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PONTIFCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATLICA DO PARAN

CENTRO DE CINCIAS EXATAS E DE TECNOLOGIA


PROGRAMA DE PS-GRADUAO EM
ENGENHARIA DE PRODUO E SISTEMAS

JULIO CESAR BATTIROLA FILHO

A PROCESS AWARE FMEA FOR FAILURE ANALYSIS IN MAINTENANCE


INTEGRATING AHP AND DELPHI METHODOLOGY

CURITIBA
2015

JULIO CESAR BATTIROLA FILHO

A PROCESS AWARE FMEA FOR FAILURE ANALYSIS IN MAINTENANCE


INTEGRATING AHP AND DELPHI METHODOLOGY

Documented Presented to the Industrial


and
System
Engineering
Graduate
Program of the Polytechnic School of the
Pontifical Catholic University of Parana as
a partial requirement for the Master
dissertation final examination.
Advisor: Prof. Dr. Eduardo de Freitas
Rocha Loures
Co-advisor: Prof. Dr. Eduardo Alves
Portela Santos

CURITIBA
2015

II
JULIO CESAR BATTIROLA FILHO

A PROCESS AWARE FMEA FOR FAILURE ANALYSIS IN MAINTENANCE


INTEGRATING AHP AND DELPHI METHODOLOGY
Final report presented to the Industrial and System Engineer Post-Graduation
program of the Polytechnic School of the Pontifical Catholic University of Parana, as
a partial requirement to obtain the title of Master in Industrial and System
Engineering.
COMISSO EXAMINADORA
_______________________________________
Prof. Dr. Eduardo de Freitas Rocha Loures (PUCPR)
Orientador
_______________________________________
Prof. Dr. Eduardo Alves Portela Santos (PUCPR)
Co-orientador
_______________________________________
Prof. Dr. Rui Francisco Martins Maral (PUCPR)
Membro Interno
_______________________________________
Prof. Dr. Emerson Rigoni (UTFPR)
Membro Externo
_______________________________________
Prof. Dr. ngelo Mrcio Oliveira SantAnna (UFBA)
Membro Externo

CURITIBA
2015

AGRADECIMENTOS
Agradeo ao meu orientador professor Dr. Eduardo de Freitas Rocha Loures
pelo apoio, conhecimento, direcionamento dos estudos, disponibilidade nos
momentos mais crticos e palavras de incentivo nas horas mais difceis, sem os
quais este trabalho no seria realizado.
Agradeo ao meu co-orientador professor Dr. Eduardo Alves Portela dos
Santos pelo apoio no incio da pesquisa e seus conselhos centrados no objetivo final
do trabalho.
Agradeo a minha namorada Gabriela Damke pelo apoio, companheirismo,
pacincia e amor durante o desenvolvimento deste trabalho.
Agradeo tambm aos professores Dr. Emerson Rigoni, Dr. Marcelo
Rodrigues e Dr. Rui Francisco Martins Maral pela sua disponibilidade e contribuio
durante as etapas do trabalho.
Agradeo aos meus pais por todos seus esforos em me fornecer sempre o
melhor, permitindo que eu alcanasse mais este objetivo.
Agradeo aos meus colegas de mestrado, por serem uma inspirao para
buscar novos conhecimentos e desafios.
Agradeo a todos os amigos e colegas que direta ou indiretamente
participaram na realizao desta pesquisa.

II

ABSTRACT
Maintenance has the objective to preserve the functional capacities of
equipments and systems in operation. Furthermore, the maintenance is not only
about optimizing equipment availability at lower cost, but also affects the whole
business perspective such as safety, environmental integrity, energy efficiency and
quality of product. Time needs to be used to investigate and determine the problem,
and to determine the maintenance plan to fix the equipment. In this regard, FMEA
has been used as best-practice expertise knowledge in the maintenance domain and
to support the decision-making process to prioritize maintenance actions so as to
enhance product/system by increasing system availability. FMEA has become a
default procedure in industry to define and document every potential failure mode.
However, according to the literature review and survey with specialist the FMEA has
some problems in its application like uncertainties in the identification of key failures
and lack of resources to be implemented. Moreover, it is noticeable the gap between
the FMEAs main role, identifying and eliminating potential failure modes, and its
applicability as a decision making tool on maintenance intervention. The objective of
this work is to develop a process aware FMEA, which integrates Delphi Methodology
to obtain consensus of specialists opinions, Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) to
realize the risk assessment based on multiple criteria and a Business Process
Management System (BPMS) to instantiate its development cycle. The proposed
method, titled PAFMEA (Process-Aware FMEA), has the objective to face the main
FMEA deficiencies concerning the failure analysis in maintenance. The BPMS
environment includes functional and non-functional requirements identified in the
literature review, from analysis of FMEA software and survey with specialists from the
academy and industrial area. The PAFMEA method was subjected to the review of
maintenance specialists and practitioners in FMEA through an application study in a
multinational manufacturing company of white goods. The positive results from the
industrial application, confronts the traditional FMEA and reveals the new perception
of the PAFMEA in the assessment and prioritization of the failure modes for the
failure analysis in maintenance.

Keywords - Maintenance, FMEA, AHP, Delphi Methodology, Process.

III

RESUMO
A manuteno tem o objetivo de preservar as capacidades funcionais dos
equipamentos e sistemas em funcionamento. Alm disso, a manuteno no versa
apenas sobre como otimizar a disponibilidade de equipamentos a um custo menor,
mas tambm afeta a perspectiva de todo o negcio, tais como a segurana, a
integridade ambiental, eficincia energtica e qualidade do produto. O tempo um
elemento de restrio para investigao de um problema e determinao do plano
de manuteno do equipamento. A este respeito, o FMEA tem sido utilizado como
um referencial de melhores prticas no domnio da manuteno industrial e de apoio
ao processo de tomada de deciso para priorizar aes de manuteno de modo a
melhorar o produto / sistema, aumentando a disponibilidade do mesmo. O FMEA
tornou-se um procedimento padro na indstria para identificar e documentar cada
modo de falha potencial. No entanto, de acordo com a reviso da literatura e
pesquisa com especialistas, o FMEA tem alguns problemas e desvantagens na sua
aplicao, como incertezas na identificao das principais falhas e falta de recursos
para ser implementado. Alm disso, percebe-se lacunas no atendimento do principal
papel do FMEA, identificando e eliminando possveis modos de falha, e sua
aplicabilidade como instrumento de tomada de deciso na manuteno. O objetivo
deste trabalho desenvolver um FMEA orientado por processo, que integra a
metodologia Delphi para obter consenso de opinies entre especialistas, Anlise
Hierrquica de Processos (AHP) para realizar a avaliao de risco com base em
mltiplos critrios e um Business Process Management System (BPMS) para
instanciar seu ciclo de desenvolvimento. O mtodo proposto, intitulado de PAFMEA
(Process-Aware FMEA), tem o objetivo de enfrentar as principais deficincias do
FMEA relativas anlise de falhas em manuteno. O ambiente BPMS inclui
requisitos funcionais e no-funcionais identificados na reviso da literatura, a partir
da anlise de softwares de FMEA e pesquisa com especialistas da academia e da
rea industrial. O mtodo PAFMEA foi submetido avaliao de especialistas em
manuteno e profissionais em FMEA por meio de um estudo de aplicao em uma
empresa multinacional de manufatura de produtos da linha branca. Os resultados
positivos de sua aplicao industrial, confrontam o FMEA tradicional e revelam
atravs do PAFMEA uma nova percepo na avaliao e priorizao dos modos de
falha para a anlise de falhas em manuteno.
Palavras chave - Manuteno, FMEA, AHP, Metodologia Delphi, Processo.

IV

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1.1 Research strategy. ..................................................................................... 5
Figure 1.2 Research dimensions................................................................................. 6
Figure 1.3 Document structure. ................................................................................... 7
Figure 2.1 The FMEA team (BERTSCHE, 2008). ..................................................... 12
Figure 2.2 The FMEA team according to VDA 4.2. ................................................... 13
Figure 2.3 FMEA approach according to AIAG (2008).............................................. 13
Figure 2.4 FMEA form (AIAG, 2008; BERTSCHE, 2008). ........................................ 15
Figure 2.5. Hierarchy diagram of an AHP (RODRIGUES, 2010). ............................. 18
Figure 2.6. Example of AHP structure. ...................................................................... 19
Figure 2.7. Generic Square Matrix. ........................................................................... 20
Figure 2.8. The seven steps of the Delphi approach................................................. 33
Figure 2.9 BPM domain (Kluska, 2014). ................................................................... 34
Figure 2.10. BPM life cycle........................................................................................ 37
Figure 2.11. BPM objects. ......................................................................................... 39
Figure 2.12. Connections objects of BPMN (OMG, 2011). ....................................... 40
Figure 2.13. Swim lanes elements of BPMN (OMG, 2011). ...................................... 40
Figure 2.14. Basic artifacts of BPMN (OMG, 2011). ................................................. 41
Figure 2.15. Histogram of RPN numbers generated from all possible combinations of
severity, occurrence and detection (SANKAR & PRABHU, 2000). ........................... 47
Figure 2.16. Distribution of proposed improvements researched. (LAURENTI et al.,
2012) ......................................................................................................................... 50
Figure 2.17 Process flow of the software (BELL et al., 1992). .................................. 51
Figure 2.18 Screenshot extract from the OpenFMECA software (RIGONI, 2009). ... 56
Figure 2.19 Hierarchy of the Italian Oil refinery system (Adpated from BEVILACQUA
& BARGLIA, 2000). ................................................................................................... 60
Figure 2.20 Model to select diagnostic technics and instrumentation (CARNERO,
2005). ........................................................................................................................ 61
Figure 2.21 Hierarchy system for the combined goal programming-AHP (BERTOLINI
& BEVILACQUA, 2006). ............................................................................................ 61
Figure 2.22 Hierarchy scheme and AHP results. ...................................................... 62
Figure 2.23 Hierarchy decision model to measure health, safety and environment
performance (CHANDIMA RATNAYAKE & MARKESET, 2010)............................... 63

Figure 2.24 AHP model to select the maintenance policy (TAN et al., 2011). .......... 64
Figure 2.25 Hierarchy model of AHP and ANP for maintenance selection (ZAIM et al.,
2012). ........................................................................................................................ 64
Figure 2.26 The hierarchical tree to calculate the fault priority (CARMIGNANI, 2008).
.................................................................................................................................. 66
Figure 2.27 Hierarchy of system (SUEBSOMRAN & TALABGEAW, 2010).............. 67
Figure 2.28 Software for maintenance priority for a termal plant (SUEBSOMRAN &
TALABGEAW, 2010) ................................................................................................. 67
Figure 2.29 Hierarchy model of integrating FMECA and ANP (ZAMMORI &
GABBRIELLI, 2011). ................................................................................................. 68
Figure 2.30 Distribution of FMEA problems and drawbacks according to its classes.
.................................................................................................................................. 73
Figure 2.31 Distribution of Methods, Guidelines, Software, Frameworks and
Approaches found in the literature review. ................................................................ 75
Figure 3.1 Framework of PA-FMEA. ......................................................................... 76
Figure 3.2 Basic IDEF0 syntax. ................................................................................. 77
Figure 3.3 Information flow of phase 1 and 2 activities. ............................................ 78
Figure 3.4 Specialists survey of their current field of work. ....................................... 79
Figure 3.5 Specialists current position. ..................................................................... 80
Figure 3.6 Specialists experience in maintenance. ................................................... 80
Figure 3.7 Quantity of FMEA sessions the specialist participated before. ................ 81
Figure 3.8 Total of resource availability responses. .................................................. 82
Figure 3.9 Total of responses related to the use and calculation of the RPN. .......... 83
Figure 3.10 Total of responses related to the behavior and treatment of the
participants. ............................................................................................................... 84
Figure 3.11 Responses of sentences #13, #14 and #15. .......................................... 84
Figure 3.12 PAFMEA methodology. .......................................................................... 85
Figure 3.13 AHP structure for the Risk Analysis of the PA-FMEA. ........................... 88
Figure 4.1 Screenshot example of IQ-Software. ....................................................... 95
Figure 4.2 FMEA matrix from IQ-Software. ............................................................... 96
Figure 4.3 Tree structure and software interface of FMEA Executive. ...................... 97
Figure 4.4 Failure analysis of FMEA Executive......................................................... 97
Figure 4.5 XFMEA screenshot of the FMEA form. .................................................... 98
Figure 4.6 XFMEA customizing and generating FMEA forms. .................................. 99

VI

Figure 4.7 Tree structure of RAM Commander. ...................................................... 100


Figure 4.8 FMEA form of RAM Commander. .......................................................... 100
Figure 4.9 FMEA report generation of RAM Commander. ...................................... 101
Figure 4.10 Tree structure of FMEA Inspector. ....................................................... 101
Figure 4.11 Architecture diagram of the BPMS. ...................................................... 106
Figure 4.12 PAFMEA process model. ..................................................................... 107
Figure 4.13 Define Scope & Client user interface. .................................................. 108
Figure 4.14 Define the Team tab user interface. ..................................................... 108
Figure 4.15 PA-FMEA process model of Strategy & Planning and FMEA
Development. ......................................................................................................... 109
Figure 4.16 Complete FMEA Header interface. ...................................................... 109
Figure 4.17 Complete FMEA form interface. ........................................................... 110
Figure 4.18 Interface for addition or edition of FMEA form lines. ............................ 110
Figure 4.19 List/Choose the Main Failure Modes interface. .................................... 111
Figure 4.20 PA-FMEA process model of AHP Development and Results
Presentation. .......................................................................................................... 111
Figure 4.21 Interface of the activity Define AHP Criteria with Delphi. ................... 112
Figure 4.22 Example of the activity Confirm Criteria Selected interface. ................ 112
Figure 4.23 Sub-process of the AHP Development activity. ................................. 113
Figure 4.24 Example of the pairwise comparison for the AHP criteria in the BPMS.
................................................................................................................................ 114
Figure 4.25 Example of the pairwise comparison for the failure modes in the BPMS.
................................................................................................................................ 114
Figure 4.26 Example of pairwise comparison between criteria, forming Matrix 1. .. 115
Figure 4.27 Example of pairwise comparison between failure modes, forming Matrix
1. ............................................................................................................................. 116
Figure 4.28 Calculation of the priority of the failure modes. .................................... 116
Figure 4.29 Example of FMEA form report sheet. ................................................... 116
Figure 4.30 Example of PAFMEA final ranking report sheet. .................................. 117
Figure 5.1 PAFMEA methodology. .......................................................................... 120
Figure 5.2 Layout of the case study sytem.............................................................. 121
Figure 5.3 AHP hierarchy structure of the case study. ............................................ 125
Figure 5.4 Graph of final ranking. ............................................................................ 130
Figure 5.5 AHP hierarchy structure with results. ..................................................... 133

VII

Figure 5.6 Time of experience in maintenance. ...................................................... 133


Figure 5.7 Quantity of FMEA sections..................................................................... 134
Figure 6.1 Comparison of hierarchy and network. .................................................. 139

VIII

LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1. The fundamental scales in AHP (Saaty, 1990). ....................................... 20


Table 2.2. Table proposed by Saaty according to Pamplona (1993). ....................... 21
Table 2.3. Modeling and reading the comparison table. ........................................... 22
Table 2.4. Comparison Table. ................................................................................... 22
Table 2.5. Comparison table in decimal values......................................................... 22
Table 2.6. Matrix for the NPV (Net Present Value) criterion...................................... 23
Table 2.7. Matrix for the Cost criterion. ..................................................................... 23
Table 2.8. Matrix for the risk criterion. ....................................................................... 23
Table 2.9. Normalization of the comparison matrix. .................................................. 24
Table 2.10. Eigenvector and ranking for the criterion NPV. ...................................... 25
Table 2.11. Eigenvector and ranking for the criterion Cost. ...................................... 25
Table 2.12. Eigenvector and ranking for the criterion Risk........................................ 25
Table 2.13. The normalization of the comparison matrix. ......................................... 26
Table 2.14. Random Index (SAATY, 2008). .............................................................. 28
Table 2.15. Final ranking of the Portfolio Project Selection Example........................ 30
Table 2.16. Resources used in BPM. ........................................................................ 36
Table 2.17 The frequency index F (PUENTE et al., 2002). .................................... 45
Table 2.18 Non-detection index D (PUENTE et al., 2002)...................................... 46
Table 2.19. RPN scale statistical data (SANKAR & PRABHU, 2000) ....................... 46
Table 2.20. Problems listed and ordered by the frequency showed in the study.
(LAURENTI et al., 2012) ........................................................................................... 49
Table 2.21 Calculation of ranking using RPN (PUENTE, 2002)................................ 54
Table 2.22 Calculation of ranking using proposed method (PUENTE, 2002). .......... 54
Table 2.23 Summary table of FMEA related works. .................................................. 58
Table 2.24 Summary table of FMEA related works. .................................................. 59
Table 2.25 Summary of decision-making related works............................................ 65
Table 2.26 Summary of FMEA integrated to decision-making methods related works.
.................................................................................................................................. 69
Table 2.27 Classification of FMEA problems and drawbacks. .................................. 71
Table 2.28 Classification of FMEA integrated to other methods according to the five
categories. ................................................................................................................. 74

IX

Table 3.1 Responses of resource availability sentences. ......................................... 81


Table 3.2 Responses of the use and calculation of the RPN sentences................... 82
Table 3.3 Responses related to the behavior and treatment of the participants. ...... 83
Table 3.4 PAFMEA form based on VDA 4.2. ............................................................ 87
Table 3.5. Intensity of importance to pairwise comparison (Saaty, 1994). ................ 90
Table 4.1 Commercial softwares of FMEA. ............................................................... 94
Table 4.2 Comparison table between the commercial FMEA software................... 102
Table 4.3 Responses of the software requirements survey. ................................... 103
Table 4.4 Functional requirements of the BPMS for the PA-FMEA. ....................... 105
Table 4.5 Non-functional requirements of the BPMS for the PAFMEA. .................. 105
Table 5.1 Severity of the Effect of the Failure Mode Ranking (SAE J1739, 2002).. 122
Table 5.2 Chances of detection (SAE J1739, 2002). .............................................. 123
Table 5.3 Probability of Occurrence of a Failure Cause (SAE J1739, 2002). ......... 123
Table 5.4 PAFMEA form of the case study. ............................................................ 124
Table 5.5 Failures modes used in the PAFMEA risk assesment. ........................... 124
Table 5.6 Pairwise comparison between severity, detection and occurrence. ........ 125
Table 5.7 Pairwise comparison of the severity sub-criteria. .................................... 126
Table 5.8 Pairwise comparison of the detection sub-criteria. .................................. 126
Table 5.9 Pairwise comparison for equipment damage. ......................................... 127
Table 5.10 Pairwise comparison for production priority. ......................................... 127
Table 5.11 Pairwise comparison for maintenance duration. ................................... 127
Table 5.12 Pairwise comparison for visual inspection............................................. 128
Table 5.13 Pairwise comparison for detailed inspection. ........................................ 128
Table 5.14 Pairwise comparison for supervisory inspection. .................................. 128
Table 5.15 Pairwise comparison for occurrence of failure. ..................................... 129
Table 5.16 Calculation of the severity ranking. ....................................................... 129
Table 5.17 Calculation of the detection ranking. ..................................................... 130
Table 5.18 Calculation of final ranking. ................................................................... 130
Table 5.19 Final ranking of failures modes according to PAFMEA. ........................ 131
Table 5.20 Comparison ranking of classical approach and PAFMEA. .................... 131
Table 5.21 Responses related to the resources sentences of the final survey. ...... 134
Table 5.22 Responses about the new risk assesment approach of the final survey.
................................................................................................................................ 135
Table 5.23 Responses about the behavior and treatment of the team members. .. 135

Table 5.24 Responses about other aspects of the PAFMEA. ................................. 135
Table 5.25 Responses about the evaluation of the software used to support the
PAFMEA. ................................................................................................................. 136

XI

INDEX
1. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................... 1
1.1. RESEARCH QUESTION ...................................................................................... 3
1.2. OBJECTIVES ........................................................................................................ 3
1.3. RESEARCH JUSTIFICATION .............................................................................. 4
1.4. METHODOLOGY APPROACH ............................................................................ 4
1.5. DOCUMENT STRUCTURE .................................................................................. 7
2. LITERATURE REVIEW .......................................................................................... 9
2.1. BACKGROUND .................................................................................................... 9
2.1.1. FMEA (FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS) ..................................... 10
2.1.2. AHP (ANALYTIC HIERARCHY PROCESS) .................................................. 16
2.1.3. DELPHI METHODOLOGY ............................................................................. 30
2.1.4. BPM (BUSINESS PROCESS MANAGEMENT) ............................................. 34
2.2. RELATED WORKS ............................................................................................. 43
2.2.1. FMEA PROBLEMS AND DRAWBACKS ........................................................ 44
2.2.2. FMEA AND DECISION MAKING METHODS RELATED WORKS ................ 50
2.3. CONSIDERETIONS AND CHAPTER SYNTHESIS ........................................... 70
3. PAFMEA FRAMEWORK ...................................................................................... 76
3.1. KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERING AND FORMALIZATION .................................... 77
3.1.1. SURVEY ANALYSIS ...................................................................................... 79
3.2. PAFMEA PROPOSITION ................................................................................... 85
3.3. PAFMEA IMPLEMENTATION AND ANALYSIS ................................................. 91
3.4. CONSIDERATIONS AND CHAPTER SYNTESIS .............................................. 92
4. PA-FMEA DEVELOPMENT CYCLE .................................................................... 93
4.1. FMEA SOFTWARE REVIEW ............................................................................. 93
4.1.1. APIS IQ-SOFTWARE ..................................................................................... 94
4.1.2. FMEA EXECUTIVE ........................................................................................ 96
4.1.3. RELIASOFT XFMEA ...................................................................................... 98
4.1.4. RAM COMMANDER ....................................................................................... 99
4.1.5. FMEA INSPECTOR ...................................................................................... 101
4.1.6. SOFTWARE SUMMARY .............................................................................. 102
4.2. SURVEY OF SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS .................................................. 103
4.3. PAFMEA SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS ........................................................ 104

XII

4.4. SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT ......................................................................... 107


4.5. CONSIDERATIONS AND CHAPTER SYNSTESIS .......................................... 117
5. APPLICATION SCENARIO ................................................................................ 119
5.1. PRESENTATION OF APPLICATION STUDY .................................................. 119
5.2. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS ............................................................................ 131
5.3. FINAL SURVEY ANALYSIS ............................................................................. 133
6. CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................. 137
6.1. FINAL CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................... 137
6.2. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE WORKS ......................................................... 139
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................ 141
ANNEX A - SURVEY PROFILE OF SPECIALISTS ............................................... 149
ANNEX B - SURVEY METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS ......................................... 151
ANNEX C - SURVEY SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS ........................................... 153
ANNEX D - SURVEY PAFMEA RESULTS ............................................................ 154

1. INTRODUCTION

The advance of the information technology became possible to collect, monitor


and supervise the production process more efficiently. However, these factors do not
increase the process efficiency without interventions and improvements at the
appropriate place and equipment. These interventions and improvements are also
called maintenance.
The maintenance objective is not only about optimizing equipment availability
at lower cost, but also affects the whole business perspective such as safety,
environmental integrity, energy efficiency and quality of product. The use of
advanced techniques in maintenance management is providing increasingly control
and safety in production processes, resulting in increased productivity, since they
ensure greater availability of equipment at a lower maintenance cost.
According to Fagundes and Almeida (2004), the need to increase reliability
has popularized several methods and techniques for minimizing and eliminating
failures. These methods and techniques have been developed to improve products
and processes reliability, i.e., increase probability of an item or equipment to perform
its function flawless. Techniques like Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), Fault
Tree Analysis (FTA) and Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) are widely use in the
manufacture industry. According to Laurenti et al. (2012) FMEA is the method most
used to anticipate failure of products and in the manufacture process.
However the qualitative approach of these methods, in particular the FMEA,
leads to many difficulties in implementing these techniques for the decision making
process in maintenance. This process is highly dependent on tacit knowledge under
a strong perspective of uncertainty and consensus, aggravated by the difficulty to
obtain information from heterogeneous systems and databases. Despite the
popularity of the FMEA, several problems related to its implementation and
usefulness have been reported in the literature such as lack understanding the
basics of FMEA and the limitations of the risk assessment approach.
In the other hand, multi criteria decision-making tools like Analytic Hierarchy
Process (AHP), Analytic Network Process (ANP) and Fuzzy Reasoning have become
a recent effort of the scientific community to complement and extend the objectives of
theses industrial techniques. AHP is an approach that the criteria are organized in a

hierarchical structure, where each level of this hierarchy is part of the problem to be
solved (Saaty, 1990). This technique makes comparative judgment between multiple
criteria and places them in a ranking, thus defines the best alternative for each
criterion in question. The relation characteristic of this method allows dealing with
uncertainties inherent to the evaluation process considering the decision domain,
criteria and actors involved.
Allied to these methods and techniques it is important to understand the failure
analysis process, which allows a better identification of failures and gives a clearer
understanding of the tasks performed in the business (PINHO, 2006). Furthermore,
another vision of process can be found on the specialists tacit knowledge related to
the operational knowledge in the use of the tools cited before (FMEA, FTA and PRA)
and the perspective on the conduction of decision-making methods (AHP, ANP and
Fuzzy). These components of knowledge characterizes an intrinsically process
approach, motivating their formalization, instantiation and incorporation through
maintenance tools with features focused on processes, not on a set of functionalities
decoupled from their procedural meanings.
In this sense emerge the BPM (Business Process Management) lifecycles
and BPMS (Business Process Management System) platforms as elements of
innovation to be used in maintenance. They

characterize

Process

Aware

Information System (PAIS) in a maintenance management domain, promoting a


complete knowledge management and process modeling, deployment and execution
through lifecycle steps. These steps can be associated with the FMEA method,
supporting the failure identification, implementation of improvements and association
of decision-making executed towards a maintenance strategy.

