Cang vs Court of Appeals

Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie

Clavano who were married, begot three children.
During the early years of their marriage, the Cang
couple's relationship was undisturbed. Not long
thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of her
husband's alleged extramarital affair. Anna Marie
subsequently filed a petition for legal separation which
was granted. They had an agreement for support of the
children and that Anna Marie can enter into
agreements without the written consent of Herbert.
Petitioner left for the US.
Meanwhile, the brother and sister-in-law of
Anna Marie filed for the adoption of the 3 minor Cang
children. Upon learning of the adoption, Herbert went
back to the Philippines to contest it, but the petition for
adoption was granted by the court.
Issue: Can minor children be legally adopted without
the written consent of a natural parent on the ground
that the latter has abandoned them?
Held:
Article 256 of the Family Code provides for its
retroactivity "insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws." As amended by the Family Code,
the statutory provision on consent for adoption now
reads: Art. 188. The written consent of the following to
the adoption shall be necessary: (2) the parents by
nature of the child, the legal guardian, or the proper
government instrumentality.
Based on the foregoing, it is thus evident that
notwithstanding the amendments to the law, the
written consent of the natural parent to the adoption
has remained a requisite for its validity.
As clearly inferred from the foregoing
provisions of law, the written consent of the natural
parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of
adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of written
consent can be dispensed with if the parent has
abandoned the child or that such parent is "insane or
hopelessly intemperate."
In the instant case, records disclose that
petitioner's conduct did not manifest a settled purpose
to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental
claims over his children as to, constitute abandonment.
Physical estrangement alone, without financial and
moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment.
While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as
he was then in the United States, he was not remiss in
his natural and legal obligations of love, care and
support for his children. He maintained regular
communication with his wife and children through
letters and telephone. He used to send packages by
mail and catered to their whims.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and MAXIMO WONG
Facts:
Private respondent Maximo Wong is the legitimate son
of Maximo Alcala, Sr. and Segundina Y. Alcala. When he

was but two and a half years old and then known as
Maximo Alcala, Jr., and his sister Margaret Alcala, was
then nine years old, they were, with the consent of
their natural parents 3 and by order of the court
adopted by spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty
Wong, both naturalized Filipinos.
Upon reaching the age of twenty-two, herein private
respondent, filed a petition to change his name to
Maximo Alcala, Jr. It was averred that his use of the
surname Wong embarrassed and isolated him from his
relatives and friends, as the same suggests a Chinese
ancestry when in truth and in fact he is a Muslim
Filipino residing in a Muslim community, and he wants
to erase any implication whatsoever of alien
nationality; that he is being ridiculed for carrying a
Chinese surname, thus hampering his business and
social life; and that his adoptive mother does not
oppose his desire to revert to his former surname.
The trial granted his petition. 5 On appeal to
respondent court, and over the opposition of petitioner
Republic through the Solicitor General, the decision of
the court below was affirmed in full, hence, this
petition for review oncertiorari.
The lone issue to be settled is whether or not the
reasons given by private respondent in his petition for
change of name are valid, sufficient and proper to
warrant the granting of said petition.
Held: For all practical and legal purposes, a man's
name is the designation by which he is known and
called in the community in which be lives and is best
known. The names of individuals usually have two
parts: the given name or proper name, and the
surname or family name. The given or proper name is
that which is given to the individual at birth or baptism,
to distinguish him from other individuals. The name or
family name is that which identifies the family to which
he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The
given name may be freely selected by the parents for
the child; but the surname to which the child is
entitled is fixed by law. 10
A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1)
It is absolute, intended to protect the individual from
being confused with others. (2) It is obligatory in
certain respects, for nobody can be without a name. (3)
It is fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the
start, and may be changed only for good cause and by
judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside the commerce of
man, and, therefore, inalienable and intransmissible by
act inter
vivos or mortis
causa.
(5)
It
is
imprescriptible. 11
Article 365 of the Civil Code mandates that "(a)n
adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter,"
in correlation with Article 341 on the effects of
adoption, among which is to"(e)ntitle the adopted
person to use the adopter's surname." This same
entitlement of an adopted child is maintained in the
Child and Youth Welfare Code. More recently in the
Family Code. 12 Clearly, from the very wordings of
the law, it may be inferred that this use of the

