Executive Summary
A.
B.
C.
proven guilty. Those treaties include the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (Article 9 of which protects the right to liberty and Article 14
the right to a fair trial) and the American Convention on Human Rights
(Articles 7 and 8 of which protect the right to liberty and a fair trial
respectively) and those constitutions include the Constitution of Brazil 1988
which, through Article 5, incorporates those treaty obligations (see
paragraphs 8 and 27-29).
D.
That is not to say that pre-trial detention should not be permitted if strictly
necessary in exceptional circumstances. But those circumstances must (a) be
strictly based on legitimate aims related to the administration of justice or the
prevention of crime or disorder and (b) be exercised in a manner that is
properly evidenced, referable to the individuals particular position,
proportionate and fair. These principles are reflected in the jurisprudence of
the UN Committee on Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission
and Court of Human Rights (see, for example, paragraphs 30-38 and 50), as
well the comparative jurisprudence on the ancient writ of habeas corpus and
the more modern right to bail (see paragraphs 10-26). We also draw on the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, the value of which
stems in part from its propounding of common principles that must apply to a
variety of different legal systems, including the English common law system
and the French civil law system (see, for example, paragraphs 38, 54, 57, 64
and 74).
E.
If the allegations brought to our attention are well-founded then we are of the
view that serious issues relating to the use of pre-trial detention, the right to
silence and the presumption of innocence are raised in relation to individuals
who are the subject of detention in the Car Wash investigation. These include:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
F.
There would also, in these circumstances, be very real concerns that there had
been a failure to have adequate regard to the fundamental and historic
significance of the right to personal liberty, and to the expeditious and
effective nature of the remedy represented by the writ of habeas corpus. We are
also of the view that the same circumstances would indicate a failure to
respect Brazils international obligations as owed under, in particular, the
American Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights as well as obligations owed under what we would
anticipate to be a proper application of the Constitution of Brazil 1988.
G.
A.
Introduction
1.
The authors of this advice are experts in international and comparative law
and have particular experience of international human rights law,
comparative constitutional law and rule of law issues more broadly. Copies
of their curriculum vitae are attached hereto as Annex 1.
2.
(a)
(b)
(c)
3.
The immediate context of this advice is the Lava Jato or Car Wash
corruption investigation currently underway in Brazil. The authors of this
report wish to emphasise that they do not purport to express any concluded
views as to the lawfulness of conduct in individual cases related to this
investigation, and they do not presume to comment definitively on the
correctness or otherwise of any individual court decisions. They have,
however, seen a range of press reporting in connection with the investigation
as well as a number of habeas corpus applications brought by detainees held in
the investigation and some recent judgments. They have also had the benefit
of discussions with a range of judges from all levels of the Brazilian court
system as well as senior lawyers during a visit to Brazil between 19th and 23rd
October 2015. If the reporting and the allegations made in the applications
are accurate then a number of serious concerns would be raised as regards
compliance with principles common to both international and comparative
law and, we would anticipate, a proper application of the Constitution of
Brazil 1988. Many of these concerns have most recently been echoed by Judge
Marco Aurelio Mello of the Supreme Federal Tribunal.1 The concerns include
the following:
(a)
(b)
(c)
4.
Each of these matters is addressed more fully below but we summarise our
views as follows:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
5.
In preparing this opinion we have had close regard to the relatively recent
report of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (the IACHR):
Report on the Use of Pre-trial detention in the Americas, 30 December 2013 (the
IACHR Report, attached hereto at Annex 2). We agree with the analysis of
international and constitutional principles set out in that Report, and with the
core conclusion of the Report that excessive use of pre-trial detention of the
kind which we understand has been complained of in the present context
breaches such principles and threatens the rule of law. Pre-trial detention
should only be used as a last resort where genuinely necessary to prevent
interference with the prosecution / investigation of a crime (through
destruction of evidence and the like) or where necessary to ensure an
accuseds attendance at trial.
6.
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Press Release, 5 December 2007.
Concluding Observations of the Committee Against Torture, Official Records of the General Assembly, FiftySixth Session, Supplement No. 44 (A/56/44), para 119(c).
3
September 2009.4 In our view the IACHR summarised the matter well when
it stated that the excessive use of pre-trial detention runs contrary to the very
essence of democratic rule of law and that the terms of Article 7.5 of the American
Convention on Human Rights establish as the sole legitimate grounds for pre-trial
detention, the risk of the accused attempting to escape justice or hindering the judicial
investigation . In addition, pursuant to the right to the presumption of innocence
and the exceptionality criterion, even when a possible legitimate justification exists,
the use of pre-trial detention must be considered and carried out in accordance with
the criteria of necessity, proportionality and reasonableness.5
7.
[States should] use pre-trial detention only when there are no other means to
ensure the appearance of the accused at trial or to prevent tampering with
evidence; interpret restrictively the circumstances in which pre-trial detention
can legally be ordered; review the laws and judicial practices to ensure that the
measure is used only in exceptional cases and for the shortest time possible;
implement other precautionary measures, such as bail, house arrests, or
electronic bracelets .. ensure that decisions ordering pre-trial detention are
4
International Bar Association (February 2010), One in Five: The Crisis in Brazils Prisons and Criminal Justice
System, p.7.
