446 U.S.

740
100 S.Ct. 1978
64 L.Ed.2d 659

Fred N. WALKER, Petitioner,

v.
ARMCO STEEL CORPORATION.
No. 78-1862.
Argued Jan. 8, 1980.
Decided June 2, 1980.

Syllabus
An Oklahoma statute provides that an action shall not be deemed to be
"commenced" for purposes of the statute of limitations until service of
summons on the defendant, but further provides ( 97) that if the
complaint is filed within the limitations period the action is deemed to
have commenced from the date of that filing if the plaintiff serves the
defendant within 60 days, even though such service occurs outside the
limitations period. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 provides that a civil
action is commenced by filing a complaint. In this case, petitioner's
personal injury action, based on diversity of citizenship, was brought
against respondent in Federal District Court in Oklahoma, and although
the complaint was filed within Oklahoma's 2-year statute of limitations,
service on respondent was not effectuated until after the 2-year limitation
period and the 60-day service period specified in 97 had expired. The
District Court dismissed the complaint as barred by the Oklahoma statute
of limitations, holding that 97 was an integral part of such statute and
that therefore under Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337
U.S. 530, 69 S.Ct. 1233, 93 L.Ed. 1520, state law, not Rule 3, applied. The
Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held : The action is barred by the Oklahoma statute of limitations. Ragan,
supra. Pp. 744-753.
(a) The scope of Rule 3 is not sufficiently broad to control the issue before
the District Court. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 14
L.Ed.2d 8, distinguished. There is no indication that the Rule was

intended to toll a state statute of limitations, much less that it purported to

displace state tolling rules for purposes of state statutes of limitations. In
diversity actions, Rule 3 governs the date from which various timing
requirements of the Federal Rules begin to run, but does not affect state
statutes of limitations. Pp. 748-751.
(b) In contrast to Rule 3, the Oklahoma statute is a statement of a
substantive decision by that State that actual service on, and accordingly
actual notice to, the defendant is an integral part of the policies
(establishment of a deadline after which the defendant may legitimately
have peace of mind, and recognition that after a certain period of time it is
unfair to require the defendant to attempt to piece together his defense to
an old claim) served by the statute of limitations. Rule 3 does not replace
such policy determinations found in state law, and that Rule and 97 can
exist side by side, each controlling its own intended sphere of coverage
without conflict. Pp. 751-752.
(c) Although in this case failure to apply the state service law might not
create any problem of forum shopping, the result would be an inequitable
administration of the law. There is no reason why, in the absence of a
controlling federal rule, an action based on state law which concededly
would be barred in the state courts by the state statute of limitations
should proceed to judgment in federal court solely because of the fortuity
that there is diversity of citizenship between the litigants. Pp. 752-753.
10 Cir., 592 F.2d 1133, affirmed.
Don Manners, Oklahoma City, Okl., for petitioner.
Jay M. Galt, Oklahoma City, Okl., for respondent.
Mr. Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the issue whether in a diversity action the federal court
should follow state law or, alternatively, Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in determining when an action is commenced for the purpose of
tolling the state statute of limitations.

* According to the allegations of the complaint, petitioner, a carpenter, was

injured on August 22, 1975, in Oklahoma City, Okla., while pounding a
Sheffield nail into a cement wall. Respondent was the manufacturer of the nail.
Petitioner claimed that the nail contained a defect which caused its head to

shatter and strike him in the right eye, resulting in permanent injuries. The
defect was allegedly caused by respondent's negligence in manufacture and
design.
3

Petitioner is a resident of Oklahoma, and respondent is a foreign corporation

having its principal place of business in a State other than Oklahoma. Since
there was diversity of citizenship, petitioner brought suit in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. The complaint was filed
on August 19, 1977. Although summons was issued that same day,1 service of
process was not made on respondent's authorized service agent until December
1, 1977.2 On January 5, 1978, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that the action was barred by the applicable Oklahoma
statute of limitations. Although the complaint had been filed within the 2-year
statute of limitations, Okla.Stat., Tit. 12, 95 (1971),3 state law does not deem
the action "commenced" for purposes of the statute of limitations until service
of the summons on the defendant, Okla.Stat., Tit. 12, 97 (1971).4 If the
complaint is filed within the limitations period, however, the action is deemed
to have commenced from that date of filing if the plaintiff serves the defendant
within 60 days, even though that service may occur outside the limitations
period. Ibid. In this case, service was not effectuated until long after this 60-day
period had expired. Petitioner in his reply brief to the motion to dismiss
admitted that his case would be foreclosed in state court, but he argued that
Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the manner in which an
action is commenced in federal court for all purposes, including the tolling of
the state statute of limitations.5