surname of the adopter by the adopted child is

both an obligation and a right.
Under Article 376 by the Civil Code, "(n)o person
can change his name or surname without judicial
authority." The application for change of name
involves a special proceeding under the strictures of
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. The purpose of the
statutory procedure authorizing a change of personal
name is simply to have, wherever possible, a record of
the change.. 13
A change of name is a special proceeding to establish
the status of a person with regard to, the rest of the
community. It is a proceeding in rem 14 and, as such,
strict
compliance
with
all
jurisdictional
requirements, particularly on publication, is
essential in order to vest the court with
jurisdiction thereover. 15 For this purpose, the only
name that may be changed is the true or official name
recorded in the civil register. 16
Turning now to the case at bar, the State has an
interest in the names borne by individuals and
entities for the purpose of identification, and a
change of name is not a matter of right but of
sound judicial discretion; 19 it is a privilege which
may be granted only upon a showing of a proper or
reasonable cause or compelling reason therefor. 20
We find unacceptable the assertion of the
Solicitor General that private respondent's
allegation of ridicule and embarrassment due to
the
use
of
his
present
surname
is
unsubstantiated.

We uphold these observations in the decision of

respondent appellate court:
The purpose of the law an allowing of
change of name as contemplated by
the provisions of Rule 103 of the Rules
of Court is to give a person an
opportunity
to
improve
his
personality and to provide his best
interest. (Calderon vs. Republic, 19
SCRA 721). In granting or denying the
petition for change of name, the
question of proper and reasonable
cause is left to the discretion of
the court. The evidence presented
need only be satisfactory to the court
and not all the best evidence available
is required. In the present case, We
believe that the court a quo had
exercised its discretion judiciously
when it granted the petition.
From the testimony of petitionerappellee and of his adopter mother
Concepcion Ty-Wong, We discern that
said appellee was prompted to file the
petition for change of name because of

the embarrassment and ridicule his

family name "Wong" brings in his
dealings with his relatives and friends,
he being a Muslim Filipino and living in
a Muslim community. Another cause is
his desire to improve his social and
business life. It has been held that
in the absence of prejudice to the
state or any individual, a sincere
desire to adopt a Filipino name to
erase signs of a former alien
nationality which only hamper(s)
social and business life, is a proper
and reasonable cause for change
of name. Nothing whatsoever is shown
in the record of this case that such
prejudice or injury to the interest of the
state or of other persons would result
in the change of petitioner's name. 23
(REASON+PREJUDICE) It bears stressing at this
point that to justify a request for change of
name, petitioner must show not only some
proper or compelling reason therefor but also
that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true
and official name. In granting or denying
petitions for change of name, the question of
proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound
discretion of the court. While it is true that the
statutory fiat under Article 365 of the Civil Code is to
the effect that an adopted child shall bear the surname
of the adopter, it must nevertheless be borne in mind
that the change of the surname of the adopted
child is more an incident rather than the object
of adoption proceedings. 30The Solicitor General
maintains the position that to sustain the change of
name would run counter to the behest of Article 365 of
the
Civil
Code
and
the
ruling
in Manuel
vs. Republic 35 that "one should not be allowed to use a
surname which otherwise he is not permitted to
employ under the law," and would set a bad example
to other persons who might also seek a change of their
surnames on lame excuses. 36
The Solicitor General's apprehensions and concern are
unfounded. We do not believe that by reverting to
his old name, private respondent would then be
using a name which he is prohibited by law from
using. True, the law prescribes the surname that a
person may employ; but the law does not go so far as
to unqualifiedly prohibit the use of any other surname.
What the law does not prohibit, it permits.
If we were to follow the argument of the Solicitor
General to its conclusion, then there will never be any
possibility or occasion for any person, regardless of
status, to change his name. Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court would then be rendered inutile. This could hardly
have been the intendment of the law.
Section 1 of Rule 103, in specifying the parties who
may avail of said remedy, uses the generic term
"persons" to signify all natural persons regardless of
status. If a legitimate person may, petition the
court for a change of name, we do not see any
legal basis or logic in discriminating against the
availment of such a remedy by an adopted child.

