Master Thesis for the Global Master of Arts Program

Arctic melting, geopolitical shifts and emerging security issues: Russias

enhanced role under Mackinders perspective.

Prepared by: Lt.Cdr Ktenas Panagiotis (H.N)

Research Area: International Security

Professor: Taliaferro Jeffrey, PhD

Ad Astra per Aspera

Ktenas Panagiotis, 2014

Contents
I. Introduction
II. Building the Background..
Chapter 1- The ice melting- Why and When? .
Chapter 2- Determining the Arctic.
Chapter 3- Establishing Mackinders world
Chapter 4- Emerging Arctic interests
Chapter 4.1- Maritime interests
Chapter 4.2-Resource based economic interests-Oil, Minerals
and Fish Stocks
Chapter 4.3- Military interests and geostrategic considerations
Chapter 5- Comprehending Security attributes
Chapter 5.1-Institutional Framework regarding the Arctic Region
Chapter 5.2- Articulated Arctic Policies.
Chapter 5.3-Existing Arctic Territorial Disputes..
Chapter 5.4- Military expenditures
III. Arguments and counter-arguments..
Chapter 6- Advancing our 1st level Argument / Geopolitics shift
and Russias Dominance ..
Chapter 7- Advancing our 2nd level Argument...
Chapter 7.1 Geopolitical dominance equals revisionism?
Chapter 7.2 Emerging Interests plus Security attributes
equals Security Reassessment?
IV. Analysis
Chapter 8 - Security Analysis Based on Combined Reasoning
Geopolitics plus Emerging Interests..
V. Conclusion
VI. Bibliography..
VII. Appendix
- Graphical presentation of thesis argumentation
-Security Analysis Based on Quantitative Analysis States...
Behavioral Model
VIII. Glossary.
IX. Notes.

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I.

Introduction

Global warming has raised serious concerns regarding environmental security, and
how it may propagate to the national security realm, affecting the balance of power between
state actors. Climate change is expected to influence the worldwide community in a
diversified manner and magnitude, being harsh with some but more reluctant if not
beneficial- to others. Such a worldwide aftereffect has the potential to generate social and
political turmoil at the domestic and international level, bringing possibly the
socioeconomic system to the brink of collapse. This thesis examines the anticipated melting
of the High North, the potential shifts in geopolitical dynamics in the region -with a special
focus on Russia among the Arctic littoral states- and the subsequent emerging Arctic
security environment. As such, it takes for granted that the melting of the Arctic will happen
some time around or after the summer of 20301; the high likelihood of this coming to pass is
established in Section II, Chapter 2.
Beyond that core assumption, it is crucial to clarify that the term geopolitics is taken
in its pure form, as it was conceptualized by Mackinder, and in contradiction to Haushofers
geopolitik. Geopolitics theory in this thesis will be used per se, with all its flaws, past
criticism, but also any preceding predictability successes, even though it is widely
recognized that to a certain extent and in a varied degree geopolitics were shaped and
propagated in such a way, in order to suit and serve the strategic interests and the policy
planning of the great powers at any given time 2 . Such allegations dont transform
geopolitics into an obsolete IR theory, diminishing its explanatory value. Geographys
importance in modern politics has been finally restored in the mountains of Afghanistan

Jacques C.J.Nihoul and Andrey G.Kostianoy, Influence of Climate Change on the Changing Arctic
and Sub-Arctic Conditions, (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental
Security, Springer, May, 2008), p22
2 Eldar Ismailov and Vladimer Papava, Rethinking Central Asia, (Central Asia-Caucasus Institute
Silk Road Studies Program A Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center, 2010), p.89

and in the treacherous alleyways of Iraq3, a relief 3D map that geopolitics tries laboriously
to analyze.
The main hypothesis examined herein is as follows:
The melting of ice in the Arctic region (main reason) will provide a predominant
geopolitical role for Russia, offering the prospect to become a Superpower (first
intermediate claim/secondary reason of main claim), which in correlation with greater
emerging opportunities for major powers to advance their national interests, make territorial
claims, establish new sea lanes, benefit economically, and advance militarily (second
intermediate claim/tertiary reason of main claim), will increase the likelihood of economic
and security competition among great powers (main claim).
This argument implies four propositions, one for each logical step, that interlink our
reasoning-claiming 4 ; firstly that an alteration in geography leads to a shift of a States
geopolitical role; secondly that a geopolitically hyper-dominant and self assured State, will
be at least a partially revisionist one; thirdly, that an alteration in geography results in
alteration of core interests; and lastly emerging interests, might compete with existing ones
that favor status quo. The argument follows two casual pathways, and each one of them is
further consisted of two distinct logical steps (levels); firstly, that the Arctic melting will
transform Russia into a major geopolitical power broker, giving her the upper hand and the
option to challenge international power balance, affecting that way regional and global
security; secondly, that Arctic melting will give rise to new interests, that will be influenced
from Russias expanded geopolitical role and security attributes5, resulting in a security
reassessment.

Robert Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography, What the map tells us about coming conflicts and the
battle against fate, (Random House, 2012), p.17
4 A graphical presentation of our argumentation can be found in Appendix. An early on print out
can be helpful throughout the reading
5 More about security attributes and their role upon interests and security, in Chapter 5

Following our argument, Russias inherited privileged geographical position upon

Mackinders Heartland, and the advent of a new Arctic Rimland due to the climate change
which will be occupied mostly by her, is expected that it will transform Russia once more
into a superpower that might result in a less secure environment in the High North and
elsewhere. The concealed assumption here is that a predominant state actor will attempt to
export its sociopolitical structure and economic dogma abroad, as the US does nowadays
with liberalism and USSR earlier did with communism. Russia has yet to adopt fully liberal
democracy as a mode of governance, and she doesnt seem willing or capable to do so in the
near future. It is rather expected that an effort to export current authoritarian behavior in her
zone of privileged interest6 will take place when she will have the power and opportunity
to do so.
Furthermore, a more self-assertive Russia may act as a partially revisionist player,
trying to rebuild its Soviet Imperium. The timing can be crucial; the power balance may
abruptly recline towards Russia, if it coincides with a tipping point in energy resources and
other factors. Speaking in celestial terms, Russia might be triggered instantaneously to
become a Red Giant State not seen before upon Earth- rebuilding her superpower
eminence through fusion of crucial material from the Arctic region. Under such cataclysmic
events, Russia might integrate on the same state structure a vast continental and a major sea
power, a role that was kept for Germany according to Mackinders fears, and which may
finally give rise to a first class world power. The United States, successor of British Empire
and an insular state that nevertheless has extensive land resources and strategic depth,
managed to become a global power based on proper maritime power projection. Russia
instead, might become an Insular Heartland, reaching for the first time the High Seas on
multiple fronts.

James Rogers, Geopolitics and the Wider North, The RUSI Journal, 157:6, 42-53, (2012), DOI:
10.1080/03071847.2012.750886, p.45

The Heartland theory of Mackinder, Spykmans Rimland concept, and Mahans

maritime superiority will be examined for relevance to this case, and in our effort to support
the abovementioned reasoning. It is recognized that Mackinder, Spykman and Mahan didnt
foresee and certainly they couldnt have done so, during their time- that the fourth Arctic
North front that enclosed Soviet Union, nowadays Russia, someday would have melted
away. They approached geography in a static rather than dynamic manner. Geography is
changing7, Derek Kane OLeary proclaims and the northern periphery, which in ancient
times wasnt land in itself, but boundary of society8, gains gradually in importance. A
basic assumption throughout this analysis will be that Chinas role is expected to continue
expanding in the near future, while the current dominant role in world affairs of the Western
flank will gradually diminish, giving rise not necessarily to a new multipolar world. Chinas
role as an emerging superpower will be slightly examined in relation with US role as a
declining one, in an effort to determine the opportunities that arise for current second tier
great powers, and in particular that of Russias.
The second step of our argument imposes the need to examine the link between
altered geography and interests. Will an ice-free North facilitate the emergence of new
interests? How are these interests going to interact with each other and with existing ones,
and what will be the outcome upon security? Will these interests compete or cooperate? In
order to further assess the hypothesis, we will proceed in two logical steps; firstly, a full
registration of emerging interests is needed, that are Arctic relevant; secondly, a close
examination of security attributes will provide insight regarding their influence upon
existing and emerging interests and Arctic security respectively, through States behavioral
shifts. Such security attributes in current thesis are regarded to be, the ongoing militarization
of the arctic region, the existing legal framework and the arctic institutionalization, the

7 Derek Kane O'Leary, Our Arctics, (Institute for Global Maritime Studies, Gloucester, MA, May,

2012), p1
8 Ibid, p3

national security policies that are on place, to mention just a few. This is going to be our
second line of defense.
The conclusion will argue that unique timing combined with adverse interests and an
enhanced Russian geopolitical role (more than ever), will subsequently result in power
rebalancing between States, and turn the tide towards confrontation rather than
collaboration. Arctic seems to be the absolute checkmate game.

II. Building the Background

Chapter 1- The ice melting- Why and When?

The uncertainty regarding if and when the Arctic will be ice-free can easily render
states Arctic planning obsolete. Dissimilar predictions coming from different scientific
weather simulation models may freeze any decision-making process in respect to the Arctic.
The Arctic is expected to be completely ice-free as soon as the summer of 2030 9 . The
climate is becoming warmer due to anthropogenic carbon emissions, and the increase of
CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere has as a result the greenhouse effect. The trapped heat
is expected to increase the mean global temperature around 3 C in the next 30 years, and
High North10 is warming twice as fast as lower latitudes 11 due to positive feedbacks.
On September 2012, the ice cap reached its lowest level, and was 3.4 million square
kilometers less than the average during period 1979-2004. The consequences of such
negligence to address the issue at hand are already evident; extended precipitation in some
9

Nihoul et.al, p22

The term is used interchangeably with other terms such as the North High Arctic, the
Northern Areas that basically denote the term Arctic, and as such is not precisely defined (see
Willy Ostreng et.al, Shipping in Arctic Waters, A Comparison of the Northeast, Northwest and
Transpolar Passages, Praxis, p.98).
11 David Fairhall, Cold Front, Conflict ahead in Arctic waters, (I.B.Tauris, 2010), p.xv
10

regions, and drought on others, melting of ageless glaciers, and a rise to the worlds sea
level anticipated to be 50 to 90 cm in this century alone12. Multiyear ice will give place to
thin first year ice. Facilities and infrastructure near coastal and river regions will be
threatened, existing deserts will expand, thawing of soil on the sub-Arctic region will make
obsolete existing transportation roads based on permafrost. It is calculated that top 3 m or
more of perennially frozen soil will be ruined which will put in danger the foundations of
basic infrastructure on the Arctic region13. Such melting of permafrost is expected to release
methane in the atmosphere, which will consequently speed up the global warming process.
An initial approach in comprehending future developments and their implications
upon security could be to direct our research to environmental deviations that influenced
humanity in earlier times. The Earths climate has experienced high and low peaks that
could account for the decline of dynasties and civilizations, such as the Tang and Ming
Dynasties, and the Maya civilization. Sovereign states have had a short existence relative to
recorded human history, let alone compared to the Earths time scale, so little can be said
about earlier climatic experiences and even lesser regarding the way that nation-states might
respond to future climate changes. Current warming of the planet differentiates further; it is
for the first time human originated, and its repercussions could be unique in magnitude and
severity.