5 IACHR Report at p. 45, para. 106 and p. 61, para. 144.
10
taken after a substantive analysis of the case and not merely a formal review;
ensure that the conditions in which pre-trial detainees are held are in line with
international standards ..
8.
On the basis of allegations we have seen and if these are correct (as to which
we can presently express no final view) there would be (to put the matter at
its lowest) very real concerns that some or all of these UN mechanism
recommendations have been breached. It is perhaps worth emphasising the
force of the international treaty commitments set out in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the ICCPR) and the American
Convention on Human Rights (the ACHR) which both have supra-legal
status in Brazilian law as a result of their ratification and incorporation in the
context of Article 5 of the Brazilian Constitution.6
11
9.
See http://www.globalgoals.org/global-goals/peace-and-justice/
12
B.
10.
11.
Consistent with this high status of the liberty interest, the origins of the writ
of habeas corpus in England, and so more broadly the writ of habeas corpus as
now reflected in rights recognised around the world, may be found in Magna
Carta as long ago as 1215. Chapter 1 of Magna Carta states that all the
freedoms set out therein were given to all the free-men of our realm, for us and
our Heirs for ever, and Chapter 29 provides that no Freeman shall be taken, or
imprisoned, or be disseised [dispossessed] of his Freehold, or Liberties, or free
13
Customs, or be outlawed or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will We not pass
upon him nor condemn him but by lawful Judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the
Land.8 A Divisional Court of the Queens Bench Division in London has in
recent times endorsed the following statement as accurately reflecting its
present day significance in English law:
[Magna Carta] becomes and rightly becomes a sacred text, the nearest
approach to an irrepealable fundamental statute that England has ever
had.For in brief it means this, that the king is and shall be below the law.9
12.
Carta arts. 1 & 29, 1 Stat. at Large (Runnington rev. to Ruffhead ed., London, Charles Eyre et
al. 1786).
9 Frederick Pollock & Frederic W. Maitland, The History of English Law (2d ed., Cambridge, 1923) at
173, cited and quoted with approval by Lord Justice Laws in Regina (Bancoult) v. Secretary of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, [2001] Q.B. 1067, 1095 (Q.B.D. Admin. Ct.).
14
13.
So too Baroness Hale, Deputy President of the UK Supreme Court, has this
year in the year of the 800th anniversary of Magna Carta, described the
protection of liberties of the individual bestowed by Chapter 29 as one of the
three great pillars of modern constitutionalism, the others being the consent of
the people to taxation and other burdens and the rule of law.10
14.
10
Magna Carta: Did She Die in Vain? Speech by Baroness Hale, Grays Inn, 19 October 2015.
We have noted in this regard Articles 647 to 667 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and, in
particular, the emphasis on expedition evident from Articles 649, Article 656 and Article 660 of the
Code. We have also had regard to Article 312 of the Code and its provision that preventive arrest may
be ordered to maintain public order, economic order, for the convenience of a criminal investigation, or to
secure the enforceability of the criminal law, whenever there is evidence of a crime and sufficient indication of
who committed it.
11
15
15.
It appears that it was in the sixteenth century that the writ of habeas corpus first
began to be used as a means of testing the validity of executive committals. As
Sharpe and Farbey say in the leading textbook on the subject, The Law of
Habeas Corpus (3rd ed., OUP, 2011) at 6: By the time of Elizabeth [I], it was becoming clear that the claim to a power to commit for reasons of state could be tested
on habeas corpus. There are cases as early as 1567 in which habeas corpus was used
by persons detained by order of the Privy Council to obtain their release on bail.
16.
In 1640 the English Parliament then made its first express attempt to curtail
the power of executive detention. Section VIII of the Habeas Corpus Act of
1640, 16 Car. 1, c. 10, provided that any Person imprisoned by order of the
King or his Council should have habeas corpus and be brought before the court
without delay with the cause of imprisonment shown. The Act was passed
against the background of the first case of major constitutional importance to
address the question of habeas corpus, Darnels Case, 3 State Trials 1 (K.B.
1627).12
17.
In Darnels Case, the King, Charles I, had imprisoned five Knights as a result of their refusal to
contribute to the repayment of a forced loan he had taken out. The Knights sought their freedom by
issue of writs of habeas corpus and, in response, the King simply asserted (at 33) that they had been
detained per speciale mandatum domini regis. The issue in the case was whether the Court was
required to assume that there was substantive legal justification for the imprisonment or whether the
failure to disclose specific grounds entitled the prisoners to be bailed pending trial. The Court ruled in
favour of the King and refused to bail the Knights. The Habeas Corpus Act of 1640 in effect reversed
that decision.
