G.R. No.

168644 : February 16, 2010

BSB GROUP, INC., represented by its President, Mr. RICARDO BANGAYAN,
Petitioner, vs. SALLY GO a.k.a. SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Respondent.
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 876001cralaw dated April 20,
2005, which reversed and set aside the September 13, 20042cralaw and November
5, 20043cralaw Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
364cralaw in Criminal Case No. 02-202158 for qualified theft. The said orders, in
turn, respectively denied the motion filed by herein respondent Sally Go for the
suppression of the testimonial and documentary evidence relative to a Security
Bank account, and denied reconsideration.

The basic antecedents are no longer disputed.

Petitioner, the BSB Group, Inc., is a duly organized domestic corporation presided by
its herein representative, Ricardo Bangayan (Bangayan). Respondent Sally Go,
alternatively referred to as Sally Sia Go and Sally Go-Bangayan, is Bangayan's wife,
who was employed in the company as a cashier, and was engaged, among others,
to receive and account for the payments made by the various customers of the
company.

In 2002, Bangayan filed with the Manila Prosecutor's Office a complaint for estafa
and/or qualified theft5cralaw against respondent, alleging that several
checks6cralaw representing the aggregate amount of P1,534,135.50 issued by the
company's customers in payment of their obligation were, instead of being turned
over to the company's coffers, indorsed by respondent who deposited the same to
her personal banking account maintained at Security Bank and Trust Company
(Security Bank) in Divisoria, Manila Branch.7cralaw Upon a finding that the evidence
adduced was uncontroverted, the assistant city prosecutor recommended the filing
of the Information for qualified theft against respondent.8cralaw

Accordingly, respondent was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 36, in an Information, the inculpatory portion of which reads:

That in or about or sometime during the period comprised (sic) between January
1988 [and] October 1989, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said

accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent [to] gain
and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry
away cash money in the total amount of P1,534,135.50 belonging to BSB GROUP OF
COMPANIES represented by RICARDO BANGAYAN, to the damage and prejudice of
said owner in the aforesaid amount of P1,534,135.50, Philippine currency.

That in the commission of the said offense, said accused acted with grave abuse of
confidence, being then employed as cashier by said complainant at the time of the
commission of the said offense and as such she was entrusted with the said amount
of money.

Contrary to law.

Respondent entered a negative plea when arraigned.10cralaw The trial ensued. On

the premise that respondent had allegedly encashed the subject checks and
deposited the corresponding amounts thereof to her personal banking account, the
prosecution moved for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum /ad testificandum
against the respective managers or records custodians of Security Bank's Divisoria
Branch, as well as of the Asian Savings Bank (now Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co.
[Metrobank]), in Jose Abad Santos, Tondo, Manila Branch.11cralaw The trial court
granted the motion and issued the corresponding subpoena.12cralaw

Respondent filed a motion to quash the subpoena dated November 4, 2003,

addressed to Metrobank, noting to the court that in the complaint-affidavit filed with
the prosecutor, there was no mention made of the said bank account, to which
respondent, in addition to the Security Bank account identified as Account No. 0114-006, allegedly deposited the proceeds of the supposed checks. Interestingly,
while respondent characterized the Metrobank account as irrelevant to the case,
she, in the same motion, nevertheless waived her objection to the irrelevancy of the
Security Bank account mentioned in the same complaint-affidavit, inasmuch as she
was admittedly willing to address the allegations with respect thereto.13cralaw

Petitioner, opposing respondent's move, argued for the relevancy of the Metrobank
account on the ground that the complaint-affidavit showed that there were two
checks which respondent allegedly deposited in an account with the said
bank.14cralaw To this, respondent filed a supplemental motion to quash, invoking
the absolutely confidential nature of the Metrobank account under the provisions of

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1405.15cralaw The trial court did not sustain respondent;
hence, it denied the motion to quash for lack of merit.16cralaw

Meanwhile, the prosecution was able to present in court the testimony of Elenita
Marasigan (Marasigan), the representative of Security Bank. In a nutshell,
Marasigan's testimony sought to prove that between 1988 and 1989, respondent,
while engaged as cashier at the BSB Group, Inc., was able to run away with the
checks issued to the company by its customers, endorse the same, and credit the
corresponding amounts to her personal deposit account with Security Bank. In the
course of the testimony, the subject checks were presented to Marasigan for
identification and marking as the same checks received by respondent, endorsed,
and then deposited in her personal account with Security Bank.17cralaw But before
the testimony could be completed, respondent filed a Motion to Suppress,18cralaw
seeking the exclusion of Marasigan's testimony and accompanying documents thus
far received, bearing on the subject Security Bank account. This time respondent
invokes, in addition to irrelevancy, the privilege of confidentiality under R.A. No.
1405.

The trial court, nevertheless, denied the motion in its September 13, 2004
Order.19cralaw A motion for reconsideration was subsequently filed, but it was also
denied in the Order dated November 5, 2004.20cralaw These two orders are the
subject of the instant case.

Aggrieved, and believing that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in acting
the way it did, respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65. Finding merit in the petition, the Court of Appeals
reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the trial court in its April 20, 2005
Decision.21cralaw The decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed orders dated

September 13, 2004 and November 5, 2004 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
testimony of the SBTC representative is ordered stricken from the records.

SO ORDERED.22cralaw

With the denial of its motion for reconsideration,23cralaw petitioner is now before
the Court pleading the same issues as those raised before the lower courts.

In this Petition24cralaw under Rule 45, petitioner averred in the main that the Court
of Appeals had seriously erred in reversing the assailed orders of the trial court, and
in effect striking out Marasigan's testimony dealing with respondent's deposit
account with Security Bank.25cralaw It asserted that apart from the fact that the
said evidence had a direct relation to the subject matter of the case for qualified
theft and, hence, brings the case under one of the exceptions to the coverage of
confidentiality under R.A. 1405.26cralaw Petitioner believed that what constituted
the subject matter in litigation was to be determined by the allegations in the
information and, in this respect, it alluded to the assailed November 5, 2004 Order
of the trial court, which declared to be erroneous the limitation of the present
inquiry merely to what was contained in the information.27cralaw

For her part, respondent claimed that the money represented by the Security Bank
account was neither relevant nor material to the case, because nothing in the
criminal information suggested that the money therein deposited was the subject
matter of the case. She invited particular attention to that portion of the criminal
Information which averred that she has stolen and carried away cash money in the
total amount of P1,534,135.50. She advanced the notion that the term "cash
money" stated in the Information was not synonymous with the checks she was
purported to have stolen from petitioner and deposited in her personal banking
account. Thus, the checks which the prosecution had Marasigan identify, as well as
the testimony itself of Marasigan, should be suppressed by the trial court at least for
violating respondent's right to due process.28cralaw More in point, respondent
opined that admitting the testimony of Marasigan, as well as the evidence
pertaining to the Security Bank account, would violate the secrecy rule under R.A.
No. 1405.29cralaw

In its reply, petitioner asserted the sufficiency of the allegations in the criminal
Information for qualified theft, as the same has sufficiently alleged the elements of
the offense charged. It posits that through Marasigan's testimony, the Court would
be able to establish that the checks involved, copies of which were attached to the
complaint-affidavit filed with the prosecutor, had indeed been received by
respondent as cashier, but were, thereafter, deposited by the latter to her personal
account with Security Bank. Petitioner held that the checks represented the cash
money stolen by respondent and, hence, the subject matter in this case is not only
the cash amount represented by the checks supposedly stolen by respondent, but
also the checks themselves.30cralaw

We derive from the conflicting advocacies of the parties that the issue for resolution
is whether the testimony of Marasigan and the accompanying documents are
irrelevant to the case, and whether they are also violative of the absolutely
confidential nature of bank deposits and, hence, excluded by operation of R.A. No.
1405. The question of admissibility of the evidence thus comes to the fore. And the
Court, after deliberative estimation, finds the subject evidence to be indeed
inadmissible.

Prefatorily, fundamental is the precept in all criminal prosecutions, that the

constitutive acts of the offense must be established with unwavering exactitude and
moral certainty because this is the critical and only requisite to a finding of guilt.
31cralaw Theft is present when a person, with intent to gain but without violence
against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, takes the personal property
of another without the latter's consent. It is qualified when, among others, and as
alleged in the instant case, it is committed with abuse of confidence.32cralaw The
prosecution of this offense necessarily focuses on the existence of the following
elements: (a) there was taking of personal property belonging to another; (b) the
taking was done with intent to gain; (c) the taking was done without the consent of
the owner; (d) the taking was done without violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things; and (e) it was done with abuse of confidence.33cralaw
In turn, whether these elements concur in a way that overcomes the presumption of
guiltlessness, is a question that must pass the test of relevancy and competency in
accordance with Section 334cralaw Rule 128 of the Rules of Court.

Thus, whether these pieces of evidence sought to be suppressed in this case the
testimony of Marasigan, as well as the checks purported to have been stolen and
deposited in respondent's Security Bank account are relevant, is to be addressed by
considering whether they have such direct relation to the fact in issue as to induce
belief in its existence or non-existence; or whether they relate collaterally to a fact
from which, by process of logic, an inference may be made as to the existence or
non-existence of the fact in issue.35cralaw

The fact in issue appears to be that respondent has taken away cash in the amount
of P1,534,135.50 from the coffers of petitioner. In support of this allegation,
petitioner seeks to establish the existence of the elemental act of taking by
adducing evidence that respondent, at several times between 1988 and 1989,
deposited some of its checks to her personal account with Security Bank. Petitioner
addresses the incongruence between the allegation of theft of cash in the

Information, on the one hand, and the evidence that respondent had first stolen the
checks and deposited the same in her banking account, on the other hand, by
impressing upon the Court that there obtains no difference between cash and check
for purposes of prosecuting respondent for theft of cash. Petitioner is mistaken.

In theft, the act of unlawful taking connotes deprivation of personal property of one
by another with intent to gain, and it is immaterial that the offender is able or
unable to freely dispose of the property stolen because the deprivation relative to
the offended party has already ensued from such act of execution.36cralaw The
allegation of theft of money, hence, necessitates that evidence presented must
have a tendency to prove that the offender has unlawfully taken money belonging
to another. Interestingly, petitioner has taken pains in attempting to draw a
connection between the evidence subject of the instant review, and the allegation
of theft in the Information by claiming that respondent had fraudulently deposited
the checks in her own name. But this line of argument works more prejudice than
favor, because it in effect, seeks to establish the commission, not of theft, but
rather of some other crime probably estafa.

Moreover, that there is no difference between cash and check is true in other
instances. In estafa by conversion, for instance, whether the thing converted is cash
or check, is immaterial in relation to the formal allegation in an information for that
offense; a check, after all, while not regarded as legal tender, is normally accepted
under commercial usage as a substitute for cash, and the credit it represents in
stated monetary value is properly capable of appropriation. And it is in this respect
that what the offender does with the check subsequent to the act of unlawfully
taking it becomes material inasmuch as this offense is a continuing one.37cralaw In
other words, in pursuing a case for this offense, the prosecution may establish its
cause by the presentation of the checks involved. These checks would then
constitute the best evidence to establish their contents and to prove the elemental
act of conversion in support of the proposition that the offender has indeed indorsed
the same in his own name.38cralaw

Theft, however, is not of such character. Thus, for our purposes, as the Information
in this case accuses respondent of having stolen cash, proof tending to establish
that respondent has actualized her criminal intent by indorsing the checks and
depositing the proceeds thereof in her personal account, becomes not only
irrelevant but also immaterial and, on that score, inadmissible in evidence.

We now address the issue of whether the admission of Marasigan's testimony on the
particulars of respondent's account with Security Bank, as well as of the
corresponding evidence of the checks allegedly deposited in said account,
constitutes an unallowable inquiry under R.A. 1405.

It is conceded that while the fundamental law has not bothered with the triviality of
specifically addressing privacy rights relative to banking accounts, there,
nevertheless, exists in our jurisdiction a legitimate expectation of privacy governing
such accounts. The source of this right of expectation is statutory, and it is found in
R.A. No. 1405,39cralaw otherwise known as the Bank Secrecy Act of 1955. 40cralaw

R.A. No. 1405 has two allied purposes. It hopes to discourage private hoarding and
at the same time encourage the people to deposit their money in banking
institutions, so that it may be utilized by way of authorized loans and thereby assist
in economic development.41cralaw Owing to this piece of legislation, the
confidentiality of bank deposits remains to be a basic state policy in the
Philippines.42cralaw Section 2 of the law institutionalized this policy by
characterizing as absolutely confidential in general all deposits of whatever nature
with banks and other financial institutions in the country. It declares:

Section 2.All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the
Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the
Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered
as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked
into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except upon written
permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a
competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in
cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.

Subsequent statutory enactments43cralaw have expanded the list of exceptions to

this policy yet the secrecy of bank deposits still lies as the general rule, falling as it
does within the legally recognized zones of privacy.44cralaw There is, in fact, much
disfavor to construing these primary and supplemental exceptions in a manner that
would authorize unbridled discretion, whether governmental or otherwise, in
utilizing these exceptions as authority for unwarranted inquiry into bank accounts. It
is then perceivable that the present legal order is obliged to conserve the absolutely
confidential nature of bank deposits.45cralaw

The measure of protection afforded by the law has been explained in China Banking
Corporation v. Ortega.46cralaw That case principally addressed the issue of whether
the prohibition against an examination of bank deposits precludes garnishment in
satisfaction of a judgment. Ruling on that issue in the negative, the Court found
guidance in the relevant portions of the legislative deliberations on Senate Bill No.
351 and House Bill No. 3977, which later became the Bank Secrecy Act, and it held
that the absolute confidentiality rule in R.A. No. 1405 actually aims at protection
from unwarranted inquiry or investigation if the purpose of such inquiry or
investigation is merely to determine the existence and nature, as well as the
amount of the deposit in any given bank account. Thus,

x x x The lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into the deposit
of B&B Forest Development Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It merely
required Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether or not the defendant B&B Forest
Development Corporation had a deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for
purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so that the bank would hold the same
intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order. It will be noted from the
discussion of the conference committee report on Senate Bill No. 351 and House Bill
No. 3977which later became Republic Act No. 1405, that it was not the intention of
the lawmakers to place banks deposits beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a
final judgmentThus:

x x x Mr. Marcos: Now, for purposes of the record, I should like the Chairman of
the Committee on Ways and Means to clarify this further. Suppose an individual has
a tax case. He is being held liable by the Bureau of Internal Revenue [(BIR)] or, say,
P1,000.00 worth of tax liability, and because of this the deposit of this individual
[has been] attached by the [BIR] .

Mr. Ramos: The attachment will only apply after the court has pronounced
sentence declaring the liability of such person. But where the primary aim is to
determine whether he has a bank deposit in order to bring about a proper
assessment by the [BIR] , such inquiry is not allowed by this proposed law.

Mr. Marcos: But under our rules of procedure and under the Civil Code, the
attachment or garnishment of money deposited is allowed. Let us assume for
instance that there is a preliminary attachment which is for garnishment or for
holding liable all moneys deposited belonging to a certain individual, but such

attachment or garnishment will bring out into the open the value of such deposit. Is
that prohibited by... the law?

Mr. Ramos: It is only prohibited to the extent that the inquiry... is made only for
the purpose of satisfying a tax liability already declared for the protection of the
right in favor of the government; but when the object is merely to inquire whether
he has a deposit or not for purposes of taxation, then this is fully covered by the
law. x x x

Mr. Marcos: The law prohibits a mere investigation into the existence and the
amount of the deposit.

Mr. Ramos: Into the very nature of such deposit. x x x47cralaw

In taking exclusion from the coverage of the confidentiality rule, petitioner in the
instant case posits that the account maintained by respondent with Security Bank
contains the proceeds of the checks that she has fraudulently appropriated to
herself and, thus, falls under one of the exceptions in Section 2 of R.A. No. 1405 that
the money kept in said account is the subject matter in litigation. To highlight this
thesis, petitioner avers, citing Mathay v. Consolidated Bank and Trust Co.,48cralaw
that the subject matter of the action refers to the physical facts; the things real or
personal; the money, lands, chattels and the like, in relation to which the suit is
prosecuted, which in the instant case should refer to the money deposited in the
Security Bank account.49cralaw On the surface, however, it seems that petitioner's
theory is valid to a point, yet a deeper treatment tends to show that it has argued
quite off-tangentially. This, because, while Mathay did explain what the subject
matter of an action is, it nevertheless did so only to determine whether the class
suit in that case was properly brought to the court.

What indeed constitutes the subject matter in litigation in relation to Section 2 of

R.A. No. 1405 has been pointedly and amply addressed in Union Bank of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals,50cralaw in which the Court noted that the inquiry
into bank deposits allowable under R.A. No. 1405 must be premised on the fact that
the money deposited in the account is itself the subject of the action.51cralaw
Given this perspective, we deduce that the subject matter of the action in the case
at bar is to be determined from the indictment that charges respondent with the
offense, and not from the evidence sought by the prosecution to be admitted into

the records. In the criminal Information filed with the trial court, respondent,
unqualifiedly and in plain language, is charged with qualified theft by abusing
petitioner's trust and confidence and stealing cash in the amount of P1,534,135.50.
The said Information makes no factual allegation that in some material way involves
the checks subject of the testimonial and documentary evidence sought to be
suppressed. Neither do the allegations in said Information make mention of the
supposed bank account in which the funds represented by the checks have
allegedly been kept.

In other words, it can hardly be inferred from the indictment itself that the Security
Bank account is the ostensible subject of the prosecution's inquiry. Without
needlessly expanding the scope of what is plainly alleged in the Information, the
subject matter of the action in this case is the money amounting to P1,534,135.50
alleged to have been stolen by respondent, and not the money equivalent of the
checks which are sought to be admitted in evidence. Thus, it is that, which the
prosecution is bound to prove with its evidence, and no other.

It comes clear that the admission of testimonial and documentary evidence relative
to respondent's Security Bank account serves no other purpose than to establish
the existence of such account, its nature and the amount kept in it. It constitutes an
attempt by the prosecution at an impermissible inquiry into a bank deposit account
the privacy and confidentiality of which is protected by law. On this score alone, the
objection posed by respondent in her motion to suppress should have indeed put an
end to the controversy at the very first instance it was raised before the trial court.

In sum, we hold that the testimony of Marasigan on the particulars of respondent's

supposed bank account with Security Bank and the documentary evidence
represented by the checks adduced in support thereof, are not only incompetent for
being excluded by operation of R.A. No. 1405. They are likewise irrelevant to the
case, inasmuch as they do not appear to have any logical and reasonable
connection to the prosecution of respondent for qualified theft. We find full merit in
and affirm respondent's objection to the evidence of the prosecution. The Court of
Appeals was, therefore, correct in reversing the assailed orders of the trial court.

A final note. In any given jurisdiction where the right of privacy extends its scope to
include an individual's financial privacy rights and personal financial matters, there
is an intermediate or heightened scrutiny given by courts and legislators to laws
infringing such rights.52cralaw Should there be doubts in upholding the absolutely

confidential nature of bank deposits against affirming the authority to inquire into
such accounts, then such doubts must be resolved in favor of the former. This
attitude persists unless congress lifts its finger to reverse the general state policy
respecting the absolutely confidential nature of bank deposits.53cralaw

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 87600 dated April 20, 2005, reversing the September 13, 2004 and
November 5, 2004 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36 in
Criminal Case No. 02-202158, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. NOS. 157294-95 JOSEPH VICTOR G. EJERCITO, petitioner, versus

SANDIGANBAYAN (SPECIAL DIVISION) AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.

DISSENTING OPINION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
I regret I cannot give my assent to the ponencia of Madame Justice Conchita Carpio
Morales. To my mind, no member of a democratic society can honestly argue that
there is nothing wrong in an examination of a bank account to the complete
ignorance of its holder. This is the kind of conduct referred to in Rochin v. California,
[1] as one that shocks the conscience, one that is bound to offend hardened
sensibilities. This abusive conduct must be stricken if we are to maintain decency,
fair play, and fairness in our judicial system. Nothing can destroy a government
more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, its disregard of the character
of its own existence. The government should not demean but protect the Bill of
Rights, because the highest function of authority is to exalt liberty. Here, petitioner
Joseph Victor G. Ejercitos right to privacy has been violated. I cannot, in my
conscience, tolerate such violation.

Zones of privacy are recognized and protected by our laws.[2] Within these zones,
any form of intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with
customary legal process. The meticulous regard this Court accord to these zones
arises not only from the conviction that the right to privacy is a constitutional
right and the right most valued by civilized men,[3] but also from our adherence
to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that no one shall be
subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy and everyone has the right to
the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.[4]

For easy reference, a narration of the factual and legal antecedents is imperative.

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, seeks to annul and set aside Sandiganbayan
(a) Resolutions, dated
February 7[5] and February 12, 2003, [6] denying Joseph Victor G. Ejercitos two
succeeding motions to quash three (3) subpoenae duces tecum/ad testificandum;
and (b) Resolution dated March 11, 2003[7] denying his motion for reconsideration
all issued in Criminal Case No. 26558 for plunder against former President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada, et al.

Joseph Victor G. Ejercito (petitioner herein) is the holder of two (2) bank accounts
with the Urban Bank and Urbancorp Investment, Inc., now Export and Industry Bank
(EIB); one is Trust Account No. 858 and the other is Savings Account No. 011617345-9.
On January 26, 2003, petitioner learned from the media that the Special
Prosecution Panel in Criminal Case No. 26558,[8] entitled People vs. Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, et al. for plunder, pending before the Sandiganbayan (respondent herein),
had requested the said court to issue subpoenae duces tecum/ad testificandum to
the EIB for the production and examination of his two (2) bank accounts.
Alarmed, petitioner attended the hearing of the plunder case set the next day
and submitted to respondent Sandiganbayan a letter expressing his deep
concern on his bank accounts being the subject of a subpoena duces tecum/ad
testificandum. He also requested that he be given time to retain the services of a
lawyer, thus:
Your Honors:
It is with much respect that I write this court relative to the concern of subpoenaing
the undersigneds bank account which I have learned through the media.
I am sure the prosecution is aware of our banking secrecy laws everyone supposed
to observe. But, instead of prosecuting those who may have breached such laws, it
seems it is even going to use supposed evidence which I have reason to believe
could only have been illegally obtained.
The prosecution was not content with a general request. It even lists and identifies
specific documents meaning someone else in the bank illegally released confidential
information.
If this can be done to me, it can happen to anyone. Not that anything can still
shock our family. Nor that I have anything to hide. Your Honors.
But, I am not a lawyer and need time to consult one on a situation that affects every
bank depositor in the country and should interest the bank itself, the Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas, and maybe the Ombudsman himself, who may want to investigate, not
exploit, the serious breach that can only harm the economy, a consequence that
may have been overlooked. There appears to have been deplorable connivance

x x x

I hope and pray, Your Honors, that I will be given time to retain the services of a
lawyer to help me protect my rights and those of every banking depositor. But the
one I have in mind is out of the country right now.
May I, therefore, ask your Honors, that in the meantime, the issuance of the
subpoena be held in abeyance for at least ten (10) days to enable me to take
appropriate legal steps in connection with the prosecutions request for the issuance
of subpoena concerning my accounts. [9] (Emphasis supplied)
To petitioners surprise, respondent Sandiganbayan advised him to file a
motion to quash not later than 12:00 noon of January 28, 2003, or the following
day. It dawned upon petitioner that respondent court had already issued a
subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum.
Upon verification of the records, petitioner found that the Special Prosecution Panel
had filed with respondent Sandiganbayan two (2) requests for the issuance of
subpoenae duces tecum/ad testificandum, one dated January 20[10] and the other
January 23,[11] 2003 for the EIB President or his authorized representative to
appear and testify on certain dates and to bring the original or certified true copies
of the following documents:

I.

