearance/emptiness model], elucidates the

empty

essence

of

all phenomena.

The

Uttaratantra, although

emphasizing the latter [authentic/inauthentic experience model], is in

accord with the former because the nature of emptiness is established as
luminous clarity.

Therefore, this is the reason why both the

Madhyamakvatra and the Uttaratantra fall to one essential point, without

contradiction, as Prsagika scriptures.

Therefore, being empty of

mistaken phenomena that are separable, and not empty of phenomena

that are inseparable with emptiness, and so forth, is not from the
perspective of ultimate analysis [13] because if something withstands
analysis from that perspective, it is truly established. Consequentially, it is
posited by means of whether or not it exists as the consummate object
found by the valid cognition of pure vision. Since whatever speech of the
[Buddha-]body and wisdom is not in the slightest degree [concerning] an
entity found by a valid cognition of confined perception, there is no
occasion for a common locus (gzhi mthun) of a permanent phenomenon
and an entity.
If one says, How can the viewpoints of the middle and last wheel
not contradict? Their provisional and definitive stras are distinct.
Concerning the manner of positing the provisional and the definitive
in general, stras are provisional meanings when the meaning of the literal
teaching has all three complete: a basis with an [other] intention, a
purpose, and explicit invalidation. The opposite of this is posited as the
definitive meaning.

Therefore, in accord with the viewpoint of the

Samdhirjastra and so forth, by means of what is or is not invalidated

by valid cognition analyzing the ultimate, [14] Candrakrti accepts stras
that mainly express the topic of emptiness as the definitive meaning, and
stras that mainly express the topic of the conventional, [or] relative, truths
as provisional meanings:
Whatever stras have the meaning that does not explain thusness
Know those to also explain the relative, what is provisional.

268
Know those that have the meaning of emptiness as the definitive
meaning.482
Therefore, the manner of positing is by means of the topic: the first Word
is provisional, the middle is definitive, and the last is a mix of provisional
and definitive meanings. Hence, it does not follow that a meaning taught
in a stra that Candrakrti has said to be a provisional meaning is
necessarily non-existent conventionally because all presentations of
relative truth are the expressed meanings of a provisional meaning.
In accordance with stras that show the heritage, the basic element
(rigs khams), by the example of cleansing a jewel, the Uttaratantra and the

Dharmadhtustotra and so forth, by means of whether there is or is not

[15] invalidation through the [conventional] valid cognition of pure vision in
accord with what is found by the valid cognition of pure vision, stras that
teach the consummate definitive meaning, Buddha-nature, are asserted
as the definitive meaning. Hence, the last Word teachings in which the
definitive meaning Buddha-nature is the topicthe nature of inseparable
appearance and emptiness and the ultimate that is appearance in accord
with the mode of subsistenceare the definitive meaning because
[Buddha-nature] is the object found by the valid cognition of pure vision.
However, if you understand the essential point of the noncontradiction of the viewpoints of the stras and stras that teach (1) the
great emptiness, the object found by ultimate valid cognition, as the
consummate definitive meaning and (2) a provisional meaning from the
aspect of appearance, the contradistinctive aspect of the relative, the
scriptures of the middle and last Words and the commentaries on the
viewpoint such as the Uttaratantra and the Madhyamakvatra will have
an indivisible viewpoint.

In particular, without having an influx of

contradictions as to the respective provisional and definitive meanings of

the beginning and end of the Uttaratantra, [16] there is the essential point
of releasing the seal of difficult points of the indicated meaning of the

482

Madhyamakvatra 6.97.

269
scripture, such as understanding nothing to divide or remove (dbye bsal

med).
Regarding this, (1) since whatever indications of Buddha-nature,
together with the [Buddha-]body and wisdom, are not [concerning] an
entity posited by confined perception, there is no common locus of a
permanent phenomenon and an entity; and (2) since whatever indications
of empty essence are not [concerning] a non-entity like a rabbit horn
posited by confined perception, it is free from the extreme of annihilation.
Therefore, it is the nature of indivisible appearance and emptiness like the
statement:
The mind is devoid of mind because
The nature of mind is luminous clarity.
The manner of purifying the defilements of the basic element is as
follows: the two obscurations are divided into two: imputed obscurations
(kun brtags) and innate obscurations (lhan skyes).

The aspect of the

imputed are discards of the path of seeing (mthong lam). The cognitive
obscurations (shes sgrib), which there are eight aspects within the innate
obscurations, are progressively abandoned by the nine grounds of the
path of meditation (sgom lam). The aspect of the extremely subtle latency
(bag nyal) of that is abandoned by the vajra[-like] meditative stabilization
(rdor ting). [17] The obscurations that are disturbing emotions (nyon sgrib),
among the two-fold division [of obscurations into those which are]
disturbing emotions and cognitive, are completely abandoned up to the
seventh ground. Their latency is abandoned on the three pure grounds.
Their extremely subtle habitual tendency (bag chags) is abandoned by the

vajra[-like] meditative stabilization. The latency of the obscurations that

are disturbing emotions, which are cognitive obscurations, are also
indicated by the name disturbing emotion in stras and stras.
Therefore, the viewpoints of the great chariots are in accord: asserting that
disturbing emotions are abandoned up to the seventh ground and

270
asserting that disturbing emotions are abandoned until the end of the
continuum (rgyun mtha).
There are three reasonings that establish483 Buddha-nature: (1)
reasoning of dependency [investigating] the effect, (2) reasoning of the
nature of things [investigating] the essence, and (3) reasoning of efficacy
[investigating] the cause. Moreover, the first is evidence that is an effect
and the latter two are evidence of [identical] intrinsic nature. [18] The first,
through putting forward as evidence the effectthat which is endowed
with the two-fold purity (dag pa gnyis ldan)the existence of the essence
of the primordially pure Buddha is established; it is posited by means of
the two separate contradistinctive aspects: (1) the Buddha that is the
primordial pure essence and (2) the Buddha that is endowed with the twofold purity.

Since the statement, sentient beings are Buddhas, is [in

reference to] the Buddha that is natural purity (rang bzhin rnam dag), it
[refers to] the suchness of mind, not the effect which is that [Buddha
endowed with the two-fold purity]; therefore, there is also no fault of the
effect abiding in the cause. The evidence put forward as an effect is from
the contradistinctive aspect of being the effect endowed with the two-fold
purity; in any case, it also is not contradictory.
If one thinks, Does the Buddha that is the mode of subsistence
abandon the obscurations to be abandoned or not?
If you speak concerning the basic nature of the Buddha that is the
mode of subsistence called the essential Buddha of primordial purity,
since its essence is primordially pure of defilements, what defilements are
there to be abandoned?

The defilements to be abandoned are not

established. [19] Although there are obscurations in the mode of

appearance for sentient beings, since a person is deluded by the
adventitious [defilements], obscurations are not able to be abandoned due
to not realizing the nature of the mode of subsistence. At the time when
the selfless abiding reality of mind is realized through the power of

483

gyi gru ba read gyis grub [17.5].

271
meditating on the path, all the obscurations, which are rooted in the
adventitious apprehension of self, will be progressively abandoned; the
fruition which is the endowment of two-fold purity will be actualized.
The following is an investigation into whether the Buddha that is the
mode of subsistence perceives objects of knowledge or not: although the
manner of the primordially pure essencethe essence which is the nature
of luminous clarityresides as the identity of knowledge, love, and powers
in the mode of subsistence, by only this the two-fold purity is not asserted.
Therefore, a person so endowed does not become omniscient because of
being a person for which appearances do not accord with the mode of
subsistence. Through the power of meditating on the path, when such a
person [20] is free from the defilements of deluded perceptions together
with their habitual tendencies, that one becomes a Buddha endowed with
the two-fold purity due to actualizing the infinite mode of subsistence of
the two wisdoms: knowing as it is and knowing all there is. Also, through
this essential point one can know whether or not the Buddha is endowed
with the two-fold purity.
Through the virtue of Do-ngak-ten-pay-nyi-ma, the one from the
eastern region of Dak-po,
Having written this in accord with the words spoken by the lord of
refuge, the lord of the expanse of phenomena free from
activity,
May all beings actualize the Truth Body of the Sugatas!
May it be virtuous! sarva mangala.

272

Document 3
Introduction
Khen-po Lo-dr-drak-pas Roar of the Fearless Lion is an exegesis
on the distinctive Jo-nang doctrine of other-emptiness.

The text is

organized around a presentation of the ground, path, and fruition

following a similar structure as Dol-po-pas Ocean of Definitive Meaning.
The Tibetan text I used for the translation was the edition that Matthew
Kapstein had published in India from a block-print from Sey Monastery
(bswe dgon pa); it is found in the second volume of a two-volume printed
edition of Khen-po Lo-dr-drak-pas major works. I also consulted another
edition of the text that I aquired while in Go-lok (mgo log), a cursive (dbu

med) edition of Khen-po Lo-dr-drak-pas collected works reportedly

printed in Dzam-thang.484 Another edition of Khen-po Lo-dr-drak-pas

Roar of the Fearless Lion can be found in a nearly verbatim abridgement

of the text attributed to one of his main students485; however, the exerpt
from the text translated below, the section concerning the three wheels of
doctrine, was omitted from that edition.

Excerpt from Roar of the Fearless Lion [48.2

[48.2--97.4]
By KhenKhen-po LoLo-drdr-drakdrak-pa
[48.2] ...All that was spoken by our teacher [the Buddha], the
eighty-four thousand sections of doctrine, are included into two: the
Causal Perfection Vehicle and the Resultant Vehicle; the profound point of
these, the consummate definitively secret essence falls upon only one
484

Khen-po Lo-dr-drak-pa, Collected Works (rje skyab mgon ma tii gsung bum), vol. a.

I will refer to this edition as DT.

