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Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 127255 August 14, 1997

JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEA, WIGBERTO E. TAADA


AND RONALDO B. ZAMORA, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE
SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, responden
MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of Republic Act No. 824
which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called "
taxes" (actually specific taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes.

Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against
respondents Jose de Venecia, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Deputy Speaker Raul
Daza, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano, the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Finance, and th
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioner
claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was approved on th
reading on September 12, 1996 and transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the Senate which
approved it with certain amendments on third reading on November 17, 1996. A bicameral
conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and
Senate versions of the bill.

The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on November
21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the Committee on Wa
and Means, proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech, after which he was interpellate. Rep.
Rogelio Sarmiento was first to interpellate. He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to
adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and asked for a head
count. After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of a quorum
Rep. Arroyo appealed the ruling of the Chair, but his motion was defeated when put to a vote. T
interpellation of the sponsor thereafter proceeded.

Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate. He was fourth in the order, following Rep
Rogelio Sarmiento, Rep. Edcel C. Lagman and Rep. Enrique Garcia. In the course of his
interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorum,
although until the end of his interpellation he never did. What happened thereafter is shown in
the following transcript of the session on November 21, 1996 of the House of Representatives,

published by Congress in the newspaper issues of December 5 and 6, 1996:

MR. ALBANO. MR. Speaker, I move that we now approved and ratify the conferenc
committee report.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion?
MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved.
(Gavel)

MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to know wh
is the question that the Chair asked the distinguished sponsor.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for one minute.
(It was 3:01 p.m.)
(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four o'clock, Wednesday, next
week.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four o'clock,
Wednesday, next week.
(It was 3:40 p.m.)

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress
having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 2
1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.

Petitioners claim that there are actually four different version of the transcript of this portion of
Rep. Arroyo's interpellation: (1) the transcript of audio-sound recording of the proceedings in th
session hall immediately after the session adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996, whic
petitioner Rep. Edcel C. Lagman obtained from he operators of the sound system; (2) the
transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996, as certified by
the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 21, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; (3
the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996 as certified
by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 28, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman
and (4) the published version above quoted. According to petitioners, the four versions differ on
three points, to wit: (1) in the audio-sound recording the word "approved," which appears on lin
13 in the three other versions, cannot be heard; (2) in the transcript certified on November 21,
1996 the world "no" on line 17 appears only once, while in the other versions it is repeated thre
times; and (3) the published version does not contain the sentence "(Y)ou better prepare for a
quorum because I will raise the question of the quorum," which appears in the other versions.
Petitioners' allegations are vehemently denied by respondents. However, there is no need to

discuss this point as petitioners have announced that, in order to expedite the resolution of this
petition, they admit, without conceding, the correctness of the transcripts relied upon by the
respondents. Petitioners agree that for purposes of this proceeding the word "approved" appea
in the transcripts.

Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the conference committee report on H
No. 7198 are in question. Petitioners' principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void
because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House; that these rules embody the
"constitutional mandate" in Art. VI, 16(3) that "each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings" and that, consequently, violation of the House rules is a violation of the Constitut
itself. They contend that the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly pass
is false and spurious.

More specifically, petitioners charge that (1) in violation of Rule VIII, 35 and Rule XVII, 103 of
rules of the House, 2 the Chair, in submitting the conference committee report to the House, did
not call for the years or nays, but simply asked for its approval by motion in order to prevent
petitioner Arroyo from questioning the presence of a quorum; (2) in violation of Rule XIX, 112,
the Chair deliberately ignored Rep. Arroyo's question, "What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" and did n
repeat Rep. Albano's motion to approve or ratify; (3) in violation of Rule XVI, 97, 4 the Chair
refused to recognize Rep. Arroyo and instead proceeded to act on Rep. Albano's motion and
afterward declared the report approved; and (4) in violation of Rule XX, 121-122, Rule XXI, 1
and Rule XVIII, 109, 5 the Chair suspended the session without first ruling on Rep. Arroyo's
question which, it is alleged, is a point of order or a privileged motion. It is argued that Rep.
Arroyo's query should have been resolved upon the resumption of the session on November 28
1996, because the parliamentary situation at the time of the adjournment remained upon the
resumption of the session.

Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 19
and the bill certified by Speaker Jose De Venecia to prevent petitioner Rep. Arroyo from formally
challenging the existence of a quorum and asking for a reconsideration.

Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the certification of the Speaker of the House tha
the law had been properly passed, considering the Court's power under Art. VIII, 1 to pass on
claims of grave abuse of discretion by the other departments of the government, and they ask
a reexamination of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 6 which affirmed the conclusiveness of an
enrolled bill, in view of the changed membership of the Court.

The Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of all respondents. In addition, respondent De
Venecia filed a supplemental comment. Respondents' defense is anchored on the principle of
separation of powers and the enrolled bill doctrine. They argue that the Court is not the proper
forum for the enforcement of the rules of the House and that there is no justification for
reconsidering the enrolled bill doctrine. Although the Constitution provides in Art. VI, 16(3) for
the adoption by each House of its rules of proceedings, enforcement of the rules cannot be sou
in the courts except insofar as they implement constitutional requirements such as that relating
to three readings on separate days before a bill may be passed. At all events, respondents
contend that, in passing the bill which became R.A. No. 8240, the rules of the House, as well as
parliamentary precedents for approval of conference committee reports on mere motion, were
faithfully observed.

In his supplemental comment, respondent De Venecia denies that his certification of H. No. 719
is false and spurious and contends that under the journal entry rule, the judicial inquiry sought
the petitioners is barred. Indeed, Journal No. 39 of the House of Representatives, covering the

sessions of November 20 and 21, 1996, shows that "On Motion of Mr. Albano, there being no
objection, the Body approved the Conference Committee Report on House Bill No. 7198." 7 This
Journal was approved on December 2, 1996 over the lone objection of petitioner Rep. Lagman.

After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding that
Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefo
dismissed.
First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in the
enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than
constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, 26-27. Petitioners do not
claim that there was no quorum but only that, by some maneuver allegedly in violation of the
rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a
quorum.

Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the constitutional provision
that "each House may determine the rules of its proceedings" 9 and that for this reason they ar
judicially enforceable. To begin with, this contention stands the principle on its head. In the
decided cases, 10 the constitutional provision that "each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings" was invoked by parties, although not successfully, precisely to support claims of
autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct its business free from interference by courts. He
petitioners cite the provision for the opposite purpose of invoking judicial review.

But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the
power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply w
its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision
the rights of private individuals. In Osmea v. Pendatun, 11 it was held: "At any rate, courts hav
declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification o
waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary rul
are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to
parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the
requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.'"

In United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 12 the rules was stated thus: "The Constitution empowe
each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional
restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the
mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be
attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of th
House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more
accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has be
prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one which once
exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the House,
and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or
tribunal."

In Crawford v. Gilchrist, 13 it was held: "The provision that each House shall determine the rules
its proceedings does not restrict the power given to a mere formulation of standing rules, or to
the proceedings of the body in ordinary legislative matters; but in the absence of constitutiona
restraints, and when exercised by a majority of a constitutional quorum, such authority extend
a determination of the propriety and effect of any action as it is taken by the body as it procee
in the exercise of any power, in the transaction of any business, or in the performance of any d

conferred upon it by the Constitution."

In State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore, 14 the Supreme Court of Ohio stated: "The
provision for reconsideration is no part of the Constitution and is therefore entirely within the
control of the General Assembly. Having made the rule, it should be regarded, but a failure to
regard it is not the subject-matter of judicial inquiry. It has been decided by the courts of last
resort of many states, and also by the United States Supreme Court, that a legislative act will n
be declared invalid for noncompliance with rules."

In State v. Savings Bank, 15 the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut declared itself as follow
"The Constitution declares that each house shall determine the rules of its own proceedings an
shall have all powers necessary for a branch of the Legislature of a free and independent state.
Rules of proceedings are the servants of the House and subject to its authority. This authority m
be abused, but when the House has acted in a matter clearly within its power, it would be an
unwarranted invasion of the independence of the legislative department for the court to set as
such action as void because it may think that the House has misconstrued or departed from its
own rules of procedure."

In McDonald v. State, 16 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held: "When it appears that an act was s
passed, no inquiry will be permitted to ascertain whether the two houses have or have not
complied strictly with their own rules in their procedure upon the bill, intermediate its introduct
and final passage. The presumption is conclusive that they have done so. We think no court ha
ever declared an act of the legislature void for non-compliance with the rules of procedure mad
by itself , or the respective branches thereof, and which it or they may change or suspend at w
If there are any such adjudications, we decline to follow them."

Schweizer v. Territory 17 is illustrative of the rule in these cases. The 1893 Statutes of Oklahom
provided for three readings on separate days before a bill may be passed by each house of the
legislature, with the proviso that in case of an emergency the house concerned may, by two-th
vote, suspend the operation of the rule. Plaintiff was convicted in the district court of violation o
law punishing gambling. He appealed contending that the gambling statute was not properly
passed by the legislature because the suspension of the rule on three readings had not been
approved by the requisite two-thirds vote. Dismissing this contention, the State Supreme Court
Oklahoma held:

We have no constitutional provision requiring that the legislature should read a bil
any particular manner. It may, then, read or deliberate upon a bill as it sees fit.
either in accordance with its own rules, or in violation thereof, or without making a
rules. The provision of section 17 referred to is merely a statutory provision for the
direction of the legislature in its action upon proposed measures. It receives its en
force from legislative sanction, and it exists only at legislative pleasure. The failure
the legislature to properly weigh and consider an act, its passage through the
legislature in a hasty manner, might be reasons for the governor withholding his
signature thereto; but this alone, even though it is shown to be a violation of a rul
which the legislature had made to govern its own proceedings, could be no reason
for the court's refusing its enforcement after it was actually passed by a majority o
each branch of the legislature, and duly signed by the governor. The courts canno
declare an act of the legislature void on account of noncompliance with rules of
procedure made by itself to govern its deliberations. McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 4
50 N.W. 185; In re Ryan, 80 Wis. 414, 50 N.W. 187; State v. Brown, 33 S.C. 151, 11
S.E. 641; Railway Co. v. Gill, 54 Ark. 101, 15 S.W. 18.

We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former Chief Justice Fernand
commenting on the power of each House of Congress to determine its rules of proceedings. He
wrote:

Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subje
to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as
they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinary have no concern with their
observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifyi
the act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular
measure. The above principle is subject, however, to this qualification. Where the
construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the
legislative body the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even it
validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved. 18

In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instea
of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court. We have no more
power to look into the internal proceedings of a House than members of that House have to loo
over our shoulders, as long as no violation of constitutional provisions is shown.

Petitioners must realize that each of the three departments of our government has its separate
sphere which the others may not invade without upsetting the delicate balance on which our
constitutional order rests. Due regard for the working of our system of government, more than
mere comity, compels reluctance on our part to enter upon an inquiry into an alleged violation
the rules of the House. We must accordingly decline the invitation to exercise our power.

Second. Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion's sponsorship in the
Constitutional Commission, contend that under Art. VIII, 1, "nothing involving abuse of discreti
[by the other branches of the government] amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is beyond
judicial review." 19 Implicit in this statement of the former Chief Justice, however, is an
acknowledgment that the jurisdiction of this Court is subject to the case and controversy
requirement of Art. VIII. 5 and, therefore, to the requirement of a justiciable controversy before
courts can adjudicate constitutional questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign
relations. For while Art. VIII, 1 has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into areas normally l
to the political departments to decide, such as those relating to national security, 20 it has not
altogether done away with political questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign
relations. As we have already held, under Art. VIII, 1, this Court's function

is merely [to] check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone
beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a differe
view. In the absence of a showing . . . [of] grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective pow
. . . It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error. 21

If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on acco
merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case doe
not present a situation in which a branch of the government has "gone beyond the constitution
limits of its jurisdiction" so as to call for the exercise of our Art. VIII. 1 power.

Third. Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House was "railroaded." They claim t
Rep. Arroyo was still making a query to the Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albano's motion

approved.

What happened is that, after Rep. Arroyo's interpellation of the sponsor of the committee repor
Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference
committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared:
"There being none, approved." At the same time the Chair was saying this, however, Rep. Arroy
was asking, "What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking
simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader's
motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by
the Chair, symbolized by its banging of the gavel.

Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the House, Rep. Albano's motion for the
approval of the conference committee report should have been stated by the Chair and later th
individual votes of the members should have been taken. They say that the method used in thi
case is a legislator's nightmare because it suggests unanimity when the fact was that one or
some legislators opposed the report.

No rule of the House of Representative has been cited which specifically requires that in case
such as this involving approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the
motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting. On the other hand, as the Solicitor General
pointed out, the manner in which the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was approva
was by no means a unique one. It has basis in legislative practice. It was the way the conferenc
committee report on the bills which became the Local Government Code of 1991 and the
conference committee report on the bills amending the Tariff and Customs Code were approved

In 1957, the practice was questioned as being contrary to the rules of the House. The point was
answered by Majority Leader Arturo M. Tolentino and his answer became the ruling of the Chair
Mr. Tolentino said:

Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the
House. Insofar as the matter of procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent
since I came here seven years ago, and it has been the procedure in this House th
if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the debate, then the voting
comes in.
xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Speaker, a point of order was raised by the gentleman from Leyte, and I wonde
what his attitude is nor on his point of order. I should just like to state that I believ
that we have had a substantial compliance with the Rules. The Rule invoked is not
one that refers to statutory or constitutional requirement, and a substantial
compliance, to my mind, is sufficient. When the Chair announces the vote by sayin
"Is there any objection?" and nobody objects, then the Chair announces "The bill i
approved on second reading." If there was any doubt as to the vote, any motion to
divide would have been proper. So, if that motion is not presented, we assume tha
the House approves the measure. So I believe there is substantial compliance here
and if anybody wants a division of the House he can always ask for it, and the Cha
can announce how many are in favor and how many are against. 22

Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that some other way would be better, more
accurate and even more just. 23 The advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly of a
method do not present any matter for judicial consideration. 24 In the words of the U.S. Circuit

Court of Appeals, "this Court cannot provide a second opinion on what is the best procedure.
Notwithstanding the deference and esteem that is properly tendered to individual congressiona
actors, our deference and esteem for the institution as a whole and for the constitutional
command that the institution be allowed to manage its own affairs precludes us from even
attempting a diagnosis of the problem." 25

Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of
the Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the following instances;
upon the last and third readings of a bill, 26 at the request of one-fifth of the Members present,
and in repassing a bill over the veto of the President. 28 Indeed, considering the fact that in the
approval of the original bill the votes of the members by yeas and nays had already been taken
would have been sheer tedium to repeat the process.

