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Derek Bannister
Professor Greenberg
May 2, 2016
The Hartford Convention
The Hartford Convention is frequently cited as the reason for the demise of the Federalist
Party. There can be little denying the strong reaction against the convention, especially after
news of the American victory at the Battle of New Orleans. American newspapers and political
leaders reacted to the Hartford Convention as if it were treasonous, but these claims were largely
unfounded. The lasting impact of the Hartford Convention, other than the oft-cited destruction of
the Federalist Party, is the cautious manner in which Americans have come to oppose American
wars. The public outrage against the Hartford Convention set the expectations for what
patriotism called for during war: unwavering support no matter the circumstances. The failure of
the opposition to the War of 1812 and the success of opposition against future wars exemplifies
the nuance, and sometimes plain luck, it takes to oppose an American war. Even forty years in
the future, politicians were taking a tremendous chance by opposing war and Henry Clay is a
sterling example of one such politician.
From December 15, 1814 to January 5, 1815, Federalist delegates from five New
England states met to discuss the issues that they believed stemmed from the DemocraticRepublican leadership of both Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. The brunt of the
discussion, however, revolved around the unhappiness with Madisons execution of the War of
1812. Many New England Federalists were opposed to the war from the onset, often because
Britain was an immensely important trading partner. The Hartford Convention came upon the
heels of some of the most thorough British victories in the war. In August of 1814, the British
captured and burned down Washington, DC. After finally defeating Napoleon, the British sent
more troops to North America, invading New York state from Canada and occupying stretches of

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Maine. By 1814, the British had closed off all northern ports in an effort to suffocate the New
England economy. Soon, calls for secession of the region of New England from the Union
cropped up, usually in hopes of retaining trade with the British. Moderate New England
Federalists called the Hartford Convention to deal with the secessionist threat and to also create a
list of formal grievances (Dzurec).
The Hartford Conventions demands for government action had really no connection to
secession. These resolutions included allowing states at the Convention to protect the citizens of
said States from the operation and effects of all acts which have been or may be passedwhich
shall contain provisions, subjecting the militia or other citizens to forcible drafts, conscriptions,
or impressments, not authorised by the Constitution of the United States (Hartford). The call
for military reform of conscription and impressment policies, interestingly enough, is exactly
what got the United States into war with the British in the first place; this fact was not last on the
Hartford delegates. The Hartford Convention delegates also demanded that Congress shall not
make or declare war, or authorize acts of hostility against any foreign nation, without the
concurrence of two thirds of both houses, implying that they did not believe that the declaration
for war had enough universal support to be carried out. In what can now be seen as an early
example of the sectionalism that in many ways would come to define the United States politics,
the Hartford delegates insisted that taxes shall be apportioned among the several states which
may be included within this union, according to their respective numbers of free persons,
including those bound to serve for a term of years and excluding Indians not taxed, and all other
persons (Hartford). In other words, they wanted to remove the three-fifths representation of the
Southern states. The call for a renewed policy on Southern representation is what possibly
garnered the most heated criticism of the Convention.

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The criticism of the Hartford Convention was heavy and immediate. On January 11,
1815, the Daily National Intelligencer wrote a scathing criticism of the members of the Hartford
Convention. Can those men, who have, with so much parade, met in conclave at Hartford, and
styled themselves a convention, be so blinded by party zeal, as to suppose New-England is ripe
for rebellion? the Washington, D.C. newspaper wrote from this slavery-practicing city. Yet this
article went on to say that, a great majority of our fellow citizens here are yet faithful to the
national interests that they had much rather defend their own soil and fight the common enemy,
than raise the standard of civil war, and imbrue their hands in the blood of Americans. This
reaction has no regard for the true aims of the Convention as the author simply saw opposition to
war and marked it as treasonous, and importantly marked the rest of the country as patriotic. The
sectional anger of the author of this piece is palpable as he continuously challenges the fighting
capabilities of New England, repeatedly implying that these states would stand no chance in a
fight for independence from the rest of the Union. Defenders of the Convention saw nothing
wrong with the objections brought up by the delegates.
High-ranking Federalists at the Hartford Convention defended their actions even years
after the collapse of the party. In 1833, Theodore Dwight, a former Federalist leader and the
grandson of Jonathan Edwards, wrote that the Hartford Convention, from the time of its coming
together to the present hour, has been the general topic of reproach and calumny, as well as of the
most unfounded and unprincipled misrepresentation and falsehood (Dwight 4). About the
Hartford Convention, Dwight also stated that, It has been reviled by multitudes of persons who
were totally unacquainted with its objects, and its proceedings, and by not a few who probably
were ignorant even of the geographical position of the place where the convention was held
(Dwight 3). Dwight believed that the Democratic-Republicans had used the Hartford Convention

