Constitutional Law II Case Digests

(Due Process onwards)

1. No person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property
without due process of law.
Case:
Villegas v. Hiu Chong
(November 10, 1978)
Fernandez, J.
FACTS:
-Mayor Antonio Villegas seek the
review of the decision of the CFI
when it ordered the ordinance
637 of Manila as null and void.
-The ordinance requires aliens to
seek a permit of the mayor before
they can be employed. (*With
permit fee of 50 pesos)
-Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho alleges
that
the
ordinance
is
discriminatory,
violative
of
uniformity in taxation, violative of
delegation of powers, oppressive,
unreasonable, violative of due
process and equal protection of
the laws.
-Villegas argued that it is not a tax
measure but an exercise of police
power.
ISSUE:
1. WON the ordinance is
valid?
2. WON the ordinance violates
due process?
HELD:
1. -No. It is clearly a tax measure
because there is no justification
for imposing the 50 peso fee from
aliens who have been cleared
from employment.
-It is unreasonable because it fails
to consider valid substantial
differences in situations among

individual aliens. (The same fee

for permanent, casual, high-end
or low income aliens)
-Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay
down any criterion or standard to
guide the Mayor in the exercise of
his discretion.
2. Requiring a person before he
can be employed to get a permit
from the City Mayor of Manila who
may withhold or refuse it at will is
tantamount to denying him the
basic right of the people in the
Philippines to engage in a means
of livelihood.
-While it is true that the
Philippines as a State is not
obliged to admit aliens within its
territory,
once
an
alien
is
admitted, he cannot be deprived
of life without due process of law.
The shelter of protection under
the due process and equal
protection clause is given to all
persons, both aliens and citizens.
Smith Bell & Company vs.
Joaquin Natividad (CoC of
Cebu) (September 17, 1919)
Malcolm, J.
FACTS:
-Smith, Bell & Co., (Ltd.), is a
corporation
organized
and
existing under the laws of the
Philippine Islands
-It is the owner of a motor vessel
known as the Bato built for it in
the Philippine Islands in 1916, of
more than fifteen tons gross
The Bato was brought to Cebu in
the present year for the purpose
of
transporting
plaintiff's
merchandise between ports in the
Islands. Application was made at
Cebu, the home port of the
vessel, to the Collector of

Customs for a certificate of

Philippine registry.
-The Collector refused to issue the
certificate, giving as his reason
that all the stockholders of Smith,
Bell & Co., Ltd., were not citizens
either of the United States or of
the Philippine Islands. The instant
action is the result.

Imbongs vs Ochoa (April 8,

2014)
Mendoza, J.
FACTS
-Despite calls to withhold support
thereto, however, Republic Act
(R.A.)
No.
10354,
otherwise
known
as
the
Responsible
Parenthood
and
Reproductive
Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was
enacted
by
Congress
on
December 21, 2012.
-Shortly after the President placed
his imprimatur on the said law,
challengers from various sectors
of society allege it to be
unconstitutional.
-According to the petitioners (14
petitions and 2 intervenors), the
RH Law violates the right to life of
the unborn as it authorizes the
purchase
of
hormonal
contraceptives
which
are
abortives and dangerous, contrary
to the constitution. (Protection of
the life of the mother and the
unborn). It also violated the right
to health and the right to
protection
against
hazardous
products, as it causes cancer and
other health problems. Also, it
violates the right to religious
freedom as it authorizes public

funds to be used for purposes

contrary to their religious belief.
-Also, they allege it amounts to
involuntary servitude as it require
medical practitioners to render 48
hrs of pro bona services to
indigent that are prosecuted, to
be
accredited
to
PhilHealth
program.
-Also it is violative of equal
protection clause since it is
primarily targeted to the poor by
introducing contraceptives and
reducing their number. Also, it is
claimed to be a violation of voidfor-vagueness rule in violation of
due process since it penalizes
any violation of the law without
defining what such violation is.
-In this connection, it is claimed
that "Section 7 of the RH Law
violates the right to due process
by removing from them (the
people) the right to manage their
own affairs and to decide what
kind of health facility they shall be
and what kind of services they
shall offer."
-The petitioners contend that the
RH Law suffers from vagueness
and, thus violates the due process
clause
of
the
Constitution.
According to them, Section 23 (a)
(l) mentions a "private health
service provider" among those
who may be held punishable but
does not define who is a "private
health care service provider."
-They argue that confusion further
results since Section 7 only makes
reference to a "private health care
institution."
-The petitioners also point out
that Section 7 of the assailed
legislation
exempts
hospitals
operated by religious groups from
rendering reproductive health
service
and
modern
family
planning methods. It is unclear,

however, if these institutions are

also
exempt
from
giving
reproductive health information
under Section 23(a)(l), or from
rendering reproductive health
procedures under Section 23(a)
(2).
-Finally, it is averred that the RH
Law punishes the withholding,
restricting
and
providing
of
incorrect information, but at the
same
time
fails
to
define
"incorrect information."
ISSUE: WON the RH bill is
violative of due process?
HELD:
-No. A statute or act suffers from
the defect of vagueness when it
lacks comprehensible standards
that men of common intelligence
must
necessarily
guess
its
meaning and differ as to its
application. It is repugnant to the
Constitution in two respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to
accord persons, especially the
parties targeted by it, fair notice
of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it
leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its
provisions
and
becomes
an
arbitrary
flexing
of
the
Government muscle.
-Clearly,
subject
to
the
qualifications and exemptions
earlier discussed, the right to be
exempt from being obligated to
render
reproductive
health
service
and
modem
family
planning methods, necessarily
includes exemption from being
obligated to give reproductive
health information and to render
reproductive health procedures.
The
terms
"service"
and
"methods" are broad enough to

include
the
providing
of
information and the rendering of
medical procedures.
-From its plain meaning, the word
"incorrect" here denotes failing to
agree with a copy or model or
with established rules; inaccurate,
faulty; failing to agree with the
requirements of duty, morality or
propriety; and failing to coincide
with the truth.
-On the other hand, the word
"knowingly"
means
with
awareness or deliberateness that
is intentional. Used together in
relation to Section 23(a)(l), they
connote a sense of malice and ill
motive to mislead or misrepresent
the public as to the nature and
effect of programs and services
on reproductive health. Public
health and safety demand that
health care service providers give
their honest and correct medical
information in accordance with
what is acceptable in medical
practice.
-"According to a long line of
decisions, equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights
conferred
and
responsibilities
imposed." It "requires public
bodies and institutions to treat
similarly situated individuals in a
similar manner."
-To provide that the poor are to be
given priority in the government's
reproductive health care program
is not a violation of the equal
protection clause. In fact, it is
pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII
of
the
Constitution
which
recognizes the distinct necessity
to address the needs of the
underprivileged by providing that
they
be
given
priority
in

addressing
the
health
development of the people.
-Moreover, the RH Law does not
prescribe the number of children
a couple may have and does not
impose conditions upon couples
who intend to have children.
While the petitioners surmise that
the assailed law seeks to charge
couples with the duty to have
children only if they would raise
them in a truly humane way, a
deeper look into its provisions
shows that what the law seeks to
do is to simply provide priority to
the poor in the implementation of
government programs to promote
basic reproductive health care.

Buck vs. Bell (May 2, 1927)

Holmes, J.
FACTS:
-The
defendant,
the
superintendent of the State
Colony for Epileptics and Feeble
Minded, was ordered to perform
the operation of salpingectomy
(removal of fallopian tube) upon
Carrie Buck, the plaintiff.
-The case comes here upon the
contention
that
the
statute
authorizing the judgment is void
under the Fourteenth Amendment
as denying to the plaintiff in error
due process of law and the equal
protection of the laws.
-Carrie Buck is a feeble-minded
white woman who was committed
to the State Colony above
mentioned in due form. She is the
daughter of a feeble- minded
mother in the same institution,
and the mother of an illegitimate
feeble-minded child.
-An Act of Virginia approved
March 20, 1924 (Laws 1924, c.

