United States v. Jose M. Igpuara, G.R. No.

L-7593
FACTS: That the defendant received P2,498 is a fact proven. The defendant drew up a
document declaring that they remained in his possession, which he could not have said
had he not received them. They remained in his possession, surely in no other sense
than to take care of them, for they remained has no other purpose. They remained in
the defendant's possession at the disposal of Veraguth; but on August 23 of the same
year Veraguth demanded for him through a notarial instrument restitution of them, and
to date he has not restored them.
The defendant therein is charged with the crime of estafa, for having swindled Juana
Montilla and Eugenio Veraguth out of P2,498 Philippine currency, which he had take on
deposit from the former to be at the latter's disposal. The document setting forth the
obligation reads:
We hold at the disposal of Eugenio Veraguth the sum of two thousand four hundred and
ninety-eight pesos (P2,498), the balance from Juana Montilla's sugar. Iloilo, June 26,
1911, Jose Igpuara, for Ramirez and Co.
The Court of First Instance of Iloilo sentenced the defendant to two years of presidio
correccional, to pay Juana Montilla P2,498 Philippine currency, and in case of
insolvency to subsidiary imprisonment at P2.50 per day, not to exceed one-third of the
principal penalty, and the costs.
The defendant appealed, alleging as errors: (1) Holding that the document executed by
him was a certificate of deposit; (2) holding the existence of a deposit, without
precedent transfer or delivery of the P2,498; and (3) classifying the facts in the case as
the crime of estafa.
ISSUE: May he use the thing deposited?
HELD: NO.
RATIO
The appellant says: "Juana Montilla's agent voluntarily accepted the sum of P2,498 in
an instrument payable on demand, and as no attempt was made to cash it until August
23, 1911, he could indorse and negotiate it like any other commercial instrument. There
is no doubt that if Veraguth accepted the receipt for P2,498 it was because at that time
he agreed with the defendant to consider the operation of sale on commission closed,
leaving the collection of said sum until later, which sum remained as a loan payable
upon presentation of the receipt."
Then, after averring the true facts: (1) that a sales commission was precedent; (2) that
this commission was settled with a balance of P2,498 in favor of the principal, Juana
Montilla; and (3) that this balance remained in the possession of the defendant, who
drew up an instrument payable on demand, he has drawn two conclusions, both
erroneous: One, that the instrument drawn up in the form of a deposit certificate could

be indorsed or negotiated like any other commercial instrument; and the other, that the
sum of P2,498 remained in defendant's possession as a loan.
It is also erroneous to assert that sum of money set forth in said certificate is, according
to it, in the defendant's possession as a loan. In a loan the lender transmits to the
borrower the use of the thing lent, while in a deposit the use of the thing is not
transmitted, but merely possession for its custody or safe-keeping.
In order that the depositary may use or dispose of the things deposited, the depositor's
consent is required, and then:
The rights and obligations of the depositary and of the depositor shall cease, and the
rules and provisions applicable to commercial loans, commission, or contract which took
the place of the deposit shall be observed. (Art. 309, Code of Commerce.)
The defendant has shown no authorization whatsoever or the consent of the depositary
for using or disposing of the P2,498, which the certificate acknowledges, or any contract
entered into with the depositor to convert the deposit into a loan, commission, or other
contract.
Engracia Obejera and Mercedes Intak vs Iga Sy C.A. No. 34, April 29, 1946 76 SCRA
581 Nature: APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Batangas
Ponente: JARANILLA, J.
Facts: On December 13, 1941, plaintiffs and defendant sought refuge in the house of
Leon Villena, on account of the Japanese invasion of the Philippines. News having
spread that the Japanese were committing barbarous acts, plaintiffs and defendant
decided to hide their things and valuables in a dugout belonging to Villena. On February
18, 1942, it was discovered that their money and things had been lost. The defendant
reported the loss of her valuables causing the arrest and investigation of Villena, two
others and the plaintiff Engracio Obejera, who were released shortly after, except
Engracio Obejera who was released only on April 19, 1912 after he, with his wife, had
consented to execute a transfer agreement with the defendant which was annulled by
the Court of First Instance in Batangas on the ground of force and intimidation.
Issue: 1. Whether or not the deed of transfer certificate executed by both parties is
valid? 2. Whether or not Obejera is civilly liable to the assets that were lost by Sy?
Held: 1. NO. Decision AFFIRMED 2. NO. Decision AFFIRMED Ratio Decidendi: The
Supreme Court ruled that the alleged deposit cannot be believed and is contrary to the
ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. Even if it was considered, any
obligation or liability arising therefrom was extinguished upon the loss. The evidence of
record shows that the plaintiffs were not in any way responsible for the loss of the
defendant's money and jewelry. It necessarily follows that the deed of transfer whereby
the plaintiffs promised to transfer their property cannot be held liable, is null and void for
lack of cause or consideration and lack of free consent

