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non-Western
nationto beoccupiesa leadingplace. The first
come a memberof the BritishCommonwealth,
India became a
for severalnationalist
symboland catalystof self-determination
movements.India proceeded on an "independent"path in
worldpoliticsand had numerousemulators
in theworld.' Where
India's role in the state-making
has met withconsidrevolution
erable approval,its strategyof nonalignment
has been debated
in the West,and even in India since the open appearancein
1959 of the Sino-Indiandispute.The criticism
has includedquestionsaboutthewisdomofnonalignment,
doubtsas to itsfeasibility,
and chargesthatitsapplicationhas shownpreference
forthecommuniststatesduringperiodsoftheCold War.2 The Indiandefense
includesassertions
that nonalignment
servesIndia's welfareand
oftenthe world's,answersabout its workability,
and claimsthat
has
been
consistent
with
ideals.3
application
professed
foreignpoliciesof the new stateshave been examinedin
xThe independent
RobertA. Scalapino,"Neutralism
in Asia," AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,
XLVIII (March, 1954), 49-63; Hans J. Morgenthau,
PoliticsAmongNations
(Chicago, 1958), Ch. 10; Laurence W. Martin,ed., Neutralismand Nonalignment(New York, 1962), withessaysby C.B. Marshall,FrancisO. Wilcox
and ArnoldWolfers,amongothers;Michael Brecher,"Neutralism:An Analysis," InternationalJournal,XVII (Summer,1962), 224-236; Kurt London,
ed., New Nationsin a Divided World (New York, 1963), especiallyvaluable
forpaperson Sino-Sovietviewsof nonalignedcountries;and Mario Rossi,The
Third World (New York, 1963). For the originsof "neutralism"in Western
thought,see Peter Lyon, "Neutralityand the Emergenceof the Concept of
The Reviewof Politics,XXII (April,1960), 255-268.
Neutralism,"
criticalevaluationsof Indian foreignpolicyare "Vivek"
2 Some essentially
[A. D. Gorwala],India WithoutIllusions(Bombay,1953); Adda B. Bozeman,
"India's ForeignPolicyToday," WorldPolitics,X (January,1958), 256-274;
S. R. Patel,ForeignPolicyof India (Bombay,1960); and WinstonL. Prouty,
"The United States Versus UnneutralNeutrality,"Speech in U.S. Senate,
September19, 1961, Congressional
Record,Vol. 107, 87th Congress,1901519028.
3 Sympatheticexplanationsor defensesof Indian nonalignmentare A.
Appadorai,"India's Foreign Policy," InternationalAffairs,XXV (January,
1949), 37-47; VincentSheean, "The Case For India," ForeignAfairs,XXX
(October, 1951), 77-90; "P" [K. M. Panikkar],"Middle Ground Between
Americaand Russia: An Indian View," ForeignAffairs,XXXII (January,
1954), 259-270; and B. K. Nehru,"AmbassadorNehru on India's Policyof
India News,I (April 27, 1962), 8.
Non-Alignment,"
257
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258
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259
in internalaffairs,equality
eignty,mutual nonaggression,mutual noninterference
and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. See the firstWhite Paper on
the Sino-Indian frontier issue, Notes, Memorandum and Letters Exchanged
and AgreementsSigned Between the Governmentsof India and China: 19541959 (New Delhi, 1959) p. 98. For Nehru's account of their origin, see
Russell H. Fifield, The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia: 1954-1958 (New York,
1958), pp. 510-511. See also M. S. Rajan, "Indian Foreign Policy in Action:
1954-56," Indian Quarterly, XVII (July-September,1960), 224.
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260
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261
fora rationalization
of India's shifttowardthe West thatis not
in officialideology.Thus it may not be prematureto
reflected
tracetherootsoftheAge ofNehrubackintohispoliticaleducation
and the shapingof his worldview. Thereafter,
the influenceof
thisview,alongwithits changes,upon India's externalgoals and
diplomaticactivitiesmay be considered.Then, by way of conof
clusion,an attemptmaybe made to presentthe characteristics
theinitialphaseofIndianforeign
policy.