12
16
circumvent the protection afforded by the writ. Prisoners were moved from
gaol to gaol so that it was impossible to serve the proper gaoler with the writ
and some prisoners were removed overseas so giving rise to practical
difficulties in terms of communication (between the detained person and
those acting on his behalf), service (on the relevant gaoler) and enforcement of
the writ (by production of the detained person) if the writ was issued.13 The
terms of the Act were designed to counter these stratagems. They also made it
clear that the territorial scope of the protection afforded by habeas corpus was
intended to be broad and removed any doubt that the Courts jurisdiction to
issue the writ extended to detentions overseas. The preamble to the Act
described it as An Act for the better securing the Liberty of the Subject, and for
Prevention of Imprisonment beyond the Seas. Section XI expressly declared that
the writ would run overseas by declaring that it may be directed and run to
Jersey and Guernsey.14 Section XII made it an offence to remove detained
persons to Scotland,15 Ireland, Jersey, Guernsey, Tangier or into Parts, Garrisons,
Twelve years earlier in 1667 one of the charges made against Edward Hyde, the First Earl of
Clarendon and Lord Chancellor, on his impeachment was that he had attempted to preclude access to
the writ of habeas corpus by sending persons to be imprisoned against law in remote islands, garrisons, and
other places, thereby to prevent them from the benefit of the law, (see Proceedings in Parliament against
Edward Earl of Clarendon, Lord High Chancellor of England, for High Treason, and other High
Crimes and Misdemeanours: 15 and 19 Charles II. A.D. 1663-1667 (1668) 6 State Trials 291 at 330,
396).
14 This was consistent with the fact that the Courts had already, or would very shortly, recognise that
the writ could run to the Channel Islands, Ireland and Calais: Rex v Salmon (KB 1669) 2 Keble 450 84
Eng Rep (re: the Channel Islands); Anonymous (KB 1681) 1 Ventris 357, 86 Eng Rep 230 (re: Ireland and
Calais).
15 The English High Court had never had jurisdiction to send the writ to Scotland because of the
formal distinction between the English and Scottish Crowns and the writs status as a prerogative
remedy of the English Crown. Holdsworths History of English Laws (Vol. IX 3ed. 1944) described the
practices which the Act sought to counter as including (at 116) in the last resort [removal of the prisoner]
out of the jurisdiction of the court. This may be taken to be a reference to removals to Scotland and
other such places and not as suggesting any wider limitation to the jurisdiction of the Court. Thus
Holdsworth states (at 124) that it was a well-established principle that though the writ could not issue into
the foreign dominions of a prince who succeeded to the throne of England, and therefore not into Scotland or
13
17
Islands or Places beyond the Seas which are or at any time hereafter shall be within or
without the Dominions of his Majesty. Section XII also went on to state that any
such imprisonments would be illegal and would give rise to an action for
false imprisonment.
18.
The Habeas Corpus Act of 1816, 56 Geo. 3, c. 100 was the next significant
development. It empowered the court to inquire into the truth of facts averred
in the return to the writ and, in cases of doubt as to their accuracy, to grant
the detained person bail16 and specified that non-obedience to the writ of
habeas corpus was a contempt of court.17
19.
Over the last four centuries English judges and lawyers have repeatedly
emphasized the importance of the writ of habeas corpus and its fundamental
purpose namely to provide a speedy and effective means to test the
Hanover, it could issue into any other part of the Kings dominions. Holdsworth summarises the effect of
the 1679 Act (at 118) as having made the writ of Habeas Corpus ad subjiciendum the most effective weapon
yet devised for the protection of the liberty of the subject and describes the success of the Act in effecting
its object as being illustrated by the desire of James II to get it repealed. He notes (at fn. 10) that in
October 1685 Barillon wrote to Louis XIV that James designed to obtain from the Parliament a repeal of
the Test and Habeas Corpus Acts, the first of which is the destruction of the Catholic Religion,and the other of
the royal authority.
16 Sections 3-4.
17 Section 2. Another Act passed in 1816 also owed its origins to the law of habeas corpus. It was
entitled An Act for the more effectually detaining in Custody Napoleon Buonapart, 56 Geo. 3, c. 22 (1816)
(Eng.), and was passed specifically to render lawful the continued detention of Bonaparte
notwithstanding the end of the Napoleonic wars by deeming him to be a Prisoner of War and so to
have no right to habeas corpus. See 1 Arnold Duncan, Lord McNair, International Law Opinions 10407
(1956), explaining the origins of the Act and how Admiral Lord Keith (the commander in chief of the
English Channel fleet) had been chased all day by a lawyer with a Habeas Corpus!. It is important to
note that it was not open to the Executive simply to declare Bonaparte to be a Prisoner of War and the
intervention of Parliament by specific legislative enactment was required. The 1862 Habeas Corpus
Act is also of significance and is referred to below.
18
lawfulness of any detention and thus to protect the liberty of the individual and the jurisdiction of the High Court in England to grant the writ has been
consistently recognized as extending to any part of the Kings dominions.
Blackstone described the writ thus (underlining added):
[T]he great and efficacious writ in all manner of illegal confinement, is that
of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum;This is a high prerogative writ,running
into all parts of the kings dominions: for the king is at all times intitled to
have an account, why the liberty of any of his subjects is restrained, wherever
that restraint may be inflicted.18
20.