Manuel M. Serrano v. Central Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-30511

Facts:
Petitioner made a time deposit, for one year with 6% interest, of One Hundred Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) with the respondent Overseas Bank of Manila.
Concepcion Maneja also made a time deposit, for one year with 6-% interest, on
March 6, 1967, of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) with the same
respondent Overseas Bank of Manila.
On August 31, 1968, Concepcion Maneja, married to Felixberto M. Serrano, assigned
and conveyed to petitioner Manuel M. Serrano, her time deposit of P200,000.00 with
respondent Overseas Bank of Manila.
Notwithstanding series of demands for encashment of the aforementioned time deposits
from the respondent Overseas Bank of Manila, dating from December 6, 1967 up to
March 4, 1968, not a single one of the time deposit certificates was honored by
respondent Overseas Bank of Manila.
In the case of Ramos vs. Central Bank of the Philippines,petitioner Manuel Serrano filed
on September 6, 1968, a motion to intervene on the ground that Serrano had a real and
legal interest as depositor of the Overseas Bank of Manila in the matter in litigation in
that case. This was denied on the ground that his claim as depositor of the Overseas
Bank of Manila should properly be ventilated in the Court of First Instance, and if this
Court were to allow Serrano to intervene as depositor, thousands of other depositors
would follow and thus cause an avalanche of cases in this Court.
Issue: Whether or not plaintiff is entitled to the relief sought.
Held:
This case isfor the recovery of time deposits plus interest from respondent Overseas
Bank of Manila, and recovery of damages against respondent Central Bank for its
alleged failure to strictly supervise the acts of the other respondent Bank and protect the
interests of its depositors by virtue of the constructive trust created when respondent
Central Bank required the other respondent to increase its collaterals for its overdrafts
said emergency loans, said collaterals allegedly acquired through the use of depositors
money.
Claims of these nature are not proper in actions for mandamus and prohibition as there
is no shown clear abuse of discretion by the Central Bank in its exercise of supervision
over the other respondent Overseas Bank of Manila, and if there was, petitioner here is
not the proper party to raise that question, but rather the Overseas Bank of Manila.
Bank deposits are in the nature of irregular deposits. They are really loans because they
earn interest. All kinds of bank deposits, whether fixed, savings, or current are to be
treated as loans and are to be covered by the law on loans. 14 Current and savings
deposit are loans to a bank because it can use the same. The petitioner here in making
time deposits that earn interests with respondent Overseas Bank of Manila was in
reality a creditor of the respondent Bank and not a depositor. The respondent Bank was
in turn a debtor of petitioner. Failure of he respondent Bank to honor the time deposit is
failure to pay s obligation as a debtor and not a breach of trust arising from depositary's
failure to return the subject matter of the deposit.
Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-66826

Facts:Rizaldy T. Zshornack and his wife maintained in COMTRUST a dollar savings

account and a peso current account. An application for a dollar drat was accomplished
by Virgillo Garcia branch manager of COMTRUST payable to a certain LeovigildaDizon.
In the application, Garcia indicated that the amount was to be charged to the dollar
savings account of the Zshornacks. There was no indication of the name of the
purchaser of the dollar draft. Comtrust issued a check payable to the order of Dizon.
When Zshornack noticed the withdrawal from his account, he demanded an explanation
from the bank. In its answer, Comtrust claimed that the peso value of the withdrawal
was given to Atty. Ernesto Zshornack, brother of Rizaldy when he encashed with
COMTRUST a cashiers check for P8450 issued by the manila banking corporation
payable to Ernesto.
Issue: Whether the contract between petitioner and respondent bank is a deposit?
Held: The document which embodies the contract states that the US$3,000.00 was
received by the bank for safekeeping. The subsequent acts of the parties also show that
the intent of the parties was really for the bank to safely keep the dollars and to return it
to Zshornack at a later time. Thus, Zshornack demanded the return of the money on
May 10, 1976, or over five months later.
The above arrangement is that contract defined under Article 1962, New Civil Code,
which reads:
Art. 1962. A deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a thing belonging
to another, with the obligation of safely keeping it and of returning the same. If the
safekeeping of the thing delivered is not the principal purpose of the contract, there is
no deposit but some other contract.
Tan vs. CAGR 108555, 20 December 1994First Division, Kapunan (J)
Facts:
Ramon Tan, a businessman from Puerto Princesa, secured a Cashiers Check from Philippine
Commercial Industrial Bank (PCIBank) to P30,000 payable to his order to avoid carrying cash while
en route to Manila. He deposited the check in his account in Rizal Commercial Banking
orporation(RCBC) in its Binondo Branch. RCBC sent the check for clearing to the Central Bank
which was returned for having been missent or misrouted. RCBC debited Tans account without
informing him. Relying on common knowledge that a cashiers check was as good as cash, and a
month after depositing the check, he issued two personal checks in the name of Go Lak and MS
Development Trading Corporation. Both checks bounced due
to insufficiency of funds. Tan filed a suit for damages against RCBC.
Issue:
Whether a cashiers check is as good as cash, so as to have funded the two checks
subsequently drawn.
Held:
An ordinary check is not a mere undertaking to pay an amount
of money. There is an
element of certainty or assurance that it will be paid upon presentation; that is why it is perceived as a