485 Yn-tan-zang-po (yon tan bzang po), rgyu bras theg pa mchog gi gnas lugs zab moi
don rnam par nges pa rje jo nang pa chen poi ring lugs jigs med gdong lngai nga ro, in
the series gang can rig brgyai sgo byed pai lde mig, vol. 15 (Beijing: Nationalities Press,
1990).

273
viewpoint (dgongs pa). With respect to how this is so, in dependence
upon the individual constituents and faculties of each disciple, there arose
distinct ways in which the status (gnas lugs) of the three vehicles is
realized through the means of various practices for different contexts.
Also, the many various philosophies progressively split. The presentation
of the four philosophies in our system flourished in the Noble Land [of
India].

From there, in Tibet as well, due to the various quintessential

instructions (man ngag) as to the manner of realizing the abiding reality of

the Middle Way philosophy of the Mahyna, there came to be distinctive
views and philosophies of the Middle Way, Mahmudr, and the Great
Perfection (rdzogs chen). From among these, the great lord Jo-nang-pa
[Shey-rap-gyal-tsen] thoroughly opened the way for the chariot tradition in
the exceptional manner of the definitive meaningthe Great Middle Way.
The essential points of the profound meaning of the Middle Way of otheremptiness in Stra and Mantra, [49] will be progressively disclosed based
on this tradition.
This has two parts: the subject of the extensive discussion here, an
explanation of the progression of profound points of the ground, path, and
fruition of the Stra Perfection Vehicle; and an appended brief disclosure
of the profound points of the ground, path, and fruition of the Vajrayna of
Mantra [the latter topic is not included in this translation].

Here,, an Explanation of the

1. The Subject of the Extensive Discussion Here
Progression of Profound Points of the Ground, Path, and Fruition of the
Stra Perfection Vehicle
This has three parts: the manner of the teaching of the profound
abiding reality of the definitive meaning of the Perfection Vehicle; the
subject of the teaching which is the actual profound abiding reality of the
ground, path, and fruition; and the way that the explanation is beneficial
[the latter two topics are not included in this translation].

274

1. The Manner of the Teaching of the Profound Abiding Reality of the

Definitive Meaning of the Perfection Vehicle [49.5]
This has two parts: the progression of the wheels of doctrine which are
the means of teaching the definitive meaning of the abiding reality; and the
way that these commentaries on Buddhas viewpoint (dgong grel) are
supreme.

1. The Progression of the Wheels of Doctrine which are the Means of

Teaching
Te
aching the Definitive Meaning of the Abiding Reality [49.5]
This has three parts: the wheels of doctrine indicated in the

Sadhinirmocanastra,

the

wheels

of

doctrine

indicated

in

Dhravararjaparipcchstra,486 and in accord with that, the way they

are indicated in the Nirva[stra] and so forth.
1. The Wheels of Doctrine Indicated in the Sa
Sa
dhinirmocanastra [49.6]
This section has two parts:

presenting scripture and establishing the

reason for that being the way it is.

1. Presenting Scripture [50.1]

[50] In general, with respect to the supreme teachers first Word,
the wheel of doctrine (chos khor, dharmacakra) of the four truths,
stemming from the topic of the four truths, for those disciples of dull
faculties who had not trained in the Mahyna and were to engage in the
vehicle of the Auditors (nyan thos kyi theg pa, ravakayna), he mainly
taught relative phenomena in the manner of their existence as true
entities.

Concerning the Middle [Word,] the wheel of doctrine of the

absence of attributes, for disciples of not very mature faculties, who

although had not trained in many stages of the vehicle of the Mahyna,
were in general to engage in the Mahyna, he mainly taught all
phenomena, from form to omniscience, in the manner of their lacking true

486

P.814, vol. 32.

275
nature.

In the last [Word,] the wheel of doctrine of the thorough

differentiation of the ultimate, for disciples of sharp and extremely mature

faculties who had trained their mental continuums through all the vehicles,
he mainly taught, through elegantly differentiating: (1) the ultimate truth
itself as truly existing, meaning that it is permanent, steadfast, and eternal
in the perspective of the wisdom of the Sublime Ones because it is the
primordially

unchanging

essence

of the indivisible

expanse

and

awareness (dbyings rig dbyer med); and (2) relative phenomena

comprising the perceiving [subjects] and perceived [objects] as not truly
existing, meaning that they are primordially non-arising like reflections in a
mirrormerely expressions (rnam gyur) of the ultimate.
[51] Therefore, he progressively [taught] the disciples of the three
wheels according to their respective mental abilitiesbeing of dull,487
mediocre,488 or sharp facultiesin order that they progressively reach the
consummate abiding reality of phenomena: in the first wheel, he taught
relative phenomena in the manner of their existing as true entitiesthat is
to say, he taught that the incontrovertible functionings of conventional
[phenomena] are truths only relatively, in accordance with their
appearance; they were not taught to exist as truly established in the
context of analyzing the abiding reality.

In the middle wheel is the

teaching that all phenomena of sasra and nirva lack true nature
that is to say, he taught that in the context of analyzing the abiding reality,
what is to be refuted, the signs of the self of phenomena, do not exist in
the way that one clings [to them] through the reification of signs (mtshan

dzin). However, it was not taught that these illusory relative phenomena
are not suitable to exist in general. Moreover, knowing that the expanse
(dbyings) of profound wisdom,489 the abiding reality beyond the domain of
reified signs, was temporarily not the subject of this teaching based on the
mental capacities of the disciples of that occasion, other than not teaching
rdul [51.1] read rtul [DT 54.3].
brang [51.1] read bring [DT54.4].
489 ya [51.4] read ye [DT 55.2].
487
488

276
it to be either existent or non-existent, there was no teaching upon having
resolved that this kind of profound expanse is completely untruea lie.
Consequently, the consummate viewpoint of all three490 wheels,
directly and indirectly is one, the Buddha-nature (bde gshegs snying po,

sugatagarbha) itselfthe ground-expanse, the ultimate self-existing

wisdom which is free from all signs, the luminous clarity, the emptyground, the totality of all aspects. However, due to the context, that is to
say, the disciples: first the relative was taught in the manner of the
ordinary four truths; in the middle, the expanse free from the constructs of
all signs [52] was taught, merely half of the definitive meaning; finally, the
ultimate definitive meaning was taught, the non-conceptual groundexpanse, the great wisdom.

Aside from merely distinctive teachings

emphasized in accordance with necessity, the three wheels are in fact

definitively one in the end.

Therefore, the prior great chariots, the

ornaments of this continent (dzam gling, Jambudvpa), the sublime and

honorable Ngrjuna, Asaga and [half-]brother [Vasubandhu], with minds
in harmony, established the three wheels as having one viewpoint. So it is
also in our tradition of the scriptural viewpoint of the lord, the great Jonang-pa [Shey-rap-gyal-tsan], as well as the gentle protector Kn-ganying-po (kun dga snying po),491 the master bearing his lineage.
Moreover, with regard to such a progression of the three wheels of
the Word, the clear distinction of the situational (gnas skabs) and the
consummate (mthar thug) is elegantly pronounced in the manner of the
supreme teachers own definitive elucidation of the viewpoint,492 that is to
say, the status of being surpassable and unsurpassable by way of
whether [it] is the provisional or definitive meaning.

[From the

Sadhinirmocanastra]:
Thereupon, the bodhisattva Paramrthasamudgata said to the
Blessed One (bcom ldan das), Initially, the Blessed One at
490

tshar [51.5] read char [DT 55.4].

491

Another name for Trantha.

492

This is a reference to the Sadhinirmocanastra (dgong pa nges grel).

277
ivadana in Deer Park, in the region of Vras, taught the four
noble truths to the ones who fully engage in the vehicle493 of the
Auditors. He fully turned the miraculous and amazing wheel of
doctrine in a way unlike anything that had been turned in this world
before by anyone, human or deity. [53] Furthermore, this wheel of
doctrine that the Blessed One turned is surpassed, affords an
occasion [of refutation], is the provisional meaning, and is the
subject of dispute.
Based on the essencelessness of phenomena, and based
on non-arising, unceasing, primordial peace, and naturally
complete nirva, the Blessed One turned the greatly miraculous
and amazing second wheel of doctrine with the feature of the
discourse of emptiness, for those who fully engage in the
Mahyna. Furthermore, this wheel of doctrine that the Blessed
One turned is surpassed, affords an occasion [of refutation], is the
provisional meaning, and is the subject of dispute.
However, based on the essencelessness of phenomena,
and based on non-arising, unceasing, primordial peace, and
naturally complete nirva, for those who fully engage in all of the
vehicles, the Blessed One taught the completely amazing and
miraculous third wheel endowed with the excellent differentiation.
This wheel of doctrine turned by the Blessed One is unsurpassed,
affords no occasion [of refutation], is the definitive meaning, and is
not the subject of dispute.
The disciples for which the turning of the first wheel concerns are those of
the Hnayna (theg pa dman pa), of the dull faculty-type, and [54] are
obscured as to the way of the causality of thorough affliction and complete
purification (kun byang) in general, and in particular, are obscured about
the selflessness of persons (gang zag gi bdag med). Therefore, since on
this occasion merely the fact of that system is taught in accordance with
their faculties and constituents, at the appropriate time, the teacher
indicates to those disciples the style of doctrine mainly in accord with such
a manner. Hence, in general, compared with the consummate viewpoint
of the teacher, there is a viewpoint higher than the main explicit meaning
of the topic of this wheel, and there is still another occasion which is the
domain of the definitive meaning. If the mere explicit meaning of this
493

thegs [52.5] read theg [DT 56.6].

278
[wheel] is held to be the consummate viewpoint, there would have to be
something that one needs to be directed to other than that, the reality of
the definitive meaning. Therefore, [the first wheel] is a subject of dispute
by the sequence of inferior and superior vehicles; hence, it is not the
consummate viewpoint.
The disciples for which the turning of the middle wheel concerns
are those of the Mahyna, of the mediocre-type, who engage the
appearances of constructed signs as real entities when analyzing the
character

of

phenomena.