The breadth of the remedy was re-affirmed in the House of Lords by the Earl
of Birkenhead in Secretary of State for Home Affairs v. OBrien, [1923] A.C. 603
(appeal taken from Eng.), when he said the following at 609 (underlining
added):
We are dealing with a writ antecedent to statute, and throwing its root deep
into the genius of our common law. The writ with which we are concerned today was more fully known as habeas corpus ad subjiciendumIt is perhaps
the most important writ known to the constitutional law of England, affording
as it does a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or
confinement. It is of immemorial antiquity, an instance of its use occurring in
18
19
the thirty-third year of Edward I. It has through the ages been jealously
maintained by Courts of Law as a check upon the illegal usurpation of power
by the Executive at the cost of the liege.
21.
In the same case, Lord Shaw, citing Cox v Hakes (1890) 15 App. Cas. 506,
stressed the importance of urgency in habeas corpus (underlining added):
My Lords, I think it right further to observe that urgency is written all over
the face of habeas corpus proceedings.
determination of the right to the applicants freedom and the avoidance of the
delay and uncertainty of ordinary litigation - these expressions are significant
of urgency as an essential quality to the proceedings.
22.
The House of Lords emphasis on the swiftness of the remedy of habeas corpus
and its fundamental constitutional importance as applied and operated in the
United Kingdom is also reflected in Sharpe (supra) in the following particular
passages of the text:
20
once the applicant raises a legitimate issue as to the legality of detention, the
onus shifts to the respondent to justify its lawfulness (p. 54, underlining
added).
It is habeas corpus that has made axiomatic, and that continues to promote,
the principle that cases raising issues of liberty ought to be speedily decided
. (p. 63 fn. 283, underlining added),
21
23.
Clarke and McCoys The Most Fundamental Legal Right: Habeas corpus in the
Commonwealth (supra) also provides a useful comparative survey of relevant
time periods applicable to the judicial review of detentions in the
Commonwealth (pp. 233, 235-236):
The usual rule in ordinary criminal cases is that the detainee must be
brought promptly before a judicial officer. The specified time for compliance is
24 hours in Kenya, Samoa19, Nauru20, Bangladesh21, Ghana22 and Lesotho23.
The relevant period is 48 hours in Antigua, Barbuda24 and Malta25. It is 72
hours in Belize26, Dominica27, and Saint Christopher and Nevis28. This right
is underpinned by constitutional imperatives, so that any technical approach
to the question of the venue of bail hearings is to be eschewed. Unexplained
and unjustified detentions for a longer period are likely to be breaches of
criminal procedure statutes and the Constitution and will result in release.
Thus the State cannot claim that because the case is serious the applicant
could be detained for long periods to facilitate the police investigation.29
22
24.
The same text rightly emphasises the fundamental importance of the right to
an effective legal remedy to review detention in the following terms:
The fundamentality of this right has been commended by the United Nations
Centre for Human Rights30 and endorsed by the European legal system. This
right as found in national instruments is normally a mandatory and
enforceable right that cannot, in the case of Constitutional provisions be
overridden by special legislation. While the remedy exists at common law, in
some States it is specifically prescribed in the Constitution or an equivalent
remedy is provided. . Partial reinforcement of this right lies in the
imperative that the court when seized of the matter shall deal with it
forthwith, though this does not necessarily mean disposed of on the same day
as the application is made or heard; that will depend on the evidence, the issues
and their complexity.31
25.
United Nations Centre for Human Rights, Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch,
Professional Training Series No. 3, Human Rights and Pre-Trial detention (New York and Geneva,
1994) at pp. 9, 40-41 referring to the right of review in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights 1966 (Article 9(4)), Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1949 Articles 3 and 9,
African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights 1981 Article 6, American Convention on Human
Rights 1969 Article 7, European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950,
Article 5(1).
31 See e.g. Constitution of Ireland Art. 40.4.2; State (Whelan) v Governor of Mountjoy Prison [1983] ILRM
52, 55.
30
23
26.
Aside from expedition, one other important matter reflected in this summary,
and already touched upon above, is the proper allocation of the burden of
proof. There is a long line of English authority consistent with international
and comparative law - emphasising that it is a fundamental doctrine of English
law that it is for the executive, once challenged, to satisfy a court that it is entitled to
deprive of his liberty an individual within the courts jurisdiction.33 This is
important because it underscores the fact that, because of the primacy of the
liberty interest, if there is a doubt as to whether the Executive has identified a
lawful basis for detention, then it is the detainee who is to have the benefit of
that doubt and release will be required.
Supra p. 19.
See Khawaja v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1984] AC 75 per Lord Scarman and Lord
Bridge.
32
33
24
C.
27.
So far as international and regional law norms are concerned it is notable that
as recently as December 2013 the IACHR published the IACHR Report, a
comprehensive document entitled Report on the Use of Pre-trial detention in the
Americas
which
can
be
found
at
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/pdl/reports/pdfs/Report-PD-2013-en.pdf. A
copy is attached hereto as Annex 2. We agree with the thorough legal analysis
of relevant international standards set out in that report and return to it in
some detail below. By way of introduction, however, it is important to
emphasise that Brazil is a signatory both to the ICCPR and the ACHR, and to
highlight some of the core conclusions reached by the IACHR. We
accordingly address both matters first.