The District Court dismissed the complaint as barred by the Oklahoma statute
of limitations. 452 F.Supp. 243 (1978). The court concluded that Okla.Stat.,
Tit. 12, 97 (1971) was "an integral part of the Oklahoma statute of
limitations," 452 F.Supp., at 245, and therefore, under Ragan v. Merchants
Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 69 S.Ct. 1233, 93 L.Ed. 1500
(1949), state law applied. The court rejected the argument that Ragan had been
implicitly overruled in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 14
L.Ed.2d 8 (1965).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. 592 F.2d
1133 (1979). That court concluded that Okla.Stat., Tit. 12, 97 (1971), was in
"direct conflict" with Rule 3. 592 F.2d, at 1135. However, the Oklahoma
statute was "indistinguishable" from the statute involved in Ragan, and the
court felt itself "constrained" to follow Ragan. 592 F.2d, at 1136.

We granted certiorari, 444 U.S. 823, 100 S.Ct. 43, 62 L.Ed.2d 29 (1979),

because of a conflict among the Courts of Appeals.6 We now affirm.

II
7

The question whether state or federal law should apply on various issues arising
in an action based on state law which has been brought in federal court under
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction has troubled this Court for many years. In
the landmark decision of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82
L.Ed. 1188 (1938), we overturned the rule expressed in Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet.
1, 10 L.Ed. 865 (1842), that federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction need
not, in matters of "general jurisprudence," apply the nonstatutory law of the
State. The Court noted that "[d]iversity of citizenship jurisdiction was conferred
in order to prevent apprehended discrimination in state courts against those not
citizens of the State," Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, supra, 304 U.S., at 74, 58 S.Ct.,
at 820. The doctrine of Swift v. Tyson had led to the undesirable results of
discrimination in favor of noncitizens, prevention of uniformity in the
administration of state law, and forum shopping. 304 U.S., at 74-75, 58 S.Ct., at
820-821. In response, we established the rule that "[e]xcept in matters governed
by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any
[diversity] case is the law of the State," id., at 78, 58 S.Ct., at 822.

In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed. 2079
(1945), we addressed ourselves to "the narrow question whether, when no
recovery could be had in a State court because the action is barred by the
statute of limitations, a federal court in equity can take cognizance of the suit
because there is diversity of citizenship between the parties," id., at 107, 65
S.Ct., at 1469. The Court held that the Erie doctrine applied to suits in equity as
well as to actions at law. In construing Erie we noted that "[i]n essence, the
intent of that decision was to insure that, in all cases where a federal court is
exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the
parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be substantially
the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would
be if tried in a State court." 326 U.S., at 109, 65 S.Ct., at 1470. We concluded
that the state statute of limitations should be applied. "Plainly enough, a statute
that would completely bar recovery in a suit if brought in a State court bears on
a State-created right vitally and not merely formally or negligibly. As to
consequences that so intimately affect recovery or non-recovery a federal court
in a diversity case should follow State law." Id., at 110, 65 S.Ct. at 1470.

The decision in York led logically to our holding in Ragan v. Merchants

Transfer & Warehouse Co., supra. In Ragan, the plaintiff had filed his
complaint in federal court on September 4, 1945, pursuant to Rule 3 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The accident from which the claim arose had
occurred on October 1, 1943. Service was made on the defendant on December
28, 1945. The applicable statute of limitations supplied by Kansas law was two
years. Kansas had an additional statute which provided: "An action shall be
deemed commenced within the meaning of [the statute of limitations], as to
each defendant, at the date of the summons which is served on him . . . . An
attempt to commence an action shall be deemed equivalent to the
commencement thereof within the meaning of this article when the party
faithfully, properly and diligently endeavors to procure a service; but such
attempt must be followed by the first publication or service of the summons
within sixty days." Kan.Gen.Stat. 60-308 (1935). The defendant moved for
summary judgment on the ground that the Kansas statute of limitations barred
the action since service had not been made within either the 2-year period or
the 60-day period. It was conceded that had the case been brought in Kansas
state court it would have been barred. Nonetheless, the District Court held that
the statute had been tolled by the filing of the complaint. The Court of Appeals
reversed because "the requirement of service of summons within the statutory
period was an integral part of that state's statute of limitations." Ragan, 337
U.S., at 532, 69 S.Ct., at 1234.
10