I
"Few men," Edward Shils writesof Nehru, "so intellectual
by disposition,
occupy comparablepositionsin any countries."8
The Indianleader'sformative
to thisdisposition
yearscontributed
and to the evolutionof his politicalthoughtwhichdid not begin
to coalesceuntilhe approachedmiddleage.9 Born into an accomplishedline of KashmiriBrahminsin 1889, Jawaharlalwas
theonlyson of MotilalNehru,a barrister
who had risento prominenceand wealthin Allahabad,a religiouscenterin the United
"red jewel."
Provinces,now Uttar Pradesh.Jawaharlalsignifies
His familyname derivesfromthe Urdu termforcanal, nahar.
An ancestor,
and Arabicscholar,had received
Raj Kaul, a Sanskrit
froma Moghul emperoraround 1716 an estatenear a canal
outsideof Delhi afterhe migratedfromKashmirby invitation
of
thecourt.Nehru'sfatherprevailedin thehouseholdas theunquestionedhead, allowinga modestscope forthe son's self-assertion
whichappearedonlyafterthe age of thirtyduringhis political
and intellectual
motherprovided
questsofthe 1920's. Jawaharlal's
him withcompensating
affection
and security.
Althoughshe was
her
husband
tended
have
few
to
orthodox,
religiousconcerns.
Educatedat homebytutors,
Nehruexperienced
an isolatedatmosof
little
disturbed
or
phere privilege
by political economicunrest.
middle
British
influences
in the house.
class,
Upper
predominated
" Edward
Shils, The Intellectual Between Tradition and Modernity: The
Indian Situation (The Hague, 1961), p. 95.
9Nehru's recollectionsof his beginningsare found chieflyin his autobiography,Toward Freedom (New York, 1941), pp. 16-47. Biographical
studies of note are B. R. Nanda, The Nehrus: Motilal and Jawaharlal (New
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262
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264
in spiritand
of international
relations,
alwaysmoremetaphysical
parochialin politicsthan Nehru's,providedNehru with many
of worldaffairs.10
conceptions
Even on the social questionNehru owed much to his own
In 1920 he came to realize at first
experienceand reflections.
hand the plightof the Indian peasantwhenhe investigated
kisan
were especially
unrestin Oudh wherelandlordand moneylender
venal. The exposureappalled the youngsophisticate
and caused
and to doubtthe relhimto feelshameabout his own privileges
evanceofbourgeoisnationalism.
he interpreted
Equallyimportant,
the Indian peasantsituationas one wherethe peasantsexpected
him and menlikehimto riseand lead them.The Brahmindutifullyresponded.11
Firstunderthe tutelageof his patricianfatherand then of
the paternalGandhi,Nehru acquiredstatureand confidence
in
of the 1920's. But partyfactionalism
the nationalist
activities
(involvingdirectactionistsand parliamentary
opportunists),
disapstrifebetweenHindus and
pointingresultsfromnoncooperation,
Moslems,and threejailingsin the 1921-1923periodreducedhis
in the Indian struggle
interest
and producedintellectual
lethargy.
He struggled
withthisconditionin 1926 whenhe tookhis wife
to Europe for her healthand entereda crucialperiodfor the
moldingofhispoliticalthought.
In Geneva he foundtemporary
help for her and a chance
to rethink
hispositionand India'splace in theperspective
ofworld
then
in
the
He
was
struck
the
narrowLocarnophase.
politics,
by
nessof Indian nationalism
and urgedhis fatherto becomebetter
informedabout world affairs.He made brieftripsto Britain,
and talkedto ErnstToller,RomainRolland,
France,and Germany
and Indianrevolutionists
in exile.Of particular
Nehru
importance,
the Congressat the BrusselsCongressof Oppressed
represented
Nationalities
in February,1927, wherehe encountered
a broad
movement
and as he soonappreciated,
againstcolonialism,
capitalism. The meetingincludedanti-imperialists
fromAfrica,Asia,
10 Nehru adapted Gandhi's principlesand applied them to international
accordingto WillardRange,JawaharlalNehru'sWorldView (Athens,
relations,
Georgia; 1961), a thesisI find unconvincing.See my Gandhi On World
Affairs(Washington,
1960).