394) recites that the health of the

patient and the welfare of society
may be promoted in certain cases
by the sterilization of mental
defectives,
under
careful
safeguard,
etc.;
that
the
sterilization may be effected in
males by vasectomy and in
females
by
salpingectomy,
without serious pain or substantial
danger to life
-The statute then enacts that
whenever the superintendent of
certain institutions including the
above named State Colony shall
be of opinion that it is for the best
interest of the patients and of
society that an inmate under his
care should be sexually sterilized,
he may have the operation
performed upon any patient
afflicted with hereditary forms of
insanity, imbecility, etc., on
complying with the very careful
provisions by which the act
protects
the
patients
from
possible abuse.
-Plaintiff contends that it is illegal
because
it
violates
her
constitutional right to bodily
integrity and a violation of due
process. Citing Munn v. Illinois,
deprivation of life includes all
those limbs and faculties by which
life is enjoyed.
-Respondent argues that it is a
valid exercise of police power and
not
degrading
or
unusual
punishment.
ISSUE: WON the plaintiff has
been afforded due process?
HELD:
-The judgment finds the facts that
have been recited and that Carrie
Buck 'is the probable potential
parent of socially inadequate
offspring, likewise afflicted, that

she may be sexually sterilized

without detriment to her general
health and that her welfare and
that of society will be promoted
by
her
sterilization,'
and
thereupon makes the order.
-It is better for all the world, if
instead of waiting to execute
degenerate offspring for crime, or
to let them starve for their
imbecility, society can prevent
those who are manifestly unfit
from continuing their kind. The
principle that sustains compulsory
vaccination is broad enough to
cover cutting the Fallopian tubes.
-But the answer is that the law
does all that is needed when it
does all that it can, indicates a
policy, applies it to all within the
lines, and seeks to bring within
the lines all similarly situated so
far and so fast as its means allow.
Of course so far as the operations
enable those who otherwise must
be kept confined to be returned to
the world, and thus open the
asylum to others, the equality
aimed at will be more nearly
reached.
3. ASPECTS

and
cleaning
establishments,
must be decided on this appeal.
-Every person, firm or corporation
in the city of Manila engaged in
laundering, dyeing, or cleaning by
any process, cloths or clothes for
compensation, shall issue dyed,
or cleaned are received a receipt
in duplicate, in English and
Spanish, duly signed, showing the
kind and number of articles
delivered, and the duplicate copy
of the receipt shall be kept by the
owner of the establishment or
person issuing same.
-The purpose of the municipal
authorities
in
adopting
the
ordinance
is
fairly
evident.
Ordinance No. 532 was enacted, it
is said, to avoid disputes between
laundrymen and their patrons and
to protect customers of laundries
who are not able to decipher
Chinese characters from being
defrauded. The object of the
ordinance was, accordingly, the
promotion of peace and good
order and the prevention of fraud,
deceit, cheating, and imposition.
-Plaintiff's contention is also that
the ordinance is invalid, because
it is arbitrary, unreasonable, and
not justified under the police
power of the city.

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

CASE:
Kwong Sing v. Manila, 41 Phil
103 (October 11, 1920)
Malcolm, J.
FACTS:
-The validity of Ordinance No. 532
of the city of Manila requiring
receipts in duplicate in English
and Spanish duly signed showing
the kind and number of articles
delivered by laundries and dyeing

ISSUE:
WON the ordinance
violates due process of law?
HELD:
-Our
holding
is,
that
the
government of the city of Manila
had the power to enact Ordinance
No. 532 and that as said
ordinance is found not to be
oppressive, nor unequal, nor
unjust, it is valid.
-The
oppressiveness
of
the
ordinance
may
have
been

somewhat
exaggerated.
The
printing of the laundry receipts
need not be expensive. The
names of the several kinds of
clothing may be printed in English
and Spanish with the equivalent
in Chinese below. With such
knowledge of English and Spanish
as
laundrymen
and
their
employees now possess, and,
certainly, at least one person in
every Chinese laundry must have
a vocabulary of a few words, and
with ability to read and write
arabic numbers, no great difficulty
should be experienced, especially
after some practice, in preparing
the
receipts
required
by
Ordinance No. 532. It may be
conceded that an additional
burden will be imposed on the
business and occupation affected
by the ordinance.
-Yet, even if private rights of
person or property are subjected
to restraint, and even if loss will
result to individuals from the
enforcement of the ordinance,
this is not sufficient ground for
failing to uphold the hands of the
legislative
body.
The
very
foundation of the police power is
the control of private interests for
the public welfare.
Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271
U.S. 500 (June 7, 1926)
Taft, J.
FACTS:
-This case comes here on a writ of
certiorari to review a decision of
the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands denying an
original petition for prohibition
against the enforcement by
criminal prosecution of Act No.
2972 of the Philippine Legislature,

known
as
the
Chinese
Bookkeeping Act, on the ground
of its invalidity.
-No. 2972. An act to provide in
what languages account books
shall be kept, and to establish
penalties for its violation.
-'Section 1. It shall be unlawful for
any
person,
company,
or
partnership
or
corporation
engaged in commerce, industry or
any other activity for the purpose
of profit in the Philippine Islands,
in accordance with existing law,
to keep its account books in any
language other than English,
Spanish or any local dialect.
-The petition, after setting out the
prosecution in the court of first
instance, and the text of the act,
avers that the petitioner Yu Cong
Eng is a Chinese merchant
engaged in the wholesale lumber
business in Manila; that he
neither
reads,
writes
nor
understands
the
English
or
Spanish language or any local
dialect.
-Even if he should employ a
bookkeeper capable of keeping
his books in the English or
Spanish language, he would have
no means of personally revising or
ascertaining the contents or
correctness of the books.
-Under the provisions of the act
he is prohibited from even
keeping a duplicate set of
accounts in his own language,
and would, in the event of the
enforcement of the law, be
compelled to remain in total
ignorance of the status of his
business.
-The petitioners aver that the act,
if enforced, will deprive the
petitioners,
and
the
12,000
Chinese merchants whom they
represent, of their liberty and

property without due process of

law, and deny them the equal
protection of the laws, in violation
of the Philippine Autonomy Act of
Congress.
-The defendants on the other
hand aver that it is valid and
necessary exercise of legislative
power, and that due to the
inability of the officials of the
internal revenue to revise and
check up properly the correctness
of the books of account which the
Chinese merchants keep in their
own language, the public treasury
loses every year very large sums.
ISSUE: WON the law is violative
of due process?
HELD:
-We fully concede that it is the
duty of a court in considering the
validity of an act to give it such
reasonable construction as can be
reached to bring it within the
fundamental law. But it is very
clear that amendment may not be
substituted for construction, and
that a court may not exercise
legislative functions to save the
law
from
conflict
with
constitutional limitation.
-If we change it to meet the needs
suggested by other laws and
fiscal regulations and by the
supposed general purpose of the
legislation, we are creating by
construction
a
vague
requirement,
and
one
objectionable
in
a
criminal
statute.
-In view of the history of the
Islands and of the conditions
there prevailing, we think the law
to be invalid, because it deprives
Chinese persons situated as they
are, with their extensive and
important
business
long

established, of their liberty and

property without due process of
law, and denies them the equal
protection of the laws.
-Without them such merchants
would be a prey to all kinds of
fraud and without possibility of
adopting any safe policy. It would
greatly and disastrously curtail
their liberty of action, and be
oppressive and damaging in the
preservation of their property. We
agree with the Philippine Supreme
Court in thinking that the statute
construed as we think it must be
construed is invalid.
-To justify the state in thus
interposing its authority in behalf
of the public, it must appear, first,
that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class,
requires such interference; and,
second, that the means are
reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose,
and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.
-While
this
court
has
not
attempted
to
define
with
exactness
the
liberty
thus
guaranteed,
the
term
has
received much consideration and
some of the included things have
been definitely stated. Without
doubt, it denotes not merely
freedom from bodily restraint but
also the right of the individual to
contract, to engage in any of the
common occupations of life, to
acquire useful knowledge, to
marry, establish a home and bring
up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of his
own conscience, and generally to
enjoy
those
privileges
long
recognized at common law as
essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men.

and in line with the constitution

national interest and survival.
ISSUE: WON the law is a violation
of due process?
Ichong vs Hernandez 11 Phil
1155 (May 31, 1957)
Labrador, J.
FACTS:
-Petitioner
challenges
the
constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to
Regulate the Retail Business." In
effect it nationalizes the retail
trade
business.
The
main
provisions of the Act are: (1) a
prohibition against persons, not
citizens of the Philippines, and
against
associations,
partnerships, or corporations the
capital of which are not wholly
owned
by
citizens
of
the
Philippines,
from
engaging
directly or indirectly in the retail
trade.
-Exception
from
the
above
prohibition in favor of aliens
actually engaged in said business
on May 15, 1954, who are allowed
to continue to engaged therein,
unless their licenses are forfeited
in accordance with the law, until
their
death
or
voluntary
retirement in case of natural
persons, and for ten years after
the approval of the Act or until the
expiration of term in case of
juridical persons;
-Petitioner argues that it violated
the equal protection clause, their
right to due process, one-subjectone-title rule, violated intl treaty
obligations.
-Respondent argues that the law
is a valid exercise of police power