Chapter 2- Determining the Arctic

The Arctic is unique, an ocean surrounded by a near-unbroken ring of land14, with

few if any similarities even with Antarctica, which is a frozen continent surrounded by sea.
An uncertainty exists among scholars on the basic definition of what is finally called or
12

Trausti Valsson, How the World will change with Global Warming, (University of Iceland Press,
2006), p17
13 Nihoul et al, p4
14 Kaplan, p.91

perceived to be Arctic. The most common definition is the region as the land and sea area
north of the Arctic circle (a circle of latitude at about 66.30 North) 15 . The Arctic is
surrounded by five Arctic littoral states that in an east-west direction are, Russia, Norway,
Denmark (Greenland), Canada and United States (Alaska). There are also Finland, Sweden
and Iceland that are considered to be Arctic states, but not littoral ones. In a North Pole
birds eye view the world looks much differently from the commonly accepted European
centered world based on Mercator projection. The Arctic holds some of the elements that are
usually met in closed seas such as the Mediterranean Sea. Still, as Scott G.Borgerson points
out correctly, the littoral states in Mediterranean Sea have always had clearer historical
claims16 that in turn formulated a complex network of interdependent ties, rivalry, and
exchange 17 . So, it will be more accurate to conceive Arctic as a region where an
embryonic regionalism is underway18, which will take its ultimate form when the Arctic
becomes ice-free. In the long term, the Arctic may finally act as a body of water that [will]
link several large economies19, and facilitate commerce through established trade routes,
becoming the heart of the High North.

Chapter 3- Establishing Mackinders world

In 1904, Halford J.Mackinder proclaimed a new era in which the epoch of

geographic exploration came to an end, and there was no unknown land left for states to
claim; the spaces were closed. He argued that every explosion of social forces, instead of
being dissipated in a surrounding circuit of unknown space and barbaric chaos, will be
15

Ronald ORourke, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress, (Congressional
Research Service, R41153, July 21, 2010), p1
16 Scott G. Borgerson, Arctic Meltdown, The Economic and Security Implications of Global
Warming, Foreign Affairs, (March/April 2008), p73
17 O'Leary, p40
18 Ibid, p40
19 Borgerson, p73

sharply re-echoed from the far side of the globe, and weak elements in the political and
economic organism of the world will be shattered in consequence 20 . That way, he
recognized implicitly the role that remote places such as the Arctic might play in a
globalized world, which is interconnected. Disputes in different parts of the globe, might
influence indirectly Arctic security. In a closed space era, this might result in friction and
zero sum games. So it is expected that because of that closed spaces, security is destined to
suffer in the future, and exactly that compression of geography will provide optimal
circumstances for new and dangerous ideologies21.
It can be difficult initially to imagine a world that will be Arctic ice-free and North
Pole centric. Even so, Heartlands isolation -and concept- will change dramatically as the
Arctic ice melts, and Siberia/Russia will acquire a huge maritime front upon the Arctic.
Mackinder expressed that in a lucid manner, as the geographical perspective that
correlates with a particular generation. But Mackinders main achievement is that he offered
in a rather simplified manner the regional structuralization of the Eurasian continent and
the identification of the functional value of its spatial elements 22. He perceived Europe,
Eurasia, Near East and Africa, as constituting the World Island. Mackinder named the
region that is detached from the general system of the ocean and river navigations23 as
Heartland. The basic characteristic of Heartland is that it doesnt have any access to an
accessible Ocean, despite the fact that it is transversed by the large Ob, Yenisei and Lena
Rivers [that] stream northward through Siberia to this coast 24 . To his understanding,
Heartland mainly consisted from Siberia, Russia, the Mongolian and Iranian Uplands, but
also a part of Eastern Europe (a position that was established in his later work). He
20

Halford J.Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, (National Defense University Press, 1942),
, p.176
21 Kaplan, p.123
22 Eldar Ismailov and Vladimer Papava, Rethinking Central Asia, (Central Asia-Caucasus Institute
& Silk Road Studies Program A Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center, 2010), p.84
23 Mackinder, p.54
24 Ibid, p.54

recognized the importance that the European and Monsoon (Southeast Asia) Coastlands
have, an approach that was further elaborated later on by Spykman. These regions
differentiate from the Heartlands in respect to the navigability of their rivers from the oceans
and inwards, and the fertility of their lands due to the widespread rainfalls. Under these
privileged conditions, the coastlands nourished their great populations25.
Mackinders basic thesis was exactly that for a state to become powerful it needs
fertility and line of communications - man power and facilities for its organization26. The
greater the occupied territory, the more the available resources are, and the easier it becomes
to dominate; modern day Russia can be regarded a prime example. Neither Norsemen nor
Arabs managed to subordinate Europe, mostly because they didnt have the fertile lands
needed to accommodate larger manpower. Eurasia, as Mackinder puts it, acted as a huge
corridor for the westward movement of humans and ideas, mainly nomads from Mongolia
plain that tried to expand and conquer West, reaching as far as the Hungarian plains. This
movement was facilitated from the geomorphology of Siberia and western Russia. The
central part of Siberia and the part of Russia beyond Urals Mountains are mostly steppes
with low grass, wheat and maize, which became the plain field that supported logistically
the above-mentioned movement. This Great Lowland is the heart of the Heartland. The
climatic regime 27 further Mackinder argued, determined these regions, and as a result
determined the political organization of these vast spaces. The open space existing between
the southern part of the Urals Mountains and the Black sea, acted as a gateway through
which Turanian nomads arrived into the heart of Europe.
In World War I, Mackinder envisioned one great battle between a land-power and a
sea power. The former was embodied on Germany and the latter on the Great Britain.
Mackinder supported the idea that if Germany would manage to conquer the World

25

Ibid, p.62
Ibid, p.24
27 Ibid, p.178
26

Island, then she would have a greater land base to build its own sea power, and this
constituted one of Mackinders greatest fears. He argued that due to demographic factors
supported by the fertility of the land, the available resources, and mostly based on
quantitative reasoning, the World Island will finally dominate upon the outer insular belt.
Mackinder realized that there will be a permanent struggle for Eastern Europe between
Russia and Germany, and that it was in the best interest of the West to establish a buffer
zone of states between these two continental powers 28 . He posed a rhetorical question,
relevant to this thesis: what if the Great Continent, the whole World Island or a large part
of it, were at some future time to become a single and united base of sea-power?29
Mackinders theory supports our first propositions principle; it couldnt have been
differently because geopolitics per se examines exactly that relation. Geography holds a
certain geopolitical value that benefits the nation-state that occupies it. We can induct
subsequently that an altered geography -due to ice melting- will result in an altered
geopolitical value. Mackinder made three basic points that will be useful in our
argumentation; firstly, that a spatially larger state has more resources to benefit from and as
a consequence it is easier to expand and dominate; secondly, land power is destined to
overcome sea power due to increased mobility; and thirdly, the continental power that has a
maritime front and manages to occupy Heartland and its vast resources, will become a world
power.

Chapter 4- Emerging Arctic interests

Few human constructed mega-infrastructures had altered historys course as the Suez
and Panama Canals did. The huge correction of geography wrought by mens hands was
the motivating factor that determined subsequent events of history. A differentiated
28
29

Ibid, p.98
Ibid, p.49

10

geopolitical role, which was a direct outcome of an altered geography (first reasoning), but
at the same time old interests collapsed under the weight of emerging ones (second
reasoning). The geostrategic importance of Northeast Sea Passage cannot be denied. The
Northern route might be for Russia what was the Panama Canal for the US, the Suez Canal
for France and England, or the discovery of the Cape road to the Indies. Such events
transformed the balance of power in the past. In our current context, Russia may have the
opportunity to establish a direct route of communication between the Barents Sea and the
Pacific Ocean, circumventing closed seas such as the Mediterranean and Black Seas, places
where the West still has an upper hand and is further capable to enforce a containment zone.
Russia may achieve a long-term national vision; that of descending in warm water outlets
and the High Seas, establishing her Mare Sovieticum30. New commercial ports and routes
will emerge in the High North, from where Russia will export commodities and will project
sea power. This chapter will document if there are any emerging interests due to Arctic
melting (third proposition), that way it will be easier later on to progress our argument.

Chapter 4.1- Maritime interests

During a speech in Murmansk in 1987, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev opened the
Northern Sea Route to the West, and claimed that the Arctic region should become a region
of cooperation, a pole of peace31. Still, the western maritime companies didnt pick up the
challenge; a bureaucratic Soviet state and an unfavorable tax regime were barriers to
involvement. The administrative situation hasnt changed much since then, but as the ice
melts, Northern routes may become feasible. The melting of ice will have as a direct
consequence new sea-lanes to open for maritime transit through the North Sea Passage,
North West Passage and in a much later time through the Transpolar Route. Russia like
Canada- proclaims that part of her northeast passage are internal waters. EU and US based
30
31

O'Leary, p60
Fairhall, p.xxviii

11

on security and trade considerations strenuously object that, and they consider Northern
Passages to be international straits.
New maritime routes may have as a result great cost savings for the maritime
industry and can reduce the travel time and fuel costs by 40% along some routes. The
distance between the port of Rotterdam and the port of Yokohama in Japan could be at least
4000 miles lesser through the North Sea Passage versus the Suez Canal. This in turn can
lead to an increased maritime trade for bulk cargo through the Northern Routes when
conditions will be appropriate. Nevertheless, a similar trend is not probable for container
ships due to time restraints and much needed predictability on arrival-departure times.
Additionally, trade flows of consumer goods are gradually moving away from China and
towards South America, Middle East and South Africa, and as a result the polar route
looses its appeal32. In spite of that, the Northern voyages have experienced a booming
period the last few years and a key advantage is that Northern Routes are away from current
geopolitical hot spots such as the Persian Gulf and regions that are pirate infested such as
the Horn of Africa and Malacca straits. In any case, trade flows will gradually alter in favor
of Northern Sea Routes despite initial inertia, and future technologic advancements will
certainly play a role. Going back in time, a similar inertia was noticed during the
technological advance from wooden ships to iron clads, where for a time the sailing
clippers maintained their hold on the long haul routes33, until the excavation of the canals
took place which shortened the routes duration and gave predominance to steam.
The port facilities that were established during the Soviet era and quite often in
total disrespect of feasibility, in a centrally planned economy-, are more or less obsolete
today, due to multiyear lack of maintenance after the collapse of USSR. Even the complete