In other words, Article 365 is not an exception, much

less can it bar resort, to Rule 103.

It is not fair to construe the desired reversion of

private respondent to the use of the name of his
parents by nature as cross ingratitude. To go by
the Solicitor General's suggestion that private
respondent should have his adoption revoked if
he wants to use the surname of his natural
father would be to exact too clear a toll for
making use of an appropriate and valid remedy
available under the law; specially considering
that his adoptive mother has given permission.

There could be no other plausible reason for private

respondent to first secure has adoptive mother's
consent before resorting to the questioned legal
recourse other than the parental respect and reverence
which is owed by and to be expected of a dutiful child.
Concordantly, we have heretofore held that a
change of name does not define or effect a
change in one's existing family relations or in
the rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does
not alter one's legal capacity, civil status or
citizenship; what is altered is only the name. 41
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of
respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. HON. ZENAIDA
ELEPANO

the Rules of Court allows deposition by leave of

Court after jurisdiction has been obtained over
any defendant or property subject of the action.
Since the jurisdictional requirement of publication has
not been complied with, the OSG goes on to argue, the
lower court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the
defendant so much so that the taking of the deposition
cannot yet be allowed at this stage.
The respondent judge denied the said Opposition.
Again, despite notice, the OSG failed to appear in the
subsequent hearings for the petition for adoption.
The respondent judge granted the petition for adoption
(p. 99, Rollo).
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration of the
aforesaid decision but the respondent judge denied the
same.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.
WON depositions should be allowed in adoption
proceedings until the publication requirement has
been fully complied with.
Held: In support of its position, the OSG cites Rule 24
Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which provides
"Section 1. Depositions pending action, when may be
taken. By leave of court after jurisdiction has been
obtained over any defendant or over property which is
the subject of the action, or without such leave after an
answer has been served, the testimony of any person,
whether a party or not, may be taken, at the instance
of any party, by deposition upon oral examination or
written interrogatories." (Emphasis supplied)
The petition has no merit. red

Private respondent Corazon Santos Punsalan filed a

verified petition for adoption of the minors Pinky
Gonzales Punsalan, the daughter of her full blood
brother, and Ellyn Mae Punsalan Urbano, the daughter
of her full blood sister.
Private respondent filed a "MOTION FOR TAKING OF
DEPOSITION" on the ground that she received an
urgent call from the United Nations Office in Geneva,
Switzerland requiring her to report for work so much so
that she will not be able to testify at the hearing of her
petition yet to be scheduled by the respondent judge.
Respondent judge granted the motion and ordered that
notice of the taking of the deposition be furnished to
the OSG (the only known oppositor in the case). The
respondent judge also issued an order setting the time
for hearing for the petition for adoption and directed
the publication of the said order. A copy of said order
as well as a copy of the said petition for adoption was
likewise sent to the OSG.

The rule cited by the OSG is inapplicable to the

case at bar.
While it is true that in an action in personam, personal
service of summons or voluntary appearance in the
case is essential for the court to acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant, in an adoption
case which involves the status of a person, there
is no particular defendant to speak of since the
action is one in rem. The jurisdiction of the court
is based on its power over the res, to render
judgment with respect to such "thing" (or status, as in
this case) so as to bar indifferently all who might be
minded to make an objection against the right so
established.

Private respondents deposition was taken. Despite

notice, no representative from the OSG appeared
to oppose the taking of the deposition.

Indeed, publication of the scheduled hearing for the

petition for adoption is necessary for the validity of a
decree of adoption but not for the purpose merely of
taking a deposition. In taking a deposition, no
substantial rights are affected since depositions
may or may not be presented or may even be
objected to when formally offered as evidence at
the trial of the main case later on.

