CHAVEZ

VS JBC
MENDOZA, J.:

The issue at hand has been in hibernation until the unexpected departure of Chief Justice Renato C.
Corona on May 29, 2012, and the nomination of former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez (petitioner),
as his potential successor, triggered the filing of this case. The issue has constantly been nagging legal
minds, yet remained dormant for lack of constitutional challenge.

As the matter is of extreme urgency considering the constitutional deadline in the process of selecting the
nominees for the vacant seat of the Chief Justice, the Court cannot delay the resolution of the issue a day
longer. Relegating it in the meantime to the back burner is not an option.

Does the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution allow more than one (1)
member of Congress to sit in the JBC? Is the practice of having two (2) representatives from each house of
Congress with one (1) vote each sanctioned by the Constitution? These are the pivotal questions to be
resolved in this original action for prohibition and injunction.

Long before the naissance of the present Constitution, the annals of history bear witness to the fact that
the exercise of appointing members of the Judiciary has always been the exclusive prerogative of the
executive and legislative branches of the government. Like their progenitor of American origins, both the
Malolos Constitution and the 1935 Constitution had vested the power to appoint the members of the
Judiciary in the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. It was during
these times that the country became witness to the deplorable practice of aspirants seeking confirmation
of their appointment in the Judiciary to ingratiate themselves with the members of the legislative body.

Then, with the fusion of executive and legislative power under the 1973 Constitution, the appointment
of judges and justices was no longer subject to the scrutiny of another body. It was absolute, except that
the appointees must have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications.

Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary from political pressure and
partisan activities, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a separate,
competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it conceived of a body
representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process and called it the Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC). Its composition, term and functions are provided under Section 8, Article VIII of the
Constitution, viz:

Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court
composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the
Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.

(2) The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term of four years with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the representative of
the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for
two years, and the representative of the private sector for one year.

(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall keep a record
of its proceedings.

(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be determined by the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations for the Council.

(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It may
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exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.

In compliance therewith, Congress, from the moment of the creation of the JBC, designated one
representative to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio members. Perhaps in order to give equal
opportunity to both houses to sit in the exclusive body, the House of Representatives and the Senate
would send alternate representatives to the JBC. In other words, Congress had only one (1)
representative.

In 1994, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only seven (7) members,
an eighth (8 ) member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting in the
JBC - one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of
a vote. Then, curiously, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow
the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. At present,
Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in
the JBC as representatives of the legislature.

It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition, setting forth the following

GROUNDS FOR ALLOWANCE OF THE PETITION

I

Article VIII, Section 8, Paragraph 1 is clear, definite and needs no interpretation in that the JBC shall have
only one representative from Congress.

II

The framers of the Constitution clearly envisioned, contemplated and decided on a JBC composed of only
seven (7) members.

III

Had the framers of the Constitution intended that the JBC composed of the one member from the Senate
and one member from the House of Representatives, they could have easily said so as they did in the
other provisions of the Constitution.

IV

The composition of the JBC providing for three ex- fficio members is purposely designed for a balanced
representation of each of the three branches of the government.

V

One of the two (2) members of the JBC from Congress has no right (not even right) to sit in the said
constitutional body and perform the duties and functions of a member thereof.

VI

The JBC cannot conduct valid proceedings as its composition is illegal and unconstitutional.

On July 9, 2012, the JBC filed its Comment. It, however, abstained from recommending on how this
constitutional issue should be disposed in gracious deference to the wisdom of the Court. Nonetheless,
the JBC was more than generous enough to offer the insights of various personalities previously
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connected with it.

Through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), respondents defended their position as members of the
JBC in their Comment filed on July 12, 2012. According to them, the crux of the controversy is the phrase
a representative of Congress. Reverting to the basics, they cite Section 1, Article VI of the
Constitution to determine the meaning of the term Congress. It is their theory that the two houses,
the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components of Congress,
such that the absence of either divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the
Constitution. In simplistic terms, the House of Representatives, without the Senate and vice-versa, is not
Congress. Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise
their respective powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section
8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of a representative from Congress, it should mean one
representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress.

Tracing the subject provisions history, the respondents claim that when the JBC was established, the
Framers originally envisioned a unicameral legislative body, thereby allocating a representative of the
National Assembly to the JBC. The phrase, however, was not modified to aptly jive with the change to
bicameralism, the legislative system finally adopted by the Constitutional Commission on July 21, 1986.
According to respondents, if the Commissioners were made aware of the consequence of having a
bicameral legislature instead of a unicameral one, they would have made the corresponding adjustment
in the representation of Congress in the JBC.