convenient substitute for currency in commercial and financial transactions. Herein, what is involved is
more than an ordinary check, but a cashiers check. A cashiers check is a primary
obligation of the issuing bank and accepted in advance by its mere issuance. By its very nature, a
cashiers check is a banks order to pay what is drawn upon itself, committing in effect its total
resources, integrity and honor beyond the check. Herein, PCIB by issuing the check created an
unconditional credit in favor any collecting bank. Reliance on the laymans perception that a cashiers
check is as good as cash is not entirely misplaced, as it is rooted in practice, tradition and principle.

MAKATI SHANGRI-LA vs. HARPER

G.R. No. 189998. August 29, 2012
PONENTE: Bersamin
DOCTRINE:
Negligence Article 2176 0f the New Civil Code provides Whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
The hotel business is imbued with public interest. Hotelkeepers are bound to
provide not only lodging for their guests but also security to their persons
and belongings to their guest. The twin duty constitutes the essence of the
business (Arts 2000-2001 New Civil Code).
Hotel owner is liable for civil damages to surviving heirs of hotel guest whom
strangers murder inside his hotel room.
FACTS:
Christian Harper was a Norweigian who came to Manila on a business trip.
He stayed at Makati Shangri-la Hotel, but he was murdered in his hotel room
[Specifically Room 1428. His ghost can be found there].
It was found that the muderer, a caucasian male, was able to trespass into
the hotel room of the victim and was then able to murder and rob the victim.
The heirs of the victim blame the hotel's gross negligence in providing the
most basic security system of its guests.
The RTC held in favor of the heirs and ordered Shangri-la to pay damages.
CA affirmed.
ISSUE: WON Shangri-la Hotel is liable for damages.

HELD:
Yes. Shangri-la is liable due to its own negligence.
The testimony revealed that the management practice of the hotel prior to
the death of the victim was to deploy only one security or roving guard for
every three or four floors of the hotel, which is inadequate because the hotel
is L-shaped that rendered hallways not visible end to end. That there was a
recommendation to increase security to one guard per floor but this was not
followed. This ommission is critical. The hotel business is imbued with public
interest. Hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging for their guests
but also security to their persons and belongings to their guest. The twin
duty constitutes the essence of the business.
Therefore, the hotel has a greater degree of care and responsibility for its
guests , otherwise the hotelkeepers would just stand idly by while strangers
have unrestricted access to all hotel rooms on the pretense of being visitors
of the guests which is absurd.
12 De los Santos v Tan Khey (1962)Facts
De los Santos (Plaintiff) lodged in the International Hotel in Iloilo City, which
was owned by Tan Khey (Defendant).When Plaintiff arrived in the hotel, he
left shortly thereafter, depositing his revolver and bag with a certain
Abutanatin. The latter was in charge of the hotel. The bag contained a
birthstone ring, an eyeglass, and a pocketbook. He returned that evening
and took his things from Abutanatin. When he got into his room, he locked
the door and went to sleep. The next morning, he woke up and found that
the door to his room was open and that hispants and bag containing the
revolver was missing.
When he reported the incident to the authorities, a secret service agent
investigated the matter and found that a wall of the room of the Plaintiff was
only 7 feet high and had an opening from which one could enter from the
outside. Tan Khey disclaims liability for the loss, saying that the things were
not deposited with the manager at the time they were lost despite notice to
that effect posted in the hotel. He likewise claims that to be liable under Art.
1998 of the Civil Code, the following must concur: Deposit of effects made
by travelers in hotels or inns. Notice was given to the hotel keeper or
employee of the effects brought by guests. That the guests/travelers take
the precautions advised by the hotelkeepers/employees relative to the
vigilance of their effects

\Issue
W/N Tan
being lost
notice of
necessary

Khey, as owner of the hotel, is liable for the loss despite their
not while in actual custody of an employee of the hotel, having no
the effects lost, and for failure of De los Santos to take the
precautions advised by the hotel.