(i)
28.
So far as United Nations treaty obligations are concerned Brazil ratified the
ICCPR in 1992 and the first and second Optional Protocols thereto in 2009 so
accepting the right of individual petition to the United Nations Human Rights
Committee (the UNHRC). She also ratified the United Nations Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman and Degrading Treatment (the
25
UNCAT) in 1989. At the regional level Brazil ratified and acceded to the
ACHR in 1992, and is subject to the jurisdiction of both the IACHR and the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (the IACtHR).
29.
The most material provisions of the ICCPR and the ACHR so far as the
present context is concerned are the following:
(a)
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall
be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived
of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such
procedure as are established by law.
2.
3.
to appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial proceedings, and,
should occasion arise, for execution of the judgement.
4.
5.
Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall
have an enforceable right to compensation.
Article 14
1.
All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the
determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and
obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and
public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal
established by law. The press and the public may be excluded from all
or part of a trial for reasons of morals, public order (ordre public) or
national security in a democratic society, or when the interest of the
private lives of the parties so requires, or to the extent strictly
necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where
publicity would prejudice the interests of justice; but any judgement
rendered in a criminal case or in a suit at law shall be made public
except where the interest of juvenile persons otherwise requires or the
27
3.
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
4.
In the case of juvenile persons, the procedure shall be such as will take
account of their age and the desirability of promoting their
rehabilitation.
5.
Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his conviction and
sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law.
6.
7.
(b)
2.
No one shall be deprived of his physical liberty except for the reasons
and under the conditions established beforehand by the constitution of
the State Party concerned or by a law established pursuant thereto.
3.
4.
5.
6.
30
7.
No one shall be detained for debt. This principle shall not limit the
orders of a competent judicial authority issued for nonfulfillment of
duties of support.
Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and
within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial
tribunal, previously established by law, in the substantiation of any
accusation of a criminal nature made against him or for the
determination of his rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or
any other nature.
2.
b.
c.
31
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
3.
4.
5.
32
(ii)
30.
We set out below some of the core conclusions and key passages from the
IACHR Report before turning to the specific, and limited, grounds upon
which pre-trial detention of the kind which has given rise to this advice can
be justified:
(a)
First the IACHR has identified the scale of the problem in this area
both in the Americas generally, and in Brazil specifically, stating:
(b)
Secondly the IACHR has, in our view rightly, identified the serious
adverse implications of excessive pre-trial detention for compliance
with international obligations and the very real issues of principle it
gives rise to, making the following findings:
33
(c)
31.
Against this background the IACHR has accurately summarised the overall
position of the UN treaty bodies in the following terms:
35
measures other than pre-trial detention; ensure that decisions ordering pretrial detention are taken after a substantive analysis of the case and not merely
a formal review; ensure that the conditions in which pre-trial detainees are
held are in line with international standards; ensure that detainees enjoy the
possibility to prepare their defence at trial, as well as the necessary conditions
to do so; and strengthen the operational capacities of the authorities
responsible for criminal investigations.37
(iii)
32.
We agree with the IACHR that this is perhaps the most basic of all the judicial
guarantees that pertain to criminal justice.38 We also agree that in practical
37
38
36
terms, upholding the right to the presumption of innocence first implies that, as a
general rule, the accused should remain at liberty during criminal proceedings and
that pre-trial detention must only be used as a truly exceptional measure.39 As
the Inter-American Court has ruled, the principle of the presumption of
innocence gives rise to the obligation of the State not to restrict the liberty of a
detained person beyond the limits strictly necessary to ensure that he will not evade
justice.40
Consistent with the historic and traditional approach adopted in habeas corpus
applications in the common law world, the IACHR and IACtHR have also
recognised that the burden rests on the State to justify the grounds for pretrial detention. As the IACHR Report states Respecting the right to the
presumption of innocence requires the State to establish the existence of the applicable
requirements for pre-trial detention, clearly and duly grounded, in each specific
case.41
37
42
38
It is of course the case that there can be legitimate grounds for pre-trial
detention but, as a matter of principle, and consistent with the fundamental
importance of the liberty interest already addressed above, these must fall to
be strictly construed in accordance with domestic and international standards.
As the IACHR Report points out, the IACtHR has consistently held that the
provisions of the ACHR give rise to the obligation not to restrict the liberty of a
detained person beyond the limits strictly necessary to ensure that he will not impede
the efficient development of an investigation and that he will not evade justice.44
37.
Importantly, the IACtHR has also emphasised that the personal characteristics
of the supposed author and the gravity of the offence he is charged with are not, in
themselves, sufficient justification for preventive detention.45
The potential
39
Invalid or inadequate grounds for pre-trial detention and references to risk of future
offending
38.