The ambiguity having resulted from a plain case of inadvertence, the respondents urge the Court to look
beyond the letter of the disputed provision because the literal adherence to its language would produce
absurdity and incongruity to the bicameral nature of Congress. In other words, placing either of the
respondents in the JBC will effectively deprive a house of Congress of its representation. In the same vein,
the electorate represented by Members of Congress will lose their only opportunity to participate in the
nomination process for the members of the Judiciary, effectively diminishing the republican nature of the
government.

The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives of Congress to be members
of the JBC does not render the latters purpose nugatory. While they admit that the purpose in creating
the JBC was to insulate appointments to the Judiciary from political influence, they likewise cautioned the
Court that this constitutional vision did not intend to entirely preclude political factor in said
appointments. Therefore, no evil should be perceived in the current set-up of the JBC because two (2)
members coming from Congress, whose membership to certain political parties is irrelevant, does not
necessarily amplify political partisanship in the JBC. In fact, the presence of two (2) members from
Congress will most likely provide balance as against the other six (6) members who are undeniably
presidential appointees.

The Issues

In resolving the procedural and substantive issues arising from the petition, as well as the myriad of
counter-arguments proffered by the respondents, the Court synthesized them into two:

(1) Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been
met in this case; and

(2) Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two
(2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.

The Power of Judicial Review

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In its Comment, the JBC submits that petitioner is clothed with locus standi to file the petition, as a citizen
and taxpayer, who has been nominated to the position of Chief Justice.

For the respondents, however, petitioner has no real interest in questioning the constitutionality of the
JBCs current composition. As outlined in jurisprudence, it is well-settled that for locus standi to lie,
petitioner must exhibit that he has been denied, or is about to be denied, of a personal right or privilege
to which he is entitled. Here, petitioner failed to manifest his acceptance of his recommendation to the
position of Chief Justice, thereby divesting him of a substantial interest in the controversy. Without his
name in the official list of applicants for the post, the respondents claim that there is no personal stake on
the part of petitioner that would justify his outery of unconstitutionality. Moreover, the mere allegation
that this case is of transcendental importance does not excuse the waiver of the rule on locus standi,
because, in the first place, the case lacks the requisites therefor. The respondents also question
petitioners belated filing of the petition. Being aware that the current composition of the JBC has been
in practice since 1994, petitioners silence for eighteen (18) years show that the constitutional issue being
raised before the Court does not comply with the earliest possible opportunity requirement.

Before addressing the above issues in seriatim, the Court deems it proper to first ascertain the nature of
the petition. Pursuant to the rule that the nature of an action is determined by the allegations therein and
the character of the relief sought, the Court views the petition as essentially an action for declaratory
relief under Rule 63 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Constitution as the subject matter, and the validity and construction of Section 8 (1), Article VIII as the
issue raised, the petition should properly be considered as that which would result in the adjudication of
rights sans the execution process because the only relief to be granted is the very declaration of the rights
under the document sought to be construed. It being so, the original jurisdiction over the petition lies
with the appropriate Regional Trial Court (RTC). Notwithstanding the fact that only questions of law are
raised in the petition, an action for declaratory relief is not among those within the original jurisdiction of
this Court as provided in Section 5,
Article VIII of the Constitution.

At any rate, due to its serious implications, not only to government processes involved but also to the
sanctity of the Constitution, the Court deems it more prudent to take cognizance of it. After all, the
petition is also for prohibition under Rule 65 seeking to enjoin Congress from sending two (2)
representatives with one (1) full vote each to the JBC.

The Courts power of judicial review, like almost all other powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject
to several limitations, namely: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge; he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Generally, a
party will be allowed to litigate only when these conditions sine qua non are present, especially when the
constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch of government is put in issue.

Anent locus standi, the question to be answered is this: does the party possess a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that there is real, concrete and legal conflict of rights and duties
from the issues presented before the Court? In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court summarized the
rules on locus standi as culled from jurisprudence. There, it was held that taxpayers, voters, concerned
citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are
met: (1) cases involve constitutional issues; (2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; (3) for voters, there must be a
showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question; (4) for concerned citizens, there
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must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early;
and (5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their
prerogatives as legislators.