Petitioners claim that they were prevented from seeking reconsideration allegedly as a result o
the precipitate suspension and subsequent adjournment of the session. 29 It would appear,
however, that the session was suspended to allow the parties to settle the problem, because
when it resumed at 3:40 p.m. on that day Rep. Arroyo did not say anything anymore. While it is
true that the Majority Leader moved for adjournment until 4 p.m. of Wednesday of the following
week, Rep. Arroyo could at least have objected if there was anything he wanted to say. The fac
however, is that he did not. The Journal of November 21, 1996 of the House shows.
ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION
On motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Chair declared the session
adjourned until four o'clock in the afternoon of Wednesday, November 27, 1996.
It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21, 1996. (emphasis added)

This Journal was approved on December 3, 1996. Again, no one objected to its approval except
Rep. Lagman.

It is thus apparent that petitioners' predicament was largely of their own making. Instead of
submitting the proper motions for the House to act upon, petitioners insisted on the pendency
Rep. Arroyo's question as an obstacle to the passage of the bill. But Rep. Arroyo's question was
not, in form or substance, a point of order or a question of privilege entitled to precedence. 30 A
even if Rep. Arroyo's question were so, Rep. Albano's motion to adjourn would have precedence
and would have put an end to any further consideration of the question. 31

Given this fact, it is difficult to see how it can plausibly be contended that in signing the bill wh
became R.A. No. 8240, respondent Speaker of the House be acted with grave abuse of his
discretion. Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction" has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial power as t
amount to lack of power. As Chief Justice Concepcion himself said in explaining this provision, t
power granted to the courts by Art. VIII. 1 extends to cases where "a branch of the governmen
or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously
to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction." 32

Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with whic
the Court should not he concerned. To repeat, the claim is not that there was no quorum but on
that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep.
Arroyo's earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll cal

established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly
especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of
the House. 33 Rep. Arroyo waived his objection by his continued interpellation of the sponsor for
so doing he in effect acknowledged the presence of a quorum. 34

At any rate it is noteworthy that of the 111 members of the House earlier found to be present o
November 21, 1996, only the five, i.e., petitioners in this case, are questioning the manner by
which the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was approved on that day. No one, exce
Rep. Arroyo, appears to have objected to the manner by which the report was approved. Rep. J
Henry Osmea did not participate in the bicameral conference committee proceedings. 35 Rep.
Lagman and Rep. Zamora objected to the report 36 but not to the manner it was approved; whil
is said that, if voting had been conducted. Rep. Taada would have voted in favor of the
conference committee report. 37

Fourth. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House
and the President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of
Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. Much
energy and learning is devoted in the separate opinion of Justice Puno, joined by Justice Davide
to disputing this doctrine. To be sure, there is no claim either here or in the decision in the EVAT
cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance] that the enrolled bill embodies a conclusive presumpti
In one case 38 we "went behind" an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine whethe
certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate.

But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court will respect the certification
the presiding officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly passed. Under this rule, this Cour
has refused to determine claims that the three-fourths vote needed to pass a proposed
amendment to the Constitution had not been obtained, because "a duly authenticated bill or
resolution imports absolute verify and is binding on the courts." 39 This Court quoted from
Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which embodies good, if old-fashioned, democratic
theory:

The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to check
any cost the misdoings of Legislatures. They have set such store by the Judiciary f
this purpose that they have almost made them a second and higher Legislature. B
they aim in the wrong direction. Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an
inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible
solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate
legal principle and to do impossibilities with the Constitution; but to represent
ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose hand
on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular governme
40

This Court has refused to even look into allegations that the enrolled bill sent to the President
contained provisions which had been "surreptitiously" inserted in the conference committee:

[W]here allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have
not been observed have no more basis than another allegation that the Conferenc
Committee "surreptitiously" inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared, w
should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard
the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the oth
two departments of our government. 41

10

It has refused to look into charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of a bill
violation of Art. VI. 26(2) of the Constitution that "upon the last reading of a bill, no amendmen
shall be allowed." 42
In other cases, 43 this Court has denied claims that the tenor of a bill was otherwise than as
certified by the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress.
The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is cited with approval by
text writers here and abroad. 44 The enrolled bill rule rests on the following considerations:

. . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an


enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official
attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of th
Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn
assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charg
respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed
Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the
judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed
Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the court to
determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated,
in conformity with the Constitution. 45
To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the massive teaching of our
cases and overthrow an established rule of evidence.

Indeed, petitioners have advanced no argument to warrant a departure from the rule, except to
say that, with a change in the membership of the Court, the three new members may be assum
to have an open mind on the question of the enrolled bill rule Actually, not three but four (Cruz
Feliciano, Bidin, and Quiason, JJ.) have departed from the Court since our decision in the EVAT
cases and their places have since been taken by four new members (Francisco, Hermosisima,
Panganiban, and Torres, JJ.) Petitioners are thus simply banking on the change in the membersh
of the Court.

Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in question is confirmed by the Journ
of the House of November 21, 1996 which shows that the conference committee report on H. N
7198, which became R.A. No. 8740, was approved on that day. The keeping of the Journal is
required by the Constitution, Art. VI, 16(4) provides:

Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish
same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and t
yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members
present, be entered in the Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.

The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the Constitut
to be recorded therein. 46 With respect to other matters, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, the Journals have also been accorded conclusive effect. Thus, in United States v. Pons
this Court spoke of the imperatives of public policy for regarding the Journals as "public memor
of the most permanent character," thus: "They should be public, because all are required to
conform to them; they should be permanent, that rights acquired today upon the faith of what
has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed tomorrow, or at some remote period of time

11

by facts resting only in the memory of individuals." As already noted, the bill which became R.A
No. 8240 is shown in the Journal. Hence its due enactment has been duly proven.

It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court
either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregard
its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in
the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. The Court h
not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of
legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of
grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case 48 may instead
appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or
amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assum
that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was permitte
by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body. 49
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Separate Opinions

VITUG, J., concurring:

When the 1987 Constitution has embodied, in its circumscription of judicial power
under Section 1, Article VIII, of the Constitution, the determination of whether or n
there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government, the Supreme Court, upon which that great burden has been imposed
could not have been thought of as likewise being thereby tasked with the awesom
responsibility of overseeing the entire bureaucracy. The term grave abuse of
discretion has long been understood in our jurisprudence as, and confined to, a
capricious and whimsical or despotic exercise of judgment as amounting to lack o
excess of jurisdiction.

I see nothing of that sort in the case at bar. Absent a clear case of grave abuse of
discretion, like the patent disregard of a Constitutional proscription, I would respec
the judgment of Congress under whose province the specific responsibility falls an
the authority to act is vested. To do otherwise would be an unwarranted intrusion
into the internal affairs of a co-equal, independent and coordinate branch of
government. At no time, it would seem to me, has it been intended by the framers
the fundamental law to cause a substantial deviation, let alone departure, from th
time-honored and accepted principle of separation, but balanced, powers of the
three branches of government. There is, of course, a basic variant between the old

12

rule and the new Charter on the understanding of the term "judicial power." Now,
Court is under mandate to assume jurisdiction over, and to undertake judicial inqu
into, what may even be deemed to be political questions provided, however, that
grave abuse of discretion the sole test of justiciability on purely political issues
is shown to have attended the contested act.

All taken, I most humbly reiterate my separate opinion in Tolentino vs. Secretary o
Finance and companion cases (G.R. No. 115455, etc., 235 SCRA 630) and vote to
deny the instant petition.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:

In filing this separate opinion for the dismissal of the instant petition, I am not
backtracking from the dissent which I expressed in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finan
1
I am somewhat bothered that if I do not elaborate, the vote which I cast today
might be wrongly construed as an implied abandonment of, and inconsistent with,
my firm stance in Tolentino.

The landmark case of Tolentino, just like the one under consideration, involved a
similar challenge to the constitutionality of a significant tax measure namely,
Republic Act No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax (EVAT)
Law. There, a number of issues, both substantive and procedural, were posed by
petitioners, each of which was discussed by the majority opinion of Mr. Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza who, incidentally, is also the ponente of instant decision. At an
rate, it is worth noting that I did not entirely disagree with each and every argume
of the opinion, most especially those touching upon substantive issues. My main
objection in Tolentino, it will be recalled, focused instead on what I perceived was
substantial breach and disregard by the Legislature of vital constitutional
requirements ordaining the procedures to be followed in the passage of a bill whic
in my opinion, the majority seemed to have cavalierly put to rest by hiding under
cloak of the enrolled bill theory 2 and the precept that the Court is not the proper
forum for the enforcement of internal legislative rules allegedly violated. 3 To me,
position then taken by the majority exhibited blind adherence to otherwise sound
principles of law which did not, however, fit the facts as presented before the Cou
Hence, I objected, not so much because I found these principles unwise or obsolet
but rather because they were applied, or misapplied, to a case which I believe did
not call for their application.

When I differed from the majority opinion which applied the enrolled bill theory, I w
very careful to emphasize that reliance thereon is not to be discontinued but that
application must be limited to minor matters relating more to form and factual iss
which do not materially alter the essence and substance of the law itself. Thus:

As applied to the instant petition, the issue posed is whether or not the
procedural irregularities that attended the passage of House Bill No. 11197
and Senate Bill No. 1630, outside of the reading and printing requirements
which were exempted by the Presidential certification, may no longer be
impugned, having been "saved" by the conclusiveness on us of the enrolled
bill. I see no cogent reason why we cannot continue to place reliance on the
enrolled bill, but only with respect to matters pertaining to the procedure
followed in the enactment of bills in Congress and their subsequent
engrossment, printing errors, omission of words and phrases and similar

13

relatively minor matters relating more to form and factual issues which do n
materially alter the essence and substance of the law itself .

Certainly, courts cannot claim greater ability to judge procedural legitimacy


since constitutional rules on legislative procedure are easily mastered.
Procedural disputes are over facts whether or not the bill had enough vot
or three readings, or whatever not over the meaning of the constitution.
Legislators, as eyewitnesses, are in a better position than a court to rule on
the facts. The argument is also made that legislatures would be offended if
courts examined legislative procedure.

Such a rationale, however, cannot conceivably apply to substantive change


in a bill introduced towards the end of its tortuous trip through Congress,
catching both legislators and the public unawares and altering the same
beyond recognition even by its sponsors.
This issue I wish to address forthwith.

As regards the principle that the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcemen
internal legislative rules, both the majority and I were actually of one mind such th
I was quick to qualify the extent of the Court's review power in respect of internal
procedures in this wise:

I wish to consider this issue in light of Article VIII, Sec. 1 of the Constitution
which provides that "(j)udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justic
. . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." We are also guided by the principle tha
court may interfere with the internal procedures of its coordinate branch on
to uphold the Constitution. 5

I differed, however, from the majority insofar as that principle was applied. In this
respect, I showed that the introduction of several provisions in the Bicameral
Conference Committee Report did not only violate the pertinent House and Senate
Rules defining the limited power of the conference committee but that the
Constitutional proscription against any amendment upon the last reading of a bill
was likewise breached. Hence, in view of these lapses, I thought that judicial revie
would have been proper in order to uphold the Constitution. This the majority,
however, disregarded invoking the same principle which should have justified the
Court in questioning the actuations of the legislative branch.

At this juncture, I wish to reiterate my continuing adherence to the aforesaid reaso


I cited in the Tolentino dissent. At the same time, I realize that the arguments I rai
in my dissent would not hold true in the instant petition.

For one thing, unlike in Tolentino, the rules of the House of Representatives allege
violated by respondents in the instant petition are purely internal rules designed f
the orderly conduct of the House's business. They have no direct or reasonable
nexus to the requirements and proscriptions of the Constitution in the passage of
bill which would otherwise warrant the Court's intervention. Likewise, the petitione
are not in any way complaining that substantial alterations have been introduced
Republic Act No. 8240. The thrust of petitioners' arguments in attacking the validit

14

of the law is merely with respect to the fact that Rep. Joker Arroyo was effectively
prevented from invoking the question of quorum and not that the substance there
offends constitutional standards. This being the case, I do not now feel called upon
invoke my previous argument that the enrolled bill theory should not be conclusiv
as regards "substantive changes in a bill introduced towards the end of its tortuou
trip through Congress," when it is palpably unwarranted under the circumstances
instant petition.
PUNO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the result. I do appreciate the fine legal disquisition of Mr. Justice Mend
to justify the dismissal of the case at bar. Nevertheless, I have to express my view
on the alleged non-justiciability of the issue posed by the petitioner as well as the
applicability of the archaic enroll bill doctrine in light of what I perceive as new
wrinkles in our law brought about by the 1987 Constitution and the winds of
changing time.
I

With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are nonjusticiable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of powe
we assume jurisdiction over the case at bar. Even in the United States, the princip
of separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the
interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by
legislators.

Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v. Ballin, 1 as a window to view the
issues before the Court. It is in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined th
boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review congressional rules. 2 It held:
xxx xxx xxx

The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that "each house may
determine the rules of its proceedings." It appears that in pursuance of this
authority the House had, prior to that day, passed this as one of its rules:
Rule XV

3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the


names of members sufficient to make a quorum in the hall of the House wh
do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and recorded in the journal, and
reported to the Speaker with the names of the members voting, and be
counted and announced in determining the presence of a quorum to do
business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)

The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question,
therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and not what methods the Speake
may of his own motion resort to for determining the presence of a quorum,
what matters the Speaker or clerk may of their own volition place upon the
journal. Neither do the advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, o
such a rule present any matters for judicial consideration. With the courts t
question is only one of power. The Constitution empowers each house to

15

determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutio
restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable
relation between the mode or method of proceedings established by the ru
and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations a
matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no
impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more
accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a
different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The pow
to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuo
power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitatio
suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribuna

Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of
congressional rules, i.e., whether they are constitutional. Rule XV was examined b
the Court and it was found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any
constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its
method has a reasonable relationship with the result sought to be attained. By
examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the m
invocation of the principle of separation of powers.
Ballin was followed in 1932 by the case of US v. Smith. 3 In Smith, the meaning of
sections 3 and 4 of Rule XXXVIII of the US Senate was in issue, viz:
xxx xxx xxx

3. When a nomination is confirmed or rejected, any Senator voting in the


majority may move for a reconsideration on the same day on which the vot
was taken, or on either of the next two days of actual executive session of t
Senate; but if a notification of the confirmation or rejection of a nomination
shall have been sent to the President before the expiration of the time with
which a motion to reconsider may be made, the motion to reconsider shall b
accompanied by a motion to request the President to return such notificatio
to the Senate. Any motion to reconsider the vote on a nomination may be la
on the table without prejudice to the nomination, and shall be a final
disposition of such motion.

4. Nominations confirmed or rejected by the Senate shall not be returned by


the Secretary to the President until the expiration of the time limited for
making a motion to reconsider the same, or while a motion to reconsider is
pending, unless otherwise ordered by the Senate.

It appears that the nomination of Mr. Smith as member of the Federal Power
Commission has been confirmed by the US Senate. The resolution of confirmation
was sent to the US President who then signed the appointment of Mr. Smith. The
Senate, however, reconsidered the confirmation of Mr. Smith and requested the
President to return its resolution of confirmation. The President refused. A petition
quo warranto was filed against Mr. Smith. The Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice
Brandeis, assumed jurisdiction over the dispute relying on Ballin. It exercised
jurisdiction although "the question primarily at issue relates to the construction of
the applicable rules, not to their constitutionality." Significantly, the Court rejected
the Senate interpretation of its own rules even while it held that it must be accord

16

the most sympathetic consideration.


xxx xxx xxx

Sixth. To place upon the standing rules of the Senate a construction differen
from that adopted by the Senate itself when the present case was under
debate is a serious and delicate exercise of judicial power. The Constitution
commits to the Senate the power to make its own rules; and it is not the
function of the Court to say that another rule would be better. A rule design
to ensure due deliberation in the performance of the vital function of advisi
and consenting to nominations for public office, moreover, should receive fr
the Court the most sympathetic consideration. But the reasons, above state
against the Senate's construction seem to us compelling. We are confirmed
the view we have taken by the fact, since the attempted reconsideration of
Smith's confirmation, the Senate itself seems uniformly to have treated the
ordering of immediate notification to the President as tantamount to
authorizing him to proceed to perfect the appointment.
Smith, of course, involves the right of a third person and its ruling falls within the
test spelled out in Ballin.

Smith was followed by the 1948 case of Christoffel v. United States. 4 Christoffel
testified before the Committee on Education and Labor of the House of
Representatives. He denied he was a communist and was charged with perjury in
regular court. He adduced evidence during the trial that the committee had no
quorum when the perjurious statement was given. Nonetheless, he was convicted
view of the judge's charge to the members of the jury that to find Christoffel guilty
they had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that
xxx xxx xxx

. . . the defendant Christoffel appeared before a quorum of at least thirteen


members of the said Committee, and that "at least that number must have
been actually and physically present . . . If such a Committee so met, that is
thirteen members did meet at the beginning of the afternoon session of Ma
1, 1947, and thereafter during the progress of the hearing some of them lef
temporarily or otherwise and no question was raised as to the lack of a
quorum, then the fact that the majority did not remain there would not affe
for the purposes of this case, the existence of that Committee as a compete
tribunal provided that before the oath was administered and before the
testimony of the defendant was given there were present as many as 13
members of that Committee at the beginning of the afternoon session . . . .

Christoffel objected to the charge on the ground that it allowed the jury to assume
there was a continuous quorum simply because it was present at the start of the
meeting of the Committee. Under the House rules, a quorum once established is
presumed to continue until the lack of quorum is raised. Again, the court assumed
jurisdiction over the case. A majority of the Court, with Mr. Justice Murphy, as
ponente, defined the issue as "what rules the House had established and whether
they have been followed." It held:

17

xxx xxx xxx

Congressional practice in the transaction of ordinary legislative business is


course none of our concern, and by the same token the considerations whic
may lead Congress as a matter of legislative practice to treat as valid the
conduct of its committees do not control the issue before us. The question i
neither what rules Congress may establish for its own governance, nor
whether presumptions of continuity may protect the validity of its legislativ
conduct. The question is rather what rules the House has established and
whether they have been followed. It of course has the power to define what
tribunal is competent to exact testimony and the conditions that establish i
competency to do so. The heart of this case is that by the charge that was
given it the jury was allowed to assume that the conditions of competency
were satisfied even though the basis in fact was not established and in face
a possible finding that the facts contradicted the assumption.

We are measuring a conviction of crime by the statute which defined it. As


consequence of this conviction, petitioner was sentenced to imprisonment f
a term of from two to six years. An essential part of a procedure which can
said fairly to inflict such a punishment is that all the elements of the crime
charged shall be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. An element of the crim
charged in the instant indictment is the presence of a competent tribunal, a
the trial court properly so instructed the jury. The House insists that to be su
a tribunal a committee must consist of a quorum, and we agree with the tri
court's charge that to convict, the jury had to be satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt that there were "actually and physically present" a majori
of the committee.

Then to charge, however, that such requirement is satisfied by a finding tha


there was a majority present two or three hours before the defendant offere
his testimony, in the face of evidence indicating the contrary, is to rule as a
matter of law that a quorum need not be present when the offense is
committed. This not only seems to us contrary to the rules and practice of t
Congress but denies petitioner a fundamental right. That right is that he be
convicted of crime only on proof of all the elements of the crime charged
against him. A tribunal that is not competent is no tribunal, and it is
unthinkable that such a body can be the instrument of criminal conviction.

The minority complained that the "House has adopted the rule and practice that a
quorum once established is presumed to continue unless and until a point of no
quorum is raised. By this decision, the Court, in effect, invalidates that rule . . . ."
minority view commanded only the vote of three (3) justices.

The US Supreme Court pursued the same line in 1963 in deciding the case of Yellin
United States. 5 Yellin was indicted on five counts of willfully refusing to answer
questions put to him by a sub-committee of the House Committee on Un-American
Activities. He was convicted by the District Court of contempt of Congress on four
counts. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit. On
certiorari, he assailed his conviction on the ground that the Committee illegally
denied his request to be heard in executive session. He alleged there was a violat
of Committee Rule IV which provides that "if a majority of the Committee or subcommittee, duly appointed as provided by the rules of the House of Representativ

18

believes that the interrogation of a witness in a public hearing might endanger


national security or unjustly injure his reputation, or the reputation of other
individuals, the Committee shall interrogate such witness in an executive session
the purpose of determining the necessity or admissibility of conducting such
interrogation thereafter in a public hearing." in a 5-4 decision, the Court, speaking
thru Mr. Chief Justice Warren, held:
xxx xxx xxx

Yellin should be permitted the same opportunity for judicial review when he
discovers at trial that his rights have been violated. This is especially so wh
the Committee's practice leads witnesses to misplaced reliance upon its rul
When reading a copy of the Committee's rules, which must be distributed to
every witness under Rule XVII, the witness' reasonable expectation is that t
Committee actually does what it purports to do, adhere to its own rules. To
foreclose a defense based upon those rules, simply because the witness wa
deceived by the Committee's appearance of regularity, is not fair. The
Committee prepared the groundwork for prosecution in Yellin's case
meticulously. It is not too exacting to require that the Committee be equally
meticulous in obeying its own rules.

It additionally bears stressing that in the United States, the judiciary has pruned th
"political thicket." In the benchmark case of Baker v. Carr, 6 the US Supreme Cour
assumed jurisdiction to hear a petition for re-apportionment of the Tennessee
legislature ruling that "the political question doctrine, a tool for maintenance of
government order, will not be so applied as to promote only disorder" and that "th
courts cannot reject as 'no law suit,' a bona fide controversy as to whether some
action denominated 'political' exceeds constitutional authority."

In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to categoric
reject the political question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of
power. For section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to
empower courts ". . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse o
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government." This power is new and was not granted to our
courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US
Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM granted this enormou
power to our courts in view of our experience under martial law where abusive
exercises of state power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the
political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the
judiciary vis-a-vis the Executive and the Legislative departments of government. I
cases involving the proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of
habeas corpus, it is now beyond dubiety that the government can no longer invok
the political question defense. Section 18 of Article VII completely eliminated this
defense when it provided:
xxx xxx xxx

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any


citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and

19

must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, n
supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor
authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies ove
civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend t
privilege of the writ.

The CONCOM did not only outlaw the use of the political question defense in natio
security cases. To a great degree, it diminished its use as a shield to protect other
abuses of government by allowing courts to penetrate the shield with the new pow
to review acts of any branch or instrumentality of the government ". . . to determi
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction." In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 7 I posited the followin
postulates:
xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceabl
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

Former Chief Justice Roberto R. Concepcion, the sponsor of this provision in


the Constitutional Commission explained the sense and the reach of judicia
power as follows:
xxx xxx xxx

. . . In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the


question of whether or not a branch of government or any of it
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdictio
or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial
power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which mea


that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matte
of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute politica
question.

The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not
mere power which it can decline to exercise. Precisely to deter this
disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike
down any act of a branch or instrumentality of government or any of its
officials done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has elongated the checking
powers of this Court against the other branches of government despite thei

20

more democratic character, the President and the legislators being elected
the people.

It is, however, theorized that this provision is nothing new. I beg to disagree
for the view misses the significant changes made in our constitutional canv
to cure the legal deficiencies we discovered during martial law. One of the
areas radically changed by the framers of the 1987 Constitution is the
imbalance of power between and among the three great branches of our
government the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary. To upgrade t
powers of the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commission strengthened some
more the independence of courts. Thus, it further protected the security of
tenure of the members of the Judiciary by providing "No law shall be passed
reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its
Members." It also guaranteed fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary.

More, it depoliticalized appointments in the judiciary by creating the Judicia


and Bar Council which was tasked with screening the list of prospective
appointees to the judiciary. The power of confirming appointments to the
judiciary was also taken away from Congress. The President was likewise gi
a specific time to fill up vacancies in the judiciary ninety (90) days from t
occurrence of the vacancy in case of the Supreme Court and ninety (90) da
from the submission of the list of recommendees by the Judicial and Bar
Council in case of vacancies in the lower courts. To further insulate
appointments in the judiciary from the virus of politics, the Supreme Court w
given the power to "appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in
accordance with the Civil Service Law." And to make the separation of the
judiciary from the other branches of government more watertight, it prohibi
members of the judiciary to be ". . . designated to any agency performing
quasi judicial or administrative functions." While the Constitution strengthen
the sinews of the Supreme Court, it reduced the powers of the two other
branches of government, especially the Executive. Notable of the powers of
the President clipped by the Constitution is his power to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus and to proclaim martial law. The exercise of this power is now
subject to revocation by Congress. Likewise, the sufficiency of the factual
basis for the exercise of said power may be reviewed by this Court in an
appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen.

The provision defining judicial power as including the "duty of the courts of
justice . . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any bran
or instrumentality of the Government" constitutes the capstone of the effor
of the Constitutional Commission to upgrade the powers of this court vis-athe other branches of government. This provision
was dictated by our experience under martial law which taught us that a
stronger and more independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in
government. . . .
xxx xxx xxx

In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of
government committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new Constitution
transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This transformation,

21

dictated by our distinct experience as a nation, is not merely evolutionary b


revolutionary. Under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, this Court approache
constitutional violations by initially determining what it cannot do; under th
1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress this Court is mandated to
approach constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not do b
what it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by not
resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.

I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new
constitutional provision as the case at bar once more calls us to define the
parameters of our power to review violations of the rules of the House. We will not
true to our trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if we refuse to
exercise this new power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceedin
timidity to unsheath the judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened other
branches of government to denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino
I endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga that this novel provision stretching
the latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation should not b
depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving t
case at bar, the lessons of our own history should provide us the light and not the
experience of foreigners.
II

Again with due respect, I dissent from the majority insofar as it relied on the enrol
bill doctrine to justify the dismissal of the petition at bar.

An enrolled bill is one which has been duly introduced, finally enacted by both
Houses, signed by the proper officers of each House and approved by the Presiden
9
It is a declaration by the two Houses, through their presiding officers, to the
President that a bill, thus attested, has received in due the sanction of the legislat
branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the
constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to
him.