The OSG, however, subsequently filed an "Opposition

to the Deposition", averring that Section 1 of Rule 24 of

Due to urgent and compelling reasons beyond her

control, private respondent could not be present to

testify at the trial of the main case for adoption. The

OSG, however, was notified of the scheduled taking of
the deposition, as well as of all the hearings of the
petition for adoption, but the OSG chose not to attend
ALL the said hearings, without explanation. The OSG,
therefore, has no reason to invoke lack of procedural
due process.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of merit.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. HON. JOSE R.
HERNANDEZ

Facts: Private respondent spouses Munson, filed a

petition[2] to adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome
Moran. In the very same petition, private respondents
prayed for the change of the first name of said minor
adoptee to Aaron Joseph.[3]
petitioner opposed to the joinder of the petition for
adoption and the petitions for change of name in a
single proceeding, arguing that these petitions should
be conducted and pursued as two separate
proceedings.
After considering the evidence and arguments of
the contending parties, the trial court ruled in favor of
herein private respondents.
Issue: The only legal issues that need to be
resolved may then be synthesized mainly as follows:
(1) whether or not the court a quo erred in granting the
prayer for the change of the registered proper or given
name of the minor adoptee embodied in the petition
for adoption; and (2) whether or not there was lawful
ground for the change of name.
Held: I. It is the position of petitioner that
respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he
additionally granted the prayer for the change of the
given or proper name of the adoptee in a petition for
adoption.
Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a
petition for change of name are two special
proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are
different from and are not related to each other, being
respectively governed by distinct sets of law and rules.
Only the laws and rules on adoption have been
observed, but not those for a petition for change of
name.[11] Petitioner further contends that what the law
allows is the change of the surname of the adoptee, as
a matter of right, to conform with that of the adopter. If
what is sought is the change of the registered given or
proper name, and since this would involve a substantial
change of ones legal name, a petition for change of
name under Rule 103 should accordingly be instituted,
with the substantive and adjective requisites therefor
being conformably satisfied.[12]

It is the change of the adoptees surname to follow

that of the adopter which is the natural and necessary
consequence of a grant of adoption and must
specifically be contained in the order of the court, in
fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner.

However,
the given or proper name,
also
known as the first or Christian name, of the
adoptee must remain as it was originally
registered in the civil register. The creation of an
adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter
a license to change the adoptees registered Christian
or first name. The automatic change thereof,
premised solely upon the adoption thus granted,
is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption.
The official name of a person whose birth is
registered in the civil register is the name
appearing therein, If a change in ones name is
desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly
complying with the substantive and procedural
requirements for a special proceeding for change of
name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the
sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be
threshed out and accordingly determined.
A petition for change of name being a
proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the
requirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest
the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. [19]
A fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any
other proceeding, cannot be an offshoot of
another special proceeding.
The Solicitor General correctly points out the
glaring defects of the subject petition insofar as it
seeks the change of name of the adoptee, [20] all of
which taken together cannot but lead to the
conclusion that there was no petition sufficient
in form and substance for change of name as
would rightfully deserve an order therefor.
Neither can the allowance of the subject petition,
by any stretch of imagination and liberality, be justified
under the rule allowing permissive joinder of causes of
action.
The dominant idea is to permit joinder of causes of
action, legal or equitable, where there is some
substantial unity between them.[29] While the rule
allows a plaintiff to join as many separate claims as he
may have, there should nevertheless be some unity in
the problem presented and a common question of law
and fact involved, subject always to the restriction
thereon regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of
parties. Unlimited joinder is not authorized. [30]

Turning now to the present petition, while it is true

that there is no express prohibition against the joinder
of a petition for adoption and for change of name, we
do not believe that there is any relation between
these two petitions, nor are they of the same
nature or character, much less do they present
any common question of fact or law, which
conjointly would warrant their joinder. In short,
these petitions do not rightly meet the underlying test
of conceptual unity demanded to sanction their joinder
under our Rules.
As keenly observed and correctly pointed out by
the Solicitor General
While what is cogent in an adoption proceeding is the
proposed adopters fitness and qualifications to adopt, a

petition for change of first name may only prosper

upon proof of reasonable and compelling grounds
supporting the change requested. Fitness to adopt is
not determinative of the sufficiency of reasons
justifying a change of name. And similarly, a change of
first name cannot be justified in view of a finding that
the proposed adopter was found fit to adopt. There is
just no way that the two actions can connect and find a
common ground, thus the joinder would be improper.
It furthermore cannot be said that the proposed
joinder in this instance will make for a complete
determination of all matters pertaining to the
coetaneous grant of adoption and change of name of
the adoptee in one petition. As already stated, the
subject petition was grossly insufficient in form and
substance with respect to the prayer for change of
name of the adoptee. The policy of avoiding
multiplicity of suits which underscores the rule on
permissive joinder of causes of action is addressed to
suits that are intimately related and also present
interwoven and dependent issues which can be most
expeditiously and comprehensively settled by having
just one judicial proceeding.

II. Petitioner avers that it was error for the lower

court to grant the petition for change of name without
citing or proving any lawful ground. Indeed, the only
justification advanced for the change of name was the
fact of the adoptees baptism under the name
Aaron Joseph and by which he has been known
since he came to live with private respondents.
[45]

Private respondents, assert that upon the grant of

adoption, the subject minor adoptee ipso facto
assumed a new identification and designation, that is,
Aaron Joseph which was the name given to him during
the baptismal rites.
We cannot fathom any legal or jurisprudential
basis for this attenuated ruling of respondent judge
and must thus set it aside.
It is necessary to reiterate in this discussion that a
persons name is for identification, for the convenience
of the world at large in addressing him. It is both of
personal as well as public interest that every person
must have a name.
Once the name of a person is officially entered in
the civil register, Article 376 of the same Code seals
that identity with its precise mandate: no person can
change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This statutory restriction is premised on the
interest of the State in names borne by
individuals
and
entities
for
purposes
of
identification.[50]
By reason thereof, the only way that the
name of person can be changed legally is
through a petition for change of name under
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.[51] It must likewise
be stressed once again that a change of name is a
privilege. Before a person can be authorized to change
his name, that is, his true or official name or that which
appears in his birth certificate or is entered in the civil
register, he must show proper and reasonable cause or

any convincing reason which may justify such change.

[53]

Jurisprudence has recognized, inter alia, the

following grounds as being sufficient to warrant a
change of name: (a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal
consequence of legitimation or adoption; (c) when
the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has
continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of
alien parentage; (e) when the change is based on a
sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase
signs of former alienage, all in good faith and
without prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the
surname causes embarrassment and there is no
showing that the desired change of name was for a
fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would
prejudice public interest.[54]
Contrarily, a petition for change of name
grounded on the fact that one was baptized by
another name, under which he has been known
and which he used, has been denied inasmuch as
the use of baptismal names is not sanctioned.
[55]
For, in truth, baptism is not a condition sine qua
non to a change of name.[56] Neither does the fact that
the petitioner has been using a different name and has
become known by it constitute proper and reasonable
cause to legally authorize a change of name.[57]
The reliance on Republic vs. Court of Appeals and
Maximo Wong, supra, painfully misapplies the ruling
therein enunciated.
The factual backdrop of said case is not at all
analogous to that of the case at bar.
It should be noted that in said case the change of
surname, not the given name, and the legal
consequences thereof in view of the adoption were at
issue. That it was sought in a petition duly and
precisely filed for that purpose with ample proof of the
lawful grounds therefor only serves to reinforce the
imperative necessity of seeking relief under and
through the legally prescribed procedures.
The practically unrestricted freedom of the natural
parent to select the proper or given name of the child
presupposes that no other name for it has theretofore
been entered in the civil register. Once such name is
registered, the same constitutes the official name. This
effectively authenticates the identity of the person and
must remain unaltered save when, for the most
compelling reasons shown in an appropriate
proceeding, its change may merit judicial approval.
While the right of a natural parent to name the
child is recognized, guaranteed and protected under
the law, the so-called right of an adoptive parent
to re-name an adopted child by virtue or as a
consequence of adoption, is unheard of in law
and
consequently
cannot
be
favorably
considered. To repeat, the change of the surname of
the adoptee as a result of the adoption and to follow
that of the adopter does not lawfully extend to or
include the proper or given name.