The converse of the limited and closed class of justifications for pre-trial
detention just addressed is that there will, or may, be examples of detaining
or judicial authorities invoking grounds for detention which cannot withstand
scrutiny when measured against a proper understanding of international and
constitutional standards. The IACHR Report gives some examples of such
flawed grounds as including (a) provisions which allow for pre-trial detention
to apply on a blanket basis to certain classes of offences,46 (b) reliance solely
on the potential sentence involved even where this was said, because of its
gravity, to give rise to a presumed flight risk,47 and (c) where it was said that
sufficient indications of guilt were present.48 Similar limitations and
principles are also recognised in other leading international Courts and, in
particular, in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.49
39.
In this regard we have also seen internet reporting in relation to the particular
context of the car wash investigation in which pre-trial detention decisions
have apparently been defended by the investigating judge as a way to
highlight the seriousness of crime and demonstrate the effectiveness of judicial action,
See the IACHR Report at p. 62, para. 148; Suarez Rosero v Ecuador, Judgment of November 12 1997,
Series C No. 35, para. 98.
47 See the IACHR Report at p. 62, para. 149 and p. 63, para. 152; Lopez Alvarez v Honduras, Judgment of
February 1 2006, Series C No. 141, para. 81.
48 See the IACHR Report at p. 62, para. 150.
49 See Idalov v Russia, Judgment of 22 May 2012 (Grand Chamber) at para. 145; Chiradi v Germany,
Judgment of 26 October 2006 at para. 40; Wemhoff v Germany, Judgment of June 27 1968 (Grand
Chamber) at para. 14.
46
40
40.
50
41
involvement of the contractor in the criminal acts of the cartel, bid rigging and the
corruption of public officials, that there is a risk of reoccurrence before noting the
necessity of preventative arrest of the executives involved to disrupt activities of the
cartel, fraud in bidding and payment of bribes to public officials. Terminology
such as this merely has to be set out for concerns as to a failure to respect the
presumption of innocence to be apparent.
41.
In this context we particularly note the reference in the 24 June 2015 decision
to converting the temporary detention of Alexandrino de Salles Ramos de
Alenar, an executive of Odebrecht SA, into preventative detention to the
alternative of suspending all Odebrecht contracts with state companies and
forbidding any new ones. This seems to us to focus on an entirely different
matter to that usually and properly considered under the rubric of alternative
measures in place of detention (e.g. house arrest, restrictions on movement,
restrictions on communications and meetings). Instead by assuming that
which has to be proved (namely the underlying allegation of wrongful
conduct in state contracts) the decision merely gives rise to further serious
concerns in relation to the adequacy of respect for the presumption of
innocence.
42
42.
Article 5(1)(c) of the ECHR allows for the arrest and pre-trial detention of a person in the following
terms: the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent
legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered
necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so.
52 See Jacobs, White & Ovey, The European Convention on Human Rights (6th ed., OUP, 2014) at p. 222.
See also e.g. Ostendorf v Germany, Judgment of 7 March 2013 at paras. 65-68.
53 Ibid.
54 Some leading commentators argue with some force that there is actually no real scope for this
aspect of Article 5(1)(c) to operate independently as conduct close to an attempt at criminal conduct
would be required and would be likely to constitute an offence in and of itself, (see e.g. Clayton &
Tomlinson, The Law of Human Rights (2 ed., OUP, 2009) at 10.193).
51
43
43.
The South African Constitutional Court has also emphasised that any attempt
to justify detention by reference to future conduct can only conceivably be
sustained if the detaining authorities are able to show not merely a
possibility or suspicion that such a risk would materialise but a likelihood
or probability that it will do so, and even then it would only be one of a range
of factors to be taken into account (see S v Dlamini 1999 (7) BCLR 771 (CC)).
44.
44
46.
47.
If remarks such as these have indeed been made then they would, in our
view, raise very serious issues as to the lawfulness of pre-trial detentions
motivated by such considerations. We are aware of no domestic or
See, for example, Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 Harv. L. Rev.
2463, 2491-93 (2004); Gerland E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 Fordham L.
Rev. 2117, 2146 (1998) and Malcolm M. Feeley, The Process is the Punishment: Handling Cases in a Lower
Criminal Court (1st ed., Russel Sage Foundation, 1992) at 236.
56 See Class Record Book November 29, 2014 The bird must be in a cage to sing; Objectified Bodies
December 2, 2014: We have to resist against the continued expansion of punitive power.
57 See Voluntary Act December 8, 2014: Imprisonment to pressure confession disfigures the plea bargain.
55
45
48.
49.
detention was to be used as a way of forcing the confession and that cooperation with the prosecution was, instead, merely a means of confirming
the appropriateness of a plea bargain agreement we are concerned that such a
distinction would be one without any material difference. If an individual
knows that by entry into a plea bargain agreement, and provision of selfincriminating information, he will not be subjected to pre-trial detention that
will, in practical terms, be very difficult to distinguish from a situation in
which an individual is told that unless he provides incriminating information
he will be the subject of pre-trial detention. This difficulty of distinction
strongly underscores the problematic nature of plea bargaining agreements
having any substantial role to play in determining pre-trial detention issues.