HELD:
-It is not a violation of equal
protection clause. The mere fact
of alienage is the root and cause
of the distinction between the
alien and the national as a trader.
The alien resident owes allegiance
to the country of his birth or his
adopted country; his stay here is
for personal convenience; he is
attracted by the lure of gain and
profit. His aim or purpose of stay,
we admit, is neither illegitimate
nor immoral, but he is naturally
lacking in that spirit of loyalty and
enthusiasm for this country where
he temporarily stays and makes
his living, or of that spirit of
regard,
sympathy
and
consideration for his Filipino
customers as would prevent him
from taking advantage of their
weakness and exploiting them.
-The classification is actual, real
and reasonable, and all persons of
one class are treated alike, and as
it cannot be said that the
classification
is
patently
unreasonable and unfounded, it is
in duty bound to declare that the
legislature
acted
within
its
legitimate prerogative and it can
not
declare
that
the
act
transcends the limit of equal
protection established by the
Constitution.
-The law in question is deemed
absolutely necessary to bring
about the desired legislative
objective, i.e., to free national
economy from alien control and
dominance. It is not necessarily
unreasonable because it affects

private rights and privileges (11

Am. Jur. pp. 1080-1081.) The test
of reasonableness of a law is the
appropriateness
or
adequacy
under all circumstances of the
means adopted to carry out its
purpose into effect (Id.) Judged by
this test, disputed legislation,
which is not merely reasonable
but actually necessary, must be
considered not to have infringed
the constitutional limitation of
reasonableness. The approval of
the bill is necessary for the
national survival.
-A cursory study of the provisions
of the law immediately reveals
how tolerant, how reasonable the
Legislature has been. The law is
made prospective and recognizes
the right and privilege of those
already
engaged
in
the
occupation to continue therein
during the rest of their lives; and
similar recognition of the right to
continue is accorded associations
of aliens. The right or privilege is
denied to those only upon
conviction of certain offenses. In
the deliberations of the Court on
this case, attention was called to
the fact that the privilege should
not have been denied to children
and heirs of aliens now engaged
in the retail trade. Such provision
would defeat the law itself, its
aims and purposes. Beside, the
exercise of legislative discretion is
not subject to judicial review
-Many of these arguments are
directed against the supposed
wisdom of the law which lies
solely
within
the
legislative
prerogative; they do not import
invalidity.
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

A. TWIN REQUIREMENTS OF
NOTICE AND HEARING
CASE:
Vinta Maritime Co., Inc. v.
NLRC, 284 SCRA 656 (January
23, 1998)
Panganiban, J.
FACTS:
-Leonides C. Basconcillo, herein
private
respondent,
filed
a
complaint with the Philippine
Overseas
Employment
Administration (POEA) Workers
Assistance and Adjudication Office
for illegal dismissal against Vinta
Maritime Co., Inc. and Elkano Ship
Management,
Inc.,
herein
petitioners. In
their
answer,
petitioners alleged that private
respondent was dismissed for his
gross
negligence
and
incompetent performance as chief
engineer of the M/V Boracay.
-He closed off the air valve
(*despite the sign), failed to
change the sea suctions resulting
to overheating, false assurance of
the fuel situation and failure to
discipline
his
subordinates.
Contrary to [private respondents]
allegations, he was given fair
warning and enough opportunity
to explain his side in the
foregoing
incidents,
not
to
mention all the chances given to
him to improve his substandard
work performance before he was
dismissed.
- He denied having been given a
chance to explain his side
regarding
the
mentioned
incidents, the truth being that he
was surprised when he was told of
his dismissal. Petitioners filed their
position paper and supporting
documents which however failed

to rebut private respondents

allegations. Moreover, he argued
that it was not his fault because
the air valve incident was the
pilots error, the overheating was
caused by ice clogging in the
inlet, the stopping of operation
was caused by another, denied
the false fuel assurance, and
denied that there was unrest in
his subordinates.
-No inquiry or investigation,
however, regarding his supposed
incompetence or negligence was
ever conducted; neither was
private respondent furnished with
a
notice
or
memorandum
regarding the cause of his
dismissal.
They
argue
that
hearing was indispensable.
-POEA ruled that respondent was
illegally dismissed, entitled to
payment of 17, 875 dollars. NLRC
affirmed the decision and denied
the MR.
ISSUE: WON the respondent was
afforded due process?
HELD:
- Although bound by law and
practice to observe due process,
administrative
agencies
exercising quasi-judicial powers
are nonetheless free from the
rigidity of certain procedural
requirements. As applied to these
proceedings, due process requires
only an opportunity to explain
ones side
- For an employees dismissal to
be valid, (1) the dismissal must be
for a valid cause and (2) the
employee must be afforded due
process. Article 282 of the Labor
Code lists the following causes for
termination of employment by the
employer: (1) serious misconduct
or willful disobedience of lawful

orders in connection with his or

her work, (2) gross and habitual
neglect of duties, (3) fraud or
willful breach of trust, (4)
commission of a crime or an
offense against the person of the
employer or his immediate family
member or representative, and
(5) analogous cases.
- There has been no valid cause of
the
respondents
dismissal
because the allegations were not
supported by evidence due to the
high ratings of the respondent in
the books.
-Moreover, the twin requirements
of notice and hearing constitute
the essential elements of due
process, and neither of these
elements can be eliminated
without running afoul of the
constitutional guaranty.
-Using these legal criteria, we
hold that private respondent was
illegally dismissed. No notice was
ever given to him prior to his
dismissal. This
fact
alone
disproves petitioners allegation
that private respondent was given
fair
warning
and
enough
opportunity to explain his side
[regarding] the incidents that led
to his dismissal.
B. NO AWARD OF RELIEF
NOT PRAYED FOR
-If not prayed in the pleadings of
the parties, the courts cannot add
or delve on that matter except
when it is necessary for the
determination of the case.
-An award may not be given if it is
not prayed for by the parties, and
the courts cannot have discretion
in this.

ISSUE: WON EO 626 constitute a

violation of due process?

C. JUDICIAL DUE PROCESS

1. Impartial
Competent Court
Cases:

and

Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA 659

(March 20, 1987)
Cruz, J.
FACTS:
-There had been an existing law
which prohibited the slaughtering
of
carabaos
(EO
626).
To
strengthen the law, Marcos issued
EO 626-A which not only banned
the movement of carabaos from
interprovinces but as well as the
movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan
1984,
Ynot
was
caught
transporting 6 carabaos from
Masbate to Iloilo. He was then
charged in violation of EO 626-A.
Ynot averred EO 626-A as
unconstitutional for it violated his
right to be heard or his right to
due process. He said that the
authority provided by EO 626-A to
outrightly confiscate carabaos
even without being heard is
unconstitutional. The lower court
ruled against Ynot ruling that the
EO is a valid exercise of police
power in order to promote general
welfare so as to curb down the
indiscriminate
slaughter
of
carabaos.
- His claim is that the penalty is
invalid because it is imposed
without according the owner a
right to be heard before a
competent and impartial court as
guaranteed by due process

HELD:
- The SC ruled that the EO is not
valid as it indeed violates due
process. EO 626-A created a
presumption
based
on
the
judgment of the executive. The
movement of carabaos from one
area to the other does not mean a
subsequent slaughter of the same
would ensue. Ynot should be
given to defend himself and
explain why the carabaos are
being transferred before they can
be confiscated.
-In
the
exceptional
cases
accepted, however, there is a
justification for the omission of
the right to a previous hearing, to
wit, the immediacy of the problem
sought to be corrected and
the urgency of the need to correct
it.
-In the case before us, there was
no such pressure of time or action
calling
for
the
petitioner's
peremptory
treatment.
The
properties involved were not even
inimical per se as to require their
instant
destruction.
There
certainly was no reason why the
offense
prohibited
by
the
executive order should not have
been proved first in a court of
justice, with the accused being
accorded
all
the
rights
safeguarded to him under the
Constitution.
Javier v. COMELEC, 144 SCRA
194 (September 22, 1986)
Cruz, J.
FACTS:
-Petitioner
proclamation

challenges
the
of
Respondent

Pacificador, a member of KBL

under Marcos, for the allegedly
massive terrorism, vote-buying,
fraud, duress and intimidation of
the latters men.
-Comelec
then
referred
the
complaints to the AFP and the 2 nd
Division ordered the proclamation
to be stayed but proceed with the
canvassing, then later on ordered
the proclamation.
-Commissioner Opinion, one of
the Commissioners should inhibit
himself as he was a former law
partner of Pacificador. Also, the
proclamation was made by only
the 2ndDivision but the Constitute
requires that it be proclaimed by
the COMELEC en banc. Then later
on the Petitioner was killed.
-The OSG moved to dismiss the
case
for
being
moot
and
academic because of the abolition
of Batasang Pambansa and the
office dispute between the two,
however it was denied due to the
importance of the subject matter
and necessity of deciding the
case.
- The petitioner complains that
the Proclamation made by the
Second Division is invalid because
all
contests
involving
the
members
of
the
Batasang
Pambansa
come
under
the
jurisdiction of the Commission on
Elections en banc.
- The respondents, for their part,
argue that only contests need to
be
heard
and
decided en
banc and all other cases can be-in
fact, should be-filed
with
and
decided only by any of the three
divisions
-The OSG argues that since there
was no proclamation yet, there
was no contest yet since it
involves contention for the same
office.