For Trust Account No. 858:

1.

Account Opening Documents

2.

Trading Order No. 020385, dated January 29, 1999;

3.

Confirmation Advice TA 858;

4.

Original/Microfilm copies, including the dorsal side of the following:

a)

Bank of Commerce MC#0256254 in the amount of P2,000,000.00;

b)
Urban Bank Corp. MC# 34181 dated November 8, 1999 in the amount of
P10,875,749.43;
c)
Urban Bank MC# 34182 dated November 8, 1999 in the amount of
P42,716,554.22;
d)
Urban Bank Corp. MC#37661 dated November 23, 1999 in the amount of
P54,161,496.52;

5.

Trust Agreement dated January 1999;

Trustee: Joseph Victor G. Ejercito

Nominee: URBAN BANK-TRUST DEPARTMENT
Special Private Account No. (SPAN) 858; and
6.
II.

Ledger of the Span #858

For Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9
SPAN # 858

1.

Signature Cards; and

2.

Statement of Account/Ledger

III.
Urban Bank Managers Checks and their corresponding Urban Bank
Managers Checks Application Form, as follows:
1. MC # 039975 dated January 18, 2000 in the amount of P70,000,000.00;
2. MC # 039976 dated January 18, 2000 in the amount of P2,000,000.00;
3. MC # 039977 dated January 18, 2000 in the amount of P2,000,000.00; and
4. MC# 039978 dated January 18, 2000 in the amount of P1,000,000.00;
Petitioner also came to know that respondent court had granted both requests[12]
and issued the corresponding subpoenae duces tecum/ad testificandum dated
January 21[13] and 24,[14] 2003.
Immediately, or on January 29, 2003, petitioner filed a motion to quash the two (2)
subpoenae.[15]
Meanwhile, on January 31, 2003, the Special Prosecution Panel filed another request
for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum pertaining to the
same documents.[16] On the same day, respondent Sandiganbayan granted the
request and issued the corresponding subpoena. Again, petitioner filed a motion to
quash.[17]

In both motions to quash, petitioner bewailed the extremely-detailed

information contained in the Special Prosecution Panels requests, alleging that a
prior illegal disclosure of his bank accounts took place.
During the exchange of pleadings, petitioner learned that there was indeed a prior
disclosure of his bank accounts. In fact, as early as February 8, 2001, the Office of
the Ombudsman had issued a subpoena duces tecum addressed to the
President or Chief Executive Officer of Urban Bank requiring him to produce
bank records and all documents relative thereto pertaining to all bank accounts
(Savings, Current, Time Deposit, Trust, Foreign Currency Deposits, etc) under the
account names of Jose Velarde, Joseph E. Estrada, Laarni Enriquez, Guia Gomez,
Joy Melendrez, Peachy Osorio, Rowena Lopez, Kevin or Kelvin Garcia, 727, 737, 747,
757 and 858.[18]

On February 13, 2001, the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC), as

receiver of Urban Bank, responded to the subpoena and certified the availability of
bank documents relating to T/A 858 and A/C 858 and the non-availability of bank
records as to the other accounts, thus:
We certify that from the gathering and research we have conducted to date
into the records of the closed Urban Bank under the custody and control of the
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC), as Receiver of said bank, the
documents enumerated in the attached list refer to A/C 858 and T/A 858.
We further certify that Accounts A/C 858 and T/A 858 do not appear in
the Registry of Deposits of Urban Bank and therefore said accounts are not part of
the deposit liabilities of said bank.[19]
Based on the foregoing certification, the Office of the Ombudsman again
issued a subpoena duces tecum dated February 16, 2001 directing the production of
documents pertinent to accounts T/C 858 and A/C 858.[20] In compliance, the
PDIC furnished the Office of the Ombudsman certified copies of the following
documents:
1.
Transaction registers dated 7-02-99, 8-16-99, 9-17-99, 10-18-99, 11-22-99,
1-07-00, 01-17-00, 04-03-00 and 04-24-00;
2.
Report of Unregularized TAF & DTS For UR COIN A & B Placements of Various
Branches as of February 29, 2000 and as of December 16, 1999; and
3.

Trading Orders Nos. A No. 78102 and A No. 078125.

Trading Order A No. 07125 is filed in two copies a white copy which showed set
up information; and a yellow copy which showed reversal information. Both
copies have been reproduced and are enclosed with this letter.[21]

The Office of the Ombudsman, in another subpoena duces tecum[22] dated March
7, 2001, directed the production of Managers/Cashiers Checks in the following
amounts:
a.

P10,875,749.43 dated November 8, 1999

b.

P 2,000,000.00 dated January 18, 2000

c.

P 2,000,000.00 dated January 18, 2000

d.

P 1,000,000.00 dated January 18, 2000

e.

P70,000,000.00 dated January 18, 2000[23]

The PDIC complied with the said subpoena.

On the basis of the foregoing documents released by the PDIC to the Office of the
Ombudsman, the Special Prosecution Panel filed with respondent Sandiganbayan its
own requests for the issuance of subpoenae duces tecum/ad testificandum.
On February 7, 2003, respondent Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion to
quash subpoenae duces tecum/ad testificandum dated January 21 and 24, 2003.
[24] Thus:
At the threshold, we state that we are not in accord with the stand of the
prosecution that a trust account is not included in the term deposit of whatever
nature. A bank deposit is defined as a contractual relationship ensuing from the
delivery, by one known as the depositor of money, funds or even things into the
possession of the bank, which receives the same upon the agreement to pay,
repay or return, upon the order or demand of the depositor, the money, funds, or
equivalent amount. This agreement on the part of the bank is usually a tacit one
and implied, and it may include an implied promise to pay interest upon the deposit,
depending upon the nature of the deposit and the account into which it is placed
(10 Am Jur 2d Banks 337, cited in page 121, Ballentines Law Dictionary, Third
Edition). x x x The Court is inclined to adopt the broader or expanded definition of
the word deposit in R.A. 1405 as to encompass trust accounts consistently with
the state policy declared in Section 1 thereof which is to give encouragement to
the people to deposit their money in banking institution and to discourage private
hoarding so that the same may be properly utilized by banks in authorized loans to

assist in the economic development of the country. In fact, the law itself adverts to
deposit of whatever nature.
x

The Bank Secrecy Laws which prohibit the disclosure of or inquiry into deposits with
any banking institution provides for exceptions as follows:
x

3. Upon order of a competent court in cases of

(a) bribery or dereliction of
duty or (b) where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of
litigation;
x

We now agree with the prosecution that the issuance of the subpoena to Export and
Industry bank (formerly Urban Bank) and PDIC falls under the exception. The
questioned subpoena was issued by this Court in relation to the instant cases
against former President Joseph Estrada for Plunder and Illegal Use of Alias. The
case for plunder which involves betrayal of public trust, undeniably, is analogous to
the cases enumerated by law for the exception to apply. As expressed by the
Supreme Court in the cases of Philippine National Bank v. Gancayco (ibid) and
Philippine National Bank v. Dionisio (9 SCRA 10), cases of unexplained wealth are
similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty and no reason is seen why these
two classes of cases cannot be excepted from the rule making bank deposits
confidential. The policy as to one cannot be different as to the other. This policy
expresses the notion that a public office is a public trust and any person who enters
upon its discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life, so far as relevant to
his duty, is open to public scrutiny. x x x
x

Further, movants claim that the subpoena must be quashed in view of the apparent
conspiracy between the prosecution panel, officials of Export and Industry Bank,
and Ms. Aurora Baldoz of the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation as revealed
by the fact that the prosecution panel knows the documents which are supposedly
very internal to the bank and its clients, deserves scant consideration. Aside from it
being not recognized as one of the grounds to quash the subpoena, the mere fact
that the request for subpoena specified the documents which are to be brought to
court, cannot, by itself proved that there was conspiracy on the part of the
prosecution, the officials of Export and Industry Bank as well as of the officials of the
PDIC to violate the bank secrecy law. As clarified by the prosecution, the
documents listed in the request were obtained in February, 2001, pursuant to the
power conferred on the Ombudsman under Section 15 (8) of R.A. 6770, long before
the Supreme Court promulgated the Marquez v. Desierto case. Conspicuously, since

the investigation was conducted in February, 2001, these cases are already
pending, hence, the Marquez ruling will not likewise apply. Besides, as already
discussed, we declare that this case falls under the exception of the aforecited law,
hence, the premise on which this argument proceeds, does not any more exist.
x

x x x The allegation that movants constitutional right to due process was violated
by the failure of the prosecution to give notice to him and accused Estrada is devoid
of merit. In the case of Adorio v. Bersamin (273 SCRA 217), the Supreme Court
ruled that:
Contrary to petitioners allegations, there was nothing irregular in the issuance of
the subpoenas duces tecum. Requests by a party for the issuance of subpoenas do
not require notice to other parties to the action. No violation of due process results
by such lack of notice since the other parties would have ample opportunity to
examine the witnesses and documents subpoenaed once they are presented in
court.
On February 12, 2003, respondent Sandiganbayan likewise denied petitioners
motion to quash subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum dated January 31, 2003.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in the Resolution dated
March 11, 2003.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari anchored on the following arguments:
(1)
Whether the inquiry by subpoenae into the bank accounts of petitioner falls
under the exceptions provided for by R.A. No. 1405; and
(2)
Whether petitioner should have been notified by respondent court, by
furnishing him copies of the subpoenae, that his bank accounts are subject of the
litigation therein.
Petitioner maintains that the inquiry into his bank accounts does not fall under the
exceptions provided by Republic Act No. 1405 (Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act), i.e.,
upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public
officials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of
litigation. He stresses that plunder is neither bribery nor dereliction of duty
and that
his bank accounts are not the subject matter[25] of the plunder case. In this
regard, he contends that the rulings of this Court in Philippine National Bank v.
Gancayco[26] and Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Purisima[27] are not
applicable to the instant case. Finally, he insists that the extremely-detailed
information in the Special Prosecution Panels requests for subpoenae duces

tecum/ad testificandum shows prior illegal disclosure of his bank accounts, in

violation of his constitutional right to due process and privacy.
On the other hand, respondent People contends that petitioners bank deposits
are actually proceeds of a trust account, hence, subject of inquiry under R.A.
No. 1405.
I find the petition impressed with merit.
The case at bar brings to fore R.A. No. 1405 or the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act. A
glimpse at its history provides an adequate backdrop for our ensuing discussion.
On September 9, 1955, the Philippine Legislature enacted R.A. No. 1405. Its
rationale is to discourage private hoarding and encourage people to deposit money
in banks to be utilized in authorized loans. It happened that after World War II,
capital and credit facilities for agricultural and industrial development in the country
were lacking. Rehabilitation of the banking system became a major government
thrust. However, private hoarding of money was rampant because people feared
government inquiry into their bank deposits and bond investments for tax collection
purposes. Thus, even if the members of Congress at that time recognized the
possible danger of R.A. No. 1405, such as providing a climate conducive to tax
evasion, still, they passed the law with the belief that the benefits accruing to the
economy with the influx of deposits and bond investments would counterbalance
immeasurably the losses of the Government from such tax evasion.[28] Section 2,
the core of R.A. No. 1405, then reads:
Sec. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the
Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the
Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered
as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked
into by any person, government official, bureau or office except upon written
permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a
competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in
cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
In 1981, Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1792 to provide for additional exceptions to the absolutely confidential nature of
bank deposits. These additional exceptions are: (1) when the examination is made
in the course of a special or general examination of a bank; or (2) when the
examination is made by an independent auditor hired by the bank to conduct its
regular audit. Section 2 of R.A. No. 1405, as amended, thus reads:
SEC.2 All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the
Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the
Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby
considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined,

inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except,
when the examination is made in the course of a special or general examination of
a bank and is specifically authorized by the Monetary Board after being satisfied
that there is reasonable ground to believe that a bank fraud or serious irregularity
has been or is being committed and that it is necessary to look into the deposit to
establish such fraud or irregularity, or when the examination is made by an
independent auditor hired by the bank to conduct its regular audit provided that the
examination is for audit purposes only and the results thereof shall be for the
exclusive use of the bank, or upon written permission of the depositor, or in case of
impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction
of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the
subject matter of litigation. (Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing amendment was premised on the realization that the old provision
adversely limited the examining authority of the Central Bank. Allegedly, such
limitation was contrary to the effective supervision of banks and endangered the
safety of deposits.
However, in 1992, P.D. No. 1792 was expressly repealed by Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7653, otherwise known as the New Central Bank Act.[29] Aside from encouraging
domestic savings, R.A. No. 7653 sought to uphold the right of citizens to privacy.
Also, the then members of Congress
were of the consensus that relaxed
disclosure rules are not conducive
to healthy competition among banks and
other financial institutions.[30]
Thus, we go back to the original provision of Section 2 of R.A. No. 1405 allowing
deposits to be examined, inquired or looked into under the following
exceptions: (1) upon written permission of the depositor;
(2) in cases of
impeachment; (3) upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or
dereliction of duty of public officials; or (4) in cases where the money deposited
or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.[31] I shall now resolve both
issues Inquiry Falls Under the Exceptions to the Confidentiality Rule and, therefore,
may be Inquired into by Respondent Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner contends that plunder is neither bribery nor dereliction of duty, hence, the
inquiry on his bank accounts cannot be considered an exception under R.A. No.
1405.
The argument is utterly without merit.
In the 1965 Philippine National Bank v. Gancayco[32] case, this Court held for the
first time that the exception upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or
dereliction of duty of public officials is not exclusive, and that analogous cases may
be considered as falling within the same exception. There, cases of unexplained
wealth were considered analogous to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty. The
Courts instructive pronouncement is quoted hereunder:

With regard to the claim that disclosure would be contrary to the policy making
bank deposits confidential, it is enough to point out that while section 2 of Republic
Act 1405 declares bank deposits to be absolutely confidential, it nevertheless
allows such disclosure in the following instances: (1) Upon written permission of the
depositor; (2) In cases of impeachment; (3) Upon order of a competent court in
cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials; (4) In cases where the
money deposited is the subject matter of the litigation. Cases of unexplained wealth
are similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty and no reason is seen why these
two classes of cases cannot be excepted from the rule making bank deposits
confidential. The policy as to one cannot be different from the policy as to the
other. This policy expresses the notion that a public office is a public trust and any
person who enters upon its discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life,
so far as relevant to his duty, is open to public scrutiny

Twenty-three (23) years thereafter, in 1988, the Court echoed the same principle in
the Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Purisima.[33] Incidentally, both
cases involve Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Today, this Court is faced with this important query is plunder analogous to
bribery, dereliction of duty or cases of unexplained wealth? I need not indulge
in a lengthy disquisition to show that plunder belongs to the same genre of
cases. Under Republic Act No. 7080, An Act Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, this
crime is committed by a public officer who, by himself or in connivance with
others, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth, the aggregate
amount or total value of which is at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00),
through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. The essence of plunder
lies in the phrase "combination or series of overt or criminal acts." Bribery and
violations of R.A. No. 3019 are only some of the criminal acts that comprise the
more serious crime of plunder. In other words, these are some of the
predicate crimes of plunder.[34]
All the criminal acts are enumerated
hereunder:
(1)
Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public
funds or raids on the public treasury;
(2)
By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage,
kickbacks, or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in
connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or
position of the public officer concerned;
(3)
By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to
the National Government or any of its subdivision, agencies or instrumentalities or
governmentowned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;

(4)
By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly, or indirectly any shares of
stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of
future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
(5)
By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other
combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit
particular person or special interests; or
(6)
By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship,
connection, or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and
to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines.
A reading of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code concerning bribery[35] and
dereliction of duty,[36] as well as corrupt practices under R.A. 3019, readily
shows the striking resemblance between them and the predicate crimes of
plunder. Paragraph 2 actually constitutes indirect bribery while paragraphs 4 and 5
constitute corrupt practices under R.A. No. 3019.[37] Logically, if the criminal acts
that make up the crime of plunder are categorized as exceptions to the
confidentiality rule, with more reason that the more serious crime of plunder should
be considered as falling within the same exception. All involve dishonesty and lack
of integrity in public service. There is no reason why plunder should be treated
differently.
Petitioner now avers that this Courts rulings in Philippine National Bank and Banco
Filipino do not apply to the present case because the subpoenae duces tecum/ad
testificandum in said cases were issued prior to the amendment of Section 8, R.A.
No. 3019. He stresses that under the old provision, the properties that may be
considered, when a public officials acquisition of properties through legitimate
means cannot be satisfactory shown, are only those of his spouse and unmarried
children.[38] However, under the new provision, the phrase spouse and
unmarried children was changed to spouse and dependents.[39] Thus, he
contends that while he is a son of the accused in the plunder case, he is
not his dependent.[40]
Petitioners argument lacks merit.
The amendment of Section 8 could not have the effect of limiting the governments
inquiry only to the properties of the spouse and dependents of a public official.
This is in light of this Courts broad pronouncement in Banco Filipino that the inquiry
extends to any other persons, and that restricting the inquiry only to property
held by or in the name of the government official or employee, or his spouse and
unmarried children is unwarranted and an absurdity that we cannot ascribe to
our lawmakers. Thus:

The inquiry into legally acquired property or property NOT legitimately acquired
extends to cases where such property is concealed by being held by or recorded in
the name of other persons. This proposition is made clear by R.A. No. 3019[41]
which quite categorically states that the term, legitimately acquired property of
a public office or employee shall not include x x x property unlawfully acquired
by the respondent, but its ownership is concealed by its being recorded in the
name of, or held by, respondents spouse, ascendants, descendants, relatives or
any other persons.
To sustain the petitioners theory, and restrict the inquiry only to property held by or
in the name of the government official or employee, or his spouse and unmarried
children is unwarranted in the light of the provisions of the statutes in question, and
would make available to persons in government who illegally acquire property an
easy and fool-proof means of evading investigation and prosecution; all they would
have to do would be to simply place the property in the possession or name of
persons other than their spouse and unmarried children. This is an absurdity that we
will not ascribe to the lawmakers.
Undoubtedly, the policy enunciated is to prevent a public official from evading
prosecution or investigation by allowing government inquiry even to properties in
the name of his spouse, ascendants, descendants, relatives or any other persons.
The Courts pronouncement renders insignificant the personal circumstance of the
public officials child, i.e. whether he is a dependent or independent, married or
unmarried. This is entirely logical. Section 8 itself starts with the statement: If in
accord with the provisions of Republic Act numbered One thousand three hundred
seventynine, a public official has been found to have acquired during his
incumbency, whether in his name or in the name of other persons, an amount of
property and/or money manifestly out of proportion to his salary and to his other
lawful income, that fact shall be a ground for dismissal or removal. Likewise,
Republic Act No. 1379,[42] excludes the following properties from the definition of
other legitimately acquired property:
1. Property unlawfully acquired by the respondent, but its ownership is concealed
by its being recorded in the name of, or held by, the respondents spouse,
ascendants, descendants, relatives or any other person.
3. Property unlawfully acquired by the respondent, but transferred by him to
another person or persons on or after the effectivity of this Act.
How can the government establish the nexus between a public official and his
property in the name of other persons if this Court will limit the inquiry only to his
spouse and dependents? Indeed, there is truth in respondent Peoples statement
that the extension of inquiry into property held by, or in the name of another
persons other than the public official, is sustained by a recognized legislative and
public policy adhered to by the courts.

Accordingly, the fact that petitioner is not an accused in the plunder case does not
insulate his bank accounts from inquiry. Such inquiry is justified by the fact that the
Special Prosecution Panel is establishing a nexus between his bank accounts and
their alleged owner, Former President Estrada, an accused in the plunder case.
Furthermore, as pointed out by respondent Sandiganbayan, there is nothing in the
exception upon order or a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty
of public officials which would suggest that in order for the exception to apply,
the owner of the deposit or of the account must be an accused in the case where
the information relative to the account is sought to be adduced.
Petitioner also contends that the money deposited in his bank accounts cannot be
considered the subject matter of the plunder case.
I am not persuaded.
The subject matter of litigation as used in R.A. No. 1405 is expounded in Union
Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[43] where the Court held:
Union Bank is now before this Court insisting that the money deposited in Account
No. 0111-01854-8 is the subject matter of the litigation. Petitioner cites the case of
Mathay vs. Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, where we defined subject
matter of the action, thus:
By the phrase subject matter of the action is meant the physical facts, the things
real or personal, the money, lands, chattels, and the like, in relation to which the
suit is prosecuted, and not the delict or wrong committed by the defendant.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals confuses the cause of action with the
subject of the action. In Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian, petitioner points out, this Court
distinguished the two concepts.
x x x The cause of action is the legal wrong threatened or committed, while the
object of the action is to prevent or redress the wrong by obtaining some legal
relief; but the subject of the action is neither of these since it is not the wrong or the
relief demanded, the subject of the action is the matter or thing with respect to
which the controversy has arisen, concerning which the wrong has been done, and
this ordinarily is the property, or the contract and its subject matter, or the thing in
dispute.
The argument is well-taken. We note with approval the difference between the
subject of the action from the cause of action. We also find petitioners definition
of the phrase subject matter of the action is consistent with the term subject
matter of the litigation, as the latter is used in the Bank Deposits Secrecy Act.
In Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Magsino, where the petitioner bank inadvertently caused the
transfer of the amount of US$1,000,000.00 instead of only US$1,000.00, the Court

sanctioned the examination of the bank accounts where part of the money was
subsequently caused to be deposited:
x x x Section 2 of [Republic Act No. 1405] allows the disclosure of bank deposits
in cases where the money deposited is the subject matter of the litigation.
Inasmuch as Civil Case No. 26899 is aimed at recovering the amount converted by
the Javiers for their own benefit, necessarily, an inquiry into the whereabouts of the
illegally acquired amount extends to whatever is concealed by being held or
recorded in the name of persons other than the one responsible for the illegal
acquisition.
Clearly, Mellon Bank involved a case where the money deposited was the subject
matter of the litigation since the money so deposited was the very thing in dispute.
There is no denying that the subject matter of a plunder case is the ill-gotten
wealth accumulated, amassed or acquired by a public officer either by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity,
business associates, subordinates or other persons,
the aggregate or total value of which is at least P50,000,000.00.[44] Since the
money deposited in petitioners bank accounts is being proven to be a portion of
former President Estradas ill-gotten wealth, it follows that it is the thing or matter
with respect to which the crime of plunder has arisen. Without the ill-gotten
wealth, there can be no plunder. Correspondingly, R.A. No. 7080 penalizing plunder
mandates that courts shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth forfeited in favor of
the State.[45] Government recovery of the ill-gotten wealth being a consequence of
plunder, necessarily an inquiry into the whereabouts of the ill-gotten wealth extends
to properties being held or recorded in the name of persons other than the one
responsible for the crime of plunder.
Extremely-Detailed Information contained
in the Special Prosecution Panels Requests for
Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum - Violative of
Petitioners Right to Due Process and Privacy
Petitioner also asserts that the extremely-detailed information in the Special
Prosecution Panels requests shows prior illegal disclosure of his bank accounts.