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as a lightning rod for blame to distract from a war that was the fault of Democratic-Republican
leadership. Dwight saw the condemnation as a scare tactic to drum up support for Jeffersons
party. Harrison Gray Otis argued in 1824 that the delegates to the Hartford Convention were
chosen by the citizens of New England the most fervently patriotic citizens of any section of
the country. In his mind, none of the patriotism was lost between the time of Revolution and
1812. Otis criticizes the governor of Massachusetts for speaking out against the Hartford
Convention, saying, The end of his Commonwealth, like Gonzalos in the Tempest, forgets the
beginning And he is not aware that he dishonors the people who rocked the cradle of
independence, by charging upon them a combination to consign it prematurely to the tomb
(Otis 5). Otis uses this allusion to Shakespeare to underscore his point that there probably would
have been no American Revolution without the patriotic craze that took hold in New England.
The sectional disdain he saw aimed at New England was, in his mind, quite ridiculous.
Even as arguments such as these came up against the idea that the Hartford Convention
was not, in fact, treasonous, the Daily National Intelligencer once again was having none of
it. Who, that has read the federal papers for a month or two, particularly [the Boston Daily
Advertiser and the Salem Gazette], does not know, that they have encouraged the belief that
forcible resistance of the National Government would be recommended by the Convention; that
men and money would be withheld, that a New Confederation would take place; and a New
Constitution be adopted The paper goes on to say, It has also been strongly intimated that a
separate Peace would be made with EnglandYet the very papers which have been filled with
this sort of language, now unblushingly assert, that the wicked Democrats, by their falsehoods
and calumny, created all the suspicion of the treasonable intentions of the Convention! Even if
the Democratic-Republicans did, in fact, fabricate the secessionist threat that the Hartford

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Convention posed, the Federalists were simply in no position to fight back. The American will
had shifted against them.
The Mexican-American War was the next opportunity for Americans to come up with
some form of opposition to a war. In many ways, the political atmosphere was similar in both
situations. For example, there had been growing discontent with James Madisons decisions as
president leading up to the Convention. In his aforementioned work, Theodore Dwight spends a
significant portion laying out the Federalist grievances with Jefferson, with these grievances
dating back to 1787. Jeffersons secretary of state and successor as president had hit New
England with even stricter trade regulations and restrictions than Jefferson ever had in the years
leading up to the conflict with England. James K. Polk found himself under similarly increasing
pressure during the Mexican-American War, especially as politicians began to anticipate the
potential problems that annexing parts of Mexico would create in terms of the debate over
slavery.
Once again, it would be the party of the seemingly haughty New Englanders that would
initiate opposition to the war. When it came time to vote for or against the war, however, only
three votes were cast against it, and these votes all came from safe seats. Despite the
considerable wonders about the aim and justification for the war, Polk was able to initiate his
war. Although he may not have had it in mind at the time, Henry Clay certainly knew what had
happened to the Federalists when they spoke out against the War of 1812. In 1846, Henry Clay
gave a toast in New Orleans in front of a crowd of military men during the war. In a joking
fashion, he said that he felt half inclined to ask for some little nook or corner in the army, in
which I might serve in avenging the wrongs to my country. The cheers of the crowd even led
him to state that I have thought that I might yet be able to capture or to slay a Mexican