- This decision was signed by

Chairman Victoriano Savellano
and Commissioners Jaime Opinion
and
Froilan
M.
Bacungan.
Previously asked to inhibit himself
on the ground that he was a
former law partner of private
respondent Pacificador, Opinion
had refused
ISSUES: WON the petitioner was
denied due process?
HELD:
- This interpretation would give to
the part more powers than were
enjoyed by the whole, granting to
the division while denying to
the banc. We do not think this
was
the
intention
of
the
Constitution.
- As correctly observed by the
petitioner, the purpose of Section
3 in requiring that cases involving
members
of
the
Batasang
Pambansa be heard and decided
by the Commission en banc was
to insure the most careful
consideration of such cases.
- It may be argued that in
conferring the initial power to
decide the pre- proclamation
question upon the division, the
Constitution did not intend to
prevent
the
Commission en
banc from exercising the power
directly, on the theory that the
greater power embraces the
lesser
-Yes. Asked to inhibit himself
(Commissioner Opinion) on the
ground that he was formerly a law
partner of the private respondent,
he
obstinately
insisted
on
participating in the case, denying
he was biased.
- This Court has repeatedly and
consistently demanded "the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge"

as the indispensable imperative of

due process.
To bolster that requirement, we
have held that the judge must not
only be impartial but must also
appear to be impartial as an
added assurance to the parties
that
his
decision
will
be
just. 16 The litigants are entitled to
no less than that. They should be
sure that when their rights are
violated they can go to a judge
who shall give them justice. They
must trust the judge, otherwise
they will not go to him at all. They
must believe in his sense of
fairness, otherwise they will not
seek his judgment.
- Due process is intended to
insure
that
confidence
by
requiring compliance with what
Justice
Frankfurter
calls
the
rudiments of fair play. Fair play
calls for equal justice. There
cannot be equal justice where a
suitor approaches a court already
committed to the other party and
with a judgment already made
and waiting only to be formalized
after the litigants shall have
undergone the charade of a
formal hearing. Judicial (and also
extrajudicial) proceedings are not
orchestrated plays in which the
parties are supposed to make the
motions
and
reach
the
denouement according to a
prepared script. There is no writer
to foreordain the ending. The
judge will reach his conclusions
only after all the evidence is in
and all the arguments are filed,
on the basis of the established
facts and the pertinent law.

Paderanga v. Azura, 136 SCRA

266 (April 30, 1985)

Melencio-Herrera, J.
FACTS:
- Petitioner, as City Mayor of
Gingoog City, seeks to annul
respondent Judge's Order denying
the Motion for Inhibition which he
(petitioner) had filed.
-The grounds were:
1. Loss of trust and confidence in
the competence and impartiality
of respondent Judge, particularly
in view of the administrative
complaints filed against him by
petitioner and others before this
Court.
2. Entertaining suits assailing the
validity of auction sales of tax
delinquent properties by issuing
restraining orders enjoining the
City Treasurer of Gingoog City
from proceeding with the auction
sales of said properties when
under Sec. 64 and 83 of P.D. 464,
the remedy to stay execution of
auction sales of tax delinquent
properties is by paying the tax,
pursuant to Sec. 74 of P.D. 464,
supra, and not by issuance of
restraining orders;
3. Bias, oppressive dispensation
of justice, and abuse of his power
of contempt in ordering the arrest
of petitioner and the members of
the Sangguniang Panglunsod of
Gingoog City and imposing upon
them an excessive fine of
P10,000.00 and an excessive
bond of P50,000.00 when the
claim for salary was only for
P5,000.00,
and
by
sensationalizing their arrest with
the
aid
of
the
Provincial
Commander at Campa Alagar,
Cagayan de Oro City, as if they
were hardened criminals and
fugitives from justice, for the
purpose of embarrassing them
before the public.

4. Issuing of Orders against the

interests of the City of Gingoog
-Respondent argues that the loss
of
trust
of
petitioner
was
unfounded and the inhibition was
prompted more because the
petitioners
counsel
was
persisting
on
his
grotesque
arguments and haughty conduct.
Moreover, the punishments or
contempt was just imposed in
obedience the rules which were
violated.

assigned by raffle to the Regional

Trial Courts thereat.
2. Jurisdiction
a. How acquired:
i. In
actions
in
personam

ISSUE: WON the judge should

inhibit himself?
HELD:
-A judge may not be legally
prohibited from sitting in a
litigation But when suggestion is
made of record that he might be
induced to act in favor of one
party or with bias or prejudice
against a litigant arising out of
circumstances
reasonably
capable of inciting such a state of
mind, he should conduct a careful
self- examination. He should
exercise his discretion in a way
that the people's faith in the
courts of justice is not impaired
-The reminder is also apropos that
next in importance to the duty of
rendering a righteous judgment is
that of doing it in such a manner
as will beget no suspicion of the
fairness and integrity of the judge
...
-ACCORDINGLY, respondent Judge
is hereby ordered to inhibit
himself from hearing the cases
enumerated in paragraph 4 of the
Petition involving the City of
Gingoog or its officials, including
petitioner. The venue of said
cases is hereby transferred to
Cagayan de Oro City each to be

ii. In
actions
in rem or
quasi
in
rem

3. Notice and Hearing

Cases:
David v. Aquilizan, 94 SCRA
707(December 14, 1979)
Santos, J.
FACTS:
- Earlier or on February 17, 1976,
the herein private respondents,
Felomeno and Ricardo Jugar
brothers, filed against Felimon C.
David,
herein
petitioner,
a
"Petition for Reinstatement" in the
CAR, 15th Regional District,
Branch II, Cotabato City.

- They alleged, inter alia, that

sometime in 1971, they were
installed as share tenants by
petitioner over separate portions
of the latter's landholding situated
at Polomolok, South Cotabato,
each portion having a seeding
(corn) capacity of two (2)
hectares, more or less, their
sharing agreement being 50-50%
of the net produce.
- In the middle part of 1973,
private respondents were no
longer allowed to continue their
cultivation of the subject lots as
petitioner-landholder
prohibited
them from doing so and took
possession of said lots for no
reason at all.
- And despite the intervention of
the
DAR
petitioner-landholder
refused and still refuses to
reinstate them.
-Petitioner alleges that private
respondents
voluntarily
surrendered their landholdings as
follows: "...Ricardo, in September,
1972, after he resigned as tractor
driver
of
respondent
(now
petitioner), due to ill health; and
later on as farm tenant of his
father; Felomeno Jugar voluntarily
surrendered his landholdings after
he sold his working animals, and
later, he continued his religious
faith healing occupation and as
farm tenant of his father
- Three months later, or on
September 29, 1979, respondent
Judge without conducting any
hearing rendered judgment for
private respondents and against
herein petitioner finding that
"...plaintiffs
Ricardo
and
Felomeno, both surnamed Jugar
(now private respondents) were
tenants of defendant Filemon C.
David (petitioner herein) at the
time PD 27 was promulgated on

October
21,
1972," 10 and
thereafter
declared
them
"owners" thereof
-Petitioner allege that he has been
denied due process and that the
judge has no jurisdiction and the
facts
were
arrived
without
hearing.
- respondent Judge Aquilizan did
not deny the lack of hearings
alleged in the petition, but
interposed the defense that the
subject decision has already
become "... final and executory
after the lapse of the period for
the perfection of an appeal ..."
and "... there is no showing that
an appeal was brought to the
Appellate Court
ISSUE: WON the petitioner has
been
denied
due
process?
HELD:
- Respondent judge did not
conduct any hearing in the case
prior
to
issuance
of
the
challenged
decision,
the
ineluctible conclusion is that the
challenged decision is null and
void for want of due process. The
following requisites, as set forth in
a leading case before the 1935
Constitution took effect, must
concur for procedural due process
in civil cases: "(1) There must be
a court or tribunal clothed with
judicial power to hear and
determine the matter before it;
(2) jurisdiction must be lawfully
acquired over the person of the
defendant or over the property
which is the subject of the
proceeding; (3) the defendant
must be given an opportunity to
be heard; and (4)judgment must
be rendered upon lawful hearing."