Therefore,

in

order

to

purge

their

conceptualities which reify signs, he mainly taught, by merely eliminating

the object of negation, an extensive presentation of emptiness free from
constructs according to [their] constituents and faculties. Consequently,
compared with the more grand consummate viewpoint which is the
definitive meaning of the Great Middle Way, the viewpoint of the main
explicit meaning of what is taught in this wheel is surpassed, [and affords]
an occasion [of refutation]. Furthermore, this is a provisional meaning and
a domain which is a subject of dispute; hence, it is not the consummate
viewpoint.
[55] The disciples for which the turning of the last wheel concerns
are those of the Mahyna, of extremely sharp faculties, who, through
their greatly distinctive power of mind, are the type that can splendidly
engage in the abiding reality of the Great Middle Waythe unity of the
emptiness of signs and the non-emptiness of natural realityin the
manner of the essential point of the definitive meaning: the expanse free
from all constructs of relative [phenomena], the totality of ultimate aspects,
the greatly wondrous array of habitat and inhabitants, teacher and retinue
which are the self-appearance of luminous clarity and the perpetually
unceasing expansive appearance of wisdom completely encompassing
the parameters of thoroughly impartial space. Therefore, the supreme
teacher indicated to the disciples of this occasion in the way of this
tradition, the Causal Perfection Vehicle according to [the disciples]
constituents and faculties, the profound and secret essential point of the

279
consummate definitive meaning, just the way it is. For this reason, on the
side of stra, there is nothing more consummate than this; hence, the
topic of this last wheel is the consummate viewpoint, not surpassed nor
[affording] an occasion [of refutation], the definitive meaning not subject to
dispute.

That
2. Establishing the Reason for T
hat Being the Way It Is [55.5]
In general, the three vehicles are not definitely posited through
temporality, [based on] being earlier, in the middle, or later; because,
without being limited to such an order, there exists an indeterminate [and]
varied sequence of stras of the three wheels, such as for instance:

Some stras of the first wheel that teach impermanence, etc., were
taught when the Victorious One was [56] on the verge of death
(parinirva)

Most of the chapters of the Avatasakastra of the last wheel were

spoken before the turning of the wheel of the four truths, for instance,
at the vajra seat, immediately after the Buddhas enlightenment in the
abode of the ruler king of the gods (lhai rgyal po dbang bsgyur gyi

gnas)

The Nirvastra (mdo sde myang das) [a first wheel stra494] was
taught at the time when [the Buddha] was on the verge of death
(parinirva)

Therefore, here the three wheels are excellently posited through the levels
of meanings of the topics. The first Word teaches the status of the four
truths principally [in the manner of] the selflessness of persons; the middle
Word extensively teaches mainly the freedom from constructs which is all
relative phenomenas emptiness of true existence, the selflessness of
phenomena, as well as the vast activities of the Mahyna; the last Word

494

The Nirvastra, a first wheel stra, is not to be confused with the [Mahpari-]

nirvastra, a last wheel stra with the same name.

280
clearly teaches the difference between the true and false, having
excellently distinguished as separate:

The manner of relative phenomena that are empty of their own

essences

The manner of the ultimate ground-expanse which is the totality of all

[ultimate] aspectsbecause of being true in the abiding reality of that
basic nature, not empty of its own essence nor nothing at allexisting
primordially unchanging, while certainly never at any time tainted by
the signs which are the constructed masses of other relative
[phenomena]

This manner of positing the meaning of the three wheels of doctrine,

based on the fact of there being a different series of topics by way of those
teachings, is the unsurpassed excellent tradition because it is done in
accord with the Victorious Ones viewpoint as he himself explains it.
[57] Some people think this: The first Word teaches all phenomena
as self-instituting (tshugs thub pa) and the middle [Word] teaches all
phenomena as not truly existent; therefore, according to the first, not only
the ground-expanse, but all phenomena are truly established and
according to the middle [Word], all phenomena comprising the two truths
including the ground-expanse are just not true.

Hence, even the

statements in the last [Word] that teach the manner of the lack of true
existence of the relative and the true existence of the ultimate directly
contradict both the first and middle Words.
I will explain this: in the first Word, as explained earlier, due to the
faculties495 of the disciples, relative [phenomena], considered merely in
the way they appear, are taught in the manner of [their] existing as true
entities.

Other than that, the actual reality of phenomena remains as

taught in the last wheel; consequently, even though it was not the
appropriate time to teach that actual reality, in order to progressively guide
them, initially he taught merely the mode of doctrine which just fits in the

495

dbar [57.3] read dbang [DT 62.5].

281
minds of these disciples. However, the consummate meaning, the mode
of the ascertainment of only the Middle Way relinquishing the two
extremesthat if one does not progressively realize the abiding reality of
the Middle Way of the categorized (rnam grangs) and uncategorized
(rnam grangs ma yin pa) free from the ordinary and extraordinary
extremes of eternalism and annihilationism, then one will not be freed from
the coarse and subtle sasrais in fact taught, in accord with the
position of the sublime Ngrjuna, in the Stra of the Instructions to

Ktyyana (ka tya ya na la gdams pai mdo):

Ktyyana, [in] this world, because of grasping to existence and
non-existence, one will not be completely free from birth, old age,
sickness, death, sorrow, lamentation, suffering and unhappiness
and distress. One will not be liberated from the five migrations of
sasra...
[58] Therefore, the consummate viewpoint of the first wheel is not suitable
to be anything other than the totality endowed with [ultimate] aspects, the
expanse free from constructs which itself is the viewpoint of the middle
and last [Word].

Also, it is said that everything exists in the explicit

teachings; however, it is taught in that way with respect to mere relative

appearances out of necessity, but as for the actual reality, it does not
contradict the viewpoint of the last [Word]. Also, in the middle Word, it is
stated that everything does not existtrue entities are negated with
regard to all phenomena comprising the relative; however, there is also
the fact that the ultimate ground-expanse itself, true as the natural state
(gshis lugs), is not negated in the Chapter of the Request of Maitreya
(byams zhus kyi leu):
The Blessed One spoke to the bodhisattva Maitreya, Maitreya,
completely imagined forms should be viewed as insubstantial.
Imagined forms should be viewed as substantially existent since
conceptuality is substantially existent, not because they exist under
their own power. Suchness form (chos nyid kyi gzugs) should be
viewed as neither insubstantial nor substantially existent, but as
distinguished by ultimacy...

282
The three natures (mtshan nyid gsum) are delineated variously earlier and
later [in the Maitreya Chapter]. [59] It excellently delineates the imagined
natures (kun btags) of form and so forth as insubstantial, conceptual
imputations; the dependent natures (gzhan dbang) as efficacious
[phenomena] which are the mere appearances of the relative; and the
abiding reality of suchness which is the thoroughly established nature
(yongs grub) as the reality of the definitive meaning of the ultimate, free
from all the constructs of the relative. Consequently, that very truth of the
ground-expanse, without being refuted, is established. Therefore, even
though the main topic extensively teaches all relative phenomena to lack
true existence, being free from constructs from the mere perspective496 of
the disciples on that occasion, this middle Word also definitely contains
the consummate viewpointthe empty-ground of the abiding reality, in the
manner of being endowed with all [ultimate] aspects, not merely a
voidness that is an existential negation that negates true existence.
Nevertheless, apart from the middle wheels merely being taught from the
aspect of a freedom from constructs out of necessity, the actual viewpoint
in fact is not distinct from the viewpoint of the last [wheel]; hence, even the
viewpoints of the middle and last [wheels] do not contradict. For these
reasons, it is not our tradition that the topic of the first wheel is only true
establishment and the topic of the middle [wheel] is only a lack of true
existence; consequently, there is no fault of contradiction between the first
and middle [wheels] and this [last wheel].
Also, other people claim as follows: Since the disciples of the first
Word are exclusively Hnaynists, the disciples of the middle Word are
exclusively Mahynists, and the disciples of the last Word are of a variety
of vehicles, the middle teaching is the definitive meaning and the first and
last teachings are provisional meanings. Therefore, it is not reasonable
that the last wheel is the definitive meaning.

496

ngod [59.3] read ngor [DT 65.1].

283
[60] Regarding this, generally there are many ways the provisional
and definitive meanings are set forth due to philosophies, but our tradition
is as follows. In the Akayamatinirdeastra:497
Those stras that teach the establishment of the relative are called
the provisional meaning. Those stras that teach the
establishment of the ultimate are called the definitive meaning.
As is said, that which teaches the relative truth as a support for the path
that leads to the supreme reality is the provisional meaning, and that
which teaches the reality of the ultimate truth is called the definitive
meaning. Although that is said in general, in particular, in the

Nirvastra (myang das):

That which expresses the Tathgata is impermanent, mutable, and
changing, is the meaning which guides. That which expresses
the Tathgata is permanent, immutable, and unchanging, is called
the definitive meaning.
The ultimate Tathgata, that permanent mode of the indivisible ground
and fruition just as it is, is said to be the definitive meaning, and those
impermanent and changing phenomena other than that are said to be
provisional meanings. Accordingly, the ultimate Buddha of the groundexpanse endowed with all [ultimate] aspects is the definitive meaning, and
all the other ephemeral appearances of the relative are provisional
meanings. Therefore, as for the topics in accord with that:

The mode of the relative is taken as what is principally the topic of the
first [wheel]

The mode of the categorized ultimate is taken as what is principally the

topic of the middle [wheel]

The consummate uncategorized definitive meaning is taken as what is

clearly, principally the topic of the last [wheel]

497

blo gros mi bzad [bzad read zad] pa bstan pai mdo. P.842, vol. 34.