In fact, the AHP

makes the decision-making problem of the failure analysis in a more complete and
thorough way than the regular FMEA, taking several factors into account and
characterizing a multi-criteria decision making approach.
The process approach in the concern of maintenance management systems is
innovative in the sense that existent technologies as Computerized Maintenance
Management System (CMMS) and Enterprise Asset Management (EAM) systems
which are intrinsically oriented to functions and not processes. The support of
process models with the widely accepted BPMN industrial notation (Business
Process Management Notation) in BPMS platforms allows the support of continuous
cycle improvement by reducing the response time between the need of the specialist

user (new process design and business rules) and its implementation by the
management resource (software).
These are important requirements that a FMEA development cycle must fulfill,
characterizing the scientific context and scope of this work. The adoption of a
process approach and inspired in the PAIS from BPM domain, leads to a new
proposition on FMEA, titled from now in this document as PAFMEA Process Aware
FMEA.
1.1.

RESEARCH QUESTION

Considering the difficulties signaled by the literature in the development and


use of FMEA in industrial maintenance, mainly in the methodological perspectives
and decision-making, the following research question emerges: A process aware
FMEA integrated with AHP (Analytic Hierarchy Process) and Delphi methodology in a
BPMS platform can help to face the main FMEA deficiencies concerning the failure
analysis in maintenance?
1.2.

OBJECTIVES

The main objective of this research is to develop a new risk assessment


method through process aware FMEA integrating Delphi methodology, AHP and
BPM in a BPMS environment to face the main FMEA deficiencies concerning the
failure analysis in maintenance.
This researchs specific objectives are:

Identify the main drawbacks and problems of the FMEA application;

Present works related to FMEA that are integrated to other methods;

Investigate the application of Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) in


maintenance;

Integrate the consensus and decision making approaches within the


FMEA methodology grounded on Business Process Management
concepts;

Develop a process aware FMEA environment through Business


Process Management System (BPMS) platform.

Evaluate the PAFMEA with experts and practitioners through an


industrial application scenario.

1.3.

RESEARCH JUSTIFICATION

The availability of the methods used to support maintenance brought more


safety to the maintenance activity, but introduced new challenges for the
maintenance professionals. It is up to them to select the most appropriate methods to
treat each type of failure. In addition to this mission, they must meet all the
owners/customers requirements, the most economical way and with the available
human capital.
According to Rozenfeld (2012) FMEA is the method most used to anticipate
failure of products and in the manufacture process. Despite the popularity of this
method, several problems related to its implementation and usefulness have been
reported in the literature, such as lack understanding the basics of FMEA and
applying wrong factors for effective FMEA (CARLSON, 2012). Furthermore, the most
cited drawback in the literature is the risk assessment approach of the method, which
takes into account only three criteria to prioritize the failure modes and the
improvement actions.
In the other hand, even with the high amount of works trying to overcome
some of the FMEA drawbacks, especially the RPN approach, none of them is
flawless and easily implemented. Moreover, these works attack, in general, one
drawback at a time, not improving the method as a whole. Therefore, from this
perspective emerges the possibility to propose a new method that overcomes the risk
assessment approach and others drawbacks in the same proposal.

1.4.

METHODOLOGY APPROACH

The methodology is the study or science of route, with the pretense that this is
a rational path to facilitate knowledge, besides bringing implied the possibility to
serve and to be used by several people, i.e., it can be followed repeatedly and
indefinitely (MAGALHAES, 2006).

The methodology can be seen as the general knowledge and skills necessary
for the researchers to guide themselves in the investigation process, make timely
decisions, select concepts, hypotheses, techniques and appropriate data. It is also
the disciple that relates to epistemology and philosophy of science (THIOLLENT,
1996).
The Figure 1.1 illustrates the process adopted for this research (research
strategy) to explore the problem, synthesizing the organization of the research and
how it will be presented. This drawing constitutes an orientation guide that enables

Chronological*Order*

Descrip(on* Phases*

the research replication.

Explora(on*

Development*

Execu(on*

Conclusion*

Conclusions*and*
Final*Results*

FMEA*
Knowledge*
Domain*

Proposi(on*of*
Model*and*BPM*
Development*
Cycle*

Execu(on*of*
Case*Study*and*
Analysis*of*
Results*

Literature*
Review*Scien(c*
Database*

Proposi(on*of*
Model*

Prepara(on*of*
Case*

Discussion*of*
Results*

Literature*
Review*
Standards**

Specica(on*of*
BPM*

Implementa(on*
of*BPMS*

Final*
Conclusions*

FMEA*SoEware*
Inves(ga(on*

Process*
Modeling*

Data*Acquisi(on*

Response*to*
Research*
Ques(on*

Experts*
Consulta(on*

Development*of*
BPMS*

Compila(on*of*
Results*

Possible*Future*
Works*

Figure 1.1 Research strategy.


The research strategy is formed by four phases:
1. The exploration phase, which is responsible by the study of the FMEA
knowledge domain. In general a literature review is performed to identify the

main drawbacks, issues and formalize the preliminary attributes of the new
approach.
2. The development phase is responsible by the proposition of the new
approach, which integrates Delphi Methodology to obtain consensus of
specialists opinions, Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) to prioritize the failure
modes based on multiple criteria, and BPM to instantiate the use of these
methods and incorporate the specialists knowledge through business process
models in a BPMS environment. Furthermore, this phase presents the
development cycle of the BPM (Business Process Management). The Figure
1.2 illustrates the research scope, integration and objective, which
characterize the new approach, the PAFMEA (Process-Aware FMEA).

Figure 1.2 Research dimensions.


3. The execution phase is responsible by the implementation of the PAFMEA in
an industrial environment. Besides the case study, this phase also presents
the results of this implementation.
4. The conclusion phase discusses the results gather from the third phase and
responds the research question in order to finalize the research study.

1.5.

DOCUMENT STRUCTURE

This document is structured in 6 chapters and can be seen in the Figure 1.3.
Chapter 1 discusses the context of the research, the research question, justification
and objectives. It also details the methodology approach to be used in order to
achieve the research objectives and to answer the research question.

Chapter 1 - INTRODUCTION
Research Question

Research
Justification

Objectives

Methodology
Approach

Document
Structure

Chapter 2 LITERATURE REVIEW


Background
FMEA

Delphi
Methodology

AHP

BPM

Related Works
FMEA integrated
with other
methods

Problems and
drawbacks about
FMEA

Chapter 3 PAFMEA FRAMEWORK


Knowledge
Discovering and
Formalization

PAFMEA
Implementation
and Analysis

PAFMEA
Proposition

Considerations and
Chapter Synteshis

Chapter 4 PAFMEA DEVELOPMENT CYCLE


FMEA Software
Review

Survey of Software
Requirements

PAFMEA Software
Requirements

Software
Development

Considerations and
Chapter Syntesis

Chapter 5 APPLICATION SCENARIO


Presentation of
Application
Scenario

Discussion of
Results

Final Survey

Chapter 6 CONCLUSIONS
Final Conclusions

Suggestions for
Future Works

Figure 1.3 Document structure.


Chapter 2 presents the literature review that has the objective to consolidate
concepts about FMEA, AHP, Delphi Methodology and BPM. Furthermore, related
works that use other methods with FMEA are presented and discussed in order to
investigate how to overcome some of FMEA drawbacks and problems. It also shows

the FMEA problems found in the literature, discussion that aims to direct the proposal
presentation in the next chapter.
Chapter 3 presents and discusses the PAFMEA framework, which is form by a
methodological basis taking into consideration the development cycle and a
technological basis based on a BPMS platform.
Chapter 4 is the development of the integrated approach into a Business
Process Management System (BPMS), which has the objective to instantiate the
PAFMEA and to facilitate its implementation. However, before the development
process, a variety of FMEA software review and a survey are performed to identify
the main requirements for the BPMS to be developed.
Chapter 5 exposes an application scenario on the implementation of the
PAFMEA instantiated in a BPMS. Furthermore, this chapter will also present a
discussion about the results obtained and a survey used to evaluate the participants
perceptions about the new method.
The last chapter presents the final conclusions of the research and possible
future works related to the present subject.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review of this research, following the structure proposed in


Figure 1.3, is divided into three parts:

Part 1: conceptual basis, development the concepts and definitions of


FMEA, AHP, Delphi Methodology and BPM.

Part 2: related works, consisting in a literature search of problems and


drawbacks related to the FMEA use and implementation, and the
proposals which integrate other methods in order to overcome or
minimize some of these problems.

Part 3: considerations and chapter synthesis, which has the objective to


highlight the main points encountered in the literature related to the
research.

2.1. BACKGROUND

According to Smith (1995), maintenance has the objective to preserve the


functional capacities of the equipments and systems in operation. Moubray (1997)
affirms that the maintenance objective is ensure that physical assets continue to do
what their users want them to do. The SAE JA1011 standard provides that
maintenance should ensure that physical items continue to perform their intended
functions. These objectives must be pursued through a maintenance program that
simultaneously collects information for improving reliability of the desired functions.
Furthermore, maintenance is usually categorized into the following three types
(Siqueira, 2005):

corrective maintenance is intended to correct failures that have already


occurred;

preventive maintenance has the objective to prevent and avoid the


consequences of failures;

predictive maintenance search to predict or anticipate the failure.

Commonly, maintenance is performed on a corrective basis or scheduled


periodically based on technicians experience and the equipments manual.
Technicians believe that failures occur due to equipments wear over time and that

10

periodic revision or substitutions solve the problem (Wilmeth; Usrey, 2000). However,
studies in aviation determined that only 11% of components fail due to wear and
fatigue (Lafraia, 2001). Furthermore, according to Rausand (1998), manufactures
recommendations may not be based on real factors, because many times in order to
maximize profit or decrease responsibility they orient short maintenance intervals.
In the methodological field, research in the areas of maintenance and
reliability, as well as the mechanisms and physics of equipments failures, gave rise
to techniques for analyzing failure modes (FMEA and FTA). However the qualitative
approach of these methods, the involvement of the maintenance people and the
decision-making perspective create barriers and uncertainties to implement them.
In the other hand, decision-making tools such as AHP, ANP and Fuzzy have
become to be recent tools to support in maintenance. However, the fuzzy approach
is mathematically hard to deal and testing an extensive set of rules is a complex and
time-consuming activity (BRAGLIA and BEVILACQUA, 2000). Therefore, some
authors proposed to substitute fuzzy logic with multi criteria decision methods such
as AHP and to assess the importance of the failure modes by means of pairwise
comparison (ZAMMORI and GABBRIELLI, 2012). .
The pillars of the proposal, as shown in Figure 1.2, will be discussed in the
following sections: 2.1.1 FMEA; 2.1.2 AHP; 2.1.3 Delphi; 2.1.4 BPM.
2.1.1. FMEA (FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS)

According to Rozenfeld, et al. (2012), FMEA (Failure Mode and Effect


Analysis) is a technique to identify potential failure modes, its effects and causes,
analyze the risk of each failure mode and define actions to prevent the occurrence of
failures. The origin of FMEA is not a consensus. Pentii and Atte (2002) assert that
was created in 1949 by the United States Army. Other authors state that emerged in
1963 from studies by NASA during the development of Apollo (BERTSCHE, 2008;
CLARKE, 2005; etc.). FMEA has become a standard procedure in industry to identify
and document all the potential failure modes in a system (Siqueira, 2005).
Furthermore, according to Siqueira (2005), failure consists in the interruption or
variation of the item capacity to perform a desired function. Completing this definition,

11

the author affirms that a failure can be classify into various aspects, such as origin,
extension, velocity, manifestation, criticality or age.
The FMEA 4th Edition is a reference manual to be used by suppliers to
Chrysler LLC, Ford Motor Company and General Motors Corporation as a guide to
assist them in the development of both Design and Process FMEAs. This manual
defines FMEA as an analytical methodology used to ensure that potential problems
have been considered and addressed throughout the product and development
process. This document also states that FMEA is a tool in risk evaluation, which is
considered to be a method to identify severity of potential effects of failure and to
provide an input to mitigating measure to reduce risk (AIAG, 2008).
Kretli (2011) also affirms that the FMEA method has the followings objectives
in maintenance:

evaluation of the cause, effects and failures risk;

enhancing the functional, operational and environmental safety;

improve internal communication;

how to detect and how to correct.

The FMEA study needs to involve a systematic identification of the following


aspects (SIQUEIRA, 2005):

function objective, with the performance level desired;

functional failure loss of the function or function deviation;

failure mode what can failure;

failure cause the reason for the failure mode to occur;

failure effect resulting impact on the main function;

criticality the severity of the effect.

It is also common to include, besides the basic aspects above, the failure
symptoms, script solution, the failure mechanism, failure rate and recommendations
(ROZENFELD, 2012).
The FMEA procedure according to VDA (Verband Der Automobilindustrie
German Association of the Automotive Industry) is the most extensive and commonly
used procedure, especially in the automotive industry, in Germany and in Europe as
a whole (BERTSHE, 2008).
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis is applied in a session where people are
gathered arising from areas of the company or manufacture floor, with varied

12

expertise, to determine, in a systematic way, all possible potential failures modes,


effects and causes of each failure mode on the performance of the equipments,
evaluate the risks and specify actions for improvement (MCDERMOTT, Mikulak and
BEAUREGARD, 2009). The FMEA development is the responsibility of a multidisciplinary team whose members encompass the necessary subject matter
knowledge (AIAG, 2008). It is noteworthy that the team needs to have the presence
of the responsible for the process and a facilitator.
In general the FMEA team consists of a moderator, who offers methodological
knowledge, and the FMEA team, which offers technical knowledge concerning the
product or process to be analyzed. The moderator certifies that the team members
acquire a basic knowledge of the FMEA methodology (BERTSCHE, 2008). The team
for a design FMEA should be made up from experts from various fields, see Figure
2.1, whereupon at least the fields marked with an X, design and production planning,
should be covered.

Figure 2.1 The FMEA team (BERTSCHE, 2008).


According to Bertsche (2008) the team size ranges ideally between 4-6
members. If less than 4 team members participate, one runs the risk that important
sub areas will be forgotten or dealt with inadequately. In the other hand, if the team
consists of more than 7-8 members, then the dynamical group effect is significantly

13

weakened, which could lead to team members, who do not feel integrated into the
discussions, which in turn leads to an inevitable upset in FMEA meetings.
The FMEA team according to VDA 4.2 is made up of four internal groups, see
Figure 2.2: department, responsible, experts and method specialist.

Figure 2.2 The FMEA team according to VDA 4.2.


There is no single approach or unique process for FMEA development.
However the Potential Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Reference Manual 4th
Edition(AIAG, 2008) and the VDA 4.2 suggest commonly methods and approaches
to develop FMEA. The FMEA Reference Manual (AIAG, 2008) approach is
represented in the Figure 2.3 and its detailed explanation will be presented in the
following.
Identify)the)Team

Define)the)Scope

Define)the)
Customer
3

Identify)Functions,)
Requirements)and)
Specifications

Identify)Potential)
Failure)Modes

Identify)Potential)
Causes

Identify)Potential)
Effects

Recommended)
Actions)and)
Results

Identifying)and)
Assessing)Risk
9

10

RISK

PRIORITY

NUMBER

Identify)Controls
8

Figure 2.3 FMEA approach according to AIAG (2008).

14

The task Identify the Team (1) is responsible for selecting the FMEA team
leader, who should select team members with relevant experience and necessary
authority. Defining scope (2) establishes the boundary of the FMEA analysis. It
defines what is included and excluded, determined based on the type of the FMEA
being developed. The scope needs to be established at the start of the process to
assure consistent direction and focus. Defining the customer (3) is one of the most
important parts of any process. There are four major customers to be considered in
the FMEA process (AIAG, 2008), which are:

END USER: the person or organization that will utilize the product;

OEM ASSEMBLY and MANUFACTURING CENTERS: the OEM


locations where manufacturing operations and vehicle assembly take
place. Addressing the interfaces between the product and its assembly
process is critical to an effective FMEA analysis;

SUPPLY CHAIN MANUFACTURING: the supplier location where


manufacturing, fabricating or assembling of production materials or
parts take place. This includes fabricating production and services parts
and assemblies and processes;

REGULATORS: government agencies that define requirements and


monitor compliance to safety and environmental specifications which
can impact the product or process.

The activity 4 is about identifying and understanding the functions,


requirements and specifications relevant to the process/product. The objective of this
activity is to clarify the product intent of the process purpose.
The activity 5 identifies the potential failure modes, which is mainly to identify
the way or manner in which a product or process could fail to meet its functions or
requirements. The potential effects of failure are defined as the effects of the failure
mode as perceived by the customer (AIAG, 2008), which is performed in activity 6.
The potential cause of failure (7) is defined as an indication of how the failure could
occur, described as something that could be corrected or controlled.
Identifying controls (8) is responsible by identifying the activities that prevent
or detect the cause of failure or failure mode. The risk assessment (9) is the most
important step of the FMEA, which is evaluated using three criteria, severity,
occurrence and detection (AIAG,2008):

15

severity: is an assessment of the level of impact of a failure;

occurrence: is how often the cause of failure may occur;

detection: is an assessment on how well the product or process


controls detect the cause of failure or failure mode.

The multiplication of the three criteria (S x O x D) results in the risk priority


number (RPN). Each standard has its own scale standardization for these criteria
and usually the scales are integers from 1 to 10 (LAURENTI et al, 2012). The value 1
is minimum severity, low frequency and most likely detectable. The opposite value
(10) is high severity, high frequency and not likely detectable, which represents an
extremely negative evaluation and low reliability of the equipment/product
(LAURENTI et al, 2012).
The last step of the method (10) is responsible by recommending actions to
reduce the overall risk and the likelihood that the failure will occur. Therefore, the
recommended actions address reduction in severity, occurrence and detection
(AIAG, 2008).
The session results of FMEA are recorded on a form that can be seen in
Figure 2.4, which need always to be reviewed and updated (AIAG, 2008). Therefore,
the implementation of FMEA should be ongoing, following the changes of the system,
not being treated as a static document (BERTSCHE, 2008). Thus the evolution of
system is documented systematically, and the application of continuous improvement
concept is encouraged (FRANCESCHINI and GALETTO, 2001).
FMEA%FORM%AIAG%(2008)
Product.FMEA

Process.FMEA

Members.of.Team:
Potential.
Item/Function
Failure.Mode

Project.Responsible
FMEA.Responsible
FMEA.No
Prepare.By:...........................Date:
Approved.by:........................................................Date:

Product.Name:
Code:
Current.Project.Control
Results.of.Actions
Potential.
Potential.
Recommended. Responsibility.
S
RPN
Actions.
Effects
Causes Prevention O Detection D
Actions
Target.Date
S O D New.RPN
Implemented

Record.and.assesment.of.results
Proposition.of.actions.to.reduce.the.risk
Definition/determination.of.all.current.controls
List.all.the.potential.causes.of.failure
List.all.the.potential.effects.of.failure
List.all.the.potential.failure.modes
Name.of.Component/Operation.and.Its.function

Figure 2.4 FMEA form (AIAG, 2008; BERTSCHE, 2008).

16

2.1.2. AHP (ANALYTIC HIERARCHY PROCESS)

The decision-making is a common activity inside the companies and daily the
employees confront difficulties in making decision, because more than one objective
and criteria must be satisfy to reach the best choice between the existing alternatives
(BELTON, 1990 apud RAFATI, 2008). Multi criteria decision (MCDM) refers to the
decision-making that considers multiple criteria where they might be contradictory.
The MCDM problems are quite common in several areas and its study
development is related to the advance of the computer technology, which allows a
more detailed analysis of complex MCDM problems. According to Xu and Yang
(2001), there are two types of MCDM problems: i. problems where the decisionmaking have a finite number of solutions, ii. decision-making with infinite solutions. In
the second type, the problem is considered to be a optimization of multiple
objectives. For this research we consider the first type of MCDM.
There are several methods to solve MCDM problems, including Analytical
Hierarchy Process (AHP), which will be used in this research. The AHP method is a
technique of decision analysis and planning of multiple criteria developed by L. Saaty
in 1991 (SCHIMDT, 1995). The theory reflects the way in which the human mind
conceptualizes and structures a complex problem (SCHIMDT, 1995). When faced
with large number of elements, controllable or not, and which integrate a decision
situation, the mind adds such elements into groups according to common proprieties
(PAMPLONA, 1993).
The method is characterized by simplicity and robustness, allowing its
application to extend to numerous areas, such as strategic planning, marketing,
quality and productivity programs, analysis of projects, maintenance, among others
(ABREU, 2000).
The AHP approach developed a valuation model with weights for criteria,
integrating different metrics into a single panel points to select elements based on a
rank (CHEN, 2006). Furthermore, is the MCDM method with the highest scientific
evidence (BRAGLIA, 2006), being objective of investigation through the ontological
representation (LIAO et al, 2014). Aguiar (2007) highlights that in AHP, the decisionmaker identify a problem of evaluation in a hierarchical structure formed by a target
of evaluation, with criteria and alternatives that correspond to a hierarchical node. For

17

Wang, Chu and Wu (2007), AHP is the most popular method for multi-criteria
decision and allows the measurement of consistency of judgments of decision, highly
relevant for the relative evaluation where uncertainty is present.
Schmidt (1995) affirms that the main advantages of AHP over other multicriteria methods are the ease of use and the ability to handle inconsistent judgments.
Furthermore, Saaty (1990) lists the advantages of a hierarchy process:

The hierarchy representation of a system can be used to show how a


change of priority from a higher level influences the priority of the lower
levels;

Helps everyone involve to understand the decision making process and


to understand the problem the same way. At the same time, displays
the inter-relationship between all the elements;

The development of a naturally hierarchy system is more efficient to the


ones build generally;

The hierarchies are stable, because small changes have small effects
and additions to a well-structured hierarchy do not disturb their
performance.

In the other hand, Schmidt (1995) also lists some disadvantages and
limitations of the AHP method:

A procedure to structure the survey is needed;

Increasing the number of alternatives, increases in a higher magnitude


the computational work;

Time consuming to develop the pairwise comparison table;

In each level, the criteria used should be independent, or at least


different.

2.1.2.1.

The AHP Methodology

According to Rodrigues (2010, p.36), basically the method is divided into three
distinct steps:

Decomposition: construction of the hierarchy of elements, in addition to


establishing criteria and defining the purpose of selection;

18

Comparative trials: Implementation of comparisons between pairs of


elements, as each criterion;

Synthesis of Priorities: construction the final ranking of priority of


elements based on algebraic calculus realized on the matrix created in
the previous phase.

Methodology Decomposition
The first step of the method is to perform the decomposition of the problem in
a hierarchy form, which is important to define the purpose, criteria and alternatives,
see Figure 2.5 that illustrates this structure on the basis of project management
domain.

Define t he Best Portfolio of Projects

Project D

Project C

Project B

Project A

Duration

Project D

Project C

Project B

Project A

Risk

Project D

Project C

Project B

Project A

Cost

Figure 2.5. Hierarchy diagram of an AHP (RODRIGUES, 2010).


The purpose contains the guideline of the selection to be performed, typically
expressed by a single sentence. For example: selecting the best portfolio of projects.
The criteria are essential to perform the comparison between alternatives,
based on the parameters common to all of them. It is noteworthy that, within a define
objective, the criteria may have different levels of importance in the selection. For this
reason AHP assigns weights to each criterion.
The alternatives comprise a list of elements to be selected according to the
goal established and the all the criteria pointed out. The Figure 2.6 illustrates another
simple example of AHP structure.

19

Figure 2.6. Example of AHP structure.

Methodology Comparative Trials


After complete the structured of the problem in a hierarchical format, the next
step of AHP is the comparison between pairs of elements in level of criteria and
alternatives, in order to define the relative importance of one element over
another within each level. According to Chen (2006), the AHP paired-wise
comparison provides an analytical engine to combine and consolidate the
evaluation of alternatives and consequently reduces the complexity of the choice
to be made.
According to Rodrigues (2010, p.35), the trials could be divided into three
categories:
I.

Construction of the Comparative Matrix;

II.

Normalization and weights calculation;

III.

The Consistency Analysis;

IV.

Construction.

i. Construction of the Comparative Matrix:


Elements of each level (criteria and alternatives) are compared in pairs to
define the importance of relative preference of each element over another within
each level.

20

Thus, a determine level can be reduced to a square matrix = !"

!"!

like the

example below (Figure 2.7):


!!

= !"
!!

!"
!!
!!

!!
!!
!!

Figure 2.7. Generic Square Matrix.

Considering that the matrix will always be square, the inferior triangle of the
matrix is the inverse of the superior triangle of the matrix, thus the quantity of
comparison needed are:
= ( 1)/2
Equation 2.1 Number of comparison needed.
Where n is the number of columns or lines of the matrix.
For the qualitative comparison Saaty proposes a comparative table with
values from 1 to 9, which is dominated as a fundamental scale of absolute numbers,
shown in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1. The fundamental scales in AHP (Saaty, 1990).
Intensity of
Importance
1

Definition

Description

Equal Importance

Two activities contribute equally to the


objective

3
5
7

Moderate importance of

Experience and judgment strongly favor one

one over another

activity over another

Essential or strong

Experience and judgment strongly favor one

importance

activity over another

Very strong importance

An activity is strongly favored and its


dominance demonstrated in practice

Extreme importance

The evidence favoring once activity over


another is of the highest possible order of
affirmation

2,4,6,8

Intermediate values

When comprise is needed

21

Pamplona (1993) interpreted the nine levels of the Saaty table in a more
simple and clearer the comparative points. This adaptive table can be seen in Table
2.2.
Table 2.2. Table proposed by Saaty according to Pamplona (1993).
Importance

Definition

Equivalent

Description
Both elements are equal in
importance

Between equivalent and weak

Intermediate value

Weak

The element is weakly more


important than the another

Between weak and moderate

Intermediate value

Moderate

The element is moderately more


important than the another

Between moderate and strong

Intermediate value

Strong

The element is strongly more


important than the another

Between strong and extreme

Intermediate Value

Absolute

The element is more important


than the another, with proved
evidence

Inverse

!" =

1
!"