I agree.

In Grisworld v. Connecticut,[46] the United States Supreme Court announced for the
first time that the right to privacy is an independent constitutional right; and that:
Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanation
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees
create zones of privacy. Our Bill of Rights, enshrined in Article III of the
Constitution, provides at least two guarantees that explicitly create zones of privacy.
They highlight a persons right to be let alone or the right to determine what,
how much, to whom and when information about himself shall be disclosed.[47]
Section 2 guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose. Section 3 renders inviolable the privacy
of communication and correspondence and further cautions that any evidence
obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.

These zones of privacy are also recognized and protected in our laws,[48] such as
civil and criminal laws. Article 26 of the Civil Code mandates that every person
shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors
and other persons and punishes as actionable torts acts such as prying into the
privacy of anothers residence; and meddling with or disturbing the private life or
family relations of another. Article 32 states that any public officer or employee,
or any private individual, who directly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner
impedes or impairs x x x the right to be secure in ones person, house, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures; x x x the privacy of
communication and correspondence shall be liable for damages. On the other
hand, Article
209,[49] Articles 290-292,[50] and Articles 280-281[51] of the Revised Penal Code
treat as crimes (a) revelation of secrets by an attorney-at-law or solicitor, (b)
discovery and revelation of industrial secrets, and
(c) trespass to dwelling,
respectively.
Aside from the foregoing, invasion of privacy is considered an offense in special
laws such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law,[52] the Intellectual Property Code of the
Philippines[53] and, of course, R.A. No. 1405, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act.
The myriad of laws enumerated only show that there are certain areas in a persons
life which even if accessible to the public, may be constitutionally and legally
protected as private.
Now, in evaluating a claim for violation of the right to privacy, a court must
determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and,
if so, whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable government
intrusion.[54] Applying these to the case at bar, the important inquiries are:

first, did petitioner exhibit a reasonable expectation of privacy over his bank
accounts?; and second, did the government violate such expectation?
The answers to both are in the affirmative.
It cannot be gainsaid that the customer of a bank expects that the documents
which he transmits to the bank in the course of his business operations, will remain
private, and that such an expectation is reasonable.[55] Financial transactions can
reveal much about a persons affairs, activities, beliefs, habits and associations.
Indeed, the totality of bank records provides a virtual current biography.[56]
Checks, for instance, in a sense, define a person. By examining them, the agents
get to know his doctors, lawyers, creditors, political allies, social connections,
religious affiliations, educational interests, the papers and magazines he reads, and
so on ad infinitum.[57] In other words, ones bank account mirrors not only his
finances, but also his debts, his way of life, his family and his civic commitment.
Such reality places a customers bank account within the expectations of privacy
category. In the Philippines, the expectation is heightened by the enactment of R.A.
No. 1405 which mandates that all deposits of whatever nature are considered as of
an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked
into by any person except under the instances therein.
Admittedly, a bank customer knowingly and voluntarily divulges his financial affairs
with the bank, but such is immaterial. The fact that one has disclosed private
papers to the bank within the context of confidential customer-bank relationship,
does not mean that one has waived all right to the privacy of the papers. Like the
user of the pay phone in Katz v. United States,[58] who, having paid the toll, was
entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be
broadcast to the world, so the customer of a bank, having written or deposited a
check, has a reasonable expectation that his check will be examined for bank
purposes only. Practically speaking, a customers disclosure of his financial affairs is
not entirely volitional, since it is impossible to participate in the economic life of
contemporary society without maintaining a bank account.[59] Consequently, the
customers reasonable expectation is that, absent customary legal process, the
matter he reveals to the bank will be utilized by the bank only for internal banking
purposes.[60]
In the instant case, while admittedly, respondent Sandiganbayans inquiry into
petitioners bank accounts falls under the two exceptions mentioned in R.A. No.
1405,[61] however, this Court observes that the manner of inquiry violates
petitioners rights to due process and privacy. At this juncture, it is worthy to note
that petitioners bank accounts were inquired into twice, first was through
subpoenae duces tecum issued by the Office of the Ombudsman and second was
through subpoenae duces tecum/ad testificandum issued by respondent
Sandiganbayan. Under both instances, petitioner was completely unaware of the
issuances of such subpoenae.

Petitioner persistently bewailed before respondent Sandiganbayan the prior

disclosure of his bank accounts pursuant to the subpoenae issued by the Office of
the Ombudsman absent any pending case in court and personal notice to him. He
sought the quashal of respondent Sandiganbayans subpoenae duces tecum/ad
testificandum on the ground that the Special Prosecution Panels requests for the
issuance of the said subpoenae were based on information illegally acquired by the
Office of the Ombudsman.
I am swayed with the merit of petitioners grievance.
In Marquez v. Desierto,[62] Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto ordered petitioner
Lourdes Marquez, a Branch Manager of Union Bank, to produce for purposes of an in
camera inspection certain bank documents relative to a case pending before the
Office of the Ombudsman. Ombudsman Desierto cited the Constitution and Section
15 (8) of R.A. No. 6770 as bases of his authority. Petitioner Marquez initially refused
but, after having been threatened with a contempt proceeding, she filed a petition
for declaratory relief seeking a clarification of the issue whether the Order of the
Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection of the questioned account is allowed
as an exception to the law on secrecy of bank deposits. The Courts ruling is
enlightening, thus:
An examination of the secrecy of bank deposits law (R.A. No. 1405) would reveal
the following exceptions:
1.

Where the depositor consents in writing;

2.

Impeachment case;

3.

By court order in bribery or dereliction of duty cases against public officials.

4.

Deposit is subject of litigation.

5.
Sec. 8, R.A. No. 3019, in cases of unexplained wealth as held in the case of
PNB v. Gancayco.
The order of the Ombudsman to produce for in camera inspection the subject
accounts with the Union Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, is based on a
pending investigation at the Office of the Ombudsman against Amado Lagdameo, et
al. for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3 (e) and (g) relative to the Joint Venture
Agreement between the Public Estates Authority and AMARI.
We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed there must be a
pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be
clearly identified, the inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case
before the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the account
holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and such inspection
may cover only the account identified in the pending case.

In Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, we held that Section 2

of the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits, as amended, declares bank deposits to be
absolutely confidential except:
(1)
In an examination made in the course of a special or general examination of
a bank that is specifically authorized by the Monetary Board after being satisfied
that there is reasonable ground to believe that a bank fraud or serious irregularity
has been or is being committed and that is necessary to look into the deposit to
establish such fraud or irregularity;
(2)
In an examination made by an independent auditor hired by the bank to
conduct its regular audit provided that the examination is for audit purposes only
and the results thereof shall be for the exclusive use of the bank;
(3)

Upon written permission of the depositor;

(4)

In cases of impeachment;

(5)
Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of
public officials; or
(6)
In cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the
litigation.
In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of
competent authority. What is existing is an investigation by the Office of the
Ombudsman. In short, what the Office of the Ombudsman would wish to do is to
fish for additional evidence to formally charge Amado Lagdameo, at al., with the
Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was no pending case in court which would warrant
the opening of the bank account for inspection.
Thus, as held by the Court, before an in camera inspection of bank documents
maybe allowed, there must be a pending case before a court of competent
jurisdiction. The Information for plunder against Former President Estrada was filed
with respondent Sandiganbayan on April 4, 2001. On the other hand, the
Ombudsman issued the subpoenae duces tecum on February 8, 16, and March 7,
2001. Clearly, there was yet no pending litigation before any court when such
subpoenae were issued. Following the Courts ruling in Marquez, what the Office of
the Ombudsman would wish to do was to fish for evidence in order to formally
charge former President Estrada before respondent Sandiganbayan.
At this point, it should be emphasized that the authority of the Ombudsman to
examine and have access to bank accounts and records must be read in
conjunction with Section 2 of R.A. No. 1405 providing that deposits of whatever
nature shall be considered confidential except in several instances already
mentioned. This is because bank deposits belong to a protected zone where

government intrusion could infringe legitimate expectation of privacy. An opposite

course is unwarranted.
In United States v. United States District Court,[63] the US Supreme Court held that
the potential for abuse is particularly acute where the legislative scheme permits
access to information without invocation of the judicial process. In such instances,
the important responsibility for balancing societal and individual interests is left to
unreviewed executive discretion, rather than the scrutiny of a neutral magistrate.
In Katz v. United States,[64] the same Court ruled that, [t[he prosecutors duty and
responsibility is to enforce the laws, to investigate and to prosecute. Those charged
with the investigative and prosecutorial duty should not be the sole judges of when
to utilize constitutionally sensitive means in pursuing their tasks. The historical
judgment is that unreviewed executive discretion may yield too readily to pressures
to obtain incriminating evidence and overlook potential invasions of privacy.
Between the government and the citizen, there must be a neutral entity that should
balance the formers claim of authority vis--vis the latters assertion of rights.
By the natural scheme of things, the Office of the Ombudsman can hardly be
characterized as detached, disinterested and neutral. Its mandate is to investigate
and prosecute any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or
agency that appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.[65] In carrying out
such mandate, it is expected to act with vigor and aggressiveness. But to permit
such office to have access to bank records without any judicial control as to
relevancy or other traditional requirements of due process and to allow the
evidence to be used in any subsequent prosecution, opens the door to a vast and
unlimited range of very real abuses of police power.[66] True, there are
administrative summonses for documents[67] recognized in other jurisdictions, but
there is a requirement that their enforcement receives a judicial scrutiny and a
judicial order.[68] In this regard, I am appalled by the whole sale subpoena duces
tecum issued by the Ombudsman directing the President or Chief Executive Officer
of Urban Bank to produce bank records and all documents relative thereto
pertaining to all bank accounts (Savings, Current, Time Deposit, Trust, Foreign
Currency Deposits, etc) under the account names of Jose Velarde, Joseph E.
Estrada, Laarni Enriquez, Guia Gomez, Joy Melendrez, Peachy Osorio, Rowena Lopez,
Kevin or Kelvin Garcia, 727, 737, 747, 757 and 858. Indubitably, such blanket
subpoena provides occasions for fishing expedition.
Above everything else, however, what strikes us most is the patent unfairness of
the process. First in the Bill of Rights is the mandate that no person shall be
deprived of his life, liberty or property without due process of law. Courts have held
that the right of personal privacy is one aspect
of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.[69] Basic due process
demands that the Office of the Ombudsman furnish petitioner a copy of the
subpoenae duces tecum it issued. In Marquez v. Desierto,[70] this Court held: The

bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present during the
inspection, and such inspection may cover only the account identified in the
pending case. Such notice is not too much to ask for, after all, an accountholder
bears the risk not only of losing his privacy but, also, his property.[71] Of course,
not to mention the procedural impasse that is encountered by such accountholder
who cannot contest the propriety of the issuance of a subpoena.
In this case, petitioner was completely unaware of the issuance of subpoenae duces
tecum, hence, he never had the opportunity to challenge them. As a matter of fact,
almost two years had passed before he learned of such issuance and the resulting
disclosure. Indeed, the ugly truth here is that neither the Office of the Ombudsman
nor the PDIC notified petitioner of the impending and actual disclosure of his bank
accounts. Such absence of notice is a fatal constitutional defect that inheres in a
process that omits provision for notice to the bank customer of an invasion of his
protected right.[72]
Now, let us take a glimpse at the proceedings before respondent Sandiganbayan.
The proceedings before respondent Sandiganbayan also leave much to be desired.
Neither respondent Sandiganbayan nor the Special Prosecution Panel nor PDIC
furnished petitioner copies of the subpoenae duces tecum/ad testificandum or of
the requests for their issuance. It bears reiterating that it was only through the
media that petitioner learned about such requests. Definitely, something is
inherently wrong in a public proceeding that allows a holder of bank account,
subject of litigation, to be completely uninformed. Also not to be overlooked is the
respondent Sandiganbayans oral directive to petitioner to file his motion to quash
not later than 12:00 noon of January 28, 2003. This notwithstanding the fact that it
was only the day before, or on January 27, 2003, that petitioner learned about the
requests and that he was yet to procure the services of a counsel. Every civilized
state adheres to the principle that when a persons life and liberty are jeopardized
by government action, it behooves a democratic government to see to it that this
jeopardy is fair, reasonable and according to time-honored tradition. The importance
of this principle is eloquently underscored by one observer who said: The quality of
a civilization is largely determined by the fairness of its criminal trials.[73]

Respondent Sandiganbayan cannot justify its omission by relying on Adorio v.

Bersamin,[74] which held that: Requests by a party for the issuance of subpoenas
do not require notice to other parties to the action. No violation of due process
results by such lack of notice since the other parties would have ample opportunity
to examine the witnesses and documents subpoenaed once they are presented in

court. Suffice it to say that petitioner was not a party to the plunder case, hence,
he could not have the opportunity to examine the witnesses and the documents
subpoenaed.

True, bank accounts at times harbor criminal plans. But this is not a reason to
declare an open season for inquiry. Customers have a constitutionally justifiable
expectation of privacy in the documentary details of the financial transactions
reflected in their bank accounts. That wall of privacy, however, is not impregnable.
Our Constitution, as well as our laws, provides procedures whereby the
confidentiality of ones financial affairs may be disclosed. In other words, access to
bank records is controlled by adequate legal process. Here, the subpoenae issued
by respondent Sandiganbayan, tainted as they are by the vices that afflict the
proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman, cannot be considered to have
been issued pursuant to such adequate legal process. Petitioner, therefore, has
reason to feel aggrieved.
Section 4, Rule 21 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides that
the court may quash a subpoenae duces tecum upon motion if it is unreasonable
and oppressive.[75] Here, the three (3) subpoenae duces tecum/ad testificandum
issued by respondent Sandiganbayan are unreasonable and oppressive for the
reasons earlier mentioned. I thus find respondent Sandiganbayan to have
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing them.
One last word. The violation of petitioners right to privacy could have been
obviated had respondent court complied with its duty to be watchful for the
constitutional rights of the citizens and against any stealthy encroachments
thereon. The motto should always be obsta principiis.[76]
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I vote to GRANT the Petition. The assailed Resolutions
dated February 7, February 12 and March 11, 2003 issued by respondent
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 26558, People of the Philippines v. Former
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, et al. being tainted with grave abuse of
discretion, should be SET ASIDE. The subpoenae duces tecum/ad testificandum
dated January 21, 24 and 31, 2003, should be QUASHED for being unreasonable and
oppressive.

LOURDES T. MARQUEZ, in her capacity as Branch Manager, Union Bank of

the Philippines, petitioners, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, (in his capacity
as OMBUDSMAN, Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau, Office
of the Ombudsman, ANGEL C. MAYOR-ALGO, JR., MARY ANN CORPUZMANALAC and JOSE T. DE JESUS, JR., in their capacities as Chairman and
Members of the Panel, respectively, respondents.

DECISION

PARDO, J.:

In the petition at bar, petitioner seeks to-a. Annul and set aside, for having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, respondents order
dated September 7, 1998 in OMB-0-97-0411, In Re: Motion to Cite Lourdes T.
Marquez for indirect contempt, received by counsel of September 9, 1998, and their
order dated October 14, 1998, denying Marquezs motion for reconsideration dated
September 10, 1998, received by counsel on October 20, 1998.
b. Prohibit respondents from implementing their order dated October 14, 1998, in
proceeding with the hearing of the motion to cite Marquez for indirect contempt,
through the issuance by this Court of a temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction.[1]
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Sometime in May 1998, petitioner Marquez received an Order from the Ombudsman
Aniano A. Desierto dated April 29, 1998, to produce several bank documents for

purposes of inspection in camera relative to various accounts maintained at Union

Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, where petitioner is the branch manager.
The accounts to be inspected are Account Nos. 011-37270, 240-020718, 245-303173 and 245-30318-1, involved in a case pending with the Ombudsman entitled, FactFinding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) v. Amado Lagdameo, et. al. The order further
states:

It is worth mentioning that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and to

require the production and inspection of records and documents is sanctioned by
the 1987 Philippine Constitution, Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the
Ombudsman Act of 1989 and under existing jurisprudence on the matter. It must be
noted that R. A. 6770 especially Section 15 thereof provides, among others, the
following powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman, to wit:
x

(8) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum and take
testimony in any investigation or inquiry, including the power to examine and have
access to bank accounts and records;
(9) Punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same
procedure and with the same penalties provided therein.
Clearly, the specific provision of R.A. 6770, a later legislation, modifies the law on
the Secrecy of Bank Deposits (R.A. 1405) and places the office of the Ombudsman
in the same footing as the courts of law in this regard.[2]
The basis of the Ombudsman in ordering an in camera inspection of the accounts is
a trail of managers checks purchased by one George Trivinio, a respondent in OMB0-97-0411, pending with the office of the Ombudsman.
It would appear that Mr. George Trivinio, purchased fifty one (51) Managers Checks
(MCs) for a total amount of P272.1 Million at Traders Royal Bank, United Nations
Avenue branch, on May 2 and 3, 1995. Out of the 51 MCs, eleven (11) MCs
in the amount of P70.6 million, were deposited and credited to an account
maintained at the Union Bank, Julia Vargas Branch.[3]
On May 26, 1998, the FFIB panel met in conference with petitioner Lourdes T.
Marquez and Atty. Fe B. Macalino at the banks main office, Ayala Avenue, Makati
City. The meeting was for the purpose of allowing petitioner and Atty. Macalino to
view the checks furnished by Traders Royal Bank. After convincing themselves of the
veracity of the checks, Atty. Macalino advised Ms. Marquez to comply with the order
of the Ombudsman. Petitioner agreed to an in camera inspection set on June 3,
1998.[4]

However, on June 4, 1998, petitioner wrote the Ombudsman explaining to him that
the accounts in question cannot readily be identified and asked for time to respond
to the order. The reason forwarded by petitioner was that despite diligent efforts
and from the account numbers presented, we can not identify these accounts since
the checks are issued in cash or bearer. We surmised that these accounts have long
been dormant, hence are not covered by the new account number generated by the
Union Bank system. We therefore have to verify from the Interbank records
archives for the whereabouts of these accounts.[5]
The Ombudsman, responding to the request of the petitioner for time to comply
with the order, stated: firstly, it must be emphasized that Union Bank, Julia Vargas
Branch was the depositary bank of the subject Traders Royal Bank Managers
Checks (MCs), as shown at its dorsal portion and as cleared by the Philippine
Clearing House, not the International Corporate Bank.
Notwithstanding the fact that the checks were payable to cash or bearer,
nonetheless, the name of the depositor(s) could easily be identified since the
account numbers x x x where said checks were deposited are identified in the order.
Even assuming that the accounts xxx were already classified as dormant
accounts, the bank is still required to preserve the records pertaining to the
accounts within a certain period of time as required by existing banking rules and
regulations.
And finally, the in camera inspection was already extended twice from May 13,
1998 to June 3, 1998, thereby giving the bank enough time within which to
sufficiently comply with the order.[6]
Thus, on June 16, 1998, the Ombudsman issued an order directing petitioner to
produce the bank documents relative to the accounts in issue. The order states:
Viewed from the foregoing, your persistent refusal to comply with Ombudsmans
order is unjustified, and is merely intended to delay the investigation of the case.
Your act constitutes disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order issued by this
office and is punishable as Indirect Contempt under Section 3(b) of R.A. 6770. The
same may also constitute obstruction in the lawful exercise of the functions of the
Ombudsman which is punishable under Section 36 of R.A. 6770.[7]
On July 10, 1998, petitioner together with Union Bank of the Philippines, filed a
petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and injunction[8] with the Regional Trial
Court, Makati City, against the Ombudsman.
The petition was intended to clear the rights and duties of petitioner. Thus,
petitioner sought a declaration of her rights from the court due to the clear conflict
between R. A. No. 6770, Section 15 and R. A. No. 1405, Sections 2 and 3.

