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Automatic

Control

Flight
Systems

An Interactive Video Teletraining and Self-Study Course

a5na

Weight
Developed and Presented by

Anthony A. Lambregts
National Resource Specialist for
Advanced Controls

Federal Aviation Administration


January 27,1999

GETTING STARTED
How Do I Use This Guide?

.................................

I.

SYSTEMS ENGINEERING CURRICULUM


What Does the Curriculum Cover? .................................
Two-Week Job Function Course .............................
Overviews of Technical Subjects ............................
Core Technical Subjects Courses ............................

II.

IVT COURSE ORIENTATION


About This IVT Course ..................................................
What Is IVT? ..................................................................
Who Is the Target Audience? ..........................................
Who Is the Instructor? ..................................................
What Will You Learn? ...................................................
How Will This Course Help You On the Job? ..............
What Topics Does the Course Cover? ...........................
What Are Some Good References? ................................

7
8
9
9
10
11
11
12

III. SELF-ASSESSMENT & EXERCISES


Pre- & Post-Course Self-Assessment Questions ............ 14
Job-Related Exercises ..................................................... 16
APPENDICES
A.
Automatic Flight Control Systems
Presentation Visuals
Course Evaluation Forms
B.

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Getting Started
How Do I Use
This Guide?

This document is to be used for both the initial IVT broadcast


and the self-study course. The guide provides you with the
position of this course in the Systems Curriculum, an orientation
to the IVT course, support materials for use during the broadcast
and self-study, self-assessment and practice exercises, and both
an IVT and self-study course evaluation.
Fo How these steps to complete your study.
1. Read Section I, Systems Curriculum, to familiarize yourself
with the the overall scope and format of the curriculum.
3 Review Section II, IVT Course Orientation, before the
-.
broadcast, if possible, or before you watch the tape to get an
overview of the purpose of the course, the target audience, the
instructor, what you will learn, how this course will help you
on the job, the topics covered in the course, and some good
references on the topic.
3. Answer t,he pre-course self-assessment questions in Section
III, Self-Assessment crnd Exercises.
4. Turn to Appendis A, Automatic Flight Control Systems
.
Presentdon Visuds, and refer to it during the broadcast OI
while watching the videotape. Appendix A contains the
visual support material used by the instructor during the
broadcast. You can use these visuals to take notes and follow
along with the broadcast presentation. Begin the videotape
here if vou
are completing this as a self-studvd course.
5. Complete the post-course self-assessment and exercises in
Section III, Self Assessment crnd Exercises.
6. Complete the appropriate form (IVT or self-studv ) from
Appendix B, Course Evnluntion Forms. For the IVT course,
you will use the keypad you have been using during the
course to complete the evaluation.

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I

Systems Engineering Curriculum


I.

Systems Engineering Curriculum

What Does the


Curriculum
Cover?

The Systems Engineering Curriculum fits into the broader AIR


Training Program that is summarized in the following figure.

The AIR Training

Program

An Overview

Within the context of the AIR Training Program, the Systems


Engineering Curriculum is designed to effectivelvd meet the
critical safety mission of the FAA by addressing the following
Service goals:
Stnnhrdizntion
l

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Promote standardization throughout the organization in task


accomplishment and application of airworthiness
regulations in order to achieve uniform compliance.

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SystemsEngineering Curriculum
Job Performance Proficiencv
Reduce significantly the time required for newly-hired
engineers to attain full job performance proficiency.

Customer Service
Establish and maintain appropriate, effective, and
responsive communication, collaboration, leadership, and
teamwork with both internal and external customers.

In addition to the Service goals, the Systems Engineering


Curriculum is designed to provide ASEs with job function
training in three domains:
Tasks and procedures governing the work of engineers in
design approval, technical project management, certificate
management, and designee management.

FAR airworthiness requirements that are the purview of


electrical and mechanical systems engineers. Generally
they are Subpart F of FAR parts 23, 25, 27, and 39.
Technical subjects essential for all new engineers to meet
both introductor\vw requirements and, later, minimum
technical proficiency level requirements.

I t7eresulting Systems Engineering Curriculum structure


consists of three main types of training opportunities -

l-l

1. Two-Week Job Function Course


3. Overviews of Technical Subjects
3. Follow-on Core Technical Subjects Courses

Two-Week
Function
Course

Job

The Two-Week Job Function Course uses an instructor-led,


classroom-based format with lecture, discussion, and individual
and group activities. Supporting materials used in the course
include print, overhead transparencies, videotapes, job aids,
and documents and sample reports.

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SystemsEngineering Curriculum
The course is divided into the following two major sections:
Section I
Certification Tasks - includes design approval, technical
project management, certification management, and DER
management.

Section 2
FAR Requirements and Key FAR Sections - includes
training in the subparts of the FAR that apply to electrical
and mechanical systems engineers (Subpart F) at two levels:
an overview of those subparts across FARs 23, 25, 27, and
29; and in-depth discussion of significant sections of the
FAR that are important to the Service. The importance of
these sections may stem from problems in interpretation an-d
application of requirements, technical complexity of a
design, ihigh visibilitvd projects, or safety considerations
that Lre paramount.

0l.e rliews of
Technical
Subjects

High-level overviews of 13 technical subjects are presented bv


NRSs, Technical Specialists or other senior engineers. TIlesed
overviews are available in two modes:
l

An initial live four-hour IVT satellite broadcast with


accompanying course material is received at each
Directorate and other downlink sites.
A Video/Self-Study Training Package adapted from the
initial IVT presentation is available through the Directorate
Training Manager.

Basic concepts and FAA-specific applications and examples


are provided for each of the following 13 technical subjects:
For electrical engineers
l

Advanced Communications

Advanced Display Systems/Heads-Up Displays

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SystemsEngineering Curriculum
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Advanced Navigation

Low Visibility

For mechanical engineers


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Crashworthiness and Interior Compliance

Doors

0 Icing
For both elecrical and mechanical engineers
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Automatic Flight Control Systems

Complex Electronic Hardware

Lightning and HIRF Protection

Human Factors

Software

Svstem
Safetvd Analysis
I
w

Each technical subject overview is designed to not only


provide ASEs with the FAA perspective on the topic, but also
serve as an indicator of what further training may be needed.

Core Technical
Subjects
Courses

As a follow-on to the Overviews of Technical Subjects, the


curriculum will provide more in-depth training in the following
two subject areas:
l

System Safety Assessment

Reliability & Probability

These core technical subjects are essential to the technical work


of the systems engineer in a regulatory environment regardless
of product or technology. Training in each of the core subjects
will be designed to bring systems engineers to a minimum level
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Systems Engineering Curriculum


of technical proficiency and to help promote proficiency in the
application of the technical knowledge in an office work
environment.
Additional technical training for engineers beyond these core
subjects will depend largely on AC0 organizational needs
stemming from customer requirements, products certified,
emerging technology, and the number of staff requiring more
specialized training. In short, the more advanced the technical
training required, the more individualized it becomes.
Such training topics could be as follows:
.

HIRF

Lightning

Software Fundumentals

Dynamic Seat Testing

Icing Certification

Accident Investigation

Human Factors

Flammability

Interior Compliance & Crashworthiness

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,IVT Course Orientation

II.

IVT Course Orientation

About This
IVT Course

Automatic Flight Control Systems is one of 13 Overviews of


Technical Topics in the Systems Engineering Curriculum
designed to prepare you to effectively meet the critical safety
mission of the FAA. [For more information on the Curuiczrla,
refer back to Section I of this guide. /
Through a four-hour Interactive Video Teletraining (IVT)
format, Anthony Lambregts, National Resource Specialist for
Advanced Controls7 will introduce you to the fundamental
concepts of automatic flight control. He will discuss some
aspects of the applicable regulations and the equally important
design aspects for which no regulations exist. His aim is not to
make you a control theory expert, but rather to lead you stepby-step through the thicket of current and future automation
designs. The emphasis is on functions more than on hardware
and software implementation. The course will stay close to the
physics of flight, introducing only those control theory
elements necessary for you to communicate with the controls
experts and to ask pertinent questions related to automation
safety. The course will show how the historic, one-function-ata-time evolution of automation designs has led to very capable,
albeit extremely complex, systems architectures in hardware
and software, with much undesirable and unnecessary
functional overlap. The vulnerabilities of the traditional
automation designs to crew errors and confusion will be
discussed and related to the underlying root cause design
practices. Mr. Lambregts will give his vision on needed
improvements in future automation design standards and
needed updates in the regulations. Finally, recent advances in
automation designs will be discussed, showing reduced
complexity, improved performance, standardized / portable
design and reduced vulnerability to crew errors are well within
the current state of the art and technology.

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IVT Course Orient&ion

What Is IVT?

Interactive Video Teletraining, or IVT, is instruction delivered


using some form of live, interactive television. For the
overview courses, the instructor delivers the course from the
television studio at the FAA Academy in Oklahoma City.
Through the IVT broadcast facility instructors are able to use a
variety of visuals, objects, and media formats to support the
instruction.
Participants are located at various receive sites around the
country and can see the instructor and his/her materials on
television sets in their classrooms. The participants can
communicate with the instructor either through a microphone
and/or the simple-to-use Viewer Response System keypads.
During the live presentation, when a participant has a question
or thelnstructor asks for specific participant responses to
questions. the participant(s) can signal to the instructor using
their keypad. The collective participant responses or the name
of a specific participant signalling a question are immediately
visible to the instructor on the console at the broadcast site.
The instructor can then respond as needed. When the instructor
calls on a specific participant to speak from a site, participants
at each of the other sites can simultaneously hear the
participant who is speaking.
This guide provides you with the framework for this course as
well as the following appendices to be used for both the IVT
and the self-study courses.
l

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Appendix A contains the actual visual support material used


by the instructor during the broadcast. You can use these
visuals to follow along with the videotape and record notes
directly on the pages.
Appendix B provides the Course Evaluation Forms for the
IVT broadcast and the self-study video course.

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IVT Course Orientation


Who Is the
Target
Audience?

This course is designed for:


Designated Engineering Representatives (DERs) who
review and approve automatic flight control/flight
management systems designs.

FAA systems engineers with a limited background in


airplane flight dynamics and automatic control systems who
wish to gain a basic familiarity with automatic control
systems design concepts and practices, control theory,
certification requirements, and issues and trends in future
automation.

Who Is the
Instructor?

Anthony
Lambregts

Anthmy A. Lnmbregts received his BS and MS in aeronautical


engineering from the University of Delft, the Netherlands.
From 1968 to 1995 he worked for the Boeing Commercial and
Military Airplane Company in design, research, and
engineering management related to automatic flight control
systems for a wide variety of commercial, military, unmanned
autonomous and research airplanes. In 1995, Mr. Lambregts
joined the FAA as a National Resource Specialist.
Mr. Lambregts is recognized internationally as an expert in
advanced control systems. He holds 16 patents, 5 Boeing
Invention Awards, and three NASA Recognition Awards. He
was involved in variou aircraft certification efforts, including
the B747 autopilot/Autothrottle and the B737/B767 Autoland
designs. He managed advanced research programs, including
the NASA TCV AFC Function Integration project, the Condor
Autonomous Flight Control System development, the HSCT
avionics/flight controls development, Enhanced Vision System,
and the NASA/Boeing FBL program.
Since joining the FAA, Anthony Lambregts has taken special
interest in automation safety and getting needed design
standards improvements adopted by the industry and in getting

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IVT Course Orient&ion


the applicable FARs and Acs updated. To this effect, he is
participating in the FAAIJAA All Weather Operations and
Flight Guidance Systems Harmonization working group
meetins and in the Autopilot review team, as well as in the
NASA/NASA Aviation Safety Program planning and proposal
evaluations. He is also working with industry and academia on
advanced flight control systems designs, such as the Bell 609,
as well as controls and displays research. Mr. Lambregts is a
member of the AIAA.

What Will You


Learn?

After completing this course, you will have a basic


understanding of automatic flight control systems (AFCS) in
use today, including:
How todays svstems have evolved over a period of more
than 50 years. *
FARs/ACs related to automatic flight control design
certification (what is covered and what is not).
Important concepts and approaches used in design for safety
and protection against failures.
The basics of aerodynamic flight controls and the
consequences for automatic flight control design; concepts
of stability; and trim and control augmentation functions.
0

AFC system architecture evolution; functional elements;


analog/digital function implementation; hardware
components: actuation; and design assurance methodology.
The various modes of AFCS and how full function/full
flight envelope AFCS evolved, including automatic landing
and FMS.
An overview of control systems theory, concepts, design
approaches, and analysis techniques.
Fly-by-wire system concepts; fundamentals in design for
handling qualities; and PI0 avoidance.

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IVT Course Orient&ion


l

How Will This


Course Help
You On the
Job?

A look at what is coming: future functionally integrated


designs and systems architectures.

At the end of this training session you will:


.

Have a background on the historical evolution of automatic


control systems and design practices.

0 Understand the basic functional architectures of automatic

control systems: How they are put together, what the


assumptions and groundrules are that can provide safe
operation, and what the limitations are.
0

What Topics
Does the
Course Cover?

Know where to look for automation design safetvd


vulnerabilities, using better insight in the control strategies
and design approaches employed.

The following topic outline is intended to give you an overview


of the course content. In addition to this outline, Appendix A
contains the visual presentation material used by the instruct01
during the broadcast.
I.

Historic perspective on the evolution of automatic flight


control systems

II.

FARs covering AFCS: What is and isnt covered

III.

Safety: Basic concepts and definitions and design


approaches

IV.

Manual airplane control, basic flight, and control


dynamics of conventional airplanes

V.

Stability and control augmentation, control theory


fundamentals

VI.

Automatic control modes

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IVT Course Orient&ion

What Are
Some Good
References?

VII.

Control algorithms functional structure, design


provisions

VIII.

Sensors, sensor information blending

IX.

Automatic landing, function, performance, design


implementation

X.

AFCS function hosting, system hardware architectures,


analog/digital computers, actuators

XI.

Design assurance strategies for hardware and software;


failure prevention/tolerance strategies; failure detection,
identification, and isolation

XII.

Fly-by-wire design concepts and issues

XIII.

Automation safety: issues with current state-of-the-art


AFCS design; design limitations; operational problems;
root causes

XIV.
xv .

Needed design standards improvements


Future functionallv d integrated designs and systems
architectures

The instructor has compiled the following references foi


automatic flight control systems.
Flight Controls. Concepts. and Methods, Lambregts, A. A.,
1996 Annual Report Netherlands Association of
Aeronautical Engineers (KNVL). Available from the
author.
Vertical Flight Path and Speed Control Autopilot Design Using
Total Energy Principles, Lambregts, A.A., AIAA paper
83- 2239 CP
Automation Safety: Needed Design Standards Improvements,
Lambregts, A.A., Presentation at the FAA LA DER
Seminar, September, 1998. Available from the author.

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I VT Course Orien tution


Elements of Airplane Performance, Ruijgrok, G.J.J., Delft
University Press, 1990.
Airplane Stability and Control, Abzug, Malcolm J. and
Larrabee, E. Eugene, Cambridge Aerospace Series, 1997.
Aircraft Dynamics and Automatic Control, McRuer, D.,
Ashkenas, I. and Graham, D., Princeton University Press,
1973.

Trends in Advanced Avionics, Cur-ran, Jim, Iowa State


University Press, 1992.
Aircraft Flight Control Actuation System Design, Raymond,
E.T., and Chenoweth, CC., SAE 15609 l-376-2.
Aviation Safety and Pilot Control-Understanding
and
Preventing Unfavorable Pilot Vehicle Interactions,
National Research Council, National Academic Press,
1997.

Accidents Direct Focus on Cockpit Automation, Aviation


Week, January30, 1995 and Studies Highlight
Automation Surprises, February 6, 1995.
Integrating Human Factors and Automation with Progress in
Aircraft Design and Flight Management, E. Tarnowski,
Airbus Industry, reprinted in Aviation Safety, pp 169- 187,
1997.

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Self-Assessmentand Exercises

III.

Self-Assessment and Exercises

Pre- & PostCourse SelfAssessment


Questions

The instructor will ask you at the begining and end of the
presentation to respond to the following five questions a.bout
. automatic flightcontrol systems.
Rate your confidence Levelfor each of the following statements
before and after completing the course.
1.

I know the basic AFCS certification regulations and


understand design concepts and failure protection
provisions needed for safety.
Very
Confident

BEFORE

THE

q
q

COURSE:
COURSE:

Moderately
Confident

q
q

Not
Confident

q
q

AFTER

THE

9
A.

I understand the basic AFCS modes of operational and


known safetv issues associated with the use of current
AFCS designs.
Very
Confident

BEFORE

THE

q
q

COURSE:
COURSE:

Moderately
Confident

q
q

Not
Confident

q
q

AFTER

THE

3.

I understand the basic AFCS design safety assurance


process, what tvpes of design analyses documentation
are needed for certifjcation, and where to find the
guidance materials.
Very
Confident

BEFORE
AFTER

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THE
THE

COURSE:
COURSE:

q
q

Moderately
Confident

q
q
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Not
Confident

q
q
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Self-Assessment & Exercises


4.

I can review, understand, and assessa complete


automatic flight control system description,
performance, and safety analysis documents that arrive
in the office for certification approval.
Very
Confident

BEFORE

THE

COURSE:
COURSE:

Moderately
Confident

Not
Confident

III

III

AFTER

THE

5.

I understand the weaknesses in the current AFCS designs


and know what operational safety aspects need to be
addressed in the planned regulation updates.
Very
Confident

BEFORE
AFTER

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THE
THE

COURSE:
COURSE:

ModerateI!
Confident

Not
Confident

cl

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---

Self-Assessment& Exercises
Job-Related
Exercises

After viewing the IVT broadcast with the support visuals in


Appendix A, complete the following questions to test your
knowledge about automatic flight control systems.
You can check your answers beginning on the page that
follows the questions.
1.

What do the regulations say about automatic control


a. Functions?
b. Modes / mode interactions?
c. Hosting of modes?
d. Use of control surfaces?
e. Performance?

3
-.

How does a conventional airplane respond to an elevator

control input?
3.

How does a conventional airplane respond to a throttle

control input?
4.

How did the functional use of elevator, and throttle for


certain automatic modes come about?

5.

What is the pre-requite condition for the autopilot to be


able to control flight path ? What will happen when this
requirement is not met?

6.

Can the autothrottle control speed unconditionally?

7.

What led to the development of the full flight regime


autothrottle?

8.

Name some of the recurrent complaints about autothrottle


designs.

9.

Why is the VNAV mode running into performance


problems when controlling to a predicted idle descent
path?

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Self-Assessment& Exercises
10. What is speed stability and why is there such a
requirement for manual airplane control?
11. What happens to speed stability when the autopilot path
mode is engaged? Is there an equivalent substitute for
speed stability?
12. What variable speed or altitude is the most critical to
control?
13. Which variable can be controlled faster, speed or altitude?
Why, how?
14. How is the autopilot stabilizer trim different than the pilot
trimming the stabilizer manually? What are the
consequences?
15. Which automatic control modes are considered flight
critical?
16. What are the underlying assumptions for the operational
safety of the non-critical automatic control modes?
17. Name key design provisions that are used to assure that no
single automatic control system failure, or combination of
failures not shown to be extremely improbable, can
prevent continued safe flight and landing.
18. What is a transfer function?
19. What is the significance of the denominator of the transfer
function?
20. What role does the numerator of the transfer function play
in the system stability and command response?
2.1. What design strategy is often used to alter the command
response without altering system stability?

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Self-Assessment& Exercises
22. An overshooting response to a step command is caused
by:
a) Low system damping.
b) Ill-conditioned numerator of the transfer functi,on.
c) Possibly both.
23. What design strategies may be employed to quicken the
response to a step command?
24. What design element is used to assure steady state
command tracking under a variety of trim conditions?
-35 . What possible design problems can be encountered when
using integral control of error feedback?
36. What non-linear control algorithm design elements are
often used? Why?
37. Whve is a pitch attitude command limit often ineffective as
a safety devise?
28. What has led to the recent questioning of the safety of
automation designs?
I?9 . Name five automation safety issues.
30. What is envelope protection?
31. What are some of the limitations of single-input/single
output control?
3?3-. Name some of the consequences of a not fullv4 automated
rudder?
33. What are possible advantages/disadvantages of a multiinput/multi-output control strategy?
34. What additional automatic control design elements are
needed to reduce critical dependency on the pilot for
operational safety?
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Self-Assessment& Exercises
Answers

1.

I.7

3.

Nothing about functions; nothing about modes;


inappropriate mode combinations should be locked out;
nothing about control mode hosting; nothing about the use
of control surfaces and performance; FAR 25.1309 states
that a system should be shown to perform its intended
function.
A conventional airplane responds in all three degrees of
freedom to an elevator control input: pitch angle, speed,
and flight path.
A conventional airplane responds in all three degrees of

freedom to a throttle control input: speed, flight path and


pitch angle.
4.

Flight path control (Altitude Hold/Select) autopilot


development using the elevator came first, next ILS glide
slope control; speed control on elevator were also
developed; tinallvI the approach speed control using the
throttles completed the first round of SISO flight control
automatic control modes in the vertical plane.

5.

The airplane must be on the positive slope part of the


speed-drag curve in order to provide sustainable flight
path control, without speed runaway. If, in the process of
controlling flight path the speed drops below the minimum
drag speed and the drag rises above the thrust, the
autopilot path control will tend to induce airplane stall.

6.

No. The control authority of the autothrottle is limited at


best to - .25 g (level flight), allowing active speed control
only as long as the autopilot path control keeps the flight
path angle within the steady state climb/descent
performance boundary. However, it is generally possible
to select autopilot vertical path commands (in principle 90
degrees vertical) that far exceed the needed thrust to
sustain speed.

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Self-Assessment& Exercises
7. The desire to fly at minimum drag speed in cruise, for best
fuel economy. At minimum drag speed, the airplane
becomes neutrally speed stable when the autopilot controls
the flight path, any flight path correction will result in a
corresponding speed deviation which tends not to self
correct, requiring high pilot workload by the pilot
manipulating throttles to control speed. The full-flight
regime autothrottle development was the answer to the
problem, but not the answer to the pilots prayer.
8.

Recurring complaints by pilots about autothrottles include:


a. Throttles are much too active, especially when there
is turbulence
b. Autothrottle does not maintain speed close enough,
especially on approach in turbulence and windshear
C.

Autothrottle is pretty dumb: it does not take airplane


energy situation into consideration

d. Autothrottle and autotpilot exhibit too much control


coupling, causing undesirable flight path, speed and
throttle gyrations after small disturbances 01
command inputs.
9.

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When thrust is .at the limit, the elevator can control either
flight path or speed, not both. At idle thrust the steady
state control of flight path by the elevator away from the
idle thrust flight path angle will cause large and
unacceptable deviations from the intended speed.
However? the elevator can be used to control the speed
without any restrictions, but the idle descent inertial flight
path angle will be affected by airplane weight,
configuration, and wind conditions.

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Self-Assessment& Exercises
10. Speed stability is the desirable characteristic of an airplane
to return to the trim speed when the control column is
slowly returned to neutral, after the airplane is first
maneuvered away from the trim speed by an initial
column input. Speed stability is required for safety during
manual control, to help keep the airplane within a safe
flying speed envelope.
11. When the autopilot path control mode is engaged speed
stability may be defeated, if the airplane is operated at or
below the minimum drag speed. The only compensating
safety strategy is to turn on the autothrottle speed control,
but even the autothrottle cannot always prevent a speed
run away if excessive flight path commands are selected.
l3A. It depends. Maintaining speed is essential for safe and
controllable flight. At low altitude obstacle clearance and
flight path control, to touchdown on the runway becomes
an equally important objective. For up and away flight,
maintaining the assigned altitude is an important safety
concept for safe air traffic control, but when caught in an
emergency (e.g., engine out), maintaining safe flying
speed is more important than maintaining assigned
altitude. In a life-threatening windshear close to the
ground, it is preferable to allow speed to bleed off to just
above stall in order to avoid or postpone hitting the
ground, but not further, because a stall close to the ground
virtually assures a crash.
13

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Speed and altitude are both energy-related quantities that


can be changed equally fast (in relative energy level) by
the throttles. At constant thrust the use of the elevator
changes altitude and speed in equal and opposite quantity,
in terms of energy level change (no net energy change).

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Self-Assessment& Exercises
14. The autopilot trims when the flight path control algorithm
computes a continuous command that is greater than a
certain threshold, therefore, it will continue to trim even if
the power setting for the airplane is wrong to sustain the
commanded flight path. As a result, the airplane can end
up far out of trim relative to the intended speed. The pilot,
on the other hand, trims the airplane to trim the control
forces to zero for the intended speed he wants to fly. This
means that when the airplane departs the trim speed, the
pilot will need to hold a control force to keep the airplane
at a speed away from the trim speed. This is a safety
feature so the airplane will naturally return to the trim
speed if the pilot relaxes his control force.
15. Only the Category III automatic landing function is
considered flight critical, because in that case the pilot
cannot be expected to provide adequate backup for a
failure of the automatic flight path control function and
assure continued safety of flight and landing.
16. The underlying assumption for the safety of the noncritical
flight control functions is that the pilot can and will
correct any failure or malfunction of the automatic flight
control system, to assure continued safe flight and landing.
This implies that at least one of the crew-members must
monitor the operation of the AFCS continuously. Another
assumption is that the crew will operate the AFCS
correctly and within its intended flight and performance
envelope.
17. Limited-control authority (e.g. 1 g); split control surfaces;
parallel redundant functional paths; fail passive/fail
operational design concepts; in-line performance
monitoring/failure detection, identification and isolation.

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Self-Assessment& Exercises
18. A transfer function is a mathematical function describing
the dynamic time-dependent relationship between control
input and a specific control state variable output.
19. The denominator of the transfer function describes the
characteristics of the dynamic modes of the system in
terms of natural frequency and damping.
20. The numerator of the transfer function does not affect the
stability of the system dynamics, but plays a very
important role in the dynamic response characteristics of
the system to a command input.
21. The command response of a system can be changed
without affecting system stability by certain
rearrangements of the feed forward command paths and by
adding feed forward command augmentation functions.
33
--.

C. Possiblvd both.

33 .

Feedforward signal command paths, emanating from a


suitable response model, fed into the corresponding state
feedback loops.

34. Integral control of the outer loop error feedback is often


used to assure steady state tracking of the command for a
variety of trim conditions.
25. Integral control of outer loop error feedback will add a
low frequencv control mode; it tends to destabilize the
existing modes; if no special design implementation
provisions are made, integral control can add a zero in the
numerator of the transfer function of interest, causing a
whiplash command overshoot characteristic.

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26. Non-linear design elements often used in control elements


include:
a. Signal amplitude limiters (e.g., pitch or bank angle
command limit).
b. Rate limiters -- to slow down or smooth out control
responses.
c. Mode switches with associated mode logic (e.g., to
control the capture and tracking sub modes of a
control algorithm).
-37 . A pitch attitude command signal limit is often ineffective
and sometimes dangerous because:
a. Such a limit is often placed on a proportional control
innerloop, where there is no assurance the error signal
between the command and the feedback will go to
zero, because of steady state control surface trim
requirements and other non-zero steady state
feedback signals downstream of the command-limited
control loop.
b. It is verv difficult to dynamically compute a correct
pitch attitude limit based angle of attack and flight
path angle performance limits, because of turbulence
and wind effects.
c. An arbitrary static limit may not prevent stall or allow
available performance extraction under all possible
flight conditions.

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Self-Assessment& Exercises
38. A string of catastrophic accidents and incidents involving
automatic flight control systems and crew-systems
interfaces:
a. A320 accidents near Strasbourg and Habsheim
b. A330 accident near Toulouse
c. B747 incident of spiral dive over Pacific
d. B737 shutdown of remaining good engine
e. A300 accident neat Nagoya
f. A310 accident near Bucharest
g. Etc.
39. Significant automation safety issues include:
a. Autopilot flight path control without consideration of
available performance (thrust) and effect on speed.
b. Loss of speed control due to lack of control priority
strategy when thrust reaches limit.
C.

Autopilot flight path control causing speed bleed


down to stalrwithout warning or timely disengage.

d. Lack of disengage logic for condition of imminent


control authority limiting, causing function failure.
e. Crew difficulty in judging adequacy of system
performance due to control strategy that differs from
the manual control strategy.
f. Operational complexity making it difficult for the
crew to maintain situation awareness.
30. Envelope protection 1sa aeslgn provtston to assure mat tne
airplanes speed, bank angle and normal acceleration will
remain within the safe operational envelope.

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25

Self-Assessment& Exercises
3 1. Limitations of single-input/single output control strategy
include:
a. Undesirable control coupling
b. Unnecessary high controller activity
c. Loss of control when controller authority limit is
reached
d. Lower performance
e. Possible violations of envelope limits not directly
controlled by SISO mode (spill over)
32. The incomplete automation of the rudder means that the
pilot must be vigilant to provide dynamic compensating
for asymmetric thrust. The autopilot must be turned off in
case of an engine failure and the pilot must manually
retrim the rudder before he can re-engage the lateral
autopilot. Difficulty of trimming sideslip to zero,
especially in asymmetric trust or lateral imbalance
conditions (no sideslip instrument).
33. Advantages of multi input-multi output control strategy:
a. Precise control command coordination to achieve
decoupled command responses
b. Lower gains, higher/smoother performance, better
design robustness (gain/phase margins)
c. Better control/design strategies providing more
functionality with simpler more generalized design,
e.g. flight and performance envelope protection based
on control priority and control authority allocation,
inherent engine out dynamic compensation and
automatic rudder re-trim.

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1999

Flight Control

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26

Self-Assessment& Exercises
34. To reduce critical dependence on pilot to assure safety of
automatic flight systems, future designs will need:
a. More general mimo control strategies.
b. A generalized reusable functional architecture that
allows up-front integration of modes using standard
building blocks.
c. Built-in performance/flight envelope protection
functions, covering all modes.
d. Fully automated rudder, providing inherent functions
of yaw damper/turn coordination, asymmetric thrust
compensation, automatic rudder trim, etc.
e. Better performance and failure monitoring with
suitable system state annunciation and timely
automatic disengage, if needed.

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27

Appendix A

Appendix A

Automatic Flight Control Systems


Presentation Visuals

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Flight Control

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A

Appendix A

AUTOMATIC FLIGHT
CONTROL
FUNDAMENTALS
Anthony A. Lambregts
National Resource Specialist
Advanced Controls

1.
23..
.$
b;:b .
*l&; 2.
*G= :;p
h
3.
5$@id
.v;..

Historic perspective
on the evolution of
automatic flight control systems (AFCS)
FARs covering

AFCS:

What is/isnt

Safety: Basic concepts


design approaches

covered

& definitions

and

4. Manual airplane control, basic flight and


control dynamics of conventional
airplanes
5. Stability and control
theory fundamentals

augmentation,

control
2

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Course
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Automatic
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1999

Flight Control

Systems
Al

Course
6. Automatic

Outline,
control

cont.

modes

7. Control algorithms
design provisions

functional

structure,

8. Sensors, sensor information


blending
(c,~
.
<i;b
b:,
$+@
III
9. Automatic
landing, function,
q-g-.
performance,
design implementation

:?> 10. AFCS function


a,
51
?h
f,A
-,;
.
architectures
a:+;;
2
1-q
*-
Analog/digital
Actuators

hosting,

system

hardware

computers

11. Design assurance strategies


and software
Failure prevention/tolerance
l

Failure detection,

12. Fly-by-Wire

identification

design

concepts

for hardware
strategies
and isolation

and issues
A

IVT;SeIf-Study
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1999

Flight Control

Systems
A2

Appendix A

13. Automation
safety: Issues with current
state of the art AFCS designs
l

Design

limitations;

Root causes

14. Needed design


52
a, . 1;9
b&.
h
.L...
%.@<.
7I

operational

standards

problems

improvements

15. Future functionally


integrated
and systems architectures

designs

s Historic Piecemeal Evolution


of Automated Functions
&

+ 1909: Wright stabilizer


:+ 1920: Sperry attitude

patent
stabilization

y&a
,I + 1930: Speed and heading angle modes
+ 1930 - 1960: Continued automation

34,

%
:p
&.

Elevator;

ailerons;

+ 1960s:

Fully automated

liil
... 1980s:

Flight management
system

rudder;

throttles

flight control
computer
6

IVTSelf-Study
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I999

Flight Control

Systetns
A3

Append.. A
&@p
*4 t: .

Traditional
Pitch Autopilot
and Autothrottle

Autothrottle
I----------,,---,
I---------e-----m,
I
Autopilot
I
I

5,
y*
@CT.,
I,
$C&.
$3.r&,
I
;&
+,
$&$I

c+l+
I

-j

Elevator
I Control

j
i

:
I

Actuator

;T.cl
I

I
I

I
I
---a-------_-----

j??

Airplane

;
1 I
I

*cum;; .,
:

$?.
A:+& I
1/i> -I

Traditional

i Outerloop

Roll Autopilot

Modes

IVT Self-Stud\: Course


Federal Aviation Authority

Automatic
January.

1999

Flight Control

Systems
A4

Appendix A
&$p
9& ,

FARs and ACs Affecting


Automatic

Flight Control Systems

FAR 25.1329 and FAR 23.1329 - Automatic


AC 25.1329-IA - Automatic
(being revised)

Pilot Systems

Pilot
Approval

+ AC 23.1329-2 - Automatic Pilot Systems


,J+ Installations
in Part 23 Airplanes
+ AC 20-57 - Automatic Landing Systems (ALS)
+c+ AC 120-29 - Criteria for approval of Category I and
Category II landing Minima for FAR 121 Operations
f&J<,
I
kg&T.
L,;y.
/_
(being revised)
:a
y-g+
i
9

FARs and ACs Affecting

+
S.
3
:;;~>a
;$,&;:r
~,
g&:
+
?-A
p+ +

AC 120-28C - Criteria for approval of Category Ill


WeatherMinima
(being revised)
AC 90-45 - A - Flight Management Systems
FAR 25.671 - Control Systems (basic mechanical
system requirementsjam,
etc)
+ FAR 25.777 and FAR 23.777 - Cockpit Controls
+ FAR 25.779 and FAR 23.777 - Motion and Effect of
Cockpit Controls
+ FAR 25.673 and FAR 25.675- Static longitudinal
stability; demonstration
+ FAR 25.177 - Static lateral stability
l( )

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Flight Control

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A5

Appelzdix A

FARs and ACs Affecting


AFCS, cont.
+ FAR 25.181 - Dynamic Stability
+ FAR 25.629 - Aeroelastic
stability
+
>I,.
-$zps
2
.CSF,
%W..,
yf>r
I::;
$>.&-f;
+
+%%:g:
_,
c..
$,$b
,*
&$,
*rc*
*(
h
g*
$.;
,;Y,?.
Z*/
.
+

requirements

FAR 25.672 - Stability Augmentation


and
Automatic and Power-Operated
Systems
FAR 25.1309 and FAR 23.1309 - Equipment,
Systems and Installations
AC 25.1309-IA - Systems
(being revised)

Design and Analyses

+ AC 23.1309-18
- Equipment Systems and
Installations
in Part 23 Airplanes (being revised)
11

g;sp
T6,

3%Selected

SAE and RTCA

x.
_ + SAE ARP 4761 - Safety Assessment
$0
+&:+ SAE ARP 4754 - Certification
Considerations
for
,,
F$.r,
Highly Integrated
or Complex Aircraft Systems
a$.
_ 3% + SAE ARP 4975 - Autoflight
ry2
Guidance System
$;s;
&,
I
P&g-:
;,ci
._;-:,
(Autoflight)
Issues Discussion
(draft)

+ SAE ARP 5366 - Autopilot, Flight Director,


Autothrust
Systems (draft)

and

+ RTCA I DO -1788 - Software Considerations


in
Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification
12

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Flight Control

Systems
A6

AppendiMvA
@p
S-p?-,@,,;

FAR 25.1329 & 23.1329

Have quick disconnect


Not produce hazardous
flight path deviations
-During
-As

normal

- for both pilots


loads or

use

a result of malfunction
13

FAR 25.1329 & 23.1329

lb
7$?.
h .lP
~~~;
I,
$39
I%.
g51
;Q,h
<@y:,&.,:.
y&y

Have positive interlocks


improper operation

to prevent

Have protection against adverse


interaction due to malfunction
Not produce multiple
due to single failure

axes hardover

Provide mode indication,


switch position

other than
1A

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Flight Control

S>.stems
A7

Appendix A

and autopilot

at all times

and corrective
l

action

Longitudinal
- Climb, cruise, descend:
3 seconds
-Low approaches:
1 second

I_
j&p
h-p-,
@g+
h
&c&.1*
;ry:,y
*?-

&

Lateral/directional

or maneuvering

AC 2513294A
q;,:,.
-, + Malfunction
yp2.
!&>,
I
Evaluate
i&g
l

2:.k./
g+-.
I
@&;
-%Gi
:.-I

flight

& 23.1329-2

test must

cumulative effects on one axis


due to any single signal
Evaluate cumulative effects on all axes
due to any single signal
Not result in dangerous dynamic
conditions
of flight path deviations,
speed and attitudes (23.1329):

Gi!*
i

IVTSelf-Study
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January.

1999

Flight Control

Systems
A8

Appendix A
-,c

9,.

AC 25.1329~IA
-.1
g?$.
!Gh
I

+ Malfunction
l

& 23.1329-2

test must

Evaluate oscillatory failures


frequencies
> .2 cps
Evaluate hardovers
feedback loop

for

due to open

Demonstrate recovery by over


powering or quick disconnect

&@,$.~
-t/J.
;. !I
:I+:Forces

for pitch, roll, yaw respectively


-%Qc 50, 30, 150 Ibs
$3
$Iy;
f<h
k::>
b$$.
Loads during malfunction
test and recovery
l

.a;P
$7
2&f;
I,
I
&,;L
%;$;

must not exceed structural limits, or An, = +I


unless analysis shows adequate structural
margins
Demonstrate
adequate annunciation
of
automatic disconnect
by aural warning (23.1329)
Demonstrate
intended function for
- All intended maneuvers
- Environmental
conditions,

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including

turbulence

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A9

Appendix A

+ For automatic
l

pilot instrument

Demonstrate lateral deviation due to


engine failures less than 3 deglsec,
with no hazardous attitudes
Demonstrate
-Vertical
-Altitude

satisfactory

deviation profile (coupled)


loss (uncoupled)
19

+ AC 25.1329~IA & 23.1329-2


+ AC 25.1329~IA - Being rewritten
:x;
,;P
#j&,
I + AC 23.1329-2
f@g;
.
i%
*%- Last rewritten in March 1991
0 _ Z.77
$&>.
I
i~jp~
l

--,.
^

More detail than AC 25.1329-IA


Spells out alternate means for
compliance with requirement to
demonstrate/evaluate
malfunctions
designs using electronic monitors
control authority limiting devices

for
or
20

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--

.-

Appemliv A
@p
+.;

FAR 25.1309 & 23.1309

::+:Equipment, systems and


installations
must be designed
so that failure conditions
Preventing continued safe flight and
landing will be extremely improbable

kr
c &
pj$--sI
-Q>
I.&
I%+&;
I
p&$
*
:J.
;;r
;p
3%
1
,4,.
&:,;I

. Reducing crews ability to cope with


adverse operating conditions will be
improbable
21

FAR 25.1309 & 23.1309

;p
&&I
g:$$
y!-*
i

+ Equipment, systems and installations


must be designed to
l

Perform

intended

Provide

warning

function
of unsafe operating

conditions

Minimize crew errors due to controls,


monitoring
and warning means
Minimize hazard on single engine airplanes
due to probable malfunctions
Prevent hazards on multiengine
due to probable malfunctions

airplane
22

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Flight Control

Systems
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Appendix A

$9 ;+iCompliance

must

&*

I-&
,A

Be shown

by analysis

or test

Consider probability of failure modes,


multiple failures, undetected failures
Consider effects on airplane
occupants

and

Consider detectability
of faults, crew
warning cues, corrective actions
9-3

4.,
..9-

+
T.,
,.:.:
c:!..,
r3;F
,:,
i?,. +
,-I.
w:h.
u,y
:
g;:;;
j;.
-*;,*:
1
(.
>.
&;;
.,,r
P
I&y:>::i&dw$~
+
Lb
I *
~g.$
w>s&..
&l i2

4$::

IVT.SeIf-Stud\:
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Defines FAIL-SAFE

design concept

Provides definition of terms


(catastrophic,
major, minor failure
conditions,
associated probabilities)
Provides compliance guidelines
based on system complexity

Automatic
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1999

Flight Control

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Appenclix A

Summary,

cont.

+I:Defines acceptable design analyses


techniques, including
l

Functional

Hazard Analysis

Required qualitative and quantitative


safety analysis for various failure
categories and system complexity,
considering
environmental
conditions,
latent failures
25

it:+
AC 25-l 309-l B & 23.1309-l
I.,
0:*Provides warning guidelines
.A
4,
I<..
*:.-:
,:;;:-,
~.
h systems, controls, monitors,
Y.:6
-+f+:
la.)h L$.
Unsafe operating conditions
@
@T;$;
: I~

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for

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Flight Control

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Appendix A

Whats

NOT in FARs

flight control
l

Definition

of functions

or modes

Minimum required set of functions


Partitioning
of functions
between
automatic flight control sub-systems
-

.:<p

system

Autopilot
Autothrottle
Flight management
system
Primary and secondary flight

displays
27

Whats

NOT in FARs

(.&.+ Performance requirements


,
+ System integration requirements
,:$5
l

::3>
2
l

Operations concept: how should


mode and mode display function
Regulations

or guidelines

each

about

-Mode overlap
-Crew- machine interfaces
Hardware architecture/redundancy

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Appemlix A

Whats

::+Specific

NOT in FARs

automation

safety

Lock out of incompatible

modes

Mixed manual and automatic

modes

- Pitch / roll control


-Pitch / throttle control
-;-.. :.y
ifi;+:
@~~;:~
I,
Q&,
.y.

- Roll I yaw control

Thrust limited climb/descent


performance envelope protection

Whats NOT in FARs


and ACs?, cont. .

h*$&,p6%
IIi:
ci;.
:,
&.;,f.X
L,,a,,
&?Ati
III +
*.&J
.>
pii !$?a
.i;<
r/
$,h
9:
b-:
IVTSelf-Study
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Maneuver

Performance

limits for normal operation


and failure monitoring

Mode reversion and automatic


disengage criteria

Automatic

System disengage

system

I manual trim operation


on pilot take over
30

Automatic
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1999

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S>rstetns
Al5

Appendix A
-..

Design

Safety:

Definitions

impact on safety or ability of flight crew


f:+Major Failure Condition:
Significant
reduction in safety margin and/or ability
of flight crew to cope; higher workload or
physical distress
continued

safe flight and landing


31

Design Safety:
Definitions.
cont.
(FHA):
h,-.+Functional Hazard Assessment
*L
,
:+>

High
level
system
examination;
classifies
:A_,
g$$
;;:+:
Q&
).
t
effects of functional failures, determines
?T
:4h 3 need and scope of additional analyses
$:;F);2..
$+~$%
*.,$G
*I!
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis:
Structured inductive analysis; describes
failure of function, component, mechanism,
effects on system and safety of aircraft

32

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Appendix A

Design Safety:
Definitions. cont.
. i:+:Fault Tree or Reliability Block Diagram
Analysis:
Structured top-down analysis;
identifies all contributing
faults and
probabilities
to determine overall
probability of defined failure condition
iq$$$$ ,:-,
-2, +. .

+ Redundancy:
Presence of more than one
independent
means for accomplishing
given function or flight operation
33

Design Safety:
Basic ConceMs

failures not shown to be extremely improbable,


@ will prevent continued safe flight and landing
&E;;
h
ifgrg?J;
(AC 25 13294A paraphrased)
1-

: Fail passive:

System will disconnect

for any

single failure that interferes with its intended


function, without significantly
reducing pilots
ability to cope with the resulting situation and
continue safe flight and landing

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Flight Control

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Appendix A

::+iFail operational:
System will continue
to perform its function, without pilot
assistance or actions, after any single
shown to be extremely improbable
Critical function:
Function whose failure
would prevent the continued safe flight
and landing of an airplane (AC 23.13094 B)

35

Design Safety:
::+Essential

function:

Function

cope with adverse


(AC 23.1309-I B)

operating

whose failure
conditions

3
fik;;
g&h
&,v.
Y +. Extremely improbable:
Probability
occurrence < I* 10 E-9
Improbable:
occurrence
Probable:

of

I*10 E-5< probability


c I*10 E-9
Probability

of

of occurrence

>I*10

E-5
36

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A18

Appendix A

+ Flight Critical
::+iNon-flight
functions

- CAT III autoland

Critical

- All other automated

+ Limited control authority is used to


assure that pilot can cope with any
failure of the non-flight critical
automation functions

Qyp:7!;
-4,G: I...

Flight Critical / Non-flight


Critical Design, cont.

,,

-+ Pilots have full burden of operational


safety for non-flight critical
automation functions
+ Operational
l

Correct

safety depends

on

use in normal operation

Correct pilot response if unsatisfactory


operation is encountered
38

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A19

Appejz dik A

f:+.:Fail-safe

provisions

Redundant load paths


In-line monitoring
and disconnect

+ Redundancy

of functional

elements

Dual with

- Equal force authority--fail


- Comparison

monitor

passive

to disconnect

and alert pilot

Triple or dual-dual

- Detection,

identification,

elimination

of faulty

element
39

8; p&q
v.&y$
_*

R Basic Design Approaches

for

Sizing of individual actuator force and servo


torque capability, e.g., lg single channel A/P
Splitting of control surfaces
pilot override capability of A/P & A/T
* Control algorithm G-limit, e.g., Fly-by-wire
airplanes

+ Placarding (operating restrictions)


+ Flight envelope monitoring
l

Stall, VmolMmo warning


Envelope protection for automatic

modes
40

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A20

Appendix A

y = Flight Path Angle


m = Aircraft Mass

w/g

* v 5=TCOS~ - D - WSiny

Weight

L - Wcosy + Tsina

Level Flight Thrust And Drag

peed

Neutral Stability
42

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Automatic Flight Control Systems


A21

Appendix A

Longitudinal

Control

IF: (T - D)/W = Constant

energy

distribution

between

altitude

L = C, l/Z - vz,,

*s

C,= c/ -+c -a ; 1/2-P- V&7


(1

"
M

.a+v

..&I

41
G
P

1/2-P,,- v2,

c;
=F

& speed

= Lift coefficient
= Air density

pr1 = Air density


sea level

at

1
/ Vtrue= True airspeed
S

= Wing span

Ve

= Equivalent
airspeed
44

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A33
--

Appendk A

On Vertical Speed
Ymax

T max

hi mas

Down

py .,., xl.<, 1
-7&V
i
Ij.

Flight

Path Control

+: At constant throttle, autopilot


@ induces speed deviation
l

flight

idle

Using

path control

If speed stays above Vneutra,stability , speed tends to


recover naturally
If speed drops below Vneutra,stability , autopilot tends to
drive airplane into stall, unless pilot manages power

; At idle power, controllability


of a predicted idle
S : descent path through elevator is very poor
l

*,,I-?-,

Speed tends to diverge as result of flight path control,


the fundamental
reason for difficulties
experienced
in
VNAV idle descents

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46

January, I999

Automatic Flight Control Systems


A23

Appemh A

peed Control:
7~~~
-Rq.p*<
;* 1., %
4 @, T :

Observations

+j To maintain speed, Thrust controlled to


compensate for changes in FIight Path Angle
and Drag
Drag smallest of terms; drag changes often

negligible,
except due to flaps, gear, and
spoilers
..+:iElevator/stabilizer
sized to provide pitch and
trim control over entire flight envelope;
&
autopilot path control authority using elevator
p$&
%X@; far exceeds available thrust necessary to
&7 maintain speed

Yq,,
I

A7

@j;?
d A- Therefore,
?F.
&
i,I,
conditional
&;>
riv,:g,
,;*;,

autothrottle
speed control
on pilot or autopilot not
performance limit

is

:!S.. exceeding
$$%?*
.>T~$,
I
ff:
&+;Q:
- autothrottle
&i$,
*::I
1, + Fixed elevator/stabilizer
speed control may be unstable due to
positive thrust pitching moments

48

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A24

Appendix A

Flight Path and Speed


,<
. +
A!

Using elevator to control flight path at


constant power setting does not always
work

:.+:Autopilot path control


speed stability

defeats

basic

;:+Using thrust to control speed will not


work satisfactorily
unless elevator
control is active

Flight Path and Speed


Control:
Conclusions,
cont.
@iip&j~:,
4. ii. Pilot must play a crucial safety
p .
p-&
during mixed manual/automatic
II
g&$
TC
Cf

role

operations

+: Elimination of operational and safety


limitations
in future designs will
require integrated flight path and
speed control with control priority for
limit thrust conditions and speed
envelope protection
50

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A25

Appemiix A

Lateral Directional
Static Equations

cosp

7G
g;;*>,:
$@;

Sideslip

. .I0

=P

=0

Lateral Directional Static


Equations, cont.
Static
Side Slip
Weight

$$s T,+T,

= Drag

Fyr=

FY,

Current

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LcOsq = Weight
F yf = Lsinv
M,

autopilots

do not control

= Mg
sideslip

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(I
47

Flight Control

Systems
A26

Appendix A
g@g

ub
,99

Lateral Directional

Static
View from Rear

P
Weight
1 Drag

= Lsinq

Fyt-xt
= T, -Ye
Current

= Weight

autopilots

do not trim the rudder


53

g+-:q$$;y
* ^j

,::@.
; Airplane Dynamic Model &
f%
4gp$,
.;,:l
State Variables
,I_

:p State variables describe linear (u,v,w) and angular


( v, 0, p ) and
@. % (p, q, r) velocities, orientation
I
p&f>>
position
(X,
Y,
Z)
of
airplane
relative
to specific
-,>q,?
reference coordinate systems
;3
$
IA
:t*+.J
3.
+ Three coordinate systems are used:
I
B
@&+z.
%&?.I
i>
1. Earth-fixed,
arbitrary coordinate
center
2. Airplane-fixed,
coordinate
center at cg (airplane
body axes), used for u,v,w and p,q,r
3. Airplane cg-centered,
axes aligned with initial
airplane velocity components
relative to airmass

~8:X, Y, Z (latitude, longitude, altitude):


airplane
position relative to earth reference system

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A27

Appendix A

axes:

X, Y, Z

Final aircraft body


axes: X, ,Y, , Z,
55

Kinematic

Relationshi

V = (r cosp +q sin p) lcos0


Q=qcosp-rsiny
Q =p+ y+sinQ

56

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Flight Control

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A28

Appendix A

1.

- nl( -q

w + r v) - \\

-I,,)

r.p

sin 0. cos V,

+I,,

.(r

-p)

- ni( -p 1 --q .u) +-\\ ~0s U~cos V

-(I,,.

-I,, ) .q .r I,,

+m(-r.u

6.

+p.w)

.(I+ p .q)

+W .cosO.sin

Izz t = ~J1z~,,,,-,,,,,,
+(I,, -I,! ) I) c(+I,, O-cl .r)
57

Stability to Body Axes


Transformation
;:+Aerodynamic
:> Axes System

forces defined

+ Equations of motion
% Axes System

defined

in Stability
in Airplane

!I+Stability to body axes transformation


5@ requires angle of attack (a) and side slip (p)
a= angle between X, axis and plane formed by

$b
:

airplane

velocity

vector

and Y, axis

p= angle between X, axis and plane formed


airplane velocity vector and 2, axis

by
58

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A29

Appendix A

Stability to Body Axes


cont.
Transformation.
<+iAccelerations
Therefore:
velocitv
irmass

always

inertial

Integrated
referenced

acceleration
and inertial

I$J+..
+v U V
c =air
l

39..1.
1&yr
tjv:;:
.-;:

t@@$;;

= air

= inertial
velocities

+ tsind

wind

(earth referenced)

Wair

wind

wind

9 Wwind

in earth axes)

W,,,ind

:* I

Angle of Attack and

W air

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A30

Appen dik A

Control

Force and Moment


Dependencies

&q&VT

and propulsive
forces and
yw. + Aerodynamic
2x+.
,
moments generally non-linear functions of
kI;&:,
$+
.-.
basic state variables and control inputs
,>*,1
If force and moment dependency
functions
defined and all airplane states and control
inputs given, total sum of force and moments
can be calculated
In that case, these nonlinear equations solved
by numerical integration
techniques
using
digital computers,
assuming initial aircraft
states also given

For analysis, often necessary to linearize


equations of motions
In many cases, particularly
for commercial
aircraft with relatively low maneuver rates,
terms involving products of perturbation
states
are small relative to other terms; may be
neglected without appreciably
affecting resulting
dynamics characterization

For example:
l
l
l

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eq. 1: vr and qw
eq. 2: rp and r2, p2
eq. 3: pv

l
l
l

eq. 4: qr and pq
eq. 5: pw
eq. 6: pq and qr

Autotnatic
Januaq : I999

Flight Control

Systems
A3 I

Appendix A

::::Linearization
Change
specific
l

of Equations,

cont.

in force or moment/unit
change of
state variable called stability derivative

Derivatives X,,, X,,, X(,, X0 denote changes


along the X axis due to u, n, q,Q.
Derivatives
defined for all state variable
of force and moments equations

Assume

Divide eq. 3 & 5 through

Divide each equation

of forces
dependencies

vfI, wI!, po, qn, r, are zero and u = 1~ +

Result: linearized
y$j&+ eq. 5 in p, p
l

by rt,; neglect

by leading

equations

Au

A 1r.q and

mass or inertia

Au.r

factor

with eq. 3 in LZ,LZ and

r
P

b,, ...
... bZ2

Form:

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Flight Control

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A32

Appendix A

yielding
+ Controls
executed

aircraft

motion

time history

&AT = j&l (t) and 6,& = f;r,.,.,(t) may be


manually or automatically

unaugmented
airplane to understand
how to
improve responses by feedback and sometimes
feedforward
control augmentation
and how
65

Unaugmented
State equations
l

$J$.
@&v,
,s$w
i
@.;
>yPh
.:jq-

i = /A/

Airplane
l

x + /B/

ti

A (state transition)
matrix elements reveal
many of the dynamic system properties

B (control)

matrix determines
effectiveness
of each controller to influence each degree
of freedom
Larger off-diagonal
SD is relative to
on diagonal SD, more modes are
cross coupled
66

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Appemk A

Longitudinally
- determined by cr,,(Cm,)
Lateral-dir. - determined by ~(Cnp)

*+ Dynamic Stability:
See FAR23125181
Means that modes describing
dynamic system behavior have
positive damping
l

67

Linear Control Analvses


+ To conduct linear analyses on aircraft
responses for given control input requires
formation of specific transfer function of
,j&
vjgj&.
interest
!Ii
,p.

&%
y%
&$I
.

j$g+ Transfer function defines


output relationship

control

input to

& + Specific input to output transfer function


may be formed applying Cramers rule to
equations of motion, or by matrix algebra

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A34

App enclix A

:T Linear Control Analyses,


l

Example:

AU
-

=
6,

e&-ff$Yr
ct[e.

f$& s@
h
t$@.
%.%,t
hp..
;c+
:I~gbg&
$r&
*<
h
!
r&.1;;
Tzw

v. ;
*c;

$$
j:Ev;;,<
,
-&.:
(4
F1p*
.I&;<
I

(polynomial
characteristic

cont.

in s)/h,
polynomial

in S

S is LaPlace operator, signifying


differentiation
(numerator)
or integration (denominator)
of
state variable with respect to time. Powers of
S signify successive differentiations
or
integrations
Numerator and denominator
polynomials
may
be factored into lSf and 2nd order elements,
yielding real and complex conjugate roots of
69

Denominator
roots called poles; poles also
referred to as eigenvalues
of system
Denominator
polynomial
(characteristic
polynomial)
is same for any transfer function
and determines natural frequency (03~) and
stability
(damping, < ) of system dynamic modes
Numerator roots called zeros; zeros only
affect time response shape, not stability

70

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A35

Appendix A

dynamic
l

behavior

of an aircraft:

Eigenvalues / poles and zero location in


complex plane; each real or complex pole pair
characterizes
a dynamic mode of airplane

. Root locus
l

Time response

simulation

. Bode or frequency
l

response

plots

Bode plots gain and phase margins/Nichols

charts
71

+ Computer control analyses


programs available to quickly
$9 perform any desired analysis
!Pt&
h
g$t?,
- MATLAB
I?G.
- MATRIX X, etc.

72

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AX

Appendix A

Unagmented

Characteristic

polynomial

qfh order in S

Factoring and rooting CP yield two 2nd


order rigid body dynamic modes

- Short period:
hp
Y
:r;
h
ay
c
:q,~
t+>

Airplane

- Phugoid
q=o-.I

cc)0 = h .5 - 1 seconds,

or long period:

Order of TF numerator
specific TF

L?+fP

<= .3 - .7

m 0 = -30 - 60 seconds,

depends

on
73

Unagmented
General Dynamic

Airplane

Characteristics,

cont.

.22++Lateral directional

Characteristic
yielding

polynomial

- Is order Roll mode

z = I/U

qfh order,
= -I

set

- lst order Spiral mode z = I/w = -10 -03 set


1) Mode sometimes
- Dutch Roll mode

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unstable

T, = 10 -m set

,wO= - S-10 set, c = 0 - .3

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A37

Appendix A

Location of pole in complex plane indicates


natural frequency cc)0and damping < of mode
a

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=I

Short Period
i Imaginary
..... .. . ...__.....
ijw
I 4

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Flight Control

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A38

Appendix A

Imaginary

Characteristics

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of

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Flight Control

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A39

Appendix A

Transter

Function

Elements

,p-. Bode Plots (frequency


inteqrator:
(low pass)

1
S

differentiator:
(high pass)

1.0

gain
(W

(d b-*() z
+

y?@ Transfer

-20
t
phase +go
degr.
0

w radlsec

Function

T.7,

Bode Plots (frequency

f3 radkec

Elements
response),

washout:
(high pass)
0

gLin
NW
t

= -

t +*O/

t +*O\
gain 0

t
phase
(degr.)

response)

cont.

- r, S
: s+l

-20

\
+

CI) radlsec

phase0
Wegr.) 1.
-90 --------.L
+

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A40

Appendix A
iggg;;
2

Transfer
-troae . Plots
rr. .

lead-lag.

Function

Elements

(frequency

response),

-&!cond
order
2 S+4ead-lag:

s2 + 2<,w, s + 0:
s2 + 2<202s

II)

tcu radlsec

+ 0;

+2

gain
w
phise +g() _--___.__
--------_
degr.
0-

cont.

phase
degr.

o
z
+mr

lad/set

-1 -1

rl rz
n egative

@I w,l

z, or c, changes

sign of num. phase


01

/, .,/

01

I
is
:.,
I
.k*
Transfer
:A
,_
,,.

Function

Analyses

&Sk.
&y+
+-&.:z
P
.&G
I.. + Given transfer function for unaugmented or
e*;
byfor augmented airplane, approximate
gain
9;~
cL..:* and
~>A
kQ&
phase plots may be sketched using break
%B&frequencies
i!&,<y.
q$&.

and asymptote

method

t!, + Computer programs quicker and more


necessary
9 accurate, but basic understanding
I%&
I J, for good control law design work
G&yI
@c
Negative z:or 6 in numerator - non-minimum
phase response (initial response opposite
-I

-,

I
(IL

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A41

Appendix A

Unaugmented

Airplane

Observations

Basic airplane
Weight,

design

configuration

center of gravity,

Speed, altitude,

math

moments

of inertia

number

ne has unacceptable
HQ, may be
possible to improve characteristics
by stability/
command augmentation
83

Y~,$
::+.Stability augmentation
- way to externally
I&,
,,%?i,
hI ac*alter certain natural internal feedback s
t$::,:

%
(stability derivative) of airplane dynamic
T&
model
%&,
I
@+k
tr$y+
9;.
:.FPure feedback of existing aircraft states will
not change order of dynamic airplane model
Addition of dynamic elements in feedback
loops will change order of airplane dynamic
model
84

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A42

Stability augmentation
sometimes used
to restore stability to desired level after
design configuration
and/or operations
decisions result in poor stability of
unaugmented
airplane

*.)*
1,.
*Ii!;a,,.
h
.<a,,,
+&f
L,2
-+-tqq
W
*
&I;,*
+@
h + Issue: Control authority and priority
i&&g
*.*_
L.
between SAS and pilot control

of+%
$9
Relationship
&z,,.

Open/Closed

Transfer

Loop

Function

Given TF G(S) of interest of basic airplane,


$+ loop TF may be derived using blockdiagram

closed
algebra

ssa, x,, = fxi - H(s)X,))G(S)


X0 (I + H(S)G(S))
;s+
;v

x,,
Xi

= Xi G(S)

G(S)
= 1 + H(S)G(S)

Example:
g.

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G(S)
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H(S) = K,

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A43

Appendix A

**i.
$&

.06 5 w,, 5 F.E.M: GM2 6db


+goo ...................................................... ........ ..........

I phase o
&$$..
f:

:.

:i

PM 2 45
co,, 5.06 : GM 2 4db

PM 130

-900
-1 800

87

qg&
-. :-: Pitch
:-.
,v;;$;;I I
Short
&$
!
-%c.
;>
?;
+.
!)?ig+
;
h
I,:L.9,
y*?y,
L&

damper- improves damping of


Period mode, feeds back pitch rate
and sometimes pitch attitude or angle of
attack to elevator on airplanes with
relaxed static stabilitv

+: Yaw damper- improves damping of


Dutch Roll mode on swept wing
airplanes, feeds back body axis yaw rate
to rudder

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A44

Appendi- A

++ Pitch Damper or Pitch Innerloop

Complex

conjugate

root
89

input

rl,rK, I-
1

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Filter may be washout or bandpass filter


At frequencies
2 short period frequency a= 8
Reliability
and cost of sensors may affect choice
Possible to use lagged 4 in lieu of 8
Feedback - different response to turbulence
8 than
Q feedback

January,. 1999

Automatic Flight Control S>xtems


A45

Appendix A

Typical Yaw Damper

,_

3% Yaw damper

command

added in series with pilots

input
91

I +: Simplest modes used in early autopilots


$+
k..:
Pitch attitude hold (structure - see slide 89)
,g;
l

$w&.
*::<;$
L

Roll attitude

hold

Vertical
Vertical speed/fpa
. Go around
Altitude hold/select
ILS glideslopelflare
Vertical navigation

Lateral
Heading/track
VORllLS localizer
Lateral navigation
(LNAV)

l
l

(VNAV)
92

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A46

Appendix A

fb :+.:Command or outerloop modes


cannot function without innerloop
feedbacks (simplest form: y / 8 and r / q )
+ In general, for any particular mode,
feedbacks are required, besides the
characteristic
mode feedback, of each
higher frequency state variable to achieve
satisfactory
damping and performance

& ?
. Feedback gains may be determined by
*p*
analyses, using transfer function I root
!:a$ locus, time response; or modem optimal
g;,
y
con&o/ analyses techniques
q$;
3k:.,.
+p
Control surface effectiveness
change
generally compensated
by 1 I qc gain
schedule
I
f$&
,,,

94

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A47

Appendix A

Control

Performance

+ Performance
requirements
generally
& desired bandwidth for control mode

specify

ii.! Bandwidth
indicates swiftness of response
follow up to a command; bandwidth (in radlsec)
is product of all steady state throughput
gains,
9 going around main control loop

integrations

in loop
96

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Appendix A

5S change of innerloop feedbacks


prevent droop of h/h, TFfrequency

and

+ Integral control also compensates


for
innerloop sensor errors and needed trim
control surface position

+: Traditional designs use


proportional
+ integral control
on modes most outerloop

+ Approach

v-

IC

can lead to trouble


98

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A49

Appendix A
6q&F

*: Nonlinear

Control Algorithm

+ Integral signal path reduces


damping, necessitating
low K,, resulting
in new low freq. mode
integrators
need proper initialization
and
HOLD submode to prevent windup
when control surface limits
99

+ Large step commands cannot


tolerate integrator, need u,-limit:
$$ designers often revert to non-linear
h
&&
design elements
4:
I.
*+.
l

CAPTURE and TRACK submodes

Switching

Limiters,

logic
rate limiters,

etc.
10(

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AS0

Appendk A
+sz
k +g

Altitude

Appropriate

Hold/Select

&limit

difficult

Mode

to determine

@$&;..*\ r

Control
Vertical

IVT,SeIf-Study
Course
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Mode Algorithms

Speed & Glide Slope Modes

Automatic
Januar4.

1999

Flight Control

Systems
AS1

Appendix A
i&g
? ,, A.

Stabilizer

Automatic

Trim

::+ Automatic
stabilizer trim ensures longterm
the elevator returns to faired position to
maintain control authority and minimize drag
+ Trim activated when elevator position
exceeds a threshold value for longer than
,:

+ Trim stops when elevator returns within a


*aA
&gF,
;j
threshold
band around neutral for a certain
I
c@+;
i.r
~
C,<
ueriod of time

Automatic stabilizer trim with


autopilot path mode engaged defeats

speed

IVT Self-Study Course


Federal Aviation Authority

trim/

stability

concept,

possibly

leaving airplane
disengage

out of trim upon A/P

Design integrity
failure)

(e.g., run-away

Automatic
January.

I999

Flight Control

Systems
A52

Appendix A

Command overshoot
Control activity

Acceleration

limiting

Tracking perf.
Loss of control
Poor energy
management
105

Lateral

Issue: 0.1. gain schedule


106

IVTSelf-Study
Course
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Automatic
January.

1999

Flight Control

Systems
A53

Appendix A

volume,

Rate gyros,
Vertical gyros,
IRU Euler angles
Accelerometers

::+In most cases,


sensor dynamics
are negligible

+ Air data sensors


l

,.
$
eg,
,ir..7
h~.<
-a;-;
,f
1*@
. .i
a,hyi..

weight

True airspeed/
Mach Number
Angle of attack
Sideslip
Temperature
107

Air Data Sensors


contamination,
icing, flow field effects,
maintenance
abuse
Not favored in flight critical
integrity issue

designs

+ Static PreSSure
side slip

sensor

sensitive

+I. Long pressure

tubes add significant

handling/

- reliability/

to position

error/

response

iags

@%. Remedies:
Probe heaters; L/R cross plumbing;
pressure transducers
close to probe;
complementary
filters
lot

IVT,SeIf-Study Course
Federal Aviation Authorit\.

January. I999

Automatic Flight Control Systems


A54

Appelzdix A

Disturbance Rejection
Performance
f

ii: Control
* include

tracking

Sensor

Atmospheric

disturbance

(process)

sources

noise (high frequency)

disturbances

Dominant sources
- Windshear
- Temperature
l

.y )
gg,
-2..

Configuration

changes

Trim changes in pitch and power due to fuel


burn, speed, and altitude changes

$*q. Effects of Turbulence


,p
and Windshear

*q>;,c; :
1-:, ~

+
R.
:!@
$?a,
&q;;>.
&&i
(I.
Xi
b
.I,
+
pi+,<
h ,+
7%&+?,;
i
&,u G+
$g;;:Tr
&
I

Turbulence and wind shear are


distinguishable
only by frequency
Airspeed is affected directly by
horizontal gusts, indirectly by
vertical gust, due to energy transfer
through elevator control

1 II

IVTSelf-Study
Course
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Automatic
January.

1999

Flight Control

Systems
A55

Appendix A

Effects of Turbulence

horizontal

and vertical

path and speed control

gusts
bandwidth;

for

$3 Control Effectiveness
df.@&;
k-.
Turbulence

in

; open

gain-db
0

thrust
control

~C~~~~~~~
closes
.........
CA<.
:...................
ac%pen
......
.............
l.
.....
.;..+.
........
-20

Ah
CIR

loopi

x.&./-y,

. +3n

10

,lelevator
- u Pnntrnl
I .&II
....+.........
............................--...i..............
. ...i.......................
-20
:/:
.Ol
.;
i.0 Y
i
+ cu rad/sec

11;

IVTSelf-Study
Course
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Automatic
January.

1999

Flight Control

Systems
A56

Appeizdix A

Control Activity in Turbulence Versus


Speed Tracking in Windshear
Throttle

Pos

~sgllst
+

LO --/L

Increasing
gust filtering

--

2O/o/ft/s -

b
J0
L,
7

4h/(kn/sec)
+

ma

verror

Udofwindshe3r

113

W~,~i 7
T;q~;
Qi iy+

Effect of Horizontal

& Vertical

Winds

on Trim Thrust at Constant7J,


t+or descent causes change
gravity component along

in

Conclusion

weight

amplify speed
deviation
114

IVTiSelf-Study Course
Federal Aviation Authority

January. 1999

Automatic Flight Control Systems


A57

Appendk A
&;y
k y;,

Balancing

control

Flight Pat

and increase

throttle

activity

* + Traditional
autopilots
and autothrottle
systems designed independently,
without
regard to undesirable
control coupling
.+ Proper balancing of altitude/speed
tracking
and control activity in turbulence
requires
integrated design and correct turbulence
$p modeling and analyses

alancing Flight Path and Speed Control


in Turbulence and Windshear, cont.
+ Options
tracking
l

for balancing
performance

altitude and speed


in turbulence:

Synthesis of feedback signals


frequency-dependent
blending
inertial and airmass referenced

by
of
states

Pitch controller:
Choice of innerloop
feedbacks -- discussed for flare algor
Choice of altitude and speed control
bandwidths
(not good option)
llf

IVTiSeIf-Study
Course
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Automatic
January,

I999

Flight Control

Systems
A58

Appendix A

Baro altitude
Baro altitude

rate

Inertial

speed

Inertial

acceleration

Geodesic

altitude

Geodesic

altitude

Vertical

Vert. airmass

fl pth angle

rate

acceleration

Inertial

angle of attack

Inertial

angle of attack

rate

Inertial

sideslip

= drift angle

Inertial

sideslip

rate

Vert. Inertial

fl pth angle
117

K$-K25f

K&K2$-+Kfi+l

K&l
+ K$+Kz$+K,S

+I
ill

IVTYjelf-Study Course
Federal Aviation Authorit>

January. 1999

Automatic Flight Control Systems


A59

App endix A

:::j
3
1%

Second
t+ Order

Third
Order

-%qy:

measure
2,.. + Accelerometers
b
;..
accelerations
due to contact
~@yQ&
*=:>
c

jp.

g-

IVT!Self-Study
Course
Federal Aviation Authority

Using Euler equations

of motion:

e-sin

P I=-=

a,. + g.cos
-

forces

q
-r

Automatic
Januar>*. I999

Flight Control

Systems
A60

Appendix A

Classic Landing
Algorithm

Flare

GS control
4a
o-, innerloop
1
command
Flare control
0

Performance
issues
Flare initiation
. Terrain sensitivity
Initialization
0 Flare gains
0 Innerloop design

Note: Flare trajectory variation due to Vqround


may be eliminated by making K, (:) to Viround

IVT Self-Study Course


Federal Aviation Authority

Automatic
January.

1999

Flight Control

Systems
A61

Appendk A

+ Classic flare algorithm can meet


performance
requirement of
AC20-57A (&&KS 1500 ft )
+ Variable flare initiation
not desirable

height is

~~,,
rl.:,%+Algorithms

with significantly
better
+;g:&
h Y performance and constant flare initiation
&.&$,
*&
height developed and flight tested by
F- NASA TCV program:
+ Variable Tau alg. with K, (:)Vgrou@q,. = 500 ft)
l

Explicit

Flare Trajectory

alg. @

2400ft)
x
Algorithms
use high gains and advanced
inner loop design for turbulence
rejection

124

IV? Self-Study Course


Federal Aviation Authority

Automatic
Januar>,. I999

Flight Control

Systems
A62

Appendix A

Performance Improvement
Gust and Windshear

1o-2

10-l

FAEQUENCY

for1

I
10

w - RADt8EC
l3EWONSE OF h/u*
132

Trajectory:

/-:?
I:P

k! -k2.v 4k2
kI c -?k++ k,.y+ k, command
/&) = 2~
?
1
computation:
- h:.v=
0
Y
= I
-1 II

-*

s =

-\-;I- I =

--

IVT Self-Study Course


Federal Aviation Authorit)

A-,, = 0
v<; . clt
AT,, +

yn-, = y,,(l-

Automatic
January.

I999

v,;

k,V,

* at

. at)

Flight Control

Systems
A63

Appendix A
y,t*q
ww,.y
k

+$&

.,

Evolution Toward Full Function


Automatic Flight Control

requiring

airplanes exhibit poor speed stability,


cruise autothrottle
to reduce workload

+ Introduction
of Inertial Navigation System and
other function automation
reduced workload
+ Introduction

of EFIS and FMC in 1980s

+ lnadverfent
result; F/WC introduced
guidance and control algorithms

new set of
127

Current Architectures

IVTSelf-Study
Course
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Automatic
January.

1999

Flight Control

Systems
A64

Appendix A

Traditional Control Algorithm


Design Process: Observations
(2: In traditional
design process, functional and
performance
requirements
often dealt with by
separate design features
::+.iThis approach

quickly

leads to undesirable

mode

ince each mode/flight


condition approached
as
separate design problem, overall complexity
can
be overwhelming
and mode integration difficult
algorithms

etter way to structure


. ..

control

Process and Tools


vg&
,
F&
h
;;g;

conceptual design and


function integration critically
depends on human ingenuity

%
i:++

Correct conceptual design is


paramount

sc ::+Classic and modern design tools


give little insight in concept design
G and function integration
130

IVT/Self-Study
Course
Federal Aviation Authority

Automatic
January,

I999

Flight Control

Systems
A65

Appendix A

;I+:Classical and modern


are both useful
;:+:Optimal

control

control

is misnomer;

methods
does not

:+:Linear design and gain determination


is
trivial - nonlinear design, mode integration
and design validation/verification
far

Avionics

Architecture:

...- m. .
IVT/Self-Study Course
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January, 1999

Typical

132

Automatic Flight Control Systems


A66

Appendix A

AFCS Digital Computer

IVT/SeIf-Study Course
Federal Aviation Authority

January, 1999

Architecture

Automatic Flight Control Systems


A67

Appendix A

lVT/SeIf-Study Course
Federal Aviation Authority

January, 1999

Automatic Flight Control Systems


A68

Appendix A

System Failure Probability


SYSTEM COMPARISON
WtTH AHRS IN LIEU OF
STRAPiX3WN

DultExCAK
PAmmE
8rnLW

to-2

WADWPLEX
DWLSUAL

. Hardware components
separate function
Parallel processing

IVT/Self-Study Course
Federal Aviation Authority

Less opportunity
functions

of parallel functions
for undefined

Reliability/availability
related to complexity

January, 1999

for every

inversely

Automatic Flight Control Systems


A69

9 Same hardware
. Parallel functions
many solutions!
. Need correct
. Software
l

for many functions


must be serialized

/ detailed

design

software

expertise

design

/ discipline

Overall effort shifts to validation


verification

is crucial

and

Control Actuation

positioning

actuators

+ Because of irreversibility,
system is used
+z-Actuator redundancy
flight critical function

an artificial

feel

needed to meet
reliability/availability

+I:As a result, manual/AFCS control


actuation interfaces can become complex

IVT/Self-Study Course
Federal Aviation Authority

January, 1999

Automatic Flight Control Systems


A70

Appendix A

Smart Actuator

Command

Typical Actuator

Voting (B-2)

Loop Closure (B-2)

I-

I*

KNICE I :UlW
-TION
I-#

i
,

K~RCEECUUIZER

I uz
s
-.

I -

c-l

142

IVT/Self-Study Course
Federal Aviation Authority

January, 1999

Automatic Flight Control Systems


A71

Appendix A

Actuator

Force & Rate Capability


(Typical)
VELOCITY

ACTUATOR

STALL

---v---
EXCESSFORCE

!
!
I
I
!
I
143

+- Must provide safety assurance


commensurate
with criticality of
loss of function
l

Flight critical function:


Pilot not
expected to provide sole safety
backup - safety must be built in

. Non-flight critical funcfion:


Pilot
assumed to be able to provide
adequate backup for safety

IVT,?SeI!-Study Course
Federal Aviation Authority

January, 1999

Automatic Flight Control Systems


A72

Appendix A

Design Safety, cont.


Hardware

component

Design (specification)

Design implementation
or software)

. Operator

error
error (hardware

error

Unacceptable/unsafe

failure

performance
145

@,

..+ Suitability of conceptual design


+ Validity of design requirements

(3 Correctness
+ Correctness
l

$@

Function as specified; no unintended function

+ Performance
l

,r
i,I

of design and specification


of implementation
requirements

Intended envelope
Specified environmental

within

conditions

:+.iFailure characteristics/management
!.+ Design error tolerance
:* Human operator error resistance/recovery
..4f
I VT/Se1 f-Study Course
Federal Aviation Authority

Automatic
January,

1999

Flight Control

Systems
A73

Appendix A

. Airplane-system
safety assessment,
i.e., per SAE 4761
- Functional
System

hazard assessment

(FHA)

safety assessment

)) Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA)


)) Fault tree analysis (FTA)
)) Common mode analysis
1) Specific risk analysis

Random

hardware

failures

Similar redundancy
- Environmental
stress testing
l

Generic

errors

- Dissimilar

IVT/SeIf-Study Course
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redundancy

January, I999

Automatic Flight Control Systems


A74

Appendix A

Strategies,

cont.

Generic errors
- Requirements
validation
- Multiple version software

(parallel

/ series)

Software verification,
i.e., RTCA DO 1786

i:++
Hardware / software design
integration / acceptance testing
14s

Hardovers,
Common

Transients, and
Mode Failures

. Must be safe I manageable


- Single channel
-wJq$
E:.
<::
L

w Engage/disengage

- control

if not extremely
force/g-limit

authority

transients

9 Must be safe I manageable


- Issue:

Autopilot

1) Failure

monitor

disengage

logic

trip

)) Departure of design envelope (speed; angle of

IVT/SeIf-Study Course
Federal Aviation Authority

January, I999

Automatic Flight Control Systems


A75

Appendix A

Hardovers,

critical
l

Transients,

design safety

Examples:
Design error in
microprocessor
or in redundancy
management software
Need exhaustive design
sneak circuit analysis

. Reasonableness
l

checks

In-line/red-line

monitors:

Performance;

sometimes

. Parity check; memory


data wrap around
l

and

Watchdog

on sensor

values

Check function
uses function

model

check sum;

timer or heartbeat

Miscompare
design)

review/

check

(e.g., dual channel

fail passive

152

IVT/Self-Study Course
Federal Aviation Authority

January, I999

Automatic Flight Control Systems


A76

Appendix A

and Isolation,

cont.

. Majority voting: Need minimum of three


independent
sources (can include
analytically
redundant sources)
. Parity equations (e.g., skewed axes inertial
reference sensors:
Deselection of sensor
with highest residue)

+I: Definition:
Airplane control concept whereby
surfaces commanded
through electrical wires
Weight reduction
Lower maintenance
-. Design freedom to optimize aerodynamic
performance
by RSS and achieve standardized
handling qualities through SAS and CAS
Cost reductions

IVT/SeIf-Study Course
Federal Aviation Authority

January, 1999

Automatic Flight Control Systems


A77

Appendix A

FBW Genesis

+; Mid-1980s, Airbus developed


FBW control featuring
l

C* control

algorithm

. Speed and n,envelope


l

A-320 with

Sidestick

controller

Autothrottle

without

protection

with passive
throttle

feel

drive servo
155

+ Boeing followed
l

C*U control

algorithm

. Conventional
. Hydraulic

IVT/SeIf-Study Course
Federal Aviation Authority

suit with B777 featuring

column/wheel/throttle

servo

feel; autopilotxolumnlwheel

January, 1999

Automatic Flight Control Systems


A78

Appendix A

characteristics,
::K:Speed stability

HQ
or equivalent

safety

+:;Mode changes for up and away


and takeoff / landing

+ Manual and automatic

electronics
electronics

IVT/Self-Study Course
Federal Aviation Authority

mode

bay versus remote


loop closure at actuator

January, 1999

Automatic Flight Control Systems


A79

Appendii A

fl stick

throttle

..Boeing
......................?Vi
......

C* Criterion

in aircraft
l

c*

(n,),,

response
+

W,,kh

(C*-variable)

V,, speed at which contributions


( n z) PS and q are equal

of

. Assume airplane has good handling qualities


when response of C*-variable falls within

Appendix A

Feedback

of

I(

C*)dt = h + 8

provides path stability, but not


path tracking; there is no speed
Certification
based on equivalent
safety obtained by speed / angle
of attack envelope protection

161

lVT/Self-Study Course
Federal Aviation Authority

Speed feedback causes n, /stick


response to be overridden long-term
by speed response, resulting in
conventional
delta V/stick command
Handling qualities deteriorate on
backside of drag curve due to
reversal of nz response

January, I999

Automatic Flight Control Systems


A81

Appendix A

TYPICAL COMMAND RESPONSE


n,U algorithm HSCT .25 g pull-up
W=400k, &=I55 kn, gamma=3O
.

162

:+ Boon to airline economics

I safety

+I.Most automated airplanes


best safety record

have

;:+Recent publicity about accidents


and incidents involving automation
criticize automation, calling
human centered design

IVTiSelf-Study Course
Federal Aviation Authority

January, 1999

for

Automatic Flight Control Systems


A82

Appendix A

;:+Most automation design deficiencies


rooted in historic systems evolution,
using incremental function design

;.+Poor control
l

strategies

Elevator flight path control without


regard to thrust
Loss of AIT speed control when at

. Automatic stabilizer trim - defeating


speed stability
. Inadequate control coordination,
high

IVT/SeIf-Study Course
Federal Aviation Authority

January, 1999

Automatic Flight Control Systems


A83

Appendix A

Deficiencies,

can overpower!
. Throttle wake up (automatic

Unsafe disconnects
+ Failure
l

engagement)

close to stall & out of trim

to disconnect

or annunciate

Vertical speed mode


improper thrust

Automation

cont.

when

fail due to

Design

No rudder control and trim for


asymmetric thrust

+ Inappropriate
control authority
limits - on pitch attitude
::+Unclear control references
(e.g, speed in A/T, A/P, FMS)

IVT/SeIf-Study Course
Federal Aviation Authority

January, 1999

Automatic Flight Control Systems


A84

Appendix A

Automation Design
Deficiencies, cont.

;.+I!
Inadequate mode status
annunciation
i:+Inconsistent
operation between
modes
+ Operational complexity leading
to pilot confusion / errors

use of control
f:+Over-reliance
automation

authority
on pilot as integrator

limitations

/ deficiencies

. Mixed manual I automatic modes


with altered safety
. Handling performance
limits and
failure conditions

IVT/Self-Study Course
Federal Aviation Authority

January, I999

Automatic Flight Control Systems


A85

Appendk A

Deficiencies:

Root Causes

Too many/overlapping
together by intractable

Poor / incomplete
and integration

. Flawed conceptual
processes

loss of control

function

automation

design

and design

will require

Better control strategy


integration
concept

modes, cobbled
mode logic

and mode

Fewer modes, elimination

Elimination

of mode overlap

of sub modes, simpler

. Better integrated

mode logic

mode concepts

- No open ended climbs/descents

IVT/Self-Study Course
Federal Aviation Authority

January, 1999

Automatic Flight Control Systems


A86

Appendix A
$9,
gT$,
* fg.i;

Needed Design Standards

- Autopilot mode control panel


- No mixed mode operation

. Better thought

out first & second

tier protection

- First tier: Performance envelope protection


- Second tier: Speed envelope protection
l

Fully automated
More effective
reconfiguration

function
. Mission;

rudder to handle thrust


failure monitoring/
management

strategy
operations;

functions;

systems

. Process management
Synthesis / analysis

lVT/Self-Study Course
Federal Aviation Authority

January, 1999

Automatic Flight Control Systems


A87

Appendix A

for commonality
- Up-front function integration

. Decoupled
l

Pilot-like

command
control

responses

strategy

- Energy efficiency
- Control authority allocation

. Envelope

safeguards

- Priority control on elevator when thrust limited


- VminNmax protection, covering alI modes

IVT/SeIf-Study Course
Federal Aviation Authority

January, 1999

Automatic Flight Control Systems


A88

Appendix A

Future Flight Control

Reduced system
maintenance

Systems

complexity,

less

Design portability:
Faster/lower
system development
Reduced

risk

customization

Less flight testing,

less pilot training

+ All-encompassing
control strategy
for all modes, including FBW manual
:+ Integrated pitch I thrust and
roll I yaw control
+ Consistency
of operation and
performance
between modes
and flight conditions

IVT/Self-Study Course
Federal Aviation Authority

January, 1999

Automatic Flight Control Systems


A89

Appendix A

Functionally Integrated
Architecture

Rational function
partitioning
No function
Simplified

Airline operations
Oriented functions

Path definition

. Altitude/vertical
Heading/track

spd

safety functions

reusable design
179

+ Outerloop control is a trajectory


kinematics problem; should be
designed independently
of airplane
characteristics
l

IVTiSelf-Study Course
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Conventional
design methods do not
cater to this approach
Output is a trajectory acceleration
command

January, 1999

Automatic Flight Control Systems


A90

Appendix A

Outerloophnerloop

Design

Design Observations,

cont.

;:+Innerloop generates forces and


moments to satisfy commanded
accelerations
l

Feedback gains may need to be


compensated
for changes in the
airplane dynamics

;:+I;
Examples:
autothrottle

Altitude

control;

Concatenation of Control
LOOPS: Altitude Control
outerloop-

Control

IVT/SeIf-Study Course
Federal Aviation Authority

authority

;e

(8

max

January, 1999

innerloOp

) depends

on max

Automatic Flight Control Systems


A91

Appendix A

Loops,

cont.

:I+!Simple rule for bandwidth separation requirement


between adjacent loops can be derived; example:
K, (h, - h) - K, h = h, assume h, = - h, then

B: K, and K;, represent

bandwidth

::+ VP 154 shows

between

disjoint

of h and h modes

/ii and OC

+ Most designers ignore problem and adjust


feedback gains for each flight condition to obtain
satisfactory
bandwidth and damping
+ Physical insight allows more accurate solution:

IVT/Self-Study Course
Federal Aviation Authority

January, 1999

Automatic Flight Control Systems


A92

Appendix A

Control Mode Functional Architecture

consist of proportional
and integral terms with
scheduled gains to assure consistent
6 By placing integrator at innerlouterloop
boundary
and following preceding rules for concatenation
of control loops, a dramatically
simplified
provided that accommodates
modes by reusable building

all possible
blocks

control

18:

Integral

control

now

Requires V referenced
to V -0uterloop
in turbulence windshear
l

Issue:

Performance

186

IVT/Self-Study Course
Federal Aviation Authority

January, 1999

Automatic Flight Control Systems


A93

Appendix A

New Generalized
Airplane independent 0
design

0 Airplane tailored
design

Guidance
error
Normalization
(any mode)

* Innerloop
Force &
moment
* control

Targets
I I
I w
1I ---w
I
I-t
*

Design Process

* Control
Commands
Coordinatior
*

Airplane

--)
I

1 Feedback
L

Designed to provide:
Decoupled control
+
Standard trajectory dynamics
l

187

in speed and altitude


+ Pilots intuitively
speed control

decouple

flight

path and

;:+ Current automatic control modes fail to


account for control coupling; operation like
giving throttle to one pilot to control speed
and elevator to other pilot to control flight path
+ Both front side and back side control
technique exhibit same type of difficulties

IVT/Self-Study Course
Federal Aviation Authority

January, 1999

Automatic Flight Control Systems


A94

Appendix A

Longitudinal

Control

Revisited.
Consider elevator and thrust
l

Elevator
Control
b

In detail the process

cont.
control responses:

Decompose speed and


flight path errors into into
energy (throttle control)
and energy distribution
(elevator control)
components
Gather up terms to form
total control commands

works as follows.....
189

Total Energy Control

+ For any path mode, feedbacks are


normalized into flight path angle
command using loop concatenation
+ Likewise, for speed mode feedbacks
are normalized into dimensionless
acceleration command

IVTiSelf-Study
Course
Federal Aviation Authority

Automatic
January,

I999

Flight Control

Systems
A95

Appendix A

use same normalization


gain constants
(first order mode control time constant)
y + ii/g

components:
+I!Elevator

controls

difference:

y - irlg

191

Total Energy Control System


Architecture
energy

control-

and Mode Hierarchy


i

energy

rate control

lizcd
and
r
mds
nation

19

IVT/Self-Study Course
Federal Aviation Authority

January, 1999

Automatic Flight Control Systems


A96

Appendix A

Total Energy Control System


Core Algorithm - Energy Rate Control
fq Airplane independent

design 0

10

Airplane tailored design

Specific Net Thrust

Pitch Attitude Command

TECS Algorithm
Features
+I.Energy Strategy achieves pilot-like
control qualify in automatic control
l

No inefficient
Decoupled
responses
Priority

throttle
overshoot

control

Simultaneous
maneuvering

free command

when thrust

limits

flight path/speed
at limit T

. Normal acceleration

IVT/SeIf-Study Course
Federal Aviation Authority

activity

January. I999

maneuver

limit

Automatic Flight Control Systems


A97

Appendix A

TECS Algorithm
Features, cont.

outerloop boundary, structured to avoid


cmd overshoot, satisfies VF 155
:+ Transient free mode switching;
no re-initialization
+ Complete consistency
between modes

and predictability
195

ALTlCAS

Descend/Acceleration
- _-_.---

ALTCMD

10 000

CASCMD

fl/sec*
THROTTLE

Modes, Combined

270

-4
55.0

Negligible

Throltle

Response1

196

IVT/SeIf-Study Course
Federal Aviation Authority

January. 1999

Automatic Flight Control Systems


A98

Appendix A

::+I!
When throttle

limits, elevator

. SPEED control,

dedicated

to

if in

- ALTITUDE HOLDISEL
- FLIGHT PATH ANGLE
TO I GO AROUND

. PATH control,

if in

- MANUAL FPA
- GLIDE SLOPE
)) Except when VMIN or VMAX becomes
)) Controlling speed mode

Go-Around Mode - Engage at 100 ft;


Weight, 560,000 lb; Flaps 30; Altitude Loss 31 ft
ALT 2000

-CAS

1000
n
VERT
ACCEL

fthed
HDOT

Weec

kn

15 THETA

-5

-15

-5

15 GAMMA

10

-30

-5

THROl-lLE 60

0
0.00

deg

5 ELEV

40

deg

deg

50

-5
10.00

20.06

30.00

40.06 50.00
Tlme,sec

60.'0&

70.00

60.00

60.00

-15 deg
100.00

196

IVT!Self-Study Course
Federal Aviation Authority

January, 1999

Automatic Flight Control Systems


A99

Appendix A

- High-Speed-Gl-ide-Slope-Capture-with
Flap Extension and V,,,Control
-____---_-__-. _-.. _,-..---_.--___

GSE 0.70

.- ---__-_ - .---------

-.--.--I

.__
0 GAMMA

0.00

-2

deg eo.70
ALT

-4 dog

2000

200 CAS
150
100 kn

FLAPP

deg
THROTTLE

deg

40

Down

20

GEAR

UP

55.0

6 ELEV

30.0

5.0

o -2

Time, set

deg

*..*

+ In speed priority mode, when thrust


is at limit, speed commands are
executed with limited longitudinal
acceleration,
so as to maintain
preferred part of energy rate for
vertical path control

lVT/Self-Study Course
Federal Aviation Authority

January, I999

Automatic Flight Control Systems


Al00

Appendix A

An Example

+ Y ) allowing
execution by reducing
temporarily
by half

by temporary

speed command
climb gradient

level off

ALTICAS Modes, Descent with


Su bsequeit--Deceleration
1
I
(100% Deceleration
Priority)

13 000
1t 10 ooo*

* - .a.=
I; ---~~...~z.x

-i
i

;.Y.~z,~,T,-----------

-C;t...., a**.. . ..*

\
\-Descent

CASCMD

kn
VERT
ACCEL

ftls2
THROTTLE

1
310 . . . . .,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2ao---C--;--i
E.,-_ --2.
1 j
I
250

--_.

Rate Reduced

16 000 ALT

-13
I-

000
~10 000

it

to Decelerate
310 CAS

-------4.

IT**0
--

u25C

kn
50 HDOT

-4

-50

55.0

It/s

6 ELEV
2

deg

b2

5.0

deg

202

1VT/Self-Study Course
Federal Aviation Authority

January, 1999

Automatic Flight Control Systems


Al01

Appendix A

FBW Manual Control Implementation

FPA-Based

Augmented

Desired y Response

Manual Mode

for Constant

&,, Input

Good HQ requires
l

Low response

Good damping

IVT/Self-Study Course
Federal Aviation Authority

Coordinated
response

lag Ty

y /z

No x. overshoot

Good pitch attitude

Time

January, 1999

Automatic Flight Control Systems


Al02

Appendix A

TECS - FPA Augmented


Effect on 8, E

Manual Mode

a Response

basic TECS

FF command

augmentation

time

gains for desired

Velocity CWS Res-pans-es -to- GM b


Column
Pull/Push: B747-TECS-. __. __
-. ^._
Flaps

30 Gear

Down
I1

:MD

leg
.UMN
ICE

0.10

1 GAMMA

0.00

-0.10

-1

20

0 i--g..

lb

.*,I7

CAS

174

kn
lTTLE

deg

--

p
---,*

,,.. .*

_-*
LI

,. . . .. ..

------

*...

I\,

---

-8

11/S

6000

170

5000

166

4000

80

ALT

II

4 ELEV

40

-4

12

18

~~

24

30
.

36 1,

42
-.

48
-

.-.

54
-.

60
-----.

January, 1999

de3
.---.---

.-

IVT/SeIf-Study Course
Federal Aviation Authority

deg

T 8 VERT
ACCEL
0

__-_-

206

Automatic Flight Control Systems


Al03

Appendix A

Total Heading Control System


12 Architecture
and Mode Hierarchv

Roll Attitude
L1-Command

Command
Cross Track
Velocity Cmd

Generalized
Roll Attitud
and Yaw
Rate
Commands
Coordinatio
I

Cross Track
Deviation

207

6 Typical AFCS Mode Control Panel


Y
V.
::
Current Generation:
747-400

+I!No apparent grouping and hierarchical


ordering of related mode functions
:I+:No indication of command execution
status

IVT,SeIf-Study Course
Federal Aviation Authority

January, 1999

Automatic Flight Control Systems


Al04

Appendix A

Mode Control

:.+ Related functions


(.+:Mode & command

grouped together and ordered


execution status indicated

Integrated

Design - Payoff

strategy

for manual and automatic

++Primary flight display


enhancements
l

/VT/Self-Study Course
Federal Aviation Authority

Panel with

Thrust / elevator

guidance

cues

cmd cues

January, I999

Automatic Flight Control Systems


Al05

Appendix A

. Continuity

manual - automatic

control

Easier pilot monitoring

of automatic

+ Large cost reductions,

lower risk

IVT/Self-Study Course
Federal Aviation Authority

Faster design cycle, less HW/SW, less

January, I999

Automatic Flight Control Systems


A106

Appendix B

Appendix B

Course Evaluation Forms


There are two course evaluation forms in this appendix. Please select
the one appropriate for your course of study.
l

IVT broadcast

Self-study video course

If you are taking this course via IVT, then you will probably complete
the course questionnaire by using the Viewer Response System
keypad that youve been using during the course. Your IVT
instructor will provide directions on how to complete the course
evaluation.

IVT!Self-Study Video Course


Federal Aviation Administration

January, I999

Automatic Flight Control Systems


B

Appendix B

IVT COURSE EVALUATION


AIR - Automatic

Flight Control Systems

l/27/99
Please give us your candid opinions concerning the training youve just completed. Your
evaluation of the IVT course is important to us, and will help us provide the best possible
products and services to you.
Use your Viewer Response keypad to answer the following questions.

very

Good

Good

Average

Poor

Very
Poor

1. Length of course

2. Depth of information

3. Pace of training

4. Clarity of objectives

5. Sequence of content

6. Quality of course materials

7. Quality of graphics/visual aids

8. Readability of text on monitor

Press the Flag

IVT Course
Federal Aviation

key to indicate when you are ready to go to the next page.

Automatic
Administration

January,

1999

Flight Control

Systems
B-l

Appendix B

very

Good

Good

Average

Poor

Veq
Poor

10. Communication between


student and instructor

11. Applicability
to your job

12. Overall quality of the course

13. Overall effectiveness of the


I VT format

9. Effectiveness of instructor(s)

of material

14. Would you like to take other IVT courses?


A. YES

B. NO

C. UNDECIDED

15. On the keypad: enter your number of years of FAA experience.


(n irmeric answer )

Wlrenjinislretl,

press the Next Quest key on your keypad and answer YES, then Enter.

Additional Comments may be faxed to


the IVT Studio:
405-954-0317 / 9507

IVT Course
Federal Aviation Administration

January, 1999

Automatic Flight Control Systems


B-2

Appendix B

Self-Study Video Course Evaluation


AIR - Automatic Flight Control Systems
Original Broadcast Date: l/27/99
Please give us your candid opinions concerning the training youve just completed. Your
evaluation of the self-study video course is important to us, and will help us provide the best
possible products and services to you.
Date(s) You Used the Self-Study Video Course Package:
Number of years of FAA experience:
(Optional)
Office phone: (

Name:
For

the following. please completely darken the circle appropriate to your response.
Very
Good

Good

Average

Poor

3. Pace of training

4. Clarity of objectives

5. Sequence of content

6. Amount of activities/practice

7. Quality of course materials

8. Effectiveness of instructor(s)

9. Overall quality of the course

Automatic

Flight Control

1. Length of course
-.
?

Depth of information

10. Overall effectiveness of the


self-study video format

Self-Study Video Course


Federal Aviation Administration

January.

1999

Very
PO01

N/A

Systems
B-3

Appendix B
11. Rate your level of knowledge of the topic before and after taking this self-study course.
Low

Moderate

High

Very
High

BEFORE THE COURSE: 0

AFTER THE C.OURSE:

Very
Low

12. What did you like best about the course?

13. What would you improve in the course?

1-t. What pre\,ious experience. if any. have you had with self-study courses?
0 None

0 Moderate

0 Considerable

15. Were you comfortable with the self-study video format?


If not. why not?

0 Yes 0 No 0 Undecided

16. Would you like to take other self-study video courses?


If not. why not?

0 Yes 0 No 0 Undecided

17. Additional comments:

PLEASE SEND THIS COMPLETED FORM TO YOUR


DIRECTORATE/DIVISION
TRAINING MANAGER (ATM). THANK YOU.
Self-Study Video Course
Federal Aviation Administration

Automatic
January.

I999

Flight Control
B-4