If i receive a scale compared to


j, thus the scale of j will be the
inverse of the scale of i.

For quantitative comparison, the table 2.1 and 2.2 are not necessary, since the
concrete values already exist for the pair comparison. This type of comparison will be
demonstrated in sequence.
To exemplify the judgment of criteria, the next calculations will be based on
the hierarchy shown in Figure 2.5, which contains three criteria: cost, risk and
duration. This example is widely used in the literature and can be found in Rodrigues
(2010) and Saaty (1990).

22

Considering that the relative importance of the criteria can vary conform the
people involved, this judgment has a qualitative nature. As an example, follow the
respective comparison of the criteria according to table 2.

Risk has importance strong (7) over NPV (Net Present Value);

Risk has importance weak (3) over cost;

Cost has importance moderate (5) over NPV.

It is important to notice that the modeling and reading of the table is done
relating the first column with the first line, example: the criterion cost has the
importance moderate (5) over the criterion duration, as shown in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3. Modeling and reading the comparison table.
Cost

Risk

Cost

NPV
5

Risk
Duration
According to the assumptions before, the comparison table can be model as
shown in Table 2.4 and as decimal values in Table 2.5:
Table 2.4. Comparison Table.
Cost

Risk

NPV

Cost

1/3

Risk

Duration

1/5

1/7

Cost

Risk

NPV

Cost

0,3333

Risk

Duration

0,2000

0,1429

Table 2.5. Comparison table in decimal values.

23

To exemplify the alternatives judgment, the hierarchy of Figure 2.5 will also be
used and to realize the comparison the values from Table 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 will be
used.
Table 2.6. Matrix for the NPV (Net Present Value) criterion.
Alternative

NPV

Project A

95

Project B

85

Project C

90

Project D

80

Table 2.7. Matrix for the Cost criterion.


Alternative

Cost

Project A

R$ 900,00

Project B

R$ 1200,00

Project C

R$ 850,00

Project D

R$ 1200,00

Table 2.8. Matrix for the risk criterion.


Alternative

Risk

Project A

32

Project B

14

Project C

23

Project D

07

The criteria duration, cost and risk are measurable; therefore it is possible to
affirm that their values are quantitative.
ii. Normalization and weight calculation
The comparison between elements of different kind is invalid if executed
based on their absolute values. For example, is incoherent compare the criteria
duration (95) with risk (32) because they have different units. Thence, the AHP

24

method do not utilized their absolute values to form the comparison table, but uses
the relative values inside a context or criteria.
The transformation of matrix with absolute values in matrix with independent
magnitude is called normalization. It allows that elements with different magnitudes
can be compared between each other with relative importance and weights. Thus,
the comparison is established as a ranking versus other ranking.
The normalized matrix is realize trough a division of each matrix element by
the sum of its respective column, as shown in equation 2.2:

!" =

!"
!
!!! !"

= 1,2,3, ,

Equation 2.2. Normalized Matrix.

According to this equation, the normalization from Table 2.5 can be realized
and seen in Table 2.9.
Table 2.9. Normalization of the comparison matrix.
Cost

Risk

NPV

Cost

0,2381

0,2258

0,3846

Risk

0,7143

0,6774

0,5385

Duration

0,0476

0,0968

0,0769

Once the comparison matrix is created, then calculate the eigenvector of each
matrix. The eigenvector is a matrix unlinked from magnitudes because it contains
only the order of the relative priority (or ranking) of the elements, based on
comparing pairs (RODRIGUES, 2010, p.38).
The calculations of the eigenvector or the relative weighted matrix are used to
give weights to the elements, as shown in equation 2.3.
!!!! !"
! =
, = 1,2,3, ,

Equation 2.3. The eigenvector calculation.

25

Considering that the eigenvector represents the relative value of the element
!" against all of them, the sum of all eigenvectors must be equal to 1, as shown in
equation 2.4.

Equation 2.4. The eigenvector sum.

As an example, follows the eigenvectors calculation and the ranking for all the
alternatives within the criteria duration, cost and risk. Furthermore, the calculation of
the eigenvector and the ranking for the normalized comparison matrix of criteria are
shown in tables 2.10, 2.11, 2.12 and 2.13.
Table 2.10. Eigenvector and ranking for the criterion NPV.
NPV

Wi

Ranking

Project A

95

0,2714

Project B

85

0,2429

Project C

90

0,2571

Project D

80

0,2286

Table 2.11. Eigenvector and ranking for the criterion Cost.


Cost

Wi

Ranking

Project A

R$900,00

0,2168

Project B

R$1200,00

0,2892

Project C

R$850,00

0,2048

Project D

R$1200,00

0,2892

Table 2.12. Eigenvector and ranking for the criterion Risk.


Risk

Wi

Ranking

Project A

32

0,4211

Project B

14

0,1842

Project C

23

0,3026

Project D

07

0,0921

26

Table 2.13. The normalization of the comparison matrix.


Cost

Risk

NPV

Wi

Ranking

Cost

0,2381

0,2258

0,3846

0,2828

Risk

0,7143

0,6774

0,5385

0,6434

NPV

0,0476

0,0769

0,0738

0,0738

As described before, the individual sum of the eigenvectors is always equal to


1, and can be checked in the equations 2.5, 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8.
! = 0,2714 + 0,2429 + 0,2571 + 0,2286 = 1
Equation 2.5. The sum of the eigenvector of NPV.

! = 0,2168 + 0,2892 + 0,2048 + 0,2892 = 1


Equation 2.6. The sum of the eigenvector of Cost.

! = 0,4211 + 0,1842 + 0,3026 + 0,0921 = 1


Equation 2.7. The sum of the eigenvector of Risk.

! = 0,2828 + 0,6434 + 0,0738 = 1


Equation 2.8. The sum of the eigenvector of the normalized matrix.

iii.

The Consistency Analysis


The next step is to calculate the consistent of the information collected from

the specialists. According to Saaty (1990), to consider a matrix consistent, the


consistency ratio (CR) must have an uncertainty of lower than 10%. The factor with
the biggest influence on the consistent of the values obtained is the normalization
step of the data collected. This procedure can be incorrectly done and consequently
generates wrong and inaccurate results (RAMOS, 2010).
To calculate the inconsistent rate, first is necessary to calculate the value of
the weighted sum (W) through the multiplication of the comparative matrix (A) and its
respective eigenvector (! ), represented by equation 2.9.

27

= !
Equation 2.9. The sum of the weighted values.
As an example, the calculation shown in equation 2.10 uses the comparative
matrix and its respective eigenvector.
1
0,333 5
0,2828
0,8662
= 3
1
7 0,6434 = 2,0083
0,2 0,1429 1
0,0738
0,2223
Equation 2.10. Example of the sum of the weighted values.
After the conclusion of the sum operation it is necessary to calculate the
eigenvalue of the obtained matrix (!"# ). The !"# is the arithmetic mean of the
division between the sum of the weighted value (W) and the eigenvector (! ),
represented by the equation 2.11.

Equation 2.11. The eigenvalue calculation.


!"# =

Following the example from equation 2.10 the calculation of the eigenvalue
can be seen in equation 2.12.

!"#

0,8662
0,2828
2,0083 0,6434
0,2223
0,0738
=
= 3,0665
3

Equation 2.12. Example of an eigenvalue calculation.


The next step is to calculate the consistency index (CI), given by the equation
2.13.

(!!"# !!)
(!!!)

Equation 2.13. Consistency index calculation.


Following the example, the calculation of the consistency index can be seen in
equation 2.14.

28

(3,0665 3)
= 0,03325
(3 1)

Equation 2.14. Example of a calculation of a consistency index.


The final stage is to calculate the Consistency Ratio (CR), described by
equation 2.15, based on a standard created by Saaty, the Random Index. According
to Rodrigues (2010) the Random Index (RI) is constant and should be used
according to the Table 2.14, which shows the RI with its respective number of
elements compared.

100%

Equation 2.15. Consistency ratio.


=

Table 2.14. Random Index (SAATY, 2008).


n

RI

0.00

0.58

0.90

1.12

1.24

1.32

1.41

1.45

Finalizing the consistency analysis, the calculation of the given example is


shown in equation 2.16:

0,03325
100% = 5,73%
0,58

Equation 2.16. Consistency ratio example calculation.


Saaty (1990) affirms that to be consistent, the CR must be lower than 10%,
therefore the example showed has consistency.

Methodology Synthesis of Priorities


The final step of AHP is the synthesis of priorities, where the ranking
(eigenvalue) of the criteria is crossed with the alternatives ranking, multiplying one

29

matrix with all alternatives eigenvalues by the criteria eigenvector matrix (SAATY,
1994). It is important to notice that the eigenvector is a matrix where the biggest the
element, the more preferential it will be, however this approach it not always valid
(RODRIGUES, 2010). In the context of project selection presented (Figure 2.5), the
approaches are:

The biggest the NPV, the better will be the project because of its bigger
return of investment, i.e., the eigenvector ranking is directly proportional
to the criterion.

In the other hand, the smallest is the Risk and the Cost, the better the
project will be for the company, i.e., the eigenvector ranking is inversely
proportional to these criteria.

In this situation, the NPV is a factor with positive characteristics and the other
two with negative characteristics. Thus, the negative eigenvectors are compared
between them, separately from the positive eigenvectors. The result will be the
reduction to two eigenvectors, been one positive and another negative, allowing the
relationship between two rankings, dividing the positive by the negative eigenvector
(SAATY, 1994).
First of all, the equation 2.17 demonstrates intersection between the projects
alternatives with the positive criteria NPV (Table 2.10).



0,2714
0,0200
0,2429
0,0179
0,0738 =

0,2571
0,0190
0,2286
0,0169

Equation 2.17. Intersection between the alternatives and the criterion NPV.
From tables 2.11 and 2.12, the normalized value of cost and risk are used with
their respective eigenvalues from table 2.13 to calculate the intersection between the
negative criteria. This calculation can be seen in equation 2.18.



0,2168
0,2892
0,2048
0,2892

0,4211
0,3322
0,1842
0,2828
0,2003

=

0,3026
0,6434
0,2526
0,0921
0,1410

Equation 2.18. Intersection between the alternatives and the criteria Cost and Risk.

30

The final step is the division between the positive dimension by the negative
dimension, values obtained in equation 2.17 and 2.18, and shown in equation 2.19.



0,0200
0,3322
0,0602
0,0179
0,2003
0,0882

=
0,0190
0,2526
0,0752
0,0169
0,1410
0,1200

Equation 2.19. Division between the positive dimension by the negative one.
The equation 2.19 shows the final ranking for the example threated and the
results are shown in Table 2.15:

Table 2.15. Final ranking of the Portfolio Project Selection Example.


Ranking

AHP Score

Project

0,1200

0,0882

0,0752

0,0602

2.1.3. DELPHI METHODOLOGY

The Delphi methodology emerged in 1948 at Rand Corporation of United


States and according to Wright and Giovinazzo (2000), it was disseminate at the
beginning of 1960 with its main objective to develop a technique to improve the
usage of specialists opinions on technological forecasting.
Sackman (1975) defines Delphi as an attempt to elucidate the specialists
opinions in a systematic matter to obtain useful results. Linstone and Turoff (1975)
affirm that Delphi is a research method used when a structured communication
approach among experts in a field is needed so that a complex problem can be
handled. According to Hasson (2000) there are three main applications for this
method:

to achieve consensus (conventional Delphi): examples include


gathering current and historical data not accurately known or available,

31

examining the significance of historical events, or putting together the


structure of a model;

to explore alternatives (scenario Delphi): examples include exploring


urban and regional planning options, evaluating possible budget
allocations,

and

planning

university

campus

and

curriculum

development;

to develop policies (policy Delphi): examples include delineating the


advantages and disadvantages associated with potential policy options,
and developing causal relationships in complex economic or social
phenomena.

According to Vichas (1982), three elements stand out in the Delphi process:
the anonymity, the control feedback and the statistical treatment of the responses
collected.
According to Enoki (2006) the anonymity means that the groups of specialists
do not know who is participating in the project or if they know any participant, they do
not communicate directly. The purpose of the anonymity is to avoid that some
people, because of their personal characteristics or position in the company,
dominate the opinions. Furthermore, when more experience specialists are
participating, the others tend to go along with their opinion, something that would
change the representative of the responses.
The control feedback means that every round of answers, the participants
need to know a little bit of the others responses. This process allows that everyone
reflects before answer the next round, changing peoples opinion going toward a
consensus. Enoki (2006) affirms that the statistical treatment of the data is the
evaluation of each set of answers, which is consider and inserted to a database
individually.
Several studies (Ament, 1970; Wissema, 1982; Helmer 1983) support and
advise the Delphi application. These studies suggest that, in general, the method is
useful to explore and unravel specific and one-dimensional questions. The
application of Delphi is suitable for situations that possess one or more of the
following characteristics (Linstone and Turoff, 1975):
1. the problem does not lend itself to be solved by analytical techniques,
but can benefit from subjective analysis on a collective basis;

32

2. individuals needed to contribute to the examination of a complex


problem have no history of adequate communication and may
represent diverse backgrounds with respect to experience or expertise;
3. more individuals are needed than can effectively interact face-to-face;
4. time and cost make frequent group meetings unfeasible;
5. the efficiency of face-to-face meetings can be increased by a
supplemental group communication process;
6. disagreements among individuals are relevant that the communication
process must be refereed and/or anonymity assured;
7. the heterogeneity of the participants must be preserved to assure
validity of the results.
One of the most important aspects of the Delphi method is the selection of the
specialists that will participate in the survey. Vichas (1982) arguments that an
essential condition for Delphi is that depend on people that know the subject in
question. Kayo & Securato (1997) point out two reasons to use specialists: (1)
specialists form a group of potential inventors or a group of forming opinion people
which their declarations could reflect in trusty forecasts; and (2) the information
provided by the specialists in a determined subject tends to have more quality than
the information of non-specialists.
The Delphi approach consists in surveys and questionnaires which is form by
seven steps , which can be seen on Figure 2.8 (Fowles, 1978).

33

Step 1
Determine and formulate the questions

Step 2
Select the specialists
Step 3
Formulate a first q uestionnaire t o send t o the specialists

Step 4
Analyze t he responses of the first q uestionnaire
Step 5

Formulate the second questionnaire to s end to t he


specialists
Step 6
Send a third questionnaire
Step 7

Summarize the p rocess and develop the final report


Figure 2.8. The seven steps of the Delphi approach.
The first step is to determine and formulate the questions, which should be
written carefully, in order to maximize the information that will be collected. The
second step is to choose the specialists that will participate in the process, which
should be prepare to involve themselves in the whole process. The third step is the
formulation of the first questionnaire, which should have basic information about the
study and include two or three questions semi-open and open to gather general
information. The fourth step is responsible by the analysis of the responses acquire
from the first questionnaire, that should determine the general tendency, as well as
the extreme responses. The fifth step is the development and submission of the

34

second questionnaire, which is responsible to inform the specialists the results of the
first round, thus they can send the responses and justify them if they differ from the
general tendency. The sixth step is the submission of the third questionnaire, which
is intended only to the specialists that had the outliners responses. This comparison
of opinions exerts a moderate influence and facilitates the convergence between on
the subject. A good degree of convergence is reached usually with the fourth
questionnaire, however, if does not happen, the cycle continue. The seventh and last
step is the analysis of the data, which should be done with statistical support to
identify convergence and divergence on the responses. This step also has the
objective to summarize the process and develop a final report, which should be
presented to the participants.
Deschamps (2013) declares that a Delphi study is usually organized in rounds,
with a set of specialists participating in each round. The author also determines that
the specialists opinions could be register through surveys, interview or panels,
among other possible techniques or tools. Results should be compiled and
distributed to all participants before each round, except for the first round.
2.1.4. BPM (BUSINESS PROCESS MANAGEMENT)

According to Kluska (2014) the BPM domain is divided into three knowledge
groups:

Business

Process

Management,

Business

Process

Modeling

Automation of Business Process, illustrated in Figure 2.9.

Vision&of&BPM&Universe&
Business'Process'
Management'

Business'Process'
Modeling'

Management&
Governance&
Centre&of&excellence&in&
process&
Maturity&model&BPMM&
based&in&CMMI&
Guidelines&to&implement&
BPM&

Process&Drawings&
Business&Process&Modeling&
Analysis&of&business&process&
Management&of&business&
process&performance&
Process&management&

Automa4on'of'Business'
Process'

BPMS&
BPM&SoBware&
SOA&&architecture&
oriented&to&service&

Figure 2.9 BPM domain (Kluska, 2014).

and

35

In the group of business process management it is possible to observe a


proactive role for the BPM implementation with the managerial skills of a business.
Thus, this management has the function to coordinate the BPM practices and
organize all the work developed by this initiative (Pinheiro de Lima et al., 2013). In
the business process modeling, the activities are from the business understanding to
construct a model that can represent the business process (Kluska, 2014).
In the last group, the automation of business process must be considered
more critical, since contain elements that will be worked for the employees and
presented to the clients (Kluska, 2014). Thus, the development of this step in directly
conditioned to the other two predecessors, therefore, must pay attention to the
correct understanding of all parts of the process management before starting this
step.
According to Spanyi (2003), Business Process Management - BPM,
comprises the definition, improvement and management of processes within an
organization. Involves all departments, even partners and third parties, characterizing
a collaborative and deliberate support of technology in order to achieve three main
objectives to a company - addressed to the client and based on performance: clarity
on strategic direction, alignment of organizational resources and increased discipline
in daily operations.
Havey (2005) affirms that the use of BPM in an enterprise can bring several
benefits:

Formalize existing processes and consequently shows points that need


improvement;

Facilitates automation and efficiency in the process flow;

Increase production and reduce imperfections in the processes;

Enables people involved in the process to solve problems that seemed


to be impossible;

Simplifies rules;

Spanyi (2003) states that business process management should be


implemented in organizations on the top chart to the bottom, which facilitates the
performance of departments and improves the performance of processes in the
organization as a whole. In addition, the BPM should start with the observation of the

36

organization and its business processes from the perspective of the customer, from
outside to inside.
According to De Sordi (2005), the business process is a mean of integrating all
organizational assets and its management happens when these assets work in sync,
assuring them efficiency. The main resources used in BPM are described in Table
2.16.
Table 2.16. Resources used in BPM.
Resource

Definition

Knowledge

The

knowledge

captured

and

shared

with

the

organization facilitates the improvement of all other


business assets.
Organizational Structure

Employees are understood as nodes in a network, and


not as separate functions in the organization chart.

Infrastructure

All support resources and support processes.

Politics and rules

Driving behavior and performance of internal human


resources and its interaction with business processes.

Human resources

Reconciling the interests and moments of integration and


interaction of employees in order to obtain a good
process performance.

Responsibility

Information

Strengthen the staff autonomy to act and think.

technology Used for the automation of procedures and activities, to

and communication

monitor performance and to form collaborative working


environments.

This section aims to show concepts, steps for implementation of BPM and
existing systems. It will be divided into three key points to achieve the objectives
described: phases of BPM, BPMN notation and BPM systems (BPMS).

37

2.1.4.1.

Phases of BPM

From the analysis of the main concepts of BPM, it is necessary to understand


its operation and the main phases that compose it. Armistead et al (1999) divide the
business process management in stages, as follows:
1. The organization analyzes the value chain in the external market and it
identifies its key processes. For this it is necessary to have a strong and wellarticulated management;
2. Develops an architecture of process in order to understand the organization;
3. The responsible for each process are chosen;
4. The customer should be listen in order to scale the skills needed and to
stipulate goals;
5. Process metrics are established and presented to the teams responsible for
the processes;
6. Performance monitoring is adjusted to the amplitude of the process;
7. Possible improvements are identified and made;
8. In some cases the structure of the organization is changed to reflect their
actual targeting processes. This does not necessarily mean the loss of
functions, but they must be absorbed by the process.
Baldam et al. (2007) points out, a more complete and organized manner, that
BPM comprising 4 steps: planning the BPM; modeling and process optimization;
process execution; control and data analysis. These steps illustrated in Figure 2.10
and explained in the following, form the life cycle of BPM.

Design and
Analysis

Monitoring

Implementa1on

Execu1on

Figure 2.10. BPM life cycle.

38

The planning stage begins the BPM cycle and is the most important phase to
the success of the project, because at this moment are chosen the critical processes
of the organization and the alignment of processes with the organizations strategy
will be realized. At this stage it is essential the participation and support of senior
management with BPM, because some actions will be executed that cross various
departments, creating frictions, conflicts of interest and lack of commitment of the
proposed targets. If the support of senior management is poor or nonexistent, its
progression may be comprised (Wolff, et al, 2009).
The second step is the modeling and optimization of processes, phase
responsible for the modeling of the current state of the process and the optimization
and modeling of the desired state of the process, when applicable (Wolff, 2009).
The third step is the execution of the processes, time that the users of the
system will see the BPM project. At this stage the deployment of the new process
according to the specifications previously obtained through the planning step
performed. This step is often considered as a separate project because of its
importance. The execution of processes is crucial and a critical stage, since that time
will be perceived the implications of change management (Wolff et al, 2009).
The fourth and final step is the control and data analysis, where it is possible
to obtain information about the processes in place to use them in the development of
indicators to compare with the old processes, enabling the understanding and
evaluation of the proposed targets. Risks, cost and quality are examples of indicators
used by organizations (Wolff et al, 2009).

2.1.4.2.

BPM Notation

The BPMN, Business Process Management Notation, allows the creation of


business processes models (Business Process Diagrams BPD) for communication
and documentation purposes. These models follow a standard notation, developed
by the Institute of Business Processes Management (The Business Process
Management Initiative BPMI) and its last version were launched in 2011 (OMG,
2011).
According to OMG (2011), BPMN is a notation that aims to generate a
business process diagram (BPD). The BPD is built through a basic set of graphics.

39

These allow for the development of diagrams that are usually quite familiar to most
business analysts, because they are very similar as flowcharts.
The four basic categories of elements in BPMN are flow objects, connecting
objects, swim lanes and artifacts, which are described below.
Flow Objects
BPMN 2.0 describes a set of three objects of flow shown in Figure 2.11:
activities, events and gateways. Activities are represented by rectangles with
rounded corners and are used to demonstrate some kind of work done in the
company. Events are represented by circles and demonstrate the course of a
process and affect the flow of a process and eventually may have a cause or impact.
Gateways are represented by a diamond and are used to control the divergence and
convergence of a control flow, determining decisions and also traditional parallel
paths or junction of paths (OMG, 2011)

Activity

Event

Gateway

Figure 2.11. BPM objects.


Connection Objects
Connection objects are used to connect diagrams in order to create the basic
skeletal structure of a business process. There are three basic types of objects for
this function that are represented in Figure 2.12: sequence flow, message flow and
association. These objects are illustrated in the figure below.

40

Figure 2.12. Connections objects of BPMN (OMG, 2011).


The sequence flow is used to demonstrate the order that activities will be
performed in a process. The message flow is used to demonstrate the flow of
messages between two participants in separate processes of organizational form, as
different sectors and business units. The association is used to associate data, texts
and artifacts with flow objects (OMG, 2011).

Swim Lanes
BPMN 2.0 uses the concept of swimming lanes as a mechanism to organize
activities in different visual categories in order to illustrate different functional
capabilities or responsibilities. It uses two types of constructs, lanes and pools,
illustrated in the Figure 2.13.

Figure 2.13. Swim lanes elements of BPMN (OMG, 2011).

41

Artifacts
The notation of BPMN 2.0 defines three basic types of artifacts, illustrated in
Figure 2.14: data objects, annotations and groups.

Figure 2.14. Basic artifacts of BPMN (OMG, 2011).


Data objects are mechanisms that demonstrate how the data are required for
activities or products and are connected in activities through associations. The
groups are represented by a dotted rectangle and can be used for the purpose of
emphasis, documentation or analysis, but do not affect the sequence flow.
Annotations are mechanisms that allow the modeler the ability to describe additional
textual information to the reader of the diagram (OMG, 2011).

2.1.4.3.

BPMS (Business Process Management System)

The term BPMS (Business Process Management System) refers to the


management of business processes systems. According to Tessari (2008), the
concept of BPMS is fully analogous to the DBMS (Database Management System).
While the DBMS manages data, the BPMS manage processes. For practical
purposes, one may call a BPMS software or BPM tool or simply BPM.
A BPMS solution enables the generation and control of business processes of
the company, resulting in faster decision making and realignment of business
processes in a more effective way (VAN DER AALST and VAN HEE, 2004).
The BPMS technology allows an organization to automate their business
processes to better manage them and consequently better manage their results,

42

whether they are products or services, while maintaining a high level of system
customization to your business (PUNTAR, 2009).
Most BPMS projects arise from the desire to improve corporate performance
although a good portion seeks flexibility as the main motivation. Some difficulties are
commonly encountered are reluctance in accepting the need for change and
problems when the existing culture of the organization is changed. The most
important variables for the project success are the commitment of management,
communication with users and management and user collaboration with the project
(PARKES, 2002 apud PUNTAR, 2009).
Usually a BPMS presents four main features: define the process, control the
process execution, control of interactions and management/monitor of executions
(BORGES 2001 apud PUNTAR, 2009). These features are, in general, aligned with
the steps of the BPM cycle cited in the literature, supporting the development.
a) Define the process
The definition of a process is the implementation stage in the BPMS tool. The
process model must submit all information necessary for the system to run the
process, among them we can highlight: data about

the activities that comprise the

process, their starting and ending conditions, rules for its implementation, users in
charge, documents handled in each activity and applications to be used (LENDRIKE
2003 apud PUNTAR, 2009).
b) Control the process execution
Once deployed, a process can be executed through its interpretation by the
BPMS that monitors and coordinates the execution of the process. The execution of
a process corresponds to the activation of instances of this process. Multiple
instances of the same process or different processes can be running simultaneously
in a BPMS (PUNTAR, 2009).