Petitioner prayed for a temporary restraining order (TRO) because the Ombudsman
and other persons acting under his authority were continuously harassing her to
produce the bank documents relative to the accounts in question. Moreover, on June
16, 1998, the Ombudsman issued another order stating that unless petitioner
appeared before the FFIB with the documents requested, petitioner manager would
be charged with indirect contempt and obstruction of justice.
In the meantime,[9] on July 14, 1998, the lower court denied petitioners prayer for
a temporary restraining order and stated thus:
After hearing the arguments of the parties, the court finds the application for a
Temporary Restraining Order to be without merit.
Since the application prays for the restraint of the respondent, in the exercise of
his contempt powers under Section 15 (9) in relation to paragraph (8) of R.A. 6770,
known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, there is no great or irreparable injury
from which petitioners may suffer, if respondent is not so restrained. Respondent
should he decide to exercise his contempt powers would still have to apply with the
court. x x x Anyone who, without lawful excuse x x x refuses to produce
documents for inspection, when thereunto lawfully required shall be subject to
discipline as in case of contempt of Court and upon application of the individual or
body exercising the power in question shall be dealt with by the Judge of the First
Instance (now RTC) having jurisdiction of the case in a manner provided by law
(section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code). Under the present Constitution
only judges may issue warrants, hence, respondent should apply with the Court for
the issuance of the warrant needed for the enforcement of his contempt orders. It is
in these proceedings where petitioners may question the propriety of respondents
exercise of his contempt powers. Petitioners are not therefore left without any
adequate remedy.
The questioned orders were issued with the investigation of the case of FactFinding and Intelligence Bureau vs. Amado Lagdameo, et. el., OMB-0-97-0411, for
violation of R.A. 3019. Since petitioner failed to show prima facie evidence that the
subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the
Ombudsman, no writ of injunction may be issued by this Court to delay this
investigation pursuant to Section 14 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989.[10]
On July 20, 1998, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration based on the following
grounds:
a. Petitioners application for Temporary Restraining Order is not only to restrain the
Ombudsman from exercising his contempt powers, but to stop him from
implementing his Orders dated April 29,1998 and June 16,1998; and
b. The subject matter of the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman at
petitioners premises is outside his jurisdiction.[11]

On July 23, 1998, the Ombudsman filed a motion to dismiss the petition for
declaratory relief[12] on the ground that the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction
to hear a petition for relief from the findings and orders of the Ombudsman, citing R.
A. No. 6770, Sections 14 and 27. On August 7, 1998, the Ombudsman filed an
opposition to petitioners motion for reconsideration dated July 20, 1998.[13]
On August 19, 1998, the lower court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration,
[14] and also the Ombudsmans motion to dismiss.[15]
On August 21, 1998, petitioner received a copy of the motion to cite her for
contempt, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman by Agapito B. Rosales, Director,
Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB).[16]
On August 31, 1998, petitioner filed with the Ombudsman an opposition to the
motion to cite her in contempt on the ground that the filing thereof was premature
due to the petition pending in the lower court.[17] Petitioner likewise reiterated that
she had no intention to disobey the orders of the Ombudsman. However, she
wanted to be clarified as to how she would comply with the orders without her
breaking any law, particularly R. A. No. 1405.[18]
Respondent Ombudsman panel set the incident for hearing on September 7, 1998.
[19] After hearing, the panel issued an order dated September 7, 1998, ordering
petitioner and counsel to appear for a continuation of the hearing of the contempt
charges against her.[20]
On September 10, 1998, petitioner filed with the Ombudsman a motion for
reconsideration of the above order.[21] Her motion was premised on the fact that
there was a pending case with the Regional Trial Court, Makati City,[22] which would
determine whether obeying the orders of the Ombudsman to produce bank
documents would not violate any law.
The FFIB opposed the motion,[23] and on October 14, 1998, the Ombudsman
denied the motion by order the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, respondent Lourdes T. Marquezs motion for reconsideration is hereby
DENIED, for lack of merit. Let the hearing of the motion of the Fact Finding
Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) to cite her for indirect contempt be intransferrably set to
29 October 1998 at 2:00 oclock p.m. at which date and time she should appear
personally to submit her additional evidence. Failure to do so shall be deemed a
waiver thereof.[24]
Hence, the present petition.[25]
The issue is whether petitioner may be cited for indirect contempt for her failure to
produce the documents requested by the Ombudsman. And whether the order of
the Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection of the questioned account is
allowed as an exception to the law on secrecy of bank deposits (R. A. No. 1405).

An examination of the secrecy of bank deposits law (R. A. No. 1405) would reveal
the following exceptions:
1. Where the depositor consents in writing;
2. Impeachment case;
3. By court order in bribery or dereliction of duty cases against public officials;
4. Deposit is subject of litigation;
5. Sec. 8, R. A. No. 3019, in cases of unexplained wealth as held in the case of PNB
vs. Gancayco[26]
The order of the Ombudsman to produce for in camera inspection the subject
accounts with the Union Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, is based on a
pending investigation at the Office of the Ombudsman against Amado Lagdameo,
et. al. for violation of R. A. No. 3019, Sec. 3 (e) and (g) relative to the Joint Venture
Agreement between the Public Estates Authority and AMARI.
We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a
pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be
clearly identified, the inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case
before the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the account
holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and such inspection
may cover only the account identified in the pending case.
In Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, we held that Section 2 of the
Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits, as amended, declares bank deposits to be
absolutely confidential except:
(1)
In an examination made in the course of a special or general
examination of a bank that is specifically authorized by the Monetary Board after
being satisfied that there is reasonable ground to believe that a bank fraud or
serious irregularity has been or is being committed and that it is necessary to look
into the deposit to establish such fraud or irregularity,
(2) In an examination made by an independent auditor hired by the bank to
conduct its regular audit provided that the examination is for audit purposes only
and the results thereof shall be for the exclusive use of the bank,
(3) Upon written permission of the depositor,
(4) In cases of impeachment,
(5) Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of
public officials, or

(6) In cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the
litigation[27]
In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of competent
authority. What is existing is an investigation by the office of the Ombudsman. In
short, what the Office of the Ombudsman would wish to do is to fish for additional
evidence to formally charge Amado Lagdameo, et. al., with the Sandiganbayan.
Clearly, there was no pending case in court which would warrant the opening of the
bank account for inspection.
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides
that "[e]very person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of
mind of his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as actionable torts several
acts for meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also holds a public
officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any violation of
the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy of letters and
other private communications. The Revised Penal Code makes a crime of the
violation of secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and
trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the AntiWiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act, and the Intellectual Property
Code.[28]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we GRANT the petition. We order the Ombudsman to cease and
desist from requiring Union Bank Manager Lourdes T. Marquez, or anyone in her
place to comply with the order dated October 14, 1998, and similar orders. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.

CARMEN LL. INTENGAN, ROSARIO LL. NERI, and RITA P. BRAWNER,

petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AZIZ
RAJKOTWALA, WILLIAM FERGUSON, JOVEN REYES, and VIC LIM,
respondents.

DECISION

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking the reversal of the

Decision[1] dated July 8, 1996 of the former Fifteenth Division[2] of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37577 as well as its Resolution[3] dated April 16, 1997
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. The appellate court, in its Decision,
sustained a resolution of the Department of Justice ordering the withdrawal of
informations for violation of Republic Act No. 1405 against private respondents.

The facts are:

On September 21, 1993, Citibank filed a complaint for violation of section 31,[4] in
relation to section 144[5] of the Corporation Code against two (2) of its officers,
Dante L. Santos and Marilou Genuino. Attached to the complaint was an affidavit[6]
executed by private respondent Vic Lim, a vice-president of Citibank. Pertinent
portions of his affidavit are quoted hereunder:

2.1
Sometime this year, the higher management of Citibank, N.A. assigned me to
assist in the investigation of certain anomalous/highly irregular activities of the
Treasurer of the Global Consumer Group of the bank, namely, Dante L. Santos and
the Asst. Vice President in the office of Mr. Dante L. Santos, namely Ms. Marilou (also
called Malou) Genuino. Ms. Marilou Genuino apart from being an Assistant Vice
President in the office of Mr. Dante L. Santos also performed the duties of an
Account Officer. An Account Officer in the office of Mr. Dante L. Santos personally
attends to clients of the bank in the effort to persuade clients to place and keep
their monies in the products of Citibank, NA., such as peso and dollar deposits,
mortgage backed securities and money placements, among others.

xxx

xxx

xxx

4.1
The investigation in which I was asked to participate was undertaken because
the bank had found records/evidence showing that Mr. Dante L. Santos and Ms.
Malou Genuino, contrary to their disclosures and the aforementioned bank policy,
appeared to have been actively engaged in business endeavors that were in conflict

with the business of the bank. It was found that with the use of two (2) companies in
which they have personal financial interest, namely Torrance Development
Corporation and Global Pacific Corporation, they managed or caused existing bank
clients/depositors to divert their money from Citibank, N.A., such as those placed in
peso and dollar deposits and money placements, to products offered by other
companies that were commanding higher rate of yields. This was done by first
transferring bank clients monies to Torrance and Global which in turn placed the
monies of the bank clients in securities, shares of stock and other certificates of
third parties. It also appeared that out of these transactions, Mr. Dante L. Santos
and Ms. Marilou Genuino derived substantial financial gains.

5.1
In the course of the investigation, I was able to determine that the bank
clients which Mr. Santos and Ms. Genuino helped/caused to divert their
deposits/money placements with Citibank, NA. to Torrance and Global (their family
corporations) for subsequent investment in securities, shares of stocks and debt
papers in other companies were as follows:

xxx

b)

Carmen Intengan

xxx

d)

Rosario Neri

xxx

i)

Rita Brawner

All the above persons/parties have long standing accounts with Citibank, N.A. in
savings/dollar deposits and/or in trust accounts and/or money placements.

As evidence, Lim annexed bank records purporting to establish the deception

practiced by Santos and Genuino. Some of the documents pertained to the dollar
deposits of petitioners Carmen Ll. Intengan, Rosario Ll. Neri, and Rita P. Brawner, as
follows:

a) Annex A-6[7] - an Application for Money Transfer in the amount of US

$140,000.00, executed by Intengan in favor of Citibank $ S/A No. 24367796, to be
debited from her Account No. 22543341;

b) Annex A-7[8] - a Money Transfer Slip in the amount of US $45,996.30,

executed by Brawner in favor of Citibank $ S/A No. 24367796, to be debited from
her Account No. 22543236; and

c) Annex A-9[9] - an Application for Money Transfer in the amount of US

$100,000.00, executed by Neri in favor of Citibank $ S/A No. 24367796, to be
debited from her Account No. 24501018.

In turn, private respondent Joven Reyes, vice-president/business manager of the

Global Consumer Banking Group of Citibank, admits to having authorized Lim to
state the names of the clients involved and to attach the pertinent bank records,
including those of petitioners.[10] He states that private respondents Aziz
Rajkotwala and William Ferguson, Citibank, N.A. Global Consumer Banking Country
Business Manager and Country Corporate Officer, respectively, had no hand in the
disclosure, and that he did so upon the advice of counsel.

In his memorandum, the Solicitor General described the scheme as having been
conducted in this manner:

First step:
Santos and/or Genuino would tell the bank client that they knew of
financial products of other companies that were yielding higher rates of interests in
which the bank client can place his money. Acting on this information, the bank
client would then authorize the transfer of his funds from his Citibank account to the
Citibank account of either Torrance or Global.

The transfer of the Citibank clients deposits was done through the accomplishment
of either an Application For Managers Checks or a Term Investment Application in
favor of Global or Torrance that was prepared/filed by Genuino herself.

Upon approval of the Application for Managers Checks or Term Investment

Application, the funds of the bank client covered thereof were then deposited in the
Citibank accounts of Torrance and/or Global.

Second step: Once the said fund transfers had been effected, Global and/or Torrance
would then issue its/ their checks drawn against its/their Citibank accounts in favor
of the other companies whose financial products, such as securities, shares of
stocks and other certificates, were offering higher yields.

Third step: On maturity date(s) of the placements made by Torrance and/or Global
in the other companies, using the monies of the Citibank client, the other
companies would then. return the placements to Global and/or Torrance with the
corresponding interests earned.

Fourth step: Upon receipt by Global and/or Torrance of the remittances from the
other companies, Global and/or Torrance would then issue its/their own checks
drawn against their Citibank accounts in favor of Santos and Genuino.

The amounts covered by the checks represent the shares of Santos and Genuino in
the margins Global and/or Torrance had realized out of the placements [using the
diverted monies of the Citibank clients] made with the other companies.

Fifth step: At the same time, Global and/or Torrance would also issue its/their
check(s) drawn against its/their Citibank accounts in favor of the bank client.

The check(s) cover the principal amount (or parts thereof) which the Citibank client
had previously transferred, with the help of Santos and/or Genuino, from his
Citibank account to the Citibank account(s) of Global and/or Torrance for placement
in the other companies, plus the interests or earnings his placements in other

companies had made less the spreads made by Global, Torrance, Santos and
Genuino.

The complaints which were docketed as I.S. Nos. 93-9969, 93-10058 and 94-1215
were subsequently amended to include a charge of estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1(b)[11] of the Revised Penal Code.

As an incident to the foregoing, petitioners filed respective motions for the exclusion
and physical withdrawal of their bank records that were attached to Lims affidavit.

In due time, Lim and Reyes filed their respective counter-affidavits.[12] In separate
Memoranda dated March 8, 1994 and March 15, 1994 2nd Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Hermino T. Ubana, Sr. recommended the dismissal of petitioners
complaints. The recommendation was overruled by Provincial Prosecutor Mauro M.
Castro who, in a Resolution dated August 18, 1994,[13] directed the filing of
informations against private respondents for alleged violation of Republic Act No.
1405, otherwise known as the Bank Secrecy Law.

Private respondents counsel then filed an appeal before the Department of Justice
(DOJ). On November 17, 1994, then DOJ Secretary Franklin M. Drilon issued a
Resolution[14] ordering, inter alia, the withdrawal of the aforesaid informations
against private respondents. Petitioners motion for reconsideration[15] was denied
by DOJ Acting Secretary Demetrio G. Demetria in a Resolution dated March 6, 1995.
[16]

Initially, petitioners sought the reversal of the DOJ resolutions via a petition for
certiorari and mandamus filed with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 119999-120001.
However, the former First Division of this Court, in a Resolution dated June 5, 1995,
[17] referred the matter to the Court of the Appeals, on the basis of the latter
tribunals concurrent jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs therein prayed for.
The petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 37577 in the Court of Appeals.

On July 8, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing the petition in
CA-G.R. SP No. 37577 and declared therein, as follows:

Clearly, the disclosure of petitioners deposits was necessary to establish the

allegation that Santos and Genuino had violated Section 31 of the Corporation Code
in acquiring any interest adverse to the corporation in respect of any matter which
has been reposed in him in confidence. To substantiate the alleged scheme of
Santos and Genuino, private respondents had to present the records of the monies
which were manipulated by the two officers which included the bank records of
herein petitioners.

Although petitioners were not the parties involved in IS. No. 93-8469, their accounts
were relevant to the complete prosecution of the case against Santos and Genuino
and the respondent DOJ properly ruled that the disclosure of the same falls under
the last exception of R.A. No. 1405. That ruling is consistent with the principle laid
down in the case of Mellon Bank, N.A. vs. Magsino (190 SCRA 633) where the
Supreme Court allowed the testimonies on the bank deposits of someone not a
party to the case as it found that said bank deposits were material or relevant to the
allegations in the complaint. Significantly, therefore, as long as the bank deposits
are material to the case, although not necessarily the direct subject matter thereof,
a disclosure of the same is proper and falls within the scope of the exceptions
provided for by R.A. No. 1405.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Moreover, the language of the law itself is clear and cannot be subject to different
interpretations. A reading of the provision itself would readily reveal that the
exception or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter
of the litigation is not qualified by the phrase upon order of competent Court
which refers only to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was similarly denied in a Resolution dated

April 16, 1997. Appeal was made in due time to this Court.

The instant petition was actually denied by the former Third Division of this Court in
a Resolution[18] dated July 16, 1997, on the ground that petitioners had failed to
show that a reversible error had been committed. On motion, however, the petition
was reinstated[19] and eventually given due course.[20]

In assailing the appellate courts findings, petitioners assert that the disclosure of
their bank records was unwarranted and illegal for the following reasons:

I.

IN BLATANT VIOLATION OF R.A. NO. 1405, PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ILLEGALLY MADE

DISCLOSURES OF PETITIONERS CONFIDENTIAL BANK DEPOSITS FOR THEIR SELFISH
ENDS IN PROSECUTING THEIR COMPLAINT IN IS. NO. 93-8469 THAT DID NOT
INVOLVE PETITIONERS.

II.

PRIVATE RESPONDENTS DISCLOSURES DO NOT FALL UNDER THE FOURTH

EXCEPTION OF R.A. NO. 1405 (i.e., in cases where the money deposited or invested
is the subject matter of the litigation), NOR UNDER ANY OTHER EXCEPTION:

(1)

PETITIONERS DEPOSITS ARE NOT INVOLVED IN ANY LITIGATION BETWEEN

PETITIONERS AND RESPONDENTS. THERE IS NO LITIGATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES,
MUCH LESS ONE INVOLVING PETITIONERS DEPOSITS AS THE SUBJECT MATTER
THEREOF.

(2)

EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THERE IS A LITIGATION INVOLVING PETITIONERS

DEPOSITS AS THE SUBJECT MATTER THEREOF, PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
DISCLOSURES OF PETITIONERS DEPOSITS ARE NEVERTHELESS ILLEGAL FOR WANT
OF THE REQUISITE COURT ORDER, IN VIOLATION OF R.A. NO. 1405.

III.

THEREFORE, PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO PROSECUTE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS

FOR VIOLATIONS OF R.A. NO. 1405 FOR HAVING ILLEGALLY DISCLOSED
PETITIONERS CONFIDENTIAL BANK DEPOSITS AND RECORDS IN IS. NO. 93-8469.

Apart from the reversal of the decision and resolution of the appellate court as well
as the resolutions of the Department of Justice, petitioners pray that the latter
agency be directed to issue a resolution ordering the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal
to file the corresponding informations for violation of Republic Act No. 1405 against
private respondents.

The petition is not meritorious.

Actually, this case should have been studied more carefully by all concerned. The
finest legal minds in the country - from the parties respective counsel, the
Provincial Prosecutor, the Department of Justice, the Solicitor General, and the Court
of Appeals - all appear to have overlooked a single fact which dictates the outcome
of the entire controversy. A circumspect review of the record shows us the reason.
The accounts in question are U.S. dollar deposits; consequently, the applicable law
is not Republic Act No. 1405 but Republic Act (RA) No. 6426, known as the Foreign
Currency Deposit Act of the Philippines, section 8 of which provides:

Sec. 8. Secrecy of Foreign Currency Deposits.- All foreign currency deposits

authorized under this Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1035, as well as
foreign currency deposits authorized under Presidential Decree No. 1034, are
hereby declared as and considered of an absolutely confidential nature and, except
upon the written permission of the depositor, in no instance shall such foreign
currency deposits be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government
official bureau or office whether judicial or administrative or legislative or any other
entity whether public or private: Provided, however, that said foreign currency
deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or
process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative
body whatsoever.[21] (italics supplied)

Thus, under R.A. No. 6426 there is only a single exception to the secrecy of foreign
currency deposits, that is, disclosure is allowed only upon the written permission of

the depositor. Incidentally, the acts of private respondents complained of happened

before the enactment on September 29, 2001 of R.A. No. 9160 otherwise known as
the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001.

A case for violation of Republic Act No. 6426 should have been the proper case
brought against private respondents. Private respondents Lim and Reyes admitted
that they had disclosed details of petitioners dollar deposits without the latters
written permission. It does not matter if that such disclosure was necessary to
establish Citibanks case against Dante L. Santos and Marilou Genuino. Lims act of
disclosing details of petitioners bank records regarding their foreign currency
deposits, with the authority of Reyes, would appear to belong to that species of
criminal acts punishable by special laws, called malum prohibitum. In this regard, it
has been held that:

While it is true that, as a rule and on principles of abstract justice, men are not and
should not be held criminally responsible for acts committed by them without guilty
knowledge and criminal or at least evil intent xxx, the courts have always
recognized the power of the legislature, on grounds of public policy and compelled
by necessity, the great master of things, to forbid in a limited class of cases the
doing of certain acts, and to make their commission criminal without regard to the
intent of the doer. xxx In such cases no judicial authority has the power to require,
in the enforcement of the law, such knowledge or motive to be shown. As was said
in the case of State vs. McBrayer xxx:

It is a mistaken notion that positive, willful intent, as distinguished from a mere

intent, to violate the criminal law, is an essential ingredient in every criminal
offense, and that where there is the absence of such intent there is no offense; this
is especially so as to statutory offenses. When the statute plainly forbids an act to
be done, and it is done by some person, the law implies conclusively the guilty
intent, although the offender was honestly mistaken as to the meaning of the law he
violates. When the language is plain and positive, and the offense is not made to
depend upon the positive, willful intent and purpose, nothing is left to
interpretation.[22]

Ordinarily, the dismissal of the instant petition would have been without prejudice to
the filing of the proper charges against private respondents. The matter would have
ended here were it not for the intervention of time, specifically the lapse thereof. So
as not to unduly prolong the settlement of the case, we are constrained to rule on a

material issue even though it was not raised by the parties. We refer to the issue of
prescription.

Republic Act No. 6426 being a special law, the provisions of Act No. 3326,[23] as
amended by Act No. 3763, are applicable:

SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in

such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) after a year for
offences punished only by a fine or by imprisonment for not more than one month,
or both: (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one
month, but less than two years; (c) after eight years for those punished by
imprisonment for two years or more, but less than six years; and (d) after twelve
years for any other offence punished by imprisonment for six years or more, except
the crime of treason, which shall prescribe after twenty years: Provided, however,
That all offences against any law or part of law administered by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue shall prescribe after five years. Violations penalized by municipal
ordinances shall prescribe after two months.

Violations of the regulations or conditions of certificates of public convenience

issued by the Public Service Commission shall prescribe after two months.
SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the
guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for
reasons not constituting jeopardy.
A violation of Republic Act No. 6426 shall subject the offender to imprisonment of
not less than one year nor more than five years, or by a fine of not less than five
thousand pesos nor more than twenty-five thousand pesos, or both.[24] Applying
Act No. 3326, the offense prescribes in eight years.[25] Per available records,
private respondents may no longer be haled before the courts for violation of
Republic Act No. 6426. Private respondent Vic Lim made the disclosure in
September of 1993 in his affidavit submitted before the Provincial Fiscal.[26] In her
complaint-affidavit,[27] Intengan stated that she learned of the revelation of the
details of her foreign currency bank account on October 14, 1993. On the other
hand, Neri asserts that she discovered the disclosure on October 24, 1993.[28] As to

Brawner, the material date is January 5, 1994.[29] Based on any of these dates,
prescription has set in.[30]
The filing of the complaint or information in the case at bar for alleged violation of
Republic Act No. 1405 did not have the effect of tolling the prescriptive period. For it
is the filing of the complaint or information corresponding to the correct offense
which produces that effect.[31]
It may well be argued that the foregoing disquisition would leave petitioners with no
remedy in law. We point out, however, that the confidentiality of foreign currency
deposits mandated by Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1246, came into effect as far back as 1977. Hence, ignorance thereof cannot be
pretended. On one hand, the existence of laws is a matter of mandatory judicial
notice;[32] on the other, ignorantia legis non excusat.[33] Even during the
pendency of this appeal, nothing prevented the petitioners from filing a complaint
charging the correct offense against private respondents. This was not done, as
everyone involved was content to submit the case on the basis of an alleged
violation of Republic Act No. 1405 (Bank Secrecy Law), however, incorrectly invoked.
[34]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO and HECTOR T. RIVERA, petitioners, vs. THE

COURT OF APPEALS, HON. GUILLERMO L. LOJA, SR., PRESIDING JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 26, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

Assailed in this petition is the consolidated decision rendered on May 23, 1996, by
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35928 and CA-G.R. SP No. 35719. CA-G.R. SP
No. 35928 had affirmed the order dated September 6, 1994, of the Regional Trial
Court, Manila, Branch 26, insofar as it denied petitioners respective Motions to
Quash the Informations in twenty-five (25) criminal cases for violation of Central
Bank Circular No. 960. Therein included were informations involving: (a)
consolidated Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883 filed against Mrs. Imelda
R. Marcos, Roberto S. Benedicto, and Hector T. Rivera; (b) consolidated Criminal
Cases Nos. 91-101884 to 91-101892 filed against Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto; and
(c) Criminal Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969 also against Mrs. Marcos and
Benedicto. Note, however, that the Court of Appeals already dismissed Criminal
Case No. 91-101884.