Held
YES.
Under Art. 1998, when the law speaks of depositing of effects by travelers in hotels or
inns, it does not mean that there is a personal receipt by the innkeeper of
such effects. This is so because nature of the business of an innkeeper is
not only to provide lodgings, but also to provide security to their persons
and effects. Such security is not only confined to those effects actually
delivered to the inn keeper for safekeeping, but also to
all effects brought in the hotel. Also, a hotel has supervision and control of the
premises thereof. The guests being strangers to the place, they must rely on
the vigilance and protection of the innkeepers over the effects placed in the
premises of the hotel.
DURBAN APARTMENTS VS. PIONEER INSURANCE
Facts: July 22, 2003, Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corp, by right of subrogation, filed
with the RTC of Makati a Complaint for Recovery of Damages against Durban
ApartmentsCorp (or City Garden Hotel) and defendant before the RTC, Vicente
Justimbaste. Respondent averred that it is the insurer for loss and damage of Jeffrey S.
Sees 2001 Suzuki Grand Vitara in the amount of P1,175,000.00. On April 30, 2002,
See arrived and checked in at the City Garden Hotel before midnight, and its parking
attendant, Justimbaste got the key to said Vitara from See to park it.On May 1,2002, at
about 1:00 am, See received a phone call where the Hotel Chief Security Officer
informed him that his Vitara was carnapped while it was parked unattended at the
parking area of Equitable PCI Bank. See went to see the Security Officer, thereafter
reported the incident to the Operations Division of the Makati City Police AntiCarnapping Unit, and a flash alarm was issued. The police investigated Hotel Security
Officer, Ernesto T. Horlador, Jr. and Justimbaste. See gave his Sinumpaang Salaysay to
the police investigator, and filed a Complaint Sheet with the PNP Traffic Management
Group in Camp Crame. It paid the P1,163,250.00 money claim of See and mortgagee
ABN AMRO Savings Bank,Inc. as indemnity for the loss of the Vitara.

Issue: Whether or not Durban Apartments is liable for damages.

Ruling: Yes. The Vitara was lost due to the negligence of Durban Apartments and
Justimbaste because it was discovered during the investigation that this was the second
time that a similar incident of carnapping happened in the valet parking service and no
necessary precautions were taken to prevent its repetition. Durban Apartments was
wanting in due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees particularly
defendant Justimbaste. Both failed and refused to pay its valid, just, and lawful claim
despite written demands.

GEMPESAW V. CA
218 SCRA 682

FACTS:
Gempensaw was the owner of many grocery stores. She paid her suppliers through
the issuance of checks drawn against her checking account with respondent
bank. The checks were prepared by her bookkeeper Galang. In the signing of the
checks prepared by Galang, Gempensaw didn't bother herself in verifying to whom
the checks were being paid and if the issuances were necessary. She didn't
even verify the returned checks of the bank when the latter notifies her of the same.
During her two years in business, there were incidents shown that the amounts
paid for were in excess of what should have been paid. It was also shown that even if
the checks were crossed, the intended payees didn't receive the amount of the
checks. This prompted Gempensaw to demand the bank to credit her account
for the amount of the forged checks. The bank refused to do so and this prompted her
to
file
the
case
against
the
bank.

HELD:
Forgery is a real defense by the party whose signature was forged. A party whose
signature was forged was never a party and never gave his consent to the
instrument. Since his signature doesnt appear in the instrument, the same cannot
be enforced against him even by a holder in due course. The drawee bank cannot
charge the account of the drawer whose signature was forged because he never gave
the
bank
the
order
to
pay.

In the case at bar the checks were filled up by petitioners employee Galang and
were later given to her for signature. Her signing the checks made the negotiable
instruments complete. Prior to signing of the checks, there was no valid contract
yet. Petitioner completed the checks by signing them and thereafter authorized
Galang to deliver the same to their respective payees. The checks were then
indorsed,
forged
indorsements
thereon.
As a rule, a drawee bank who has paid a check on which an indorsement has been
forged cannot debit the account of a drawer for the amount of said check. An
exception to this rule is when the drawer is guilty of negligence which causes the
bank to honor such checks. Petitioner in this case has relied solely on the honesty
and loyalty of her bookkeeper and never bothered to verify the accuracy of the
amounts of the checks she signed the invoices attached thereto. And though
she received her bank statements, she didn't carefully examine the same to
double-check
her
payments. Petitioner didn't exercise reasonable diligence which eventually led to the
fruition of her bookkeepers fraudulent schemes.