The enrolled bill originated in England where there is no written Constitution


controlling the legislative branch of the government, and the acts of Parliament,
being regarded in their nature as judicial as emanating from the highest tribuna
in the land are placed on the same footing and regarded with the same venerat
as the judgment of the courts which cannot be collaterally attacked. 10 In England
the conclusiveness of the bill was premised on the rationale that "an ad of
parliament thus made is the exercise of the highest authority that this kingdom
acknowledges upon earth. And it cannot be altered, amended, dispensed with,
suspended or repealed, but in the same forms and by the same authority of
parliament; for it is a maxim in law that it requires the same strength to dissolve a
to create an obligation. 11

Over the years, the enrolled bill theory has undergone important mutations. Some
jurisdictions have adopted the modified entry or affirmative contradiction rule. Un
this rule, the presumption in favor of the enrolled bill is not conclusive. The rule
concedes validity to the enrolled bill unless there affirmatively appears in the
journals of the legislature a statement that there has not been compliance with on
or more of the constitutional requirements. 12 Other jurisdictions have adopted the

22

Extrinsic Evidence Rule which holds that an enrolled bill is only prima facie eviden
that it has been regularly enacted. The prima facie presumption, however, can be
destroyed by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence that the constitutional
requirements in enacting a law have been violated. For this purpose, journals and
other extrinsic evidence are allowed to be received. 13 Some limit the use of extrin
evidence to issues of fraud or mistakes. 14

These variants developed after a re-examination of the rationale of the enrolled bi


The modern rationale for the enrolled bill theory was spelled out in Field v. Clark,
viz.:
xxx xxx xxx

The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the


President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official
attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress.
is a declaration by the two Houses, through their presiding officers, to the
President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction
the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in
obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congre
shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his
approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill
that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable.
the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an
enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official
attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the Presiden
of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face,
solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the
government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing
the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and
independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon the
assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated
in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question
properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the
Constitution.

The principle of separation of powers is thus the principal prop of the enrolled bill
doctrine. The doctrine is also justified as a rule of convenience. Supposedly, it avo
difficult questions of evidence. 16 It is also believed that it will prevent the filing of
too many cases which will cast a cloud of uncertainty on laws passed by the
legislature. As explained in Ex Pacte Wren 17 "if the validity of every act published
law is to be tested by examining its history, as shown by the journals of the two
houses of the legislature, there will be an amount of litigation, difficulty, and painf
uncertainty appalling in its contemplation, and multiplying a hundredfold the alleg
uncertainty of the law." The conclusiveness of the enrolled bill is also justified on t
ground that journals and other extrinsic evidence are conducive to mistake, if not
fraud.

These justifications for the enrolled bill theory have been rejected in various
jurisdictions in the United States. In his Dissenting Opinion in Tolentino v. Secretar
of Finance, and its companion cases, 18 Mr. Justice Regalado cited some of the
leading American cases which discussed the reasons for the withering, if not demi

23

of the enrolled bill theory, viz:


xxx xxx xxx

Even in the land of its source, the so-called conclusive presumption of valid
originally attributed to that doctrine has long been revisited and qualified, i
not altogether rejected. On the competency of judicial inquiry, it has been
held that "(u)nder the "enrolled bill rule" by which an enrolled bill is sole
expository of its contents and conclusive evidence of its existence and valid
enactment, it is nevertheless competent for courts to inquire as to what
prerequisites are fixed by the Constitution of which journals of respective
houses of Legislature are required to furnish the evidence.
In fact, in Gwynn vs. Hardee, etc., et al., the Supreme Court of Florida
declared

(1) While the presumption is that the enrolled bill, as signed by the legislati
offices and filed with the secretary of state, is the bill as it passed, yet this
presumption is not conclusive, and when it is shown from the legislative
journals that a bill though engrossed and enrolled, and signed by the
legislative officers, contains provisions that have not passed both houses,
such provisions will be held spurious and not a part of the law. As was said
Mr. Justice Cockrell in the case of Wade vs. Atlantic Lumber Co., 51 Fla. 628
text 633, 41 So. 72, 73:

This Court is firmly committed to the holding that when the


journals speak they control, and against such proof the enrolle
bill is not conclusive.
More enlightening and apropos to the present controversy is the decision
promulgated on May 13, 1980 by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in D & W
Auto Supply, et al. vs. Department of Revenue, et al., pertinent excerpts
wherefrom are extensively reproduced hereunder.

. . . In arriving at our decision we must, perforce, reconsider the validity of a


long line of decisions of this court which created and nurtured the so-called
"enrolled bill" doctrine.
xxx xxx xxx

[1] Section 46 of the Kentucky Constitution sets out certain procedures that
the legislature must follow before a bill can be considered for final
passage. . . .
xxx xxx xxx

. . . Under the enrolled bill doctrine as it now exists in Kentucky, a court may
not look behind such a bill, enrolled and certified by the appropriate officers
to determine if there are any defects.
xxx xxx xxx

24

. . . In Lafferty, passage of the law in question violated this provision, yet th


bill was properly enrolled and approved by the governor. In declining to look
behind the law to determine the propriety of its enactment, the court
enunciated three reasons for adopting the enrolled bill rule. First, the court
was reluctant to scrutinize the processes of the legislature, an equal branch
government. Second, reasons of convenience prevailed, which discouraged
requiring the legislature to preserve its records and anticipated considerabl
complex litigation if the court ruled otherwise. Third, the court acknowledge
the poor record-keeping abilities of the General Assembly and expressed a
preference for accepting the final bill as enrolled, rather than opening up th
records of the legislature. . . .
xxx xxx xxx

Nowhere has the rule been adopted without reason, or as a result of judicia
whim. There are four historical bases for the doctrine. (1) An enrolled bill wa
a "record" and, as such, was not subject to attack at common law. (2) Since
the legislature is one of the three branches of government, the courts, bein
coequal, must indulge in every presumption that legislative acts are valid. (
When the rule was originally formulated, record-keeping of the legislatures
was so inadequate that a balancing of equities required that the final act, th
enrolled bill, be given efficacy. (4) There were theories of convenience as
expressed by the Kentucky court in Lafferty.

The rule is not unanimous in the several states, however and it has not bee
without its critics. From an examination of cases and treaties, we can
summarize the criticism as follows: (1) Artificial presumptions, especially
conclusive ones, are not favored. (2) Such a rule frequently (as in the prese
case) produces results which do not accord with facts or constitutional
provisions. (3) The rule is conducive to fraud, forgery, corruption and other
wrongdoings. (4) Modern automatic and electronic record-keeping devices n
used by legislatures remove one of the original reasons for the rule. (5) The
rule disregards the primary obligation of the courts to seek the truth and to
provide a remedy for a wrong committed by any branch of government. In
light of these considerations, we are convinced that the time has come to re
examine the enrolled bill doctrine.

[2] This court is not unmindful of the admonition of the doctrine of stare
decisis. The maxim is "Stare decisis et non quieta movere," which simply
suggests that we stand by precedents and to disturb settled points of law. Y
this rule is not inflexible, nor is it of such a nature as to require perpetuation
error or logic. As we stated in Daniel's Adm'r v. Hoofnel, 287 Ky 834, 155
S.W.2d 469, 471-72 (1941).

The force of the rule depends upon the nature of the question
be decided and the extent of the disturbance of rights and
practices which a change in the interpretation of the law or the
course of judicial opinions may create. Cogent considerations a
whether there is clear error and urgent reasons "for neither
justice nor wisdom requires a court to go from one doubtful rul
to another," and whether or not the evils of the principle that h
been followed will be more injurious than can possibly result fr

25

a change.

Certainly, when a theory supporting a rule of law is not grounded on facts, o


upon sound logic, or is unjust, or has been discredited by actual experience
should be discarded, and with it the rule it supports.

[3] It is clear to us that the major premise of the Lafferty decision, the poor
record-keeping of the legislature, has disappeared. Modern equipment and
technology are the rule in record-keeping by our General Assembly. Tape
recorders, electric typewriters, duplicating machines, recording equipment,
printing presses, computers, electronic voting machines, and the like remov
all doubts and fears as to the ability of the General Assembly to keep accur
and readily accessible records.

It is also apparent that the "convenience" rule is not appropriate in today's


modern and developing judicial philosophy. The fact that the number and
complexity of lawsuits may increase is not persuasive if one is mindful that
overriding purpose of our judicial system is to discover the truth and see th
justice is done. The existence of difficulties and complexities should not det
this pursuit and we reject any doctrine or presumption that so provides.

Lastly, we address the premise that the equality of the various branches of
government requires that we shut our eyes to constitutional failing and othe
errors of our copartners in government. We simply do not agree. Section 26
the Kentucky Constitution provides that any law contrary to the constitution
"void." The proper exercise of judicial authority requires us to recognize any
law which is unconstitutional and to declare it void. Without elaborating the
point, we believe that under section 228 of the Kentucky Constitution it is o
obligation to "support . . . the Constitution of the commonwealth." We are
sworn to see that violations of the constitution by any person, corporatio
state agency or branch or government are brought to light and corrected
To countenance an artificial rule of law that silences our voices when
confronted with violations of our constitution is not acceptable to this court

We believe that a more reasonable rule is the one which Professor Sutherlan
describes as the "extrinsic evidence." . . . . Under this approach there is a
prima facie presumption that an enrolled bill is valid, but such presumption
may be overcome by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence establishin
that constitutional requirements have not been met.

We therefore overrule Lafferty v. Huffman and all other cases following the
called enrolled bill doctrine, to the extent that there is no longer a conclusiv
presumption that an enrolled bill is valid. . . .

Clearly, the enrolled bill doctrine no longer enjoys its once unassailable respectab
in United States. Sutherland reveals that starting in the 1940's,
". . . the tendency seems to be toward the abandonment of the conclusive
presumption rule and the adoption of the third rule leaving only a prima facie
presumption of validity which may be attacked by any authoritative source of
information." 19

It is high time we re-examine our preference for the enrolled bill doctrine. It was in

26

the 1947 case of Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 20 that this Court, with three (3) justices
dissenting, first embraced the rule that a duly authenticated bill or resolution impo
absolute verity and is binding on the courts. In 1963, we firmed up this ruling in
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez, 21 thus:
xxx xxx xxx

Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product which is patently


distinct and different from "urea" and "formaldehyde," as separate articles
used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as "urea formaldehyd
Petitioner contends, however, that the bill approved in Congress contained
copulative conjunction "and" between the term "urea" and "formaldehyde,"
and that the members of Congress intended to exempt "urea" and
"formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the
synthetic resin glue called "urea formaldehyde," not the latter as a finished
product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of t
Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members
thereof. But said individual statements do not necessarily reflect the view o
the Senate. Much less do they indicate the intent of the House of
Representatives (see Song Kiat Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank, 54 Off
Gaz. 615; Mayor Motors Inc. vs. Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue, L
15000 [March 29, 1961]; Manila Jockey Club, Inc. vs. Games and Amusemen
Board, L-12727 [February 19, 1960]). Furthermore, it is well settled that
enrolled bill which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea an
formaldehyde" conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the
measure passed by Congress and approved by the President (Primicias vs.
Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs.
Comm. on Elections, L-18684, Sept. 14, 1961). If there has been any mistak
in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress a
approved by the Executive on which we cannot speculate without
jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of t
cornerstones of our democratic system the remedy is by amendment or
curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
In the 1969 case of Morales v. Subido,
doctrine, viz:

22

we reiterated our fidelity to the enrolled b

. . . . We cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happene


The respect due to the other branches of the Government demands that we
act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest
as the official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise we would be
cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine wh
actually did happen in the labyrinth of law-making, with consequent
impairment of the integrity of the legislative process. The investigation whic
the petitioner would like this Court to make can be better done in Congress
After all, House cleaning the immediate and imperative need for which
seems to be suggested by the petitioner can best be effected by the
occupants thereof. Expressed elsewise, this is a matter worthy of the attent
not of an Oliver Wendell Holmes but of a Sherlock Holmes.
Significantly, however, Morales diluted the conclusiveness rule of the enrolled bill

27

doctrine. The ponencia stressed:

By what we have essayed above we are not of course to be understood as


holding that in all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be su
there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires must be
entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a
legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such matters entered on
the journal, is a question which we do not now decide. All we hold is that wi
respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the
enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.

In the 1974 case of Astorga v. Villegas, 23 we further diluted the enrolled bill doctr
when we refused to apply it after the Senate President declared his signature on t
bill as invalid. We ruled:
xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding offices of Congre


is conclusive proof of a bill's due enactment, required, it is said, by the resp
due to a co-equal department of the government, is neutralized in this case
the fact that the Senate President declared his signature on the bill to be
invalid and issued a subsequent clarification that the invalidation for his
signature meant that the bill he had signed had never been approved by th
Senate. Obviously this declaration should be accorded even greater respect
than the attestation it invalidated, which it did for a reason that is undispute
in fact and indisputable in logic.

As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the


certification made by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of
authentication. The law-making process in Congress ends when the bill is
approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity
the bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In other words
is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers
that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says that "[e]very bill passed
the Congress shall, before it becomes law, be presented to the President." I
Brown vs. Morris, supra, the Supreme Court of Missouri, interpreting a simil
provision in the State Constitution, said that the same "makes it clear that t
indispensable step is the final passage and it follows that if a bill, otherwise
fully enacted as a law, is not attested by the presiding officer, the proof tha
has 'passed both houses' will satisfy the constitutional requirement.

Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but argues
that the disclaimer thereof by the Senate President, granting it to have bee
validly made, would only mean that there was no attestation at all, but wou
not affect the validity of the statute. Hence, it is pointed out, Republic Act N
4065 would remain valid and binding. This argument begs the issue. It wou
limit the court's inquiry to the presence or absence of the attestation and to
the effect of its absence upon the validity of the statute. The inquiry, howev
goes farther. Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and
consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is ther
to determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted. In such a case

28

entries in the journal should be consulted.

The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary


record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not
authenticated and is subject to the risk of misprinting and other errors, the
point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to inquire whethe
the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same
text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and
circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate
journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy
amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but
were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed b
him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleg
law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking, but to declare that the bill was
not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed
both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when they
withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error committ
and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief
Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such
rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to
sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not
intended by the law-making body.