11For Nehru'ssenseof obligation,see MargaretW. Fisher,"Nehru: The
in India,
Hero As ResponsibleLeader,"in Leadershipand PoliticalInstitutions
RichardL. Parkand Irene Tinker,eds. (Princeton,1959), esp. p. 50.
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265
element,"Nehru
Europe,and Latin America. "The communist
recalledlater,"was also strongthere."12The Marxianspiritand
attackvocabulary
appealedto him,and he issueda pressstatement
From
the
Brussels
the
came
ing imperialism.
meeting
League
withGeorgeLansbury,AlbertEinstein,and
AgainstImperialism,
otherfamousnoncommunists
on its executivecommittee.Nehru,
a
on
Later he persuadedthe
the
committee.
too, accepted post
to
the
Congress affiliate,conceding
potentialdisadvantagesof
"thesocialistcharacterof the League and thepossibility
thatRussian foreignpolicymightinfluenceit."13 Communists
prevailed
in the League and triedto forceNehruto abandon conciliatory
in 1928-1929.He refusedand theLeague
dealingswiththeBritish
expelledhim.
Whenhe leftBrusselsin 1927,Nehrureturned
to Switzerland
and in a reportto the All-IndiaCongressCommittee
condemned
United States "imperialism"
in Latin Americaand praisedthe
Nehru and his father,at the son's urging,
meetingliberally.14
of
accepteda Soviet invitationto attendthe tenthanniversary
the BolshevikRevolution.Their staywas limitedto fourdaysin
Moscow. They met ForeignMinisterChicherinand President
Kalinin. The son leftwithan appreciationof Sovieteducation,
Lenin's reputation,
and the Russianprisonsystem.And he saw
a need forfreeIndia to workforcordialrelationswiththe Soviet
Union.15
Returningto India in 1927, Nehru continuedhis studyof
withGandhi'smoderation,
he supported
Marxism.16Dissatisfied
the Congresswing that demandedindependencewithoutqualificationsas to Commonwealth
ties.And he pressedthe partyto
theleftin foreign
affairs
and domestic
questions.In thelate 1920's
12Nehru,Toward Freedom,p. 124.
13 Quoted in Brecher,
op. cit.,p. 113.
"4Ibid., pp. 111-12.
15Nehru'sviewsof Russia were publishedin Indian newspapersand collectedin JawaharlalNehru,SovietRussia (Bombay,1929). The elderNehru's
of SovietRussia werealso favorableand he expressedthemin the
impressions
LegislativeAssemblywhere he was Leader of the Opposition. See K. M.
Panikkarand A. Pershad,eds.,The Voice of Freedom:The Speechesof Pandit
Motilal Nehru (New York, 1961), pp. 372-392.
s1WithoutnamingNehru,one writersuggests1927 as the startof a preforworldcommunism
viouslyunknownsympathy
amongsomeIndian nationalists. See Bimla Prasad, The Originsof Indian ForeignPolicy: The Indian
National Congressand World Affairs,1885-1947 (Ph.D. Thesis, Columbia
University,
1958), p. 72.
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266
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267
withMarxismand internationalism.