284
[61] Hence, the stras of provisional and definitive meaning are posited in
that way in consideration of the topic in the sequence of the three wheels
in general, from the aspect of taking the provisional meaning, the
temporary definitive meaning, and the consummate definitive meaning as
what is principally the topic.

However, it is not appropriate for the

consummate meaning of the topic to be the provisional meaning, nor is it

good pedagogy that after a disciple has been instructed in the definitive
meaning, to again be instructed in a provisional meaning. Therefore, the
manner of taking the first and last [wheels] as provisional meanings and
the middle [wheel] as the definitive meaning is not asserted in our498
tradition. Moreover, in the Lakvatrastra:
If it were conceptualized as a self, it would not be proper. Thus, I
do not teach this to immature beings (byis pa).
It is said that if the ultimate expanse were taught to be true to those whose
minds have not been trained by the middle wheel, there is a danger that
the view of a self will arise; therefore, they are not suitable recipients for
the mode of that teaching.

Hence, the profound, consummate topic

difficult to realize is established to be the teaching of only the last wheel.

Therefore, the statement in the Sadhinirmocanastra that the disciples
of the last wheel are those who fully engage in all of the vehicles
moreover should be understood as extremely mature bodhisattvas with
sharp faculties whose minds have been trained through engagment in all
the vehicles. In that way, even though the consummate viewpoint of the
three wheels, as explained before, comes down to just one, nevertheless,
the manner of what is principally taught in each [wheel] is distinct. [62]
Moreover, from a certain angle there is a manner of greater and lesser
[degrees of] accordance because (1) from a particular angle, there is great
accordance between the first and middle wheels and (2) there is a vast

498

dang [61.3] read rang [DT 67.5].

285
difference, without such great accordance, between the first and last
wheels. This follows because:
(1) There is great accordance [between the first and middle wheels] due to
such factors as:

both of the first two [wheels] do not teach appearances to be mind

nor mention the eight collections of consciousness

also, presentations of the five principles (chos lnga), three natures,

and so forth are not mentioned at all in the first [wheel], nor even in
the middle [wheel] did they appear extensively

such a teaching of the last wheel as the wisdom without duality of

subject and object was not explained in either of the two [other
wheels]

(2) However, there is a great difference [between the first and last wheels]
because in the last wheel:

appearances are taught to be mind

there

are

extensive

teachings

of

the

eight

collections

of

consciousness, five principles, and three natures

external objects as asserted by the Auditors are taught to be nonexistent

there are teachings of non-dual wisdom, not at all asserted by the

Auditors, as truly established, etc.

Through this fact as well, the first and last wheels can be known to be
discordant [with respect to being] provisional meanings.

Also, in

considering from a certain angle the topic in the three wheels, there is a
manner of positing the first and middle wheels as provisional meanings
and the last wheel as the definitive meaning because, from the aspect of
merely the topic:

the firstthe angle of the relative, the four [noble] truths

the middlethe angle of a mere emptiness which is included in the

relative

the lastthe angle of ultimate reality;

286
[63] The first and the second are asserted as provisional meanings and
the last as the definitive meaning.

However, there is no conflict in

meaning.
Moreover, some people claim as follows: The last wheel in general
and also the Sadhinirmocanastra in particular, other than being mere
Mind-Only Stras, are not reasonable to be Middle Way Stras for such
reasons as: (1) the [Buddha-]Nature Stras and so forth of the last Word
generally [teach] that the non-dual wisdom is truly established (bden grub)
and (2) the Sadhinirmocanastra delineates all phenomena by the three
natures.
Regarding this, it does not follow that the subject, the supreme
stras of the last Word, the [Buddha-]Nature Stras and so forth, become
the tradition of the Mind-Only Realists (dngos smra bai sems tsam pa)
through the mere teaching that generally the non-dual wisdom is truly
established because there is a great difference in the utterly dissimilar
ways of establishing as true (1) the truly established wisdom that is the
subject of the teaching of the last wheel and (2) the truly established
dependent and thoroughly established natures of the tradition of the MindOnly Realists. This is so because (1) the wisdom that is the subject of the
last teaching is truly established due to its being true in the abiding reality
of the basic nature (gshis)499 as the object of the sublime reflexive
awareness free from constructs; and (2) since the truly established
dependent and thoroughly established natures of the Mind-Only tradition
are posited from a philosophy which is not beyond the appearance factor
of consciousness, from the aspect of [their] observing signs as true
entities, which is an object of negation [in our tradition]there is a manner
of great difference, as will be explained below.
In particular, through the occurrence of an extensive presentation of
the three natures, the Sadhinirmocanastra [64] does not become the
tradition of the Mind-Only Realists because if it did:

499

gshes [63.5] read gshis [DT 70.4].

287

the Chapter of the Requests of Maitreya in the Prajpramit and

also the Five-Hundred Stanza Prajpramit extensively teach the
three natures

and thus even these two stras would have to be asserted as stras of
the Mind-Only Realists

Such is unreasonable. The first [point] is established because:

(1) the three natures are delineated in the Chapter of the Requests of
Maitreya by way of extensively stating:
Maitreya, it should be known that the bodhisattvas engaged in the
Perfection of Wisdom and abiding in the skill of completely
discerning phenomena, designate classifications of form through
three types. It should be known that the designated classifications
[encompass] from feeling, perception, formation, consciousness up
until the attributes of a Buddha: In this way, this is completely
imagined form, this is imagined form, this is suchness form.500 In
this way, this is completely imagined feeling, this is imagined
feeling, this is suchness feeling. In this way, this is completely
imagined perception, this is imagined perception, this is suchness
perception. In this way, this is completely imagined formation, this
is imagined formation, this is suchness formation. In this way, this
is completely imagined consciousness, this is imagined
consciousness, this is suchness consciousness[65] In this way,
this is a completely imagined Buddha attribute, this is an imagined
Buddha attribute, this is a suchness Buddha attribute
(2) the three natures are clearly taught in the Five-Hundred Stanza

Prajpramit through its extensively saying:501

Subhti, form is a non-existent entity, an inferior entity, and an
existent entitymental-consciousness [is a non-existent entity, an
inferior entity, and an existent entity]Since immature ordinary
beings, not knowing form as three types (leu), do not know the
authentic as it is, they grasp at form, establish it, and obscure
[reality]. Since through grasping at and establishing form they
These three are equivalent to the three natures: the imagined, dependent, and
thoroughly established natures.
501 Pacaatika, 243.3; see Edward Conze, Perfect Wisdom: the Short Prajaparamit

500

Texts (London: Luzac and Co. Ltd., 1973), 108.

288
obscure [reality], if by means of even the vehicle of the Auditors or
the vehicle of the Self-Realized Ones deliverance does not occur,
needless to mention [that Mahyna deliverance would occur] by
means of the Mahyna.
The second [pointthat asserting the Chapter of the Requests of Maitreya
in the Prajpramit and the Five-Hundred Stanza Prajpramit as
stras of the Mind-Only Realists is unreasonable] is established
because these two stras are great scriptural collections of the

Prajpramit, the scriptural tradition of the Middle Way which vastly

teaches profound emptiness.
Therefore, it follows that the subject, the collections of the last
wheel of the Word, are the extraordinary, supreme definitive meaning
stras of the tradition of Great Middle Way because these scriptural
collections are unexcelled scriptures which signify well suchness, the
abiding reality that relinquishes the two extremes. In particular, it follows
that the subject, the Sadhinirmocanastra, is not a scripture of the MindOnly Realists because it teaches the abiding reality of the Middle Way.
This follows because this stra teaches the adventitious phenomena of
the relative to be non-arising, unceasing, and primordial peace; and the
empty-ground, which is the ultimate truth itself, to be supreme as naturally
nirva.
Moreover, the last Word is not Mind-Only scripture because the
Victorious One himself says that it transcends Mind-Only in the

Lakvatrastra:
In reliance on mind-only,
External objects will not be imagined.
In reliance on non-appearance,
Mind-only will be transcended.
In reliance on authentic observation,
Non-appearance will be transcended.
If a yogi remains in non-appearance,
The Mahyna will not be seen.

289
Therefore, also the foremost king of the three realms, the second
Victorious One, the great Jo-nang-pa himself, with this fact in mind spoke
these words:
If [67] it is said, Since the middle wheel is the Middle Way and the
last wheel Mind-Only, the middle wheel being the definitive
meaning and the last wheel the provisional meaning itself
invalidates [your position]. This is extremely unreasonable (1)
because there is neither scripture nor reasoning whatsoever that
the last wheel is Mind-Only scripture and (2) because that [last
wheel] teaches what is beyond Mind-Only, teaches the meaning of
the consummate Great Middle Way, and teaches in accord with the
meaning of the consummate Vajrayna.

Dhra
vararjaparipcch502
2. The Wheels of Doctrine Indicated in the Dhra
vararjaparip
[67.3]
This section has two parts: presenting scripture and establishing [the
reason for that being] the way it is.

1. Presenting Scripture [67.4]

Initially, the teacher himself, by means of the three wheels
according with the respective disciples of the occasion, elegantly turned
the three progressive wheels of doctrine for the sake of progressively
purifyingthrough practicing the meaning of the teaching expressed as
the mode of the doctrinethe gross and subtle defilements which obscure
the seeing of the Buddha-nature, the suchness that resides in their
respective

mental

continuums.

Furthermore,

from

the

Dhranvararjaparipcchstra:
Noble child, observe this: a person skilled in gemstones, for
instance, knowing well the manner of refining gems, takes a
thoroughly impure gemstone from the class of valuable gemstones,
and after leaving it in astringent salt water, [68] thoroughly washes
it with a haircloth to refine it. However, he does not cease his
502

gzugs [67.3] read gzungs [DT 74.6].