43

c) Control of interactions
When forwarding activities for the actors responsible, the BPMS adds items to
the work lists of these actors, which contain activities of several instances from
processes that are running at that moment. The actors, in turn, access their job
listings and select the task they wish to perform. The execution of the task involves
manipulation of documents, decision making or filling data. Activities are
implemented in workplaces of the performers through specific applications or tools.
The completion of the activity replaces the process flow, and triggers new activities,
according to the results generated (LENDRIKE 2003 apud PUNTAR, 2009).
d) Management/Monitor of executions
The BPMS offers management and monitoring process execution tools. The
process model itself has the status of activities performed and running, or to be
performed. Some BPMS still have resources to measure performance and statistics
that assist in projecting improvements (PUNTAR, 2009).
Usually there is distinction between ordinary users and with administration
rights, so that the definition and instantiation of processes should be made by users
with these responsibilities. Similarly, functions of suspension and cancellation of
instances can be restricted to users with administrative privilege (BORGES 2001
apud PUNTAR, 2009).

2.2.

RELATED WORKS

This section is used to identify, evaluate and interpreted the main works
available in the literature relevant to the research question. This chapter is divided
into three sections:

FMEA problems and drawbacks: this section has the objective to give a
brief summary on the main works that give a productive comment or a
insight about the problems and drawbacks of the FMEA method.

44

FMEA integrated to other methods: this section has the objective to


give a brief summary on the main works that developed or showed a
new approach for the FMEA which was integrated with other methods.

considerations and chapter synthesis: this section has the objective to


summarize and categorize the FMEA problems and drawbacks cited.
Furthermore, classifies and organizes the works where the FMEA is
integrated to other methods.

2.2.1. FMEA PROBLEMS AND DRAWBACKS

According to Rausand e Oien (1996), a failure represents a fundamental


concept to reliability analysis, which the failure is defined by the termination of the
ability of an item to perform a required function. The quality of the reliability
analysis depends on the analysts ability to identify all functions performed by the
components and possible failure with potential of occurrence.
FMEA (Failure Mode and Effect Analysis) is a very important technique for
failure analysis (STAMATIS, 2003). Furthermore, Maral (2009) affirms that
FMEA is a tool to forecast problems and one of the most efficient techniques at
low risk for problem prevention and identification of the most effective solutions in
terms of cost. Using three factors (occurrence, detection and severity), a ranking
is performed according to the potential risk represented by FMEA through the
RPN (Risk Priority Number).
However, some researchers (Gilchrist, 1993; Ben-Daya and Raouf, 1996;
Deng, 1989; Chang et al., 2001; Puente et al., 2002;) criticize the rationality of the
FMEA approach, especially the risk priority number (RPN) as determined by
multiplying the converted scores of the three factors (occurrence, detection and
severity) without considering their relative importance. The main drawbacks cited
by these authors are:

RPN is unable to assign weight to the three factors, which may exist
during the analysis process and needed by the participants;

RPN is unable to estimate the effectiveness of the improvement


action;

RPN ignores the effect of production quantity;

45

The conversion of scores are linear for the chance of failure, but
nonlinear for the chance of detection;

Different sets of the three factors can produce the exact same value
of RPN, however, the hidden implications may be totally different;

RPN evaluation does not fulfil the usual measurement requirements;

There is no precise algebraic rule to assign a score to the frequency


index F and detection index D, as traditional scoring is based on
the probability of occurrence of failures and the probabilities of nondetection. Table 2.17 and Table 2.18 show how traditional FMEA
employs five categories for each failure parameter, and how the
score for each index can range over a ten-point scale of evaluation.
This simplifies calculation, but converts probability into another
scoring system.

Table 2.17 The frequency index F (PUENTE et al., 2002).


Score

Likelihood of occurrence

Remote

Low

1/20000

1/10000

1/2000

1/1000

1/200

1/100

1/20

1/10

10

1/2

Moderate

High
Very High

46

Table 2.18 Non-detection index D (PUENTE et al., 2002).


Score

Likelihood of occurrence

Remote

0-5

Low

6-15

16-25

26-35

36-45

46-55

56-65

66-75

76-85

10

86-100

Moderate

High
Very High

Sankar and Prabhu (2000) point out that the RPN scale itself has some
non-intuitive statistical properties. The initial and correct observation that the
scale starts at 1 and ends at 1000 often leads to incorrect assumptions about the
middle of the scale. The Table 2.19 contains some common faulty assumptions.
The 1000 RPN numbers generated from all possible combinations of severity,
occurrence and detections are shown on the histogram in Figure 2.15. It is
possible to notice that RPNs are heavily distributed at the bottom of the scale and
that nearly every RPN value is non-unique, some being recycle as many as 24
times.

Table 2.19. RPN scale statistical data (SANKAR & PRABHU, 2000)
Incorrect Assumption

Actual Statistical Data

The average of all RPN values is

The average RPN value is 166

roughly 500
Roughly 50% of RPN values are above

6% of all RPN values are above 500.

500. (The median is near 500)

(The median is 105).

There are 1000 possible RPN values.

There are 120 unique RPN values.

47

Figure 2.15. Histogram of RPN numbers generated from all possible combinations of
severity, occurrence and detection (SANKAR & PRABHU, 2000).
FMEA is especially efficient if applied in the analysis of elements which
cause the whole system failure. However, it can be very complicated in the case
of complex systems, which have multiple functions and are comprised of a
number of components, since a variety of information on the system has to be
considered (RAUSAND, 2004).
Despite of the popularity of the method, several problems related to its
implementation and usefulness has been reported in the literature. Some of these
problems include: lack of well-define terms (KARA-ZAITRI et al., 1991; LEE,
2001); problems in identifying key failures (BEDNARZ and MARRIOTT, 1988);
reusing knowledge about failures (AJAYI and SMART, 2008; LOUGH et al., 2008;
STONE et al., 2005). Depending on the size of the analyzed system, the number
of potential failure modes can be very large, invalidating a complete FMEA study.
According to Popovic (2012), a thorough FMEA demands time and
provision of necessary resources during the design and process development,
when design and process changes can be implemented with least difficulty and
financial means. PIPIC (2003) affirms that the main weaknesses of this method
are:
1. FMEA process is tiring and time consuming;
2. There are few overlaps, actually even a gap, between design and
process FMEA;
3. The failures are incompletely represented by FMEA method;

48

4. FMEA does not identify the current failures that occur in real time.

Vinodh (2012) affirms that is difficult to precisely determine the probability


of failure event in FMEA. He also states that the information from FMEA is
expressed using linguistic variables and it is difficult to evaluate such linguistic
variables. It is also stated that interdependencies among various failures modes
and effects on the same level and different levels of hierarchical structure of an
engineering system are not considered in FMEA (Liu et al., 2010; Tay and Lim,
2008).
Laurenti et al. (2012) analyzed 106 publications and found 361 problems in
FMEA and summarized them by similarity in 37 problems. These problems were
grouped in 10 classes: risk definition, resources, PDP (Product Development
Process) integration, organizational culture, knowledge management, procedures,
competence, information, temporal and behavior. The Risk Definition class
considers the calculation and concepts involving the RPN (Risk Priority Number)
and the following indexes: severity, occurrence and detection. The Resource
class refers to the allocation of sufficient resources for the implementation of
FMEA (material, facilitator support, sponsor support, etc.). The PDP Integration
class refers to the integration with the application of FMEA activities, methods and
people in the development of the process. The Temporal class is composed of
problems associated with the time of the FMEA application associated with the
PDP cycle. The Organizational Culture class considers the organization values
and standards shared by the employees that hinder the FMEA application.
Information Management comprises the problems of use, register and reuse of
knowledge about failures and improvement actions. The class Procedures alludes
to the limitations associated with the execution of the tasks and activities of the
improvements index. Finally, the Behavior class is composed by the problems
associated with the behaviors and attitudes of the employees involved in the
FMEA application. The Table 2.20 shows the main problems found by the author:

49

Table 2.20. Problems listed and ordered by the frequency showed in the study.
(LAURENTI et al., 2012)
Class
Problem
Frequency
Risk Definition

The RPN (Risk Priority Number) are not

34,91%

precise.
Resources

The FMEA application is time consuming and

31,13%

requires lot resources.


PDP Integration

The FMEA application is not integrated with

24,53%

other methods and activities.


Temporal

Applied late in the PDP.

21,70%

Risk Definition

Indexes are used as if everyone had the same

20,75%

importance.
Risk Definition

The same value of severity may represent

19,81%

situations characterized by different levels of


risk.
Behavior

It is consider tedious by practitioners.

16,04%

Risk Definition

Qualitative criteria are used as quantitative.

15,09%

Information

Lack of reuse of failure informations (old

14,15%

Management

FMEAs and field failures).

Organizational

It is considered hard-working by the team

Culture

members.

12,26%

In the attempt to overcome these problems, a diversity of improvements has


been reported in the literature. Laurenti et al. (2012) reported 161 improvements
proposed for the FMEA method and classified them into Approaches, Tools,
Frameworks, Methods, Systems (Software) and Guidelines. The Figure 2.16 shows
the distribution of the proposed improvements.

50

4%
16%

1% 1%
Methods
44%

Guidelines
Systems

34%

Frameworks
Approaches
Tools

Figure 2.16. Distribution of proposed improvements researched. (LAURENTI et al.,


2012)
The distribution of Figure 2.16 shows that frameworks, approaches and tools
are minority within the 161 improvements proposed in the literature. Since this
research aims on developing an approach that is form by a framework (chapter 3)
and a tool (chapter 4), it is possible to conclude that the PAFMEA addresses a poorly
investigated area.

2.2.2. FMEA AND DECISION MAKING METHODS RELATED WORKS

In the literature, like previous signalized, there a large quantity of works that
are based on other methods and integrated to other methods to overcome some of
the FMEA problems and drawbacks. This section has the purpose to show the main
works of this context related to the research question. Furthermore, this stage will
also present the main works related to the application of decision-making methods in
the maintenance domain. This section is divided into three sub-section: (i) FMEA
Works, (ii) Decision Making Works and (iii) FMEA Integrated to Decision Making
Methods Works.

51

2.2.2.1. FMEA Works

The software Failure Mode and Effect Simulation (FMES), developed by


Palumbo (1992), uses the reliability analysis, FMEA combined with the rate failure of
components and recovery rates from the software to build a model that can be solved
by the system failure probability. The FMES is supported by Reliability Modeling
Language to model the system and to automatize the FMEA. The approach
simulates the process of failure occurrence and effect propagation, which can help
the decision makers whether to act on the failure or wait until the failure occurs.
However, it does not improve the FMEA approach and the simulation of each failure
is necessary in order to understand the final outcomes, which could be a time
consuming approach.
Bell et al. (1992) developed a software to automatize the FMEA using
qualitative models.

The causal reasoning process is applied to code how an

engineer uses a system diagram, instead of coding a set of situations and answers
that the user would find. The main advantage of this approach is that it is not
necessary to consider and solve all situations that could be found in a period after the
analysis. The Figure 2.17 shows the process flow of the software, however the
software is not process oriented, which obligates the user to have a detailed training
before using the tool.

Figure 2.17 Process flow of the software (BELL et al., 1992).

52

Gilchrist (1993) attacks the main FMEA drawback by modifying the traditional
risk priority number by considering the failure cost and proposed a different model
called Expected Cost (EC). The equation of this model is = . . ! . ! , where
C is the failure cost, n denotes the annual production quantity, ! is the probability of
failure and ! is the probability of detecting the failure. The main advantage of this
approach is that aggregates the failure cost of the equipment, however, due to the
difficulty of estimating the probability of failure and the probability of detecting the
failure, this model is not used frequently.
Ben-Daya and Raouf (1996) indirectly attacks the traditional risk priority
number affirming that scoring the factors using the 1-9 scale is not suitable and the
treatment of equal importance for each factor is not practical. The authors concluded
that the chance of occurrence should be more important than the chance of
detection, and proposed a new formulation for chance of occurrence by raising the 19 scale to power of 2. By changing the equal importance of the factors, the authors
minimize one of the main drawbacks cited in the literature, however not all the users
share the opinion that occurrence is more important than detection or severity, which
creates a limitation for the approach implementation.
Sankar and Prabhu (2000) developed a modified approach for prioritization of
failures in a System FMEA, which uses the rank 1-1000 called the Risk Priority
Ranks (RPR) to represent the increasing risk of the 1000 possible severityoccurrence-detection combinations.

These 1000 possible combinations were

tabulated by an expert in order of increasing risk and can be interpreted as if-then


rules. The failure having a higher rank was given a higher priority. However, the need
of an experience specialist to create the rank limits and makes it difficult to reach a
reliable result.
Houten and Kimura (2000) developed a virtual maintenance software to
support FMEA. The software compares the expected behavior against the real
behavior of the equipment. Furthermore, it is possible to compare the equipment
behavior with specific signals, which can be detected by sensors and used to avoid
major failures.
Huang et al. (2000) developed a Web-based FMEA that is form by three main
components: the web server for the FMEA, the database server and the FMEA client.
All users are united by the Internet or intranet, and can be located in different

53

geographic locations. The user uses the web browser to connect to the FMEA server
and enter the information needed to complete the FMEA. The inserted data is saved
in the database and can be accessed at any time. Therefore, the main advance of
the approach is that face-to-face meetings are not needed due to the web-based
software. However, the software does not minimize the main FMEA drawback, the
RPN calculation and analysis.
Chang (2001) proposed to use a different method that integrates Grey Theory
to calculate the risk priority number of FMEA. Grey theory, proposed by Julong Deng
in 1982, deals with decisions characterized by incomplete information, and explores
the system behavior using relational analysis and model construction (Chang, 1996).
This theory also provides measure to analyze relationship between discrete
qualitative and quantitative series. In Changs (2001) approach, the decision factors
(occurrence, detection and severity) can be assigned with different weights,
according to the process or the specialists need. The different set of weights will
result in different pattern of priority, thus, the limited resources can be effectively
allocated to the most critical items based on the process improvement strategies.
Furthermore, the problem of linear and nonlinear conversion for chance of
occurrence and detection are eliminated using the approach proposed. However,
there is no consensus method to weight the criteria, which could bring the same
problem as cited before for the FMEA approach during the RPN criteria ranking.
Puente et al. (2002) highlighted a number of FMEA drawbacks, inherent to the
traditional FMEA model, especially the calculation of the risk priority number (RPN).
Given these drawbacks, they proposed to structure expert knowledge in the form of
qualitative decision rules whereby a risk priority category (RPC), from very low VL
to very high VH, can be assigned to each cause of failure. This effectively reduces
one of the main criticisms aimed at the traditional model, since the structure of the
rule system proposed allows considerable weighting the severity index S
associated to a case of failure. Additionally to this proposal, the authors incorporated
a fuzzy decision system, which increased the continuity of the FMEA decision model
(by electing continuous values of the detection, frequency and severity), and which
optimizes risk discrimination of different causes of failure. Table 2.21 and Table 2.22
show the different from the traditional methodology and the methodology proposed
by the authors. It can be seen how the results of the ranking of the proposed
methodology is different from the traditional one. This is because the new model

54

gives a marked weighting to the severity index, whereas the RPN-based model
simply calculates the product of the three indexes with no consideration of the
importance assign to a particular index. Therefore, by changing the equal importance
of the criteria the authors minimize one of the FMEA drawbacks. However, not all the
users share the opinion that severity is more important than detection or occurrence,
which creates a limitation for the approach implementation.

Table 2.21 Calculation of ranking using RPN (PUENTE, 2002).


Failure

Detection

Occurrence

Severity

RPN

Ranking

Failure 1

32

Failure 2

40

Failure 3

10

70

Failure 4

49

Failure 5

63

Table 2.22 Calculation of ranking using proposed method (PUENTE, 2002).


Failure

Detection

Occurrence

Severity

RPC

Ranking

Failure 1

1 - VL

4-M

8-H

Failure 2

5-M

2-L

4-M

M-H

Failure 3

1 - VL

7-H

10 - VH

VH

Failure 4

7-H

7-H

1 - VL

L-M

Failure 5

3-L

7-H

3-L

Bowles (2004) proposes that the RPN approach should be discontinued and
an entirely new prioritization technique should be used. The detection ranking should
be removed, which is also recommended by Palady et al. (1994). The detection rank
assigned for the failure mode is highly subjective, which can result in considerable
variation from one analysis to another, and a low third detections means that the
companys verification program will be able to detect that the potential problem is
real, but fixing this problem late in the design process is generally expensive.
Furthermore, the new approach proposes to segment the severity in nominal ratings
as security, functionality and cosmetics, relating it to the failure and set the maximum
value for the probability of occurrence in each class. In our research the PAFMEA will

55

also segment the severity criteria and the sub-criteria will be select by the users,
allowing a more flexible and high implementation of the approach.
There are several possible corrective actions that, theoretically, are capable of
reducing the RPN for any given failure mode. Although there are actions that aim on
reducing only severity or only occurrence, FMEA does not provide any guidelines to
help the users to choose the optimal corrective action. Therefore Blivband et al.
(2004) presented the Extended FMEA (EFMEA) method, which uses screen plot to
prioritize the associated risks with failure and evaluate the adequacy of the
improvement actions. Using graph analysis and mathematic expression the method
evaluate the feasibility of the corrective action and the expected RPN value after the
implementation, then the most adequate action is proposed to be implemented.
Yen and Chen (2005) presented a method that integrated green design with
FMEA and TRIZ (Theory of Inventive Problem Solving). The proposed method is
based on the FMEA structure and uses environment, safety and health. The FMEA is
changed to define the eco-mode of failure and to prioritize throw the eco-RPN. The
indexes severity, occurrence and detection are transformed into environmental
impact, consumer perspective and compliance with the legislation. The TRIZ method
is

used

to

propose

improvements

on

the

product/equipment

taking

into

considerations the eco-innovations. Furthermore, a checklist is develop to guide the


engineers to discover the product deficiencies and decrease the brainstorm duration.
Chao and Ishii (2007) present the method Design Process FMEA, which adds
to the traditional FMEA a survey to help identify the failure modes and the failure
effects. Furthermore, the method uses a new approach called EPN (Error Priority
Number) to prioritize the failure modes. The error comes from different areas such
as: knowledge, analysis, communication, execution, change and organization.
However, the acquisition and integration of the error from different areas are time
consuming and very difficult to perform with high reliability.
Nepal (2008) proposed a framework to capture and analyze the failure modes
that could happen due to the interactions of components and functional elements of
the system/equipment. The framework is based on the definition of the product
architecture; follow by a model called SFC (Structure-Functions-Contrains). The
models objective is to identify, using simulation, the interactions between the
components and its restrictions, then extract the failure modes that could happen
because of these interactions. The RPN is calculated with fuzzy logic and a new

56

index called criticality index, are used to form a prioritization table for the failure
modes.
Rigoni (2009) presented a software called OpenFMECA (Figure 2.18) and
developed by the Development Center of Products (NeDIP / EMC / UFSC). The
software main objective is to provide a collaborative and parallel environment to
develop the FMECA where people can access the software from different location
using a web server. Furthermore, the software uses Delphi methodology to reach a
consensus on the RPN criteria ranking, which a face-to-face meetings are
unnecessary for the risk assessment. However, the Delphi is conducted directly on
the S, O, D index, answering a part of the consensus issue in FMEA, but not
improving the expected extended perspective on RPN analysis.

Figure 2.18 Screenshot extract from the OpenFMECA software (RIGONI, 2009).
Chin (2009) uses FMEA integrated with Evidential Reasoning approach in the
decision analysis of multiple attributes. The method proposes to capture the diversity
of opinions from the members of the team and to prioritize the failure modes from
different types of uncertainties such as incomplete assessment, ignorance and
intervals. The method also allows the combination of the risk factors in a non-linear
measurement, which tries to overcome the most drawback cited in the literature, the
RPN calculation.

57

Oliveira (2010) proposed a technique to be integrated to failure analysis: the


Analysis of Critical Processes by Experts (ACPE). The analysis of critical processes
segments various processes in critical and non-critical, where experts opine which
processes should be expanded into a FTA (Fault Tree Analysis) and then
consequently expanded into a FMEA. Furthermore, the ACPE considers Delphi
methodology and Jury of Experts to conduct collective discussion of the processes
under consideration. With the integration of this technique the article intends to
propose an integrative method to use the experts opinion in the beginning of the
process and eliminate future works on failures that could not be minimize.
In order to summarize these FMEA related works and to facilitate further
researches, the Table 2.23 and Table 2.24 bring together all the references with their
most important information related to the research question.

58

Table 2.23 Summary table of FMEA related works.


Reference

Proposal

Methods

Highlighted

Used

Points
Simulates the

Palumbo (1992)

Software for

FMEA &

process of failure

failure simulation

Simulation

occurrence and
effect propagation

Bell et al. (1992)

Gilchrist (1993)

Software to

FMEA &

support FMEA

Casual

development

Reasoning

New RPN
integrating Cost

Ben-Daya and

New scale for

Raouf (1996)

occurrence

FMEA

The tool
guarantees
standardization of
the FMEA

importance of

Sankar and

to analyze failure

cited FMEA

Prabhu (2000)

developed by

FMEA &

Kimura (2000)

support FMEA

software

Huang et al.
(2000)

Web-Based
software to
support FMEA

problem, the RPN


approach

Virtual software to

Not process oriented,


which needs a detailed
training to use the tool

of failure

Attacks the most

Houten and

recovery rates

the failure analysis

Creates new rank

specialists

rate of failure and

Difficult to estimate cost

FMEA criteria

FMEA

Hard to keep record of

Aggregate cost to

Changes equal
FMEA

Problems

Not everyone share the


opinion that occurrence
is the most important
criteria
It depends on the
specialists experience
to reach a reliable result

Use sensors to

Limitation of structure

detect/avoid major

(sensors) to configure

failure

software

No face-to-face
FMEA &

meetings needed

It does not minimize the

software

due to the use of

RPN drawback

internet
The FMEA criteria

Chang (2001)

New RPN
approach

FMEA &

can have different

There is no consensus

Grey

weights, according

method to weight the

Theory

to the process or

criteria;

the specialists need


Puente et al.

New RPN

FMEA &

(2002)

approach

Fuzzy

Changes the equal


importance of
FMEA criteria

Not everyone share the


opinion that severity is
the most important
criteria

59

Table 2.24 Summary table of FMEA related works.


Reference

Proposal

Methods

Highlighted

Used

Points

New risk
Bowles (2004)

assessment

FMEA

(RPN) approach

Segment severity
into sub-criteria
Evaluate the

Problems
Eliminates detection
criteria; sub-criteria are
fixed

Blivband et al.

Choose the best

FMEA &

(2004)

corrective action

Screen Plot

Yen and Chen

Changes RPN

FMEA &

Considers eco-

Limits the FMEA to a

(2005)

criteria

TRIZ

innovations aspects

green design analysis

Uses different

Time consuming to

areas to perform

collect and integrate

the risk assessment

information

Chao and Ishii


(2007)

New risk
assessment
(RPN) approach

FMEA &
survey

Carmignani

Modified RPN

FMEA &

(2008)

approach

AHP

Identify
Nepal (2008)

Chin (2009)

Considers cost and


potential profit by
reducing losses

RPN approach

The economic
correlation presented is
not the same for every
company

Extracts the failure

It continue with the

FMEA,

modes that could

same RPN criteria,

between

Fuzzy &

happen with the

which limits the team

components and

Simulation

interaction of

member analysis and

components

its final results

No need for face-

FMECA &

to-face meetings

Delphi

New RPN
approach
Technique to

Oliveira (2010)

and expected RPN

Its does not improve the

interactions

new RPN

Rigoni (2009)

feasibility of actions

classify process
and help failure
analysis

FMEA &
Evidential
Reasoning

Uses Delphi to
reach a consensus
on the RPN

Continue using the


same RPN approach,
which has its limits and
drawbacks

Captures diversity

No consensus method

of opinion and use

to obtain opinion of

uncertainties to

members; Uncertainties

propose priority

are fixed by the work

Delphi &

Use Delphi to reach

Jury of

a consensus of

Specialists

specialists opinion

It does not improve


FMEA

60

2.2.2.2. Decision Making Methods

Bevilacqua and Barglia (2000) presented an application of AHP technique for


selecting the best maintenance strategy for three groups of machines of an Italian Oil
refinery processing plant. The hierarchy of the system and its criteria can be seen in
Figure 2.19. This approach allows the users to take into account more than one
criteria, which gives a clearly advantage to the method and a good support for the
decision making process. However, despite this advantage, the approach does not
allow the user to choose the criteria and the analysis is made on a macro level, which
is a group of machines and not one at a time.

Goal%

Damages%

Correc8ve%
Maintenance%

Applicability%

Preven8ve%
Maintenance%

Added3Value%

Opportunis8c%
Maintenance%

Condi8on3
Based%
Maintenance%

Cost%

Predic8ve%
Maintenance%

Figure 2.19 Hierarchy of the Italian Oil refinery system (Adpated from BEVILACQUA
& BARGLIA, 2000).
Carnero (2005) proposed a model, integrating AHP and factor analysis (FA),
to select diagnostic technics and instrumentation in the predictive maintenance
program. The model was applied to screw compressors that are monitored by means
of number of predictive maintenance programs (PMPs), and can be seen in Figure
2.20. Despite the quantity of criteria used and the level of detailed of the analysis, the
reliability of the final results depends entirely on the companys maturity in the

61

predictive maintenance program, which can limit and difficult the implementation of
the model.

Figure 2.20 Model to select diagnostic technics and instrumentation (CARNERO,


2005).
In the same path, Bertolini and Bevilacqua (2006) proposed a combined goal
programming-AHP approach to identify the optimal maintenance policy for a set of
centrifugal pumps operating in the process and service plants of an Italian oil
refinery. The use of combined model allows investigating the maintenance selection
problem in detail, taking into account the resource burden and providing the analyst
with a tool to assess the priority level of the different maintenance alternatives. The
data for the pairwise comparison of the AHP were collected by an interview
performed with the company maintenance and production management staff. The
criteria used to apply AHP were based of the classical FMEA parameters and the
hierarchy of the system can be seen in Figure 2.21. The good thing about using the
FMEA RPN criteria is that usually the people involved are already familiar with them,
however it also brings the drawbacks of this approach, which were already cited in
this research.