In 1993, the enrolled bill doctrine was again used as a secondary rationale in the
case of Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 24 In this case, the judges claimed t
the pertinent part of section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 repealing the franking privilege o
the judiciary appeared only in the Conference Committee Report. In rejecting this
contention, this Court ruled:

While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for


compromising differences between the Senate and the House, it is not limit
in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader function is described thus:

A conference committee may deal generally with the subject


matter or it may be limited to resolving the precise differences
between the two houses. Even where the conference committe
is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom
severely limits the freedom with which new subject matter can
inserted into the conference bill. But occasionally a conference
committee produces unexpected results, results beyond its
mandate. These excursions occur even where the rules impose
strict limitations on conference committee jurisdiction. This is
symptomatic of the authoritarian power of conference commit
(Davies, Legislative Law and Process: In a Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p
81).

It is a matter of record that the Conference Committee Report on the bill in


question was returned to and duly approved by both the Senate and the
House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its certificat
by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the
House of Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of
Congress. It was then presented to and approved by President Corazon C.

29

Aquino on April 3, 1992.

Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not inquire beyo
the certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of
Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that
the enrolled bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that hav
to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of t
bill). The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we
held in the old (but stills valid) case of U.S. vs. Pens, where we explained th
reason thus:

To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine


legislature when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit,
would be to violate both the letter and spirit of the organic law
by which the Philippine Government was brought into existenc
to invade a coordinate and independent department of the
Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and
functions of the Legislature.

Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charg
that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventua
became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not
distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and th
legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in
accordance with the Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound
such official assurances from a coordinate department of the government, t
which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.

Finally in 1994 came the case of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, et al and its
companion cases. 25 Involved in the case was the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7716
otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax Law. The majority 26 partly reli
on the enrolled bill doctrine in dismissing challenges to the constitutionality of R.A
No. 7716. It held:
xxx xxx xxx

Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Republic


No. 7716 must be resolved in its favor. Our cases manifest firm adherence t
the rule that an enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its provisions
but also of its due enactment. Not even claims that a proposed constitution
amendment was invalid because the requisite votes for its approval had no
been obtained or that certain provisions of a statute had been "smuggled" i
the printing of the bill have moved or persuaded us to look behind the
proceedings of a coequal branch of the government. There is no reason now
depart from this rule.

No claim is here made that the "enrolled bill" rule is absolute. In fact in one
case we "went behind" an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determi
whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate in
view of the fad that the President of the Senate himself, who had signed the
enrolled bill, admitted a mistake and withdrew his signature, so that in effec

30

there was no longer an enrolled bill to consider.

But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of
bills have not been observed have no more basis than another allegation th
the Conference Committee "surreptitiously" inserted provisions into a bill
which it had prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the
enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases
would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments of our
government.

These cases show that we have not blindly accepted the conclusiveness of the
enrolled bill. Even in Tolentino, Mr. Justice Mendoza was cautious enough to hold th
"no claim is here made that the enrolled bill is absolute." I respectfully submit that
is now time for the Court to make a definitive pronouncement that we no longer g
our unqualified support to the enrolled bill doctrine. There are compelling reasons
this suggested change in stance. For one, the enrolled bill is appropriate only in
England where it originated because in England there is no written Constitution an
the Parliament is supreme. For another, many of the courts in the United States ha
broken away from the rigidity and unrealism of the enrolled bill in light of
contemporary developments in lawmaking. 27 And more important, our uncritical
adherence to the enrolled bill is inconsistent with our Constitution, laws and rules.
Mabanag, 28 we relied on section 313 of the Old Code of Civil Procedure as amend
by Act No. 2210 as a principal reason in embracing the enrolled bill. This section,
however has long been repealed by our Rules of Court. A half glance at our Rules
show that its section on conclusive presumption does not carry the conclusive
presumption we give to an enrolled bill. But this is not all. The conclusiveness of a
enrolled bill which all too often results in the suppression of truth cannot be justifi
under the 1987 Constitution. The Preamble of our Constitution demands that we li
not only under a rule of law but also under a regime of truth. Our Constitution also
adopted a national policy 29 requiring full public disclosure of all state transactions
involving public interest. Any rule which will defeat this policy on transparency ou
to be disfavored. And to implement these policies, this Court was given the power
pry open and to strike down any act of any branch or instrumentality of governme
if it amounts to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdictio
It is time to bury the enrolled bill for its fiction of conclusiveness shuts off truth in
many litigations. We cannot dispense justice based on fiction for the search for
justice is the search for truth. I submit that giving an enrolled bill a mere prima fac
presumption of correctness will facilitate our task of dispensing justice based on
truth.
III

In sum, I respectfully submit that the Court has jurisdiction over the petition at ba
and that issues posed by petitioner are justiciable. Nonetheless, I do not find any
grave abuse of discretion committed by the public respondents to justify granting
said petition. As the ponencia points out, the petition merely involves the complai
that petitioner was prevented from raising the question of quorum. The petition do
not concern violation of any rule mandated by the Constitution. Nor does it involve
the right of a non-member of the House which requires constitutional protection. T
rules on how to question the existence of a quorum are procedural in character. Th
are malleable by nature for they were drafted to help the House enact laws. As we
stated, these rules are servants, not masters of the House. Their observance or no
observance is a matter of judgment call on the part of our legislators and it is not

31

business of the Court to reverse this judgment when untainted by grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Davide, Jr., J., concurs.

Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., concurring:

When the 1987 Constitution has embodied, in its circumscription of judicial power
under Section 1, Article VIII, of the Constitution, the determination of whether or n
there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government, the Supreme Court, upon which that great burden has been imposed
could not have been thought of as likewise being thereby tasked with the awesom
responsibility of overseeing the entire bureaucracy. The term grave abuse of
discretion has long been understood in our jurisprudence as, and confined to, a
capricious and whimsical or despotic exercise of judgment as amounting to lack o
excess of jurisdiction.

I see nothing of that sort in the case at bar. Absent a clear case of grave abuse of
discretion, like the patent disregard of a Constitutional proscription, I would respec
the judgment of Congress under whose province the specific responsibility falls an
the authority to act is vested. To do otherwise would be an unwarranted intrusion
into the internal affairs of a co-equal, independent and coordinate branch of
government. At no time, it would seem to me, has it been intended by the framers
the fundamental law to cause a substantial deviation, let alone departure, from th
time-honored and accepted principle of separation, but balanced, powers of the
three branches of government. There is, of course, a basic variant between the old
rule and the new Charter on the understanding of the term "judicial power." Now,
Court is under mandate to assume jurisdiction over, and to undertake judicial inqu
into, what may even be deemed to be political questions provided, however, that
grave abuse of discretion the sole test of justiciability on purely political issues
is shown to have attended the contested act.

All taken, I most humbly reiterate my separate opinion in Tolentino vs. Secretary o
Finance and companion cases (G.R. No. 115455, etc., 235 SCRA 630) and vote to
deny the instant petition.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:

In filing this separate opinion for the dismissal of the instant petition, I am not
backtracking from the dissent which I expressed in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finan
1
I am somewhat bothered that if I do not elaborate, the vote which I cast today
might be wrongly construed as an implied abandonment of, and inconsistent with,
my firm stance in Tolentino.
The landmark case of Tolentino, just like the one under consideration, involved a
similar challenge to the constitutionality of a significant tax measure namely,
Republic Act No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax (EVAT)
Law. There, a number of issues, both substantive and procedural, were posed by

32

petitioners, each of which was discussed by the majority opinion of Mr. Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza who, incidentally, is also the ponente of instant decision. At an
rate, it is worth noting that I did not entirely disagree with each and every argume
of the opinion, most especially those touching upon substantive issues. My main
objection in Tolentino, it will be recalled, focused instead on what I perceived was
substantial breach and disregard by the Legislature of vital constitutional
requirements ordaining the procedures to be followed in the passage of a bill whic
in my opinion, the majority seemed to have cavalierly put to rest by hiding under
cloak of the enrolled bill theory 2 and the precept that the Court is not the proper
forum for the enforcement of internal legislative rules allegedly violated. 3 To me,
position then taken by the majority exhibited blind adherence to otherwise sound
principles of law which did not, however, fit the facts as presented before the Cou
Hence, I objected, not so much because I found these principles unwise or obsolet
but rather because they were applied, or misapplied, to a case which I believe did
not call for their application.

When I differed from the majority opinion which applied the enrolled bill theory, I w
very careful to emphasize that reliance thereon is not to be discontinued but that
application must be limited to minor matters relating more to form and factual iss
which do not materially alter the essence and substance of the law itself. Thus:

As applied to the instant petition, the issue posed is whether or not the
procedural irregularities that attended the passage of House Bill No. 11197
and Senate Bill No. 1630, outside of the reading and printing requirements
which were exempted by the Presidential certification, may no longer be
impugned, having been "saved" by the conclusiveness on us of the enrolled
bill. I see no cogent reason why we cannot continue to place reliance on the
enrolled bill, but only with respect to matters pertaining to the procedure
followed in the enactment of bills in Congress and their subsequent
engrossment, printing errors, omission of words and phrases and similar
relatively minor matters relating more to form and factual issues which do n
materially alter the essence and substance of the law itself .

Certainly, courts cannot claim greater ability to judge procedural legitimacy


since constitutional rules on legislative procedure are easily mastered.
Procedural disputes are over facts whether or not the bill had enough vot
or three readings, or whatever not over the meaning of the constitution.
Legislators, as eyewitnesses, are in a better position than a court to rule on
the facts. The argument is also made that legislatures would be offended if
courts examined legislative procedure.

Such a rationale, however, cannot conceivably apply to substantive change


in a bill introduced towards the end of its tortuous trip through Congress,
catching both legislators and the public unawares and altering the same
beyond recognition even by its sponsors.
This issue I wish to address forthwith.

As regards the principle that the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcemen
internal legislative rules, both the majority and I were actually of one mind such th
I was quick to qualify the extent of the Court's review power in respect of internal

33

procedures in this wise:

I wish to consider this issue in light of Article VIII, Sec. 1 of the Constitution
which provides that "(j)udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justic
. . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." We are also guided by the principle tha
court may interfere with the internal procedures of its coordinate branch on
to uphold the Constitution. 5

I differed, however, from the majority insofar as that principle was applied. In this
respect, I showed that the introduction of several provisions in the Bicameral
Conference Committee Report did not only violate the pertinent House and Senate
Rules defining the limited power of the conference committee but that the
Constitutional proscription against any amendment upon the last reading of a bill
was likewise breached. Hence, in view of these lapses, I thought that judicial revie
would have been proper in order to uphold the Constitution. This the majority,
however, disregarded invoking the same principle which should have justified the
Court in questioning the actuations of the legislative branch.

At this juncture, I wish to reiterate my continuing adherence to the aforesaid reaso


I cited in the Tolentino dissent. At the same time, I realize that the arguments I rai
in my dissent would not hold true in the instant petition.

For one thing, unlike in Tolentino, the rules of the House of Representatives allege
violated by respondents in the instant petition are purely internal rules designed f
the orderly conduct of the House's business. They have no direct or reasonable
nexus to the requirements and proscriptions of the Constitution in the passage of
bill which would otherwise warrant the Court's intervention. Likewise, the petitione
are not in any way complaining that substantial alterations have been introduced
Republic Act No. 8240. The thrust of petitioners' arguments in attacking the validit
of the law is merely with respect to the fact that Rep. Joker Arroyo was effectively
prevented from invoking the question of quorum and not that the substance there
offends constitutional standards. This being the case, I do not now feel called upon
invoke my previous argument that the enrolled bill theory should not be conclusiv
as regards "substantive changes in a bill introduced towards the end of its tortuou
trip through Congress," when it is palpably unwarranted under the circumstances
instant petition.
PUNO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the result. I do appreciate the fine legal disquisition of Mr. Justice Mend
to justify the dismissal of the case at bar. Nevertheless, I have to express my view
on the alleged non-justiciability of the issue posed by the petitioner as well as the
applicability of the archaic enroll bill doctrine in light of what I perceive as new
wrinkles in our law brought about by the 1987 Constitution and the winds of
changing time.
I

With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are nonjusticiable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of powe

34

we assume jurisdiction over the case at bar. Even in the United States, the princip
of separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the
interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by
legislators.

Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v. Ballin, 1 as a window to view the
issues before the Court. It is in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined th
boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review congressional rules. 2 It held:
xxx xxx xxx

The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that "each house may
determine the rules of its proceedings." It appears that in pursuance of this
authority the House had, prior to that day, passed this as one of its rules:
Rule XV

3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the


names of members sufficient to make a quorum in the hall of the House wh
do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and recorded in the journal, and
reported to the Speaker with the names of the members voting, and be
counted and announced in determining the presence of a quorum to do
business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)

The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question,
therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and not what methods the Speake
may of his own motion resort to for determining the presence of a quorum,
what matters the Speaker or clerk may of their own volition place upon the
journal. Neither do the advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, o
such a rule present any matters for judicial consideration. With the courts t
question is only one of power. The Constitution empowers each house to
determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutio
restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable
relation between the mode or method of proceedings established by the ru
and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations a
matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no
impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more
accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a
different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The pow
to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuo
power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitatio
suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribuna

Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of
congressional rules, i.e., whether they are constitutional. Rule XV was examined b
the Court and it was found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any
constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its
method has a reasonable relationship with the result sought to be attained. By
examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the m
invocation of the principle of separation of powers.
Ballin was followed in 1932 by the case of US v. Smith.

In Smith, the meaning of

35

sections 3 and 4 of Rule XXXVIII of the US Senate was in issue, viz:


xxx xxx xxx

3. When a nomination is confirmed or rejected, any Senator voting in the


majority may move for a reconsideration on the same day on which the vot
was taken, or on either of the next two days of actual executive session of t
Senate; but if a notification of the confirmation or rejection of a nomination
shall have been sent to the President before the expiration of the time with
which a motion to reconsider may be made, the motion to reconsider shall b
accompanied by a motion to request the President to return such notificatio
to the Senate. Any motion to reconsider the vote on a nomination may be la
on the table without prejudice to the nomination, and shall be a final
disposition of such motion.