290
efforts with just this; after that, he leaves it in an astringent fluid
(zas kyi khu ba) and washes it with a woolen cloth to refine it.
However, he does not cease his efforts with just this; after that he
leaves it in a great medicinal serum and then washes it with a fine
cloth to refine it. Thoroughly refined and free from defilements, it is
called the great class of vairya (star-gem). Noble child, just so
a Tathgata as well, knowing the constituents of thoroughly impure
sentient beings, by means of the disquieting discourse of
impermanence, suffering, selflessness, and impurity, makes
sentient beings who delight in sasra give rise to disillusionment,
causing them to enter into the disciplinary doctrine of Sublime
Ones. However, a Tathgata does not cease his efforts by just
this; after that, by means of the discourse of emptiness,
signlessness, and wishlessness, he causes them to realize the
manner of the Tathgatas. However, a Tathgata does not cease
his efforts by just this; after that, by means of the discourse on the
wheel of the irreversible doctrinethe discourse on the complete
lack of the three-fold conceptualization (khor gsum)he causes
those sentient beings who are the results of various natures to
enter the realm of the Tathgatas. Engaging and realizing the
Tathgata suchness, they are called the unexcelled place of
offering.503
As discussed previously, the wheels of doctrine [indicated] in the

Sadhinirmocanastra,

through

distinguishing

the

definitive

and

provisional meanings from the aspect of the meaning of the topic, mainly
teach in accordance with the needs of the disciples. Here is the elegant
teaching in this [Dhranvara-]stra illustrating, through the aspect of
partial concordance with the exemplified meaning, the method for
cleansing the defilements in three stages through the example of
cleansing the impurities of a jewel, upon having taken the defilements of
the mental continuum endowed with the [Buddha-]nature as defilements of
the essential nature. Regarding this system, for example, someone skilled
with gemstones brings out the natural luster of a gem through cleansing
well the threegross, subtle, and extremely subtledefilements of the

503

This quote can be found in the Tathgatamahkarunirdeastra (de bzhin gshegs

pai snying rje chen po nges par bstan pai mdo) P.814, vol. 32, p. 300, 176b.4-177a.3.

291
gem

in

progression

through

three

separate

methods,

thereby

accomplishing the benefit of whatever is desired. Similarly, the Victorious

One, skilled in the constituents of the disciples, purifies in stages the three
defilements of the mental continuums of the disciples which are the
adventitious defilements arising due to the power of beginningless
habituation to the defilementsin the mental continuum of the one to be
trainedobscuring the proper vision of the primordial Buddha. He
teaches:

the view of the transitory [collection] thoroughly imagining a self of

person and so forth, which are the gross defilements included within
the discards of the [path of] seeing

in general, the mere apprehension of an I or self and so forth, which

are the subtle defilements included within the discards of the [path of]
meditation up to the seven impure grounds

the subtle three-fold conceptualization and so forth, [70] which are the
extremely subtle defilements included within the discards on the [path
of] meditation of the three pure grounds.

He does this by means of excellently teaching the methods of thorough

purification, discerning the distinctive sections of the path of skillful means
in accord with the propensities (rgyud tshod) of the disciples, namely the
numerous types of paths which are mainly three:

the selflessness of persons

the selflessness of phenomenaa mere freedom from constructs

the luminously clear nature, the view of the unity of appearance and
emptiness.

Moreover:
(1) The first wheel clearly teaches the mode of impermanence, suffering,
selflessness, and so forth; the disciples of this occasion, by means of
practicing in such a way, relinquish the discards of the [path of] seeing.
Therefore, they are made to directly see the truth of the doctrine of the
Sublime Onesthey are made to enter the discipline.

292
(2) The middle wheel clearly teaches the mode504 of the three gates of
liberation and so forth; the disciples of this occasion, by means of
practicing in such a way, are made to authentically ascertain the
aspect of the empty property of reality. Therefore, the realization of the
mode of the Tathgatathe profound suchness free from constructs
is made more intense than before through relinquishing the
defilements which are the discards of the seven impure grounds.
(3) The last wheel excellently teaches the irreversible, the consummate
ground empty of the constructs of the relative, the luminously clear
Buddha-nature with all the ultimate aspects, distinguishing separately
the modes of (1) the non-existence of the adventitious constructs in the
basic nature505 [71] and (2) the primordial existence of the natural
reality. Therefore, the disciples of [this] occasion, the results of an
abundance of manners of realization (rtogs rigs) of all the vehicles, are
made to enter the ever-immutable, consummate suchness as the
reality of the basic naturethe realm of the Tathgatas empty of all the
aspects of the relative and certainly not empty of the nature of the
great treasury of the expansive attributes of the three mysteries of the
ultimate primordial Buddha.
In this way, since the defilements of the disciples are progressively
purified by the three wheels, the ground-expansethe Buddha-nature as
suchdue to temporarily being seen in different ways, is progressively
actualized: (1) initially seen as merely the abiding reality of common
truths, (2) then seen as the quality of emptiness, the nature free from
constructs, (3) then the mode of subsistence of the ultimate Buddhanature as it is; hence, according to the way it is (yin lugs), even though it is
nothing other than the sole ground-expanse itself, the different ways of
seeing arise as such due to the power of meditators on the path. This

504
505

tshal [70.4] read tshul [DT 78.5].

gshes [70.6] read gshis [DT 79.1].

293
manner can be known through Buddhas teaching by way of the example
of the jewel.

2. Establishing [the Reason for That Being] the Way It Is [71.6]

Since the nature of the abiding reality demonstrated by the three
wheels on this occasion is also elegantly taught by means of the later
[wheels] clarifying much more than the previous, [72] the supreme among
the three wheels is firmly established as the last Word which itself
distinguishes the ultimate. This is so because (1) the three-stage wheels,
by means of the mode of the abiding reality demonstrated being a more
profound meaning indicated in the latter [wheels] than that indicated in the
previous, are the scriptures of the lesser, middling, and greater scriptural
collections demonstrating the progressively more excellent meaning
indicated; (2) this being the case, it is necessarily that: the first [wheel]
teaching the mere common abiding reality is exceeded by the middle
[wheel] teaching the Middle Way which is the nature free from constructs;
and yet more supreme than that is the last [wheel] teaching clearly the
freedom from constructs from the aspect of [the endowment of] the totality
of [ultimate] aspects.
The disciples of this [teaching] as well, according to the

Sadhinirmocana, proceed by the manner of the transformation of their

mental continuumsa progression of the lowest, higher, and paramount
facultiesbecause the mental continuums of the disciples of the middle
occasion are more excellent than the mental continuums of the disciples
of the first occasion, and the mental continuums of the disciples of the
occasion of the last phase are even more excellent and mature than
those.
Regarding this, some people say: If the manner of purifying the
defilements of disciples by the wheel of doctrine of this [last] occasion is
as such, then it [absurdly] follows that whoever are the disciples of this
[last wheel] exclusively possess the indeterminate heritage (rigs) because:
[73] (1) whoever is a disciple of this [last wheel] necessarily progressively

294
engages in the three vehicles and (2) as such, lacking a determinate
heritage for a distinctive vehicle, they are exclusively those who
progressively engage with an indeterminate heritage.
Here in our tradition of the Middle Way of definitive meaning, we
assert that even if heritage is determinate for the distinctive temporary
vehicles (gnas skabs kyi theg pa), since there is not a single being who
does not possess the essential nature of Buddha (sangs rgyas kyi snying

po), in the endat the time when whoever of them connects with the
fortune of meditating on the Mahyna paththere is not anyone who
does not actualize unexcelled awakening.

Therefore, in our tradition,

since we do not accept the endowment of determinate heritage for three

distinctive consummate vehicles (mthar thug kyi theg), distinctive, mere
temporary heritages are necessary. Temporarily, due to the influence of
that heritage, disciples have various [heritages], for instance: there are
even disciples exclusively of the first wheel, merely disciples of the first
and second, and disciples of all three wheels; hence, it also does not
necessarily follow that whoever is a disciple of [the last wheel] is
exclusively indeterminate.

In the end, at the time of possessing the

fortune of the Mahyna, it is also suitable to progressively actualize the

meaning of the abiding reality according to the meanings indicated in the
three wheels.
Also, some people say: It is not reasonable that the continuums of
disciples are necessarily [74] purified progressively by the three wheels in
this way because unlike such a progression, the first [wheel] is intended
as [that of] the Auditors, the second as the Middle Way of Mahyna, and
the last as Mind-Only; therefore, the progression of purifying defilements
also is not consistent with such a sequence.
In the tradition of the Victorious One, regent [Maitreya] and his
followers, the progression of the intended meaning which is taught in the
wheels of doctrine is that excellent506 path itself which is uncorrupted as to

506

lags [74.3] read legs [83.1].

295
the sequence of the method for progressively actualizing the abiding
reality as it is. Since it is needless to say that after the abiding reality is
seen, the manner of the corrupt, crooked sequence of obscuring gibberish
could never be the way it is, what inconsistency507 from any angle (thad) is
there in that sequence as [mentioned] previously?

There certainly is

none.
Also, some people also say: The wheels of this [are as follows]:
through the first [wheel], the disciples enter the realization of the
selflessness of persons, thus becoming mature, they enter the path of
discipline508; through the middle [wheel], by means of entering the
realization of the selflessness of phenomena exceeding that [realization of
the first wheel], they are caused to be liberated; through the last [wheel]
they are caused to enter the gate of practice together with the vast path of
the characteristics of the relative exceeding that [of the middle wheel].
This bestowal of greater liberation is the intended meaning (dgongs don)
of this [last] wheel of doctrine.
In our tradition, in the way [explained] above, if the primordially [75]
residing Buddha-nature of the continuums of disciples is progressively
actualized like a jewel, in that way, there is no contradiction in whichever
way it is explained; but once one considers the Truth Body to be only a
new production of what did not previously exist, as soon as that tradition is
taken up it becomes adverse to our own tradition of the Middle Way of
definitive meaning. Therefore, the great lord Jo-nang-pa said:
Through practicing the meaning of the three wheels, one accords
with the purifying of the gross, subtle, and extremely subtle
defilements of the Buddha-nature which is like a wish-fulfilling
jewel. Moreover, the first wheel is also a preliminary for, and
follows in accord with, meditation on the profound definitive
meaning of the Mahyna; the second wheel also accords with the
practice of the exceptional meditative stabilization of resting in
equipoise on the profound meaning; the third wheelby
507
508

khrigs [74.4] read grig [DT 83.3].

gdul [74.4] read dul [DT 83.4].