32

The Maritime Executive, Arctic Shipping Route Plagued by Icebergs and Insurance, October 15,
2013 (accessed April 27, 2014); available from http://www.maritimeexecutive.com/article/Arctic-Shipping-Route-Plagued-by-Icebergs-and-Insurance-2013-1015/?goback=%2Egde_4213713_member_5795861240458797058
33 Fairhall, p.88

12

absence of piracy in the region nowadays, can change rapidly in the near future when the
route will become more lucrative. These routes may become main avenues for immigration,
smuggling, narcotics, and even terrorists attacks. The Arctic frontier may become a
lawlessness frontier. Technological advancements may determine the outcome. Russia,
South Korea and Finland seem to have a technological edge in respect to the Arctic. Such a
technological edge may have civilian and military applications. Military tactics in the
Arctic, which more or less are non-existent at the moment, may develop in compliance with
the technological breakthroughs. Technological innovations and new military dogmas might
become a decisive factor in achieving predominance in the Arctics harsh environment.
Heartland is no longer a fortress34, Hall argued in 1955, realizing that a less ice-infested
Arctic will end the era of isolation. Taking into consideration the almost non-existent road
and limited rail network in the Arctic and sub Arctic Circle, maritime transportation may
constitute the only affordable solution to an existing transportation problem of minerals and
oil between producing and consuming zones.
Russia is certainly eager to alter world maritime trade routes to her benefit. An open
Northern Sea Route will provide substantial revenues to the Russian economy, and will
boost its geopolitical role, diminishing at the same time the importance of the Suez and
Panama Canals. A potential Russian monopoly of Northern Routes, will provide great
leverage upon states whose economies are based on maritime trade and foreign exchange.
This is probable due to the peculiarities of the Northeastern route and the continuous
Russian efforts to treat Arctic waters as her internal-territorial waters. In such a case, Russia
and in her effort to protect such a monopoly is expected to build a blue navy, that way
controlling the energy corridors and the market itself. In a future era of oil depletion,
Russian oil/gas reserves will enhance her role as energy arbitrator. However such an
outcome is not guaranteed due to multiple factors; inadequate infrastructure and investment
34

Arthur R.Hall, Mackinder and the Course of Events, Annals of the Association of American
Geographers, Vol. 45, No.2 (Jun., 1955), p.125

13

capital, ice coverage unpredictability, sunk costs for maritime companies, technological
advancements, geopolitical considerations from other states, and enlargement of existing
canals. Competition is not predetermined; firstly, current maritime interests may
repositioned inexpensively in northern latitudes if Russia doesnt hinder such moves, and
the opposite seems more probable (to be a facilitator); secondly, emerging regional maritime
interests cannot compete with existing international ones, when international maritime
industry operates mostly based on good relations, unless regional interests become
protges of the Russian state which seems improbable.

Chapter 4.2 Oil, Mineral Interests and fish stocks

In an age with diminishing raw materials, how might a state with vast resources
behave? Lets imagine Russia forty years from now, as being the only depositor of worlds
remaining resources that are placed in Arctic. How might an autarchic Russia use her natural
endowments and military power? The 2008 U.S Geological Survey (USGS) report regarding
the estimated reserves of undiscovered oil and gas in the High North raised great
expectations to the international community. The reserves of oil and gas in the Arctic are
estimated to be more than 30% of the total undiscovered globally. In particular, the USGS
estimates that 90 billion barrels of oil, nearly 1700 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 44
billion barrels of natural gas liquids35, remain to be found in the region. The crucial aspect
is that oil wealth is not evenly distributed across states. The lion share seems to fall in
Russian hands, mostly in the Barents Sea. The extraction of oil wealth is not going to be an
easy task, and moreover, there isnt legal clarity concerning ownership and regulation36 of
resources, in order for foreign companies to get involved in such projects. Russias
deficiency on judicial independence and democratic institutions, the extensive corruption
and the absence of diversity in her economy, are some of the prerequisites for a resource
35
36

ORourke, p18
Fairhall, p.159

14

curse to nurture. Because of that, Chalecki expects that Russia could even be vulnerable to
petro-statehood37. Even if resource curse seems not a probable scenario due to a strong
centralized state and a capable enough army to enforce its will, a Dutch disease cannot be
ruled out. In fact, Russias overdependence in energy/mining sector for revenues is
problematic by any standards, potentially giving leverage upon her from exogenous
interests.
Russias dependence on technical expertise and capital investment from Western
companies is anticipated to mitigate security risks at least in the near future. Nevertheless,
the supplier base for the oil consuming countries will gradually move towards the North,
moving away from the Middle East region, which in turn will change the geopolitics of the
world in a fundamental way38. Beyond oil and gas, there are precious deposits of minerals
and non-minerals, such as gold, diamonds, nickel, zinc, copper and lead. The exploitation of
the natural resources provides Russia 11 percent of her GDP 39. Siberia is Russias treasury
box, waiting to be exploited. Minerals come second only to oil/gas exports, accounting for
17.7 percent of total exports, in 200540. Even so, and despite the fact that Russia has over
20000 minerals deposits, it seems that the remaining quality becomes less and less attractive
for extraction based on market economic criteria 41 . Fish stocks on the other hand, were
always an issue of confrontation. Past experiences could pour some light into future
developments. United Kingdom and Iceland, NATO allies, almost confronted each other in
the 70s because of disputed fishing grounds42. The climate change will bring an alteration
on the migration pattern of straddling stock, moving from one countrys EEZ to another.
37

Elizabeth L.Chalecki, Environmental Security, A Guide to the Issues, (Praeger, 2013), p.51
Valsson, p119
39 Dmitry Gorenburg, Russias Arctic Security Strategy, Russian Analytical Digest No96, (May
12, 2011), p.11
40 Willy streng, Karl Magnus Eger, Brit Flistad, Arnfinn Jrgensen-Dahl, Lars Lothe, Morten
Mejlnder-Larsen, and Tor Wergeland, Shipping in Arctic Waters: A comparison of the Northeast,
Northwest and Trans Polar Passages, (Springer, 2013), p.106
41 streng, p.120
42 Chalecki, p.84
38

15

Overfishing and a declined fish production-catch could be a reason for confrontation in the
far future. Russian fishing ports, such as Murmansk, Belomorsk and Arkhangelsk will gain
in importance43, altering existing maritime routes and military considerations.
Upcoming global energy insecurity is anticipated to give an upper hand to states that
are autarkic in oil and minerals. Russia is privileged due to the unexploited resources in
Northern Siberia. Russia could gain leverage upon energy dependent states and regions such
as the EU. How these states will respond depends on the power balance at the time in
question. It is expected that declining powers will try to hinder Russias ambitious plans,
while they are still powerful enough in relative terms vis--vis Russia. In the long term, the
abundance of resources will widen the economic gap, providing an opportunity for
increased Russian military expenditures; this already happened during the previous decade,
favored by the oil boom in prices. In the short term, Russia is expected to behave
cooperatively, as long as it needs western know-how, investment capital and open markets
for her raw materials. This is expected to change when Russia will become more selfsufficient and self-assured.
Still, the causality of a wealthier Russia and a more aggressive one is not going to be
straightforward; economic interests may finally prevail upon national security interests,
peacefully forcing her to adopt a more cooperative stance in the Arctic region. Furthermore,
it is unclear for now if the anticipated increased wealth will finally translate into enhanced
Russian military capabilities. Besides, new technological advancements in the energy sector,
such as the recent breakthrough in shale gas exploitation, could easily reduce energy
dependency from Russia, consequently reducing Russian leverage44. Energy interests differ
from maritime ones, in a critical aspect. Energy reserves have a strategic importance in
Russian security planning. Furthermore, the energy sector has always been a closed club of

43

streng, p.111
Charles K.Ebinger and Evie Zambetakis, The geopolitics of Arctic melt, International Affairs
85:6, (2009), p1220
44

16

multibillion-dollar empires, which lacked transparency and where long-standing

relationships werent the norm. As such, a military and economic confrontation deriving
from the oil and gas sector is more favorable due to the fact that Russia has an absolute
control upon oil/gas reserves and at the same time is the major stakeholder of the oil/gas
companies that have been destined to exploit them. The close relations among western
governments and energy companies goliaths might exaggerate such frictions.

Chapter 4.3- Military interests and geostrategic considerations

During the Cold War, the Arctic had to play a crucial role in national strategies. The
end of Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union didnt diminish that role. As Derek K.
O'Leary argues if the Atlantic Age has passed and the pivot to Asia signaled that the
Pacific Age is fully upon us, we may also ask if an Arctic Age will in this century entail
another oceanic orientation45. The melting of the ice will present new options in military
planning at the strategic and tactical levels. The thickness of the ice and the noisy
underwater environment make the Arctic sea an excellent environment for nuclear ballistic
missile submarines (SSBN) to operate and hide, acting as a first strike nuclear weapon or a
deterrent one. Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent obsolescence
of her conventional army forces, Russia still maintained her nuclear capabilities as a
measure of deterrence against a superior US army, in pure conventional military terms. The
North Pole is the most direct attack route, between Europe and North America. Beyond the
Kola Peninsula, which is the main naval base of Russias SSBN, the High north
accommodates a chain of eleven forward bomber bases 46 that are dispersed along her
Arctic frontier. The geostrategic importance of the region is expected to rise further.

45

O'Leary, p2
Kristian tland, Russias Armed Forces and the Arctic: All Quiet on the Northern Front?,
Contemporary Security Policy, 32:2, (2011), 267-285, DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2011.590354,
p.270
46

17

One of the major concerns of Russians Navy planners has always been the
containment of the Northern Fleet in Kola Peninsula by NATO countries. Svalbard Island
will play a significant geostrategic role in the new Arctic era, because it is overlooking the
sea-gap connecting Barents Sea with the Atlantic Ocean. As Perry and Andersen write, the
Northern routes include strategic choke points such as Russias Severnaya Zemlya and
New Siberian Islands in the Northern Sea Route- that could be blocked by adversaries.47
The Tsushima naval battle in 1905, which resulted in the destruction of the Russian
Northern fleet squadron from the Japans after an all-around globe sail from St.Petersburg,
became part of the Russian military psych and one of its greatest fears. This incident created
a Russian deep historical neurosis48 and a feeling of claustrophobia. Russian fears of
encirclement are not without merit. Military confrontation might become a self-fulfilled
prophecy, if it will be combined with emerging interests in the maritime and energy sector.
Russias feeling of encirclement found its way out from her peculiar standing
through the frozen north. H.P.Smolka, just before the outbreak of World War II, foresaw the
great importance of Murmansk as a year around ice-free port49. Future Russia, will certainly
gain a huge advantage at the tactical and strategic levels if she manages to bridge the
Northern fleet with that of the Pacific due to the Arctic melt. The Panama Canal was the
equivalent in US history that connected the east and west coast fleets, and gave rise to a
global maritime power. An Arctic ice-free ocean will bring closer opposite shores, creating a
sort of a North Mediterranean, eliminating obstacles and distances, establishing routes and
giving opportunity for new military strategies to be developed. However, current naval ships
are not ice capable, so such travel is prohibited at the moment; even with an icebreaking
escort there is a high probability of hull damage. Technological advancements in Arctic
military equipment could be a force multiplier for any navy, bringing forces to the rear of
47

Charles M.Perry and Bobby Andersen, Strategic Dynamics in the Arctic Region, (The Institute
for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., February 2012), p10
48 Fairhall, p.xxiii
49 H.P.Smolka, Soviet strategy in the Arctic, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 16, No 2, (Jan 1938), p273

18

foes without early warning. NATO would have to figure out how to contain an extensive
Russian maritime front; Russian military planners would deal with how to defend it and
furthermore materialize Admiral Kuznetchovs dream of a blue navy.

Chapter 5- Comprehending Security attributes

Charles K.Ebinger et.al argue that the geopolitical importance of the Arctic will rise
when there will be a confluence of factors: oil price rise, ice capable technology,
sustainable and environmental friendly commercial development, interest in new maritime
shipping routes, clear legal framework and established code of conduct 50 . In order to
properly assess the security situation that climate change will inflict in the Arctic region and
that will consequently add or subtract to the importance that is derived from Mackinders
quite deterministic geography and the emerging economic interests, it is crucial to examine
four security attributes that have a role to play; the institutional framework regarding the
Arctic, articulated national security Arctic policies, existing territorial disputes, and lastly
military expenditures. As Huebert eloquently puts it, what are the states saying or doing51
will determine the new security environment.

Chapter 5.1-Institutional Framework regarding the Arctic Region

The Arctic Council is an intergovernmental forum that consists of five Arctic littoral
states, the Arctic Five - Russia, United States, Canada, Denmark (through Greenland), and
Norway - plus Sweden, Iceland and Finland (altogether the Arctic Eight, A8). The Illulissat
declaration in 2008 gave the impression that Arctic rim powers prefer to treat the Arctic as a
closed group issue. An agreement reached in 2011, which put in place a legally binding

50

Ebinger et al, p1232

Rob Huebert, The Newly Emerging Arctic Security Environment, (Canadian Defence & Foreign
Affairs Institute, March 2010), p.5
51

19

Search and Rescue policy, further supports the notion of close cooperation among the Arctic
States. On the other hand, the lack of established enforcement mechanism it certainly limits
Arctic Councils effectiveness. Reluctance from the US to include security issues on the
Arctics Council agenda is another major concern. Either way, a rational assumption can be
made here that the more institutionalized the Arctic environment becomes and the better
framed it is with legally binding agreements that are recognized by all stakeholders and
easily enforced by the international community, then the more secure it is going to be.
Under this scheme, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 52 (UNCLOS) has a
substantial role to play.
The existing institutional legal framework of UNCLOS and Arctic Council
determines the rights and obligations that Arctic States and international community have,
and provides the forum for dialogue, which in turn reduces security risks and the probability
of an unwanted military escalation. Even so, we expect that great powers such as the EU and
emerging ones such as China will attempt to modify existing Arctic Councils framework to
include them. A potential effort to exclude certain states from the decision making process,
would probably lead some of them to adopt a more provocative and revisionist stance. A
possible new Arctic Councils operational framework should include also a wider agenda,
including security issues. However, an enlarged in scope Arctic Council that would have the
authority to negotiate Arctic security issues could potentially limit the role of the UN and
other international organizations. Consequently, and looking in a macroscopic level such a
move could be characterized as counterproductive, but still favorable enough for a few
states. On the other hand, a further enlargement of the Arctic Council with new members,
without altering its agenda, could jeopardize the meaning of its existence; Canada and
Russia are reluctant to accept new members, due to the abovementioned concerns.

52

UNCLOS is an international framework under UN that regulates the obligations and privileges
that states have upon sea and its resources.

20

Chapter 5.2- Articulated Arctic Policies

There are differences among the official Arctic policies of the Arctic Eight
nations, having each one a special focus upon a distinctive area. The initial impression
that is given after a thorough study of these national security papers is an obvious
unwillingness to militarize Arctic and consequently transform into a confrontational
zone; still, they express their preparedness to act accordingly (or their willingness to be
prepared in order to act) in case it is needed. Russias policy documents are less
confrontational compared to the 1997 edition, and mainly focus on bi- and multilateral
cooperation as a mean to resolve global issues 53 . Their major concern is the proper
utilization of the energy resources that are regarded as strategic. Russias strong will to
improve the conventional capabilities of Russian army is expressed on her military
doctrine. Russias security policy does not rule out the use of military force and sees the
Arctic as an area of potential conflictalong with the Middle East, Central Asia and the
Caspian Sea54. Still, Russias expressed main goals are border protection and security,
and the creation of special Arctic forces capable of operating in the region55. The recent
reorganization of Russian Military Commands and their areas of responsibility further
support his argument. In particular, the Central Command that will be responsible for the
vast expanse of the High North will be finally situated in the South and wont have a
naval element of its own56. These in turn tell us that Russians downplay the military
importance of the Arctic, at least for now. However, Russias military complex higher
degree of autonomy that is unaccountable to its citizens could be of major concern57.

53

tland, p.275
Fairhall, p.55
55 tland, p.276
56 tland, p.278
57 tland, p.274
54

21

The Arctic strategies all have a common base; they recognize that the Arctic will
gain in geopolitical importance. Each state is compelled to take action early and be prepared
militarily and diplomatically. It is obvious that a potentially dangerous downward slope lies
here; a military build up and a new national security strategy may result into a vicious circle
of counterbalancing, which in turn creates a security dilemma. What that means is that
abovementioned national security policies will follow suit the aggressor; just one revisionist
state could transform the current pacifist-like Arctic security policies into an escalating
scenario. Therefore, Arctic security policies tell us where we stand now, not where we will
be in the near future. But still they influence public perceptions and the decision-making
processes in at the governmental level.

Chapter 5.3-Existing Arctic Territorial Disputes

Existing territorial disputes seem unlikely to escalate into major conflicts in the
immediate future. This has to do mainly with the unwillingness from the Arctic states to
internationalize their disputes, which might become a backdoor invitation to emerging
stakeholders in Arctic affairs. They are making concerted efforts to safeguard their
privileged rights in the region. An exemplary example is the territorial settlement in the
Barents Sea between Russia and Norway, a long-standing delimitation dispute of their
shelves. It isnt clear if the peaceful resolution of Norway and Russias territorial dispute in
Barents Sea was a Russian tactical one-time maneuvering or a strategic decision of a lawabiding state, projecting cooperation as her mean to achieve her ends. Russia was the first
state to submit a claim regarding an expansion of its Extended Continental Shelf (ECS) in
the UNs Commission on the limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) 58, back in 2001. The

58

UNCLOS according to article 76, provides the right for each State to establish an Extended
Continental Shelf (ECS) as a zone based on the particular geomorphology of its seabed where it
can exercise limited sovereignty. Each State can submit such claims to UNs Commission on the
limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), and the Commission reviews the documentation and, by
two-thirds majority, approves its recommendations to the submitting State, see ORourke, p7

22

planting of the Russian flag in 2007, on the bottom of the North Pole upon the Lomonosov
Ridge, was probably politically motivated to support such claims. Two of the regions that
Russia initially claimed to be continuations of her continental shelf, are situated in the
Arctic. In particular these are the Lomonosov and Mendeleev Ridges; the former extends
and reaches the Northern part of Greenland (Denmark) and Ellesmere Island (Canada). Who
owns Lomonosov Ridge, owns also the North Pole, which in turn can be a factor of national
pride and could certainly boost political careers. Most importantly the Lomonosov Ridge
seems to hold huge deposits of oil and gas.
Furthermore, one of the remaining territorial boundaries disputes is that between USRussia in the Bering Strait. An agreement was signed for a final settlement just before the
collapse of the Soviet Union, in June 1990. According to this agreement, the maritime
boundary was clarified and four distinct zones where the Exclusive Economic Zone EEZ of
both states overlapped were resolved mostly in favor of US. The US Congress ratified the
agreement, but Russia the successor state of Soviet Union, both in term of liabilities and
rights- denied to do so because the Russian political elite felt that the sovereign rights of
Russia were repudiated by the agreement, being the direct outcome of a unique historical
weakness of Soviet diplomacy.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has commented on many occasions that
Russia will resolve any remaining issues in strict compliance with international law 59.
This doesnt preclude the fact that exogenous conflicts in relation to the Arctic region may
propagate easily there. Furthermore, Russia may exploit territorial differences among
NATO allies, using divide and conquer logic. But she may even exploit longstanding
territorial disputes for domestic reasons, related to internal nationalistic pressures emerging
from her electoral body. Such an outcome, and when it will be left uncontrollable, could
exaggerate existing territorial disputes significance, escalating easily even into military

59

Fairhall, p.38

23

conflict. It is estimated that an unfavorable decision by Commission on the limits of the

Continental Shelf (CLCS) upon occupation of the Lomonosov Ridge and the North Pole,
will result in a zero sum psychology among Arctic state actors. In such a case, territorial
disputes can become hot spots in a series of provocations.

Chapter 5.4- Military expenditures

The recent economic resurrection of Russias economy was a direct outcome of
high-energy prices, which in turn resulted in a substantial increase in Russian military
expenditures. Part of the enlarged economic pie went towards military projects and
procurement of military equipment, including for improved Arctic capabilities. In 2011,
President Putin announced the creation of two Arctic brigades, adding as for our own geopolitical interests [in the Arctic] are concerned, we shall be protecting them firmly and
consistently60. In the same year it was announced that Russia would spend almost $730
billions procuring advanced weaponry until 2030 61 . Under this mindset, Russia has
reinitiated in 2007 strategic bomber flights above the Arctic and near the Canadian
Archipelago and northern Norways borders, an older Soviet era practice. The Northern fleet
becomes more assertive in the region, a trend that is expected to continue in the near future.
The deployment of the Borei class SSBN, when it will take finally place, will signal a
tipping point in regional military balance. This in turn explains, Canada and Norways
extensive military procurement program and the continuous efforts of the latter to raise a red
flag in NATO alliance regarding the grim future of the High North.
The harsh Arctic environment makes it difficult for any state to monitor and attain
full domain awareness, and could even hide ongoing militarization. Historical precedents,
human hawkish agents such as Canadian P.M Harper, or Russian President Putin, and the
60

Thomas Grove, Russia Creates Two Brigades of Arctic Troops, Reuters, July 1, 2011 (accessed
April 27, 2014); available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/07/01/russia-arctic-troopsidUKLDE76017D20110701
61 tland, p.268

24

fear of lost opportunities might speed up such a process. A security dilemma62 could be the
outcome; militarize first before the opponent does, in order to gain a tactical advantage.
External events might easily propagate into the Arctic region. Russias current superior
icebreaking fleet speaks for itself; the Arctic has a special importance in Russias foreign
policy, military and energy development planning. Nevertheless, what we are currently
experiencing in the Arctic region isnt a full-scale militarization but rather a soft
militarization, which is self-restrained from becoming hard one. No player seems willing
to spend more for arctic military equipment and training, when any gains -if any- can only
be seen far in the future. It appears more probable that when the time will be riper, only then
the Arctic States will increase such arctic expenditures, a cost saving approach based on
timely utilization of available resources.

III. Arguments - Counterarguments

The relation between the arctic melting and the emerging interests will not be
analyzed further, as it was already elaborated in Chapter 4, in the Building the
Background section of our current essay. We will focus instead in Geopolitics shift and
the implications upon Russias dominance.

Chapter 6- Advancing our 1st level Argument / Geopolitics shift and Russias
Dominance
A question immediately arises; is Mackinders geopolitics a relevant theory
nowadays, able to describe upcoming events in a rather fragile world? It can be even argued
62

The three main preconditions for being a security dilemma according to Shiping Tang, are
basically met here; we have an anarchic nature, and Arctics peculiarities could enhance it; there
is a gradual accumulation of military power; and lastly, Russia (or any other Arctic State) doesnt
have malign intentions at least for now in respect to the region. See Shiping Tang (2011), The
Security dilemma and ethnic conflict: toward a dynamic and integrative theory of ethnic conflict,
Review of International Studies, 37, pp 511-536 doi:10.1017/S0260210510000616

25

that its core thesis, that of Heartlands unique destiny, an area which is termed as the region
to which, under modern conditions, sea-power can be refused access 63 , loses its initial
meaning and in turn urges us to revise it. Even if Heartland term itself needs a reevaluation,
the importance that Heartland has upon the World Island doesnt diminish but rather
expands in an Arctic ice-free era. Mackinders core thinking seems relevant today and may
provide hints about the emerging world and Russias unique role in it. Geopolitical shifts
and the Arctics riches may result in territorial claims by littoral states, which in their effort
to guarantee their survival and advance their power in a rather dynamic environment, they
will form new alliances and if environment permits even challenge the international status64.
The outcome could be an extensive power rebalancing which almost certainly will reshape
states borders. Such changes in geography will certainly affect political constellations and
hierarchies65.
The importance that Mackinder reserved for the land power vis--vis the maritime
power was based in the significance that he put in the railroad expansion and the mobility he
envisioned that such a development would finally provide. However even today, Russias
Heartland is underdeveloped and basic infrastructure is missing that would facilitate such
mobility. It seems that Mackinder was quite overambitious about Heartlands future in
regards to mobility because he underestimated the technical difficulties that such
development meant. His era of high land mobility never arrived in this part of the world, and
transportation remains the weakest wheel of the Russian war machine as H.P.Smolka has
emphasized back in 1938 66 . In order to become a continental power as Mackinder
envisioned, Russia shall invest intensively in road and rail infrastructure. Only then can she
exploit fully the role that Heartland has to play. But can Russia become at the same time a
63

Mackinder, p.78
P.Siousiouras, D.Dalaklis, and P.Baxevani, Arctic: A new field Geopolitical Fermentation,
Naval Inspection, Hellenic Navy Journal, (July 2013), p.81
65 Christian Le Mire and Jeffrey Mazo, Arctic opening, Insecurity and Opportunity, (Adelphi Series,
2013, 53:440), p.122
66 Smolka, p272
64

26

major maritime power and what are expected to be her relative gains in respect to other
great powers? Mackinder realized the serious implications for global stability that might
derive from a combination of maritime oceanfront with the pivot area under the roof of one
state; Germany was his main fear, but we can only assume that an ice-free Russia could
easily supersede it.
Zbigniew Brzezinski, national adviser of US President Carter, defined Russia as a
black hole, due to the fact that geographically was inaccessible from the sea 67 , a
geographical determinism that precluded her from evolving into a sea power. Mackinder
had expressed a similar idea; that geography determines the kind of power that can emerge.
As a next logical step, he argued that marginal lands that possess a maritime front, such as
Europe, South East Asia and Near East, are inclined to become maritime powers. Russia on
the other hand, is inclined to become a major continental power, based on the strategic depth
of the Heartland and the abundance of her resources. However, what Mackinder couldnt
foresee, was that Russia one day could gradually be transformed from an isolated heartland
and consequently a continental power, potentially into maritime power through the opening
of the Arctic Ocean. Russia will be neither an outer crescent country, insular from the rest
world due to an ocean as the United States is, nor an inner crescent state. It is clear that
emerging Russia wont fall anymore into anyone of Mackinders categories; a revision is
much needed here. Russia is going to be a unique combination of the original Pivot area and
a newly appeared extensive northern oceanic front, becoming a peninsular Heartland
reaching directly the Arctic, Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, and indirectly the Mediterranean
Sea through the Christian orthodox geopolitical arc68. Furthermore, Iran and Afghanistan
67

Le Mire et al, p.121, as it was presented initially in Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand
Chessboard, (1997)
68 J. Anderson, in Putin and the Russian Orthodox Church: Assymetric Symphonia (Journal of
International Affairs), portrays Putin as a pragmatic politician that used the Church for political
ends and domestic ends (p. 188), still supporting the constitutionl separation of the church and
the State. Prof. Robert C.Blitt, in Russias Orthodox foreign policy, the Growing influence of the
Russian Orthodox Church in Shaping Russias policies abroad, presents in chapter 3.2.5.3 the
efforts of Patriarch Kirill to unite the Christian orthodox states and gain political leverage.

27

had always a prominent geopolitical role to play in Russias geopolitical calculations;

establishing political control over them, Russia could be able to reach the Indian Ocean. The
Arctic might become a new Rimland, with the importance that Spykman anticipated.
Mackinder cautioned that the nation that will combine the Heartland with an extensive
maritime front, based on the vast underground hidden resources, might become a single
world empire69, if it is not timely counterbalanced; a Hyper-Empire70. This in turn, raises
a crucial question regarding the combination in a single state structure of the continental and
sea based dominance and the effect of such an outcome upon the power balance and
collective security.
Where Mackinders theory lacks, Mahan and Spykmans rationale supplement it.
Their distinct approaches can be crucial to our final understanding and they will further
support our argument that Russia has the potential to become once more a major
superpower. Spykman, a successor of Mackinder, believed that the efficient control of
Rimland, would lead to the domination upon Mackinders Heartland and as a direct
consequence that of the world71. Mahan instead, a predecessor of Mackinder and Spykman,
was an advocate of sea power and he compartmentalized world in a geographically similar
manner as Mackinder (the opposite is more true). Mahan was far from being considered a
pure geographic determinist; he meticulously examined the importance of other factors
beyond geography, such as the physical conformation, extent of territory, number of
population, character of people, and character of government 72 . He recognized, as this
thesis does, that a constellation of factors determine the political outcome and he recognized

However, it seems that President Putins world geopolitical view wasnt influenced in a great
extent by the Orthodox dogma because he early on realized that it wasnt a viable tool to forge a
counter coalition against liberalism and western ideas abroad.
69 Mackinder, p.2
70 Hyper Empire as a term used in this paper is defined in the Appendix
71 Ismailov et al, p.89
72 Sumida, p 41 as it was initially maintained by William E.Lizey, Mahan on Sea Power (rev.ed)
(Norman, OK: U. of Oklahoma Press 1981; first pub 1947), p.316

28

the importance of the human agent, the governmental factor73 that supplemented that of
geography. From the above, it is clear that Russia is in a unique position because three
quite distinct geopolitical approaches will finally converge upon her; and the vast
potential that she has to become finally a superpower, is based exactly on these. Spykmans
Rimland that once could act as bridgehead74 for US and British troops to land and attack
in the rear of the continental power, becomes less probable with a Northern Rimland open
for a Russian blue navy to develop. Such a navy could encircle Spykmans Rimland from
the South when a continental army could exercise pressure from the North. In such a case,
no state situated in Rimland would have ever thought to confront the dominant Continental
Power or sign an alliance with an insular state, such as the US.
Relative gains matter on States calculations. Russia is expected to be the absolute
and relative winner, gaining the most in respect to any other arctic littoral state and in every
sector that we could thought of. Canada and the US might follow. When the time is ripe,
Russia may succeed abruptly and unconditionally to shift the geopolitical balance to her
favor, becoming an energy goliath and supporting consequently a vast war machine that it
could be almost unbeatable. Vast resources and logistics and an autarchic leadership have
been the elements of Russian victory historically. Under a Mahanian approach, the
Russian leadership and its national vision will have also a crucial role to play in the future.
Taking Stalin as an example, in 1936 the Communist Committee decided due to political
and military motivations that a large sea and ocean fleet was crucial for the projection of
power by USSR75. Still, USSR naval future was finally restricted by two factors; firstly,
Stalins perception that a coastal navy was really needed rather than a blue ocean navy,
which would be capable to defend the motherland; secondly, due to absence of raw

73

Sumida, p 49
Arthur R.Hall, Mackinder and the Course of Events, Annals of the Association of American
Geographers, Vol. 45, No.2 (Jun., 1955), p.111
75 Natalia I.Yegorova, Stalins Conception of Maritime Power: Revelations from the Russian
Archives, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol 28, No. 2, (April 2005), p.158
74

29

materials and technical expertise. The former proves the important role that human agents
have in an autarchic political system, where the latter that technical difficulties can hinder
progress but cannot forestall them if there is strong will in place from the leadership,
towards certain goals.
Several similarities pop up right away, between the USSR and todays Russia.
President Putin has centralized power, controlled the media and the economic structure, in
his effort to govern efficiently the Russian state. Such a political move, even if it looks
illiberal in Western eyes, was a crucial step towards Russias reemergence. Even so, exactly
this absolutism, based on an existing undemocratic logic that the king must be right, might
finally hinder any further progress. An essential point here is that Russia has to overcome
herself in order to become a major maritime power. The leadership and even more the
bureaucracy around it, are historically trained to see Russia in continental terms, rather
than oceanic ones. Even if a unique opportunity surfaces for Russia to develop a blue navy,
this might not be fulfilled due to her historical momentum and the inherited common belief
of being a landlocked power. Human agency shall play a significant role in altering nations
course; a leader like-minded Peter the Great is what it needed.

Chapter 7- Advancing our 2nd level Argument

Chapter 7.1 Geopolitical dominance equals revisionism?

Mead is right in stating that Westerners have misread the collapse of Soviet Union
and the end of Cold War as the end of geopolitics, when in reality it was Fukuyamas end of
History of ideas 76 , even a temporary one as recent history has proven. In particular,
Fukuyama key thesis was that the final advent of the model of Western liberal democracy

76

Walter Russell Mead, The return of Geopolitics, The Revenge of the Revisionist Powers,
Foreign Affairs, May/June, 2014 (accessed May 7, 2014); available at
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141211/walter-russell-mead/the-return-of-geopolitics

30

was the end point of the economic and sociopolitical evolution of humanity. Mead argues
that geopolitics was always present, and nowadays Russia, China and Iran could be
considered revisionist powers77, but with each one possessing different agendas; in the case
of Russia, Mead argues that what she wants is to reassemble as much of the Soviet Union
as it can78. Such revisionism, according to Mead, wants to challenge US power projection
in Eurasia and not directly confront her. Ikenberry instead, in his article The Illusion of
Geopolitics, portrays Russia (and China) as part time spoilers at best79. He bases his
argument on the superiority of the US and the liberal model, versus a non-existent
alternative from illiberal states such as Russia.
Ikenberrys argument is faulty in three aspects; firstly, he overestimates US soft
power that can be projected abroad, or as he puts it Washingtons unique ability to win
friends and influence states80, when in the first place friends dont exist in international
relations, but just converging short-term interests; secondly, even when he accepts that the
US will come down from the peak of the hegemony, he doesnt recognize the fact that
Chinas or Russias economic predominance will result in winning hearts and minds of
state actors that were formerly US allies; thirdly, as a direct consequence of that, liberal
capitalist model and liberal democracy might loose their initial appeal. What Mead and
Ikenberry even more didnt foresee is that the war of ideas is approaching once more, and
geopolitics is expected to be there to accommodate it. The liberal model is questioned
worldwide, despite Ikenberrys arguments to the contrary, and 2008 financial crisis was a
turning point for the US and the world as a whole. The rise of nationalism and communism
77

With the term revisionist States we imply those States that are unsatisfied with and are
willing to challenge current international hierarchical structure and power balance.
78 Walter Russell Mead, The return of Geopolitics, The Revenge of the Revisionist Powers,
Foreign Affairs, May/June, 2014 (accessed May 7, 2014); available at
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141211/walter-russell-mead/the-return-of-geopolitics
79 G.John Ikenberry, The Illusion of Geopolitics, The Enduring Power of the Liberal Order,
Foreign Affairs, May/June, 2014, (accessed May 7, 2014); available at
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141212/g-john-ikenberry/the-illusion-of-geopolitics
80 Ibid.

31

once more in Europe supports the above notion. Ikenberry is right that Russia or China
currently lack an alternative model, the ideas, capacities, or allies that could overthrow
Washingtons current predominance. This however doesnt mean that they wont challenge
US role. Russias endeavor to establish a new strategic vision and an ideology81 is an effort
to procure an ideological weapon, similar to the one that the Soviet Union once had. An
ideological weapon could be considered to be an advanced situated parachute [army]
division 82 , securing positions and disrupting the normal procedures in the rear of the
enemy 83 . Modern day liberal model of governance is exactly that; the moral veil that
dresses underneath US supremacy. As such, it isnt seriously questioned as long as no other
ideology is readily available.
Equally important, is Russias own self-image in our understanding of its behavioral
attitude. The reality seems to be that Russia is meticulously carving a new image out of
nothing; Eurasianism84 seems to be a partial answer to her problem; the lack of strategic
vision, which is a direct inheritance of the sudden USSR collapse. A.Barbashin et.al argue
that Russian conservatism, dissimilar to western conservatism, gave birth to a modern
version of Eurasianism85. Based on the principles of Eurasianism as was formed just after
the 1917 October Revolution, and as an alternative to Bolsheviks ideology, its conceptual
originators believed that Russias geography is its fate and that there is nothing any ruler
can do to unbind himself from the necessities of securing his lands86. A.Dungin, the reviver
of Eurasianism, in his earlier writings depicted a struggle between two types of global

81

Such as Eurasianism, which is further analyzed later on

Arthur R.Hall, Mackinder and the Course of Events, Annals of the Association of American
Geographers, Vol. 45, No.2 (Jun., 1955), p.123
83 Hall, p.123
84 Eurasianism is a Russian school of thought initially coming from the 20s that proclaims a
unique Eurasian identity for Russia, independent from European influences
85 Barbashin et al
86 Barbashin et al. This and other core principles that constituted Eurasianism were initially
published in a collection of articles titled Exodus to the East, by Georges Florovsky, Nikolai
Trubetzkoy, Petr Savitskii, and Petr Suvchinky
82

32

powers: land powers, or Eternal Rome which are based on the principles of statehood
and civilizations of the sea, or Eternal Carthage which are based on individualism87. In
the abovementioned dipole of moral vis-a-vis malicious, he further argued that Eternal
Rome which is represented by nowadays moral Russia, and in order to prevail upon
Eternal Cartage which is represented by the malicious United States, she must embrace
conservatism. This new Russia shall include Mackinders Heartland plus a possible
protectorate over all EU members88. Even if it is unclear to what extent Eurasianism as an
ideology has infiltrated into the Russian political thinking, still it gives a good hint upon the
ongoing struggle of ideas that is happening in domestic Russian political level. And as
Mackinder warned, when ideology prevails upon realism, hunger and turmoil lies ahead.
Neo-Eurasianism sees Russia as a continental power that has to fight back the global
maritime power; this indirectly excludes Russia from becoming a major maritime power. As
such, it is certainly a revisionist school of political thought. Furthermore, it supports our
earlier argument about leaderships role, that if Russia wants to become a Hyper-Empire,
then the Russian bureaucracy should evolve and overcome the notion of a landlocked
empire.
Media on their part build perceptions, even quite often upon request. The
perception of strategic finds 89 in relation to each states historical claims and national
identity, is what finally matters. Hence, a thorough examination of Russian media practices
may provide a few hints to Russias hidden objectives, answering the question; is or will
Russia become in the mid term a revisionist State, leading to a less secure Arctic?
E.W.Rowe et.al examined the framing of Arctic, which means how the Russian political
elite conceptualizes Arctic and how in turn the Russian media conglomerate narrates it
towards the domestic audience. Based on that, E.W.Rowe et.al elaborated upon nowadays

87

Ibid.
Ibid.
89 Ebinger et al, p.1221
88

33

scenarios of Arctic scramble, concluding that are a direct outcome of the tradition of
classical geopolitics, or as they put it, the geopolitical narrative90. Nevertheless they point
out, that Russian policymakers display a certain indifference towards scenarios of future
Arctic conflict but they faintly distinguish an inclination towards cooperation. The medias
de facto dependency on the Russian state 91 might give an extra weight to our earlier
observation. On the contrary, Russian academic circles seem to have a more competitionoriented approach92. Such an internal dichotomy among different Russian domestic actors
and institutions creates an uncertainty about the preferred Arctic path that Russia should
follow. Furthermore, the Russian media -aka the Russian state- didnt alter their posture
towards Arctic becoming a more confrontational one, because of crises developing
elsewhere (such as Georgia); a sort of Arctic isolation. Nonetheless, nobody can preclude
that in the near future Arctic will not be influenced negatively from external stimuli,
abandoning its current isolation from international affairs.
The Russian dichotomy goes up to the diplomatic level, affecting its stance; Russian
foreign policy balances between two different tracks, multilateralism and bilateralism. Even
if Russia initially favored bilateralism with her neighbors in order to project power and bend
easily their will to her own gain, an altered policy course has been noticed during the last
few years. In the post-Cold War era, Russia has been more willing to work through
potentially restrictive international organizations 93 . The question is, if this could be a
strategic option hiding a long-term vision of a law-abiding state fully integrated in
international community or instead if it could be a tactical move based on necessity and well
calculated realism derived from Russias currently diminished status. If Russia choses
multilateralism, then revisionism becomes less probable and collective security may take the
upper hand upon power balance and confrontation; idealism in such a case wins. However,
90

Rowe et al, p.70

Roi, p.554
92 Rowe et al, p.74
93 Le Mire et al, p.124
91

34

the Russian participation in international organizational bodies shall not be misrepresented.

Russias posture wont drift away from earlier long held positions. It is also unclear if
Russia makes use of such international institutions as a mean to project her power abroad,
and influence over a number of extra-regional states, particularly those in Northeast
Asia94, based on her natural resources and energy diplomacy.
Going deeper, Russias goals, expressed or thoroughly hidden, could provide a better
understanding. Could Putins regime goal be to advance its interest in regime preservation
though domestic and foreign policies aimed at immunizing Russia from the orange virus,
and the survival of autocracy95? It seems plausible that any regime has an interest to
survive, and a semi democratic one even more. The Arctic in particular seems to be for
Russia not a pragmatic goal but rather a patriotic desire to expand Russias frontiers 96. A
revisionist stance might finally emerge not as a national need to expand based on a
favorable power balance and core national interests, but as a result of nationalism, weak
domestic political structures, and diplomatic avalanches; save face considerations are
always inside politicians minds. Kaplan on his part argues that Russia doesnt have any
other choice than to become a revisionist power, due to ups and downs of Russian history,
[and] its new geographical vulnerabilities97, that compel her to regain control over the
Russian privileged space.
Any emerging power may be considered as a de facto revisionist power, at least
partially. This is so, because in a closed space as the one that Mackinder had envisioned in
1904, a zero sum game becomes the predominant school of thought. For one state to emerge
and expand, another state must decline and contract. Russia has realized that what she lost in
the blink of an eye back in the 90s will be difficult if not impossible to regain, but if she is
94

Ibid, p.125
Michael L.Roi, p.556, as it is initially maintained at Ambrosio, T, Authoritarian Backlash:
Russian Resistance to Democratization in the Former Soviet Union, (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2009)
96 Trenin et al, p25
97 Kaplan, p.176
95

35

willing to do so, revisionism is the way ahead. However, and by definition, status quo
powers are the ones that initially designed and subsequently benefited from the rules of the
game, when the revisionist states are dissatisfied from existing world structure, and have a
desire to redraft it98. Consequently, Russia is in many aspects a status quo power, being one
of the prime architects of current post WWII world order. So it seems probable that Russia
wont be willing to become a fully revisionist power because in such a case the outcome
might be against core interests, and risking a new world order that it could be worse than the
one existing. Russia isnt either a partial spoiler because she has shown signs to cooperate
for international and regional stability through international organizations. She is rather a
partial revisionist power99, being in a track to regain part of her historical privileged space.

Chapter 7.2 Emerging Interests plus Security attributes equals

Security Reassessment?
Charles M. Perry et.al foresee a peaceful end for the Arctic region based on three
arguments; firstly, the majority of the Arctic wealth is located in undisputed sovereign
territories; secondly, the tools that UNCLOS provide for peaceful settlements and the
successful outcome and final resolve of long standing issues using as a case example that
between Russia and Norway for their overlapping EEZ; and thirdly the sheer expense and
technical challenges involved in extracting oil, gas, and other strategic resources which
leads to collaboration and not confrontation100. However, Perry recognizes that low tension
could appear in the Arctic region, which could even turn into major crisis. Similarly,
Chalecki falls into the cooperative camp, when she states, environmental security cannot be

98

Shiloh Rainwater, Race to the North, Chinas Arctic Strategy and its Implications, Naval War
College Review, (Spring, 2013), Vol. 66, No.2, p.63, as it was initially maintained by A.F.K
Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago:Chicago Univ. Press, 1980)
99 Or mildly revisionist, a term used by Shiloh Rainwater to describe Chinas arctic strategy
based on Iain Johnstons proposed five levels of analysis. More at Rainwater, p.63
100 Perry, p3

36

addressed in an anarchic fashion 101. What Chalecki implies is that if we really want to
address environmental changes of global scale then nations will have to cooperate out of
necessity at least. Still, the above arguments are to a certain extent flawed. Leaving aside
morality and idealism, and basing our argument on pure realism, then a power rebalancing
in the near future seems almost unavoidable and a major security crisis might be its direct
consequence. Crises quite often are triggered from a single point-event, a crisis incubator,
and propagate outwards like a thrown stone into the water. Even if a substantial part of the
undiscovered oil/gas resources falls into well defined territorial waters or EEZ, this cant
preclude future tensions; firstly, because a major part of undiscovered energy resources is
expected to be found in still disputed continental shelves; secondly relative gains do matter
on States logic. Regarding the argument that Russia is currently dependent on western oil
extraction technology in order to further develop her fields, which in turn implies that the
cooperation path could be Russias only available option, still this fact didnt finally hinder
Russia from exercising a firm political and financial control102 over her energy sector.
And she further seems willing to use such power as past experience has shown as leverage
upon dependent countries. Additionally, Chaleckis argument doesnt stand against scrutiny
because environmental degradation isnt a new phenomenon. Nations have failed to address
and mitigate the consequences of climate change when the time was ripe.
Scott Borgerson assesses future developments in international relations after the
arctic melt using different lens; not surprisingly, his results are that of anarchy and rivalry.
He argues that the lack of overarching political or legal structures will inevitably lead to a
diplomatic gridlock103. From the moment that new stakeholders will step up on the arctic
arena such as China, and preexisting vested interests might be questioned, such as energy
security, freedom of seas and unimpeded trade, then new disputes might emerge and older

101

Chalecki, p.13
Fairhall, p.22
103 Borgerson, p.72
102

37

ones could reshape. Scott Borgerson further argues that Arctics Council mandate prohibits
addressing security issues; an arctic security forum might be crucial in coping with future
security challenges. Going one-step farther, he advocates the idea that even UNCLOS is
unsuitable to address the geographic peculiarities of Arctic north. Existing but still hidden
oil wealth underground, the sea-lanes that can bridge Pacific and Atlantic Ocean, makes
Arctic a key emerging pressure point in international affairs104. In our security analysis
that follows we will further elaborate upon Borgersons argument and the quantitative
analysis in Appendix provides a practical mean to understand the correlation between
geopolitics and emerging interests, and their respective outcome (cooperationconfrontation).

IV. Security Analysis

Chapter 8 Based on Combined Reasoning - Geopolitics plus Emerging
Interests

Russias political system, being in transition phase from autarchic to become more
democratic, will determine much. Researches have shown that such transitions, usually lead
to an aggressive stance105, and as a consequence domestic insufficiencies are externalized. A
common characteristic among autarchic states is that people usually consent to 180 degrees
diplomatic turns in foreign policy, even if such direction inversions might have huge
consequences upon society106. So, an autarchic administration is unpredictable on its social
behavior towards other states, avoiding easily legalities and disrespecting international

104

Borgerson, p.73
Roi, p.557
106 Ibid., p.557
105

38

norms. The centralization of power back to Moscow, has to do with two interdependent
factors; firstly, with regimes willingness to preserve itself by controlling bureaucracy and
the distribution of internal power; secondly, with the concept that Russian people are
socially trained to perform better under such centralized autarchic regimes. Currently, it
is unclear if such a move will assist Russia or inadvertently lead her straightforward into
resources curse hug, further alienating the provinces from the central state. But now, it is
more than obvious why Russian administration is against western liberalism; it sees
liberalism as a potential factor that could dissolve current societal fabric and the domestic
distribution of power, fears that do have some merit. This in turn gives us a hint about
upcoming trends. We might expect that Russia will gradually become more illiberal as long
as she is willing to reestablish herself to a predominant role in world affairs as the one she
enjoyed during the Soviet era. As Stalin did once, Arctic once more will be the spearhead,
the fundamental motivational factor in psychological and materialistic terms to expand her
reach worldwide.
Arctic security must also be examined in relation to global security107. Chinas role
will certainly dictate the behavior of Russia and the rest. In a cautious but quite
deterministic manner Mackinder foresaw that an alteration of the occupier of the Pivot area
it wont alter the outcome, which is the emergence of a powerful state. Russia could feed
China with the much-needed raw materials through the Northern maritime route, a move
that would make any US strategy of Chinas containment almost obsolete. Combined
Russian and Chinese naval forces could even constitute a fleet in being108, a unified fleet
that could be gathered in short notice and create a sizeable and respectable force in the
region, as Julian Corbett had envisioned for the US. Russia and China are already deepening
their economic relations 109 . So, Arctic will determine the effectiveness of US regional

107

Roi, p.552
Kaplan, p.111
109 Rainwater, p.72
108

39

strategy, and most importantly in a time period that Chinas superseding role will coincide
with that of an ice-free Arctic. The US and the European allies have the greatest interest to
get Russia on board, if they really want to have a chance to counterbalance forthcoming new
world order based on Chinas predominance.
Vested interests may bring together opposing forces, dissimilar looking states, even
if there are core incompatibilities among their political systems and the level of their
democratization. Democratic France and autocratic Russia did so in 1895, in an effort to
counterbalance Germany in the European continent110. It cannot be discarded the option of
a closer future cooperation between Russia and the rest Arctic littoral states, in an effort to
contain the Chineses hunger for resources and economic expansion. Kaplan supports the
idea that it might be in US interests to cooperate closely with Russia in an effort to contain
emerging China, based on the argument that pressure on land can help the United States
thwart China at sea111. In such a case, Russia once more will become a second military
front, as it did happen during WWII. The flip side of the coin could be a close cooperation
between Russia and China in an effort to reduce western democratic influence and [instead]
favor the promotion of an alternative model of authoritarian capitalism 112 . Under this
perspective, crises like the one in Ukraine (2014) shall not govern future events; in the
hierarchy of global interests, the western camp must foresee that Russia and Arctic have the
outmost priority. Russia, as the current occupier of Heartland has the power to act as arbiter
and influence the destinies of the world113. Unquestionably at the end its a matter of choice;
which state do we really want to be Heartlands occupier, that of Russia or China instead?
And the problem remains almost the same since Mackinders era; how two major
continental powers Germany (EU) and Russia- could be kept apart?

110

Mackinder, p.107
Kaplan, p.203
112 Roi, p.556
113 Hall, p119
111

40

Our initial hypothesis was based on two distinct reasonings, geopolitics and
emerging interests. Even if geopolitics seems to be clearly on Russias side114, this cant also
be said for emerging interests and the relevant security attributes. Emerging interests, either
economic or national-strategic, will be influenced from a basket of security attributes.
What can be said with some certainty is that Russia has the potential to gain the most out of
an Arctic era. This means that she will be a relative winner versus the rest. However, we
cant be sure about the proper utilization of her accommodating opportunities, due to
domestic inefficiencies that have already been analyzed. Furthermore, and regarding the
security question, it isnt sure that emerging interests will compete with older ones,
questioning that way status quo. Taking as an example the maritime sector, it is expected
that existing southern trade routes will be peacefully and gradually replaced by the Northern
routes, if and when an Arctic Ocean free of ice becomes a reality. Maritime companies will
transfer their operations to the High North, due to cost effectiveness. Maritime countries,
being nowadays in a vantage point because they are situated on the main trade route that
starts somewhere in Mediterranean Sea or Atlantic Ocean and ends in South China Sea, will
not have any other option than to comply with natures caprices. Even if an economic
competition is expected, this could be far away from military confrontation. The outcome
might be completely different if Russia exercises a monopoly in Northern Sea route,
implementing high rates for foreign commercial vessels. Still, such a strategy seems almost
suicidal and Russia is in a great need to develop her Northern frontier, and western capital
seems to be a prerequisite. The same logic hides behind the energy sector, with a substantial
difference though. Russia sees energy as a strategic sector that could provide diplomatic
leverage, and because of that, it is totally controlled by the state. Energy is going to be a
sector of competition and cooperation at the same time. Russias close dependency in highenergy prices for states revenues, further imply that crises in oil-infested regions might be
114

We assume here that Russia will act as revisionist, when the time will be ripe for her to do

so.

41

on her own interest. The security attributes could influence either way the security in the
region and the emerging interests. A mega migration pattern due to the climate change will
be directed mostly towards Siberia, a bad omen for regions security. Such movements will
certainly influence the indigenous people and their way of life. Siberia might become one of
the last arable lands that will be called to accommodate an even larger world population, if
IPCC predictions of a need to increase [food production] by 55 percent by 2030 115 turn to
be real. Russias decision to ban the export of maize and wheat in 2007 due to low
production that year, is still a reminder of the multiple natural endowments that she possess
because of geography. It is also a reminder of the multilayer approach that Russia might
follow, in a case that she decides to subdue her foes, using even food as a foreign policy
tool116.

