H2 HISTORY YEAR 5 TERM 1 ASSIGNMENT

Samuel Ho

Why did democracy fail in the early independence period for some Southeast Asian countries
but not others?

During the early independence period, leaders and masses would participate in the Southeast
Asian democracies that emerged out of the colonial era like never before. Yet, many of these
democracies would come to fail, such as Indonesia, Burma and Thailand, while others would
remain remarkably resilient, such as Malaya and Singapore, although all share many of the
same problems. What differentiates the two clusters are the prevalence of democratic
behavior to address disunity, the resulting degree of alienation fringe political groups faced,
the nature of civil-military relations, as well as the prevailing economic conditions.

Democracies fail when disagreeing political groups do not possess democratic behaviours
towards resolving conflicts. When colonial powers failed to sufficiently prepare their subjects
for democratic behaviours, political groups will be inclined towards resolving their
differences outside of the democratic structure, instead resorting to radical measures that
fundamentally destabilize democracy. In Indonesia, strict prewar Dutch suppression of native
political activity from organisations like the PNI, as well as the war waged against the
Indonesians to retain their colonies after the Second World War meant, meant that Indonesians
had little experience of compromise within a democratic system. While Sukarno would spend
much effort balancing power between major rival groups such as the Army and the
Communists, their disagreements would ultimately erupt in the Gestapu, which saw the
purging, outlawing and massacre of PKI members, and the forcible removal of Sukarno. This
showed that the right (represented by the conservative Army) and the left (represented by the
PKI) were only able to resolve their differences through the use of force, and simply
overlooked the democratic standard of compromise, leading Indonesia into a period of

maximum government under General Suharto. Similarly, the Burmese were rapidly given
independence by the British under the guise of a united government under Aung San, and
were therefore provided with little preparation for democratic behaviours. While the national
figure of Aung San was temporarily able to broker an agreement between the dominant
Bamar and ethnic minorities at the Panglong Conference, this agreement rapidly disintegrated
into ethnic insurgencies against the civilian government, proving that ethnic divisions could
not be overcome by democratic processes since the capacity for democratic behaviours did
not exist in Burma. Conversely, Singapore shows an example where democracy ultimately
succeeded due to a continued respect for democratic processes. Under the British, gradual
constitutional development entrenched a respect for constitutional norms and prepared party
leaders for the standards of democratic contestation. The challenge of Barisan Sosialis to the
PAP government illustrates this point well. While the Barisan Sosialis wielded mass political
power like the PAP did not the Barisan controlling 2/3 of organized labour and 43 labour
unions this pro-communist movement (which would most definitely have moved towards
maximum government) was careful to continually respect Singapores democratic standards.
This they did by trying to pit the PAP and the Assembly against Lee Kuan Yew, instead of
using unconstitutional means. Therefore, political instability did not erupt and democracy did
not fail in Singapore. These two examples illustrate the importance of democratic behaviours
in order to sustain a democratic structure of governance.

Democracies are also prone to fail when fringe political groups feel alienated from
mainstream politics and are able to galvanize a significant part of the population against the
political establishment. When this happens, democracies are illegitimized by such groups as
they refuse to take part in the mainstream democratic process, since such groups, pushed so
far to the fringe, can only imagine a zero-sum solution to their alienation the demolishing of
democracy and institutionalization of a political system favourable to their cause. Thailand
provides a good example for this. In the prewar period, the constitutional revolution saw
Pridis government sidelining royalists who lost their power. In the postwar period, Pridis