Figure 2.21 Hierarchy system for the combined goal programming-AHP (BERTOLINI
& BEVILACQUA, 2006).

62

Arunraj and Maiti (2010) presented a methodology, integrating AHP and goal
programming, to select the maintenance policy based on risk of equipment failure
and cost of maintenance. The methodology was implemented in a benzene
extraction unit of a chemical plant. According to the hierarchy scheme and the results
presented in Figure 2.22, risk criteria has the highest weight, which impacts directly
on the final result that is the selection of the condition based maintenance. Despite
the ease of implementation and the high applicability of the method, the low amount
of criteria limits the analysis of the team members.

Figure 2.22 Hierarchy scheme and AHP results.


Chandima Ratnayake and Markeset (2010) proposed an approach to assess
how well the health, safety and environment goals and financial interests are
implemented in the process of selecting a maintenance strategy for an oil and gas
production installation via AHP methodology. In general, the criteria for overall
optimum such as cost factors and safety cannot be measured by the same metrics
and combined in the same objective function. However this paper illustrates how
such criteria can be achieved through AHP, which can be seen on Figure 2.23. The
paper also point out the importance of the experts perception, which provides a direct
reflect on the success of the AHP implementation. Thus, the proposed approach can
be used as a practical maintenance management guide, which also provides an
effective means to help managers determine the priorities among decision criteria
and assess the extent of health, security and environment adoption in their
organization. In the other hand, the not possibility to choose the criteria of the AHP

63

highlights one of the proposals drawback. Furthermore, the analysis on a macro


level, which is the selection of the maintenance strategy for the whole system, limits
a more detailed analysis for each equipment or component.

Figure 2.23 Hierarchy decision model to measure health, safety and environment
performance (CHANDIMA RATNAYAKE & MARKESET, 2010).
Tan et al. (2011) proposed a risk based inspection methodology to evaluate
and select the maintenance strategy in the industrial process of an oil refinery. Using
the risk definition, probability and consequence of failure the equipments were
chosen to apply the AHP method. According to the Figure 2.24, four criteria were
chosen to implement the analytic hierarchy process. Despite the applicability of the
method, it attacks only one equipment and does not deal with the different failure
modes from the process or other equipment.

64

Figure 2.24 AHP model to select the maintenance policy (TAN et al., 2011).
Zaim et al (2012) proposed to apply AHP and ANP (Analytic Network Process)
decision-making methodologies to select the most appropriate maintenance strategy.
According to the hierarchy model presented in Figure 2.25 the four criteria have their
own sub-criteria, which enhance the final analysis. The final scores show that both
method rank predictive maintenance as the most appropriate one, showing that both
of them are reliable and applicable in this specific area.

Figure 2.25 Hierarchy model of AHP and ANP for maintenance selection (ZAIM et al.,
2012).
In order to summarize these decision-making methods related works and to
facilitate further researches, the Table 2.25 brings together all the references with
their most important information related to the research question.

65

Table 2.25 Summary of decision-making related works.


Reference
Bevilacqua and
Barglia (2000)

Proposal

Methods

Highlighted

Used

Points

Select
maintenance

AHP

strategy
Select diagnostic

Carnero (2005)

technics and

Select optimal

Bevilacqua

maintenance

(2006)

policy

Arunraj and Maiti


(2010)
Chandima
Ratnayake and
Markeset (2010)

AHP & FA

criteria which
includes Cost

AHP

Uses RPN FMEA


criteria for the AHP

Select

AHP &

Uses risk of failure

Maintenance

Goal

and cost as criteria

Policy

Program

for the AHP

Evaluate how
factors impacts
maintenance

AHP

strategy
Select

Tan et al. (2011)

perform the AHP


Big quantity of

instrumentation
Bertolini and

Uses four criteria to

Maintenance
Strategy

AHP criteria are fixed;


analysis on a macro
level
Depends on the
companys maturity on
the predictive
maintenance program
AHP criteria are fixed;
FMEA criteria limits the
analysis
Low amount of criteria
limits the analysis

Integration of

AHP criteria are fixed;

environmental and

analysis on a macro

economic factors

level

Integration of safety
AHP

Problems

and cost criteria to


the analysis

It does not deal with


failure modes
It does deal with the

Select
Zaim et al. (2012)

Maintenance
Strategy

AHP &

It has sub-criteria

ANP

for the main criteria

failure modes;
maintenance strategy
selection on a macro
level

2.2.2.3. FMEA Integrated to Decision Making Methods

With a different perspective, Aguiar (2007) presented an investigation, using


AHP and Fuzzy logic, about the use of FMEA with the exhibition of identified
irregularities for its correct use in some automotive companies. The AHP is applied to
prioritize the irregularities identified in the FMEA application. The irregularities were
identified with specialists support. Through the AHP approach was possible to create

66

grades and quantitative values, which represent the FMEA application performance
of each stage. Therefore, the approach does not deal with the failure modes and
does not help directly in the maintenance decision-making process.
Carmignani (2008) proposes a new integrated method called Priority-Cost
FMECA (PC-FMECA), where the failure modes to be attacked are classify using a
modified RPN calculation. This modified RPN consider a new parameter called
profitability, which is based on cost and potential profit to reduce the losses caused
by failure occurrence. The profitability considers the advantages obtained with the
design improvements minus the cost to implement these improvements. Integrated
with this parameter, the AHP was used to obtain the weight of each criterion and the
Figure 2.26 shows the hierarchical tree of the scheme. Furthermore, the approach
proposes a mathematical expression to select the best failure modes to be attacked
based on the company budget available. To develop the approach the authors
needed to present a methodology to correlate the potential failure to its fundamental
economic aspects, which are not always the same for every company, which limits
the method implementation.

Figure 2.26 The hierarchical tree to calculate the fault priority (CARMIGNANI, 2008).
Suebsomran and Talabgeaw (2010) analyzed and developed the software for
maintenance priority and management for a thermal power plant.

The software

incorporated the FMEA and AHP (Analytic Hierarchy Process) approaches to find the

67

critical ranking of the systems units relating more than one criterion. The FMEA
method was utilized to find and collect the failure modes of the system and the AHP
approach was used to rank the units based on three criteria (cost, man-hour and line
priority). The systems hierarchy can be seen on Figure 2.27 and the software
interface can be seen on Figure 2.28.

Figure 2.27 Hierarchy of system (SUEBSOMRAN & TALABGEAW, 2010).

Figure 2.28 Software for maintenance priority for a termal plant (SUEBSOMRAN &
TALABGEAW, 2010)
This work highlight the possibility to integrate FMEA and AHP approaches into
usable software, which was implemented in a real thermal plant and showed
satisfactory results. The main gain of this tool is that supports the managers in the
decision making process. However, despite the advantage of the approach, the
software does not give one final ranking but one for each criterion, which cannot be
chosen by the users. Furthermore, the AHP is performed based on the systems units
and not the failure modes.

68

Zammori and Gabbrielli (2011) reinforce the use of multi criteria decision
methods in the calculation of risk number (RPN) with application of Analytic Network
Process (ANP). The authors divide the severity criteria, occurrence and detection in
sub-criteria and observe the interactions between them and the alternatives in
obtaining the RPN. The Figure 2.29 presents the hierarchy model of the approach
and shows how the multi criteria will be implemented into the FMECA method, which
its mainly objective is to use a different approach for the RPN. This paper presents
one of the main inspiration bases for this research in the use of the AHP/ANP
structure. However, the relational treatment imposed by the ANP method makes
difficult to implement in the industrial scenario due to the high mathematical
complexity required to use paid software.

Figure 2.29 Hierarchy model of integrating FMECA and ANP (ZAMMORI &
GABBRIELLI, 2011).
In order to summarize the related works of FMEA integrated to decisionmaking methods and to facilitate further researches, the Table 2.26 brings together
all the references with their most important information related to the research
question.

69

Table 2.26 Summary of FMEA integrated to decision-making methods related works.


Reference

Aguiar (2007)

Methods

Highlighted

Used

Points

Analyze the

FMEA &

Use specialists to

It does not deal with

FMEA

AHP &

identify

failure modes; It does

irregularities

Fuzzy

irregularities

not improve FMEA

Proposal

Carmignani

Modified RPN

FMEA &

(2008)

approach

AHP

Suebsomran and

Maintenance

FMEA &

priority

AHP

Zammori and

Modified RPN

FMECA &

Gabbrielli (2011)

approach

ANP

Talabgeaw
(2010)

Considers cost and


potential profit by
reducing losses

Problems

The economic
correlation presented is
not the same for every
company

Software for

AHP performed for

maintenance

units; one rank for each

Priority

criterion; criteria fixed

Uses RPN criteria

Sub-criteria could also

and adds sub-

be added for detection;

criteria for severity

sub-criteria are fixed

70

2.3.

CONSIDERETIONS AND CHAPTER SYNTHESIS

The first part of this chapter presents the background concerning the mains
conceptual pillars of this research such as FMEA, AHP, Delphi methodology and
BPM. The second part was devoted firstly to investigate the FMEA problems and
drawbacks found in the literature and the integration between the FMEA and other
methods, which are an attempt to overcome some of the problems/drawbacks
showed.
In an attempt to summarize and classify the problems/drawbacks of FMEA, six
classes were defined based on Laurenti et al. (2012):

Risk Definition: all the problems related to the RPN calculation, such as
the RPN values are not precise, the indexes (severity, occurrence and
detection) are treated with the same importance, one RPN value can
represent different risk situations;

Resources: refers to the allocation of sufficient resources for the


implementation of FMEA (material, facilitator support, sponsor support,
etc.), which the main problem is the time consumed to develop a
FMEA;

Behavior: is composed by the problems associated with the behaviors,


attitudes and personal thoughts of the employees involved in the FMEA
application;

Information Management: comprises the problems of use, register and


reuse of knowledge about failures and improvement actions;

Procedures: alludes to the limitations associated with the execution of


the tasks, the activities of the improvements and the FMEA method;

Temporal: is composed of problems associated with the moment of the


FMEA application.

The Table 2.27 shows the relations between the problems and drawbacks
found in the literature review according to the classes cited above.

71

Table 2.27 Classification of FMEA problems and drawbacks.


Class

Reference
Ben-Daya and Raouf (1996); Bowles (2004); Blivband et
al. (2004); Carmignani (2008); Chao and Ishii (2007);

Risk Definition

Chang (2001); Chin (2009); Chang et al. (2001); Gilchrist


(1993); Deng (1989); Nepal (2008); Puente et al. (2002);
Sankar and Prabhu (2000); Suebsomran and Talabgeaw
(2010);
Bell et al. (1992); Carmignani (2008); Chao and Ishii

Resources

(2007); Houten and Kimura (2000); Huang et al. (2000);


Nepal (2008); Palumbo (1992); Popovic (2012); Pipic
(2003); Yen and Chen (2000).

Behavior

Nepal (2008); Palumbo (1992); Chao and Ishii (2007);


Yen and Chen (2005).
Ajayi and Smart (2008); Bell et al. (1992); Lough et al.

Information Management

(2008); Nepal (2008); Palumbo (1992); Stone et al.


(2005);
Aguiar (2007); Arcidiacono and Campatelli (2004);
Bednarz and Marriott (1988); Blivband et al. (2004);

Procedures

Rausand (2004); Goble and Brombacher (1999); KaraZaitri et al. (1991); Lee (2001); Oliveira (2010); Pipic
(2003); Vinodh (2012); Yen and Chen (2005).

Temporal

Bell et al. (1992); Chao and Ishii (2007); Nepal (2008);


Pipic (2003);

72

Procedures
24%

Risk Deni*on
28%

Informa*on
Management
12%
Resources
20%

Behavior
8%

Temporal
8%

The Figure 2.30 shows the frequency of the FMEA problems and drawbacks
according to its specific classes. It is possible to notice that the most cited problem is
the Risk Definition, which are the problems related to the calculation of the RPN.
Furthermore, the problems related to the FMEA procedures and the resource
availability are highly frequent cited in the literature.

73

Procedures
24%

Risk Deni*on
28%

Informa*on
Management
12%
Resources
20%

Behavior
8%

Temporal
8%

Figure 2.30 Distribution of FMEA problems and drawbacks according to its classes.
Following the second part of this chapter, the section 2.2.2 had the purpose to
show the integration of FMEA with other methods found in the literature, where the
researches have the objective to overcome some of the FMEA problems and
drawbacks cited. In order to summarize and organize, these works were classified
into five categories: Methods, Guidelines, Software, Frameworks and Approaches.
The concepts for these categories are:

Methods: a procedure form by a specific knowledge used to solve a


specific problem (ENGWALL, KLING and WERR, 2005);

Guidelines: recommendation that determines the direction of an action.


Usually the guideline transfer the knowledge from a specialist to an
user (ENGWALL, KLING and WERR, 2005).

Software: sequence of instructions executed by a computer. This


sequence follows a specific standard that results in an expected
behavior (ROZENFELD, 2012).

Frameworks: conceptual structure form by elements that support the


development of something (HAWKINS, 1994)

74

Approaches: high level way to deal with a subject (HOUAISS, 2007)

The Table 2.28 shows the classification of these works according to the
categories cited above.

Table 2.28 Classification of FMEA integrated to other methods according to the five
categories.
Categories

Reference
Arcidiacono and Campatelli (2004); Aguiar (2007);
Bowles (2004); Blivband et al. (2004); Carmignani

Methods

(2008); Chang (2001); Chao and Ishii (2007); Chin


(2009); Gilchrist (1993); Goble and Brombacher (1999);
Puente et al. (2002); Sankar and Prabhu (2000); Yen and
Chen (2005); Zammori and Gabbrielli (2011)
Arcidiacono and Campatelli (2004); Bell et al. (1992);

Guidelines

Ben-Daya and Raouf (1996); Blivband et al. (2004);


Bowles (2004); Carmignani (2008); Chang (2001); Chin
(2009); Nepal (2008); Puente et al. (2002).
Bell et al. (1992); Houten and Kimura (2000); Huang et

Software

al. (2000); Palumbo (1992); Rigoni (2009); Suebsomran


and Talabgeaw (2010).

Frameworks

Nepal (2008)

Approaches

Oliveira (2010)

The Figure 2.31 shows the distribution of these works according to the
categories cited (Methods, Guidelines, Software, Frameworks and Approaches). It is
possible to notice that the most use practice is Methods, follow by Guidelines.
These practices are being developed in different types of industries such as energy,
manufacturing and product development. Furthermore, the knowledge field is
dominated by exploratory studies and investigations of a unique case, especially
because the quantity of practices in each category and the diversity of areas
published.

75

Frameworks
3%
SoEware
19%

Approaches
3%

Methods
44%

Guidelines
31%

Figure 2.31 Distribution of Methods, Guidelines, Software, Frameworks and


Approaches found in the literature review.
The study realized does not have the pretention to find all the
problems/drawbacks and related works of FMEA, but it is sufficient to take general
conclusions.
Despite the high amount of works trying to overcome some of the FMEA
drawbacks, especially the RPN approach, none of them is flawless and easily
implemented. Therefore, the PAFMEA will present a new risk assessment approach
by using AHP after a previous analysis of the classical RPN calculation. Moreover,
since the quantity of software and frameworks identified in literature are small, as is
presented in Figure 2.31, a software will be developed to implement the PAFMEA
framework. This way the PAFMEA characterizes a scientific insertion and
contribution in each of the categories identified in Figures 2.30 and 2.31.

76

3. PAFMEA FRAMEWORK

In order to overcome some of the FMEA drawbacks identified in the literature,


this chapter has the objective to show a new method proposed by research, the
PAFMEA (Process Aware FMEA), which presents two main components: (i) a
methodological basis taking into consideration the development cycle related to the
use of FMEA integrating the AHP and Delphi methods and (ii) a technological basis
based on a BPMS platform, the Bizagi BPM Suite, allowing the development,
integration and interface with supported tools in an corporative environment.
The proposed framework, represented in Figure 3.1, is based on IDEF0
notation and helps to represent the perspectives cited (methodological and
technological basis), illustrating the mechanisms, resources and controls the
execution of actions. The IDEF0 is based on a well-establish graphical language
known as the Structure Analysis and Design Technique (SADT) and is also used to
model decisions, actions and activities of an organization (IDEF0, 1993).
Drawbacks
Barriers
Requirements

Practices
Structure

Concerns

Concerns

Literature &
Software
Reviews

Research
Goal

Interviews Questionnaries

Practices
Requirements

A1
Scientific
Database

Results Analysis

Actions
Results

Practices
FMEA Problems
& Drawbacks

A3

AHP
Delphi

Standards
BPMN

FMEA Proposition Feedback

Risk
Failure Controls

Structure

PA-FMEA
Results

Guidelines

PA-FMEA
Execution

Scope

Team

Phase A3
Phases A4, A5, A6

PA-FMEA

Parameters

A5

Team

BPMS

Team

Customer

Case Study:
Planning and
Preparation
A4

Human
Resources

Information

FMEA Results Improvements: Controls (RPN, S, O, D) / Actions Analysis


Phases A1, A2

BPMS
(Bizagi)

Function

A6

BPMS

TI Basis

PA-FMEA
Proposition
(Specification)

Barriers

Qualtrics

FMEA s
Softwares

BAM Business Activity


Monitoring

Perfor
mance

A2

Excel
Mendeley

FMEA
Standards

Concerns

Preliminary
Consultation with
Experts

FMEA Problems
& Drawbacks

Methodology

Knowledge Discovering and Formalization


PA-FMEA Proposition
PA-FMEA Implementation and Analysis

Figure 3.1 Framework of PA-FMEA.

Production &
Maintenance
Scheduling

77

Several structured methods are available and the IDEF0 model diagram
represented in Figure 3.2 is based on a simple syntax, which is the one used on the
framework proposed.
Controls'(Factors'that'
constrains'the'ac%vity)'

Inputs'(Parameters''
that'are'altered'by'
the'ac%vity)'

Func%on'or'Ac%vity'

Outputs'(Results'of'
the'ac%vity)'

Mechanisms'(Means'used'
to'performed'the'ac%vity)'

Figure 3.2 Basic IDEF0 syntax.


The IDEF0 model diagram represents functions (i.e. processes, operations,
activities) and horizontal arrows indicate Inputs (entering the boxes (on the left))
and "Outputs" (leaving the boxes (on the right)), in this case representing the
transformation and evolution of the information (products of the research) through the
process. Controls (arrow entering from the top) represents aspects that constrain or
govern the function (e.g. methods and tools) and Mechanisms (arrows entering
from the bottom) represents the resources, which performs the function (e.g. people,
software, database).
The framework in Figure 3.1 is divided into three stages: knowledge
discovering and formalization (activities/phases A1, A2), PA-FMEA proposition
(activity/phase A3) and PAFMEA implementation and analysis (activities/phases A4A6). These stages and its phases will be explained in the next sub-sections of this
chapter.
3.1.

KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERING AND FORMALIZATION

Phases A1 and A2 form the Knowledge Discovering and Formalization stage


from the framework represented in Figure 3.1.
Phase A1 input is the research goal and is oriented towards a literature review
and software review. The literature review, presented in chapter 2, is about the
context of FMEA, which is form by the FMEA problems/drawbacks and works that try

78

to overcome some of these drawbacks. The software review, presented in chapter 4,


is a benchmark analysis to check the commercial software available to support the
FMEA development. The output of this phase is characterized by the FMEA
problems and drawbacks, presented in section 2.2.1 and summarized in Table 2.27,
and the software requirements presented in section 4.2.2.
Phase 2, name as Preliminary Consultant with Experts, has the objective to
identified the main FMEA problems/drawbacks and software requirements for a new
system to support the FMEA development from the experts perspective. The
specialists come from manufacture maintenance area, from academy and the
industry. This phase is developed through an online survey software called Qualtrics
and presented in section 4.2.1 of chapter 4. The expected output is the validation of
the requirements and attributes to be used in the elaboration of the PAFMEA system.
The main concept of this stage is to compare the output results of phase 1
with phase 2, in order to confront the information and solidify the methodological
basis of the proposal. The Figure 3.3 represents the information flow of phase 1 and
2 activities, which its final objective is the PAFMEA proposition, formed by PAFMEA
methodology and PAFMEA BPMS.

Figure 3.3 Information flow of phase 1 and 2 activities.


The survey is divided into three parts:

79

Profile of Specialists: It has the objective to identify the profile of each


specialist and its questions are presented in Annex A Profile of
Specialists.

Methodological Aspects: It has the objective to corroborate the problems


and drawbacks of the FMEA methodology identified in the literature, which
is presented in ANNEX B - Survey Methodological Aspects.

Software Requirements: It has the objective to identify the most essential


requirements to be implemented in a tool to support the FMEA
development. This survey can be seen in ANNEX C - Survey Software
Requirements and its results are presented in section 4.2.1.

3.1.1. Survey analysis


This section will present the survey analysis of Profile of Specialists (Annex
A) and Methodological Aspects (Annex B). A total of 17 specialists answered the
survey and 94% of them work in the industry. The graph in Figure 3.4 shows their
current field of work, which confirms that 88% are from the maintenance and
engineer department.
47%

50%

41%

40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

12%

12%

0%
Logis1c

Manufacture

Maintenance

Engineer

Quality

Figure 3.4 Specialists survey of their current field of work.


The specialists are mostly form by engineer (47%), professor (18%) and
analysts (18%). Since this research is focused on the application of FMEA in the
maintenance area, the surveys shows that 41% of the specialists have more than 5
years of experience in maintenance and 65% have more than 2 years of experience
in the same field. The Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 show the total responses of their
current position and experience in maintenance.

80

47%

50%
40%
30%
18%

20%
10%

18%
12%

6%

6%

6%

6%

0%
Technician

Analyst

Engineer Supervisor Manager

Professor Researcher Consultant

Figure 3.5 Specialists current position.


35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%

29%
24%

24%
12%

12%
0%

0 to 1

1 to 2

2 to 5

5 to 9

9 to 15

Above 15

Years

Figure 3.6 Specialists experience in maintenance.


In order to guarantee the experience of the specialists in the application of
FMEA, the last question (#9) asks how many FMEA sessions have each one
participated before and the survey shows that 77% participated in more than 4
sessions and 47% more than 10 FMEA sessions. The Figure 3.7 shows all the
responses.

81

47%

50%
40%
30%
18%

20%

12%

12%

12%

10%

0%

0%
1 to 2

2 to 4

4 to 6

6 to 8

8 to 10

Above 10

Quan*ty of FMEA Sessions

Figure 3.7 Quantity of FMEA sessions the specialist participated before.


The second part of the survey is form by 15 sentences related to the
methodological aspects of the FMEA and can be seen on Annex B. The specialists
evaluated in a scale of 5 points (1 = Totally Disagree and 5 = Totally Agree) each
phase, so if the mean value of the sentences is above 3 it means that the majority of
the participants agree with the statement.
The first three sentences are related to the availability of resources for the
FMEA development. The Table 3.1 shows that the specialists agree with all the
sentences and confirms the drawback of resource availability pointed out by the
literature review. The third sentence, availability for face-to-face meetings, is the
biggest problem according to the specialists opinion (4,41 out of 5,0). The bar graph
in Figure 3.8 shows the division of the selected scale of the three sentences, which
fortifies the level of agreement according to the resource availability drawback for the
FMEA development.

Table 3.1 Responses of resource availability sentences.


Sentence

Totally

Disagree

Indifferent

Agree

Disagree

Totally

Mean

Agree

#1

4,00

#2

14

4,18

#3

10

4,41

82

35
30
10

25
20
15

14

10

Totally Disagree

Disagree

0
Indierent
#1

#2

Agree

Totally Agree

#3

Figure 3.8 Total of resource availability responses.


The next set of sentences is related to the use and calculation of the RPN,
which is the biggest problem according to the literature review. The Table 3.2 shows
that in most of the sentences the specialists agree with the RPN drawbacks. Two
sentences draw the attention, sentence #4 and #5. Sentence #4 affirms that exists a
limitation on the RPN approach, but even with some disagreements in general the
specialists agree with the affirmative. In the other hand, sentence #5 has the highest
score, which means that the addition of new criteria would be very much appreciated
by the participants. The bar graph in Figure 3.9 supports the results and emphasizes
the high frequency agreement of the sentences.

Table 3.2 Responses of the use and calculation of the RPN sentences.
Sentence

Totally

Disagree

Indifferent

Agree

Disagree

Totally

Mean

Agree

#4

3,65

#5

12

4,00

#6

10

4,41

#7

13

4,00

83

50
45
40
35

#7

30
25

#6

20

#5

15

#4

10
5
0
Totally Disagree

Disagree

Indierent

Agree

Totally Agree

Figure 3.9 Total of responses related to the use and calculation of the RPN.
Sentences #8 until #12 are related to the behavior and treatment of the
participants during the FMEA development. The results showed in Table 3.3 confirm
the specialists opinion that the personality and the behavior of each participant can
impact negatively in the FMEA development. The bar graph in Figure 3.10 shows all
the responses related to the sentences and the five scales.

Table 3.3 Responses related to the behavior and treatment of the participants.
Sentence

Totally

Disagree

Indifferent

Agree

Disagree

Totally

Mean

Agree

#8

4,41

#9

13

3,71

#10

12

3,88

#11

10

4,25

#12

11

3,76

84

60
50
#12

40

#11

30

#10

20

#9

10

#8

0
Totally Disagree

Disagree

Indierent

Agree

Totally Agree

Figure 3.10 Total of responses related to the behavior and treatment of the
participants.
The last three sentences are related to various aspects that could not be
classified into resources, RPN calculation and behavior of participants. The results
from sentence #13 show that the knowledge obtained from one FMEA is used as a
starting point for new ones. Thus, the reuse of knowledge is not a problem of the
method like it was identify in the literature. In the other hand, the results from
sentence #14 show the high agreement on the difficulties to monitor the improvement
actions of the FMEA. Sentence #15 represents the big indifference by the specialists
on the affirmation, which means that the standardization of the terminology used is
not important for the specialists. The graph in Figure 3.11 presents all the responses
from #13, #14 and #15.