V. Conclusion
Geopolitics isnt a panacea, a tool that can be used to determine the outcome of each
one of the existing or emerging political issues. Even if it has conceptual flaws, the real
treasure is hidden behind its obvious simplicity. According to geopolitics, Russia will have
once more the opportunity to become a superpower due to tangible resources and privileged
position, in the coming Arctic era. In a rather ambiguous international environment,
geopolitics remains important because it provides concrete facts. What geopolitics doesnt
describe are the intangible variables that could unquestionably influence the outcome.
However, in Russias case seems probable that she might finally overcome internal and
external impediments and achieve once more a predominant role in world affairs. If Russia
will evolve into a Hyper-Empire is difficult to say, and certainly a favorable geography
115
116

Chalecki, p.19
Chalecki, p.86

42

cant be enough. It seems certain though that such a route will certainly include periods of
instability and insecurity that will closely correlate with Arctics issues, intermixed with
global ones117. This correlation will become more intense as long as the arctic region turns
to be more ice-free. Human expansion in the Arctic region will result in an even more
closed world as it was initially envisioned by Mackinder; or isnt so? Geopolitics main flaw
is its closed-three dimensional approach. The word itself is deriving from the Greek word
, meaning earth that is fixed by definition. But, it is time for humanity to conceptualize
world differently, in an opened-three or even four dimensions. Moving our theater of
political action away from earth and towards universe, a new wide-open world arises. What
is suggested here is that sooner than we may anticipate rapid technological advancements in
space industry will force humanity to address terrestrial political issues through
Cosmospolitics. The new Indies will be the closest planets in our Solar system, and the
Silk Route will be through the interstellar medium.
We are standing in a crossroad; if we will look back, only two decades ago, lays in
dereliction the communist ideology; looking ahead, as international community, we are
ready to depart from pure capitalism but still without having a clear flight plan. The chosen
track will drive our futures and the future of the arctic. Staying on the current track, the
outcome might be similar with the one that led into two previous World Wars and a Cold
War, as two trains that are on the same line, but in opposite directions 118 . Recent
Ukrainian crisis reinforces the belief that geopolitics [are] replacing ideology 119 .
Society is an on Going Concern120, and has momentum, Mackinder argued correctly121.
117

Huebert, p.5
Mackinder, p.104
119 Kaplan, p.175 a statement made by Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev in Rossiyskaya
Gazeta, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union
120 Hall, p.117, according to Arthur R.Hall, Mackinder perceived Going Concern to be a great
state and its overgrown economic structure, whose momentum was such that it was in constant
danger of destruction by collision with some other Going Concern in war or of disintegration in
revolution
121 Mackinder, p.8
118

43

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VII. Appendix

1st level

1st proposition
altered geography
differentiated geopolitical
importance

Argument (Line of attack) divided in two Reasonings,

each one further divided in two distinct levels
...because of Arctic Melting
(Main Reason)
then

1st Reasoning- Russia will

gradually overcome in
geopolitical importance any
other State both in relative
and absolute terms-, proving
to be a unique opportunity
to become a hyper-Empire

2nd level

2nd proposition
a geopolitical dominant
state will be a
revisionist one

then

1st
intermediate
claim/
secondary
reason

2nd
intermediate
claim/
tertiary
reason
Related
then

then
...then Security and
Economic Competition
(Main Claim based on
Secondary and Tertiary
Reasoning)

3rd proposition
altered geography
emergence of new
interests

2nd Reasoning-Emergence
of new regional and global
interests, unevenly
distributed that will
compete with status quo
4th proposition
new interests compete
with existing interests that
favor status quo

-What does Mackinder say

about the relation of geography
and geopolitics?
-Which States will gain
geopolitically the most?
-Will Russias geopolitical role
be enhanced?
-What does it take for Russia to
become a global power or a
hyper-Empire?
-Does Mackinder, Spykman and
Mahans theories converge in
Russias case?
-What are the obstacles in such
a course?
-Could it happen an extreme
shift in power balance and in a
short time frame? Then what?
-Will a dominant Russia be also
a revisionist one? What does
work towards or against such
stance?
-What are Russian goals? Is in
their interest to compete than
cooperate?
-Does her political system,
influence future developments?
Any other attributes?
-Is Russia going to export her
semi democratic-authoritarian
political system abroad?
-Are available options for status
quo powers in order to
counterbalance? Balance of
power vis-a-vis collective
security
-Does world moves to a
multipolar, bipolar or unipolar
one?

Argument (Line of attack)

Questions to be answered
...because of Arctic Melting
(Main Reason)
then

then

1st level

1st Reasoning- Russia will

gradually overcome in
geopolitical importance any
other State both in relative
and absolute terms-, proving
to be a unique opportunity
to become a hyper-Empire

2nd Reasoning-Emergence
of new regional and global
interests, unevenly
distributed that will
compete with status quo

2nd level
then

then

-Do we have another historical

example of such environmental
change and that magnitude? If
yes, what happened?
-Do we have another historical
example of geography change,
human initiated (Canal, Mega
infrastructures)? If yes, what
have happened?
-What are existing Arctic
interests? Introducing,
economic and strategic
interests.
-What are the emerging ones?
-Are they competitive or
cooperative?
-How do we evaluate their
influence upon security?
Introducing security attributes,
such as legal framework,
territorial disputes, military
procurements, arctic security
policies.

...then Security and

Economic Competition
(Main Claim based on
Secondary and Tertiary
Reasoning)
-How do interests correlate with
geopolitics?
-Towards collaboration or
confrontation? Introducing a
quantitative approach (matrix
based) and another one based on
combined reasoning

50

Security Analysis Based on Quantitative Analysis States Behavioral Model122

The utility of any theory is linked to its predictability. It is common among IR

scholars to overlook such an elemental use, and rather address political theory as a mean of
categorization and explanation of different social and political phenomena. However, IR
field that way is reduced from what it should have been, meaning a tool for policy and
decision-making. It is upon us to realize that we have to overcome existing division lines
between realism, idealism, constructivism, critical IR theory and their sub categorizations123.
Such theories mostly base their explanatory power in humans nature duality and their
fundamental difference is that they bid on different sides of human nature, believing that it
will finally prevail as a behavioral norm in modern states affairs. Only then we will be able
to establish an Integrated International Relations theory, which will be based on a States
Behavioral Model. Such a theory will accept the importance of human agents, geopolitics,
outside stakeholders, first level variables and much more, and will integrate them altogether
into a computer simulation model with different weight ratio for each variable.
Instantaneously, questions arise such as, how we choose the attributes and most importantly
weight them. The weight ratio of each variable can be determined by examining earlier
cases and it can be improved later on, through a feedback analysis loop. An equally
important question is what do we expect the outcome of such an equation to be? As a first
step, a basic model is presented here relevant to our arctic case. We examine the probability
of two possible outcomes, that of conflict or cooperation. Real life is certainly more
122

In current appendix, a primitive model is presented in an effort to quantify the relation

among emerging interests and geopolitics, and their subsequent influence upon the Arctic
security environment. Its accuracy is questionable, due to the complicated systems that are
involved and the fact that a vast number of intermediate variables are interlinked, not clearly
though. Fuzzy logic could be the appropriate mathematical model to assess different outcomes
in IR field.
123 For an introduction on how and why liberalism became the mainstream theory after the end
of Cold War, and the importance of geopolitics as a theory with explanatory power upon modern
politics see Robert Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography, What the map tells us about coming
conflicts and the battle against fate, (Random House, 2012), Chapter 1

51

complicated, having more outcomes and falling usually somewhere between. It is rational to
expect that a confluence of parameters will correlate in many different ways, yet a model
shall be developed keeping in mind simplicity. In our arctic model we use four inputsvariables that are weighted differently; geopolitics, maritime interests, energy & mineral
interests, geostrategic & military interests. That way we are consistent with what has been
presented earlier in Chapter 4. As we can see in the following table, we consider that
geopolitics has the greatest role to play in Arctics future, with energy, maritime and
military interests following (Column 1). For each one variable is given a range of
Probability of Conflict occurrence Pcf (max-min), which is vaguely estimated based on our
research so far (Column 3). It is estimated that geopolitics and maritime interests are prone
for conflict, when energy and maritime interests are inclined towards cooperation, with the
latter being more cooperative than the former (0.20-0.35 versus 0.20-0.70). Energys
variable probability Pcf has a wider gap, almost 0.5 units (0.70-0.20), moving all the way
from the cooperative into the conflict spectrum. This is so because of the unpredictability of
sectors influence upon security. In Column 4, the Probability of Cooperation Pcp is
presented, as supplementary to Pcf but it isnt further used in our model.
States Behavioral (1)
Model
Weighted
Ratio Wr

(2) Probability (3) Probability (4) Probability of

of Conflict Pcf of Cooperation Conflict after
(min-max)
Pcp (1-Pcf)
Security Attributes1
are included Pf (minmax)

(5) Mean Probability

of Conflict after Security
Attributes * are included
Pfm =(min(4)+max(4))/2

0.40-0.15
Geopolitics
0.35
0.60-0.85
0.65-0.90
0.775
Maritime Interests
0.80-0.65
0.20
0.20-0.35
0.10-0.25
0.175
Energy &minerals
Interests
0.80-0.30
0.30
0.20-0.70
0.30-0.60
0.45
Geostrategic/
0.60-0.70
0.65-0.75
0.70
Military Interests 0.15
0.40-0.30
1. Security attributes are regarded to be the extent of arctic institutionalization, arctic security policies, existing
territorial disputes, militarization and migration, as were presented in Chapter 5
2. The closer the weighted mean probability of conflict gets to 1, then the likelihood for security competition among
great powers gets higher. The lowest value can be 0, which means a fully cooperative environment.

(6) Weighted Mean

Probability of Conflict
after Security Attributes *
are included
Pfwm =(5)*(1)
0.271
0.035
0.135
0.105
Weighted mean
probablity of conflict 2=
(0.271+0.035+0.135+0.105)
/ (0.35+0.20+0.30+0.15)=
0.546

52

In Column (4), the probability of conflict with the security attributes included Pf is
calculated. Security attributes as were presented in Chapter 5, have a minimum upward
trend effect upon military interests and geopolitics Pcf. Maritime interests are influenced
positively, and are expected to present a downward trend, giving a Pf somewhere around
0.10-0.25. Security attributes are expected to close the wide gap of energys Pcf, stabilizing
the effects of energy sector upon arctic security (Pf =0.30-0.60). In Column (5), the mean
probability of conflict with the security attributes included Pcm is calculated, in an effort to
eliminate the extremes. Finally, in column (6) the total weighted mean probability is
presented, that gives us a 0.546 or 54,6% probability of conflict. This outcome, even if it is
in many ways subjective, yet it has an objectivity that it is derived from our earlier analysis.
Concluding, the chances are splitted among arctic cooperation or confrontation, but still
inclined slightly towards the latter.

VIII. Glossary-Terms
Hyper-Empire term is used in current thesis as an expression to describe a
superpower that has evolved from a regionally cultivated nation-empire, incorporating
the following attributes; a combination of Thalassocracy and continental Empire, able to
project power effectively worldwide; expanding outwards but not just in the periphery
through direct occupation, coercive actions or cultural affinity, and enclosing politically
or militarily populations that are ethnically and culturally distinct under a semi
democratic-authoritarian political structure; and succeeding all the above mainly due to
unprecedented natural endowments and a predominant geopolitical role. What our term
implies is that Hyper Empire is the power that will control successfully the World Island
and the Oceans around it at the same time. Hyper Empire cant be a nation state, because
it can enclose ethnically diverse populations. It distinguishes from an Empire in the
53

political power source, which isnt either oligarchy or monarchy, being simultaneously
territorial and hegemonic in nature and concentrating enough power to challenge
international institutions such as the UN. Hyper Empire cant either be a federation of
states because its constituents parts would have to transfer in a central authority their
sovereignty rights possibly involuntarily-, becoming that way members of a larger state
structure. In Russias case, a Hyper Empire means a revival of defunct Soviet Union
Federation under democratic authoritarianism, with ex-Soviet states members
participating either unwillingly from fear of repercussions or due to cultural affinity, and
an established protectorate upon European states; is a post modern Russia that could
evolve into a maritime and continental superpower capable enough to efficiently
command Mahans High Seas and Mackinders World Island. The opposite end of a
Hyper Empire can be argued to be a Hyper Power based on liberalism, such as the US is
regarded to be nowadays.

XI. Notes

54