The factual antecedents of the instant petition are as follows:

On December 27, 1991, Mrs. Imelda Marcos and Messrs. Benedicto and Rivera were
indicted for violation of Section 10 of Circular No. 960[1] in relation to Section 34[2]
of the Central Bank Act (Republic Act No. 265, as amended) in five Informations filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879
to 91-101883, the charge sheets alleged that the trio failed to submit reports of
their foreign exchange earnings from abroad and/or failed to register with the
Foreign Exchange Department of the Central Bank within the period mandated by
Circular No. 960. Said Circular prohibited natural and juridical persons from
maintaining foreign exchange accounts abroad without prior authorization from the
Central Bank.[3] It also required all residents of the Philippines who habitually
earned or received foreign currencies from invisibles, either locally or abroad, to
report such earnings or receipts to the Central Bank. Violations of the Circular were
punishable as a criminal offense under Section 34 of the Central Bank Act.

That same day, nine additional Informations charging Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto
with the same offense, but involving different accounts, were filed with the Manila
RTC, which docketed these as Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101884 to 91-101892. The
accusatory portion of the charge sheet in Criminal Case No. 91-101888 reads:

That from September 1, 1983 up to 1987, both dates inclusive, and for sometime
thereafter, both accused, conspiring and confederating with each other and with the
late President Ferdinand E. Marcos, all residents of Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and

feloniously fail to submit reports in the prescribed form and/or register with the
Foreign Exchange Department of the Central Bank within 90 days from October 21,
1983 as required of them being residents habitually/customarily earning, acquiring
or receiving foreign exchange from whatever source or from invisibles locally or
from abroad, despite the fact they actually earned interests regularly every six (6 )
months for the first two years and then quarterly thereafter for their investment of
$50-million, later reduced to $25-million in December 1985, in Philippine-issued
dollar denominated treasury notes with floating rates and in bearer form, in the
name of Bank Hofmann, AG, Zurich, Switzerland, for the benefit of Avertina
Foundation, their front organization established for economic advancement
purposes with secret foreign exchange account Category (Rubric) C.A.R. No. 211
925-02 in Swiss Credit Bank (also known as SKA) in Zurich, Switzerland, which
earned, acquired or received for the accused Imelda Romualdez Marcos and her late
husband an interest of $2,267,892 as of December 16, 1985 which was remitted to
Bank Hofmann, AG, through Citibank, New York, United States of America, for the
credit of said Avertina account on December 19, 1985, aside from the redemption of
$25 million (one-half of the original $50-M) as of December 16, 1985 and outwardly
remitted from the Philippines in the amounts of $7,495,297.49 and $17,489,062.50
on December 18, 1985 for further investment outside the Philippines without first
complying with the Central Bank reporting/registering requirements.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

The other charge sheets were similarly worded except the days of the commission
of the offenses, the name(s) of the alleged dummy or dummies, the amounts in the
foreign exchange accounts maintained, and the names of the foreign banks where
such accounts were held by the accused.

On January 3, 1992, eleven more Informations accusing Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto
of the same offense, again in relation to different accounts, were filed with the same
court, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969. The Informations
were similarly worded as the earlier indictments, save for the details as to the dates
of the violations of Circular No. 960, the identities of the dummies used, the
balances and sources of the earnings, and the names of the foreign banks where
these accounts were maintained.

All of the aforementioned criminal cases were consolidated before Branch 26 of the
said trial court.

On the same day that Criminal Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969 were filed, the
Central Bank issued Circular No. 1318[5] which revised the rules governing nontrade foreign exchange transactions. It took effect on January 20, 1992.

On August 24, 1992, the Central Bank, pursuant to the governments policy of
further liberalizing foreign exchange transactions, came out with Circular No. 1353,
[6] which amended Circular No. 1318. Circular No. 1353 deleted the requirement of
prior Central Bank approval for foreign exchange-funded expenditures obtained
from the banking system.

Both of the aforementioned circulars, however, contained a saving clause, excepting

from their coverage pending criminal actions involving violations of Circular No. 960
and, in the case of Circular No. 1353, violations of both Circular No. 960 and Circular
No. 1318.

On September 19, 1993, the government allowed petitioners Benedicto and Rivera
to return to the Philippines, on condition that they face the various criminal charges
instituted against them, including the dollar-salting cases. Petitioners posted bail in
the latter cases.

On February 28, 1994, petitioners Benedicto and Rivera were arraigned. Both
pleaded not guilty to the charges of violating Central Bank Circular No. 960. Mrs.
Marcos had earlier entered a similar plea during her arraignment for the same
offense on February 12, 1992.

On August 11, 1994, petitioners moved to quash all the Informations filed against
them in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883; 91-101884 to 91-101892,
and 91-101959 to 91-101969. Their motion was grounded on lack of jurisdiction,
forum shopping, extinction of criminal liability with the repeal of Circular No. 960,
prescription, exemption from the Central Banks reporting requirement, and the
grant of absolute immunity as a result of a compromise agreement entered into
with the government.

On September 6, 1994, the trial court denied petitioners motion. A similar motion
filed on May 23, 1994 by Mrs. Marcos seeking to dismiss the dollar-salting cases
against her due to the repeal of Circular No. 960 had earlier been denied by the trial
court in its order dated June 9, 1994. Petitioners then filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the trial court likewise denied this motion on October 18, 1994.

On November 21, 1994, petitioners moved for leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration. The trial court, in its order of November 23, 1994, denied
petitioners motion and set the consolidated cases for trial on January 5, 1995.

Two separate petitions for certiorari and prohibition, with similar prayers for
temporary restraining orders and/or writs of preliminary injunction, docketed as CAG.R. SP No. 35719 and CA-G.R. SP No. 35928, were respectively filed by Mrs. Marcos
and petitioners with the Court of Appeals. Finding that both cases involved
violations of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the appellate court consolidated the two
cases.

On May 23, 1996, the Court of Appeals disposed of the consolidated cases as
follows:

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge

in denying petitioners respective Motions to Quash, except that with respect to
Criminal Case No. 91-101884, the instant petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The assailed September 6, 1994 Order, in so far as it denied the Motion to
Quash Criminal Case No. 91-101884 is hereby nullified and set aside, and said case
is hereby dismissed. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.[7]

Dissatisfied with the said decision of the court a quo, except with respect to the
portion ordering the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 91-101884, petitioners filed the
instant petition, attributing the following errors to the appellate court:

THAT THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE INFORMATIONS/CASES FILED
AGAINST PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS ARE QUASHABLE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING
GROUNDS:

(A)
LACK OF JURISDICTION/FORUM SHOPPING/NO VALID PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION

(B)

EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY

1) REPEAL OF CB CIRCULAR NO. 960 BY CB CIRCULAR NO. 1353;

2) REPEAL OF R.A. 265 BY R.A. 7653[8]

(C)

PRESCRIPTION

(D)

EXEMPTION FROM CB REPORTING REQUIREMENT

(E)

GRANT OF ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY.[9]

Simply stated, the issues for our resolution are:

(1) Did the Court of Appeals err in denying the Motion to Quash for lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court, forum shopping by the prosecution, and
absence of a valid preliminary investigation?

(2) Did the repeal of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Republic Act No. 265 by
Circular No. 1353 and Republic Act No. 7653 respectively, extinguish the criminal
liability of petitioners?

(3) Had the criminal cases in violation of Circular No. 960 already prescribed?

(4) Were petitioners exempted from the application and coverage of Circular No.
960?

(5) Were petitioners' alleged violations of Circular No. 960 covered by the absolute
immunity granted in the Compromise Agreement of November 3, 1990?

On the first issue, petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. They
aver that the dollar-salting charges filed against them were violations of the AntiGraft Law or Republic Act No. 3019, and the Sandiganbayan has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over their cases.

Settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined
by the law in force at the time the action is instituted.[10] The 25 cases were filed in
1991-92. The applicable law on jurisdiction then was Presidential Decree 1606.[11]
Under P.D. No. 1606, offenses punishable by imprisonment of not more than six
years fall within the jurisdiction of the regular trial courts, not the Sandiganbayan.
[12]

In the instant case, all the Informations are for violations of Circular No. 960 in
relation to Section 34 of the Central Bank Act and not, as petitioners insist, for
transgressions of Republic Act No. 3019. Pursuant to Section 34 of Republic Act No.
265, violations of Circular No. 960 are punishable by imprisonment of not more than
five years and a fine of not more than P20,000.00. Since under P.D. No. 1606 the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to try criminal cases where the imposable
penalty is less than six years of imprisonment, the cases against petitioners for
violations of Circular No. 960 are, therefore, cognizable by the trial court. No error
may thus be charged to the Court of Appeals when it held that the RTC of Manila
had jurisdiction to hear and try the dollar-salting cases.

Still on the first issue, petitioners next contend that the filing of the cases for
violations of Circular No. 960 before the RTC of Manila constitutes forum shopping.
Petitioners argue that the prosecution, in an attempt to seek a favorable verdict
from more than one tribunal, filed separate cases involving virtually the same
offenses before the regular trial courts and the Sandiganbayan. They fault the

prosecution with splitting the cases. Petitioners maintain that while the RTC cases
refer only to the failure to report interest earnings on Treasury Notes, the
Sandiganbayan cases seek to penalize the act of receiving the same interest
earnings on Treasury Notes in violation of the Anti-Graft Laws provisions on
prohibited transactions. Petitioners aver that the violation of Circular No. 960 is but
an element of the offense of prohibited transactions punished under Republic Act
No. 3019 and should, thus, be deemed absorbed by the prohibited transactions
cases pending before the Sandiganbayan.

For a charge of forum shopping to prosper, there must exist between an action
pending in one court and another action before another court: (a) identity of parties,
or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity
of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts;
and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment
rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to
res judicata in the action under consideration.[13] Here, we find that the single act
of receiving unreported interest earnings on Treasury Notes held abroad constitutes
an offense against two or more distinct and unrelated laws, Circular No. 960 and
R.A. 3019. Said laws define distinct offenses, penalize different acts, and can be
applied independently.[14] Hence, no fault lies at the prosecutions door for having
instituted separate cases before separate tribunals involving the same subject
matter.

With respect to the RTC cases, the receipt of the interest earnings violate Circular
No. 960 in relation to Republic Act No. 265 because the same was unreported to the
Central Bank. The act to be penalized here is the failure to report the interest
earnings from the foreign exchange accounts to the proper authority. As to the antigraft cases before the Sandiganbayan involving the same interest earnings from the
same foreign exchange accounts, the receipt of the interest earnings transgresses
Republic Act No. 3019 because the act of receiving such interest is a prohibited
transaction prejudicial to the government. What the State seeks to punish in these
anti-graft cases is the prohibited receipt of the interest earnings. In sum, there is no
identity of offenses charged, and prosecution under one law is not an obstacle to a
prosecution under the other law. There is no forum shopping.

Finally, on the first issue, petitioners contend that the preliminary investigation by
the Department of Justice was invalid and in violation of their rights to due process.
Petitioners argue that governments ban on their travel effectively prevented them
from returning home and personally appearing at the preliminary investigation.
Benedicto and Rivera further point out that the joint preliminary investigation by the

Department of Justice, resulted to the charges in one set of cases before the
Sandiganbayan for violations of Republic Act No. 3019 and another set before the
RTC for violation of Circular No. 960.

Preliminary investigation is not part of the due process guaranteed by the

Constitution.[15] It is an inquiry to determine whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof.[16] Instead, the right to a preliminary
investigation is personal. It is afforded to the accused by statute, and can be
waived, either expressly or by implication.[17] The waiver extends to any
irregularity in the preliminary investigation, where one was conducted.

The petition in the present case contains the following admissions:

1. Allowed to return to the Philippines on September 19, 1993on the condition

that he face the criminal charges pending in courts, petitioner-appellant Benedicto,
joined by his co-petitioner Rivera, lost no time in attending to the pending criminal
charges by posting bail in the above-mentioned cases.

2. Not having been afforded a real opportunity of attending the preliminary

investigation because of their forced absence from the Philippines then, petitionersappellants invoked their right to due process thru motions for preliminary
investigationUpon denial of their demands for preliminary investigation, the
petitioners intended to elevate the matter to the Honorable Court of Appeals and
actually caused the filing of a petition for certiorari/prohibition sometime before
their arraignment but immediately caused the withdrawal thereofin view of the
prosecutions willingness to go to pre-trial wherein petitioners would be allowed
access to the records of preliminary investigation which they could use for purposes
of filing a motion to quash if warranted.

3. Thus, instead of remanding the Informations to the Department of Justice

respondent Judge set the case for pre-trial in order to afford all the accused access
to the records of the prosecution

xxx

5. On the basis of disclosures at the pre-trial, the petitioners-appellants Benedicto

and Rivera moved for the quashing of the informations/cases[18]

The foregoing admissions lead us to conclude that petitioners have expressly

waived their right to question any supposed irregularity in the preliminary
investigation or to ask for a new preliminary investigation. Petitioners, in the above
excerpts from this petition, admit posting bail immediately following their return to
the country, entered their respective pleas to the charges, and filed various motions
and pleadings. By so doing, without simultaneously demanding a proper
preliminary investigation, they have waived any and all irregularities in the conduct
of a preliminary investigation.[19] The trial court did not err in denying the motion
to quash the informations on the ground of want of or improperly conducted
preliminary investigation. The absence of a preliminary investigation is not a ground
to quash the information.[20]

On the second issue, petitioners contend that they are being prosecuted for acts
punishable under laws that have already been repealed. They point to the express
repeal of Central Bank Circular No. 960 by Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 as well as
the express repeal of Republic Act No. 265 by Republic Act No. 7653. Petitioners,
relying on Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code,[21] contend that repeal has the
effect of extinguishing the right to prosecute or punish the offense committed under
the old laws.[22]

As a rule, an absolute repeal of a penal law has the effect of depriving a court of its
authority to punish a person charged with violation of the old law prior to its repeal.
[23] This is because an unqualified repeal of a penal law constitutes a legislative act
of rendering legal what had been previously declared as illegal, such that the
offense no longer exists and it is as if the person who committed it never did so.
There are, however, exceptions to the rule. One is the inclusion of a saving clause in
the repealing statute that provides that the repeal shall have no effect on pending
actions.[24] Another exception is where the repealing act reenacts the former
statute and punishes the act previously penalized under the old law. In such
instance, the act committed before the reenactment continues to be an offense in
the statute books and pending cases are not affected, regardless of whether the
new penalty to be imposed is more favorable to the accused.[25]

In the instant case, it must be noted that despite the repeal of Circular No. 960,
Circular No. 1353 retained the same reportorial requirement for residents receiving
earnings or profits from non-trade foreign exchange transactions.[26] Second, even
the most cursory glance at the repealing circulars, Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353
shows that both contain a saving clause, expressly providing that the repeal of
Circular No. 960 shall have no effect on pending actions for violation of the latter
Circular.[27] A saving clause operates to except from the effect of the repealing law
what would otherwise be lost under the new law.[28] In the present case, the
respective saving clauses of Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 clearly manifest the intent
to reserve the right of the State to prosecute and punish offenses for violations of
the repealed Circular No. 960, where the cases are either pending or under
investigation.

Petitioners, however, insist that the repeal of Republic Act No. 265, particularly
Section 34,[29] by Republic Act No. 7653, removed the applicability of any penal
sanction for violations of any non-trade foreign exchange transactions previously
penalized by Circular No. 960. Petitioners posit that a comparison of the two
provisions shows that Section 36[30] of Republic Act No. 7653 neither retained nor
reinstated Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265. Since, in creating the Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas, Congress did not include in its charter a clause providing for the
application of Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265 to pending cases, petitioners
pending dollar-salting cases are now bereft of statutory penalty, the saving clause in
Circular No. 1353 notwithstanding. In other words, absent a provision in Republic
Act No. 7653 expressly reviving the applicability of any penal sanction for the
repealed mandatory foreign exchange reporting regulations formerly required under
Circular No. 960, violations of aforesaid repealed Circular can no longer be
prosecuted criminally.

A comparison of the old Central Bank Act and the new Bangko Sentrals charter
repealing the former show that in consonance with the general objective of the old
law and the new law to maintain internal and external monetary stability in the
Philippines and preserve the international value of the peso,[31] both the repealed
law and the repealing statute contain a penal clause which sought to penalize in
general, violations of the law as well as orders, instructions, rules, or regulations
issued by the Monetary Board. In the case of the Bangko Sentral, the scope of the
penal clause was expanded to include violations of other pertinent banking laws
enforced or implemented by the Bangko Sentral. In the instant case, the acts of
petitioners sought to be penalized are violations of rules and regulations issued by
the Monetary Board. These acts are proscribed and penalized in the penal clause of
the repealed law and this proviso for proscription and penalty was reenacted in the
repealing law. We find, therefore, that while Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265 was

repealed, it was nonetheless, simultaneously reenacted in Section 36 of Republic

Act No. 7653. Where a clause or provision or a statute for that matter is
simultaneously repealed and reenacted, there is no effect, upon the rights and
liabilities which have accrued under the original statute, since the reenactment, in
effect neutralizes the repeal and continues the law in force without interruption.
[32] The rule applies to penal laws and statutes with penal provisions. Thus, the
repeal of a penal law or provision, under which a person is charged with violation
thereof and its simultaneous reenactment penalizing the same act done by him
under the old law, will neither preclude the accuseds prosecution nor deprive the
court of its jurisdiction to hear and try his case.[33] As pointed out earlier, the act
penalized before the reenactment continues to remain an offense and pending
cases are unaffected. Therefore, the repeal of Republic Act No. 265 by Republic Act
No. 7653 did not extinguish the criminal liability of petitioners for transgressions of
Circular No. 960 and cannot, under the circumstances of this case, be made a basis
for quashing the indictments against petitioners.

Petitioners, however, point out that Section 36 of Republic Act No. 7653, in
reenacting Section 34 of the old Central Act, increased the penalty for violations of
rules and regulations issued by the Monetary Board. They claim that such increase
in the penalty would give Republic Act No. 7653 an ex post facto application,
violating the Bill of Rights.[34]

Is Section 36 of Republic Act No. 7653 an ex post facto legislation?

An ex post facto law is one which: (1) makes criminal an act done before the
passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act;
(2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was when committed; (3)
changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to
the crime when committed; (4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes
conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense; (5) assuming to regulate civil rights, and remedies only,
in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done
was lawful; and (6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection
to which he has become entitled such as the protection of a former conviction or
acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.[35]

The test whether a penal law runs afoul of the ex post facto clause of the
Constitution is: Does the law sought to be applied retroactively take from an

accused any right that was regarded at the time of the adoption of the constitution
as vital for the protection of life and liberty and which he enjoyed at the time of the
commission of the offense charged against him?[36]

The crucial words in the test are vital for the protection of life and liberty.[37] We
find, however, the test inapplicable to the penal clause of Republic Act No. 7653.
Penal laws and laws which, while not penal in nature, nonetheless have provisions
defining offenses and prescribing penalties for their violation operate prospectively.
[38] Penal laws cannot be given retroactive effect, except when they are favorable
to the accused.[39] Nowhere in Republic Act No. 7653, and in particular Section 36,
is there any indication that the increased penalties provided therein were intended
to operate retroactively. There is, therefore, no ex post facto law in this case.

On the third issue, petitioners ask us to note that the dollar interest earnings subject
of the criminal cases instituted against them were remitted to foreign banks on
various dates between 1983 to 1987. They maintain that given the considerable
lapse of time from the dates of the commission of the offenses to the institution of
the criminal actions in 1991 and 1992, the States right to prosecute them for said
offenses has already prescribed. Petitioners assert that the Court of Appeals erred in
computing the prescriptive period from February 1986. Petitioners theorize that
since the remittances were made through the Central Bank as a regulatory
authority, the dates of the alleged violations are known, and prescription should
thus be counted from these dates.

In ruling that the dollar-salting cases against petitioners have not yet prescribed,
the court a quo quoted with approval the trial courts finding that:

[T]he alleged violations of law were discovered only after the EDSA Revolution in
1986 when the dictatorship was toppled down. The date of the discovery of the
offense, therefore, should be the basis in computing the prescriptive period. Since
(the) offenses charged are punishable by imprisonment of not more than five (5)
years, they prescribe in eight (8) years. Thus, only a little more than four (4) years
had elapsed from the date of discovery in 1986 when the cases were filed in 1991.
[40]

The offenses for which petitioners are charged are penalized by Section 34 of
Republic Act No. 265 by a fine of not more than Twenty Thousand Pesos

(P20,000.00) and by imprisonment of not more than five years. Pursuant to Act No.
3326, which mandates the periods of prescription for violations of special laws, the
prescriptive period for violations of Circular No. 960 is eight (8) years.[41] The
period shall commence to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.[42] In the
instant case, the indictments against petitioners charged them with having
conspired with the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in transgressing Circular No.
960. Petitioners contention that the dates of the commission of the alleged
violations were known and prescription should be counted from these dates must be
viewed in the context of the political realities then prevailing. Petitioners, as close
associates of Mrs. Marcos, were not only protected from investigation by their
influence and connections, but also by the power and authority of a Chief Executive
exercising strong-arm rule. This Court has taken judicial notice of the fact that Mr.
Marcos, his family, relations, and close associates resorted to all sorts of clever
schemes and manipulations to disguise and hide their illicit acquisitions.[43] In the
instant case, prescription cannot, therefore, be made to run from the dates of the
commission of the offenses charged, for the obvious reason that the commission of
those offenses were not known as of those dates. It was only after the EDSA
Revolution of February, 1986, that the recovery of ill-gotten wealth became a highly
prioritized state policy,[44] pursuant to the explicit command of the Provisional
Constitution.[45] To ascertain the relevant facts to recover ill-gotten properties
amassed by the leaders and supporters of the (Marcos) regime[46] various
government agencies were tasked by the Aquino administration to investigate, and
as the evidence on hand may reveal, file and prosecute the proper cases. Applying
the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed,[47] we are more
inclined to believe that the violations for which petitioners are charged were
discovered only during the post-February 1986 investigations and the tolling of the
prescriptive period should be counted from the dates of discovery of their
commission. The criminal actions against petitioners, which gave rise to the instant
case, were filed in 1991 and 1992, or well within the eight-year prescriptive period
counted from February 1986.