- Being null and void from its

inception, the decision sought to
be set aside does not exist in the
eyes of the law because it is "as
though it had not been done. In
legal contemplation, it is no
judgment at all. "By it, no rights
are divested. From it, no rights
can be obtained. Being worthless
in itself, all proceedings founded
upon it are equally worthless.
WHEREFORE,
petition
is
GRANTED and the challenged
order and decision are hereby SET
ASIDE. Respondent judge is
hereby
directed
to
conduct
appropriate proceedings in the
case. This decision is immediately
executory. No costs.

was extrajudicially foreclosed,

without citing Bautista.
- an action (Civil Case No. 870)
was filed by Rufino Ramos and
Juan Ramos in the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija against
the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines and the RFC (as
successor in interest of Bautista)
claiming ownership of the land in
question
and
seeking
the
annulment of T.C.T. No. 2336 in
the name of the Government,
O.C.T. No. P-389 in the name of
Bautista and T.C.TG. No. NT-12108
in the name of the RFC.
- The lower court dismissed the
complaint,
stating
that
the
annulment of Lourdes' title was a
proceeding ex parte as far as she
was concerned and could not bind
her at all;

DBP v. Bautista, 26 SCRA 366

(November 29, 1968)
Fernando, J.

ISSUE: WON the nullification of

title was valid?

FACTS:
- The Development Bank of the
Philippines now appellant, filed a
complaint against one of its
debtors, Lourdes Gaspar Bautista,
now appellee, for the recovery of
a sum of money representing the
unpaid mortgage indebtedness.
After the bank had acquired title,
it was nullified as it belonged to
another
claimant
without
however, the debtor being cited
to appear in the court action.
- "On July 16, 1949, Bautista
applied for a loan with the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation
(RFC), predecessor in interest of
the
plaintiff-appellee
Development
Bank
of
the
Philippines (DBP), offering as
security the parcel of land. It was
approved and later on the land

HELD:
-Yes.
The
fundamental
due
process requirement having been
disregarded, appellee Bautista
could not in any wise be made to
suffer,
whether
directly
or
indirectly, from the effects of such
decision. After appellant bank had
acquired her title by such
extrajudicial foreclosure sale and
thus, through its own act, seen to
it that her obligation had been
satisfied, it could not thereafter,
seek to revive the same on the
allegation that the title in
question
was
subsequently
annulled, considering that she
was not made a party on the
occasion of such nullification.
- If it were otherwise, then the
cardinal requirement that no
party should be made to suffer in
person or property without being

given a hearing would be brushed

aside. The doctrine consistently
adhered
to
by
this
Court
whenever such a question arises
in a series of decisions is that a
denial of due process suffices to
cast on the official act taken by
whatever
branch
of
the
government the impress of nullity
- In such a case, it is wisely
provided by the Civil Code that
appellee Bautista, as vendor,
should have been summoned and
given the opportunity to defend
herself. In view of her being
denied her day in court, it would
to be respected, that she is not
"obliged to made good the proper
warranty."

Lorenzana v. Cayetano, 78
SCRA 485 (August 31, 1977)1
Guerrero, J.
FACTS:
- In 1958, petitioner filled in the
Municipal
Court
of
Manila
ejectment cases for non-payment
of rentals against her tenants
occupying different stalls in that
quonset hut situated in the San
Lazaro Estate (corner of C.M.
Recto St. and Quezon Blvd.,
Manila
- The private respondent, on the
other hand, occupied the area
north of the quonset hut which
area was also leased by her from
the Manila Railroad Company and
1 A man's house is his castle
where the wind may enter, the
rain may enter but neither the
King nor the King's men may
enter without the consent of the
owner.

subsequently from the Bureau of

Lands, and on which her house
stood. Hence, the areas occupied
by the two principal protagonists
are adjacent to each other.
-RTC affirmed the decision of the
MTC in favor of petitioners. and
ordered the defendants-tenants to
vacate the premises leased. Upon
refusal of the tenants to vacate
the premises, the court granted a
partial execution of the judgment
and on July 20, 1959, a writ of
demolition was issued, specifically
commanding the Sheriff of Manila
"to demolish the premises subject
of the above-name cases"
- Petitioner together with her
counsel, Atty. Nereo Paculdo and
Deputy Sheriff Jose L. Cruz
proceeded
and
entered
the
premises of the respondent and in
spite of her protests that she was
not a party to the ejectment
cases in which the demolition
order was secured and that her
premises was not subject of said
ejectment cases, they destroyed
the latter's fence including flower
pots
trellises
and
electric
installations and carted away the
materials
thereof
and
built
another fence 5 meters into the
premises of the respondent,
boring holes into the cemented
garden or patio of her house.
After the petitioner went to the
house of the respondent twice,
moving the fence, the respondent
filed a complaint in court.
- The respondent Polly Cayetano
filed in the Court of First Instance
of Manila against the petitioner
Anita U. Lorenzana, Atty. Nereo J.
Paculdo and Deputy Sheriff Jose L.
Cruz for damages with mandatory
injunction. Defendants moved to
dismiss. It was dismissed, as well
as the MR but the CA reversed the

decision
and
ordered
the
petitioners to pay, 5,500 for
actual and moral damages.
- The petitioner contends that the
respondent having voluntarily
appeared before the court and
invoked its jurisdiction seeking
affirmative relief by filing on
August 3, 1959, a petition to
declare Lorenzana, Atty. Paculdo
and Sheriff Cruz in contempt and
holding them liable in damages,
thus she could no longer question
the validity of the writ. And that
because she was heard in court,
she was not deprived of due
process.
ISSUE: WON the respondents
were afforded due process, being
heard in court?
HELD:
-No. It must be noted that
respondent was not a party to any
of the 12 ejectment cases
wherein the writs of demolition
had been issued; she did not
make her appearance in and
during the pendency of these
ejectment cases. Respondent only
went to court to protect her
property from demolition after the
judgment in the ejectment cases
had become final and executory.
Hence, with respect to the
judgment in said ejectment cases,
respondent
remains
a
third
person to such judgment, which
does not bind her.
- Indeed, respondent was heard
but simply hearing her did not
fulfill the basic conditions of
procedural due process in courts.
When
respondent
appeared
before the court to protect and
preserve her property, the Court
had
not
lawfully
acquired
jurisdiction over the property of

the respondent because the

premises of the respondent was
not included in the ejectment
cases and the judgment in said
cases could not affect her
property, much less demolish the
same
- It may be laid down with
certainty that the requirements of
due process is satisfied if the
following conditions are present
namely: (1) There must be a court
or tribunal clothed with judicial
power to hear and determine the
matter before it; (2) jurisdiction
must be lawfully acquired over
the person of the defendant or
over the property which is the
subject of the proceedings: (3)
the defendant must be given an
opportunity to be heard; and (4)
judgment must be rendered upon
lawful hearing.
The
judgment
and
the
demolition orders were valid and
binding to the tenants but not to
the respondent and her property.
Fundamentally, it is the wrongful
execution of the judgment and
the writ that is the basis of the
claim for damages.

Pp. v Beriales, 70 SCRA 361

(April 7, 1976)
Concepcion, Jr., J.
FACTS:
- Appeal from the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Leyte,
Branch V, Ormoc City, in Criminal
Case No. 562-0, convicting the
accused
Ricardo
Beriales
Benedicto Custodio and Pablito
Custodio of the crime of murder,
for killing Saturnina Porcadilla.

- At the hearing of November 26,

1974, appellants' counsel moved
for a reinvestigation of said case,
along with two other related cases
which the court a quo granted.
- On December 3, 1974, the trial
court postponed the hearing of
the case to December 17 and 18,
1974. 5 in view of the City Fiscal's
motion "for a deferment of the
hearing or trial set for December
5 and 6, 1974 until such time the
REINVESTIGATION shall have been
terminated for which the result of
said
reinvestigation
will
be
submitted to this Honorable Court
for its resolution in the premises.
- When the case was called for
hearing on December 13, 1974,
counsel for the appellant asked
the court to wait for the City Fiscal
to
appear,
since
the
reinvestigation of the case had
already been terminated and the
Fiscal, if given a chance, might be
able
to
report
on
said
reinvestigation. The trial court,
however, insisted in arraigning
the appellants. When arraigned,
the three appellants declined to
plead, saying: "I am not going to
answer the question because the
Fiscal
is
not
yet
around." Thereupon,
the
trial
court entered a plea of "Not
Guilty" for each of them.
-Without
the
fiscal
the
presentation of evidence was
ordered by the court through the
private prosecutor. The refusal of
the counsel for the defense to
cross-examine due to the absence
of the Fiscal was taken by the
court as a waiver of such right.
Even in the presentation of the
evidence for the defense, they
still reiterated their position that it
is necessary for them to see the
result of the reinvestigation of the

fiscal.
Then
the
case
was
submitted for decision.
-The appellants argued that they
were denied of due process
because they did not consent to
the trial.
ISSUE: WON the appellants were
denied due process?
HELD:
-Yes. After the trial court granted
the
appellants'
motion
for
reinvestigation,
it
became
incumbent upon the court to hold
in abeyance the arraignment and
trial of the case until the City
Fiscal shall have conducted and
made his report on the result of
such reinvestigation.
- That was a matter of duty on its
part, not only to be consistent
with its own order but also to do
justice aid at the same time to
avoid a possible miscarriage of
justice. It should be borne in
mind, that the appellants herein
were charged with the serious
crime of murder, and considering
that
their
motion
for
reinvestigation is based upon the
ground
that
it
was
Felipe
Porcadilla (husband and father,
respectively, of the two deceased,
Saturnina Porcadilla and Quirino
Porcadilla) who was the aggressor
for having attacked and seriously
wounded
appellant
Pablito
Custodio. It committed a serious
irregularity which nullifies the
proceedings below because such
a procedure is repugnant to the
due process clause of the
Constitution.
- "to permit such prosecution of a
criminal case by the private
prosecutor
with
the
fiscal
in absentia can set an obnoxious
precedent that can be taken

advantage of by some indolent

members of the prosecuting arm
of the government.

Republic v. Sandiganbayan,
239 SCRA 529 (December 28,
1994)
Bellosillo, J.
FACTS:
- Challenged in this petition
for certiorari (with prayer for writ
of
preliminary
injunction
or
temporary restraining order) is
the
resolution
of
public
respondent
Sandiganbayan
(Second
Division)
dated
28
October 1992 which lifted its
order of default of 6 April 1989
against private respondent Imelda
R. Marcos in connection with the
now
well-known
"ill-gotten
wealth" cases pending before said
court as well as the resolution of 6
January 1993 denying the motion
to reconsider the order of 28
October 1992.
- The propriety of the grounds and
circumstances set forth by private
respondent to justify her failure to
file her answers, which the
Sandiganbayan considered as
meritorious when it lifted the
default order on 28 October 1992.
As the causes of action are
different, res judicata cannot be
invoked.
-The propriety of the grounds and
circumstances set forth by private
respondent to justify her failure to
file her answers, which the
Sandiganbayan considered as
meritorious when it lifted the
default order on 28 October 1992.
As the causes of action are
different, res judicata cannot be
invoked.

ISSUE: WON the Sandiganbayan

erred in its decision?
HELD:
- No. Aside from the foregoing
considerations,
the
most
elementary sense of fairness and
liberality
appears
to
have
prompted the Sandiganbayan to
lift
the
order
of
default.
Significantly, it is the avowed
policy of the law to accord both
parties every opportunity to
pursue and defend their cases in
the open and relegate technicality
to the background in the interest
of substantial justice. After all,
petitioner had applied, on several
occasions, for leave to file
amended or expanded complaints
which applications were invariably
granted,
notwithstanding
the
resulting delay. Perhaps, it is now
the turn of private respondent to
be the recipient of and enjoy the
same procedural liberality if not
compassion.

1. Right to Appeal
a. Not Essential to the
Right to a Hearing
b. Exception:
i. If
the
law
allows appeal
ii. Cases
under
the minimum
appellate
jurisdiction of
the SC
Case:
Calano v. Cruz, 94 Phil. 230
(January 12, 1954)
Montemayor, J.
FACTS:
- As a result of the 1951 elections
respondent
Pedro
Cruz
was
proclaimed a councilor-elect in the
municipality of Orion, Bataan, by
the Municipal Board of Canvasser.
Petitioner Pedro Calano filed a
complaint or petition for quo
warranto under section 173 of the
Revised election code (Republic
Act No. 180), contesting the right
of Cruz to the office on the ground
that Cruz was not eligible for the
office of municipal councilor.
- Although the petition might be
regarded as somewhat defective
for failure to state a sufficient
cause of action, said question was
not raised in the motion to
dismiss because the ground relied
upon, namely, that petitioner had
no legal capacity to sue, did not
refer to the failure to state a
sufficient cause of action but
rather
to minority,
insanity,
coverture,
lack
of
juridical
personality,
or
nay
other
disqualification of a party. As a
result, the order of dismissal was

reversed and the case was

remanded to the court of origin
for further proceedings.
-However
it
was
dismissed
because it was filed out of time
and petitioner has no legal
capacity
as
contended
by
respondent. The higher court held
that it was filed within the
specified time and was remanded.
-Respondent moved to dismiss for
lack of cause of action. It was
sustained by the CFI, then the
petitioners appealed. However,
Respondent argues that under the
law there is no appeal from a
decision of a court of First
Instance in protests against the
eligibility
or
election
of
a
municipal councilor, the appeal
being limited to election contests
involving the offices of Provincial
governor,
Members
of
the
Provincial Board, City Councilors
and City Mayors, this under
section 178 of the Revised
Election Code.
ISSUE: WON the contention of
respondent is correct?
HELD:
-Yes. section 178 of the Revised
election code limiting appeals
from decisions of Courts of First
Instance in election contests over
the offices of Provincial Governor,
members of the Provincial Board,
City Councilors and City Mayors,
did not intend to prohibit or
prevent the appeal to the
Supreme
Court
in
protests
involving purely questions of law,
that is to say, that protests
involving other officers such as
municipal councilor may be
appealed provided that only legal
questions are involved in the

appeal. Consequently, the appeal

in the present case involving as it
does purely questions of law is
proper.
- In view of the foregoing, the
failure of Calano to allege that he
is entitled to the office of
councilor now occupied by the
respondent Cruz does not effect
the sufficiency of his cause of
action. Reversing the order of
dismissal, the case is hereby
remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings.

2. Exceptions
to
Requirements of Hearing
a. Abatement
of
nuisance per se
b. In
cases
where
statutory
presumptions
are
applicable
Judgment
1. Must be based on the
facts and the law (Sec.
14, Article 8 of the
Constitution2)
2 Section 14. No decision shall be
rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based.No petition for
review or motion for
reconsideration of a decision of
the court shall be refused due
course or denied without stating
the legal basis therefor.

2. Must conform to and be

supported by pleadings
and evidence
Case:
Diona v. Balangue,
173559 (Jan 7, 2013)
Del Castillo, J.

GR No.

FACTS:
- This Petition for Review on
Certiorari assails the November
24, 2005 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals which annulled a
portion of the decision of the RTC
granting 5% monthly interest.
- On March 2, 1991, respondents
obtained a loan of P45,000.00
from petitioner payable in six
months and secured by a Real
Estate Mortgage over their 202square meter property located in
Marulas, Valenzuela and covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. V-12296. When the debt
became due, respondents failed
to pay notwithstanding demand.
Petitioner
then
asked
for
foreclosure with other damages
prayed for.
-Due to the failure of respondents
to answer, the case was set ex
parte.
-Respondent seek to annul the
judgment because not all of them
(Sonny)
have
been
served
summons.
-Since the writ of execution could
not be satisfied, petitioner asked
the court that the property be
auctioned (*which was granted).
The petitioner was the only bidder
(420k), hence the title was in his
favor.
- Respondents then filed a Motion
to Correct/Amend Judgment and