296
distinguishing well what exists and what does not exist, and so forth
in the arising of exceptional meditative stabilizationpoints out
(ngo sprod pa) in accord with the profound Secret Mantra.
This is the mode of our tradition.
3. In Accord with That, the Way They are Indicated in the Nirv
Nirv
a[stra]
and so forth [75.5]
This section has three parts: presenting scripture, establishing through
reasoning that being the way it is, and an appended identification of the
scriptural collections of definitive meaning.

1. Presenting Scripture [75.6]

This section has two parts: presenting scripture from the Nirvastra and
presenting scripture from the Agulimlyastra.
1. Presenting Scripture from the Nirv
Nirv
astra [75.6]
[76] In general, there is no difference with respect to what is mainly
indicated by the last Wordsuchness, the ground-expanse, self-existing
wisdom, Buddha-nature, the totality of ultimate aspectstherefore, from
the aspect of making such a definitive meaning what is principally the
topic, being the consummate of all the scriptures of the Perfection Vehicle
among all the stra collections is the general mode. In particular, there is
also a mode in which this Mahparinirvastra, of the category of the last
Word, is the supreme consummate essence of all the scriptural collections
on the side of stra, from the [Mahparinirva-]stra itself:
From the twelve[-branched] stra collections, the [Mahyna] stra
collection emerged; from the [Mahyna] stra collection, the
extremely expansive collection (shin tu rgyas pai sde) emerged;
from the extremely expansive stra collection, the Prajpramit
emerged; from the Prajpramit, the Mahparinirva completely
emerged, like the butter-essence. Butter-essence is an example
for the nature of Buddha (sangs rgyas kyi rang gzhin), the nature
of Buddha is the Tathgata.

297
As is said, the supreme essence which emerged from the twelvebranched scriptures is the Mahyna Stras; and more essential yet is the
extremely expansive collection; from such Mahyna [Stras], the
supreme essencethe Prajpramit Stras [emerged]; [77] and yet
more consummately essential than these Prajpramit Stras, is said to
be this Mahparinirvastra itself which teaches the Buddha-nature of
definitive meaning, like the butter-essence. Moreover, this stra is said to
be the consummate of all scriptural collections because the teacher,
having finished teaching the meaning of the nine-branched scriptures,509
taught the definitive meaning of the consummate profound meaning,
calling it the tantra teaching the essential nature, here understood as a
stra:
Since the Tathgata had completed the [teaching] activity of the
meaning within the nine-branched scriptures, he taught the
permanent Buddha-nature from the culminant tantra of Buddhanature to the monks.
Therefore, culminant stras such as this are said to be consummate.
Moreover, from [the Mahparinirvastra] itself:
A510 is the culminant tantra; this stra collection teaches the
culmination of the culminant meaning of all the stra collections. I
taught the single letter or the single sphere (thig le) that was
previously unheard by all of the Auditors and Self-Realized Ones.
This great stra collection is supremely sacred because, for
example, in the way the beings of the Northern [Continent of]
Kurava (sgra mi snyan) are endowed with merit, those who listen to
this great stra collection are transcendentit should be known
that [78] they are bodhisattvas, great beings. Therefore, greater
is the meaning of culminant tantra.
Since the profound meaning of the viewpoint of the culminant stras is not
the domain of the Hnayna, it is said to be the mode of the unexcelled

509
510

pas da [77.3] read pai [DT 86.4].

This is the short vowel a in Sanskrit, the first letter of the Sanskrit alphabet.

298
most secret supreme meaning. Furthermore, [the Mahparinirvastra]
itself clearly states that the reason this is so is the elegant teaching of the
ultimate essential nature itself:
In that way, since that Mahparinirva[stra] teaches Buddhanature, it is boundless.
The manner in which this supreme stra is the supreme essence of all
stra collections is the realization of the audience retinue of great beings;
after the Buddha spoke the stra, the audience, in a respectful manner,
made a firm pledge to uphold, propagate, and act according to the stra.
It is as [the Mahparinirvastra] itself says:
Then, the bodhisattva Kyapa511 said this to the Blessed One:
Blessed One, as the Tathgatas taught, the Mahparinirvastra,
like the butter-essence, is supremeis paramount! For whoever
drinks it, the various illnesses also will be purified, it also becomes
a medicinal elixir! Having heard this, I think that [79] those who do
not listen to nor want this stra collection are extremely foolish, they
do not enact a virtuous mind. Blessed One, I will peel my skin to
use it as a foundation to write letters on, draw [my] blood to use it
as ink, extract [my] marrow to use it as water, and crack my bones
for a pen[I will] endure writing this stra collection of the
Mahparinirvastra! Having written it, [I will] also endure
reading, reciting, understanding, teaching, and expounding it
extensively to others.

2. Presenting Scriptur
Scripture
ture from
from the Agulimlyastra [79.3]
Agulimla, an emanation of the Tathgata, and the sublime Pra,
the son of Maitryathrough the manner of trying to settle whether the
consummate reality is either (1) selflessness, the meaning of the two initial
Words or (2) the ground-expanse of self-existing wisdom, the meaning of
the last Wordhold a dialogue, discussing by means of questions and
answers about this topic. In the end, the sublime Agulimla extensively

511

srong [78.5] read srung [DT 87.7].

299
explains the essential viewpoint (dgongs bcud) of the Sugatas and
[bodhisattva] children of the three timesthe mode of the definitive
meaning essential nature.

Seen here stated extensively in the

Agulimlyastra:
Then Agulimla [80] addressed Pra, the son of Maitrya:
That which every Buddha and Auditor never finds,
Having fully become Buddha, that doctrine (chos)
Will be taught to all living beings (srog chags).
What is the meaning of these words?
Pra replied:
The Buddhas and the Blessed Ones of the past, not finding
the element (dbyings) of a sentient being, a self, a soul, a
person, a human, a human being, even though they
searched all phenomena with extreme persistence, passed
away thinking,512 selflessness is the word of the Buddha.
Similarly applied, the Buddhas and Blessed Ones of the
present and future also do not find nor will find. Having
stated that it applies in the same way to all the Auditors and
Self-Realized Ones, in this way, the soul, the person, the
being, the human, the sentient being, the element of self are
taught not to exist; thus, selflessness is taught. In that way,
emptiness is taughtthe discourse of such a doctrine is
taught.
Agulimla again addressed Pra, the son of Maitrya, saying:
Alas! You noble Pra, acting the behavior of a bee, do not
know how to indicate the discourse of doctrine! Bees also
know how to produce a buzzing sound, you, stupid like a
bee, do not say anything! Pra, since you [81] do not know
the covert speech (ldem poi ngag) of the Tathgata, thinking
that selflessness is the doctrine is falling like a moth into the
flames of deluded doctrine. That which the Buddhas do not
find: the Buddhas and Blessed Ones of the past passed
away without finding in any sentient being a lack of Buddhanature. The Buddhas and Blessed Ones of the present also
do not find any sentient being lacking the element of self.
Buddhas and Blessed Ones of the future as well will not find
any sentient being lacking the element of sentient being.
Also, the Self-Realized Ones and the Auditors in the three

512

sta [80.3] read ste [DT 89.7].

300
times have not, do not, nor will find any sentient being
without Buddha-nature.
This is the meaning of that
513
verse.
The meaning of the scriptural words of Agulimla is as follows: in
response to a question to Pra, Pra explains the abiding reality
according to the explicit teaching of the first and middle Wordsthe
meaning of the two-fold selflessnessas the viewpoint of the Buddhas
and [bodhisattva] children. Agulimla extensively speaks of the abiding
reality of the explicit teaching of the last Word which exceeds thatthe
essential nature of the Victorious Ones, that very ground-expanse which is
all-pervasive, permanent, the perfection of the sacred self, the mode of the
consummate grand viewpoint of the Buddhas and [bodhisattva] children.
[82] Thereby, he elegantly establishes the intended meaning of the last
wheel as the consummate abiding reality.

2. Establishing through Reasoning That Being the Way It Is [82.1]

Generally, according to the spoken words of the Omniscient
Victorious One himself who has thoroughly actualized the consummate
abiding reality and thus possesses the unexcelled supreme knowledge in
which all delusion is exhausted, the last wheel Word in general, and the
supreme stra collection of the [Mahpari-]nirva itself in particular, from
the aspect of the meaning of the topic, is the essence of all the sections of
scripturethe unexcelled definitive meaning Word which teaches the
consummate abiding reality of phenomena. This is so because there is
the fact, for instance, that the glorious melody of the Victorious One
himself teaches that the scripture collection of the Mahparinirva is the
essence of all stra collections, like the butter-extractthe essential topic
[of all scriptures]and hence, through the impact of statements over and
over as to [this] culminant stra itself teaching the consummate abiding
reality of the definitive meaning endowed with limitless good qualities, by

513

P.879, vol. 34, p. 317, 157b.8-158b.3.