The fourth issue involves petitioners claim that they incurred no criminal liability for
violations of Circular No. 960 since they were exempted from its coverage.

Petitioners postulate that since the purchases of treasury notes were done through
the Central Banks Securities Servicing Department and payments of the interest
were coursed through its Securities Servicing Department/Foreign Exchange
Department, their filing of reports would be surplusage, since the requisite
information were already with the Central Bank. Furthermore, they contend that the

foreign currency investment accounts in the Swiss banks were subject to absolute
confidentiality as provided for by Republic Act No. 6426,[48] as amended by
Presidential Decree Nos. 1035, 1246, and 1453, and fell outside the ambit of the
reporting requirements imposed by Circular No. 960. Petitioners further rely on the
exemption from reporting provided for in Section 10(q), [49] Circular No. 960, and
the confidentiality granted to Swiss bank accounts by the laws of Switzerland.

Petitioners correctly point out that Section 10(q) of Circular No. 960 exempts from
the reporting requirement foreign currency eligible for deposit under the Philippine
Foreign Exchange Currency Deposit System, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6426, as
amended. But, in order to avail of the aforesaid exemption, petitioners must show
that they fall within its scope. Petitioners must satisfy the requirements for
eligibility imposed by Section 2, Republic Act No. 6426.[50] Not only do we find the
record bare of any proof to support petitioners claim of falling within the coverage
of Republic Act No. 6426, we likewise find from a reading of Section 2 of the Foreign
Currency Deposit Act that said law is inapplicable to the foreign currency accounts
in question. Section 2, Republic Act No. 6426 speaks of deposit with such
Philippine banks in good standing, as maybe designated by the Central Bank for
the purpose.[51] The criminal cases filed against petitioners for violation of Circular
No. 960 involve foreign currency accounts maintained in foreign banks, not
Philippine banks. By invoking the confidentiality guarantees provided for by Swiss
banking laws, petitioners admit such reports made. The rule is that exceptions are
strictly construed and apply only so far as their language fairly warrants, with all
doubts being resolved in favor of the general proviso rather than the exception.[52]
Hence, petitioners may not claim exemption under Section 10(q).

With respect to the banking laws of Switzerland cited by petitioners, the rule is that
Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.[53] Laws of foreign
jurisdictions must be alleged and proved.[54] Petitioners failed to prove the Swiss
law relied upon, either by: (1) an official publication thereof; or (2) a copy attested
by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied by a certification from the secretary of the Philippine embassy or
legation in such country or by the Philippine consul general, consul, vice-consul, or
consular agent stationed in such country, or by any other authorized officer in the
Philippine foreign service assigned to said country that such officer has custody.[55]
Absent such evidence, this Court cannot take judicial cognizance of the foreign law
invoked by Benedicto and Rivera.

Anent the fifth issue, petitioners insist that the government granted them absolute
immunity under the Compromise Agreement they entered into with the government

on November 3, 1990. Petitioners cite our decision in Republic v. Sandiganbayan,

226 SCRA 314 (1993), upholding the validity of the said Agreement and directing
the various government agencies to be consistent with it. Benedicto and Rivera
now insist that the absolute immunity from criminal investigation or prosecution
granted to petitioner Benedicto, his family, as well as to officers and employees of
firms owned or controlled by Benedicto under the aforesaid Agreement covers the
suits filed for violations of Circular No. 960, which gave rise to the present case.

The pertinent provisions of the Compromise Agreement read:

WHEREAS, this Compromise Agreement covers the remaining claims and the cases
of the Philippine Government against Roberto S. Benedicto including his associates
and nominees, namely, Julita C. Benedicto, Hector T. Rivera, x x x

WHEREAS, specifically these claims are the subject matter of the following cases
(stress supplied):

1. Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 9

2. Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 24

3. Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 34

4. Tanodbayan (Phil-Asia)

5. PCGG I.S. No. 1

xxx

WHEREAS, following the termination of the United States and Swiss cases, and also
without admitting the merits of their respective claims and counterclaims presently
involved in uncertain, protracted and expensive litigation, the Republic of the
Philippines, solely motivated by the desire for the immediate accomplishment of its
recovery mission and Mr. Benedicto being interested to lead a peaceful and normal
pursuit of his endeavors, the parties have decided to withdraw and/or dismiss their
mutual claims and counterclaims under the cases pending in the Philippines, earlier
referred to (underscoring supplied);

xxx

II. Lifting of Sequestrations, Extension of Absolute Immunity and Recognition of the

Freedom to Travel

a) The Government hereby lifts the sequestrations over the assets listed in Annex
C hereof, the same being within the capacity of Mr. Benedicto to acquire from the
exercise of his profession and conduct of business, as well as all the haciendas
listed in his name in Negros Occidental, all of which were inherited by him or
acquired with income from his inheritanceand all the other sequestered assets
that belong to Benedicto and his corporation/nominees which are not listed in Annex
A as ceded or to be ceded to the Government.

Provided, however, (that) any asset(s) not otherwise settled or covered by this
Compromise Agreement, hereinafter found and clearly established with finality by
proper competent court as being held by Mr. Roberto S. Benedicto in trust for the
family of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos, shall be returned or surrendered to the
Government for appropriate custody and disposition.

b) The Government hereby extends absolute immunity, as authorized under the

pertinent provisions of Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, to Benedicto, the
members of his family, officers and employees of his corporations above mentioned,
who are included in past, present and future cases and investigations of the
Philippine Government, such that there shall be no criminal investigation or
prosecution against said persons for acts (or) omissions committed prior to February
25, 1986, that may be alleged to have violated any laws, including but not limited to
Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to the acquisition of any asset treated, mentioned
or included in this Agreement.

x x x[56]

In construing contracts, it is important to ascertain the intent of the parties by

looking at the words employed to project their intention. In the instant case, the
parties clearly listed and limited the applicability of the Compromise Agreement to
the cases listed or identified therein. We have ruled in another case involving the
same Compromise Agreement that:

[T]he subject matters of the disputed compromise agreement are Sandiganbayan

Civil Case No. 0009, Civil Case No. 00234, Civil Case No. 0034, the Phil-Asia case
before the Tanodbayan and PCGG I.S. No. 1. The cases arose from complaints for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages against former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, members of his family, and alleged cronies, one of
whom was respondent Roberto S. Benedicto.[57]

Nowhere is there a mention of the criminal cases filed against petitioners for
violations of Circular No. 960. Conformably with Article 1370 of the Civil Code,[58]
the Agreement relied upon by petitioners should include only cases specifically
mentioned therein. Applying the parol evidence rule,[59] where the parties have
reduced their agreement into writing, the contents of the writing constitute the sole
repository of the terms of the agreement between the parties.[60] Whatever is not
found in the text of the Agreement should thus be construed as waived and
abandoned.[61] Scrutiny of the Compromise Agreement will reveal that it does not
include all cases filed by the government against Benedicto, his family, and
associates.

Additionally, the immunity covers only criminal investigation or prosecution against

said persons for acts (or) omissions committed prior to February 25, 1986 that may
be alleged to have violated any penal laws, including but not limited to Republic Act
No. 3019, in relation to the acquisition of any asset treated, mentioned, or included
in this Agreement.[62] It is only when the criminal investigation or case involves
the acquisition of any ill-gotten wealth treated, mentioned, or included in this
Agreement[63] that petitioners may invoke immunity. The record is bereft of any
showing that the interest earnings from foreign exchange deposits in banks abroad,
which is the subject matter of the present case, are treated, mentioned, or
included in the Compromise Agreement. The phraseology of the grant of absolute
immunity in the Agreement precludes us from applying the same to the criminal

charges faced by petitioners for violations of Circular No. 960. A contract cannot be
construed to include matters distinct from those with respect to which the parties
intended to contract.[64]
In sum, we find that no reversible error of law may be attributed to the Court of
Appeals in upholding the orders of the trial court denying petitioners Motion to
Quash the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883, 91-101884
to 91-101892, and 92-101959 to 92-101969. In our view, none of the grounds
provided for in the Rules of Court[65] upon which petitioners rely, finds application
in this case.
One final matter. During the pendency of this petition, counsel for petitioner Roberto
S. Benedicto gave formal notice to the Court that said petitioner died on May 15,
2000. The death of an accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon.[66]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The assailed consolidated Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated May 23, 1996, in CA-G.R. SP No. 35928 and CA-G.R.
SP No. 35719, is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that the charges against deceased
petitioner, Roberto S. Benedicto, particularly in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to
91-101883, 91-101884 to 101892, and 92-101959 to 92-101969, pending before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26, are ordered dropped and that any
criminal as well as civil liability ex delicto that might be attributable to him in the
aforesaid cases are declared extinguished by reason of his death on May 15, 2000.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE "JOSEPH" GOTIANUY as
substituted by ELIZABETH GOTIANUY LO, respondents.
A Complaint for recovery of sums of money and annulment of sales of real
properties and shares of stock docketed as CEB-21445 was filed by Jose "Joseph"
Gotianuy against his son-in-law, George Dee, and his daughter, Mary Margaret Dee,
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 58.
Jose Gotianuy accused his daughter Mary Margaret Dee of stealing, among his other
properties, US dollar deposits with Citibank N.A. amounting to not less than
P35,000,000.00 and US$864,000.00. Mary Margaret Dee received these amounts
from Citibank N.A. through checks which she allegedly deposited at China Banking
Corporation (China Bank). He likewise accused his son-in-law, George Dee, husband

of his daughter, Mary Margaret, of transferring his real properties and shares of
stock in George Dee's name without any consideration. Jose Gotianuy, died during
the pendency of the case before the trial court.1 He was substituted by his
daughter, Elizabeth Gotianuy Lo. The latter presented the US Dollar checks
withdrawn by Mary Margaret Dee from his US dollar placement with Citibank. The
details of the said checks are:
1) CITIBANK CHECK NO. 69003194405412 dated September 29 1997 in the amount
of US$5,937.52 payable to GOTIANUY: JOSE AND/OR DEE: MARY MARGARET;
2) CITIBANK CHECK NO. 69003194405296 dated September 29 1997 in the amount
of US$7,197.59 payable to GOTIANUY: JOSE AND/OR DEE: MARY MARGARET;
3) CITIBANK CHECK NO. 69003194405414 dated September 29 1997 in the amount
of US$1,198.94 payable to GOTIANUY: JOSE AND/OR DEE: MARY MARGARET;
4) CITIBANK CHECK NO. 69003194405413 dated September 29 1997 in the amount
of US$989.04 payable to GOTIANUY: JOSE AND/OR DEE: MARY MARGARET;
5) CITIBANK CHECK NO. 69003194405297 dated October 01 1997 in the amount of
US$766,011.97 payable to GOTIANUY: JOSE AND/OR DEE: MARY MARGARET; and
6) CITIBANK CHECK NO. 69003194405339 dated October 09 1997 in the amount of
US$83,053.10 payable to GOTIANUY: JOSE AND/OR DEE: MARY MARGARET.2
Upon motion of Elizabeth Gotianuy Lo, the trial court3 issued a subpoena to Cristota
Labios and Isabel Yap, employees of China Bank, to testify on the case. The Order of
the trial court dated 23 February 1999, states:
Issue a subpoena ad testificandum requiring MS. ISABEL YAP and CRISTOTA LABIOS
of China Banking Corporation, Cebu Main Branch, corner Magallanes and D.
Jakosalem Sts., Cebu City, to appear in person and to testify in the hearing of the
above entitled case on March 1, 1999 at 8:30 in the morning, with regards to
Citibank Checks (Exhs. "AAA" to "AAA-5") and other matters material and relevant
to the issues of this case.4
China Bank moved for a reconsideration. Resolving the motion, the trial court issued
an Order dated 16 April 1999 and held:
The Court is of the view that as the foreign currency fund (Exhs. "AAA" to "AAA-5")
is deposited with the movant China Banking Corporation, Cebu Main Branch, Cebu
City, the disclosure only as to the name or in whose name the said fund is deposited
is not violative of the law. Justice will be better served if the name or names of the
depositor of said fund shall be disclosed because such a disclosure is material and
important to the issues between the parties in the case at bar.

Premises considered, the motion for reconsideration is denied partly and granted
partly, in the sense that Isabel Yap and/or Cristuta Labios are directed to appear
before this Court and to testify at the trial of this case on April 20, 1999, May 6 & 7,
1999 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning and only for the purpose of disclosing in whose
name or names is the foreign currency fund (Exhs. "AAA" to "AAA-5") deposited with
the movant Bank and not to other matters material and relevant to the issues in the
case at bar.5
From this Order, China Bank filed a Petition for Certiorari6 with the Court of Appeals.
In a Decision7 dated 29 October 1999, the Court of Appeals denied the petition of
China Bank and affirmed the Order of the RTC.
In justifying its conclusion, the Court of Appeals ratiocinated:
From the foregoing, it is pristinely clear the law specifically encompasses only the
money or funds in foreign currency deposited in a bank. Thus, the coverage of the
law extends only to the foreign currency deposit in the CBC account where Mary
Margaret Dee deposited the Citibank checks in question and nothing more.
It has to be pointed out that the April 16, 1999 Order of the court of origin modified
its previous February 23, 1999 Order such that the CBC representatives are directed
solely to divulge "in whose name or names is the foreign currency fund (Exhs. "AAA"
to "AAA-5") deposited with the movant bank." It precluded inquiry on "other
materials and relevant to the issues in the case at bar." We find that the directive of
the court below does not contravene the plain language of RA 6426 as amended by
P.D. No. 1246.
The contention of petitioner that the [prescription] on absolute confidentiality under
the law in question covers even the name of the depositor and is beyond the
compulsive process of the courts is palpably untenable as the law protects only the
deposits itself but not the name of the depositor. To uphold the theory of petitioner
CBC is reading into the statute "something that is not within the manifest intention
of the legislature as gathered from the statute itself, for to depart from the meaning
expressed by the words, is to alter the statute, to legislate and not to interpret, and
judicial legislation should be avoided. Maledicta expositio quae corrumpit textum It
is a dangerous construction which is against the words. Expressing the same
principle is the maxim: Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos, which
simply means that where the law does not distinguish, we should not make any
distinction." (Gonzaga, Statutes and their Construction, p. 75.)8

From the Decision of the Court of Appeals, China Bank elevated the case to this
Court based on the following issues:
I

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS INTERPRETED THE PROVISION OF

SECTION 8 OF R.A. 6426, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE FOREIGN
CURRENCY DEPOSIT ACT, IN A MANNER CONTRARY TO THE LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE,
THAT IS, TO PROVIDE ABSOLUTE CONFIDENTIALITY OF WHATEVER INFORMATION
RELATIVE TO THE FOREIGN CURRENCY DEPOSIT.
II
PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS NOT THE OWNER OF THE QUESTIONED FOREIGN
CURRENCY DEPOSIT. THUS, HE CANNOT INVOKE THE AID OF THE COURT IN
COMPELLING THE DISCLOSURE OF SOMEONE ELSE'S FOREIGN CURRENCY DEPOSIT
ON THE FLIMSY PRETEXT THAT THE CHECKS (IN FOREIGN CURRENCY) HE HAD
ISSUED MAY HAVE ENDED UP THEREIN.
III
PETITIONER CAN RIGHTLY INVOKE THE PROVISION OF SEC. 8, R.A. 6426, IN BEHALF
OF THE FOREIGN CURRENCY DEPOSITOR, OWING TO ITS SOLEMN OBLIGATION TO
ITS CLIENT TO EXERCISE EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE IN THE HANDLING OF THE
ACCOUNT.9
As amended by Presidential Decree No. 1246, the law reads:
SEC. 8. Secrecy of Foreign Currency Deposits. All foreign currency deposits
authorized under this Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1035, as well as
foreign currency deposits authorized under Presidential Decree No. 1034, are
hereby declared as and considered of an absolutely confidential nature and, except
upon the written permission of the depositor, in no instance shall such foreign
currency deposits be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government
official, bureau or office whether judicial or administrative or legislative or any other
entity whether public or private: Provided, however, that said foreign currency
deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or
process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative
body whatsoever. (As amended by PD No. 1035, and further amended by PD No.
1246, prom. Nov. 21, 1977) (Emphasis supplied.)
Under the above provision, the law provides that all foreign currency deposits
authorized under Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by Sec. 8, Presidential Decree
No. 1246, Presidential Decree No. 1035, as well as foreign currency deposits
authorized under Presidential Decree No. 1034 are considered absolutely
confidential in nature and may not be inquired into. There is only one exception to
the secrecy of foreign currency deposits, that is, disclosure is allowed upon the
written permission of the depositor.

This much was pronounced in the case of Intengan v. Court of Appeals,10 where it
was held that the only exception to the secrecy of foreign currency deposits is in the
case of a written permission of the depositor.
It must be remembered that under the whereas clause of Presidential Decree No.
1246 which amended Sec. 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, the Foreign Currency Deposit
System including the Offshore Banking System under Presidential Decree 1034 were
intended to draw deposits from foreign lenders and investors, and we quote:
Whereas, in order to assure the development and speedy growth of the Foreign
Currency Deposit System and the Offshore Banking System in the Philippines,
certain incentives were provided for under the two Systems such as confidentiality
of deposits subject to certain exceptions and tax exemptions on the interest income
of depositors who are nonresidents and are not engaged in trade or business in the
Philippines;
Whereas, making absolute the protective cloak of confidentiality over such foreign
currency deposits, exempting such deposits from tax, and guaranteeing the vested
rights of depositors would better encourage the inflow of foreign currency deposits
into the banking institutions authorized to accept such deposits in the Philippines
thereby placing such institutions more in a position to properly channel the same to
loans and investments in the Philippines, thus directly contributing to the economic
development of the country.
As to the deposit in foreign currencies entitled to be protected under the
confidentiality rule, Presidential Decree No. 1034,11 defines deposits to mean funds
in foreign currencies which are accepted and held by an offshore banking unit in the
regular course of business, with the obligation to return an equivalent amount to the
owner thereof, with or without interest.12
It is in this light that the court in the case of Salvacion v. Central Bank of the
Philippines,13 allowed the inquiry of the foreign currency deposit in question mainly
due to the peculiar circumstances of the case such that a strict interpretation of the
letter of the law would result to rank injustice. Therein, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an
American tourist, was charged with criminal cases for serious illegal detention and
rape committed against then 12 year-old Karen Salvacion. A separate civil case for
damages with preliminary attachment was filed against Greg Bartelli. The trial court
issued an Order granting the Salvacions' application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment. A notice of garnishment was then served on China Bank
where Bartelli held a dollar account. China Bank refused, invoking the secrecy of
bank deposits. The Supreme Court ruled: "In fine, the application of the law depends
on the extent of its justice x x x It would be unthinkable, that the questioned law
exempting foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment, or any other
order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any

administrative body whatsoever would be used as a device by an accused x x x for

wrongdoing, and in so doing, acquitting the guilty at the expense of the innocent.14
With the foregoing, we are now tasked to determine the single material issue of
whether or not petitioner China Bank is correct in its submission that the Citibank
dollar checks with both Jose Gotianuy and/or Mary Margaret Dee as payees,
deposited with China Bank, may not be looked into under the law on secrecy of
foreign currency deposits. As a corollary issue, sought to be resolved is whether Jose
Gotianuy may be considered a depositor who is entitled to seek an inquiry over the
said deposits.
The Court of Appeals, in allowing the inquiry, considered Jose Gotianuy, a codepositor of Mary Margaret Dee. It reasoned that since Jose Gotianuy is the named
co-payee of the latter in the subject checks, which checks were deposited in China
Bank, then, Jose Gotianuy is likewise a depositor thereof. On that basis, no written
consent from Mary Margaret Dee is necessitated.
We agree in the conclusion arrived at by the Court of Appeals.
The following facts are established: (1) Jose Gotianuy and Mary Margaret Dee are
co-payees of various Citibank checks;15 (2) Mary Margaret Dee withdrew these
checks from Citibank;16 (3) Mary Margaret Dee admitted in her Answer to the
Request for Admissions by the Adverse Party sent to her by Jose Gotianuy17 that
she withdrew the funds from Citibank upon the instruction of her father Jose
Gotianuy and that the funds belonged exclusively to the latter; (4) these checks
were endorsed by Mary Margaret Dee at the dorsal portion; and (5) Jose Gotianuy
discovered that these checks were deposited with China Bank as shown by the
stamp of China Bank at the dorsal side of the checks.
Thus, with this, there is no issue as to the source of the funds. Mary Margaret Dee
declared the source to be Jose Gotianuy. There is likewise no dispute that these
funds in the form of Citibank US dollar Checks are now deposited with China Bank.
As the owner of the funds unlawfully taken and which are undisputably now
deposited with China Bank, Jose Gotianuy has the right to inquire into the said
deposits.
A depositor, in cases of bank deposits, is one who pays money into the bank in the
usual course of business, to be placed to his credit and subject to his check or the
beneficiary of the funds held by the bank as trustee.18
On this score, the observations of the Court of Appeals are worth reiterating:
Furthermore, it is indubitable that the Citibank checks were drawn against the
foreign currency account with Citibank, NA. The monies subject of said checks
originally came from the late Jose Gotianuy, the owner of the account. Thus, he also
has legal rights and interests in the CBC account where said monies were deposited.