The instantcause of his attractionto Marxismin the late 1920's stemmedfromhis dislike
Its post-1917recordfilled
of the Second SocialistInternational.
and insuffihim "withdistaste,"because it was too bureaucratic
but
because
the
British
Labour
Party,a
cientlymilitant, chiefly
had proveda bitterdisapmemberof the Second International,
to Indian nationalists
who expectedthe partyto give
pointment
In
contrast
Nehrubelievedthatthe
themmoreeffective
support.
both
in dealingwithits
anticolonial
SovietUnion was genuinely
with dependent
and
in
relations
minorities
its
own internal
around
he
turned
1927,
"inevitably
peoples elsewhere.Thus,
19The Mahatma'stheoryof nonviolenceis exploredin myarticle"Toward
a Reevaluationof Gandhi'sPoliticalThought,"The WesternPoliticalQuarterly,XVI (March, 1963), 99-108.
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268
forwhateveritsfaults,it was
withgood willtowardcommunism,
and notimperialistic."20
at leastnothypocritical
he
Concurrently,
foundthatcommunists
had "dictatorial
ways"and "vulgarmethof science which he
ods."21 His devotionto the potentialities
identified
withMarxianclaimsto a scienceof history
strengthens
communism's
attractions
forhim. Moreover,Nehruhad not previouslyfounda basis for his social consciencein Indian ideas,
or renaissance,
whethertraditional
or in liberalor Fabian notions,
him. Additionally,
of
these
had
influenced
he had
all
although
it
lacked
a cowith
Indian
dissatisfied
become
nationalism,
believing
withsomepriorfaithdid
modemideology.Disillusionment
herent,
himin favorof Marxism,forapartfromhis brush
notpredispose
with Theosophyin boyhood,he had alwaystakenpride in his
Althoughin April,1936, Nehrucalled "socialism"his
skepticism.
"vitalcreed,"22he viewedMarxismnot as a faithsystembut as
of
a rationalphilosophy
thatgave himhis firstand onlynetwork
inteltime
and
and
values,linkingchangesdespite
bridging
place
lect and matter.23
betweenNehru'sMarxian ideas
There is a close relationship
For the period,1927-1938,the associaand his internationalism.
lifein whichIndian
tionis foundin an awarenessof international
nationalismwas only one importantunit that had to take its
of other
properplace.24Breakingaway fromthe concentration
Nehru
on
Indian
at
leaders
or, most,imperialquestions,
Congress
about
in
his
ideas
Marxian
self-determination
a
intellecrethought
In thisphase
tual contextand a European,politicalframework.
he becameconvincedthatthe riseof fascismin Italy,Spain, and
Germany,
providedevidenceof how Marxianprinciples
explained
and that his Indian
otherwise
disjointedhistoricalcircumstances,
nationalismmustserve a broad internationalism
illuminatedby
20Nehru, Toward Freedom, p. 126.
21Ibid.
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269
theseexplanations.
He did notthinkofthisrelationship
as a diminutionof Indian aspirationsto freedom.Instead,he considered
Indian nationalismin its highestmanifestation
to coincidewith
this internationalism,
that is to say, duringthe Popular Front
for at that time his appreciationof
period,with antifascism,
Marxismhad reachedits peak. To be an internationalist
was to
be antifascist,
he told a London audienceof the Conferenceon
Peace and Empirein July,1938.25 To Nehruand to manyassociatedwithhimin theCongress
thismeantthatanyIndiannationalist worthhis salt would be an internationalist
fighterin the
and
fascism.
The
next
againstimperialism
struggle
stagewouldbe
a worldfederation
ofundefined
character
in whichsociallyresponsibleand pacificnationalism
wouldprevail.
The apogee of Nehru'sattachment
to a Marxian interpretation of worldpoliticscame in 1937-38whenhe flewto Europe.
In Spain he saw a Manicheantragedyand raisedhis voice in
supportoftheRepublicanregime.He detectedtragedyin Czechoslovakiaand England.He accusedtheBritishGovernment
of seekan
economic
alliance
with
in
an
effort
to
ing
Germany
strengthen
Britain'swaningrole in worldpoliticswhereGermany,Russia,
and the United States providedleadership.26
He believedthat
the Munich agreementconfirmed
his analysisof Britishpolicy.