In public suits, the plaintiff, representing the general public, asserts a public right in assailing an
allegedly illegal official action. The plaintiff may be a person who is affected no differently from any other
person, and can be suing as a stranger, or as a citizen or taxpayer. Thus, taxpayers have been
allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is
being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of
public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid
statute.

In this case, petitioner seeks judicial intervention as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a nominee to the
position of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. As a taxpayer, petitioner invokes his right to demand that
the taxes he and the rest of the citizenry have been paying to the government are spent for lawful
purposes. According to petitioner, since the JBC derives financial support for its functions, operation and
proceedings from taxes paid, petitioner possesses as taxpayer both right and legal standing to demand
that the JBCs proceedings are not tainted with illegality and that its composition and actions do not
violate the Constitution.

Notably, petitioner takes pains in enumerating past actions that he had brought before the Court where
his legal standing was sustained. Although this inventory is unnecessary to establish locus standi because
obviously, not every case before the Court exhibits similar issues and facts, the Court recognizes the
petitioners right to sue in this case. Clearly, petitioner has the legal standing to bring the present action
because he has a personal stake in the outcome of this controversy.

The Court disagrees with the respondents contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue because he
is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a personal stake on the case
is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that only official nominees for the post of Chief Justice
can come to the Court and question the JBC composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise
screens and nominates other members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the JBCs
duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in the land. A vast number of
aspirants to judicial posts all over the country may be affected by the Courts ruling. More importantly,
the legality of the very process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the
controversy. The Court considers this a constitutional issue that must be passed upon, lest a constitutional
process be plagued by misgivings, doubts and worse, mistrust. Hence, a citizen has a right to bring this
question to the Court, clothed with legal standing and at the same time, armed with issues of
transcendental importance to society. The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and
unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who
have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.

With respect to the question of transcendental importance, it is not difficult to perceive from the
opposing arguments of the parties that the determinants established in jurisprudence are attendant in
this case: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear
case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or
instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific
interest in the questions being raised. The allegations of constitutional violations in this case are not
empty attacks on the wisdom of the other branches of the government. The allegations are substantiated
by facts and, therefore, deserve an evaluation from the Court. The Court need not elaborate on the legal
and societal ramifications of the issues raised. It cannot be gainsaid that the JBC is a constitutional
innovation crucial in the selection of the magistrates in our judicial system.

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The Composition of the JBC

Central to the resolution of the foregoing petition is an understanding of the composition of the JBC as
stated in the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution. It reads:

Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court
composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the
Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.

From a simple reading of the above-quoted provision, it can readily be discerned that the provision is
clear and unambiguous. The first paragraph calls for the creation of a JBC and places the same under the
supervision of the Court. Then it goes to its composition where the regular members are enumerated: a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired member of the Court and a
representative from the private sector. On the second part lies the crux of the present controversy. It
enumerates the ex officio or special members of the JBC composed of the Chief Justice, who shall be its
Chairman, the Secretary of Justice and a representative of Congress.

As petitioner correctly posits, the use of the singular letter a preceding representative of Congress is
unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the
Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the
JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the
JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear,
plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in
the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As
much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in common
use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates
the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what
they say. Verba legis non est recedendum from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

The raison d tre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained; and second, because
the Constitution is not primarily a lawyers document but essentially that of the people, in whose
consciousness it should ever be present as an important condition for the rule of law to prevail.

Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is
equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by
considering the company of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated. This is because a
word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases, and its meaning
may, thus, be modified or restricted by the latter. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not
be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole. A statute
must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible. In short,
every meaning to be given to each word or phrase must be ascertained from the context of the body of
the statute since a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases
and its meaning may be modified or restricted by the latter.

Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word Congress used in
Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever
is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either
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case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The foregoing declaration is but
sensible, since, as pointed out by an esteemed former member of the Court and consultant of the JBC in
his memorandum, from the enumeration of the membership of the JBC, it is patent that each category
of members pertained to a single individual only.

Indeed, the spirit and reason of the statute may be passed upon where a literal meaning would lead to
absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers. Not any of these
instances, however, is present in the case at bench. Considering that the language of the subject
constitutional provision is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort extrinsic aids such as records
of the Constitutional Commission.