We affirmed, relying on Erie and York. "We cannot give [the cause of action]
longer life in the federal court than it would have had in the state court without
adding something to the cause of action. We may not do that consistently with
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins." 337 U.S., at 533-534, 69 S.Ct., at 1235. We rejected
the argument that Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governed the
manner in which an action was commenced in federal court for purposes of
tolling the state statute of limitations. Instead, we held that the service of
summons statute controlled because it was an integral part of the state statute of
limitations, and under York that statute of limitations was part of the state-law
cause of action.

11

Ragan was not our last pronouncement in this difficult area, however. In 1965
we decided Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 14 L.Ed.2d 8,
holding that in a civil action where federal jurisdiction was based upon diversity
of citizenship, Rule 4(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rather than
state law, governed the manner in which process was served. Massachusetts
law required in-hand service on an executor or administrator of an estate,
whereas Rule 4 permits service by leaving copies of the summons and
complaint at the defendant's home with some person "of suitable age and
discretion." The Court noted that in the absence of a conflicting state procedure,
the Federal Rule would plainly control, 380 U.S., at 465, 85 S.Ct., at 1140. We
stated that the "outcome-determination" test of Erie and York had to be read

with reference to the "twin aims" of Erie : "discouragement of forum-shopping

and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws." 380 U.S., at 468, 85
S.Ct., at 1142. We determined that the choice between the state in-hand service
rule and the Federal Rule "would be of scant, if any, relevance to the choice of
a forum," for the plaintiff "was not presented with a situation where application
of the state rule would wholly bar recovery; rather, adherence to the state rule
would have resulted only in altering the way in which process was served." Id.,
at 469, 85 S.Ct., at 1143 (footnote omitted). This factor served to distinguish
that case from York and Ragan. See 380 U.S., at 469 n. 10, 85 S.Ct., at 1143 n.
10.
12

The Court in Hanna, however, pointed out "a more fundamental flaw" in the
defendant's argument in that case. Id., at 469, 85 S.Ct., at 1142. The Court
concluded that the Erie doctrine was simply not the appropriate test of the
validity and applicability of one of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:

13

"The Erie rule has never been invoked to void a Federal Rule. It is true that
there have been cases where this Court had held applicable a state rule in the
face of an argument that the situation was governed by one of the Federal
Rules. But the holding of each such case was not that Erie commanded
displacement of a Federal Rule by an inconsistent state rule, but rather that the
scope of the Federal Rule was not as broad as the losing party urged, and
therefore, there being no Federal Rule which covered the point in dispute, Erie
commanded the enforcement of state law." 380 U.S., at 470, 85 S.Ct., at 1143.

14

The Court cited Ragan as one of the examples of this proposition, 380 U.S., at
470, n. 12, 85 S.Ct., at 1143, n. 12. 7 The Court explained that where the Federal
Rule was clearly applicable, as in Hanna, the test was whether the Rule was
within the scope of the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. 2072, and if so, within
a constitutional grant of power such as the Necessary and Proper Clause of Art.
I. 380 U.S., at 470-472, 85 S.Ct., at 1143-1145.

III
15

The present case is indistinguishable from Ragan. The statutes in both cases
require service of process to toll the statute of limitations, and in fact the
predecessor to the Oklahoma statute in this case was derived from the
predecessor to the Kansas statute in Ragan. See Dr. Koch Vegetable Tea Co. v.
Davis, 48 Okl. 14, 22, 145 P. 337, 340 (1914). Here, as in Ragan, the complaint
was filed in federal court under diversity jurisdiction within the 2-year statute
of limitations, but service of process did not occur until after the 2-year period
and the 60-day service period had run. In both cases the suit would concededly

have been barred in the applicable state court, and in both instances the state
service statute was held to be an integral part of the statute of limitations by the
lower court more familiar than we with state law. Accordingly, as the Court of
Appeals held below, the instant action is barred by the statute of limitations
unless Ragan is no longer good law.
16

Petitioner argues that the analysis and holding of Ragan did not survive our
decision in Hanna.8 Petitioner's position is that Okla.Stat., Tit. 12, 97 (1971),
is in direct conflict with the Federal Rule. Under Hanna, petitioner contends,
the appropriate question is whether Rule 3 is within the scope of the Rules
Enabling Act and, if so, within the constitutional power of Congress. In
petitioner's view, the Federal Rule is to be applied unless it violates one of
those two restrictions. This argument ignores both the force of stare decisis and
the specific limitations that we carefully placed on the Hanna analysis.