12
10
8

#13

#14

#15

2
0
Totally Disagree

Disagree

Indierent

Agree

Totally Agree

Figure 3.11 Responses of sentences #13, #14 and #15.

85

3.2.

PAFMEA PROPOSITION

Phase A3 is related to the proposition of the PAFMEA method, which is


associated to the framework proposed and illustrated in Figure 3.12. The framework
is divided into two parts, Preparation and Development

Stage 1
Preparation

Stage 2
Development

Documents
List of Components
Drawings

Structure
Analysis

Documents
List of Components
Drawings

Identify Team
Optimization

Functional
Analysis

Define Scope

Define Client
DELPHI

Risk
Assessment

Failure
Analysis

ANALYTIC

HIERARCHY

PROCESS

BPM

Figure 3.12 PAFMEA methodology.


Stage 1- Preparation
The first part, Preparation, is developed inspired based on the Potential
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Reference Manual 4th Edition (AIAG, 2008), and
is critical to the development of the FMEA and its final results, which is form by three
steps: identifying the team, defining the scope of the FMEA and defining the
customer.
Identifying the team is the stage responsible for selecting the FMEA team
leader, who should select team members with relevant experience in the
equipment/process and well trained. According to Bertsche (2008) the team size
ranges ideally between 4-6 members and should be formed by a cross-functional

86

group of experts in the subject that thoroughly analyzes equipment or manufacturing


processes.
Defining the scope establishes the boundary of the FMEA analysis. It defines
what is included and excluded, determined based on the type of the FMEA being
developed. The scope needs to be established at the start of the process to assure
consistent direction and focus.
There are four major customers to be considered in the FMEA process, closed
to machinery FMEA requirements in maintenance environment, which are:

End User: the person, organization field or organization that will utilize the asset,
machine or system.

Workstation

or

manufacturing

centers:

the

workstation

location

where

manufacturing operations and maintenance operation take place.

Parts supply chain: the supplier of stock parts managed by maintenance staff.

Regulators: government agencies that define requirements and monitor


compliance to safety and environmental specifications that can impact the product
or process.

Stage 2- Development
The second part of the approach is responsible by the development of the
FMEA, which is form by five steps: structure analysis, function analysis, failure
analysis, risk assessment and optimization.
The structure analysis and function analysis (Figure 3.12, A/B) are
responsible of identifying the elements of the equipment and their relative functions.
From a block of diagram or flow chart of the process it creates the structure
relationship between elements of the system by a tree structure. Thus, it is possible
to present the equipment in a matter that allows the overall understanding of the
system. To fulfill this step, the team leader should assign an experienced team
member, who should use equipments documents to reach a final result.
The failure analysis (Figure 3.12, C) should be carried out for each system
element and for each case it should be decided which system elements it is
reasonable to carry out a failure analysis. This step is responsible to determinate all
potential failure functions, this means that all the failure that leads to an unfulfiment
or limitation of a function is considered. At the end, the content of the failure function

87

structure is inserted into the PA-FMEA form sheet according to VDA 4.2, Table 3.4,
as potential failure effect (FE), potential failure mode (FM) and potential failure cause
(FC).

Table 3.4 PAFMEA form based on VDA 4.2.

PA#eFMEA(FORM

Number:
Page:
Created:

Item-Code:
Responsible:
Type-/-Model-/Fabrication:
State:
Company:
FMEA-/-System-Element: Item-Code:
Responsible:
Created:
State:
Company:
Modified:
PotentialResponsibilityPotentialPotential-EffectsFailurePreventiveDetection/-Target-/S
CausesO
D RPN
(FE)
ModesActions
Actions
Completion(FC)
(FM)
Date

The risk assessment (Figure 3.12, D) is responsible to define the risk of each
failure mode, i.e., the RPN (Risk Priority Number), and is carried out under three
evaluation criteria:

S: Severity of the potential failure effect

O: probability for the occurrence of the failure cause and

D: probability for the detection of the occurred failure cause.


The definition of the RPN is the most frequent problem according to literature

and can be confirmed by the Figure 2.30. Therefore, to formulate a more efficient and
effective failure priority ranking, the approach propose to use the AHP technique,
which its implementation is based on the following considerations:

Different sets of the three factors can produce the exact same value of RPN,
however, the hidden implications may be totally different as pointed out by Bowles
(2004), Chang (2001), Chin (2009) and Sankar and Prabhu (2001).

The RPN based on a simple multiplication factor is not enough, as pointed out by
Ben-Daya and Raouf (1996), Chang (2001), Gilchrist (1993), Laurenti (2012),
Puente (2002) and Rausand (2004)

The necessity to integrate conventional aspects of FMEA based on probability of


failure, chance of non-detection and severity with economic factors.

88

The AHP has no intent to take the RPN characterization out of the FMEA, but
has the objective to give a new and extended perspective to the user. Thus, it will be
possible to have a new analysis and a comparison between the classic RPN
calculation and the new approach. Therefore, instead of multiplication, the PAFMEA
uses a hierarchical decision structure similar to that proposed by Zammori and
Gabbrielli (2011) represented in Figure 2.29. The AHP structure for the risk analysis
of the PAFMEA can be seen in the Figure 3.13.

Obtain'a'Hierarchy'of'Failure'Modes'

Severity'

Criterion'I'

Detec;on'

Criterion'II'

Criterion'III'

Failure'
Mode'I'

Criterion'I'

Failure'
Mode'II'

Criterion'II'

Failure'
Mode'III'

Occurrence'

Criterion'III'

Criterion'I'

Failure'
Mode'IV'

Figure 3.13 AHP structure for the Risk Analysis of the PA-FMEA.
The objective of the AHP is to obtain a new hierarchy of the failure modes
using more criteria than in the classic RPN calculation. Since severity, detection and
occurrence are terms well established and understandable by the users, the proposal
is to include sub-criteria to these ones, as can be seen on Figure 3.13.
Since the AHP is a technique of decision analysis and planning of multiple
criteria, it is first necessary to decide which criteria shall be used. The sub-criteria of
severity, detection and occurrence will be presented to the users and the Delphi
method will be implemented to reach a consensus on which criteria will be used.
Deschamps (2013) declares that specialists opinions could be register through
surveys, interviews or panels, among other possible techniques or tools. The team
members will also decide the quantity of sub-criteria, which will be limited to until
three for each one.

89

The first round of the Delphi will be responsible to present the sub-criteria and
the goal to choose them is also explain with enough information so everyone is
aware of the process been applied. The criteria based on the literature review and
presented to the team members are: cost, production priority, maintenance cost,
maintenance duration, profit, man-hour, equipment damage, environmental damage
and employee safety. During the first round, the participants can add more criteria,
which will be integrated to the criteria presented before. The second round of
questionnaire is responsible to show the criteria added by the participants, however
the responses are not presented yet. The participants are asked to review their
opinions according to the compiled results so that agreement can be reached. The
number of rounds may vary according to the agreement of the participants or the
observation that agreement will not be reached.
Following with the new risk assessment approach, the AHP is implemented
with four failure modes, which should be selected by the specialists or the ones with
the highest RPN obtained by the classical FMEA. The criteria used in this step are
the ones chosen by the participants. Briefly, the step-by-step procedure in using AHP
is the following:
1. Define the decision criteria in the form of a hierarchy of objectives (Figure
3.13);
2. Weight the criteria and alternatives as a function of their importance for the
corresponding element of the higher level. For this purpose, the AHP uses
simple pairwise comparison to determine weights and ratings, so that the
analyst can concentrate on just two factors at one time. One question which
might arise when using pairwise comparison is: how important is the criteria
cost with respect to the criteria production priority in terms of the hierarchy
of the failure modes? The answer will be equally important, moderate
important, etc. The verbal responses are then quantified and translated into a
score via the use of the discrete 9-point scales from Table 3.5.
3. To maintain anonymity and reach a consensus on the comparison of the
failure modes and criteria, a Delphi technique is applied with the participation
of specialists. The number of rounds is not fixed, but at least three rounds
needs to be performed in order to reach a satisfactory result.

90

Table 3.5. Intensity of importance to pairwise comparison (Saaty, 1994).


Intensity of
Importance
1

Definition

Description

Equal Importance

Two activities contribute equally


to the objective

Moderate importance of one

Experience and judgment

over another

strongly favor one activity over


another

Essential or strong importance

Experience and judgment


strongly favor one activity over
another

Very strong importance

An activity is strongly favored


and its dominance
demonstrated in practice

Extreme importance

The evidence favoring once


activity over another is of the
highest possible order of
affirmation

Reciprocals

If activity i has one of the


above numbers compared with
activity j.

4. After a judgment matrix has been developed, a priority vector to weight the
elements of the matrix is calculated. This is the normalized eigenvector of the
matrix.
The optimization actions (Figure 3.12, E), fifth step of approach, should be
taken for the failures modes with the highest ranking and according to the cost of
each action. Optimization actions are additional or new preventive and/or detection
actions introduced based on FMEA results (BERTSCHE, 2008). These actions can
be:

91

Actions that prevent the potential failure cause or reduce the occurrence of
potential failures. Such actions are only possible by altering the design or the
process.

Actions, which reduce the severity of a failure.

This is attainable through

conceptual alterations on the product (e.g. redundancy, error signals, etc.).

Actions taken to raise the probability of detection. Such actions could be


changes in the testing procedures and/or in the design and/or in the process.
After implementing the new preventive and/or detection actions, these actions

are newly assessed through a new implementation of FMEA, forming a cycle in the
process, indicated by the feedback (bottom arrow from A6 to A4 phase) in Figure 3.1.
This assessment represents a prognosis concerning the improvement potential to be
expected. The final assessment is carried out after the new actions are implemented
and tested.
3.3.

PAFMEA IMPLEMENTATION AND ANALYSIS

Phases A4, A5 and A6 form the PA-FMEA Implementation and Analysis


stage from the framework represented in Figure 3.1. In summary, this stage regards
the development and conduction of an application study to test the model generated
in the previous stage.
Phase A4 is the preparation and planning of the application study that should
be conducted in the next phase. This step is very important to prepare the team
members for the PA-FMEA implementation, where everyone involved should have
the same level of information.
Phase A5 regards the conduction of the application study. The application
study will be conduct in a manufacture company and the end product of this step will
be composed of the database from the BPMS and the evaluation of the obtained
results.
Phase A6 aims at the comparison between the PAFMEA results and the
classic FMEA. A final questionnaire will be used to evaluate the PAFMEA
effectiveness, represented by the feedback (up arrow from A6 to A4 phase) in Figure
3.1.

92

3.4.

CONSIDERATIONS AND CHAPTER SYNTESIS

According to Hawkins (1994), framework is a conceptual structure form by


elements that support the development of something (HAWKINS, 1994) and this
chapter presented the PA-FMEA framework.
The framework developed is based on IDEF0 notation and helps to represent
the methodological and technological basis. The methodological basis is about the
development cycle and the use of FMEA integrating the AHP and Delphi methods,
and the technological basis is based on a BPMS platform.
The framework is divided into three stages: knowledge discovering and
formalization, PAFMEA proposition, PAFMEA implementation and analysis.
Knowledge discovering is about the study of the literature review and the
consultation with experts to identify and formalize the FMEA drawbacks and possible
improvements to the method. Therefore, the information gather from this stage was
used to propose the PAFMEA method.
The second stage presents the PAFMEA in detailed, which is form by the
preparation phase and the development phase. The preparation phase could be
considered as the strategy and consolidation of the case to be analyze and the
development phase is the analysis itself.
The third stage of the framework is the implementation of the method in a real
case scenario with the analysis of the results.
The PAFMEA methodology will be developed in a business process
management system (BPMS Bizagi Suite), which has the objective to instantiate the
process and to facilitate its implementation. This is the subject for the next chapter.

93

4. PA-FMEA DEVELOPMENT CYCLE

In order to minimize errors, facilitate the application and give a workflow


oriented perspective to the approach proposed, a BPM system, also called as BPMS,
will be implemented. BPMS is a category of software that aims to address the full life
cycle of BPM. BPMS reduce lead-time, reduce hand-off errors and brings more
flexibility to change the structure of supported business processes as pointed out by
Reijers (2006). The BPMS, devoted to PAFMEA, was developed in the Bizagi Suite
Plataform.
Bizagi is designed to deliver results with the tools to: BPMN diagramming
processes, define business rules, orchestrating other applications, defining the user
interface, optimization and load balancing work, web portal work, work performance
indicators of processes and monitor of activities. In Bizagi, when processes are
automated, then can be easily modified, providing organizations with the necessary
agility to achieve their business results. With Bizagi, is possible to check the state of
the process and develop a custom web interface with all the collected data.
Before developing the BPMS, a benchmark analysis was performed, as
structured and planned according to Phase A1 of the PA-FMEA framework, to check
the commercial software available to support the FMEA development. Therefore, this
chapter is divided into four parts: the FMEA software review to investigate relevant
features and functional requirements, survey of software requirements, software
requirements and the development of the PAFMEA system using the Bizagi platform.
4.1.

FMEA SOFTWARE REVIEW

There is a big variety of commercial software to support the FMEA


implementation and the
Table 4.1 shows some software names and their respective developers and
websites.

94

Table 4.1 Commercial softwares of FMEA.


Software
APIS IQSOFTWARE
FMEA Executive
FMEA Inspector
Ram Commander
Reliasoft - XFMEA
FMEA-Pro
FMEA Facilitator
FMEA Xpert
Risk Spectrum
FMEA
SCIO-FMEA
CIMOS FMEA

Developer
APIS GmbH
Symphony
Technologies
Macromar Software
ALD Reliability
Engineering
Reliasoft Corporation
Dyadem International
Kinetic
Elcomind

Website
http://www.apis.de/en
http://www.symphonytech.com
http://www.mapromar.com
http://www.aldservice.com
http://www.reliasoft.com.br
http://www.dyadem.com
http://www.fmeca.com
http://www.elcomind.it

Scandpower

http://www.scandpower.com

PLATO
MBFG

http://www.plato-ag.de
http://www.irmler.com/

Table 4.1 (APIS IQ-SOFTWARE, FMEA Executive, FMEA Inspector, Ram


Commander and Reliasoft XFMEA) were analyzed to check for their main features
and benefits.
The marketing material and the manual of the software were used to perform
this analysis. Furthermore, educational licenses of the software were acquired to
allow a more accurate analysis through a global software exploration.

4.1.1. APIS IQ-SOFTWARE


APIS informationtechnologien GmbH is a German company that has been
around since 1992. Its products are software for managing technical risks based on
knowledge. The software of the APIS IQ-Software aims to support users working in
the scope of Risk Management (FMEA, Process Flow Diagram, Control Plan). They
enable you to manage data in a consistent and efficient manner, without redundancy,

95

i.e., possible changes in the documents can be made without the need for additional
adjustments in other documents.
This software creates various documents, such as DFMEA/PFMEA/DRBFM
forms, term plans and statistical evaluations. The format in which the documents are
presented can be modified to meet ISO/TS 169494, VDA 4.2, AIAG FMEA 4th edition,
IEC 61508 and ISO CD 26262.
The main software features are presented below:

Tree structure: represents the structure of the system in form of a tree,


which shows how the system can be divided into subsystems and the
failure analysis and function analysis can be realized. The Figure 4.1
represents a screenshot of the software with the tree structure.

Figure 4.1 Screenshot example of IQ-Software.

FMEA Matrix: represents all inputs and outputs of the FMEA analysis,
following international standards such as VDA, AIAG, MIL, etc. The
software allows comments and graphics to be displayed next to the
array. Figure 4.2 shows the FMEA matrix with a Pareto graphic.

96

Figure 4.2 FMEA matrix from IQ-Software.

Follow-up actions: list the responsible, the date and any additional
information for each action. This features assists in the project
management and generates a follow-up actions report for a better
analysis.

Statistical evaluation: provides numbers and diagrams based on these


numbers in order to be able to assess the risks in a system. There are
different options available such as pareto analysis (Figure 4.2),
frequency analysis, risk matrix, among others.

The main software drawback is that there is no activity guide to develop the
FMEA, thus the user gets lost on which button or tool to use. Therefore a detailed
course is necessary to be able to use the tool by everyone involved.

4.1.2. FMEA EXECUTIVE


FMEA executive supports the development of Design and Process FMEA
where the administrator can customize standard guidelines for rating of severity,
occurrence and detection.
The software main features are:

Tree structure, which can be seen on the Figure 4.3;

97

Figure 4.3 Tree structure and software interface of FMEA Executive.

Guidelines for rating severity, occurrence and detection are already


inserted in the software, the user needs only to choose from a list box
(Figure 4.4);

Figure 4.4 Failure analysis of FMEA Executive.

Send automatic notification to the responsible of the improvement


actions;

Follow-up activities can be added and their respective improvement


actions;

Attached files to support the FMEA development, such as MS Word,


MS Excel, pictures, CAD etc.;

FMEA form is based on AIAG FMEA 4th edition and can be exported to
MS Excel.

98

The software is based on only one standard, AIAG FMEA 4th Edition, which
does not allow the generation of the FMEA form according to any other standard.
Furthermore, there is no process-oriented guide, thus the user needs to know the
software and its features before starting to develop the FMEA.
4.1.3. RELIASOFT XFMEA
ReliaSoft Corporation specializes in developing software for the reliability
engineering. The company based in Tucson, USA, has a representative in So
Paulo, Brazil ReliaSoft.
XFMEA ReliaSoft software helps in the development of FMEA and FMECA
facilitating the study, management of information and preparation of reports for
analysis of FMEA or FMECA. The software has pre-defined settings, including major
industry standards (such as AIAG FMEA-3 or FMEA-4, SAE J1739 and MIL-STD1629A) and also provides options to extend and customize their analyzes and reports
as needed.
The reports generated by XFMEA report information about each component
analyzed with your failure mode (s). It also provides information on the effects and
causes of failure modes, and a control plan for recommended actions and a
spreadsheet for project review after the recommended actions are finalized.
The software provides many features, which allows the users to:

Register and manage the data to analyze the failure modes and failure
effects;

Find and reuse important information from existing FMEAs;

Existing guidelines to rate severity, occurrence and detection (Figure


4.5);

Figure 4.5 XFMEA screenshot of the FMEA form.

99

Present data through reports according to international standards


(APQP5, ISO TS 16949, among others);

Create flow diagrams of processes and functional block diagrams;

Build charts with the FMEA results;

Manage improvement actions through email notification;

Save data in commercial database software, Access or SQL Server;

Customizes and generates the FMEA forms in different standards such


as SAE J1739, SAE ARP5580, AIAG FMEA 4th edition, MIL-STD1629A, etc. (Figure 4.6).

Figure 4.6 XFMEA customizing and generating FMEA forms.


There is no process oriented guide, therefore the user gets lost inside the
software on which feature should use to continue the FMEA development.

4.1.4. RAM COMMANDER


RAM Commander is a software tool for Reliability and Maintainability Analysis
and Prediction, FMEA/FMECA, Fault Tree Analysis, Event Tree Analysis and Safety
assessment. Its reliability and safety modules cover all widely known reliability
standards and failure analysis approaches.
The software main features are:

100

Tree structure, which can be seen on Figure 4.7;

Figure 4.7 Tree structure of RAM Commander.

Statistical maintenance tools, such as MTTR, MTBF, etc.;

Existing guidelines to help the user the rating process of severity,


occurrence and detection;

Generate FMEA forms, Figure 4.8, but it is not based on international


standards;

Figure 4.8 FMEA form of RAM Commander.

Generate reports in HTML, MS Excel, MS Word, RTF, etc.;

A variety types of reports, but none international standard is pointed


out, as can be see on Figure 4.9.

101

Figure 4.9 FMEA report generation of RAM Commander.


There is no process-oriented guide and none support for the user on the
failure analysis step. Since the software is develop for Reliability, the variety of tools
confuses the user, making the software complex and sometimes confusing.
Furthermore, none standard is cited during the FMEA development forcing the user
to use the software FMEA template.

4.1.5. FMEA INSPECTOR


FMEA Inspector is a FMEA software tool that facilitates the FMEA
development process. It has a simple and intuitive interface, however it is not
process oriented.
The software main features are:

Tree structure, which can be seen on Figure 4.10;

Figure 4.10 Tree structure of FMEA Inspector.

Generates the FMEA report but does not allow the possibility to choose
a standard to generate the FMEA form;

It gives the possibility to add improvement actions and its respective


responsible.

There is no process-oriented guide and none support for the users during the
FMEA development. The simplicity of the software creates a lot of limitations, such
as no guidelines during the failure analysis and no team communication during the
whole process. Furthermore, it does not provide FMEA forms according to
international standards, forcing the user to use the software FMEA report template.

102

4.1.6. SOFTWARE SUMMARY


In order to summarize and compare the software, the

Table 4.2 shows their features. It is possible to notice that none of the software
have all the features, thus the objective of the PA-FMEA BPMS is to integrate as
many features as possible.

Table 4.2 Comparison table between the commercial FMEA software.

Process-Oriented
Tips/Directions to Develop
FMEA
User Control
Friendly UI
Structural Tree View
RPN Auto Calculation
Generate FMEA Form
Export FMEA Form to
Word/Excel/PDF
FMEA Form Based on
Standards
Guidelines to S / O / D
Guidelines according to
standards
Rates to S / O / D already
inserted
Development of Multiple
FMEA
Columns to Add Actions to
Each FM
Statistical and Graph
Analysis
Send Email to Responsible
by each Action
Send Email Automatically
Save data in Commercial

APIS IQSoftware

FMEA
Executive

FMEA
Inspector

RAM
Commander

Reliasoft
XFMEA

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

No
No

No
No

No
No

No
No

No
Yes

103

Database Software

According to the Table 4.2, none of the software is process-oriented, which is


one of the biggest advantages of the PAFMEA system. Furthermore, the new
software proposes a new risk assessment approach, which is not presented in the
software reviewed.
4.2.

SURVEY OF SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS

This survey is shown in Annex C and has the objective to identify the most
essential requirements to be implemented in a tool to support the FMEA
development.

Furthermore,

it

completes

the

Knowledge

Discovering

and

Formalization stage from the framework represented in Figure 3.1.


The sentences presented to the specialists were based on the literature
review and the software review of section 4.1. The specialists evaluated in a scale of
5 points (1 = Desirable and 5 = Very Essential) each phrase, so if the mean value
of the sentences is above 3 it means that the majority of the participants thinks that
the requirement is essential. This survey was performed in the same round as the
Profile of Specialists and Methodological Aspects surveys. Its responses are
presented in Table 4.3.
The only requirement that is not essential for the specialists is the variety of
standards to support the FMEA development (#1). In the other hand, the most
essential requirement according to the survey is represented in sentence #10, which
is the possibility to save the data of the FMEA in a commercial software database
(SQL Server), and clearly is a big advantage to reuse the information.
Sentence #2 and #6 confirms the necessity to show guidelines and tips during
the FMEA development, in specially rating of the RPN criteria (severity, detection and
occurrence). Furthermore, sentence #3 represents that a process-oriented approach
would be an essential requirement to help the participants through the FMEA
development.

Table 4.3 Responses of the software requirements survey.


Sentence

Desirable

Important

Indifferent Essential

Very

Mean

104

Essential
#1

2.94

#2

11

3.71

#3

3.71

#4

3.29

#5

3.65

#6

11

3.88

#7

3.12

#8

3.59

#9

3.65

#10

4.00

#11

3.18

4.3.

PAFMEA SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS

The requirements were chosen based on the commercial software analyzed,


FMEA drawbacks according to the literature review and the preliminary consultant
with the experts. The requirements are classify with the following level of priorities
(SOMMERVILLE and KOTONYA, 1998):

Essential: It is essential to use with the operation of the system. It is


mandatory to implement this requirement, since, without it, the system will not
work correctly;

Important: It is necessary to the functioning of the system. Without this


requirement, the system can still be used. However, the use is not
satisfactory;

Desirable: It adds new values to the system and makes it more complete.
This type of requirement could be implemented in later versions of the
system, since even without its implementation the system meets their basic
features.
The requirements are also classify into Functional and Non-Functional.

According to Sommerville and Kotonya (1998), a functional requirement defines a

105

function of a system and its components. The functional requirements of the BPMS
developed can be seen on Table 4.4.

Table 4.4 Functional requirements of the BPMS for the PA-FMEA.


Functional Requirements
Description
Allows the user to login in the system with a
unique "username" and "password"
Allows the registration of the participants
with full name, username, password

Essential

Generate FMEA report

Generate FMEA report and export to PDF

Essential

FMEA based on VDA 4.2

FMEA form based on VDA 4.2

Essential

Name
Login
Register Users

Variety of Standards
Calculate RPN
Automatically
Show guidelines for
S/O/D

FMEA form based on AIAG 4ed.


Calculate the RPN value automatically and
show to the user
Show guidelines to rate severity, occurrence
and detection
The user does not have to type the rates for
S/O/D rates inserted
severity, occurrence and detection. The
previously
user needs only to choose them
Send email to the
Send email to the responsible by the
responsible
improvement actions
Tips to develop the FMEA and to continue
Tips to develop FMEA
in the process showed in every screen.
Realized the AHP
The AHP calculus should be performed with
automatically
Excel without user intervention
Show consistency ratio of Show the consistency ratio of each pairwise
AHP
comparison (AHP) to the user
Allow the user do redo
AHP with inconsistency

Allow the user to redo the pairwise


comparison of the AHP

Priority

Essential

Important
Essential
Essential
Important
Desirable
Desirable
Important
Important
Important

In the other hand, according to Sommerville and Kotonya (1998), nonfunctional requirement describes restrictions and quality aspects related to the
system and its development process. The non-functional requirements of the BPMS
can be seen on Table 4.5.

Table 4.5 Non-functional requirements of the BPMS for the PAFMEA.