More importantly, the Citibank checks (Exhibits "AAA" to "AAA-5") readily

demonstrate (sic) that the late Jose Gotianuy is one of the payees of said checks.
Being a co-payee thereof, then he or his estate can be considered as a co-depositor
of said checks. Ergo, since the late Jose Gotianuy is a co-depositor of the CBC
account, then his request for the assailed subpoena is tantamount to an express
permission of a depositor for the disclosure of the name of the account holder. The
April 16, 1999 Order perforce must be sustained.19 (Emphasis supplied.)
One more point. It must be remembered that in the complaint of Jose Gotianuy, he
alleged that his US dollar deposits with Citibank were illegally taken from him. On
the other hand, China Bank employee Cristuta Labios testified that Mary Margaret
Dee came to China Bank and deposited the money of Jose Gotianuy in Citibank US
dollar checks to the dollar account of her sister Adrienne Chu.20 This fortifies our
conclusion that an inquiry into the said deposit at China Bank is justified. At the very
least, Jose Gotianuy as the owner of these funds is entitled to a hearing on the
whereabouts of these funds.
All things considered and in view of the distinctive circumstances attendant to the
present case, we are constrained to render a limited pro hac vice ruling.21 Clearly it
was not the intent of the legislature when it enacted the law on secrecy on foreign
currency deposits to perpetuate injustice. This Court is of the view that the
allowance of the inquiry would be in accord with the rudiments of fair play,22 the
upholding of fairness in our judicial system and would be an avoidance of delay and
time-wasteful and circuitous way of administering justice.23
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated 29 October 1999 affirming the Order of the RTC, Branch 58, Cebu
City dated 16 April 1999 is AFFIRMED and this case is ordered REMANDED to the
trial court for continuation of hearing with utmost dispatch consistent with the
above disquisition. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

LEIDEN E. FERNANDEZ, GLORIA B. ADRIANO, EMELDA A. NEGAPATAN, JESUS

P. TOMONGHA, ELEONOR A. QUIANOLA, ASTEMA C. CAMPO, FLORIDA
VILLACERAN, FLORIDA B. TALLEDO AND BRENDA GADIANO, Petitioners,
vs.
NICASIO C. ANION, the Labor Arbiter of the Regional Arbitration Branch
VII-Cebu City; MARGUERITE LHUILLIER; and ALVAREZ CAETE LOPEZ
PANGANDOYON AHAT & PAREDES LAW OFFICES, represented by ATTY.
WILFREDO S. PANGANDOYON, JR., Respondents.

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

The instant petition is a proceeding for contempt in connection with the execution of
a final and executory Decision1 of this Court in G.R. No. 105892, entitled Leiden E.
Fernandez, et al., v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., a labor case
involving the illegal dismissal of herein petitioners by respondent Marguerite
Lhuillier from their employment at Agencia Cebuana-H. Lhuillier Pawnshop (Agencia
Cebuana, hereafter), of which the latter is the sole proprietor. Via the present
recourse, petitioners pray the Court to hold the respondents guilty of civil and
criminal contempts for failure to comply with and implement the Decision of the
Court in G.R. No. 105892. They also seek the inhibition of respondent Labor Arbiter
Nicasio C. Anion from taking part in further execution proceedings relative to the
same case, and request that a final computation be made by the Court of the exact
amount of the monetary awards due them under the same Decision.

Stripped to the bare essentials, the material facts briefly stated as follows:

In 1990, petitioners filed their respective complaints against respondent Marguerite

Lhuillier and/or Agencia Cebuana with the Regional Arbitration Branch VII, Cebu
City, for illegal dismissal, service incentive pay, reinstatement with full back wages,
and damages. Their complaints were consolidated and assigned to then Labor
Arbiter Gavino Velasquez, Jr. who, in a decision2 dated August 30, 1991, found for
the petitioners, to wit:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the complainants [petitioners]

and against the respondent. The respondent is hereby ordered:

1. To reinstate the complainants to their respective position at the Agencia Cebuana

with full back wages without qualifications; if reinstatement is not feasible, for one
reason or another, to pay to the complainants their respective separation pay,
service incentive leave pay with full back wages without qualification computed
hereunder as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

2. To pay to all the complainants the amount of P100,000.00 for moral damages and
the amount of another P100,000.00 for exemplary damages, plus the amount of
P98,018.25 as attorneys fees representing 10% of the total award and the amount
of P30,000.00 for litigation expenses.

Claiming denial of due process, respondent Marguerite Lhuillier appealed to the

National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), in connection with which she filed a
cash bond of P748,411.34. In a decision dated March 11, 1992, the NLRC vacated
the decision of Labor Arbiter Velasquez, Jr. and remanded the case to the Regional
Arbitration Branch VII, Cebu City, for further proceedings.

Following the NLRCs denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners went to
this Court on a petition for certiorari in G.R. 105892.1awphi1.nt

In a Decision3 promulgated on January 28, 1998, the Court granted the certiorari
petition, reversed and set aside the assailed decision and resolution of the NLRC
and reinstated with modifications the decision of Labor Arbiter Velasquez, Jr., thus:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The labor arbiters decision is REINSTATED
with MODIFICATIONS, such that the award of separation pay is deleted and the
service incentive leave pay is computed from December 16, 1975 up to the
petitioners actual reinstatement. Full back wages, including the accrued thirteenth
month pay, are also awarded to the nine petitioners - - Leiden Fernandez, Brenda
Gadiano, Gloria Adriano, Emelia Negapatan, Jesus Tomongha, Eleonor Quianola,
Asteria Campo, Florida Villaceran and Florida Talledo - - from the date of their illegal
dismissal to the time of their actual reinstatement. Petitioners Lim and Canonigo,
whom we find to have voluntarily resigned, are not entitled to any benefit.

SO ORDERED.

On April 28, 1998, the Decision became final and executory and an Entry of
Judgment was made thereon in the Book of Entries of Judgment.
What transpired next lies at the core of the instant petition for contempt.
On April 8, 1999, herein public respondent Labor Arbiter Nicasio C. Anion, by way
enforcing this Courts Decision in G.R. No. 105892, issued a writ of execution4
commanding the Deputy Sheriff to:
x x x REINSTATE the complainants [petitioners] at the respondent Agencia Cebuana
and to proceed to the premises of the respondent located at Calderon St., Cebu City
or wherever the same could be found and collect from the respondent the sum of
P3,505,092.33 representing complainants award plus execution fee of P34,550.92
and the deposit fee of P17,535.46 or a total sum of P3,556,178.71 and thereafter
turn over the said sum to this Office for appropriate disposition. Should you fail to
collect said sum in cash, you are hereby authorized to cause the satisfaction of the
same on the movable or immovable properties of the respondent not exempt from
execution.
On April 15 and 16, 1999, the Deputy Sheriff, garnished the Citibank and Metrobank
accounts of respondent Marguerite Lhuillier and levied on a parcel of land belonging
to her located in Mandaue City.

On April 20, 1999, petitioners filed with the same Regional Arbitration Branch VII,
Cebu City, a motion for the release to them of respondents cash bond earlier
posted by her in connection with her appeal to the NLRC from the adverse decision
of Labor Arbiter Velasquez, Jr. On the very same day, respondent Labor Arbiter
Anion issued an Order directing the release of the cash bond to the petitioners.
Petitioners received the amount of P748,411.34.
Then, on May 14, 1999, respondents Alvarez Caete Lopez Pangandoyon Ahat &
Paredes Law Offices, through respondent Atty. Wilfredo S. Pangandoyon, Jr., filed
with Labor Arbiter Nicasio C. Anion, on behalf of Marguerite Lhuillier, a motion5 to
lift or set aside the writ of garnishment alleging that the garnished accounts were
not in the name of Marguerite Lhuillier alone but were joint accounts with
Christopher Darza and Claudine Darza. The motion further claims that the writ of
execution was directed only against Agencia Cebuana, hence, not even Marguerite
Lhuillier can be made personally liable thereunder.
Petitioners vigorously opposed the motion to lift, arguing that respondents Alvarez
Caete Lopez Pangandoyon Ahat & Paredes Law Offices have no legal personality to
represent Margruerite Lhuillier as they are not her counsels on record. Petitioners
point out that the counsels on record for Marguerite Lhuillier are Atty. Amadeo D.
Seno and Atty. Luis V. Diores and that there had been no proper substitution of
counsel made. Moreover, petitioners claim in the same opposition that the
garnished bank accounts are not joint accounts but are accounts only in the name
of Marguerite Lhuillier, who, contrary to the allegations in the motion, is just as
liable under the writ as Agencia Cebuana.
In a resolution dated June 10, 1999, respondent Labor Arbiter Nicasio C. Anion
granted the motion to lift or set aside the writ of garnishment and directed the
Deputy Sheriff to enforce this Courts Decision in G.R. No. 105892 only on the
properties of Agencia Cebuana.
On June 21, 1999, petitioners appealed the aforementioned resolution of Labor
Arbiter Ainon to the NLRC. Subsequently, they also filed with this Court the instant
petition for "civil and criminal contempt and other disciplinary sanctions; inhibition
of the respondent labor arbiter; final computation of the exact figure of petitioners
monetary awards including separation pay; with request to consolidate petitioners
recent appeal filed with the [NLRC] to this instant petition." In sum, petitioners
submit that the collective acts of the public and private respondents constitute
contempt of this Court in that they thwarted the implementation of the final and
executory Decision of the Court in G.R. No. 105892.
First off, it greatly saddens the Court that petitioner employees, who were illegally
dismissed way back in 1990 -- seventeen (17) years before this date -- have yet to
be fully compensated for the injustice that had befallen them almost two decades
ago despite the final and executory judgment of this very Court in their favor. It is in

the interests of justice, therefore, that the Court must make conclusive clarifications
as to the execution of its final Decision against respondent Marguerite Lhuillier.
In an individual proprietorship, the owner has unlimited personal liability for all the
debts and obligations of the business.6 As sole proprietor of Agencia Cebuana, from
whose employment the petitioners were unlawfully removed, Marguerite Lhuillier is
the party against whom the Courts final and executory Decision in G.R. No. 105892
is enforceable. Put differently, Marguerite Lhuillier is personally liable under the
same Decision. Garnishment and levy over her property are proper in the
dispensation of justice.
Be that as it may, we do not find, however, any contumacious act to have been
committed by both the public and private respondents, either individually or
collectively. As it were, there was never an attempt on their part to subvert or hold
at bay the final implementation of the executory Decision of the Court in the main
case. Quite the contrary, recognizing the executory character of this Courts
Decision in question, respondent Labor Arbiter Nicasio Anion issued a writ of
execution for its implementation. For their part, the private respondents did not
actually or maliciously resist the writ thus issued. What they opposed was the
garnishment of the bank accounts allegedly jointly owned by respondent Marguerite
Lhuillier and two others, not the writ of execution itself. We hold, however, that such
accounts, even if joint as claimed by the private respondents, are subject to
garnishment. It is in the nature of joint accounts that anyone of the depositors has
access to the entire funds therein. If, afterwards, there should be squabbling
amongst the supposed joint depositors as to the share of each, they can sort it out
amongst themselves.
We reiterate for the purpose of clarity that private respondent Marguerite Lhuillier is
personally liable under this Courts Decision in dispute. Her co-respondent Agencia
Cebuana is a sole proprietorship without a juridical personality of its own. But while
the position taken by the public and private respondents that the judgment in
question is not enforceable against respondent Marguerite Lhuillier, but solely
against Agencia Cebuana is wrong, they are not liable for contempt.
For one, the filing of the respondent law firm of Alvarez Caete Lopez Pangandoyon
Ahat & Paredes Law Offices of its motion to lift the order of garnishment cannot be
adjudged contumacious simply because they do not appear as counsel of record of
respondent Marguerite Lhuillier/Agencia Cebuana. Their engagement to file that
particular motion does not appear to be a replacement or substitution of counsel
where the withdrawal or consent of former counsel is required. There was no
intention on their part to replace or substitute the counsels on record of Marguerite
Lhuillier and/or Agencia Cebuana. For sure, the services of the counsels on record
were never terminated. In this light, we are inclined to believe that the engagement
of the law firm of Alvarez Caete Lopez Pangandoyon & Paredes Law Offices
appears to have been on collaborative effort basis. Besides, it is settled rule in our

jurisdiction that a lawyer is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any

cause in which he appears.7 It is hard to imagine that the respondent law firm who
has no personal interest in the case would fight for and defend a case with
persistence and vigor if it had not been authorized or employed by the party
concerned.8 Besides, it must be stressed that the respondent law firm merely filed a
motion to lift the order of garnishment, an appearance which is basically limited in
character.
On the part of the respondent Labor Arbiter, it appears clear to us that it was never
his intent to defy the final and executory Decision of this Court in the main case,
much less to delay its enforcement. He did, after all, issue a writ of execution on
April 8, 1999. Not only that. When the petitioners filed their motion for the release
to them of respondents cash bond in connection with her appeal to the NLRC from
the earlier adverse decision of Labor Arbiter Velasquez Jr., respondent Labor Arbiter
Nicasio C. Anion issued an order directing such release that very same day and
petitioners did receive the amount of P748,411.34. Hence, the Decision of this Court
in question had, in fact, already been partially executed. For this reason, we do not
see the need for the inhibition of Labor Arbiter Nicasio Anion in the enforcement
process of the same Decision. He is, however, directed with all dispatch to satisfy
the final and executory Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 105892. The petitioners
have waited long enough for the justly deserved fruits of their labor. As regards the
companion request of the petitioners for a final computation by the Court of the
exact amounts of monetary awards due them under the same Decision, the Court is
not inclined to venture thereon considering that said computation had already been
done by Labor Arbiter Velasquez, Jr., in his decision of March 11, 1992, as affirmed
with modifications by the Court in its Decision in G.R. No. 105892.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, and finding no contumacious act on the part of the herein
respondents, the instant petition is DISMISSED but the respondent Labor Arbiter
Nicasio C. Ainon is DIRECTED to IMMEDIATELY IMPLEMENT this Courts Decision in
G.R. No. 105892.
No Costs.
SO ORDERED.

KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., father and

Natural Guardian, and Spouses FEDERICO N. SALVACION, JR., and EVELINA
E. SALVACION, petitioners, vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA
BANKING CORPORATION and GREG BARTELLI y NORTHCOTT, respondents.

DECISION

TORRES, JR., J.:

In our predisposition to discover the original intent of a statute, courts become the
unfeeling pillars of the status quo. Little do we realize that statutes or even
constitutions are bundles of compromises thrown our way by their framers. Unless
we exercise vigilance, the statute may already be out of tune and irrelevant to our
day.

The petition is for declaratory relief. It prays for the following reliefs:

a.) Immediately upon the filing of this petition, an Order be issued restraining the
respondents from applying and enforcing Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No.
960;

b.) After hearing, judgment be rendered:

1.) Declaring the respective rights and duties of petitioners and respondents;

2.) Adjudging Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 as contrary to the
provision of the Constitution, hence void; because its provision that Foreign
currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other
order to process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever

i.) has taken away the right of petitioners to have the bank deposit of defendant
Greg Bartelli y Northcott garnished to satisfy the judgment rendered in petitioners
favor in violation of substantive due process guaranteed by the Constitution;

ii.) has given foreign currency depositors an undue favor or a class privilege in
violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution;

iii.) has provided a safe haven for criminals like the herein respondent Greg Bartelli
y Northcott since criminals could escape civil liability for their wrongful acts by
merely converting their money to a foreign currency and depositing it in a foreign
currency deposit account with an authorized bank.

The antecedents facts:

On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and

lured petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with him to his apartment.
Therein, Greg Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four days, or up to February 7,
1989 and was able to rape the child once on February 4, and three times each day
on February 5, 6, and 7, 1989. On February 7, 1989, after policemen and people
living nearby, rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli was arrested and detained at the Makati
Municipal Jail. The policemen recovered from Bartelli the following items: 1.) Dollar
Check No. 368, Control No. 021000678-1166111303, US 3,903.20; 2.) COCOBANK
Bank Book No. 104-108758-8 (Peso Acct.); 3.) Dollar Account China Banking
Corp., US $/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-30-8877; 5.) Philippine Money (P234.00)
cash; 6.) Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed Doll (Teddy Bear) used in seducing the
complainant.

On February 16, 1989, Makati Investigating Fiscal Edwin G. Condaya filed against
Greg Bartelli, Criminal Case No. 801 for Serious Illegal Detention and Criminal Cases
Nos. 802, 803, 804, and 805 for four (4) counts of Rape. On the same day,
petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati Civil Case No. 89-3214 for
damages with preliminary attachment against Greg Bartelli. On February 24, 1989,
the day there was a scheduled hearing for Bartellis petition for bail the latter
escaped from jail.

On February 28, 1989, the court granted the fiscals Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the
Issuance of Warrant of Arrest and Hold Departure Order. Pending the arrest of the
accused Greg Bartelli y Northcott, the criminal cases were archived in an Order
dated February 28, 1989.

Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 89-3214, the Judge issued an Order dated February 22,
1989 granting the application of herein petitioners, for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary attachment. After petitioners gave Bond No. JCL (4) 1981 by FGU
Insurance Corporation in the amount P100,000.00, a Writ of Preliminary Attachment
was issued by the trial court on February 28, 1989.

On March 1, 1989, the Deputy Sheriff of Makati served a Notice of Garnishment on

China Banking Corporation. In a letter dated March 13, 1989 to the Deputy Sheriff
of Makati, China Banking Corporation invoked Republic Act No. 1405 as its answer to
the notice of garnishment served on it. On March 15, 1989, Deputy Sheriff of Makati
Armando de Guzman sent his reply to China Banking Corporation saying that the
garnishment did not violate the secrecy of bank deposits since the disclosure is
merely incidental to a garnishment properly and legally made by virtue of a court
order which has placed the subject deposits in custodia legis. In answer to this
letter of the Deputy Sheriff of Makati, China Banking Corporation, in a letter dated
March 20, 1989, invoked Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 to the effect
that the dollar deposits of defendant Greg Bartelli are exempt from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body,
government agency or any administrative body, whatsoever.

This prompted the counsel for petitioners to make an inquiry with the Central Bank
in a letter dated April 25, 1989 on whether Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 has
any exception or whether said section has been repealed or amended since said
section has rendered nugatory the substantive right of the plaintiff to have the
claim sought to be enforced by the civil action secured by way of the writ of
preliminary attachment as granted to the plaintiff under Rule 57 of the Revised
Rules of Court. The Central Bank responded as follows:

May 26, 1989

Ms. Erlinda S. Carolino

12 Pres. Osmea Avenue

South Admiral Village

Paranaque, Metro Manila

Dear Ms. Carolino:

This is in reply to your letter dated April 25, 1989 regarding your inquiry on Section
113, CB Circular No. 960 (1983).

The cited provision is absolute in application. It does not admit of any exception,
nor has the same been repealed nor amended.

The purpose of the law is to encourage dollar accounts within the countrys
banking system which would help in the development of the economy. There is no
intention to render futile the basic rights of a person as was suggested in your
subject letter. The law may be harsh as some perceive it, but it is still the law.
Compliance is, therefore, enjoined.

Very
truly yours,

(SGD) AGAPITO S.
FAJARDO

Director[1]

Meanwhile, on April 10, 1989, the trial court granted petitioners motion for leave to
serve summons by publication in the Civil Case No. 89-3214 entitled Karen
Salvacion. et al. vs. Greg Bartelli y Northcott. Summons with the complaint was
published in the Manila Times once a week for three consecutive weeks. Greg
Bartelli failed to file his answer to the complaint and was declared in default on

August 7, 1989. After hearing the case ex-parte, the court rendered judgment in
favor of petitioners on March 29, 1990, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against

defendant, ordering the latter:

1. To pay plaintiff Karen E. Salvacion the amount of P500,000.00 as moral

damages;

2. To pay her parents, plaintiffs spouses Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., and Evelina E.
Salvacion the amount of P150,000.00 each or a total of P300,000.00 for both of
them;

3. To pay plaintiffs exemplary damages of P100,000.00; and

4. To pay attorneys fees in an amount equivalent to 25% of the total amount of

damages herein awarded;

5. To pay litigation expenses of P10,000.00; plus

6. Costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED.

The heinous acts of respondents Greg Bartelli which gave rise to the award were
related in graphic detail by the trial court in its decision as follows:

The defendant in this case was originally detained in the municipal jail of Makati
but was able to escape therefrom on February 24, 1989 as per report of the Jail
Warden of Makati to the Presiding Judge, Honorable Manuel M. Cosico of the

Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 136, where he was charged with four counts
of Rape and Serious Illegal Detention (Crim. Cases Nos. 802 to 805). Accordingly,
upon motion of plaintiffs, through counsel, summons was served upon defendant by
publication in the Manila Times, a newspaper of general circulation as attested by
the Advertising Manager of the Metro Media Times, Inc., the publisher of the said
newspaper. Defendant, however, failed to file his answer to the complaint despite
the lapse of the period of sixty (60) days from the last publication; hence, upon
motion of the plaintiffs through counsel, defendant was declared in default and
plaintiffs were authorized to present their evidence ex parte.

In support of the complaint, plaintiffs presented as witness the minor Karen E.

Salvacion, her father, Federico N. Salacion, Jr., a certain Joseph Aguilar and a certain
Liberato Mandulio, who gave the following testimony:

Karen took her first year high school in St. Marys Academy in Pasay City but has
recently transferred to Arellano University for her second year.

In the afternoon of February 4, 1989, Karen was at the Plaza Fair Makati Cinema
Square, with her friend Edna Tangile whiling away her free time. At about 3:30 p.m.
while she was finishing her snack on a concrete bench in front of Plaza Fair, an
American approached her. She was then alone because Edna Tangile had already
left, and she was about to go home. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 2 to 5)

The American asked her name and introduced himself as Greg Bartelli. He sat
beside her when he talked to her. He said he was a Math teacher and told her that
he has a sister who is a nurse in New York. His sister allegedly has a daughter who
is about Karens age and who was with him in his house along Kalayaan Avenue.
(TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 4-5).