At most, entry into such an agreement could perhaps be relied on by a
detainee as a positive factor in his or her favour, but the failure to enter into
such an agreement, or to provide incriminating information, could, in our
view, never be a proper basis upon which to uphold pre-trial detention.
The IACHR and IACtHR in common with other bodies such as the
European Court - also apply concepts of necessity, proportionality and
reasonableness in assessing the lawfulness of measures which interfere with
fundamental rights. Commensurate with the importance of the liberty interest
47
it can be anticipated that this exercise will be a particularly rigorous one in the
present context.
51.
Again we have considered and agree with the core of the analysis in this
regard set out by the IACHR at paragraphs 158 to 172 and 221 to 243 of its
Report. We would particularly flag the following aspects of this analysis:
(a)
(b)
(c)
48
(d)
(e)
The IACHR has rightly identified a host of measures which will fall to
be considered by way of alternatives to detention and emphasised case
law mandating such consideration.61
See further in this regard Case of Barreto Leiva v Venezuela, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment
of November 17, 2009, para. 119.
59 See Melnikova v Russia, Judgment of January 30 2008 at paras. 83-84.
60 See Labita v Italy, Judgment of April 6 2000 (Grand Chamber) at para. 15.
61 See e.g. Jablonski v Poland, Judgment December 21 2000 at para. 84 and the IAHRC Report pp. 90-91
at paras. 224-233.
58
49
53.
The time spent in jail awaiting trial has a detrimental impact on the
individual. It often means loss of job; it disrupts family life; and it enforces
idleness. Most jails offer little or no recreational or rehabilitative programs.
The time spent in jail is simply dead time. Moreover, if a defendant is locked
up, he is hindered in his ability to gather evidence, contact witnesses, or
otherwise prepare his defense. Imposing those consequences on anyone who
has not yet been convicted is serious. It is especially unfortunate to impose
them on those persons who are ultimately found to be innocent. Finally, even
62
63
50
54.
Perhaps for these reasons, the ECtHR held in Assenov v Bulgaria, Application
No. 24760/94, Judgment of 28 October 1998 at paragraph 154 that the
persistence of reasonable suspicion that the person arrested has committed an offence
is a condition sine qua non for the validity of the continued detention, but, after a
certain lapse of time, it no longer suffices: the Court must then establish whether the
other grounds cited by the judicial authorities continue to justify the deprivation of
liberty.
55.
To this end, the decision of the 13th Federal District of Curitiba dated 24 July
2015, reviewing and maintaining its own previous decision to order the
preventative detention of Rogrio Santos de Arajo, Mrcio Fria da Silva,
Cesar Raomos Rocha, Alexandrino de Salles Ramos de Alenar and Marcelo
Bahia Odebrecht concerns us. As an attempt to re-take the original decisions
based on additional evidence at a time when we understand that they were
already the subject of appeals, its effect is potentially to reset the clock in
relation to the extant appeals, so as to thwart the objective of immediacy. We
are also, in particular, troubled by some of the language used in this decision
which, at least on an initial reading, appears to assume crimes to have been
51
56.
Bail
58.
In many countries these principles have been set out by the courts in the
context in which bail (release on the security of a monetary sum or imposition
of other conditions short of a deprivation of liberty) is granted to persons
detained and in advance of trial, and may be denied only in the interests of
justice.
59.
See the IACtHR Case of Yvon Neptune v Haiti, Judgment May 6 2008, Series C No. 180, para. 108;
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention Annual Report 24 December 2012 at para. 62; the IACtHR
Case of Chaparro Alvarez v Ecuador, Judgment of November 21 2007, Series C No. 170, para. 93.
65 See e.g. Aleksanyan v Russia, Judgment of December 22 2008, at para. 179.
64
53
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
60.
Such
54
61.
The South African Criminal Procedure Act then sets out the following factors
that must be taken into account in deciding whether to grant an accused bail:
(a)
the period for which the accused has already been in custody since his
or her arrest;
(b)
(c)
the reason for any delay in the disposal or conclusion of the trial and
any fault on the part of the accused with regard to such delay;
(d)
any financial loss which the accused may suffer owing to his or her
detention;
(e)
(f)
(g)
any other factor which in the opinion of the court should be taken into
account.
55
62.
When these criteria have been tested in courts, the general principle has been,
first, whether there was a rational connection between the persons
deprivation of liberty and some legitimate, or objectively determinable
purpose. Second, the courts ask whether the detention serves any just cause.
For example, the detention of all those owing civil debts was held by the
South African Constitutional Court to be lacking in just cause.67
63.
International practice also provides that the longer the person is detained
without trial, the more the courts will require in order for the detention to be
justified. As was said in a Zimbabwean case,
The amount of time which had elapsed has to be considered together with the
crucial factor of the lack of progress in the investigations in this case. The
Attorney General acts at his peril if he fails to put before the court specific facts
which show that the States case has been strengthened after a long time.68
64.
So too ECtHR jurisprudence rejects passive reliance on standard, preformulated reasons justifying detention, especially when the accused has been
held for an extended period of time.69
Coetzee v.Government of the Republic of South Africa and others v Commanding Officer Port Elizabeth
Prison , 1995 (4) SA 631 (CC).
