263 U.S.

94
44 S.Ct. 42
68 L.Ed. 186

UNITED STATES
v.
SLAYMAKER.
No. 87.
Argued Oct. 18, 1923.
Decided Nov. 12, 1923.

Mr. Assistant Attorney General Lovett, for the United States.

Mr. George A. King, of Washington, D. C., for appellee.
Mr. Justice McKENNA delivered the opinion of the Court.

Slaymaker, upon his enrollment during the War with Germany, as an officer of
the Naval Reserve Force, was paid the sum of $150, as a gratuity for the
purchase of a uniform. He was subsequently commissioned as an officer of the
regular Navy and that sum was checked against his account and deducted from
his pay as such officer. This action is brought to recover that amount.

The Court of Claims gave judgment for Slaymaker, following the ruling, it said,
of Price v. United States, 55 Ct. Cl. 499. To review and reverse its action the
government (there is convenience in so designating the United States)
prosecutes this appeal.

The difference between it and the court, and the latter's decision turns upon an
act of Congress passed August 29, 1916, 39 Stat. 589 (Comp. St. 2900 1/2
a[21, 22]). The act provides that:

'Members of the Naval Reserve Force shall, upon first reporting for active
service for training during each period of enrollment, be credited with a
uniform gratuity of $50 for officers and $30 for mem.

'Upon reporting for active service in time of war or national emergency the

'Upon reporting for active service in time of war or national emergency the
uniform gratuity shall be $150 for officers and $60 for men: * * * Provided,
that should any member of the Naval Reserve Force sever his connection with
the service without compulsion on part of the government before the expiration
of his term of enrollment, the amount so credited shall be deducted from any
money that may be or may become due him.'

We are confronted at the outset with the word 'service' and its definition, in the
provision 'should any member of the Naval Reserve Force sever his connection
with the service.' (Italics ours.) The word 'service' is an ambiguous one. It has
many senses. In the first paragraph of the act of Congress it has a limited and
immediately understood meaning. It has manifestly a larger meaning in the
second paragraph, but how much larger is open to disputeis disputed in this
case. Does it mean the Naval Service in the most comprehensive sense of that
designation, or the branches or departments of that service, or more narrowly,
the functions in those branches or departments? We are inclined to pronounce
for the most comprehensive sense, though we feel the strength of the
considerations which urge against it.

The allowance is called a 'gratuity' but it has useful design. It is intended to

attract ability to the work and purposes of the government. It is a reward and
accorded necessarily at the enrollment of the ability which continued in utility
upon whatever objects or for whatever purposes exerted. It grew the greater as
it was exercised in experience and we cannot ascribe to Congress the intention
to visit with the same consequencepenalty, we may saya continuation of
service having such result as a cessation of service. There was prompting and
inducement to the reverseprompting and inducement to the policy and
practice of giving assurance to officers and men that the promotions they
deserved and received would not be regarded as of no benefit to the government
no more benefit than though they officers and menwere disconnected from
government.

The government contests this construction and the judgment of the Court of
Claims. Its contention is that Slaymaker's resignation from the Naval Reserve
Force was a severance of his connection 'with the service' within the meaning
of the Act of August 29, 1916, supra, and that it was 'without compulsion on
the part of the government,' it being not only voluntary but under the
admonition that the gratuity that had been granted him would have to be
refunded since he was 'leaving the Reserve Force of his own volition and not
by compulsion on the part of the Navy Department.'

If the contention were relevant under our construction of the act we should be

reluctant to hold that his action was voluntary and incurred the return of the
gratuity.
10

July 1, 1918 (40 Stat. 711 [Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, 2900 1/2 a(22 4/5)]),
Congress passed an act containing the following provision:

11

'That no part of the clothing gratuity credited to members of the Naval Reserve
Force shall be deducted from their accounts where said members accept or have
accepted temporary appointments in the Navy in time of war or other national
emergency.'

12

This act was passed after the deduction from Slaymaker's pay. The Court of
Claims considered the act as a declaration of the meaning of the Act of August
29, 1916. The court strongly supports its holdings. We however, may rest our
decision on the meaning we have assigned to the Act of August 29, 1916.

13

Judgment affirmed.