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(Greenberg 145). Yet, these statements were made just days after confiding to his journal that,
This unhappy war with Mexico fills me with anxious solicitude (Greenberg 145). Clay was in
no way struck by the war fever that had swept particular across the western frontier of the United
States, including his home state of Kentucky. Clays son and namesake volunteered for the war,
much to the discontent of Henry Clay, Sr. Clay was, however, one to excite a crowd and he loved
to be loved. At the time, there was no room for political opposition to this war of territorial
expansion.
After the crushing loss of his favored son, Henry Clay delivered a scathing review of the
Polk administrations decision to go to war with Mexico at an important speech in Lexington.
Calling it an unnecessary war of offensive aggression, Clay went after not only Polk, but
also Whigs who had voted in favor of war preparations despite knowing that it was unjust and
not virtuous in a Republican sense (Greenberg 232). Clay detested the death and destruction of
life that resulted from American aggression and a land-grabbing craze. Believing that other
countries look upon us, in the prosecution of the present War, as being actuated by a spirit of
rapacity, and an inordinate desire for territorial aggrandizement (Greenberg 233). Following
defeat in his final presidential bid, Clay was now willing to give up his opportunist character and
tell the American public exactly what he thought would do the most good. Yes, Clay would most
likely have voted for war against Mexico if he had been a young man in Congress, but those days
were over. As the North American and United States Gazette noted, It may be the last time
[Clays] voice shall be overheard speaking of, or to, the republic for when such a man as Henry
Clay speaks, though only to an audience of his own immediate friends and neighbors, he speaks
to the whole American people (Henry Clay) He even stated that he ever regarded slavery
as a great evil, clearly standing against any calls to allow any more slave states into the union

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(Greenberg 233). With no opportunity for any future presidential bids and with his family left in
tatters because of the war, Clay had nothing to lose. His sincerity would inspire a certain
audience member who was to become the 16th President of the United States.
As is quite clear, the grievances of the Hartford Convention and the arguments in Clays
speech shared many qualities: both opposed presidential policies that had put in place during the
war effort, and both rejected policies that would promote slavery. The Hartford Convention,
however, failed exactly where Clays opposition to the war succeeded. Clay delivered his
opposition to the war at a time when peace was in no way forthcoming. Some politicians were
calling for the immediate end to the war, while others were calling for the annexation of all of
Mexico. On top of this, Mexico was more inclined to fight for every last bit of land than to agree
to give away large tracts of their country. The Federalists at the Hartford Convention fell victim
to awful timing. They came out with their official grievances not only after peace was officially
struck with the British, but also right before news of Jacksons victory surfaced. If the War of
1812 had dragged on for longer, it is not improbably that the Hartford Convention could have
had an impact similar to Clays speech, but instead the Federalists were caught opposing a nonexistent war.
Clays assertion that the war has been brought upon us by our own act did not sit well
with the Polk administration. Like the Republican newspapers following the Hartford
Convention, the members of Jacksons party claimed that Clays speech was treasonous
(Greenberg 235). A number of newspapers throughout the country were more receptive of Clays
opposition, however. There seems to be a generous emulation among the Whig press of the
country in praise of the boldness and energy, the wisdom and soundness, the patriotism and
moderation of this most extraordinary effort of the master mind of the pure and great statesman,