4. Nominations confirmed or rejected by the Senate shall not be returned by


the Secretary to the President until the expiration of the time limited for
making a motion to reconsider the same, or while a motion to reconsider is
pending, unless otherwise ordered by the Senate.

It appears that the nomination of Mr. Smith as member of the Federal Power
Commission has been confirmed by the US Senate. The resolution of confirmation
was sent to the US President who then signed the appointment of Mr. Smith. The
Senate, however, reconsidered the confirmation of Mr. Smith and requested the
President to return its resolution of confirmation. The President refused. A petition
quo warranto was filed against Mr. Smith. The Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice
Brandeis, assumed jurisdiction over the dispute relying on Ballin. It exercised
jurisdiction although "the question primarily at issue relates to the construction of
the applicable rules, not to their constitutionality." Significantly, the Court rejected
the Senate interpretation of its own rules even while it held that it must be accord
the most sympathetic consideration.
xxx xxx xxx

Sixth. To place upon the standing rules of the Senate a construction differen
from that adopted by the Senate itself when the present case was under
debate is a serious and delicate exercise of judicial power. The Constitution
commits to the Senate the power to make its own rules; and it is not the
function of the Court to say that another rule would be better. A rule design
to ensure due deliberation in the performance of the vital function of advisi
and consenting to nominations for public office, moreover, should receive fr
the Court the most sympathetic consideration. But the reasons, above state
against the Senate's construction seem to us compelling. We are confirmed
the view we have taken by the fact, since the attempted reconsideration of
Smith's confirmation, the Senate itself seems uniformly to have treated the
ordering of immediate notification to the President as tantamount to
authorizing him to proceed to perfect the appointment.
Smith, of course, involves the right of a third person and its ruling falls within the
test spelled out in Ballin.
Smith was followed by the 1948 case of Christoffel v. United States.

Christoffel

36

testified before the Committee on Education and Labor of the House of


Representatives. He denied he was a communist and was charged with perjury in
regular court. He adduced evidence during the trial that the committee had no
quorum when the perjurious statement was given. Nonetheless, he was convicted
view of the judge's charge to the members of the jury that to find Christoffel guilty
they had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that
xxx xxx xxx

. . . the defendant Christoffel appeared before a quorum of at least thirteen


members of the said Committee, and that "at least that number must have
been actually and physically present . . . If such a Committee so met, that is
thirteen members did meet at the beginning of the afternoon session of Ma
1, 1947, and thereafter during the progress of the hearing some of them lef
temporarily or otherwise and no question was raised as to the lack of a
quorum, then the fact that the majority did not remain there would not affe
for the purposes of this case, the existence of that Committee as a compete
tribunal provided that before the oath was administered and before the
testimony of the defendant was given there were present as many as 13
members of that Committee at the beginning of the afternoon session . . . .

Christoffel objected to the charge on the ground that it allowed the jury to assume
there was a continuous quorum simply because it was present at the start of the
meeting of the Committee. Under the House rules, a quorum once established is
presumed to continue until the lack of quorum is raised. Again, the court assumed
jurisdiction over the case. A majority of the Court, with Mr. Justice Murphy, as
ponente, defined the issue as "what rules the House had established and whether
they have been followed." It held:
xxx xxx xxx

Congressional practice in the transaction of ordinary legislative business is


course none of our concern, and by the same token the considerations whic
may lead Congress as a matter of legislative practice to treat as valid the
conduct of its committees do not control the issue before us. The question i
neither what rules Congress may establish for its own governance, nor
whether presumptions of continuity may protect the validity of its legislativ
conduct. The question is rather what rules the House has established and
whether they have been followed. It of course has the power to define what
tribunal is competent to exact testimony and the conditions that establish i
competency to do so. The heart of this case is that by the charge that was
given it the jury was allowed to assume that the conditions of competency
were satisfied even though the basis in fact was not established and in face
a possible finding that the facts contradicted the assumption.

We are measuring a conviction of crime by the statute which defined it. As


consequence of this conviction, petitioner was sentenced to imprisonment f
a term of from two to six years. An essential part of a procedure which can
said fairly to inflict such a punishment is that all the elements of the crime
charged shall be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. An element of the crim
charged in the instant indictment is the presence of a competent tribunal, a
the trial court properly so instructed the jury. The House insists that to be su

37

a tribunal a committee must consist of a quorum, and we agree with the tri
court's charge that to convict, the jury had to be satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt that there were "actually and physically present" a majori
of the committee.

Then to charge, however, that such requirement is satisfied by a finding tha


there was a majority present two or three hours before the defendant offere
his testimony, in the face of evidence indicating the contrary, is to rule as a
matter of law that a quorum need not be present when the offense is
committed. This not only seems to us contrary to the rules and practice of t
Congress but denies petitioner a fundamental right. That right is that he be
convicted of crime only on proof of all the elements of the crime charged
against him. A tribunal that is not competent is no tribunal, and it is
unthinkable that such a body can be the instrument of criminal conviction.

The minority complained that the "House has adopted the rule and practice that a
quorum once established is presumed to continue unless and until a point of no
quorum is raised. By this decision, the Court, in effect, invalidates that rule . . . ."
minority view commanded only the vote of three (3) justices.

The US Supreme Court pursued the same line in 1963 in deciding the case of Yellin
United States. 5 Yellin was indicted on five counts of willfully refusing to answer
questions put to him by a sub-committee of the House Committee on Un-American
Activities. He was convicted by the District Court of contempt of Congress on four
counts. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit. On
certiorari, he assailed his conviction on the ground that the Committee illegally
denied his request to be heard in executive session. He alleged there was a violat
of Committee Rule IV which provides that "if a majority of the Committee or subcommittee, duly appointed as provided by the rules of the House of Representativ
believes that the interrogation of a witness in a public hearing might endanger
national security or unjustly injure his reputation, or the reputation of other
individuals, the Committee shall interrogate such witness in an executive session
the purpose of determining the necessity or admissibility of conducting such
interrogation thereafter in a public hearing." in a 5-4 decision, the Court, speaking
thru Mr. Chief Justice Warren, held:
xxx xxx xxx

Yellin should be permitted the same opportunity for judicial review when he
discovers at trial that his rights have been violated. This is especially so wh
the Committee's practice leads witnesses to misplaced reliance upon its rul
When reading a copy of the Committee's rules, which must be distributed to
every witness under Rule XVII, the witness' reasonable expectation is that t
Committee actually does what it purports to do, adhere to its own rules. To
foreclose a defense based upon those rules, simply because the witness wa
deceived by the Committee's appearance of regularity, is not fair. The
Committee prepared the groundwork for prosecution in Yellin's case
meticulously. It is not too exacting to require that the Committee be equally
meticulous in obeying its own rules.

It additionally bears stressing that in the United States, the judiciary has pruned th
"political thicket." In the benchmark case of Baker v. Carr, 6 the US Supreme Cour

38

assumed jurisdiction to hear a petition for re-apportionment of the Tennessee


legislature ruling that "the political question doctrine, a tool for maintenance of
government order, will not be so applied as to promote only disorder" and that "th
courts cannot reject as 'no law suit,' a bona fide controversy as to whether some
action denominated 'political' exceeds constitutional authority."

In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to categoric
reject the political question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of
power. For section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to
empower courts ". . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse o
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government." This power is new and was not granted to our
courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US
Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM granted this enormou
power to our courts in view of our experience under martial law where abusive
exercises of state power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the
political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the
judiciary vis-a-vis the Executive and the Legislative departments of government. I
cases involving the proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of
habeas corpus, it is now beyond dubiety that the government can no longer invok
the political question defense. Section 18 of Article VII completely eliminated this
defense when it provided:
xxx xxx xxx

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any


citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and
must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, n
supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor
authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies ove
civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend t
privilege of the writ.

The CONCOM did not only outlaw the use of the political question defense in natio
security cases. To a great degree, it diminished its use as a shield to protect other
abuses of government by allowing courts to penetrate the shield with the new pow
to review acts of any branch or instrumentality of the government ". . . to determi
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction." In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 7 I posited the followin
postulates:
xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceabl

39

and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

Former Chief Justice Roberto R. Concepcion, the sponsor of this provision in


the Constitutional Commission explained the sense and the reach of judicia
power as follows:
xxx xxx xxx

. . . In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the


question of whether or not a branch of government or any of it
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdictio
or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial
power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which mea


that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matte
of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute politica
question.

The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not
mere power which it can decline to exercise. Precisely to deter this
disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike
down any act of a branch or instrumentality of government or any of its
officials done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has elongated the checking
powers of this Court against the other branches of government despite thei
more democratic character, the President and the legislators being elected
the people.

It is, however, theorized that this provision is nothing new. I beg to disagree
for the view misses the significant changes made in our constitutional canv
to cure the legal deficiencies we discovered during martial law. One of the
areas radically changed by the framers of the 1987 Constitution is the
imbalance of power between and among the three great branches of our
government the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary. To upgrade t
powers of the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commission strengthened some
more the independence of courts. Thus, it further protected the security of
tenure of the members of the Judiciary by providing "No law shall be passed
reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its
Members." It also guaranteed fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary.

More, it depoliticalized appointments in the judiciary by creating the Judicia


and Bar Council which was tasked with screening the list of prospective
appointees to the judiciary. The power of confirming appointments to the
judiciary was also taken away from Congress. The President was likewise gi
a specific time to fill up vacancies in the judiciary ninety (90) days from t
occurrence of the vacancy in case of the Supreme Court and ninety (90) da
from the submission of the list of recommendees by the Judicial and Bar
Council in case of vacancies in the lower courts. To further insulate

40

appointments in the judiciary from the virus of politics, the Supreme Court w
given the power to "appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in
accordance with the Civil Service Law." And to make the separation of the
judiciary from the other branches of government more watertight, it prohibi
members of the judiciary to be ". . . designated to any agency performing
quasi judicial or administrative functions." While the Constitution strengthen
the sinews of the Supreme Court, it reduced the powers of the two other
branches of government, especially the Executive. Notable of the powers of
the President clipped by the Constitution is his power to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus and to proclaim martial law. The exercise of this power is now
subject to revocation by Congress. Likewise, the sufficiency of the factual
basis for the exercise of said power may be reviewed by this Court in an
appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen.

The provision defining judicial power as including the "duty of the courts of
justice . . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any bran
or instrumentality of the Government" constitutes the capstone of the effor
of the Constitutional Commission to upgrade the powers of this court vis-athe other branches of government. This provision
was dictated by our experience under martial law which taught us that a
stronger and more independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in
government. . . .
xxx xxx xxx

In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of
government committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new Constitution
transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This transformation,
dictated by our distinct experience as a nation, is not merely evolutionary b
revolutionary. Under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, this Court approache
constitutional violations by initially determining what it cannot do; under th
1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress this Court is mandated to
approach constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not do b
what it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by not
resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.

I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new
constitutional provision as the case at bar once more calls us to define the
parameters of our power to review violations of the rules of the House. We will not
true to our trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if we refuse to
exercise this new power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceedin
timidity to unsheath the judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened other
branches of government to denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino
I endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga that this novel provision stretching
the latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation should not b
depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving t
case at bar, the lessons of our own history should provide us the light and not the
experience of foreigners.
II

41

Again with due respect, I dissent from the majority insofar as it relied on the enrol
bill doctrine to justify the dismissal of the petition at bar.

An enrolled bill is one which has been duly introduced, finally enacted by both
Houses, signed by the proper officers of each House and approved by the Presiden
9
It is a declaration by the two Houses, through their presiding officers, to the
President that a bill, thus attested, has received in due the sanction of the legislat
branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the
constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to
him.

The enrolled bill originated in England where there is no written Constitution


controlling the legislative branch of the government, and the acts of Parliament,
being regarded in their nature as judicial as emanating from the highest tribuna
in the land are placed on the same footing and regarded with the same venerat
as the judgment of the courts which cannot be collaterally attacked. 10 In England
the conclusiveness of the bill was premised on the rationale that "an ad of
parliament thus made is the exercise of the highest authority that this kingdom
acknowledges upon earth. And it cannot be altered, amended, dispensed with,
suspended or repealed, but in the same forms and by the same authority of
parliament; for it is a maxim in law that it requires the same strength to dissolve a
to create an obligation. 11

Over the years, the enrolled bill theory has undergone important mutations. Some
jurisdictions have adopted the modified entry or affirmative contradiction rule. Un
this rule, the presumption in favor of the enrolled bill is not conclusive. The rule
concedes validity to the enrolled bill unless there affirmatively appears in the
journals of the legislature a statement that there has not been compliance with on
or more of the constitutional requirements. 12 Other jurisdictions have adopted the
Extrinsic Evidence Rule which holds that an enrolled bill is only prima facie eviden
that it has been regularly enacted. The prima facie presumption, however, can be
destroyed by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence that the constitutional
requirements in enacting a law have been violated. For this purpose, journals and
other extrinsic evidence are allowed to be received. 13 Some limit the use of extrin
evidence to issues of fraud or mistakes. 14

These variants developed after a re-examination of the rationale of the enrolled bi


The modern rationale for the enrolled bill theory was spelled out in Field v. Clark,
viz.:
xxx xxx xxx

The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the


President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official
attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress.
is a declaration by the two Houses, through their presiding officers, to the
President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction
the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in
obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congre
shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his
approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill
that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable.

42

the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an


enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official
attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the Presiden
of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face,
solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the
government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing
the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and
independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon the
assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated
in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question
properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the
Constitution.