68 S v Stouyannides 1992 (2) ZLR 126 (SC) at 127. See also S v Hitschmann 2007 (2) SACR 110 (ZH).
69 Bahmutskiy v Russia, Application No. 36932/02, Judgment of 25 June 2009.
67
56
65.
D.
66.
We should also emphasise in this context that we have had regard to Article
312 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This provides, in material part: that
preventive detention may be ordered to maintain public order, economic order,
for the convenience of a criminal investigation, or to secure the enforceability of the
criminal law, whenever there is evidence of a crime and sufficient indication of who
committed it. Although this wording is general in nature we would expect
it to be construed in a way that was consistent with the international
standards set out above. On this basis, it is important to stress that the term
convenient should be interpreted in its technical narrow sense, that is, it
70
See also Aleksander Smantser v Belarus, Communication No. 1178/2003, Decision 17 November 2008.
57
applies only when there is some demonstrable and specific risk of interference
with evidence, or of flight by the detainee, which could not be met by
alternative measures falling short of detention. Similarly detention could not
be said to be necessary to secure the enforceability of the criminal law unless
there were specific and concrete information as to the imminent commission
of a criminal offence. We can, in particular, see no basis upon which this
provision could be construed so as to permit pressure to be placed on a
detainee to provide incriminating information (whether in respect of himself
or others) without placing Brazil in breach of her international obligations.
67.
(a)
(b)
The judge or tribunal shall cause the order sought to pass immediately
(Article 649) and an officer that procrastinates in effecting its
58
68.
We also understand that the bail provisions in Articles 321-350 provide for
bail in relation to certain offences with and without the provision of bail
bonds. These too fall to be construed in line with the international standards
set out above.
69.
(a)
(b)
(c)
70.
71.
In the absence of any concrete justification for preventative detention and the
ability of alternative measures to achieve the purposes of protecting the
60
61
E.
72.
73.
62
74.
Leading cases in this area supportive of these propositions from the ECtHR
include Allenet de Ribemont v France, Judgment of 10 February 1995 (Series A
No. 308), Konstas v Greece, Judgment of 24 May 2001 and, most recently,
Abdulla Ali v United Kingdom (Application No 30971/12), Judgment of 30 June
2015. In this last case the ECtHR summarised the relevant principles in the
following terms:
87.
63
January 2000; Woch v. Poland (dec.), no. 27785/95, 30 March 2000; Priebke
v. Italy (dec.), no. 48799/99, 5 April 2001; and Beggs, cited above, 123).
88.
The Court has previously identified various matters that it considers relevant
to the assessment of the impact of adverse publicity on the fairness of the trial
or on respect for the presumption of innocence. Thus, it has made clear that
there is unlikely to be any arguable complaint under Article 6 where the
criminal charges are determined by professional judges, since their
professional training and experience allow them to disregard any external
influence (see, for example, Priebke, cited above; and G.C.P. v. Romania, no.
20899/03, 48, 20 December 2011).
90.
In some cases concerning adverse press publicity, the Court has looked at
whether the impugned publications were attributable to, or informed by, the
authorities (see, for example, Sutyagin v. Russia (dec.), no. 30024/02, 8 July
2008; and Beggs, cited above, 127). However, it is important to emphasise
that the fact that the authorities were the source of the prejudicial information
is relevant to the question of the impartiality of the tribunal only in so far as
the material might be viewed by readers as more authoritative in light of its
source. The question whether public officials have prejudged a defendants
guilt in a manner incompatible with the presumption of innocence is a
separate issue to be considered under Article 6 2, with the focal point being
the conduct of those public officials and not the impartiality of the tribunal
itself (see, for example, Allenet de Ribemont v. France, 10 February 1995,
64
39-41, Series A no. 308). Thus, while the authoritative nature of the published
material may require, for example, a greater lapse of time or most robust jury
directions, it is unlikely in itself to lead to the conclusion that a fair trial by an
impartial tribunal is no longer possible. In particular, allegations that any
disclosure of prejudicial material by the authorities was deliberate and was
intended to undermine the fairness of the trial are irrelevant to the assessment
of the impact of the disclosure on the impartiality of the trial court.
75.
The Privy Council has also opined relatively recently on this issue.
In
65
F.
Conclusion
76.
77.
78.
(a)
(b)
(c)
66
(a)
(b)
79.
If the allegations brought to our attention in the present context are wellfounded then we are of the view that serious issues relating to the lawfulness
of the use of pre-trial detention, the right to silence and the presumption of
innocence are raised. There would, furthermore, be very real concerns that
there had been a failure to have adequate regard to the fundamental and
historic significance of the right to personal liberty, and to the expeditious and
effective nature of the remedy represented by the writ of habeas corpus. We are
also of the view that the same circumstances would indicate a failure to
respect Brazils international obligations as owed under, in particular, the
ACHR and the ICCPR and would be difficult to reconcile with a proper
application of the Constitution of Brazil 1988 applied in accordance with such
instruments.
80.
67
68