government likewise saw the marginalization of Phibuns militarists by purging them from the
army. These alienated groups both with significant organizational strength would
ultimately join forces following the confusion proceeding from the assassination of King
Ananda Mahidol, as the royalists laid the blame with Pridi, providing a justification for the
militarists to stage a coup and gain control of the government, leading to the eventual
consolidation of military rule under Phibun. The speed at which a legitimately elected civilian
government was swept away in favour of a maximum military government is testimony to
how alienated fringe groups (if left unquelled) play a role in bringing an end to democracies.
The alienation of political groups from the mainstream can also lead to them taking radical
action outside of mainstream politics, providing a justification for armed parties to re-imposed
order. The alienated ethnic and communist groups in Burma mounted a widespread
insurgency which provided a justification for the Burmese Army to stage a coup on a severely
weak civilian government in order to re-impose order. Comparatively, Malaya, despite facing
a considerable challenge from the MCP disrupting the Malayan economy and society, still
managed to ensure the survival of its democracy. This is due to the fact that the fringe MCP
was actively prevented from gaining a significant following within elite circles or masses by
the British and Malayan administrations. Crucially, the moderate MCA was groomed and
engaged with by both administrations, ensuring that the Chinese population in Malaya would
not be inclined to join the ranks of the MCP, denying the MCP of its main following. This
subsequently allowed the communists to be regarded as a genuine national threat that the state
could bring its full weight down upon. Therefore, Malayan democracy survived its biggest
existential threat. These two examples show how crucial addressing alienated fringe groups
within a democracy is to ensuring its survival.

Another crucial factor in determining the survival of democracy is the nature of civil-military
relations. A military submissive to a constitutionally legitimate civilian government will tend
to perpetuate the democratic nature of the civilian government, while a military with more
legitimacy than a civilian government will tend to result in a drift towards maximum

government and the suspension of democracy. The former is illustrated by Malaya and
Singapore, in which the military did not exist before the civilian government. The military is
therefore de facto submissive towards the will of the civilian government. As a result, the
militaries of these countries did not ever stage a coup, which would have seen the suspension
of democracy. This stands in stark comparison to Burma. The Burmese Army saw a stretch of
activity prior to independence, having aided the Japanese drive out the British, and in turn
aided the Allied forces in driving out the Japanese. In comparison, the post-independence
civilian government quickly fell into disunity following the death of Aung San as the
compromises between the AFPFL and other ethnic minorities unraveled. The civilian
government, helpless in suppressing the ethnic rebels who controlled one-tenth of the country
by 1962, was swiftly deposed by a coup led by Ne Win and the military the very moment U
Nu resigned as party chief. The comparative legitimacy of the military provided a justification
for a transition towards maximum government in Burma, and therefore, the suspension of
democracy.

One last factor that proved the death knell for democracies are poor economic conditions. In
times of economic hardship, mass disorder will erupt, providing leaders with a casus belli to
re-impose order with maximum governments. This is best seen in the example of Philippines.
Continued economic underdevelopment, alongside the persistence of the old oligarchy which
deprivileged the masses as well as rampant corruption, led to a swell of public discontent that
enabled Marcos to sign Proclamation No. 1081 and announce martial law, instituting a New
Society that would feature maximum government until 1981. Similarly, in Indonesia, the
destruction of plantations, factories and transport infrastructure during the Revolution, in
addition to the weakness of the indigenous business class meant that economic recovery was
sluggish. These discontents led to regional rebellions, which provided Sukarno with an
opportunity to institute Guided Democracy in Indonesia In comparison, the Malaysian and
Singaporean tigers have seen rapid economic development and a resulting improvement of
social conditions, leading to a significant lack of mass discontent or disorder. There is

continued trust in the civilian government to efficiently facilitate economic development, and
therefore there has been no reason for maximum governments to be instituted, ensuring the
survival of democracies in these countries.

While these factors are all significant, it would be too premature to say that they are all
significant in the same way, or that one is more important that the rest. We might view it as
such: the lack of democratic behaviour leads to political instability arising from groups
alienated from mainstream politics in the civilian sphere. When a more legitimate military
alternative is present in the realm of politics, economic grievances provides the trigger for
mainstream politics, now seen to be ineffectual, to be suspended with the force of the military
thereby leading to the failure of democracy.