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the Philadelphian North American and United States Gazette newspaper wrote (Henry Clays
Speech). The Philadelphia paper also wrote that Clays voice was full of its ancient muscle
and that he spoke the counsels of wisdom which have so often, in the times of his countrys
need, fallen from his tongue (Mr.). Harrison Gray Otis heaped similar praise upon the citizens
of Massachusetts, but his praise fell on deaf ears.
Alexis de Tocqueville observed in Democracy in America that, In this general
excitement distinguished men were ready to anticipate the call of the community, and the people
clung to them for support and placed them at their head. But such events are rare, and it is from
the ordinary course of affairs that our judgment must be formed. He notes here that the
politicians at the helm of the country at its inception were the ablest in American history.
Tocqueville attributes this to the fact that the colonies were, at the time, in a time of excitement
and revolution: the country needed these great men. Once the new political system, and the
liberties that came with it, became the norm, the average politician fell in both stature and ability.
The argument could be made that this phenomenon of excitement followed by the flatness can be
generalized to Americans in time of war. The beginning of both the War of 1812 and the
Mexican-American War led to mass hysteria and calls for battle. In both cases, however, once
these wars became the norm and the end appeared to be nowhere in sight, the economicallyprogressive political party the Federalists and the Whigs respectively could no longer support
the ideology of the war. Opposition to war in America stems from the staleness and
destructiveness of war. Interestingly, in the case of the War of 1812, Americans finally found
something to be intensely proud of when news of the Battle of New Orleans rolled in. This pride
buried the Federalist Party because the war didnt last long enough for the majority of Americans
to come around to the opposition. In Clays case, however, the Mexican refusal to surrender

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weighed down on the American public. There would be no Battle of New Orleans in the case of
the Mexican-American War.
In the case of these two wars, disapproval of the wars manifested itself in a cyclical form:
calls for war initially found the support of almost every congressman, only to be followed by
gradual but increasingly unruly opposition. The timing of the opposition is what either helps or
hurts the political party that is willing to stand against the conflict. The Federalists made public
their opposition to the War of 1812 just days before General Jacksons tremendous victory
against the British was reported. Henry Clay, on the other hand, opposed the Mexican-American
War at a time when his political career was essentially exhausted and he had nothing to lose. His
opposition made him a hero to some, especially because the prospects of an American victory
raised polarizing questions about the future of slavery. The results of the Hartford Convention
illustrate a major theme of American politics: timing is everything.

Works Cited
Dwight, Theodore. History of the Hartford Convention: With a Review of the Policy of the
United States Government, Which Led to the War of 1812. New York: White, 1833. The
CAT. Web. 17 Apr. 2016.
Dzurec, David. "Hartford Convention." The Early Republic and Antebellum America: An
Encyclopedia of Social, Political, Cultural, and Economic History. Ed. Christopher G.
Bates. Armonk, NY: Sharpe Reference, 2013. 539-540. Gale Virtual Reference Library.
Web. 10 Apr. 2016.
Greenberg, Amy S. A Wicked War. New York: Random House, 2012. Print.

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"Hartford Convention." Daily National Intelligencer [Washington, District Of Columbia] 11 Jan.
1815. 19th Century U.S. Newspapers. Web. 29 Apr. 2016.
"Henry Clay." North American and United States Gazette [Philadelphia, Pennsylvania] 13 Nov.
1847. 19th Century U.S. Newspapers. Web. 22 Apr. 2016.
"Henry Clay's Speech." North American and United States Gazette [Philadelphia, Pennsylvania]
4 Dec. 1847. 19th Century U.S. Newspapers. Web. 23 Apr. 2016.
"Mr. Clay's Speech." North American and United States Gazette [Philadelphia, Pennsylvania] 17
Nov. 1847. 19th Century U.S. Newspapers. Web. 23 Apr. 2016.
Otis, Harrison Gray. Otis' Letters in Defence of the Hartford Convention and the People of
Massachusetts. Boston: S. Garnder, 1824. The CAT. Web. 17 Apr. 2016.
"Resistance of the Laws." Daily National Intelligencer [Washington, District Of Columbia] [Jan.
18, 1815]. 19th Century U.S. Newspapers. Web. 17 Apr. 2016.
"The Convention at Hartford." Daily National Intelligencer [Washington, District Of Columbia]
11 Jan. 1815. 19th Century U.S. Newspapers. Web. 16 Apr. 2016.