Nevertheless, even if the Court should proceed to look into the minds of the members of the
Constitutional Commission, it is undeniable from the records thereof that it was intended that the JBC be
composed of seven (7) members only. Thus:

MR. RODRIGO: Let me go to another point then.

On page 2, Section 5, there is a novel provision about the appointments of members of the Supreme
Court and judges of the lower courts. At present it is the President who appoints them. If there is a
Commission on Appointments, then it is the President with the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointment. In this proposal, we would like to establish a new office, a sort of a board composed of
seven members called the Judicial and Bar Council. And while the President will still appoint the member
of the judiciary, he will be limited to the recommendees of this Council.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. RODRIGO. Of the seven members of the Judicial and Bar Council, the President appoints four of them
who are regular members.

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MR. CONCEPCION. The only purpose of the Committee is to eliminate partisan politics.

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MR. RODRIGO. If my amendment is approved, then the provision will be exactly the same as the provision
in the 1935 Constitution, Article VIII, Section 5.

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If we do not remove the proposed amendment on the creation of the Judicial and Bar Council, this will be
a diminution of the appointing power of the highest magistrate of the land, of the President of the
Philippines elected by all the Filipino people. The appointing power will be limited by a group of seven
people who are not elected by the people but only appointed.

Mr. Presiding Officer, if this Council is created, there will be no uniformity in our constitutional provisions
on appointments. The members of the Judiciary will be segregated from the rest of the government. Even
a municipal judge cannot be appointed by the President except upon recommendation or nomination of
the three names by this Committee of seven people, commissioners of the Commission on Elections, the
COA and the Commission on Civil Serviceeven ambassadors, generals of the Army will not come under
this restriction. Why are we going to segregate the Judiciary from the rest of our government in the
appointment of high-ranking officials?

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Another reason is that this Council will be ineffective. It will just besmirch the honor of our President
without being effective at all because this Council will be under the influence of the President. Four out of
seven are appointees of the President and they can be reappointed when their term ends. Therefore, they
would be kowtow the President. A fifth member is the Minister of Justice, an alter ego of the President.
Another member represents the Legislature. In all probability, the controlling part in the legislature
belongs to the President and, therefore, this representative form the National Assembly is also under the
influence of the President. And may I say, Mr. Presiding Officer, that event the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court is an appointee of the President. So it is futile he will be influence anyway by the
President. [Emphases supplied]

At this juncture, it is worthy to note that the seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical
purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting. This underlying reason leads
the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between two representatives
of Congress, or among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter. This unsanctioned practice
can possibly cause disorder and eventually muddle the JBCs voting process, especially in the event a tie is
reached. The aforesaid purpose would then be rendered illusory, defeating the precise mechanism which
the Constitution itself created. While it would be unreasonable to expect that the Framers provide for
every possible scenario, it is sensible to presume that they knew that an odd composition is the best
means to break a voting deadlock.

The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature of Congress, the word Congress in Section
8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution should be read as including both the Senate and the House of
Representatives. They theorize that it was so worded because at the time the said provision was being
drafted, the Framers initially intended a unicameral form of Congress. Then, when the Constitutional
Commission eventually adopted a bicameral form of Congress, the Framers, through oversight, failed to
amend Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution. On this score, the Court cites the insightful analysis of
another member of the Court and JBC consultant, retired Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago. Thus:

A perusal of the records of the Constitutional Commission reveals that the composition of the JBC reflects
the Commissions desire to have in the Council a representation for the major elements of the
community. xxx The ex-officio members of the Council consist of representatives from the three main
branches of government while the regular members are composed of various stakeholders in the
judiciary. The unmistakeable tenor of Article VIII, Section 8(1) was to treat each ex-officio member as
representing one co-equal branch of government. xxx Thus, the JBC was designed to have seven voting
members with the three ex-officio members having equal say in the choice of judicial nominees.

xxx

No parallelism can be drawn between the representative of Congress in the JBC and the exercise by
Congress of its legislative powers under Article VI and constituent powers under Article XVII of the
Constitution. Congress, in relation to the executive and judicial branches of government, is
constitutionally treated as another coequal branch of in the matter of its representative in the JBC. On the
other hand, the exercise of legislative and constituent powers requires the Senate and House of
Representatives to coordinate and act as distinct bodies in furtherance of Congress role under our
constitutional scheme. While the latter justifies and, in fact, necessitates the separateness of the two
houses of Congress as they relate inter se, no such dichotomy need be made when Congress interacts
with the other two co-equal branches of government.