The principle of separation of powers is thus the principal prop of the enrolled bill
doctrine. The doctrine is also justified as a rule of convenience. Supposedly, it avo
difficult questions of evidence. 16 It is also believed that it will prevent the filing of
too many cases which will cast a cloud of uncertainty on laws passed by the
legislature. As explained in Ex Pacte Wren 17 "if the validity of every act published
law is to be tested by examining its history, as shown by the journals of the two
houses of the legislature, there will be an amount of litigation, difficulty, and painf
uncertainty appalling in its contemplation, and multiplying a hundredfold the alleg
uncertainty of the law." The conclusiveness of the enrolled bill is also justified on t
ground that journals and other extrinsic evidence are conducive to mistake, if not
fraud.

These justifications for the enrolled bill theory have been rejected in various
jurisdictions in the United States. In his Dissenting Opinion in Tolentino v. Secretar
of Finance, and its companion cases, 18 Mr. Justice Regalado cited some of the
leading American cases which discussed the reasons for the withering, if not demi
of the enrolled bill theory, viz:
xxx xxx xxx

Even in the land of its source, the so-called conclusive presumption of valid
originally attributed to that doctrine has long been revisited and qualified, i
not altogether rejected. On the competency of judicial inquiry, it has been
held that "(u)nder the "enrolled bill rule" by which an enrolled bill is sole
expository of its contents and conclusive evidence of its existence and valid
enactment, it is nevertheless competent for courts to inquire as to what
prerequisites are fixed by the Constitution of which journals of respective
houses of Legislature are required to furnish the evidence.
In fact, in Gwynn vs. Hardee, etc., et al., the Supreme Court of Florida
declared

(1) While the presumption is that the enrolled bill, as signed by the legislati
offices and filed with the secretary of state, is the bill as it passed, yet this
presumption is not conclusive, and when it is shown from the legislative
journals that a bill though engrossed and enrolled, and signed by the
legislative officers, contains provisions that have not passed both houses,
such provisions will be held spurious and not a part of the law. As was said
Mr. Justice Cockrell in the case of Wade vs. Atlantic Lumber Co., 51 Fla. 628

43

text 633, 41 So. 72, 73:

This Court is firmly committed to the holding that when the


journals speak they control, and against such proof the enrolle
bill is not conclusive.
More enlightening and apropos to the present controversy is the decision
promulgated on May 13, 1980 by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in D & W
Auto Supply, et al. vs. Department of Revenue, et al., pertinent excerpts
wherefrom are extensively reproduced hereunder.

. . . In arriving at our decision we must, perforce, reconsider the validity of a


long line of decisions of this court which created and nurtured the so-called
"enrolled bill" doctrine.
xxx xxx xxx

[1] Section 46 of the Kentucky Constitution sets out certain procedures that
the legislature must follow before a bill can be considered for final
passage. . . .
xxx xxx xxx

. . . Under the enrolled bill doctrine as it now exists in Kentucky, a court may
not look behind such a bill, enrolled and certified by the appropriate officers
to determine if there are any defects.
xxx xxx xxx

. . . In Lafferty, passage of the law in question violated this provision, yet th


bill was properly enrolled and approved by the governor. In declining to look
behind the law to determine the propriety of its enactment, the court
enunciated three reasons for adopting the enrolled bill rule. First, the court
was reluctant to scrutinize the processes of the legislature, an equal branch
government. Second, reasons of convenience prevailed, which discouraged
requiring the legislature to preserve its records and anticipated considerabl
complex litigation if the court ruled otherwise. Third, the court acknowledge
the poor record-keeping abilities of the General Assembly and expressed a
preference for accepting the final bill as enrolled, rather than opening up th
records of the legislature. . . .
xxx xxx xxx

Nowhere has the rule been adopted without reason, or as a result of judicia
whim. There are four historical bases for the doctrine. (1) An enrolled bill wa
a "record" and, as such, was not subject to attack at common law. (2) Since
the legislature is one of the three branches of government, the courts, bein
coequal, must indulge in every presumption that legislative acts are valid. (
When the rule was originally formulated, record-keeping of the legislatures
was so inadequate that a balancing of equities required that the final act, th
enrolled bill, be given efficacy. (4) There were theories of convenience as

44

expressed by the Kentucky court in Lafferty.

The rule is not unanimous in the several states, however and it has not bee
without its critics. From an examination of cases and treaties, we can
summarize the criticism as follows: (1) Artificial presumptions, especially
conclusive ones, are not favored. (2) Such a rule frequently (as in the prese
case) produces results which do not accord with facts or constitutional
provisions. (3) The rule is conducive to fraud, forgery, corruption and other
wrongdoings. (4) Modern automatic and electronic record-keeping devices n
used by legislatures remove one of the original reasons for the rule. (5) The
rule disregards the primary obligation of the courts to seek the truth and to
provide a remedy for a wrong committed by any branch of government. In
light of these considerations, we are convinced that the time has come to re
examine the enrolled bill doctrine.

[2] This court is not unmindful of the admonition of the doctrine of stare
decisis. The maxim is "Stare decisis et non quieta movere," which simply
suggests that we stand by precedents and to disturb settled points of law. Y
this rule is not inflexible, nor is it of such a nature as to require perpetuation
error or logic. As we stated in Daniel's Adm'r v. Hoofnel, 287 Ky 834, 155
S.W.2d 469, 471-72 (1941).

The force of the rule depends upon the nature of the question
be decided and the extent of the disturbance of rights and
practices which a change in the interpretation of the law or the
course of judicial opinions may create. Cogent considerations a
whether there is clear error and urgent reasons "for neither
justice nor wisdom requires a court to go from one doubtful rul
to another," and whether or not the evils of the principle that h
been followed will be more injurious than can possibly result fr
a change.

Certainly, when a theory supporting a rule of law is not grounded on facts, o


upon sound logic, or is unjust, or has been discredited by actual experience
should be discarded, and with it the rule it supports.

[3] It is clear to us that the major premise of the Lafferty decision, the poor
record-keeping of the legislature, has disappeared. Modern equipment and
technology are the rule in record-keeping by our General Assembly. Tape
recorders, electric typewriters, duplicating machines, recording equipment,
printing presses, computers, electronic voting machines, and the like remov
all doubts and fears as to the ability of the General Assembly to keep accur
and readily accessible records.

It is also apparent that the "convenience" rule is not appropriate in today's


modern and developing judicial philosophy. The fact that the number and
complexity of lawsuits may increase is not persuasive if one is mindful that
overriding purpose of our judicial system is to discover the truth and see th
justice is done. The existence of difficulties and complexities should not det
this pursuit and we reject any doctrine or presumption that so provides.
Lastly, we address the premise that the equality of the various branches of

45

government requires that we shut our eyes to constitutional failing and othe
errors of our copartners in government. We simply do not agree. Section 26
the Kentucky Constitution provides that any law contrary to the constitution
"void." The proper exercise of judicial authority requires us to recognize any
law which is unconstitutional and to declare it void. Without elaborating the
point, we believe that under section 228 of the Kentucky Constitution it is o
obligation to "support . . . the Constitution of the commonwealth." We are
sworn to see that violations of the constitution by any person, corporatio
state agency or branch or government are brought to light and corrected
To countenance an artificial rule of law that silences our voices when
confronted with violations of our constitution is not acceptable to this court

We believe that a more reasonable rule is the one which Professor Sutherlan
describes as the "extrinsic evidence." . . . . Under this approach there is a
prima facie presumption that an enrolled bill is valid, but such presumption
may be overcome by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence establishin
that constitutional requirements have not been met.

We therefore overrule Lafferty v. Huffman and all other cases following the
called enrolled bill doctrine, to the extent that there is no longer a conclusiv
presumption that an enrolled bill is valid. . . .

Clearly, the enrolled bill doctrine no longer enjoys its once unassailable respectab
in United States. Sutherland reveals that starting in the 1940's,
". . . the tendency seems to be toward the abandonment of the conclusive
presumption rule and the adoption of the third rule leaving only a prima facie
presumption of validity which may be attacked by any authoritative source of
information." 19

It is high time we re-examine our preference for the enrolled bill doctrine. It was in
the 1947 case of Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 20 that this Court, with three (3) justices
dissenting, first embraced the rule that a duly authenticated bill or resolution impo
absolute verity and is binding on the courts. In 1963, we firmed up this ruling in
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez, 21 thus:
xxx xxx xxx

Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product which is patently


distinct and different from "urea" and "formaldehyde," as separate articles
used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as "urea formaldehyd
Petitioner contends, however, that the bill approved in Congress contained
copulative conjunction "and" between the term "urea" and "formaldehyde,"
and that the members of Congress intended to exempt "urea" and
"formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the
synthetic resin glue called "urea formaldehyde," not the latter as a finished
product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of t
Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members
thereof. But said individual statements do not necessarily reflect the view o
the Senate. Much less do they indicate the intent of the House of
Representatives (see Song Kiat Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank, 54 Off
Gaz. 615; Mayor Motors Inc. vs. Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue, L
15000 [March 29, 1961]; Manila Jockey Club, Inc. vs. Games and Amusemen

46

Board, L-12727 [February 19, 1960]). Furthermore, it is well settled that


enrolled bill which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea an
formaldehyde" conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the
measure passed by Congress and approved by the President (Primicias vs.
Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs.
Comm. on Elections, L-18684, Sept. 14, 1961). If there has been any mistak
in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress a
approved by the Executive on which we cannot speculate without
jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of t
cornerstones of our democratic system the remedy is by amendment or
curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
In the 1969 case of Morales v. Subido,
doctrine, viz:

22

we reiterated our fidelity to the enrolled b

. . . . We cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happene


The respect due to the other branches of the Government demands that we
act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest
as the official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise we would be
cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine wh
actually did happen in the labyrinth of law-making, with consequent
impairment of the integrity of the legislative process. The investigation whic
the petitioner would like this Court to make can be better done in Congress
After all, House cleaning the immediate and imperative need for which
seems to be suggested by the petitioner can best be effected by the
occupants thereof. Expressed elsewise, this is a matter worthy of the attent
not of an Oliver Wendell Holmes but of a Sherlock Holmes.
Significantly, however, Morales diluted the conclusiveness rule of the enrolled bill
doctrine. The ponencia stressed:

By what we have essayed above we are not of course to be understood as


holding that in all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be su
there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires must be
entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a
legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such matters entered on
the journal, is a question which we do not now decide. All we hold is that wi
respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the
enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.

In the 1974 case of Astorga v. Villegas, 23 we further diluted the enrolled bill doctr
when we refused to apply it after the Senate President declared his signature on t
bill as invalid. We ruled:
xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding offices of Congre


is conclusive proof of a bill's due enactment, required, it is said, by the resp
due to a co-equal department of the government, is neutralized in this case
the fact that the Senate President declared his signature on the bill to be
invalid and issued a subsequent clarification that the invalidation for his
signature meant that the bill he had signed had never been approved by th

47

Senate. Obviously this declaration should be accorded even greater respect


than the attestation it invalidated, which it did for a reason that is undispute
in fact and indisputable in logic.

As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the


certification made by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of
authentication. The law-making process in Congress ends when the bill is
approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity
the bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In other words
is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers
that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says that "[e]very bill passed
the Congress shall, before it becomes law, be presented to the President." I
Brown vs. Morris, supra, the Supreme Court of Missouri, interpreting a simil
provision in the State Constitution, said that the same "makes it clear that t
indispensable step is the final passage and it follows that if a bill, otherwise
fully enacted as a law, is not attested by the presiding officer, the proof tha
has 'passed both houses' will satisfy the constitutional requirement.

Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but argues
that the disclaimer thereof by the Senate President, granting it to have bee
validly made, would only mean that there was no attestation at all, but wou
not affect the validity of the statute. Hence, it is pointed out, Republic Act N
4065 would remain valid and binding. This argument begs the issue. It wou
limit the court's inquiry to the presence or absence of the attestation and to
the effect of its absence upon the validity of the statute. The inquiry, howev
goes farther. Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and
consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is ther
to determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted. In such a case
entries in the journal should be consulted.

The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary


record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not
authenticated and is subject to the risk of misprinting and other errors, the
point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to inquire whethe
the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same
text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and
circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate
journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy
amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but
were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed b
him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleg
law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking, but to declare that the bill was
not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed
both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when they
withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error committ
and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief
Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such
rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to
sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not
intended by the law-making body.

In 1993, the enrolled bill doctrine was again used as a secondary rationale in the
case of Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 24 In this case, the judges claimed t

48

the pertinent part of section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 repealing the franking privilege o
the judiciary appeared only in the Conference Committee Report. In rejecting this
contention, this Court ruled:

While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for


compromising differences between the Senate and the House, it is not limit
in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader function is described thus:

A conference committee may deal generally with the subject


matter or it may be limited to resolving the precise differences
between the two houses. Even where the conference committe
is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom
severely limits the freedom with which new subject matter can
inserted into the conference bill. But occasionally a conference
committee produces unexpected results, results beyond its
mandate. These excursions occur even where the rules impose
strict limitations on conference committee jurisdiction. This is
symptomatic of the authoritarian power of conference commit
(Davies, Legislative Law and Process: In a Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p
81).

It is a matter of record that the Conference Committee Report on the bill in


question was returned to and duly approved by both the Senate and the
House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its certificat
by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the
House of Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of
Congress. It was then presented to and approved by President Corazon C.
Aquino on April 3, 1992.

Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not inquire beyo
the certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of
Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that
the enrolled bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that hav
to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of t
bill). The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we
held in the old (but stills valid) case of U.S. vs. Pens, where we explained th
reason thus:

To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine


legislature when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit,
would be to violate both the letter and spirit of the organic law
by which the Philippine Government was brought into existenc
to invade a coordinate and independent department of the
Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and
functions of the Legislature.

Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charg
that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventua
became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not
distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and th
legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in
accordance with the Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound

49

such official assurances from a coordinate department of the government, t


which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.