The American asked Karen what was her favorite subject and she told him its
Pilipino. He then invited her to go with him to his house where she could teach
Pilipino to his niece. He even gave her a stuffed toy to persuade her to teach his
niece. (Id., pp.5-6)

They walked from Plaza Fair along Pasong Tamo, turning right to reach the
defendants house along Kalayaan Avenue. (Id., p.6)

When they reached the apartment house, Karen notices that defendants alleged
niece was not outside the house but defendant told her maybe his niece was inside.
When Karen did not see the alleged niece inside the house, defendant told her
maybe his niece was upstairs, and invited Karen to go upstairs. (Id., p. 7)

Upon entering the bedroom defendant suddenly locked the door. Karen became
nervous because his niece was not there. Defendant got a piece of cotton cord and
tied Karens hands with it, and then he undressed her. Karen cried for help but
defendant strangled her. He took a packing tape and he covered her mouth with it
and he circled it around her head. (Id., p. 7)

Then, defendant suddenly pushed Karen towards the bed which was just near the
door. He tied her feet and hands spread apart to the bed posts. He knelt in front of
her and inserted his finger in her sex organ. She felt severe pain. She tried to
shout but no sound could come out because there were tapes on her mouth. When
defendant withdrew his finger it was full of blood and Karen felt more pain after the
withdrawal of the finger. (Id., p.8)

He then got a Johnsons Baby Oil and he applied it to his sex organ as well as to her
sex organ. After that he forced his sex organ into her but he was not able to do so.
While he was doing it, Karen found it difficult to breathe and she perspired a lot
while feeling severe pain. She merely presumed that he was able to insert his sex
organ a little, because she could not see. Karen could not recall how long the
defendant was in that position. (Id., pp. 8-9)

After that, he stood up and went to the bathroom to wash. He also told Karen to
take a shower and he untied her hands. Karen could only hear the sound of the
water while the defendant, she presumed, was in the bathroom washing his sex
organ. When she took a shower more blood came out from her. In the meantime,
defendant changed the mattress because it was full of blood. After the shower,
Karen was allowed by defendant to sleep. She fell asleep because she got tired
crying. The incident happened at about 4:00 p.m. Karen had no way of
determining the exact time because defendant removed her watch. Defendant did
not care to give her food before she went to sleep. Karen woke up at about 8:00
oclock the following morning. (Id., pp. 9-10)

The following day, February 5, 1989, a Sunday, after breakfast of biscuit and coke
at about 8:30 to 9:00 a.m. defendant raped Karen while she was still bleeding. For
lunch, they also took biscuit and coke. She was raped for the second time at about
12:00 to 2:00 p.m. In the evening, they had rice for dinner which defendant had
stored downstairs; it was he who cooked the rice that is why it looks like lugaw.
For the third time, Karen was raped again during the night. During those three
times defendant succeeded in inserting his sex organ but she could not say whether
the organ was inserted wholly.
Karen did not see any firearm or any bladed weapon. The defendant did not tie her
hands and feet nor put a tape on her mouth anymore but she did not cry for help for
fear that she might be killed; besides, all those windows and doors were closed.
And even if she shouted for help, nobody would hear her. She was so afraid that if
somebody would hear her and would be able to call a police, it was still possible
that as she was still inside the house, defendant might kill her. Besides, the
defendant did not leave that Sunday, ruling out her chance to call for help. At
nighttime he slept with her again. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 12-14)
On February 6, 1989, Monday, Karen was raped three times, once in the morning
for thirty minutes after breakfast of biscuits; again in the afternoon; and again in the
evening. At first, Karen did not know that there was a window because everything
was covered by a carpet, until defendant opened the window for around fifteen
minutes or less to let some air in, and she found that the window was covered by
styrofoam and plywood. After that, he again closed the window with a hammer and
he put the styrofoam, plywood, and carpet back. (Id., pp. 14-15)
That Monday evening, Karen had a chance to call for help, although defendant left
but kept the door closed. She went to the bathroom and saw a small window
covered by styrofoam and she also spotted a small hole. She stepped on the bowl
and she cried for help through the hole. She cried: Maawa na po kayo sa akin.
Tulungan nyo akong makalabas dito. Kinidnap ako! Somebody heard her. It was a
woman, probably a neighbor, but she got angry and said she was istorbo. Karen
pleaded for help and the woman told her to sleep and she will call the police. She
finally fell asleep but no policeman came. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 15-16)
She woke up at 6:00 oclock the following morning, and she saw defendant in bed,
this time sleeping. She waited for him to wake up. When he woke up, he again got
some food but he always kept the door locked. As usual, she was merely fed with
biscuit and coke. On that day, February 7, 1989, she was again raped three times.
The first at about 6:30 to 7:00 a.m., the second at about 8:30 9:00, and the third
was after lunch at 12:00 noon. After he had raped her for the second time he left
but only for a short while. Upon his return, he caught her shouting for help but he
did not understand what she was shouting about. After she was raped the third
time, he left the house. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 16-17) She again went to the
bathroom and shouted for help. After shouting for about five minutes, she heard

many voices. The voices were asking for her name and she gave her name as
Karen Salvacion. After a while, she heard a voice of a woman saying they will just
call the police. They were also telling her to change her clothes. She went from the
bathroom to the room but she did not change her clothes being afraid that should
the neighbors call the police and the defendant see her in different clothes, he
might kill her. At that time she was wearing a T-shirt of the American bacause the
latter washed her dress. (Id., p. 16)
Afterwards, defendant arrived and opened the door. He asked her if she had asked
for help because there were many policemen outside and she denied it. He told her
to change her clothes, and she did change to the one she was wearing on Saturday.
He instructed her to tell the police that she left home and willingly; then he went
downstairs but he locked the door. She could hear people conversing but she could
not understand what they were saying. (Id., p. 19)

When she heard the voices of many people who were conversing downstairs, she
knocked repeatedly at the door as hard as she could. She heard somebody going
upstairs and when the door was opened, she saw a policeman. The policeman
asked her name and the reason why she was there. She told him she was
kidnapped. Downstairs, he saw about five policemen in uniform and the defendant
was talking to them. Nakikipag-areglo po sa mga pulis, Karen added. The
policeman told him to just explain at the precinct. (Id., p. 20)
They went out of the house and she saw some of her neighbors in front of the
house. They rode the car of a certain person she called Kuya Boy together with
defendant, the policeman, and two of her neighbors whom she called Kuya Bong
Lacson and one Ate Nita. They were brought to Sub-Station I and there she was
investigated by a policeman. At about 2:00 a.m., her father arrived, followed by her
mother together with some of their neighbors. Then they were brought to the
second floor of the police headquarters. (Id., p. 21)
At the headquarters, she was asked several questions by the investigator. The
written statement she gave to the police was marked Exhibit A. Then they
proceeded to the National Bureau of Investigation together with the investigator
and her parents. At the NBI, a doctor, a medico-legal officer, examined her private
parts. It was already 3:00 in early morning, of the following day when they reached
the NBI, (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, p. 22) The findings of the medico-legal officer has
been marked as Exhibit B.
She was studying at the St. Marys Academy in Pasay City at the time of the
Incident but she subsequently transferred to Apolinario Mabini, Arellano University,
situated along Taft Avenue, because she was ashamed to be the subject of
conversation in the school. She first applied for transfer to Jose Abad Santos,
Arellano University along Taft Avenue near the Light Rail Transit Station but she was

denied admission after she told the school the true reason for her transfer. The
reason for their denial was that they might be implicated in the case. (TSN, Aug.
15, 1989, p. 46)
xxx xxx

xxx

After the incident, Karen has changed a lot. She does not play with her brother and
sister anymore, and she is always in a state of shock; she has been absent-minded
and is ashamed even to go out of the house. (TSN, Sept. 12, 1989, p. 10) She
appears to be restless or sad. (Id., p. 11) The father prays for P500,000.00 moral
damages for Karen for this shocking experience which probably, she would always
recall until she reaches old age, and he is not sure if she could ever recover from
this experience. (TSN, Sept. 24, 1989, pp. 10-11)
Pursuant to an Order granting leave to publish notice of decision, said notice was
published in the Manila Bulletin once a week for three consecutive weeks. After the
lapse of fifteen (15) days from the date of the last publication of the notice of
judgment and the decision of the trial court had become final, petitioners tried to
execute on Bartellis dollar deposit with China Banking Corporation. Likewise, the
bank invoked Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960.
Thus, petitioners decided to seek relief from this Court.
The issues raised and the arguments articulated by the parties boil down to two:
May this Court entertain the instant petition despite the fact that original jurisdiction
in petitions for declaratory relief rests with the lower court? She Section 113 of
Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of R.A. 6426, as amended by P.D. 1246,
otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a
foreign transient?
Petitioners aver as heretofore stated that Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No.
960 providing that Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body,
government agency or any administrative body whatsoever. should be adjudged as
unconstitutional on the grounds that: 1.) it has taken away the right of petitioners
to have the bank deposit of defendant Greg Bartelli y Northcott garnished to satisfy
the judgment rendered in petitioners favor in violation of substantive due process
guaranteed by the Constitution; 2.) it has given foreign currency depositors an
undue favor or a class privilege n violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution; 3.) it has provided a safe haven for criminals like the herein
respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott since criminal could escape civil liability for
their wrongful acts by merely converting their money to a foreign currency and
depositing it in a foreign currency deposit account with an authorized bank; and 4.)
The Monetary Board, in issuing Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 has
exceeded its delegated quasi- legislative power when it took away: a.) the

plaintiffs substantive right to have the claim sought to be enforced by the civil
action secured by way of the writ of preliminary attachment as granted by Rule 57
of the Revised Rules of Court; b.) the plaintiffs substantive right to have the
judgment credit satisfied by way of the writ of execution out of the bank deposit of
the judgment debtor as granted to the judgment creditor by Rule 39 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which is beyond its power to do so.

On the other hand, respondent Central Bank, in its Comment alleges that the
Monetary Board in issuing Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 did not exceed its
power or authority because the subject Section is copied verbatim from a portion of
R.A. No. 6426 as amended by P.D. 1246. Hence, it was not the Monetary Board that
grants exemption from attachment or garnishment to foreign currency deposits, but
the law (R.A. 6426 as amended) itself; that it does not violate the substantive due
process guaranteed by the Constitution because a.) it was based on a law; b.) the
law seems to be reasonable; c.) it is enforced according to regular methods of
procedure; and d.) it applies to all members of a class.
Expanding, the Central Bank said; that one reason for exempting the foreign
currency deposits from attachment, garnishment or any other order process of any
court, is to assure the development and speedy growth of the Foreign Currency
Deposit System and the Offshore Banking System in the Philippines; that another
reason is to encourage the inflow of foreign currency deposits into the banking
institutions thereby placing such institutions more in a position to properly channel
the same to loans and investments in the Philippines, thus directly contributing to
the economic development of the country; that the subject section is being
enforced according to the regular methods of procedure; and that it applies to all
currency deposits made by any person and therefore does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
Respondent Central Bank further avers that the questioned provision is needed to
promote the public interest and the general welfare; that the State cannot just
stand idly by while a considerable segment of the society suffers from economic
distress; that the State had to take some measures to encourage economic
development; and that in so doing persons and property may be subjected to some
kinds of restraints or burdens to secure the general welfare or public interest.
Respondent Central Bank also alleges that Rule 39 and Rule 57 of the Revised Rules
of Court provide that some properties are exempted from execution/attachment
especially provided by law and R.A. No. 6426 as amended is such a law, in that it
specifically provides, among others, that foreign currency deposits shall be
exempted from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any
court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever.

For its part, respondent China Banking Corporation, aside from giving reasons
similar to that of respondent Central Bank, also stated that respondent China Bank
is not unmindful of the inhuman sufferings experienced by the minor Karen E.
Salvacion from the beastly hands of Greg Bartelli; that it is not only too willing to
release the dollar deposit of Bartelli which may perhaps partly mitigate the
sufferings petitioner has undergone; but it is restrained from doing so in view of R.A.
No. 6426 and Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960; and that despite the
harsh effect to these laws on petitioners, CBC has no other alternative but to follow
the same.
This court finds the petition to be partly meritorious.
Petitioner deserves to receive the damages awarded to her by the court. But this
petition for declaratory relief can only be entertained and treated as a petition for
mandamus to require respondents to honor and comply with the writ of execution in
Civil Case No. 89-3214.
The Court has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over a petition for declatory
relief.[2] However, exceptions to this rule have been recognized. Thus, where the
petition has far-reaching implications and raises questions that should be resolved,
it may be treated as one for mandamus.[3]
Here is a child, a 12-year old girl, who in her belief that all Americans are good and
in her gesture of kindness by teaching his alleged niece the Filipino language as
requested by the American, trustingly went with said stranger to his apartment, and
there she was raped by said American tourist Greg Bartelli. Not once, but ten times.
She was detained therein for four (4) days. This American tourist was able to
escape from the jail and avoid punishment. On the other hand, the child, having
received a favorable judgment in the Civil Case for damages in the amount of more
than P1,000,000.00, which amount could alleviate the humiliation, anxiety, and
besmirched reputation she had suffered and may continue to suffer for a long, long
time; and knowing that this person who had wronged her has the money, could not,
however get the award of damages because of this unreasonable law. This
questioned law, therefore makes futile the favorable judgment and award of
damages that she and her parents fully deserve. As stated by the trial court in its
decision,
Indeed, after hearing the testimony of Karen, the Court believes that it was
indoubtedly a shocking and traumatic experience she had undergone which could
haunt her mind for a long, long time, the mere recall of which could make her feel
so humiliated, as in fact she had been actually humiliated once when she was
refused admission at the Abad Santos High School, Arellano University, where she
sought to transfer from another school, simply because the school authorities of the
said High School learned about what happened to her and allegedly feared that they
might be implicated in the case.

xxx
The reason for imposing exemplary or corrective damages is due to the wanton and
bestial manner defendant had committed the acts of rape during a period of serious
illegal detention of his hapless victim, the minor Karen Salvacion whose only fault
was in her being so naive and credulous to believe easily that defendant, an
American national, could not have such a bestial desire on her nor capable of
committing such heinous crime. Being only 12 years old when that unfortunate
incident happened, she has never heard of an old Filipino adage that in every forest
there is a snake, xxx.[4]
If Karens sad fate had happened to anybodys own kin, it would be difficult for him
to fathom how the incentive for foreign currency deposit could be more important
than his childs right to said award of damages; in this case, the victims claim for
damages from this alien who had the gall to wrong a child of tender years of a
country where he is mere visitor. This further illustrates the flaw in the questioned
provisions.
It is worth mentioning that R.A. No. 6426 was enacted in 1983 or at a time when the
countrys economy was in a shambles; when foreign investments were minimal and
presumably, this was the reason why said statute was enacted. But the realities of
the present times show that the country has recovered economically; and even if
not, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of law for being
unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the questioned law may be good
when enacted. The law failed to anticipate the inquitous effects producing outright
injustice and inequality such as as the case before us.
It has thus been said thatBut I also know,[5] that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the
progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened,
as new discoveries are made, new truths are disclosed and manners and opinions
change with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep
pace with the times We might as well require a man to wear still the coat which
fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to remain ever under the regimen of their
barbarous ancestors.
In his comment, the Solicitor General correctly opined, thus:
"The present petition has far-reaching implications on the right of a national to
obtain redress for a wrong committed by an alien who takes refuge under a law and
regulation promulgated for a purpose which does not contemplate the application
thereof envisaged by the allien. More specifically, the petition raises the question
whether the protection against attachment, garnishment or other court process
accorded to foreign currency deposits PD No. 1246 and CB Circular No. 960 applies

when the deposit does not come from a lender or investor but from a mere transient
who is not expected to maintain the deposit in the bank for long.
The resolution of this question is important for the protection of nationals who are
victimized in the forum by foreigners who are merely passing through.
xxx
xxx Respondents China Banking Corporation and Central Bank of the Philippines
refused to honor the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 89-3214 on the
strength of the following provision of Central Bank Circular No. 960:
Sec. 113 Exemption from attachment. Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt
from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court,
legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever.
Central Bank Circular No. 960 was issued pursuant to Section 7 of Republic Act No.
6426:
Sec. 7. Rules and Regulations. The Monetary Board of the Central Bank shall
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of this Act which shall take effect after the publication of such rules and
regulations in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of national circulation for at
least once a week for three consecutive weeks. In case the Central Bank
promulgates new rules and regulations decreasing the rights of depositors, the rules
and regulations at the time the deposit was made shall govern.
The aforecited Section 113 was copied from Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426. As
amended by P.D. 1246, thus:
Sec. 8. Secrecy of Foreign Currency Deposits. -- All foreign currency deposits
authorized under this Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1035, as well as
foreign currency deposits authorized under Presidential Decree No. 1034, are
hereby declared as and considered of an absolutely confidential nature and, except
upon the written permission of the depositor, in no instance shall such foreign
currency deposits be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government
official, bureau or office whether judicial or administrative or legislative or any other
entity whether public or private: Provided, however, that said foreign currency
deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or
process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative
body whatsoever.
The purpose of PD 1246 in according protection against attachment, garnishment
and other court process to foreign currency deposits is stated in its whereases, viz.:

WHEREAS, under Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1035, certain Philippine banking institutions and branches of foreign banks are
authorized to accept deposits in foreign currency;
WHEREAS, under provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1034 authorizing the
establishment of an offshore banking system in the Philippines, offshore banking
units are also authorized to receive foreign currency deposits in certain cases;
WHEREAS, in order to assure the development and speedy growth of the Foreign
Currency Deposit System and the Offshore Banking System in the Philippines,
certain incentives were provided for under the two Systems such as confidentiality
subject to certain exceptions and tax exemptions on the interest income of
depositors who are nonresidents and are not engaged in trade or business in the
Philippines;
WHEREAS, making absolute the protective cloak of confidentiality over such foreign
currency deposits, exempting such deposits from tax, and guaranteeing the vested
right of depositors would better encourage the inflow of foreign currency deposits
into the banking institutions authorized to accept such deposits in the Philippines
thereby placing such institutions more in a position to properly channel the same to
loans and investments in the Philippines, thus directly contributing to the economic
development of the country;

Thus, one of the principal purposes of the protection accorded to foreign currency
deposits is to assure the development and speedy growth of the Foreign Currency
Deposit system and the Offshore Banking in the Philippines (3rd Whereas).
The Offshore Banking System was established by PD No. 1034. In turn, the
purposes of PD No. 1034 are as follows:
WHEREAS, conditions conducive to the establishment of an offshore banking
system, such as political stability, a growing economy and adequate communication
facilities, among others, exist in the Philippines;
WHEREAS, it is in the interest of developing countries to have as wide access as
possible to the sources of capital funds for economic development;
WHEREAS, an offshore banking system based in the Philippines will be
advantageous and beneficial to the country by increasing our links with foreign
lenders, facilitating the flow of desired investments into the Philippines, creating
employment opportunities and expertise in international finance, and contributing
to the national development effort.

WHEREAS, the geographical location, physical and human resources, and other
positive factors provide the Philippines with the clear potential to develop as
another financial center in Asia;
On the other hand, the Foreign Currency Deposit system was created by PD No.
1035. Its purpose are as follows:
WHEREAS, the establishment of an offshore banking system in the Philippines has
been authorized under a separate decree;
WHEREAS, a number of local commercial banks, as depository bank under the
Foreign Currency Deposit Act (RA No. 6426), have the resources and managerial
competence to more actively engage in foreign exchange transactions and
participate in the grant of foreign currency loans to resident corporations and firms;
WHEREAS, it is timely to expand the foreign currency lending authority of the said
depository banks under RA 6426 and apply to their transactions the same taxes as
would be applicable to transaction of the proposed offshore banking units;
It is evident from the above [Whereas clauses] that the Offshore Banking System
and the Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw deposits from
foreign lenders and investors (Vide second Whereas of PD No. 1034; third Whereas
of PD No. 1035). It is these depositors that are induced by the two laws and given
protection and incentives by them.
Obviously, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the
kind of deposit encourage by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and
protection by said laws because such depositor stays only for a few days in the
country and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only for a short time.
Respondent Greg Bartelli, as stated, is just a tourist or a transient. He deposited
his dollars with respondent China Banking Corporation only for safekeeping during
his temporary stay in the Philippines.
For the reasons stated above, the Solicitor General thus submits that the dollar
deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli is not entitled to the protection of Section 113 of
Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against attachment, garnishment or
other court processes.[6]
In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if
we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which
exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court.
Legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is
applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen
aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article
10 of the New Civil Code which provides that in case of doubt in the interpretation
or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and

justice to prevail. Ninguno non deue enriquecerse tortizerzmente con damo de

otro. Simply stated, when the statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of those
fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of conscience.
(Padilla vs. Padilla, 74 Phil. 377)
It would be unthinkable, that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank No. 960
would be used as a device by accused Greg Bartelli for wrongdoing, and in so doing,
acquitting the guilty at the expense of the innocent.
Call it what it may but is there no conflict of legal policy here? Dollar against
Peso? Upholding the final and executory judgment of the lower court against the
Central Bank Circular protecting the foreign depositor? Shielding or protecting the
dollar deposit of a transient alien depositor against injustice to a national and victim
of a crime? This situation calls for fairness legal tyranny.
We definitely cannot have both ways and rest in the belief that we have served the
ends of justice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD No.
1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of R.A. 6426 are hereby held to be
INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are
hereby REQUIRED to COMPLY with the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 893214, Karen Salvacion, et al. vs. Greg Bartelli y Northcott, by Branch CXLIV, RTC
Makati and to RELEASE to petitioners the dollar deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli
y Northcott in such amount as would satisfy the judgment.
SO ORDERED.
Case Digest on Salvacion v. Central Bank of the Philippines

278 SCRA 27

FACTS:

Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for committing four counts of rape
and serious illegal detention against Karen Salvacion. Police recovered from him
several dollar checks and a dollar account in the China Banking Corp. He was,
however, able to escape from prison. In a civil case filed against him, the trial court
awarded Salvacion moral, exemplary and attorneys fees amounting to almost
P1,000,000.00.

Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of Bartelli with the
China Banking Corp. but the latter refused arguing that Section 11 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960 exempts foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment,
or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or
any administrative body whatsoever.

Salvacion therefore filed this action for declaratory relief in the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by PD 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign
Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient?

HELD: The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No.
1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby held to be
INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are
hereby required to comply with the writ of execution issued in the civil case and to
release to petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli in such amount as would satisfy
the judgment.

RATIO: Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the favorable
judgment and award of damages that Salvacion and her parents fully deserve. It
then proceeded to show that the economic basis for the enactment of RA No. 6426
is not anymore present; and even if it still exists, the questioned law still denies
those entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The
intention of the law may be good when enacted. The law failed to anticipate the
iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as the case before
us.

The SC adopted the comment of the Solicitor General who argued that the Offshore
Banking System and the Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw
deposits from foreign lenders and investors and, subsequently, to give the latter
protection. However, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is
not the kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives
and protection by said laws because such depositor stays only for a few days in the
country and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only for a short time.
Considering that Bartelli is just a tourist or a transient, he is not entitled to the

protection of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against
attachment, garnishment or other court processes.

Further, the SC said: In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its
justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order
or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative
body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result
especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This
would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that in case of doubt
in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail.