Krit Chanwong

World Studies 10: Period 5

March 10th 2016
The failure to address the issues that led to the 1905 revolution was the primary
cause of the Russian Revolution. To what extent do you agree with this
statement?
In 1905, after the failure of the Russo-Japanese War, riots broke out in
St.Petersburg. These riots were violently suppressed by Tsarist authorities. To appease
the revolutionaries, Tsar Nicholas II, the then current Russian Tsar, called for the
creation of a legislative body called the Duma. 12 years later, in March 1917, Tsar
Nicholas II was to abdicate after several military disasters during the First World War.
The abdication of the Tsar led to the creation of the Russian Republic under the
Provisional Government, led by ex-Tsarist minister Alexander Kerensky. The short
lived Provisional Government was soon to be overthrown in a Coup by a group of
radical Marxist revolutionaries called the Bolsheviks. Led by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin,
they seized Petrograd (new name for St. Petersburg) in October and installed a
Communist government. The question here is whether the 1905 Revolution was the
primary cause in the 1917 October Revolution. The term primary cause here means
a significant contingency, although the notion of causation is problematic. In a
historical event, there is no one cause. All historical events are merely coincidental.
However, in this case, the primary cause meant that without this particular cause, the
1917 Revolution would have been delayed or would have taken a different character.
The Russian Revolution does not refer to the February Revolution in 1917, but rather
to the October Coup, where the Bolshevik movement seized power from the
Provisional Government. Although the issues in 1905 provided a vital contingency
towards the October Coup, many other contingencies also minimised the effects of the
1905 Revolution.
Firstly, it must be admitted that the problems of the 1905 Revolution were
never effectively dealt with. A major contingency leading to the 1905 Revolution was
the lack of economic modernity. (Brooman, 10) Although the Russian state repeatedly
attempted to solve this, the disastrous harvests of 1916 and 1917 ultimately showed

that the demand of manpower in wartime was something Russia could not keep up
with. This suggested that the Russian economy still demanded manpower, and was not
fully mechanised. (Gatrell and Harrison, 417) Moreover, another issue that led to the
1905 Revolution was the lack of political representation of proletariat and peasant
interests. (Brooman, 10) Although, in the aftermath of the 1905 Revolution, a
legislative assembly called the State Duma was formed, this failed miserably. From
the start, the Duma was limited in its legislative capabilities by a set of Fundamental
Laws, which deemed that the Tsar was still the absolute autocrat. (Brooman, 12)
Moreover, a British observer who had sat at the meetings of the Duma commented
The Duma, in its short, unhappy life was a picture of the most poignant phase of the
conflict between government and people. (Pares, 11) Although the primary aim of
creating the Duma was to represent the interests of the lower classes, by 1912, the
Duma had more deputies of the nobility class than any of the preceding sessions.
Fifty-one per cent, a slight but absolute majority, were from this class. (Walsh, 6)
This suggests many things. Firstly, it suggests that the 1905 Revolution was unable to
significantly change anything de facto. The Russian economy was still archaic, 9
years after the revolution. Apart from this, the Tsars unwillingness for political
reforms meant that the politics of imperial Russia was still stuck in the past. Although
a legislative parliament was formed, this parliament was plagued by organisational
problems and was ultimately hijacked by the nobility, who could do nothing but
support the Tsar.
However, the October Coup was also largely influenced by the course of the
First World War (1914-1918). The First World War had huge economic effects on the
Russian people. By 1917, the Imperial governments real GDP had decreased by 33%.
The Russian state lost $22 million and 1.8 million men throughout the course of the
bloody war. (Broadberry, 28) Inflation was also important, as retail prices in
Moscow doubled in the first two years of the war. (Gatrell and Wauldron) This
meant that people earning standard wages could buy less and less consumer produce
to sustain their lives. Moreover, Russian defeats further demoralised Russian society.
After being defeated in East Prussia, the Russian logistical system broke down. This
meant that by 1917, German units had 5 times the number of small arms than normal
Russian units. (Gatrell and Harrison, 431) Moreover, it was generally acknowledged
that many Russian soldiers supported the Bolshevik cause. For example, riots during

March 8th in Petrograd were joined by the soldiers of the 4th Company of the
Pavlovsky Regiment. By March 12th, the capital was in the hands of the unruly mob.
(Nikolaieff, 20) Even Lenin acknowledged, the soldiers are voicing the real demands
of the people far better than those gentlemen [in the Duma], the enlightened
bourgeoisie. (Lenin) The major contingency for many revolutions is economic and
social turmoil. (MacCulloch, 29) What the evidence presented here suggests that
Russian society was in economic turmoil. The government simply did not have
enough money to fight a war and maintain consistent consumer product prices. This
meant that many citizens, especially the lower income earners, had to enjoy a
considerably lower standard of living. Moreover, the inability of the economy to deal
with military logistics ultimately led many soldiers to be illuminated by the Bolshevik
ideals. As soldiers fought in deplorable conditions, often without arms, they were
fascinated by slogans by the Bolsheviks promise of land, bread and peace.
Furthermore, Bolshevik opportunism and Kerenskys political mistakes also
fueled the October Coup. Although self-professed Marxist, the Bolsheviks repeatedly
ignored the main principles of Marxist revolution for the sake of gaining power. For
example, Marxist theory demanded that a communist revolution must come directly
after an extended period bourgeoisie rule. (Schaff, 269) However, in 1917, Russia
was still a neo-feudal society. (Brooman, 2) Hence, when Lenin launched his coup, he
understood fully that this was not a Marxist revolution, but rather, an attempt to regain
power and to hold it. Even Lenin acknowledged when he commented "the fate of the
Russian and world revolutions depends on two or three days of fighting . . . To delay
is suicide." (Daniels, 9) This was further exacerbated by the mistakes of the
Provisional Government. The primary mistake of the Provisional Government was to
continue World War I, even though the Russian motherland was being bled from
within. The effects of World War I reduced the power of the Provisional Government
and Kerensky to only making monotonous speeches of which everyone was weary,
or of fatal outbursts of passion. (Elkin, 20) Another major mistake was to arm the
Bolshevik militia, the Red Guards, in order to quell a rebellious army led by General
Lavr Kornilov. The Kerenskys government need for political stability led to the
Provisional Government permitted indiscriminate arming of the workers. Ultimately,
the aftermath of the rebellion was perfectly summed by Trotsky in a conversation:
Use Kerensky as a gunrest to shoot Kornilov. Afterward we will settle [affairs] with

Kerensky." (Ascher, 251) What this suggests is that the Bolsheviks made constant use
of political opportunities. They actively collaborated with the Provisional Government
for the sake of political power, only to deceive them by launching a coup detat.
As we can see, even if the 1905 Revolution was a contingency, it was by no
means the primary contingency. World War I provided another vital source of dissent
for the Russian public, as it strained Russias economy and demoralised society. The
mistakes of the Provisional Government created an atmosphere where the Bolsheviks
could exploit dissent effectively. Although the issues that led to the 1905 Revolution
were never adequately solved, these issues have plagued Russia since the earliest
times. If the 1905 Revolution truly were the primary cause of the 1917 Revolution,
then one should expect a Bolshevik Coup in the poorest countries or the most
oppressive ones. This conclusion has one main implication: that the 1917 Revolution
was brought about not by the Bolshevik want to improve the conditions of the citizens
of Russia, but rather, as a deceptive ploy in order to gain power and hegemony. And
this looks altogether true. For the Revolution did not liberate the masses, but gave rise
to the greatest and most feared totalitarian regimes that the world has ever
encountered: the Soviet Union.

WORDCOUNT:1,091

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