17

We note at the outset that the doctrine of stare decisis weighs heavily against
petitioner in this case. Petitioner seeks to have us overrule our decision in
Ragan. Stare decisis does not mandate that earlier decisions be enshrined
forever, of course, but it does counsel that we use caution in rejecting
established law. In this case, the reasons petitioner asserts for overruling Ragan
are the same factors which we concluded in Hanna did not undermine the
validity of Ragan. A litigant who in effect asks us to reconsider not one but two
prior decisions bears a heavy burden of supporting such a change in our
jurisprudence. Petitioner here has not met that burden.

18

This Court in Hanna distinguished Ragan rather than overruled it, and for good
reason. Application of the Hanna analysis is premised on a "direct collision"
between the Federal Rule and the state law. 380 U.S., at 472, 85 S.Ct., at 1143.
In Hanna itself the "clash" between Rule 4(d)(1) and the state in-hand service
requirement was "unavoidable." 380 U.S., at 470, 85 S.Ct., at 1143. The first
question must therefore be whether the scope of the Federal Rule in fact is
sufficiently broad to control the issue before the Court. It is only if that question
is answered affirmatively that the Hanna analysis applies.9

19

As has already been noted, we recognized in Hanna that the present case is an
instance where "the scope of the Federal Rule [is] not as broad as the losing
party urge[s], and therefore, there being no Federal Rule which cover[s] the
point in dispute, Erie command[s] the enforcement of state law." Ibid. Rule 3
simply states that "[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the
court." There is no indication that the Rule was intended to toll a state statute of
limitations,10 much less that it purported to displace state tolling rules for
purposes of state statutes of limitations. In our view, in diversity actions11 Rule

3 governs the date from which various timing requirements of the Federal
Rules begin to run, but does not affect state statutes of limitations. Cf. 4 C.
Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 1057, pp. 190-191
(1969); id., 1051, at 165-166.
20

In contrast to Rule 3, the Oklahoma statute is a statement of a substantive

decision by that State that actual service on, and accordingly actual notice by,
the defendant is an integral part of the several policies served by the statute of
limitations. See C & C Tile Co. v. Independent School District No. 7 of Tulsa
County, 503 P.2d 554, 559 (Okl.1972). The statute of limitations establishes a
deadline after which the defendant may legitimately have peace of mind; it also
recognizes that after a certain period of time it is unfair to require the defendant
to attempt to piece together his defense to an old claim. A requirement of actual
service promotes both of those functions of the statute. See generally ibid.;
Seitz v. Jones, 370 P.2d 300, 302 (Okl.1961). See also Ely, The Irrepressible
Myth of Erie, 87 Harv.L.Rev. 693, 730-731 (1974).12 It is these policy aspects
which make the service requirement an "integral" part of the statute of
limitations both in this case and in Ragan. As such, the service rule must be
considered part and parcel of the statute of limitations. 13 Rule 3 does not replace
such policy determinations found in state law. Rule 3 and Okla.Stat., Tit. 12,
97 (1971), can exist side by side, therefore, each controlling its own intended
sphere of coverage without conflict.

21

Since there is no direct conflict between the Federal Rule and the state law, the
Hanna analysis does not apply.14 Instead, the policies behind Erie and Ragan
control the issue whether, in the absence of a federal rule directly on point, state
service requirements which are an integral part of the state statute of limitations
should control in an action based on state law which is filed in federal court
under diversity jurisdiction. The reasons for the application of such a state
service requirement in a diversity action in the absence of a conflicting federal
rule are well explained in Erie and Ragan, see supra, at 744-746, and need not
be repeated here. It is sufficient to note that although in this case failure to
apply the state service law might not create any problem of forum shopping,15
the result would be an "inequitable administration" of the law. Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S., at 468, 85 S.Ct., at 1142. There is simply no reason why, in
the absence of a controlling federal rule, an action based on state law which
concededly would be barred in the state courts by the state statute of limitations
should proceed through litigation to judgment in federal court solely because of
the fortuity that there is diversity of citizenship between the litigants. The
policies underlying diversity jurisdiction do not support such a distinction
between state and federal plaintiffs, and Erie and its progeny do not permit it.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

22

Affirmed.

The Court of Appeals stated that summons was issued the following day,
August 20. See 592 F.2d 1133, 1134 (CA10 1979). However, the docket sheet
in the District Court indicates that summons was issued August 19. See App.
insert preceding p. A-1. Nothing turns on this difference.

The record does not indicate why this delay occurred. The face of the process
record shows that the United States Marshal acknowledged receipt of the
summons on December 1, 1977, and that service was effectuated that same day.
Id., at A-5. At oral argument counsel for petitioner stated that the summons was
found "in an unmarked folder in the filing cabinet" in counsel's office some 90
days after the complaint had been filed. Tr. of Oral Arg. 3. See also id., at 6.
Counsel conceded that the summons was not delivered to the Marshal until
December 1. Id., at 3-4. It is unclear why the summons was placed in the filing
cabinet. See id., at 17.

Under Oklahoma law, a suit for products liability, whether based on a

negligence theory or a breach of implied warranty theory, is governed by the 2year statute of limitations period of Okla.Stat., Tit. 12, 95 (1971). See Hester
v. Purex Corp., 534 P.2d 1306, 1308 (Okl.1975); O'Neal v. Black & Decker
Manufacturing Co., 523 P.2d 614, 615 (Okl.1974); Kirkland v. General Motors
Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1361 (Okl.1974). The period begins to run from the date
of injury. O'Neal v. Black & Decker Manufacturing Co., supra, at 615;
Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., supra, at 1361.

Oklahoma Stat., Tit. 12, 97 (1971), provides in pertinent part: "An action
shall be deemed commenced, within the meaning of this article [the statute of
limitations], as to each defendant, at the date of the summons which is served
on him, or on a codefendant, who is a joint contractor or otherwise united in
interest with him. . . . An attempt to commence an action shall be deemed
equivalent to the commencement thereof, within the meaning of this article,
when the party faithfully, properly and diligently endeavors to procure a
service; but such attempt must be followed by the first publication or service of
the summons, . . . within sixty (60) days."

Petitioner also argued in his reply brief to the motion to dismiss that respondent
should have relied on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41dismissal for failure
to prosecuterather than the state statute of limitations. Respondent in its

response to the reply brief argued that a Rule 41 argument was implicit in its
motion to dismiss. Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals
addressed this issue.
6

Compare case below; Rose v. K. K. Masutoku Toy Factory Co., 597 F.2d 215
(CA10 1979); Lindsey v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 592 F.2d 1118, 1121-1123
(CA10), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 856, 100 S.Ct. 116, 62 L.Ed.2d 75 (1979);
Witherow v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 530 F.2d 160, 163-166 (CA3 1976);
Anderson v. Papillion, 445 F.2d 841 (CA5 1971) (per curiam ); Groninger v.
Davison, 364 F.2d 638 (CA8 1966); Sylvester v. Messler, 351 F.2d 472 (CA6
1965) (per curiam ), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011, 86 S.Ct. 619, 15 L.Ed.2d 526
(1966), all holding that state law controls, with Smith v. Peters, 482 F.2d 799
(CA6 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989, 94 S.Ct. 1587, 39 L.Ed.2d 886 (1974),
and Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey Co., 398 F.2d 598 (CA2 1968), holding that
Rule 3 controls. See also Ingram v. Kumar, 585 F.2d 566, 568 (CA2 1978)
(reaffirming Sylvestri ), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 940, 99 S.Ct. 1289, 59 L.Ed.2d
499 (1979); Prashar v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 480 F.2d 947 (CA8 1973)
(distinguishing Ragan), cert. denied sub nom. Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft v. Prashar, 415 U.S. 994, 94 S.Ct. 1596, 39 L.Ed.2d 891
(1974); Chappell v. Rouch, 448 F.2d 446 (CA10 1971) (distinguishing Ragan ).
See generally, Walko Corp. v. Burger Chef Systems, Inc., 180 U.S.App.D.C.
306, 308-311, 554 F.2d 1165, 1167-1170 (1977) (dicta).

The Court in Hanna noted that "this Court has never before been confronted
with a case where the applicable Federal Rule is in direct collision with the law
of the relevant State." 380 U.S., at 472, 85 S.Ct., at 1144.

Mr. Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in Hanna concluded that Ragan
was no longer good law. 380 U.S., at 474-478, 85 S.Ct., at 1145-1148. See also
Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey Co., 398 F.2d 598 (CA2 1968).

This is not to suggest that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to be
narrowly construed in order to avoid a "direct collision" with state law. The
Federal Rules should be given their plain meaning. If a direct collision with
state law arises from that plain meaning, then the analysis developed in Hanna
v. Plumer applies.

10

"Rule 3 simply provides that an action is commenced by filing the complaint

and has as its primary purpose the measuring of time periods that begin running
from the date of commencement; the rule does not state that filing tolls the
statute of limitations." 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
1057, p. 191 (1969) (footnote omitted).
The Note of the Advisory Committee on the Rules states:

"When a Federal or State statute of limitations is pleaded as a defense, a

question may arise under this rule whether the mere filing of the complaint
stops the running of the statute, or whether any further step is required, such as,
service of the summons and complaint or their delivery to the marshal for
service. The answer to this question may depend on whether it is competent for
the Supreme Court, exercising the power to make rules of procedure without
affecting substantive rights, to vary the operation of statutes of limitations. The
requirement of Rule 4 (a) that the clerk shall forthwith issue the summons and
deliver it to the marshal for service will reduce the chances of such a question
arising." 28 U.S.C.App., pp. 394-395.
This Note establishes that the Advisory Committee predicted the problem
which arose in Ragan and arises again in the instant case. It does not indicate,
however, that Rule 3 was intended to serve as a tolling provision for statute of
limitations purposes; it only suggests that the Advisory Committee thought the
Rule might have that effect.
11

The Court suggested in Ragan that in suits to enforce rights under a federal
statute Rule 3 means that filing of the complaint tolls the applicable statute of
limitations. 337 U.S., at 533, 69 S.Ct., at 1234, distinguishing Bomar v. Keyes,
162 F.2d 136, 140-141 (CA2), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 825, 68 S.Ct. 166, 92
L.Ed. 400 (1947). See Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 Harv.L.Rev. 693,
729 (1974). See also Walko Corp. v. Burger Chef Systems, Inc., 180
U.S.App.D.C., at 308, n. 19, 554 F.2d, at 1167, n. 19; 4 Wright & Miller, supra,
1056, and authorities collected therein. We do not here address the role of
Rule 3 as a tolling provision for a statute of limitations, whether set by federal
law or borrowed from state law, if the cause of action is based on federal law.

12

The importance of actual service, with corresponding actual notice, to the

statute of limitations scheme in Oklahoma is further demonstrated by the fact
that under Okla.Stat., Tit. 12, 97 (1971), the statute of limitations must be
tolled as to each defendant through individual service, unless a codefendant
who is served is "united in interest" with the unserved defendant. That
requirement, like the service requirement itself, does nothing to promote the
general policy behind all statutes of limitations of keeping stale claims out of
court. Instead, the service requirement furthers a different but related policy
decision: that each defendant has a legitimate right not to be surprised by notice
of a lawsuit after the period of liability has run. If the defendant is "united in
interest" with a codefendant who has been served, then presumably the
defendant will receive actual notice of the lawsuit through the codefendant and
will not have his peace of mind disturbed when he receives official service of
process. Similarly, the defendant will know that he must begin gathering his
evidence while that task is still deemed by the State to be feasible.

13

The substantive link of 97 to the statute of limitations is made clear as well by

another provision of Oklahoma law. Under Okla.Stat., Tit. 12, 151 (1971), "
[a] civil action is deemed commenced by filing in the office of the court clerk
of the proper court a petition and by the clerk's issuance of summons thereon."
This is the state-law corollary to Rule 3. However, 97, not 151, controls the
commencement of the lawsuit for statute of limitations purposes. See Tyler v.
Taylor, 578 P.2d 1214 (Okl.App.1977). Just as 97 and 151 can both apply
in state court for their separate purposes, so too 97 and Rule 3 may both apply
in federal court in a diversity action.

14

Since we hold that Rule 3 does not apply, it is unnecessary for us to address the
second question posed by the Hanna analysis: whether Rule 3, if it applied,
would be outside the scope of the Rules Enabling Act or beyond the power of
Congress under the Constitution.

15

There is no indication that when petitioner filed his suit in federal court he had
any reason to believe that he would be unable to comply with the service
requirements of Oklahoma law or that he chose to sue in federal court in an
attempt to avoid those service requirements.