To Set Aside Execution Sale dated

December 17, 2001, claiming that
the parties did not agree in
writing on any rate of interest and
that petitioner merely sought for
a 12% per annum interest in her
Complaint. Surprisingly, the RTC
awarded 5% monthly interest (or
60% per annum) from March 2,
1991
until
full
payment.
Resultantly, their indebtedness
inclusive of the exorbitant interest
from March 2, 1991 to May 22,
2001 ballooned from P124,400.00
to P652,000.00. Then it was
granted.
-CA reversed the decision holding
that the RTC has no jurisdiction.
- They contended that the portion
of the RTC Decision granting
petitioner 5% monthly interest
rate is in gross violation of Section
3(d) of Rule 9 of the Rules of
Court and of their right to due
process. And there was no
interest in the verbal agreement
of parties
-Petitioners argue that annulment
of judgment could only be availed
of if there are no other remedies
available, and that the remedies
were not availed of due to
negligence of the partys counsel.
Moreover,
they
allege
the
immutability of judgment.
ISSUE: WON the respondent have
been denied due process?
HELD:
- We agree with respondents that
the award of 5% monthly interest
violated their right to due process
and, hence, the same may be set
aside in a Petition for Annulment
of Judgment filed under Rule 47 of
the Rules of Court.
- The rule on Annulment of
Judgment explicitly provides that

it is not available as a substitute

for a remedy which was lost due
to the partys own neglect in
promptly availing of the same.
- It is settled that courts cannot
grant a relief not prayed for in the
pleadings or in excess of what is
being sought by the party. They
cannot also grant a relief without
first ascertaining the evidence
presented in support thereof. Due
process considerations require
that judgments must conform to
and
be
supported
by
the
pleadings and evidence presented
in court
- The raison dtre in limiting the
extent of relief that may be
granted is that it cannot be
presumed that the defendant
would not file an Answer and
allow himself to be declared in
default had he known that the
plaintiff will be accorded a relief
greater than or different in kind
from
that
sought
in
the
Complaint. No doubt, the reason
behind Section 3(d), Rule 9 of the
Rules of Court is to safeguard
defendants right to due process
against unforeseen and arbitrarily
issued judgment
Ordinarily,
the
mistake,
negligence or lack of competence
of counsel binds the client. This is
based on the rule that any act
performed by a counsel within the
scope of his general or implied
authority is regarded as an act of
his client. A recognized exception
to the rule is when the lawyers
were grossly negligent in their
duty to maintain their clients
cause and such amounted to a
deprivation
of
their
clients
property without due process of
law
- In fine, respondents did not lose
the remedies of new trial, appeal,

petition for relief and other

remedies through their own fault.
It can only be attributed to the
gross negligence of their erstwhile
counsel which prevented them
from pursuing such remedies. We
cannot also blame respondents
for relying too much on their
former counsel. Clients have
reasonable expectations that their
lawyer would amply protect their
interest during the trial of the
case.

Administrative Due Process

Requisites:

Union Inc., is entirely false and

unsupported by the records of the
Bureau of Customs and the Books
of Accounts of native dealers in
leather.
- That the supposed lack of
leather materials claimed by
Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme
to systematically prevent the
forfeiture of this bond despite the
breach of his CONTRACT with the
Philippine Army.
- That the employer Toribio
Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor
practice for discriminating against
the National Labor Union, Inc.,
and unjustly favoring the National
Workers' Brotherhood.

Case:
Ang Tibay v. CIR, 60 Phil 635
(February 27, 1940)
Laurel, J.
FACTS:
- The respondent National Labor
Union, Inc., on the other hand,
prays for the vacation of the
judgment
rendered
by
the
majority of this Court and the
remanding of the case to the
Court of Industrial Relations for a
new trial.
- We have re-examined the entire
record of the proceedings had
before the Court of Industrial
Relations in this case, and we
have
found
no
substantial
evidence that the exclusion of the
89 laborers here was due to their
union affiliation or activity
-Respondent avers that Toribio
Teodoro's
claim
that
on
September 26, 1938, there was
shortage of leather soles in ANG
TIBAY making it necessary for him
to
temporarily
lay
off
the
members of the National Labor

ISSUE: WON Toribio Teodoro

validly observed principles of due
process in its termination?
HELD:
- No. The fact, however, that the
Court of Industrial Relations may
be said to be free from the rigidity
of
certain
procedural
requirements does not mean that
it can, in justifiable cases before
it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental
and
essential
requirements of due process in
trials and investigations of an
administrative character. There
are primary rights which must be
respected even in proceedings of
this character:
1. the right to a hearing, which
includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present
his own case and submit evidence
in support thereof
2. Not only must the party be
given an opportunity to present
his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights
which
he
asserts
but
the

tribunal must
consider the
evidence presented
3. While the duty to deliberate
does not impose the obligation to
decide right, it does imply a
necessity
which
cannot
be
disregarded, namely, that of
having something to support it is
a nullity, a place when directly
attached.
4. Not only must there be some
evidence to support a finding or
conclusion but the evidence must
be "substantial." It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind accept as adequate to
support a conclusion."
5. The decision must be rendered
on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in
the record and disclosed to the
parties affected.
6.
The
Court
of
Industrial
Relations or any of its judges,
therefore, must act on its or his
own independent consideration of
the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate
in arriving at a decision.
7.
The
Court
of
Industrial
Relations
should,
in
all
controversial questions, render its
decision in such a manner that
the parties to the proceeding can
know the various issues involved,
and the reasons for the decision
rendered
- By and large, after considerable
discussions, we have come to the
conclusion that the interest of
justice would be better served if
the movant is given opportunity
to present at the hearing the
documents referred to in his
motion and such other evidence
as may be relevant to the main
issue involved.

Review of decision by the

same officer who rendered it
previously
in
a
different
capacity
Cases:
Zambales Chromite v. CA, G.R.
No. L-49711 (Nov 7, 1979)
Aquino, J.
FACTS:
- The petitioners appealed from
the second decision of the Court
of Appeals, reversing its first
decision and holding that it was
improper
from
Benjamin
M.
Gozon, as Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, to affirm
his own decision as Director of
Mines.
- In Mines Administrative Case No.
V-227, Director Gozon issued an
order dated October 5, 1960
wherein he dismissed the case
filed by the petitioners or
protestants (Zambales Chromite
Mining Co., Inc. or the group of
Gonzalo P. Nava). In that case,
they sought to be declared the
rightful and prior locators and
possessors of sixty-nine mining
claims located in Santa Cruz,
Zambales.

- The petitioners appealed from

that order to the Secretary of
Agriculture
and
Natural
Resources. While the appeal was
pending, Director Gozon was
appointed Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources. Instead of
inhibiting himself, he decided the
appeal, DANR Case No. 2151, on
August 16, 1963 as it he was
adjudicating the case for the first
time. 'Thus, Secretary Gozon
exercised appellate jurisdiction
over a case which he had decided
as Director of Mines. He acted as
reviewing authority in the appeal
from his own decision
- On September 20, 1963, the
petitioners filed a complaint in the
Court
of
First
Instance
of
Zambales, assailing Secretary
Gozon's decision and praying that
they be declared the prior
locators and possessors of the
sixty-nine
mineral
claims
in
question. It was dismissed and
the lower court held that the rule
on a judge reviewing his own
decision does not apply to
administrative bodies and there
was no evidence that it was with
bias or hostility.
-CA reversed the decision of the
lower court found that the
petitioners (Nava group) had
discovered minerals and had
validly located the said sixty-nine
mining claims and that there was
no sufficient basis for Secretary
Gozon's findings.
ISSUE: WON Secretary Gozon
acted with grave abuse of
discretion?
HELD:
-Yes.
The
palpably
flagrant
anomaly of a Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources

reviewing his own decision as

Director of Mines is a mockery of
administrative justice
- In order that the review of the
decision of a subordinate officer
might not turn out to be a farce
the
reviewing
officer
must
perforce be other than the officer
whose decision is under review;
otherwise,
there
could
be
no different viewor there would
be no real review of the case. The
decision of the reviewing officer
would
be
a
biased
view;
inevitably, it would be the same
view since being human, he would
not admit that he was mistaken in
his first view of the case.
Petitioners-appellants
were
deprived of due process, meaning
fundamental
fairness,
when
Secretary Gozon reviewed his own
decision as Director of Mines
Anzaldo v. Clave, G.R. No. L54597 (Dec 15, 1982)
Aquino, J.
FACTS:
- Doctor Felicidad Estores-Anzaldo
55, seeks to annul the decision of
Presidential Executive Assistant
Jacobo C. Clave dated March 20,
1980, revoking her appointment
dated January 5, 1978 as Science
Research
Supervisor
IIand
directing the appointment to that
position of Doctor Eulalia L.
Venzon.
- At the time the vacancy
occurred, or on June 30, 1974,
both Doctors Anzaldo and Venzon
were holding similar positions in
the
Medical
Research
Department: that of Scientist
Research Associate IV
- Later, Doctor Pedro G. Afable,
Vice-Chairman,
became
the

Officer-in-Charge of the NIST.