The Nazi-Sovietdetenteand Russianaggressionin Finland disreactions
appointedhim,but he viewedthemas understandable
to Westernevils.Nehruwroteto Maulana Azad thatthe attack
was to be explainedby Sovietdesireto preventBritishimperialism
fromusingFinland as "a futurejumpingoffplatform"for an
Sovietbehavior
invadingRussia.27At anothertimehe interpreted
as "payingback the imperialist
powersin theirown coin."28He
confessed
thatRussianopportunism
and powerpoliticshad damworld
socialism.
The
was not thatof Marxismfault,
then,
aged
Leninism.
Nehru'sinvolvement
in frustrated
to achieve a
negotiations
national Indian participation
in World War II, the civil disobedienceof 1942, and his subsequentimprisonment
depressed
prior optimismabout men reshapinghistorywith the help of
Marxism.In prisonduring1944 he wrotea major work,The
25
Jawaharlal Nehru, The Unity of India (New York, 1942), pp. 268-277.
p. 302.
27Jawaharlal Nehru, A Bunch of Old Letters (Bombay, 1958), p. 430.
28 Jawaharlal Nehru, China, Spain and the War
(Allahabad, 1940) p. 244.
26 Ibid.,
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270
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271
the controversy
to the UnitedNations.
population,and submitted
The application of Nehru's general directivesfor his country's
The
foreignpolicymay be describedunderorderand strategy.
world ordermay be exemplified
India's
declared
by
friendship
withall states,whatevertheirpoliticalor economicsystems;
by its
for all peoples, and of the eliminaadvocacy of self-determination
tion of war, by the removal of its historicalor potential causes,
Western imperialism,Caucasian racism, economic want, military
alliances,nationalfear,sizable conventionalarmaments,and nuclear
at theBelgrademeetweapons.The problemofwar,Nehruinsisted
thanany of itsroots
ing of neutralsin 1961,is of greaterpriority
which must be approached in termsof solvingthe higherissue.34
The heading of "strategy"is essentiallythat of "nonalignment"
United States in 1959, found in Selig S. Harrison, India and the United States
(New York, 1961), pp. 38-43. A history for the Indian Council of World
Affairs uses principle and interest to explain the sources of India's foreign
policy. See K. P. Karunakaran, India In World Affairs,I (Calcutta, 1952),
pp. 21-57.
33 J. C. Kundra, Indian Foreign Policy, 1947-1954: A Study of Relations
with the Western Bloc (Groningen, 1955), p. 43. Resolutions of the Indian
National Congress party from 1885 to 1952 dealing with external affairs are
compiled in The Background of India's Foreign Policy, N. V. Rajkumar, ed.
(New Delhi, 1952).
s3 The Conference of Heads of State or Governmentof Nonaligned Countries,p. 116. Opposition to war and militarypacts is also importantin Congress
statements. See All India Congress Committee, Resolutions on Foreign Policy:
1947-1957 (New Delhi, n.d.), pp. 11, 14-15, 33, 51-52.
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272
or "independent"
policy,whichin Nehru'smindis morethanan
ad hoc responseto the Cold War. Nonalignment,
the superior
methodfor achievingthe rightinternational
order,would be
India'spolicyevenin theabsenceofthestruggle
betweenthecommunistand anticommunist
blocs. For nonalignment
is a means
to combattheentiresystem
of"traditional"
worldpoliticsin which
and war are naturalresultsand the concentration
of
imperialism
is
a
Thus
Indian
characteristic.
under
power leading
foreign
policy
Nehru has demandedan end to bipolarity,
the particularkind
of concentration
whichIndia has faced foralmosttwo decades.