301
means of that fact itself the other similar stra collections of the last Word
can be understood to be definitive meaning stras.
Moreover, it follows that the subject, that stra which teaches the
definitive meaning, rare like an udumbra flower, excellently distinguishes
the differences of the three sequential wheels of the Word through its
manner of teaching because that stra, in excellently distinguishing the
manner of the profound abiding reality, certainly engenders a greatly
distinctive and glorious quality of causing those fortunate disciples who
are close to activating the power of the heritage of the supreme vehicle to
quickly reach the inner-expanse definitive meaning of the abiding reality
and actualize it as it is, by means of excellently gaining certainty,
extensively and in detail, as to the state of the intrinsic basic nature of the
suchness of all phenomenanot merely reduced to an existential
negation, emptiness that is nothing whatsoever, as the mere negation of
the constructs which are the objects of negation[but] in the manner of
the great self-existing wisdom which is the immutable essence of the
reality of the basic nature, the sole ground-expanse empty of all relative
constructs, the totality of [ultimate] aspects naturally luminous and clear,
thoroughly lucid like a vairya (star-gem) which itself innately exists
primordially.

That [reason] entails [excellently distinguishing the

differences of the three sequential wheels of the Word through its manner
of teaching] because:
(1) on the occasion of explaining the abiding reality in the manner of
suchness, the stra excellently distinguishes as separate the modes
of:

the categorized abiding reality, the lack of constructs which is a mere

existential negation and

the consummate abiding reality, the luminous clarity which is the

totality of [ultimate] aspects.

(2) Scriptures that clearly teach in stages this abiding reality itself are
certainly like the progression as was explained before according to the
way of the three-stage wheel of the Word.

302
Some people say: Isnt that Mahparinivastra [84] a stra of the MindOnly Realists own tradition?
It is not because:
(1) the abiding reality of the Mind-Only Realists own tradition does not
transcend the mere appearance factor of consciousness and
(2) the abiding reality that is explicitly taught by this stra is the selfexisting wisdom, the totality of [ultimate] aspects free from constructs,
which transcends consciousness.
Hence, there is no ground of likeness with the Mind-Only Realists own
traditions assertions.
If it is said, Well, isnt this stra renowned as a Mind-Only Stra?
Even though it is renowned as such a stra, aside from being
renowned as that through later proponents of Mind-Only merely taking the
viewpoint of the stra as their own tradition, actually that stra is
unmistakably certain to be a scriptural source of the definitive meaning
Great Middle Way.
If it is thought, According to this [Great Middle Way] tradition,
wouldnt there be no difference between the stra collections of both MindOnly and the Middle Way?
There is no difference between the stra collections of those two
because aside from the mere distinction between better and worse ways
of explaining the viewpoint of one stra, actually there are no stras to be
distinctly posited.

For example, although the Vaibhikas and the

Sautrntikas do not have different stra collections, [the difference] is

merely how they adopt a viewpoint (dgongs pa len lugs).
Again, someone may say, The words of Agulimla514 are not
suitable to be the source of the definitive meaning because he was a great
evil-doer.

514

Literally, the one with a garland of fingers.

303
It is not suitable515 to entertain doubts in this way [85] because the
sublime Agulimla was an emanation of the Buddha. Moreover, this is
because the Agulimlyastra itself says that to the south of this land,
beyond as many Buddha-fields as the grains of sand in sixty-two Ganges
rivers, in that pure realm called Adorned With All Precious Gems there
resided a Buddha called Sarvalokapriyadaranbhyudgatamahbhiyukta
and he emanated as Agulimla.
In that way, the purpose of these supreme stras is to elegantly
establish the last [Word] as the consummate definitive meaning by means
of the manner of the three wheels being progressively more excellently
supreme.

Moreover, in general, the teacher extensively taught the

manner of the selflessness of persons in the first Word in order to destroy

the view of a self of worldly people, causing [disciples] to enter the gate of
the doctrine; in the middle [wheel], to the disciples who were able to
comprehend the expanse of the selflessness of phenomena even more
free from constructs than that [selflessness of persons in the first wheel],
by teaching this type of emptiness he caused [the disciples] to strive in
training and endeavoring in that manner; from then, having seen the
degeneration of some fools with faulty views of emptiness, to turn them
away from wrong views in order to at some point guide them on the
authentic path after their faculties have progressively maturedand in
particular, since the time had also come to teach the consummate
definitive meaning to the mature disciples [86] with extremely sharp
faculties of the last [wheel] for the sake of that tradition accomplishing vast
benefithe elegantly distinguished the ultimate in the last Word.

The

Victorious One himself taught in the Mahbherstra:516

In order to destroy the self of worldly people, selflessness was
taught. If the demonstrated teaching was spoken otherwise, would
it not [merely have referred to] death? It is renowned that the
Buddha, the Blessed One, taught selflessness, evoking
515

rang [84.6] read rung [DT 95.4].

516

P.888, vol. 35, p. 91, 113a.6-113b.3.

304
astonishment and after that, one is caused to enter the teaching by
means of causes and hundreds of thousands of reasonings.
Through being caused to enter that way, at some point when faith
in the most high is born and enters, one is caused to train,
persevere, and strive in the doctrine of emptiness. Then after that,
seeing a view that wastes liberation, fools teach emptiness and
selflessness from among all the [Buddhas] teachings. The fools
who do not know the meaning of emptiness and selflessness will
degenerate.
And:
If the discourse of the Buddha-nature is not taught, since the
essential nature is denigrated, the discourse of the permanent
Buddha as such is rejected; therefore, due to that, the person will
not pass beyond sorrow.
[87] Regarding the manner endowed with this purpose excellently spoken
from the Buddhas own mouth, since there is no one in this world more
greatly learned than the Victorious One himself, and other than he himself,
there is no one who knows all phenomena without exception; wrongly
disturbing the viewpoint of the exceptional stra collections destroys the
manner of the Capable Ones doctrine (thub pai chos) and is therefore
inappropriate.

Who can have faculties superior to the Victorious One

himself? Since the source of the doctrines tradition comes to only the
Buddha, he should be held as the valid measure (tshad ma); thinking this,
in the words of the undefeated victorious regent [Maitreya]:
There is not a single person in this world more greatly learned than
the Victorious One.
Since there is no other who knows properly by means of
omniscience [everything] without exception and supreme
thusness,
Therefore, do not disturb whichever stra collections the Sage
himself set forth
Because [this] destroys the manner of the Capable One and also
causes harm to the sacred doctrine.
And in the words of the sublime Ngrjuna:

305
Regarding this meaning,
Who has faculties superior to the Victorious One?
And so forth.
Consequently, this last wheel of the Wordhaving elegantly
distinguished the way that the natural basic nature, the ultimate, exists
and is not empty, and the adventitious fabrication, the relative, does not
exist and is empty and so forth[88] teaches through the manner of
pointing out in accordance with the way it actually is. Since the indicated
meaning of the three wheels is as such, confidence is excellently brought
forth for the disciples of this occasion: the way things are in the
consummate abiding reality, not being reduced to the non-establishment
of everything or simply a mere emptiness that is a non-existence, is the
primordially residing ultimate suchness of luminous claritya predicative
negationwithin the ground of the emptiness of all relative constructs, an
existential negation; therefore, since the ultimate totality of aspects, the
lucid517 great wisdom completely free from constructs, is changeless in the
manner of inclusion (yongs gcod) within the ground of elimination through
the exclusion (rnam par bcad) of the relative, within that basic nature518
are the spontaneously present, primordial qualities, exceeding the number
of grains of sand on the Ganges, of the self-existing ultimate Buddha who
has never been stained by any negative fault. This is so, since it was said
intending that manner, in the words of the great lord Jo-nang-pa:
In that way, when there arises the meditative stabilization of the
unity of tranquility (zhi gnas) and special insight (lhag mthong)
through the engagement in the yoga of the Perfection of Wisdom,
there needs to be the pointing out of the way it is according to the
way things abide, teaching through distinguishing the existent and
the non-existent, the empty and not empty, etc. because everything
does not abide as non-existent and not established and so forth:
since within the ground of an existential negationnon-existence,
emptiness, and the grounds of those, [89] etc.there is a

517
518

twangs [88.3] read dwangs [DT 99.6].

gshes [88.3] read gshis [DT 99.7].

306
predicative negation; and since inclusion resides within the ground
of elimination by exclusion; and since within the ground that
naturally relinquishes all faults resides the spontaneously present
realization complete with all consummate qualities. Therefore, the
third wheel is called that endowed with excellent differentiation.

3. An Appended Identification of the Scriptural Collections of Definitive

Meaning [89.3]
Thus, appended to the explanation of the wheels of doctrine, a
concise summary, identifying through mainly roughly sketching the
scriptures from which arose the Great Middle Way of the definitive
meaning Causal Vehicle, set forth here according to what was said in the
words of the foremost lama, the gentle protector Kn-ga-nying-po. This
supreme mode of the Middle Way of other-emptiness is the consummate
viewpoint of all three wheels, yet the stra collections mainly relied upon
are: the Maitreya Chapter of the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza

Prajpramit,

the

Five-Hundred

Stanza

Prajpramit,

the

Sadhinirmocana, the Lakvatra, the Gaavyha (rgyan thug po), the

common and concordant explanations in the Avatasaka (phal po che),
the Tathgathagarbhastra, [90] some sections of the Mahratnakta
(dkon mchog btsegs pa) such as the rmldevsihandastra (dpal

phreng

seng

ge

sgras

zhus

pai

mdo)

and

so

forth,

the

Avikalpapraveadhra (rnam par mi rtog pa la jug pai gzungs), the

Suvaraprabh (gser od dam pa), the Dhranvararjaparipcch, the
Tathgataguajncintyaviayvatra (yon tan dang ye shes bsam gyis
mi khyab pa la jug pa), the Agulimlyastra, the Mahmegha (phags pa
sprin chen po), the Ratnamegha (phags pa dkon mchog sprin), the
Mahbherhrakaparivarta

(phags

pa

rnga

po

chei

leu),

the

Mahparinirva, the Praantavinicayasamdhistra (rab tu zhi ba rnam

nges kyi ting nge dzin gyi mdo), and so forth in addition to most of the
tantra collections which teach very clearly the extraordinary meaning are
relied upon.