Effective January 5, 1978, he
appointed Doctor Anzaldo to the
contested
position.
The
appointment was approved by the
Civil Service Commission.
-Dr. Venzon then appealed to the
office of the President.
-Chairman Clave of the Civil
Service
Commission
and
Commissioner Jose A. R. Melo
recommended in Resolution No.
1178 dated August 23, 1979 that
Doctor Venzon be appointed to
the
contested
position,
a
recommendation which is in
conflict
with
the
1978
appointment of Doctor Anzaldo
which was duly attested and
approved by the Civil Service
Commission.
-The appeal and MR of Dr. Anzaldo
was both denied by the CSC. Then
he appealed to the Office of the
President
then
Presidential
Executive Assistant Clave (who
was concurrently Chairman of the
Civil Service Commission) in his
decision of March 20, 1980
revoked
Doctor
Anzaldo's
appointment and ruled that, "as
recommended by the Civil Service
Commission" (meaning Chairman
Clave himself and Commissioner
Melo), Doctor Venzon should be
appointed
to
the
contested
position but that Doctor Anzaldo's
appointment to the said position
should be considered "valid and
effective during the pendency" of
Doctor Venzon's protest.
ISSUE: WON Dr. Anzaldo has
been denied due process?
HELD:
-Yes. Due process of law means
fundamental fairness. It is not fair
to
Doctor
Anzaldo
that

Presidential Executive Assistant

Clave should decide whether his
own
recommendation
as
Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission, as to who between
Doctor
Anzaldo
and
Doctor
Venzon should be appointed
Science Research Supervisor II,
should be adopted by the
President of the Philippines.
-Common sense and propriety
dictate that the commissioner in
the Civil Service Commission, who
should be consulted by the Office
of the President, should be a
person different from the person
in the Office of the President who
would decide the appeal of the
protestant
in
a
contested
appointment.
Better Buildings v. NLRC, G.R.
No. 109714 (Dec 15, 1997)
Romero, J.
FACTS:
- This petition for certiorari with
prayer for the issuance of a
temporary
restraining
order
and/or injunction seeks to annul
the decision of public respondent
National
Labor
Relations
Commission
which
reinstates
private respondents Halim Ysmael
and Eliseo Feliciano to their
former positions without loss of
seniority rights and benefits and
to pay them backwages.
- Private respondent Halim Ysmael
(Ysmael) was hired as a Sales
Manager by petitioner Better
Building, Inc. (BBI) on March 16,
1985. In addition to his monthly
salary, he was given the free use
of the company car, free gasoline
and
commission
from
sales. Private respondent Eliseo
Feliciano (Feliciano), on the other

hand, was employed as Chief

Supervisor by the petitioner since
January 1966. Then later on a
memo stating their dismissal was
circulated.
-The Labor arbiter ruled it as a
case of illegal dismissal and
ordered
reinstatement
with
damages. The NLRC affirmed it
except to the portion of damages.
- Petitioner argues that the private
respondent was validly dismissed
for engaging in the same line of
business as that of his employer
(petitioner). Thus, his act of
engaging in a business in direct
competition with his employer
was, not only an act of disloyalty,
but more specifically a willful
breach of trust and confidence.
ISSUE: WON the respondents
were illegally dismissed?
HELD:
-Yes although he was dismissed
for a cause. In the case at bar,
petitioner has clearly established
private respondents culpability
by convincing evidence. First, it
was never disputed that private
respondent established another
corporation, Reachout General
Services,
engaged
in
the
maintenance/janitorial
service,
the same line of business as that
of
petitioner. In
this
regard,
private respondent failed to
adduce substantial evidence to
disprove this allegation.
-It was without the requirements
of due process.
- In this jurisdiction, we have
consistently
ruled
that
in
terminating an employee, it is
essential
that
the
twin
requirements
of
notice
and
hearing must be observed. The
written
notice
apprises
the

employee of the particular acts or

omissions for which his dismissal
is sought and at the same informs
the employee concerned of the
employers decision to dismiss
him.
-In the case at bar, the record is
bereft of any showing that private
respondent was given notice of
the charge against him. Nor was
he ever given the opportunity
under
the
circumstances
to
answer
the
charge;
his
termination was quick, swift and
sudden.
- Evidently, the decision to
dismiss respondent was merely
based on the fact that petitioner
was already convinced at the time
that the private respondents were
engaged in disloyal acts. As
regards the procedural aspect,
the failure to observe the twin
requirements
of
notice
and
hearing taints the dismissal with
illegality.
-Payment of nominal damages
was then ordered.
Carag v. NLRC, G.R.
147590 (April 2, 2007)
Carpio, J.

No.

FACTS:
-The petition assails the decision
of labor arbiter which held that
Mariveles Apparel Corporation
(MAC), MAC's Chairman of the
Board Antonio Carag (Carag), and
MAC's President Armando David
(David) (collectively, respondents)
are guilty of illegal closure and
are solidarily liable for the
separation pay of MAC's rank and
file employees
- National Federation of Labor
Unions (NAFLU) and Mariveles
Apparel Corporation Labor Union
(MACLU)
(collectively,

complainants), on behalf of all of

MAC's rank and file employees,
filed a complaint against MAC for
illegal dismissal brought about by
its illegal closure of business
-They allege that the termination
was without notice and nonpayment of salaries. The nonappearance
of
respondents
prompted Arbiter Ortiguerra to
declare the case submitted for
resolution "based on the extant
pleadings."
-The
corporation
however,
stopped business operation on
July 8, 1993 and nder this given
circumstance, the complainants
have no option left but to implead
Atty. ANTONIO CARAG, in his
official capacity as Chairman of
the
Board
along
with
MR.
ARMANDO DAVID as President.
- The respondents on the other
hand by way of controversion
maintain
that
the
present
complaint was filed prematurely.
The respondents deny having
totally closed and insist that
respondent company is only on a
temporary shut-down occasioned
by the pending labor unrest.
There being no permanent closure
any claim for separation pay must
not be given due course.
- Respondents
opposed
the
impleader of Atty. Antonio C.
Carag and Mr. Armando David
saying that they are not the
owners of Mariveles Apparel
Corporation and they are only
minority
stockholders
holding
qualifying shares. Piercing the veil
of corporate fiction cannot be
done in the present case for such
remedy can only be availed of in
case of closed or family owned
corporations.

ISSUE: WON petitioner Carag's

right to due process been
blatantly violated by holding him
personally liable for over P50
million
of
the
corporation's
liability, merely as
board
chairman and solely on the basis
of the motion to implead him in
midstream of the proceedings as
additional
respondent, without affording him
the right to present evidence and
in violation of
the
accepted
procedure prescribed by Rule V of
the NLRC Rules of Procedure, as
to render the ruling null and void?
HELD:
- Arbiter Ortiguerra never issued
summons to Carag, never called
him to a conference for possible
settlement, never required him to
submit a position paper, never set
the case for hearing, never
notified him to present his
evidence, and never informed him
that the case was submitted for
decision - all in violation of
Sections 2, 3, 4, 5(b), and 11(c) of
Rule V of The New Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC.
- Indisputably, there was utter
absence of due process to Carag
at the arbitration level. The
procedure adopted by Arbiter
Ortiguerra completely prevented
Carag from explaining his side
and presenting his evidence. This
alone renders Arbiter Ortiguerra's
Decision a nullity insofar as Carag
is concerned. While labor arbiters
are not required to conduct a
formal hearing or trial, they have
no license to dispense with the
basic requirements of due process
such as affording respondents the
opportunity to be heard.
- The essence of due process is
that a party be afforded a

reasonable opportunity to be
heard and to submit any evidence
he may have in support of his
defense. Where, as in this case,
sufficient opportunity to be heard
either through oral arguments or
position
paper
and
other
pleadings is not accorded a party
to a case, there is undoubtedly a
denial of due process.
- For a wrongdoing to make a
director personally liable for debts
of
the
corporation,
the
wrongdoing approved or assented
to by the director must be a
patently unlawful act. Mere failure
to comply with the notice
requirement of labor laws on
company closure or dismissal of
employees does not amount to a
patently unlawful act. Patently

unlawful acts are those declared

unlawful by law which imposes
penalties for commission of such
unlawful acts. There must be a
law declaring the act unlawful and
penalizing the act.
- Thus, the rule is still that the
doctrine of piercing the corporate
veil applies only when the
corporate fiction is used to defeat
public convenience, justify wrong,
protect fraud, or defend crime. In
the absence of malice, bad faith,
or a specific provision of law
making a corporate officer liable,
such corporate officer cannot be
made
personally
liable
for
corporate liabilities