106

Non-Functional Requirements
Name
Description
Friendly The user interface has to be friendly, without
interface ambiguities and misunderstandings
The system should be easy to learn for the user, a lay
Easy to
user should be able to perform the most basic
learn
functions
The system should always be available. The system
Reliability should not be unavailable for errors of users. And if it
happens, your recovery should be immediate.
Only authorized personal should be able to use and
Privacy
interfere in the FMEA process
Tips and Texts are and technical information are used during the
Directions analysis to help the users
Process A process oriented software to guarantee the final
Oriented result of the analysis
The users personal identification such as name should
Anonymity
remain in anonymity

Priority
Important
Desirable

Desirable
Essential
Important
Essential
Essential

The figure Figure 4.11 represents the architecture diagram of the BPMS,
which is divided into three layers:

Internet Layer: this layer is responsible to provide the software interface for the
final user.

BPM layer: this layer is where the BPM is located, which is integrated to Excel
file responsible to calculate the AHP.

Data Access Layer: this layer is responsible to save all the data inserted by
the user.

Figure 4.11 Architecture diagram of the BPMS.

107

4.4.

SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT

The first step of the software development is to model the process of the PAFMEA to
be implemented. In fact, process modeling is essential to represent complex
systems, being the great importance to define the rules of information system
integrated with business processes. The process model of the PAFMEA can be seen
on

Figure 4.12.

Figure 4.12 PAFMEA process model.

108

Following the conceptual model (Figure 3.12) the process model is divided into
four steps represented by milestones in BPMN: Strategy & Planning, FMEA
Development, AHP Development and Results Presentation. These steps will be
explained in the next sections.

4.4.1. Strategy & Planning


The Strategy & Planning step is composed by the first stage of the PA-FMEA
framework (Figure 3.12) and is formed by two activities and one gateway.

The

activities are responsible of defining the team, the scope and the client of the
process. The gateway is used to decide what standard the participants want to base
the next activities of the PA-FMEA development. The Figure 4.13 shows the user
interface of Define Scope & Client activity, which is also possible to see the values
inserted by the user in the previous activity through the tab Define the Team, Figure
4.14.

Figure 4.13 Define Scope & Client user interface.

Figure 4.14 Define the Team tab user interface.

109

4.4.2. FMEA Development


The next step of the process is responsible by the FMEA development, which
can be better seen on Figure 4.15.

Figure 4.15 PA-FMEA process model of Strategy & Planning and FMEA
Development.
The FMEA development step is form by three activities:

Complete FMEA Header: complete the header of the FMEA form, which is
based on the VDA 4.2 (Table 2.1) and the user interface can be seen on
Figure 4.16.

Figure 4.16 Complete FMEA Header interface.

Complete FMEA Form: the user should complete the FMEA form with the
information from the failure analysis, which is based on VDA 4.2 (Table 2.1)
and the user interface can be seen on Figure 4.17. Each line of the form

110

should be added individually, where after the plus button is pushed a new form
is opened (Figure 4.18), thus the user can add all the information related to
the analysis.

Figure 4.17 Complete FMEA form interface.

Figure 4.18 Interface for addition or edition of FMEA form lines.

List/Choose Main Failure Modes: In this activity, the users should choose the
failure modes that will be analyzed with AHP in the next step of the PAFMEA.
The user interface of this activity can be seen on Figure 4.19.

111

Figure 4.19 List/Choose the Main Failure Modes interface.

4.4.3. AHP Development


The third step of the PA-FMEA process is titled as AHP Development and
can be detailed seen on Figure 4.20. This is the most important step of the method,
which proposes an alternative approach using Analytic Hierarchy Process to perform
the risk assessment activity represented in Figure 3.12.

Figure 4.20 PA-FMEA process model of AHP Development and Results


Presentation.
This step is formed by five activities, which are:

Define AHP Criteria with Delphi: this activity is responsible by choosing the
criteria that will be applied in the AHP development. The quantity and the

112

criteria will be selected through an application of Delphi inside the Bizagi. An


example of this interface can be seen on Figure 4.21, which shows the
beginning of the severity criteria selection.

Figure 4.21 Interface of the activity Define AHP Criteria with Delphi.
Confirm Criteria Selected: responsible of confirming the criteria selected by the
users, where it is possible to add a new one or continue the process with the
criteria already selected. One example of this activity interface is represented
on Figure 4.22.

Figure 4.22 Example of the activity Confirm Criteria Selected interface.

113

AHP Development: this activity is represented as a sub-process to summarize


its main objective. The full process is represented on Figure 4.23 and is mainly
responsible by completing the pairwise comparison between each failure
mode and the criteria selected on the previous activity. The users in the Bizagi
interface will realize the pairwise comparison and the calculation will be
realized in an Excel file, which will be explained later. The users will first
perform the pairwise comparison between the AHP criteria (Figure 4.24) and
then the pairwise comparison between the failure modes for each AHP
criterion (Figure 4.25). After completing each pairwise comparison, the user
needs to press the button on the bottom of the screen, Generate Excel AHP
Document, which is responsible by sending the values chosen to the excel
file and also generates a partial report for the user to check the results.

Figure 4.23 Sub-process of the AHP Development activity.

114

Figure 4.24 Example of the pairwise comparison for the AHP criteria in the BPMS.

Figure 4.25 Example of the pairwise comparison for the failure modes in the BPMS.

Calculate Consistency Ratio: activity responsible to calculate the consistent of


the information collected on the pairwise comparison. This step will be
calculated in the Excel file developed for the PAFMEA approach. If the
consistency ratio is higher than 10%, the user is invited to redo its evaluation
through the pairwise comparison, as is represented in the gateway after this
activity on Figure 4.20.

Calculate AHP Final Priorities: this activity will calculate the final hierarchy list
of the failure modes. This calculation will also be performed in the Excel file
and will be shown on the BPMS interface to the user.

115

The AHP calculation will be realized through an Excel file developed especially
for this application, which will also be used to create a report for the user and can be
exported to a excel or pdf file. The excel file is divided into three steps:
1. Perform comparison between the criteria;
2. Perform comparison between the failure modes for each criteria;
3. Obtain the final priorities through a new sheet, which uses the priorities
calculated in the other two steps.
The methodology of step 1 and 2 is the same and the sequence of the
calculation is:
I.

Weight the criteria or failure modes using simple pairwise comparison


forming Matrix 1, Figure 4.26 and Figure 4.27. This is the only step
where the user needs to insert values, the next ones will be calculated
automatically using the excel tools.

II.

Calculation of the priority (Matrix 2, Matrix 3 and Matrix 4 of Figure


4.28), which the priority is obtain by the normalized eigenvector. Matrix
2 is Matrix 1 squared and Matrix 3 is Matrix 2 squared. Continue
creating matrices until Normalized Eigen Vector does not change.

III.

Calculation of the consistent ratio (CR), where a value over 0.1


indicates that there is a concern of inconsistency in the pairwise
comparison. If the inconsistency happens, the user needs to redo the
pairwise comparison until the value gets below 0.1.

Step%1:%Pairwise%comparison%for%all%criteria
Matrix'1

Criteria
Cost
Cost
1
Safety
5
Equip.'Damage
1/3
Occurrency
1/3

Safety
1/5
1
1/5
1/7

Equip.'Damage
3
5
1
1/5

Occurrency
3
7
5
1

Figure 4.26 Example of pairwise comparison between criteria, forming Matrix 1.

Step%1:%Pairwise%comparison%for%"Cost"
Matrix'1

Cost
FM1
FM2
FM3

FM1
1
1/7
1/9

FM2
7
1
1/5

FM3
9
5
1

116

Figure 4.27 Example of pairwise comparison between failure modes, forming Matrix
1.

Step%2:%Calculation%of%priority%(i.e.,%normalized%eigenvector)
Matrix'2

Matrix'3

Matrix'4

FM2

Normalized%
Eigenvector
71.80000
0.78594
15.12698
0.16558
4.42857
0.04848

Eigenvector

Cost
FM1
FM2
FM3

FM1

Cost
FM1
FM2
FM3

FM1
FM2
FM3
35.58413 157.2222 496.31
7.878005 35.58413
112.3
2.495591 11.02921 35.584

689.12063
155.76372
49.10892

0.77083
0.17423
0.05493

Cost
FM1
FM2
FM3

FM1
FM2
FM3
3743.425 16663.18 52978 73384.73481
840.9226 3743.425 11902 16486.62157
264.495 1177.292 3743.4 5185.21153

0.77201
0.17344
0.05455

3
0.84127
0.250794

FM3

15.8
3
1.177778

53
11.286
3

Figure 4.28 Calculation of the priority of the failure modes.

4.4.4. Results Presentation


This step is responsible by the generation of the FMEA Report where the user
can decide whether to export to a PDF or Excel file. The report is composed by the
FMEA form (Figure 4.17) filled by the user and the Excel spreadsheet developed to
realize the risk assessment using AHP, which is form by the pairwise comparison and
the final ranking of the chosen failure modes. An example of both parts can be seen

Resistncia queimada
Problema na vlvula de refrigerao

Manter resistncias sobressalentes

Figure 4.29 Example of FMEA form report sheet.

6
2

Deteco Visual

Responsibility

Detection Actions

Ocurrence

Preventive Actions

Potential Cause

Qualidade do componente
Vlvula travada

RPN

4
4

Potential Failure Mode

Severity

Teste precisa ser repetido


Teste perdido

Detection

Aquecer Cmara
Resfriar a Cmara

Potential Effects

Function_

on Figure 4.29 and Figure 4.30.

2
2

48 Marcelo
16 Marcelo

117

Severity
[FM1]
[FM2]
[FM3]
[FM4]

Criteria'I
0.045
0.604
0.093
0.259

Criteria'II
0.596
0.101
0.243
0.059

[FM1]
[FM2]
[FM3]
[FM4]

Criteria'I
0.522
0.085
0.342
0.050

Criteria'II
0.574
0.092
0.282
0.053

[FM1]
[FM2]
[FM3]
[FM4]

Criteria'I
0.094
0.242
0.612
0.052

Criteria'II
.
.
.
.

Criteria'III
0.262
0.110
x
0.581
0.046

Severity'Criteria
0.067
0.293
0.640

Severity'Ranking
0.346
0.141
0.450
0.064

Detection
Criteria'III
Detection'Criteria
0.137
0.717
0.146
x
0.088
=
0.653
0.195
0.064

Detection'Ranking
0.451
0.098
0.398
0.053

Occurence
Criteria'III
Occurence'Criteria
Ocurrence'Ranking
.
1.000
0.094
.
x
1.000
=
0.242
.
1.000
0.612
.
0.052

Final'Ranking
Severity
Resistance'Burned
0.346
Refrigeration'Valve'with'Problem
0.141
Voltage'equipment'with'problem
0.450
Variation'of'voltage'supplier0.064

Detection Occurence
0.451
0.094
0.098
0.242
x
0.398
0.612
0.053
0.052

Sev_Det_Occu
0.280
0.094
0.626

Final'Ranking
0.198
0.200
0.547
0.055

Varia4on/of/voltage/supplier/
Voltage/equipment/with/problem/
1/

Refrigera4on/Valve/with/Problem/
Resistance/Burned/

0.000/

0.100/

0.200/

0.300/

0.400/

0.500/

0.600/

Figure 4.30 Example of PAFMEA final ranking report sheet.


4.5.

CONSIDERATIONS AND CHAPTER SYNSTESIS

This chapter presented the BPM system of the PA-FMEA, which is an online
tool to support the development of the FMEA and to aggregate a different failure
analysis using Analytic Hierarchy Process. Before developing the BPMS, a
benchmark study was made to analyze the main commercial software solutions
available to support the FMEA development.
The integration of the AHP is to provide a different and more accurate
methodology for the decision makers, where it is possible to add as many criteria as

118

the team members decide to calculate the hierarchy list of the failure modes. Thus,
the analysis of the failure modes are not obligated to use only severity, occurrence
and detection, the users can also use other criteria such as maintenance cost,
production priority, safety, etc.
The PA-FMEA system was developed in the Bizagi Suite tool and its main
advantages are:

Real-time monitoring and analysis of the process;

Execution and performance reports are generated automatically;

It standardize and centralize the procedure facilitating the evaluation


and continues improvement of the process;

Online access without the need of local software.

119

5. APPLICATION SCENARIO

This chapter will show an application study of the PAFMEA method


implementation in a manufacturing company of white goods. Moreover, this chapter
will also present a discussion about the results obtained and a survey used to
evaluate the participants perceptions about the new method.
5.1.

PRESENTATION OF APPLICATION STUDY

The application study of the PAFMEA implementation is carried out in a


manufacturing company of white goods. The company is a global leader in
household appliances selling more than 50 million products to customers in more
than 150 markets every year. The company focuses on innovations that are
thoughtfully designed, based on extensive consumer insight, to meet the real needs
of consumers and professionals. The company is located in more than 50 countries
and has over 60 thousands employees.
In order to follow the PAFMEA methodology, Figure 5.1, stage 1 was
performed and its results are:

identify team:

one maintenance supervisor, one maintenance

engineer, two maintenance analysts.

define scope: implement the method to the most critical system


according to the teams experience, which is a set of test room that is
detailed in the next paragraph.

define client: the client is the end-user of the system.

120

Stage 1
Preparation

Stage 2
Development

Documents
List of Components
Drawings

Structure
Analysis

Documents
List of Components
Drawings

Identify Team
Optimization

Functional
Analysis

Define Scope

Define Client
DELPHI

Risk
Assessment

Failure
Analysis

ANALYTIC

HIERARCHY

PROCESS

BPM

Figure 5.1 PAFMEA methodology.


The system selected is a set of test rooms responsible by checking and
verifying products in the end of the assembling line. Its main objective is to guarantee
the proper functionality of the product in different temperature environments and
voltages. The Figure 5.2 presents the layout of the system.

121

Figure 5.2 Layout of the case study sytem.

The systems components and its functionalities are:

chiller: responsible by cooling the water;

chiller water tube: bring the water inside the test rooms;

water Valve: allows the water from the chiller to enter in the test room;

motor fan: blow air into the test room to guarantee the desired
temperature;

heater: heat the test room;

varivolt: changes the voltage according to the PLC signal;

PLC: programmable logic controller responsible by controlling the


temperature inside the test room and the voltage supply for the product;

fluke data acquisition system: reads the thermocouples installed


inside the products;

supervisory: computer with supervisory control and acquisition system


responsible by the acquisition and analysis of data.

The second stage of the PAFMEA is responsible by the failure mode and
effect analysis, which is form by the activities A, B, C, D and E that are represented

122

in Figure 5.1. The results of the activities A,B and C are presented in the PAFMEA
form, which was adapted to match with the companys FMEA form and can be seen
in Table 5.4. Furthermore, the form shows the risk assessment results related to the
classical FMEA approach, which is the ranking of the criteria (severity, occurrence,
detection) and the calculation of the RPN. These criteria are treated with the same
importance and the same weight to realize the RPN calculation. Even though the
software was developed based on VDA 4.2, the ranking of these criteria were based
on the standard SAE J1739/2002 because it was already used in the company, and
the index tables related to the criteria can be seen in Table 5.1, Table 5.2 and Table
5.3.

Table 5.1 Severity of the Effect of the Failure Mode Ranking (SAE J1739, 2002).
Severity of the Effect of
the Failure Mode
Hazardous - without warning
Hazardous - with warning
Very High
High
Moderate
Low
Very Low
Small
Very Small
None

Function Impact derived from the


Severity (S) of the Effect of the Failure

Rank

Mode
Impact on safety, health or environment. The failure
will happen without warning.
Impact on safety, health or environment. The failure
will happen with warning.
Very high impact. The function is lost and a long
period is needed to restore normality.
High impact. Part of the function is lost and a long
period is needed to restore normality.
Moderate impact. Part of the function is lost and a
period is needed to restore normality.
Low impact. The function is impaired and needs to be
verified.
Moderate impact. Part of the function is impaired and
needs to be verified.
Reduced impact. Failure takes some time to be
repaired but it does not affect the function.

10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3

Insignificant impact. Failure can be repaired rapidly.

No effect to safety, health and environment.

123

Table 5.2 Chances of detection (SAE J1739, 2002).


Chances of

Criterion to assess the probability to Detect (D) the

Detection

Failure Cause

Rank

The existing control will not detect the potential cause and
Almost Impossible

consequently the failure mode. Or there is not existing control for

10

this related cause.


Very Remote
Remote
Very Low
Low
Medium
Moderately High
High
Very High
Almost Certain

There is a very remote possibility that the existing control will detect
the potential cause and consequently the failure mode
There is a remote possibility that the existing control will detect the
potential cause and consequently the failure mode
There is a very low possibility that the existing control will detect the
potential cause and consequently the failure mode
There is a very low possibility that the existing control will detect the
potential cause and consequently the failure mode
There is a medium possibility that the existing control will detect the
potential cause and consequently the failure mode
There is a moderately high possibility that the existing control will
detect the potential cause and consequently the failure mode
There is a high possibility that the existing control will detect the
potential cause and consequently the failure mode
There is a very high possibility that the existing control will detect
the potential cause and consequently the failure mode
It is almost certain that the existing control will detect the potential
cause and consequently the failure mode

9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1

Table 5.3 Probability of Occurrence of a Failure Cause (SAE J1739, 2002).


Criterion Used to Assess the Probability of Occurrence of a Failure Cause
Failure According to Operational Cycle

Rank

1 in 90

10

1 in 900

1 in 36.000

1 in 90.000

1 in 180.000

1 in 270.000

1 in 360.000

1 in 540.000

1 in 900.000

1 in more than 900.000

124

Table 5.4 PAFMEA form of the case study.


Number:
Page:
Created:

PAFMEA FORM

Failure Mode

Effects

Chiller with problem

No temperature control

Refrigeration valve with problem

No temperature control

PLC with problem


PT100 with problem

No temperature control
No temperature control

8
4

Room fan with problem

No temperature control

Resistance burned

No temperature control

Functional Failure

Cool Room

It does not cool

Heat Room

PLC with problem


PT100 with problem

No temperature control
Heaters does not turn on
No temperature control
No temperature control

Room fan with problem

No temperature control

Varivolt with problem

No voltage control

PLC with problem


Supervisory communication problem
Variation of voltage supplier

No voltage control
No voltage control
High variation of voltage
No data for final test
Redo test due to no data

7
7
7
5
5
5
5

Resistence relay burned

It does not heat

Controlled
Voltage

It does not controlled


voltage

Acquisite
Temperature

It does not acquisite


temperature

Supervisory communication problem


Problem with data acquisition equipment
(Fluke)

No temperature data for test

7
8
4

Cause of Failure Mode

Actual Controls

Detection

Function

Created:
Modified:

Occurrence

Type / Model / Fabrication:


FMEA / System Element:
Set of Test Rooms

Responsible:
Company:
Responsible:
Company:
Severity

Item Code:
State:
Item Code:
State:

RPN

2
2
2
1
2
2
1
1
2
1
2
5
9
5
3
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
4
7
3
3
1
2
5
2
2
1
2

Corrective Main.
Preventive Main.
Corrective Main.
Visual
Corrective Main.
Corrective Main.
Visual
Employee Instructions
Corrective Main.
Visual
Corrective Main.
Quality tests
Spare resistence
Corrective Main.
Visual
Quality tests
Panel air circulation
Visual
Employee Instructions
Corrective Main.
Visual
Corrective Main.
Visual
Supervisory
Quality tests
Corrective Main.
Visual
Supervisory
None
Supervisory
Supervisory
Supervisory
Supervisory

4
4
2
1
5
5
2
5
2
1
3
3
3
2
2
2
3
1
3
2
2
3
3
2
4
4
2
2
2
2
2
4
4

56
56
28
7
70
70
16
20
24
6
36
105
189
70
42
14
21
8
12
24
12
36
84
98
60
84
14
28
70
20
20
20
40

Gas leakage in the compressor


Excess dirt in the condenser
No water circulation
Energy peak
Locked valve
Problem with relay valve
Energy peak
Misuse of sensor
Motor fan burned
No energy source for motor
Motor broke
Life time of equipment
Bad resistence quality
No air flow
Energy peak
Life time of equipment
Overheat of relay
Energy peak
Misuse of sensor
Motor fan burned
No energy source for motor
Motor broke
Wrong installation
End of course triggered
Life time of equipment
Problem with varivolt motor
Energy peak
Problem with network
Quality of energy supplier
Problem with network
Technical problem with fluke
Fluke locked

Responsibil
ity / Target /
Completion
Date
Dutra
Dutra
Dutra
Dutra
Marcelo
Marcelo
Battirola
Dutra
Marcelo
Marcelo
Marcelo
Marcelo
Marcelo
Marcelo
Marcelo
Marcelo
Marcelo
Battirola
Dutra
Marcelo
Marcelo
Marcelo
Marcio
Marcio
Marcio
Marcio
Battirola
Battirola
Battirola
Battirola
Battirola
Battirola

According to the PAFMEA method, four failure modes should be selected to


continue to a more detailed risk assessment and the team members decided to use
the failure mode with the highest RPN. These failure modes are highlighted in the
PAFMEA form represented in Table 5.4. The Table 5.5 ranks these failure modes
and presents their main information.
Table 5.5 Failures modes used in the PAFMEA risk assessment.
Rank
1
2
3
3

Function

Functional
Failure

Failure Mode

RPN
189

Heat Room

It does not heat

Resistance burned

Controlled

It does not

Varivolt with

voltage

controlled voltage

problem

Cool room

It does not cool

Controlled

It does not

Variation of

Voltage

controlled voltage

voltage supplier

Refrigeration valve
with problem

98
70
70

125

The next step of the risk assessment is the selection of the sub-criteria related
to severity, detection and occurrence. This selection was realized using Delphi
methodology and a consensus was reached with two rounds of questionnaire, which
was performed using the BPMS showed in chapter 4. The final AHP hierarchy
structure is represented in Figure 5.3. According to the team members, there is no
other criterion that is interesting to analyze occurrence, so this criterion will not be
divided.

Level'0'
Goal'

Obtain'a'Hierarchy'of'Failure'Modes'

Level'1'
Criteria'

Level'2'
SubKCriteria'

Severity'

Equipment'
Damage'

Level'3'
Alterna?ve'

Produc?on'
Priority'

Resistance'Burned'

Detec?on'

Maintenance'
Dura?on'

Visual'
Inspec?on'

Varivolt'with'problem'

Occurrence'

Detailed'
Inspec?on'

Supervisory'
Inspec?on'

Refrigera?on'Valve'
with'problem'

Failure'
Occurrence'

Varia?on'of'voltage'
supplier'

Figure 5.3 AHP hierarchy structure of the case study.


The sequence of the approach is characterized by the calculation of the AHP
that is mainly formed by pairwise comparisons. First of all, the pairwise comparison
between the criteria (level 1) was realized and the results can be seen in Table 5.6.
The priority weight column shows that occurrence has the highest priority and
severity is the second one.

Table 5.6 Pairwise comparison between severity, detection and occurrence.



Severity
Detection
Occurrence

Severity

Detection

1
0.250
3
Consistency Ratio: 0.082

4
1
5

Occurrence
0.333
0.20
1
Sum:

Priority
Weight
0.280
0.094
0.626
1.000

126

After the calculation of level 1, the pairwise comparison of the sub-criteria


(level 2) related to severity and detection were realized. The results of these
comparisons are presented in Table 5.7 and Table 5.8. For the severity sub-criteria,
the priority weight column shows that maintenance duration has the highest priority
and production priority is the second one. For the detection sub-criteria, the priority
weight column shows that visual inspection has the highest priority and inspection
using the supervisory system is the second one. Furthermore, the tables show that
the consistency ratio is below the necessary (0,1).

Table 5.7 Pairwise comparison of the severity sub-criteria.


Equipment Damage Production Priority


Equipment
Damage
Production
Priority
Maintenance
Duration

Maintenance
Duration

Priority
Weight

0.167

0.143

0.067

0.333

0.293

7
Consistency Ratio: 0.091

Sum:

0.640
1.000

Table 5.8 Pairwise comparison of the detection sub-criteria.


Visual Inspection

Detailed
Inspection

Supervisory
Inspection

Priority
Weight

Visual Inspection

0.717

Detailed
Inspection

0.166

0.333

0.088

Supervisory
Inspection

0.2

0.195

Consistency Ratio: 0.092

Sum:

1.000

According to the team members, there is no other sub-criteria to analyze


occurrence, so this criteria will not be divided. Thus, the next step of this approach is
to perform the pairwise-comparison between the failure modes for each sub-criterion.
The failure modes will be presented in the tables according to the following
abbreviation:

FM1: resistance burned;

FM2: refrigeration valve with problem;

127

FM3: varivolt with problem;

FM4: variation of voltage supplier.

The sequence of the approach is to perform the pairwise comparisons for


each sub-criterion (level 2) between the failure modes (level 3). The results of this
development for the severity sub-criteria are presented in Table 5.9, Table 5.10 and
Table 5.11. Furthermore, the tables show the consistency ratio of the pairwise
comparison, which has to be lower than 0,1.

Table 5.9 Pairwise comparison for equipment damage.


Equipment Damage

FM1

FM2

FM3

FM4


Priority Weight

FM1

1.00

0.13

0.33

0.14

0.045

FM2

8.00
3.00

1.00
0.17

6.00
1.00

4.00
0.25

0.604
0.093

7.00
0.25
Consistency Ratio: 0.079

4.00

1.00

0.259
1.000

FM3
FM4

Sum:

Table 5.10 Pairwise comparison for production priority.


Production Priority

FM1
FM1
1.00
FM2
0.14
FM3
0.33
FM4

FM2
7.00
1.00
4.00

FM3
3.00
0.25
1.00

FM4
8.00
3.00
3.00

Priority Weight
0.596
0.101
0.243

0.13
0.33
Consistency Ratio: 0.078

0.33

1.00

0.059
1.000

Sum:

Table 5.11 Pairwise comparison for maintenance duration.