307
The explicit teaching of the middle wheel for the most part mainly
applies to meditative equipoise (mnyam bzhag)being situated at the
time of resting in equanimity (mnyam par jog) on the profound expanse
without any reference, and the teachings by means of delineating objects
of knowledge are explained as other-emptiness according to how the
teacher himself explained in the Maitreya Chapter and the Five-Hundred

Stanza Prajpramit. There are mistaken assumptions that some stra

collections [91] such as the Ratnolka? (dkon mchog ta la la) 519 teach selfemptiness; however, while the Bodhisattvacrya and a plethora of stra
collections that mainly teach a presentation of the path and fruition are
connected with both [self-emptiness and other-emptiness], there are many
in accord with this tradition of the Middle Way in most of those remaining,
the Buddhabhmi (phags pa sangs rgyas kyi sa), the Dharmasagti
(chos yang dag par sdud pa), and so forth. As is said.

2. The Way that These Commentaries on Buddhas Viewpoint are

Supreme [91.3]
In general, that which is the supreme doctrine of the Middle Way of
definitive meaning, the profound essential point of the Victorious Ones
consummate viewpoint, is the distinctive Ktayuga doctrine excluding the
three-fold debasements (gsum ldan mar bcad); moreover, there are two
Ktayuga in terms of time: the great four times and the lesser four times.
The great four times are posited based on the quality of the time of the
aeon: a quarter of the 4,320,000 years of that being made into four
segments (rkang ba) [1,080,000 years], when these four are totally
complete it is the Ktayuga; and similarly, the first, second, and third
segments are progressively posited as the Tretayuga, the Dvparayuga,
and the Kaliyuga. The four lesser times are posited by means of the
quality of the teaching; [92] a quarter of the span of 21,600 human years

519

I am not sure what text Khen-po Lo-dr-drak-pa is referring to here. The DT edition

has one less la [90.6, DT 102.6] after dkon mchog ta la.

308
[5,400 years] of that being made into the length of the respective four
times: flawless, complete with good qualities is the Ktayuga doctrine;
similarly, the degeneration of a quarter is the former Tretayuga, the
degeneration of nearly half is the latter Tretayuga, the remainder of the
degeneration of three-quarters is the Dvparayuga, and when there does
not exist even a quarter it is posited as the Kaliyuga.
Therefore, the teaching, as if undiluted, on the occasion when the
Buddha was residing, if treated in terms of the context of the flawless
teaching, in general is the Ktayuga doctrine of such an occasion, and
from among the [teachings] as well, there is a reason for calling the stra
collections of the last Word the Ktayuga doctrine because they are called
such since the ultimate abiding reality of the expanse of phenomena is
thoroughly and completely taught.

Compared with that, the other

scriptural collections, from the aspect of teaching a little bit variously,

without teaching thoroughly and completely the factor of the expanse of
phenomena, could be posited as Tretayuga and so forth; however, the
actual three-fold debasements came laterthe scriptural traditions
explaining everything to be exclusively self-empty which are unable to
reach the consummate viewpoint of the Victorious One.
I have previously addressed solely stras in the progression of the
Word which is the supreme [93] excellent teaching of the Ktayuga
doctrine transcending such three-fold debasements. Also, the progression
of stras, composed by many great masters and accomplished beings,
provide commentary on the viewpoint of the definitive meaning stra
collections. There are extremely many exceptional commentaries on the
Buddhas viewpoint variously present or absent from the Tibetan region
the works of the regent Maitreya:

the Abhisamaylakra, a commentary of Buddhas viewpoint of the

middle wheel of the Word

the Mahyanstralkra, a commentary of Buddhas viewpoint of

the Mahyna Stra collections in general

309

the

Dharmadharmatvibhga

and

the

Madhyntavibhga,

commentaries of the Buddhas viewpoint of the Mahyna in general,

principally [explaining] the viewpoint of the last Word

the Uttaratantra, a commentary of Buddhas viewpoint of the distinctive

last Word.

Maitreyas five, exceptionally supreme vehicle commentaries on Buddhas

viewpoint, first opening the way of the chariot tradition of the definitive
meaning Middle Way, are the consummate stras that are the doctrinal
source of the Great Middle Way; and the commentaries on the viewpoint
of the Doctrines of Maitreya composed by the sublime Asaga, praised by
the scriptures as supreme in distinguishing the definitive and provisional
stra collections by the Victorious One himself, who having met the
supreme regent and obtained well the instructions of those profound
doctrines, excellently opened the way in this world for the chariot tradition
of the Great Middle Way, the supreme Ktayuga doctrine; and the
commentaries on the viewpoint composed by Vasubandhu, the [half-]
brother of the great master; and the followers of these two, [94]
progressively, masters Sthiramati, Dinga, Dharmakrti, and later arrivals,
the honorable Ratnkaranti, as well as Vintadeva, Guaprabha,
Candragomin, Llvajra, nandagarbha, Buddhajna, Buddhaguhya, the
sovereign Maitrpda, and so forth.
In general, the scriptural traditions of the Doctrines of Maitreya,
Asaga, and his [half-]brother [Vasubandhu] teach through integrating the
consummate viewpoint of all three wheels, and also in accord with these,
the sublime Ngrjuna who came before them, in the Madhyamakakrik
[15.7]:
The Blessed One,
Knowing entities and non-entities,
Refuted existence and non-existence
In the Instructions to Ktyyana
He establishes that the first wheel also teaches the Middle Way free from
the two extremes.

Also, since he states, Nirva, being the sole

310
truth,520 the consummate viewpoint of the middle wheel as well is
excellently taught as the definitive meaning Middle Way of otheremptiness.

This sublime master himself in the commentaries on the

viewpoint of the last Word, [95] the Collection of Praises: the

Dharmadhtustotra, Paramrthastotra, Nirpamastotra, Lokttastotra,

and so forth; and also through some scriptures of Mantra, indisputably
explains well, certainly in accord with the viewpoint of the profound
essential point of the supreme Ktayuga doctrine as well as the Doctrines
of Maitreya and their followers.

Due to this, among the gathering of

disciples of this master, such as master Lu-p (klu bos),521 many came
who were great developers of the tradition of the definitive meaning
essential nature. From them, the followers of that lineage as well, by
means of upholding and developing the Ktayuga doctrine, the viewpoint
of the last wheel, there were many who contributed various short works
(gsungs zur) that engage the definitive meaning Great Middle Waythe
consummate viewpoint.
In that way, in the Noble Land [of India], while the viewpoints of the
two chariots, Ngrjuna and Asaga, are not conflicting, there were many
followers of these two also, who in certain respects were greatly in accord
with the definitive meaning Middle Way; and in the time before master
Buddhaplita came, there was nothing other than the manner of the single
Great Middle Way, the viewpoint of both Ngrjuna and Asaga.
If it is thought, Then what is to be identified as the stras of the
Realist Mind-Only tradition?
Previously, before Ngrjuna came, [96] and after the five-hundred
Yogcra masters who were proponents of the Mahyna, such as the
great venerable Apitarka, it is reasonable that some from among them
produced some scattered stras of the Realist Mind-Only tradition;
however, like the stras of the eighteen sects, they were not translated
In Yuktiaik (rigs pa drug cu pa), v.35; D.3825, vol. 68, 21b.5; see also Christian
Lindtner, Master of Wisdom (Berkeley: Dharma Publishing, 1997/1986), 84.
520

521

I am not sure who Khen-po Lo-dr-drak-pa is referring to here.

311
into Tibetan. Later, Asaga and his [half-]brother [Vasubandhu] came,
and although these two together with their followers were not at all MindOnly Realists, they were merely renowned as such later, after
Buddhaplita and so forth came.
Although here in the land of snow, among these there were many
upholders of the way of our tradition of the Ktayoga doctrine of the regent
[Maitreya] and his followers, the greatly exceptional one who opened the
way of the chariot tradition is the foremost, second Victorious One, the
ruler of the authentic and profound wheel of doctrine in the three realms,
endowed with the heritage (rigs ldan), the great emanation body (sprul

sku), omniscient Jo-nang-pathe sole, unsurpassed supreme guide of

the definitive meaning, the one with the four reliances,522 whose
supreme deeds are certainly meaningful; and the thoroughly perfect
sovereign of the definitive meaning teaching of this supreme guide and
lord of doctrine, the foremost Drl-wey-gn-po (sgrol bai mgon po,
Trantha), the bearer of the treasury of the profound great secret.
Concerning the elegant opening of the way of the supreme Ktayuga
doctrinethe excellent tradition of the essential naturein the cool land
[of Tibet], [97] these two, who are the peerless lords of the definitive
meaning teaching, explained the suchness of the profound abiding reality
in accord with the viewpoint of the Victorious One, the regent [Maitreya],
and their followers.
This expression follows them as much as my mind can fathom,
through previous karma this fortune of the doctrinethe descent of the
divine flower523has befallen me at this time, as such here it is. This
completes the brief progression of the wheels of doctrine.
Since the Victorious One himself explained his own viewpoint
The dew[-like] nectar of the viewpoint of the All-Seeing Guide
An epithet for Dol-po-pa. The four reliances are: reliance on the doctrine, not
individuals; reliance on the meaning, not words; reliance on the definitive meaning, not
provisional meanings; reliance on wisdom, not consciousness.

522

523

This is in reference to throwing a flower into the maala during initiation.

312
In

the manner of the miraculous last wheel excellently

distinguishing [the ultimate]
It is reasonable that there is no one more learned on this subject.
A stanza of the interlude. [97.4]

313

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