Finally in 1994 came the case of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, et al and its
companion cases. 25 Involved in the case was the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7716
otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax Law. The majority 26 partly reli
on the enrolled bill doctrine in dismissing challenges to the constitutionality of R.A
No. 7716. It held:
xxx xxx xxx

Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Republic


No. 7716 must be resolved in its favor. Our cases manifest firm adherence t
the rule that an enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its provisions
but also of its due enactment. Not even claims that a proposed constitution
amendment was invalid because the requisite votes for its approval had no
been obtained or that certain provisions of a statute had been "smuggled" i
the printing of the bill have moved or persuaded us to look behind the
proceedings of a coequal branch of the government. There is no reason now
depart from this rule.

No claim is here made that the "enrolled bill" rule is absolute. In fact in one
case we "went behind" an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determi
whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate in
view of the fad that the President of the Senate himself, who had signed the
enrolled bill, admitted a mistake and withdrew his signature, so that in effec
there was no longer an enrolled bill to consider.

But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of
bills have not been observed have no more basis than another allegation th
the Conference Committee "surreptitiously" inserted provisions into a bill
which it had prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the
enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases
would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments of our
government.

These cases show that we have not blindly accepted the conclusiveness of the
enrolled bill. Even in Tolentino, Mr. Justice Mendoza was cautious enough to hold th
"no claim is here made that the enrolled bill is absolute." I respectfully submit that
is now time for the Court to make a definitive pronouncement that we no longer g
our unqualified support to the enrolled bill doctrine. There are compelling reasons
this suggested change in stance. For one, the enrolled bill is appropriate only in
England where it originated because in England there is no written Constitution an
the Parliament is supreme. For another, many of the courts in the United States ha
broken away from the rigidity and unrealism of the enrolled bill in light of
contemporary developments in lawmaking. 27 And more important, our uncritical
adherence to the enrolled bill is inconsistent with our Constitution, laws and rules.
Mabanag, 28 we relied on section 313 of the Old Code of Civil Procedure as amend
by Act No. 2210 as a principal reason in embracing the enrolled bill. This section,
however has long been repealed by our Rules of Court. A half glance at our Rules
show that its section on conclusive presumption does not carry the conclusive
presumption we give to an enrolled bill. But this is not all. The conclusiveness of a

50

enrolled bill which all too often results in the suppression of truth cannot be justifi
under the 1987 Constitution. The Preamble of our Constitution demands that we li
not only under a rule of law but also under a regime of truth. Our Constitution also
adopted a national policy 29 requiring full public disclosure of all state transactions
involving public interest. Any rule which will defeat this policy on transparency ou
to be disfavored. And to implement these policies, this Court was given the power
pry open and to strike down any act of any branch or instrumentality of governme
if it amounts to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdictio
It is time to bury the enrolled bill for its fiction of conclusiveness shuts off truth in
many litigations. We cannot dispense justice based on fiction for the search for
justice is the search for truth. I submit that giving an enrolled bill a mere prima fac
presumption of correctness will facilitate our task of dispensing justice based on
truth.
III

In sum, I respectfully submit that the Court has jurisdiction over the petition at ba
and that issues posed by petitioner are justiciable. Nonetheless, I do not find any
grave abuse of discretion committed by the public respondents to justify granting
said petition. As the ponencia points out, the petition merely involves the complai
that petitioner was prevented from raising the question of quorum. The petition do
not concern violation of any rule mandated by the Constitution. Nor does it involve
the right of a non-member of the House which requires constitutional protection. T
rules on how to question the existence of a quorum are procedural in character. Th
are malleable by nature for they were drafted to help the House enact laws. As we
stated, these rules are servants, not masters of the House. Their observance or no
observance is a matter of judgment call on the part of our legislators and it is not
business of the Court to reverse this judgment when untainted by grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Davide, Jr., J., concurs.
Footnotes

1 JOURNAL No. 39, pp. 66, 68; Rollo, pp. 210, 212: Transcript of November 2
1996 session, pp. 39-52; Rollo, pp. 368-381; Petition, p. 6 par. 10; Rollo, p. 8

2 Rule VIII, 35. Voting. Every member present in the session shall vote o
every question put unless he inhibits himself on account of personal pecuni
interest therein.

Rule XVII, 103. Manner of Voting. The Speaker shall rise to put a questio
saying "As many as are in favor of (as the question may be), say Aye" and,
after the affirmative vote is counted, "As many as are opposed, say Nay. . .

3 Rule XIX, 112. Reading and Withdrawal of Motions. The Speaker shall
state the motion or, if in writing shall cause it to be read by the Secretary
General before being debated. A motion may be withdrawn any time before
approval.

4 Rule XVI, 97. Recognition of Member. When two or more members rise

51

the same time, the Speaker shall recognize the Member who is to speak firs

5 Rule XX, 121. Definition. Questions of privilege are those affecting the
duties, conduct, rights, privileges, dignity, integrity or reputation of the Hou
or of its members, collectively or individually.

122. Precedence. Subject to the ten-minute rule, questions of privilege


shall have precedence over all other question, except a motion to adjourn a
a point of order.

Rule XXI, 123. Definition and Precedence. A privileged motion pertains t


subject matter which, under the rules, takes precedence over others.

The order of precedence of privileged motions is determined in each case b


the rules.

Rule XVIII, 109. Who May Vote; Procedure; Exceptions. When a bill, repo
or motion is adopted or lost a member who voted with the majority may mo
for its reconsideration on the same or succeeding session day. The motion
shall take precedence over all other questions except a motion to adjourn a
question of privilege, and a point of order.
6 235 SCRA 630 (1994).
7 Rollo, p. 228.
8 Id., p. 229.
9 Art. VI, 16(3).

10 E.g., United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 144 U.S. 1, 36 L.ED. 321 (1862
Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 589 F. 2d 582 (1978); Murray v. Buchanan, 674 F. 2d 14
(1982); Metzenbaum v. Federal Energy Regulatory Com'n. 675 F. 2d 1282
(1982). See also Osmea v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863 (1960).

11 109 Phil. at 870-71. See also EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Financ
235 SCRA 630.
12 144 U.S. at 5, 36 L.Ed. at 324-25 (emphasis added).
13 64 Fla. 41; 59 So. 963, 968 (1912) (emphasis added).
14 124 Ohio St. 256, 177 N.E. 910, 911 (1931) (emphasis added).
15 79 Conn. 141, 64 Atl. 5, 9-10 (1906) (emphasis added).
16 80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W. 185, 186 (1891 ) (emphasis added).
17 5 Okl. 297, 47 Pac. 1094 (1897) (emphasis added).

18 ENRIQUE M. FERNANDO, CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES ANNOTATED

52

188-189 (1977); Pacete v. Secretary of the Commission on Appointments, 4


SCRA 58 (1971).
19 Petition, p. 25, quoting the sponsorship speech of former Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion, chairman of the Committee on Judiciary of the
Constitutional Commission, in 1 RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMISSION 436 (Session of July 10, 1986).

20 Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 (1990); See Marcos v. Manglapus, 1


SCRA 668, 695 (1989); Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448 (1971).

21 Co. v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692,


701 (1991); Llamas v. Orbos, 202 SCRA 849, 857 (1991); Lansang v. Garcia,
SCRA at 480-481 (emphasis added).
22 4 CONG. REC. 413-414 (Feb. 15, 1957).
23 United States v. Ballin , Joseph & Co., 144 U.S. at 5, 36 L.Ed. at 324-25;
State v. Lewis, 186 S.E. 625, 630 (1936).
24 United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6, 76 L.Ed. 954 (1931).
25 Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F. 2d 539, 549 (1985).
26 Art. VI, 26(2).
27 Id., 16(4).
28 Id., 27(1).
29 Id., p. 17; id., p. 19.

30 INOCENCIO PAREJA, RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES


COMMENTED AND ANNOTATED 331 (1963); REYNALDO FAJARDO, PRINCIPLE
OF PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURE 157-158, 172-173 (1963).
31 Rule XIX, 13.

32 I RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 436 (Session of July 1


1986).
33 ALICE STURGIS, STANDARD CODE OF PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURE, 17
(1950).
34 PAUL MASON, MANUAL OF LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE 335 (1953).
35 Conference Committee Report, Rollo, p. 36; Petition, p. 14; Rollo, p. 16.
36 Ibid.

53

37 Petition, p. 14; Rollo. p. 16.


38 Astorga v. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714 (1974).
39 Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1, 12 (1947).

40 Id. at 17, quoting 4 JOHN WIGMORE TREATISE ON THE LAW ON EVIDENC


1350 at 702 (1940). This excerpt is preserved in the Chadbourne edition o
this locus classicus. See 4 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE 1350 at 834 (James
Chadbourne, ed. 1972).
41 EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance], 235 SCRA at 672, Cf.
Morales v. Subido, 27 SCRA 131 (1969).
42 Philippine Judges Ass'n v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703, 710 (1993); Morales v.
Subido, 27 SCRA 131.

43 Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. v. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347 (1963); Resi
Inc. v. Auditor General, 25 SCRA 754 (1968).
44 4 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE 1350 (James H. Chadbourne, ed. 1972); 6
MANUEL V. MORAN, COMMENTS ON THE RULES OF COURT 115 (1980); 7
VICENTE J. FRANCISCO, THE REVISED RULES OF COURT (Pt. II) 454 (1973).

45 Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672, 36 L.Ed. 249, 303 (1891

46 The following are required to be entered on the Journal: (1) The yeas and
nays on the third and final reading of a bill (Art. VI, 26(2)); (2) the yeas and
nays on any question, at the request of one-fifth of the members present (Id
16(4)); (3) the yeas and nays upon repassing a bill over the President's vet
(Id., 27(1); and (4) the President's objection to a bill which he has vetoed.
(Id.)

47 34 Phil. 729, 735 (1916), quoting State ex rel. Herron v. Smith, 44 Ohio 3
(1886).
48 Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 529.
49 Metzenbaum v. Federal Energy Regulatory Com'n. 675 F.2d 1282.
ROMERO, J., concurring:
1 235 SCRA 630.

2 Id., at p. 672: "Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal


validity of Republic Act No. 7716 must be resolved in its favor. Our cases
manifest firm adherence to the rule that an enrolled copy of a bill is conclus
not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment. Not even claims tha
proposed constitutional amendment was invalid because the requisite votes
for its approval had not been obtained or that certain provisions of a state h
been "smuggled" in the printing of the bill have moved or persuaded us to
look behind the proceedings of a coequal branch of the government. There

54

no reason now to depart from this rule.

No claim is here made that the "enrolled bill" rule is absolute. In fact in one
case we "went behind" an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determi
whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate in
view of the fact that the President of the Senate himself, who had signed th
enrolled bill, admitted a mistake and withdrew his signature, so that in effec
there was no longer an enrolled bill to consider.

But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of
bills have not been observed have no more basis than another allegation th
the Conference Committee "surreptitiously" inserted provisions into a bill
which it had prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the
enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases
would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments of our
government."

3 Id., at p. 675: "Moreover, this Court is not the proper forum for the
enforcement of these internal Rules. To the contrary, as we have already ru
"parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the
courts have no concern." Our concern is with the procedural requirements o
the Constitution for the enactment of laws. As far as these requirements are
concerned, we are satisfied that they have been faithfully observed in these
cases."
4 Id., pp. 778-779; emphasis supplied.
5 Id., p. 780; emphasis supplied; compare to note 3, supra.
PUNO, J., concurring and dissenting:
1 144 US 1 (1891).

2 The case involved the validity of a law which allegedly was passed in
violation of House Rule XV which provided that members present in the
chamber but not voting would be "counted and announced in determining t
presence of a quorum to do business."
3 286 US 6 (1932).
4 338 US 89 (1948).
5 374 US 109 (1963).
6 369 US 186 (1962); see also Bond vs. Floyd, 385 US 116 (1966).
7 235 SCRA 630.
8 Supra.

55

9 Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Rev. ed., p. 624.

10 Price v. Moundsville, 64 Am. St. Rep. 878, 879; 43 W. Virginia 523 [1897]

11 Carr v. Coke, 47 Am. St. Rep. 801, 803 [1895]; see also Note on ex rel.
Reed v. Jones, 23 L.R.A. 211 [1893]. The rule of conclusiveness is similar to
common law rule of the inviolability of the Sheriff's return. The Sheriff is
considered as an officer of the King just as a parliamentary act is deemed a
regal act and no official can dispute the King's word. Dallas, Sutherland
Statutes and Statutory Construction, Vol. 1, 4th ed., pp. 408-418 (1972).
12 Sutherland, op cit., p. 410.
13 Sutherland, Vol. I, Section 1405 (3rd ed., 1943).

14 See e.g., Mogilner v. Metropolitan Plan Communication, 236 Ind. 298, 14


N.E. 2d 220 [1957].
15 Op. cit, footnote No. 2.

16 50 Am. Jur. Statutes, S. 150 (1938) 4 J. Wigmore Evidence, S. 1350 (3rd e


1940).
17 63 Miss 512 (1886).
18 Op cit, pp. 729-732 (1994).
19 Sutherland, op. cit., pp. 224-225.
20 78 Phil. 1 (1947).
21 7 SCRA 374.
22 27 SCRA 131, 134-135.
23 56 SCRA 714.
24 227 SCRA 703.
25 Supra.

26 Justices Cruz, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo and Puno dissente
27 See writer's dissenting opinion in Tolentino, supra, p. 818.
28 Op cit.
29 Section 28 of Article II of the Constitution.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

56

Arroyo vs. De Venecia G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997


Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests,
Political Law
Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends
certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are
members of the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the
rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that
their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with
certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile
the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The

57
bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the
interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack
of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The
interpellation then proceeded.
After Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority
Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference
committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the
Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the same time the Chair was
saying this, Rep.
Arroyo was asking, What is thatMr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were
talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the
Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the conference committee report had
by then already been declared by the Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective
secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by
President Ramos.
Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in
violation of the rules of the House
Held: Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They
are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no
concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have
the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has
agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the
construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the
legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even
its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved.
In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a
member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the
dispute to the Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House
with which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no
quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the
presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum
had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a
quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when
the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the
House.

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