Maintenance Duration
FM1
FM2
FM1
1.00
3.00
FM2
0.33
1.00
FM3
3.00
7.00
FM4
0.14
0.25
Consistency Ratio: 0.087

FM3
0.33
0.14
1.00
0.14

FM4
7.00
4.00
7.00
1.00

Priority Weight
0.262
0.110
0.581
0.046
Sum:
1.000

128

The pairwise comparison for the detection sub-criteria are presented in Table
5.12, Table 5.13 and Table 5.14. Moreover, the tables show that the consistency of
the data is inside the required value (<0,1). However, these consistencies were not
reached in the first pairwise, forcing the team members to analyze the weights and
redo the pairwise comparison.
Table 5.12 Pairwise comparison for visual inspection.
Visual Inspection

FM1
FM2
FM1
1.00
7.00
FM2
0.14
1.00
FM3
0.50
7.00
FM4
0.13
0.33
Consistency Ratio: 0.087

FM3
2.00
0.14
1.00
0.20

FM4
8.00
3.00
5.00
1.00

Priority Weight
0.522
0.085
0.342
0.050
Sum:
1.000

Table 5.13 Pairwise comparison for detailed inspection.


Detailed Inspection

FM1
FM2
FM1
1.00
7.00
FM2
0.14
1.00
FM3
0.33
5.00
FM4
0.14
0.33
Consistency Ratio: 0.088

FM3
3.00
0.20
1.00
0.20

FM4
7.00
3.00
5.00
1.00

Priority Weight
0.574
0.092
0.282
0.053
Sum:
1.000

Table 5.14 Pairwise comparison for supervisory inspection.


Supervisory Inspection

FM1
FM2
FM1
1.00
1.00
FM2
1.00
1.00
FM3
7.00
5.00
FM4
0.33
0.33
Consistency Ratio: 0.061

FM3
0.14
0.20
1.00
0.17

FM4
3.00
3.00
6.00
1.00

Priority Weight
0.137
0.146
0.653
0.064
Sum:
1.000

The pairwise comparison for the occurrence of failure is presented in Table


5.15. Moreover, the table shows that the consistency of the data is inside the
required value (<0,1). However, these consistencies were not reached in the first
pairwise, forcing the team members to analyze the weights and redo the pairwise
comparison.

129

Table 5.15 Pairwise comparison for occurrence of failure.


Occurrence

FM1
FM2
FM3
FM4

FM1
1.00
4.00
7.00

FM2
0.25
1.00
4.00

FM3
0.14
0.25
1.00

FM4
3.00
5.00
7.00

Priority Weight
0.094
0.242
0.612

0.33
0.20
Consistency Ratio: 0.089

0.14

1.00

0.052
1.000

Sum:

After the pairwise comparison of level 1, level 2 and level 3, the next step is
the calculation of the ranking of the failure modes for each criterion (severity,
detection and occurrence). The calculation of the severity ranking is presented in
Table 5.16. The left matrix is obtained by using the priority weight value of equipment
damage (criterion I), production priority (criterion II) and maintenance duration
(criterion III). These values are presented in Table 5.9, Table 5.10 and Table 5.11,
respectively. The severity sub-criteria column is obtained by using the priority weight
from Table 5.7.

Table 5.16 Calculation of the severity ranking.


Severity

FM1
FM2
FM3

Criterion I
0.045
0.604
0.093

FM4

0.259

Criterion II Criterion III


0.596
0.262
0.101
0.110
x
0.243
0.581
0.059

0.046

Severity
Sub-Criteria
0.067
0.293
0.640

Severity Ranking
0.346
0.141
0.450
0.064

The calculation of the detection ranking is presented in Table 5.17. The left
matrix is obtained by using the priority weight value of visual inspection (criterion I),
detailed inspection (criterion II) and supervisory inspection (criterion III). These
values are presented in Table 5.12, Table 5.13 and Table 5.14, respectively. The
detection sub-criteria column is obtained by using the priority weight from Table 5.8.

130

Table 5.17 Calculation of the detection ranking.


Detection

FM1
FM2
FM3
FM4

Criterion I
0.522
0.085
0.342
0.050

Criterion II Criterion III


0.574
0.137
0.092
0.146
x
0.282
0.653
0.053
0.064

Detection
Sub-Criteria
0.717
0.088
0.195

Detection Ranking
0.451
0.098
0.398
0.053

The last action of the risk assessment approach is the calculation of the final
ranking, which is presented in Table 5.17. The left matrix is form by the final ranking
of severity, detection and occurrence. These values are presented in Table 5.16,
Table 5.17 and Table 5.15, respectively. The Sev_Det_Occu column is form by the
priority weight from Table 5.6. Moreover, the Figure 5.4 represents in a bar graph the
ranking of the failure modes.

Table 5.18 Calculation of final ranking.

Final Ranking

FM1
FM2
FM3
FM4

Severity
0.346
0.141
0.450
0.064

Detection Occurrence
0.451
0.094
0.098
0.242
x
0.398
0.612
0.053
0.052

Sev_Det_Occu
0.280
0.094
0.626

0.055

FM4
0.547

0.000

0.100

Final Ranking
0.198
0.200
0.547
0.055

FM3

0.200

FM2

0.198

FM1

0.200

0.300

0.400

0.500

0.600

Figure 5.4 Graph of final ranking.


Therefore the final ranking of the risk assessment is presented in Table 5.19.

131

Table 5.19 Final ranking of failures modes according to PAFMEA.


Rank

Function
Controlled
voltage

Functional
Failure
It does not

PAFMEA

Failure Mode

AHP Weight

Varivolt with

controlled

0.547

problem

voltage

Refrigeration
2

Cool room

It does not cool

valve with

0.200

problem
3
4

Resistance

Heat Room

It does not heat

0.198

Controlled

Voltage is not

Variation of

Voltage

controlled

voltage supplier

burned

0.055

After finalizing the risk assessment, the final activity of the PAFMEA is the
optimization of the system according to the most critical failure modes, which can
also be treated as the recommended maintenance activities. However, this activity
was not possible to complete due to the lack of time to have the feedback of the
proposed actions considering the period of this research and its presentation.
5.2.

DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

One of the PAFMEA proposals is the new risk assessment approach, which uses
AHP to calculate a new ranking of the failure modes. Therefore, the Table 5.20
compares the ranking of the classical RPN approach with the ranking of the PAFMEA
approach. The results show that the ranking of both approaches are different, which
puts in question the classical approach and corroborate with the literature.
Table 5.20 Comparison ranking of classical approach and PAFMEA.
Failure Mode

Classical RPN Rank

PAFMEA Rank

Resistance burned

Varivolt with problem

Refrigeration valve with problem

Variation of voltage supplier

132

According to the team members the PAFMEA approach adds new promising
perspectives to the analysis, which can be summarize in the addition of more criteria
and the different weights assign by the AHP for these criteria.
The PAFMEA ranking caused a deeper discussion between the participants
about their priorities in the maintenance area. At the end, they conclude that the new
ranking is more suitable to their reality (based on classical FMEA) and the reasons
are:

If a resistance burns, the solution is well known by the team members and the
action is fast, which does not have a big impact in the process.

If the equipment varivolt has a problem, which happens less frequent than the
resistance burned, the solution is not known and the repair action could take
two hours or two days.

If the refrigeration valve has a problem, the solution is also not known, which
could take hours to repair or even days to change the equipment for a new
one.
Another perspective of the final results is the different weight for the criteria

and sub-criteria, which can be seen in Figure 5.5. According to the results showed,
occurrence is the most important criteria for the team members, follow by severity
and detection. The inversion of importance seen here, occurrence over severity, is
explicable because the system under analysis does not impact the users safety, thus
occurrence is more important because impact directly the production rate. It is also
possible to conclude that detection has a low impact on the final ranking, mainly
because its weight is much smaller than the other criteria.
The structure also shows that maintenance duration is the most important subcriteria related to severity, which is because the maintenance duration affects directly
production priority, overall equipment effectiveness and the production target. Also in
the severity criteria, the level of equipment damage is the less important one.
In the detection sub-criteria, visual inspection is the most important, because
according to the team members this kind of inspection is the easiest and the first one
to perform by the employees. Detailed inspection is the less important one, because
its the longest one and not always gives the expected results.

133

Obtain'a'Hierarchy'of'Failure'Modes'

Severity'

Detec?on'

0.280'

Equipment'
Damage'

0.094'

Produc?on'
Priority'

0.067'

Occurrence'

Maintenance'
Dura?on'

0.293'

Visual'
Inspec?on'

0.640'

Resistance'Burned'

0.717'

Refrigera?on'Valve'
with'problem'

0.198'

Detailed'
Inspec?on'

0.626'

Supervisory'
Inspec?on'

0.088'

Varivolt'with'problem'

0.200'

Failure'
Occurrence'

0.195'

1.000'

Varia?on'of'voltage'
supplier'

0.547'

0.055'

Figure 5.5 AHP hierarchy structure with results.


5.3.

FINAL SURVEY ANALYSIS

In order to analyze the implementation of the PAFMEA and the benefits of the
BPMS a survey was performed with the team members. The sentences of the survey
can be seen in Annex D.
The survey of Annex A was also implemented to identify the profile of the
specialists, which is form by four people. According to this survey, all the specialists
work in the maintenance department and the group is form by one supervisor, one
engineer and two analysts. Moreover the graph presented in Figure 5.6 and Figure
5.7 show the time of experience in maintenance and the quantity of FMEA section
the participants responded. By that, it is possible to conclude that the team members
have good experience in the maintenance domain and has participated in average

Quan*ty of People

over six FMEA sections.

3
2
1
0
0 to 1

1 to 2

2 to 5

5 to 9

9 to 15

Years

Figure 5.6 Time of experience in maintenance.

Above 15

Quan*ty of People

134

2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
1 to 2

2 to 4

4 to 6

6 to 8

8 to 10

Above 10

Quan*ty of FMEA Sec*ons

Figure 5.7 Quantity of FMEA sections.


The final survey (Annex D) is form by 17 sentences related to the PAFMEA
functionalities and requirements that were implemented to overcome some of the
FMEA drawbacks already cited. The specialists evaluated in a scale of 5 points (1 =
Totally Disagree and 5 = Totally Agree) each phrase, so if the mean value of the
sentences is above 3 it means that the majority of the participants agree with the
statement.
The first three sentences are related to the drawbacks classified into
resources that the methodology tries to overcome. The results of Table 5.21 show
that the team members agree that the PAFMEA eliminates the necessity to have
face-to-face meetings and that the method provides the possibility to better manage
the available time by the participants.

Table 5.21 Responses related to the resources sentences of the final survey.
Sentence

Totally

Disagree

Indifferent

Agree

Disagree

Totally

Mean

Agree

#1

4.00

#2

4.25

The next set of sentences is related to the new risk assessment approach, which
is the biggest problem according to the literature review. The Table 5.22 shows that
the addition of more criteria and the different weight for the criteria were 100%
accepted and approved by the participants. The team members also agreed that the
directly comparison gives a better evaluation to rank the failure modes.

135

Table 5.22 Responses about the new risk assesment approach of the final survey.
Sentence

Totally

Disagree

Indifferent

Agree

Disagree

Totally

Mean

Agree

#3

5.00

#4

5.00

#5

4.25

Sentences #6 until #8 are related to the behavior and treatment of the


participants during the PAFMEA development. In this case, according to Table 5.23
the team members also agree with the advantages about this method, where the
online software minimizes the discussion that could happen during meetings and that
the employees insights are treated equally by the moderator due to the anonymity
imposed by the system.

Table 5.23 Responses about the behavior and treatment of the team members.
Sentence

Totally

Disagree

Indifferent

Agree

Disagree

Totally

Mean

Agree

#6

4.50

#7

3.75

#8

4.50

Sentences #9 and #10 are related to other aspects that could not be classified
into the last three set of sentences. The Table 5.24 confirms that the guidelines used
to support the users in the ranking of the criteria is very helpful and that the language
used throughout the method is clear for the users.

Table 5.24 Responses about other aspects of the PAFMEA.


Sentence

Totally

Disagree

Indifferent

Agree

Disagree

Totally

Mean

Agree

#9

4.00

#10

4.00

136

The last sentences were used to evaluate the benefits of the software used to
support the PAFMEA development. The results of Table 5.25 show that the
participants agree with all the sentences. The main sentences that could be
highlighted here are:

#12: The software facilitates the standardization of the terminology


used to nominee the functions, function failure, failure modes, failure
effects and failure causes.

#13: The software optimizes the time available of the team members by
given the possibility to perform the analysis at any time and from
different places.

#16: The software facilitates to find and reuse important information of


previous FMEAs, decreasing the efforts needed to develop new
analysis.

Therefore, these sentences also show that other problems like the lack of
standardization during different failure analysis, the availability of time and the
facilitation to reuse information are solved by the PAFMEA system.

Table 5.25 Responses about the evaluation of the software used to support the
PAFMEA.
Sentence

Totally

Disagree

Indifferent

Agree

Disagree

Totally

Mean

Agree

#11

4.00

#12

4.25

#13

4.75

#14

4.25

#15

4.50

#16

4.50

#17

4.75

137

6. CONCLUSIONS

This chapter presents the conclusions of this work (item 6.1) and suggestions
for future work (item 6.2). The conclusions compare the research questions and
objectives set forward to the results obtained, also highlighting the contributions of
the research. The suggestions for future work describe possible research that could
be carried out both from the results obtained as to complement them.
6.1.

FINAL CONCLUSIONS

The guiding aspects of this work originated from findings in technical-scientific


articles, specialized bibliographies and questionnaires with experts.
Despite the popularity and usability of the FMEA method, the literature review
corroborated by the experts opinion presents a number of drawbacks related to use
and implementation of this method. Therefore, this work proposed a process aware
FMEA method integrating Delphi methodology, AHP and BPM in a BPMS platform to
face the main deficiencies concerning the failure analysis in maintenance.
In order to achieve the desired objective, the research fulfilled the following
specific objectives:

The main drawbacks and problems of the FMEA application were


identified and presented in section 2.2.1. The results showed that over
the problems cited, the most exposed ones (28%) are about to the risk
definition, which are all the problems related to the RPN approach;

The related works of the FMEA that are integrated to other methods
were presented in section 2.2.2. The results showed that 44% of the
attempts are related to the proposition of a new method, leaving
software (19%), framework (3%) and approach (3%) proposals as the
least used ones. However, despite the high amount of works trying to
overcome some of the FMEA drawbacks, especially the RPN approach,
none of them is flawless and easily implemented, which leaves a gap
on the field for new proposals;

The investigation of the application of Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP)


in maintenance was presented in section 2.2.2.2. The works showed

138

that this method is majorly applied to select the maintenance strategy


on a macro level, leaving the failure modes and specific equipment
analysis on the side;

The PAFMEA proposition, which integrates the consensus and decision


making approaches within the FMEA methodology grounded on
Business Process Management concepts, is presented in chapter 3;

The development of the process aware FMEA environment through


Business Process Management System (BPMS) platform is presented
in chapter 4;

The evaluation of the PAFMEA with experts and practitioners through


an industrial application scenario is presented in chapter 5. The results
showed that the final ranking of the new proposal is different from the
classical RPN calculation, which puts in question the classical approach
and corroborate the drawbacks cited in the literature and signalized by
the specialists.

Moreover, the evaluation provided by the team

members showed that the PAFMEA adds new promising perspectives


to the analysis, which can be summarize in the addition of more criteria
and the different weights assign by the AHP for these criteria.
Using the results from the industrial application, it is possible to conclude that
the PAFMEA method adds new promising perspectives to the analysis, which can be
summarize in the addition of more criteria, the different weights assign by the AHP
for these criteria and the possibility to realize the failure analysis without face-to-face
meetings. This way the PAFMEA characterizes a scientific insertion and contribution
in the categories of risk definition and resources identified in Figure 2.30, and the
category of method, framework and software identified in Figure 2.31. Moreover, the
proposal can simultaneously handle the multiple and conflicting goals characteristic
of decision problems such as quality control system selection, facility allocation
problems and decision-making actions throughout the factory floor. In other hand,
since the PAFMEA adds new methods and increases the complexity of the analysis it
does not reduce the whole failure analysis process.
Therefore, the process aware FMEA integrated with Delphi methodology and
AHP in a BPMS platform helps the team members to face the main FMEA
deficiencies concerning the failure analysis in maintenance, which in this case are
the risk definition and the resource availability.

139

6.2.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE WORKS

The PAFMEA uses AHP for the risk assessment stage of the failure mode
analysis by adding more criteria and assigning different weight for these criteria.
However, the software implemented in the BPMS platform limited the number of subcriteria for severity and detection. Moreover, the software also limited the alternatives
of the AHP for a maximum of four failure modes. Therefore, one possible future work
would be increasing the quantity of sub-criteria and alternatives to enrich the failure
analysis.
In order to enhance the multi-criteria analysis, the ANP (Analytic Network
Process) could be as an extension of the AHP structure. While the AHP decomposes
a decision problem in the form of a hierarchy of independent elements, the ANP
replaces the hierarchies with networks and makes it possible to structure the
decisions that involve functional dependencies. The structure difference between a
hierarchy and a network is illustrated in Figure 6.1

Figure 6.1 Comparison of hierarchy and network.


ELECTRE methods could also be use to enhance the multi-criteria analysis.
According to Gomes et. al. (2012) these methods are based on the concept of
overcoming relations, distinguished in the problematic matter, quantity of information
inter and intra-criteria and overcoming relations used in the application. The authors
also point out that the ELECTRE method use a system of weights to measure the
importance of each criterion in the decision makers vision, aiming to build

140

concordance rates, used to evaluate the benefits of an alternative over the others,
and disagreement rates that measure the disadvantages of an alternative over the
other.

141

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149

ANNEX A - SURVEY PROFILE OF SPECIALISTS

1. Your current activity is:


( ) Industry
( ) Academic
2. In which field have you worked before?
( ) Logistic

( ) Quality

( ) Manufacture

( ) Maintenance

( ) Engineer

( ) Finance

( ) Marketing
3. What field do you current work?
( ) Logistic

( ) Quality

( ) Manufacture

( ) Maintenance

( ) Engineer

( ) Finance

( ) Marketing
4. What is your current position?
( ) Operator

( ) Technician

( ) Analyst

( ) Engineer

( ) Supervisor

( ) Manager

5. Time of experience in your current field.


( ) 1 to 2 years

( ) 3 to 5 years

( ) 6 to 9 years

( ) 10 to 15 years

( ) Above 16 years
6. Time of experience in Maintenance.
( )0

( ) 1 to 2 years

( ) 3 to 5 years

( ) 6 to 9 years

( ) 10 to 15 years

( ) Above 16 years

7. What is(are) your field of focus in maintenance?


( ) RCM (Reliability Center Maintenance)
( ) TPM
( ) Planning and Control
( ) Detective and Predictive Maintenance
( ) Measurement and Instrumentation

150

( ) Costs, Resources and Materials


( ) Maintenance Indicators
8. In the FMEA development:
( ) Follow a specific standard

( ) Use specific form

( ) Use software

( ) Participates in the FMEA team

( ) Coordinate FMEA

( ) Others

9. How many FMEA sessions have you participated before?


( ) 1 to 2

( ) 2 to 4

( ) 4 to 6

( ) 6 to 8

( ) 8 to 10

( ) Above 10

151

ANNEX B - SURVEY METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS

According to your perception, evaluate in a scale of 5 points (1 = Totally Disagree


and 5 = Totally Agree), in a general matter, the grade of the following sentences
according to the FMEA application. Choose only one value of the scale for each
sentence.
The sentences below are related to the availability of resources for FMEA
development.
1. FMEA is a time consuming method.
( )1

( )2

( )3

( )4

( )5

2. The application of FMEA is often delayed because of resources availability.


( )1

( )2

( )3

( )4

( )5

3. The availability for face-to-face meetings is often a problem in the FMEA


development process.
( )1

( )2

( )3

( )4

( )5

The sentences below are related to the use and calculation of the RPN (Risk Priority
Number).
4. The RPN criteria (severity, occurrence and detection) form a limited approach for the
decision-making process.
( )1

( )2

( )3

( )4

( )5

5. One of the main drawbacks of the FMEA is that it does not assigned weights to the
three criteria (severity, occurrence and detection) to calculate the RPN.
( )1

( )2

( )3

( )4

( )5

6. The addition of new criteria (safety, sustainability, cost, production priority,


maintenance duration, etc.) would strengthen the FMEA method.
( )1

( )2

( )3

( )4

( )5

7. One RPN value can represent different risk situations because of the combination of
the criteria (severity, occurrence and detection), which is often a problem in the
decision making process.
( )1

( )2

( )3

( )4

( )5

The sentences below are related to the behavior and treatment of the FMEA
participants.
8. Disagreements or doubts happen between the team member during the ranking of

152

the occurrence, detection and severity.


( )1

( )2

( )3

( )4

( )5

9. People involved in the FMEA development are not treated equally during the
meetings.
( )1

( )2

( )3

( )4

( )5

10. The attitudes, behaviors and relationship between the team members often a cause
for the long FMEA meetings.
( )1

( )2

( )3

( )4

( )5

11. The application of FMEA is consider tedious by the team members.


( )1

( )2

( )3

( )4

( )5

12. Reach a consensus between the participants to rank occurrence, detection and
severity is a hard and time-consuming task.
( )1

( )2

( )3

( )4

( )5

The sentences below are related to the others aspects of the FMEA.
13. The knowledge obtain from one FMEA is usually used as a starting point for new
FMEAs.
( )1

( )2

( )3

( )4

( )5

14. The monitoring process of the improvements actions is often a problem for the
responsible.
( )1

( )2

( )3

( )4

( )5

15. The terminology used to describe an item and structure of the FMEA form (failure
mode, failure effects, cause of failure, etc.) is standardized.
( )1

( )2

( )3

( )4

( )5

153

ANNEX C - SURVEY SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS

According to your perception, evaluate in a scale of 5 points (1 = Desirable and 5 =


Very Essential), in a general matter, the grade of the following sentences according
to the requirements necessary for a software to support the FMEA development.
Choose only one value of the scale for each sentence.
1. Variety of FMEA standards to be chosen by the user.
( )1

( )2

( )3

( )4

( )5

2. Help structure in each phase to support the user during the FMEA development.
( )1

( )2

( )3

( )4

( )5

3. A process oriented approach, which ensures that the user follows the right steps
for the FMEA development.
( )1

( )2

( )3

( )4

( )5

4. Generation of the FMEA form/report in a variety of standards.


( )1

( )2

( )3

( )4

( )5

5. Export the FMEA form/report for various types of files (MS Excel, PDF, etc).
( )1

( )2

( )3

( )4

( )5

6. Show guidelines to help the user to rate the RPN criteria (severity, occurrence
and detection).
( )1

( )2

( )3

( )4

( )5

7. The rating for the RPN criteria (severity, occurrence and detection) should be
already inserted in the software to avoid misunderstanding by the users.
( )1

( )2

( )3

( )4

( )5

8. Addition of external files (pictures, CAD, documents, etc.) to help the users during
the FMEA development.
( )1

( )2

( )3

( )4

( )5

9. Send email automatically to the responsible by each improvement action and to


the moderator of the FMEA.
( )1

( )2

( )3

( )4

( )5

10. Save data from the FMEA in a commercial database software (SQL Server).
( )1

( )2

( )3

( )4

( )5

11. Collaborative work through an online tool, without the need of face-to-face
meetings.
( )1

( )2

( )3

( )4

( )5

12. Please add other requirements that were not listed above.

154

ANNEX D - SURVEY PAFMEA RESULTS

According to your perception, evaluate in a scale of 5 points (1 = Totally Disagree


and 5 = Totally Agree), in a general matter, the grade of the following sentences
according to the PAFMEA application. Choose only one value of the scale for each
sentence.
The sentences below are related to the availability of resources for the failure
analysis.
1. Since the PAFMEA is implemented in an online software, the team members do not
need to be available at the same time, which improves the analysis.
( )1

( )2

( )3

( )4

( )5

2. The online software allows the user to better manage their time and availability for
future analysis.
( )1

( )2

( )3

( )4

( )5

The sentences below are related to the use and calculation of the RPN (Risk Priority
Number).
3. Since the regular FMEA uses three criteria (severity, occurrence and detection) the
application of the PAFMEA gives more flexibility to the method by adding more
criteria to evaluate and rank the failure modes.
( )1

( )2

( )3

( )4

( )5

4. One of the main problem of the FMEA is that it does not assigned weights to the
three criteria (severity, occurrence and detection) to calculate the RPN, however
since the PAFMEA uses a different approach to rank the failure modes, this problem
is solved.
( )1

( )2

( )3

( )4

( )5

5. The comparison performed between the criteria gives a more accurate perception
and evaluation to better rank the failure modes.
( )1

( )2

( )3

( )4

( )5

The sentences below are related to the behavior and treatment of the FMEA
participants.
6. The online software eliminates the discussions that could happen during face-to-face
meetings.

155

( )1

( )2

( )3

( )4

( )5

7. The PAFMEA ensures the anonymity of the team members and guarantee that their
opinions are treated equally.
( )1

( )2

( )3

( )4

( )5

8. Reach a consensus between the participants to rank the criteria is easier with the
new approach and the software.
( )1

( )2

( )3

( )4

( )5

The sentences below are related to the others aspects of the PAFMEA.
9. The guidelines showed to rate severity, occurrence and detection are very helpful.
( )1

( )2

( )3

( )4

( )5

10. The language used is clear and specific, in other words, vague and imprecise
expressions are not used.
( )1

( )2

( )3

( )4

( )5

The sentences below are related to the software used to support the PAFMEA
implementation.
11. The software facilitates the integration and participation of the team members.
( )1

( )2

( )3

( )4

( )5

12. The software facilitates the standardization of the terminology used to nominee the
functions, function failure, failure modes, failure effects and failure causes.
( )1

( )2

( )3

( )4

( )5

13. The software optimizes the time available of the team members by given the
possibility to perform the analysis at any time and from different places.
( )1

( )2

( )3

( )4

( )5

14. The software facilitates the management of input and output data of the analysis.
( )1

( )2

( )3

( )4

( )5

15. The software facilitates the management of the improvement actions recommended.
( )1

( )2

( )3

( )4

( )5

16. The use of the software facilitates to find and reuse important information of previous
FMEAs, decreasing the efforts needed to develop new analysis.
( )1

( )2

( )3

( )4

( )5

17. The software facilitates the development of reports to support the decision-making
process.
( )1

( )2

( )3

( )4

( )5

156