It is more in keeping with the co-equal nature of the three governmental branches to assign the same
weight to considerations that any of its representatives may have regarding aspiring nominees to the
judiciary. The representatives of the Senate and the House of Representatives act as such for one
branch and should not have any more quantitative influence as the other branches in the exercise of
prerogatives evenly bestowed upon the three. Sound reason and principle of equality among the three
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branches support this conclusion. [Emphases and underscoring supplied]

More than the reasoning provided in the above discussed rules of constitutional construction, the Court
finds the above thesis as the paramount justification of the Courts conclusion that Congress, in the
context of JBC representation, should be considered as one body. It is evident that the definition of
Congress as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in government - to legislate. In the passage
of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same
holds true in Congress non-legislative powers such as, inter alia, the power of appropriation, the
declaration of an existence of a state of war, canvassing of electoral returns for the President and Vice-
President, and impeachment. In the exercise of these powers, the Constitution employs precise
language in laying down the roles which a particular house plays, regardless of whether the two houses
consummate an official act by voting jointly or separately. An inter-play between the two houses is
necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply
discount. Verily, each house is constitutionally granted with powers and functions peculiar to its nature
and with keen consideration to 1) its relationship with the other chamber; and 2) in consonance with the
principle of checks and balances, to the other branches of government.

This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two
houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of
Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial officers. Hence, the term Congress must be
taken to mean the entire legislative department. A fortiori, a pretext of oversight cannot prevail over the
more pragmatic scheme which the Constitution laid with firmness, that is, that the JBC has a seat for a
single representative of Congress, as one of the co-equal branches of government.

Doubtless, the Framers of our Constitution intended to create a JBC as an innovative solution in response
to the public clamor in favor of eliminating politics in the appointment of members of the Judiciary. To
ensure judicial independence, they adopted a holistic approach and hoped that, in creating a JBC, the
private sector and the three branches of government would have an active role and equal voice in the
selection of the members of the Judiciary.

Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have more quantitative influence in the JBC by having more than
one voice speak, whether with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each, would, as one former
congressman and member of the JBC put it, negate the principle of equality among the three branches of
government which is enshrined in the Constitution.

To quote one former Secretary of Justice:

The present imbalance in voting power between the Legislative and the other sectors represented in the
JBC must be corrected especially when considered vis--vis the avowed purpose for its creation, i.e., to
insulate the appointments in the Judiciary against political influence. By allowing both houses of
Congress to have a representative in the JBC and by giving each representative one (1) vote in the
Council, Congress, as compared to the other members of the JBC, is accorded greater and unwarranted
influence in the appointment of judges. [Emphasis supplied]

It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members
only. Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote or half (1/2) of it, goes against
that mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, providing Congress with an equal voice with
other members of the JBC in recommending appointees to the Judiciary is explicit. Any circumvention of
the constitutional mandate should not be countenanced for the Constitution is the supreme law of the
land. The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which
all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer. Constitutional doctrines must remain
steadfast no matter what may be the tides of time. It cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate
the call of situations and much more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of the government and the
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people who run it. Hence, any act of the government or of a public official or employee which is contrary
to the Constitution is illegal, null and void.

As to the effect of the Courts finding that the current composition of the JBC is unconstitutional, it bears
mentioning that as a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no
duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all.
This rule, however, is not absolute. In the interest of fair play under the doctrine of operative facts,
actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified. In
Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation, the Court explained:

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and
fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute
prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.

The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those
who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of
unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a
municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.

Considering the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and holds that
notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official
actions are nonetheless valid.

At this point, the Court takes the initiative to clarify that it is not in a position to determine as to who
should remain as the sole representative of Congress in the JBC. This is a matter beyond the province of
the Court and is best left to the determination of Congress.

Finally, while the Court finds wisdom in respondents' contention that both the Senate and the House of
Representatives should be equally represented in the JBC, the Court is not in a position to stamp its
imprimatur on such a construction at the risk of expanding the meaning of the Constitution as currently
worded. Needless to state, the remedy lies in the amendment of this constitutional provision. The courts
merely give effect to the lawgiver's intent. The solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret and apply
the law does not include the power to correct, by reading into the law what is not written therein.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar Council
IS declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so
that only one ( 1) member of Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with
Section 8( 1 ), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

This disposition is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
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