The culturaland politicalintegrity
of nationsrequiresa breaking
of
hisup the greatcampswhenevertheyappear in international
tory.The processwill, Nehru has argued,spreadthe arena of
he has oftensaid that India does not
peace. To be consistent,
demanda thirdbloc,an illicitobjective.As NehrutoldtheUnited
Nations Assemblyin December,1947, India "travelsa lonely
road." True internationalism,
is incompatiblewith alignment.35
this
is
his
thatIndia willnot barnotion
insistence
Strengthening
for
ends
selfish
an
gain
through independent
pathin worldpolitics.
to
for
India's
Nehruhas presentBut, compensate
possibleisolation,
ed hisnationas a pillarand guardianofinternational
organization
interests
of themajornations.36
againsttheselfish
Nehru'sideas on revolution,
notablythe Marxian analysesof
and
capitalism,imperialism, war, have influencedthe fieldsof
order and strategy.Nonetheless,
the Indian leader's movement
from
The
reflected
in
Marxism,
away
Discoveryof India, reduced
itsappeal to himas a mastertheoryof life.For himMarxismhad
nearlythat statusduring1936-38; but in the postindependence
periodto 1958, it was moreof a major politicaland economic
otherexplanations,
explanation,
subjectto limitingcircumstances,
and revisions.Consequently,
withthe acquisitionof sovereignty,
Nehrudid not himselfengagein or cause his nationto enterthe
militantclass struggleof international
communism
and its penetrationofnoncommunist
societies
constitutional
or
othermeans.
by
And he did notattempt
to buildan Indiannationafterthemodel
of SovietRussia,despitehis admirationformuchof the Russian
social reconstruction.
On the otherhand, he consideredhimself
M. N. Das, op. cit.,p. 202.
Berkesand MohinderS. Bedi, The Diplomacyof India: Indian
ForeignPolicyin the UnitedNations (Stanford,1958), pp. 2-3.
35
36 Ross N.
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275
tionalistChineseregimeas an official
targetof Indian displeasure,
with Nehru'sguarded commentson the communist
contrasting
a nationwhosefreedom
he had
seizureofpowerin Czechoslovakia,
knownfirsthand.40
Indian behaviorin the UnitedNationsafterthemainKorean
crisisdeclinedprovidedfurther
indications
of New Delhi'snavigation in worldpoliticsbased on checkpointsfromthe portside.
Nehru'sgovernment
deniedthe competenceof a UnitedNations
headed
an
Indian, into enforcedlabor in the Soviet
by
inquiry,
Union,on the groundsthatthe studydealtwitha singlekindof
slavelaborand did not studyconditions
India, howelsewhere.41
had
to
other
because
ever,
objectedpreviously
investigations
they
weretoobroad. Additional
evidenceis foundin thecareerofV. K.
KrishnaMenon in the UnitedNations. AssociatedwithNehru
since1935,afterindependence
KrishaMenonbecameIndia'sHigh
Commissioner
in GreatBritainand in 1952 beganhis UnitedNationsservice,becomingchiefdelegatein twoyears. In the world
he articulatedand executeda proceduraland suborganization
stantiveapproachholdingthe West, and especiallythe United
foractivelyor passively
theadvanceof
States,responsible
impeding
international
Afro-Asian
and
the
underdevelnationalism,
peace,
lands.
In
1956
Nehru
rewarded
Krishna
Menon
with
cabinet
oped
rank.A neopacifist,
KrishnaMenonsoonbecameDefenseMinister,
from1958 hisand Nehru'sbeliefthatRussiawould
implementing
be a socialistfriend
to checktheNew Chinaand theUnitedStates.
and publicdemandsfollowing
thefrontier
debacle(1962)
Congress
compelledthe PrimeMinisterto releaseKrishnaMenonfromthe
government.Despitetheintellectual
kinshipof Nehruand Krishna Menon for nearlythree decades,42there is no substantial
evidenceof undue influenceon Nehru or that KrishnaMenon
exceededhis authority,
exceptduringthe Hungariancrisiswhen
he votedagainsta UnitedNationsresolution
callingforsupervised
elections
in Hungaryinsteadof following
instructions
to abstainon
all Hungarianissues.43KrishnaMenon'simportance
is thathe is
Norman Cousins, Talks With Nehru (New York, 1951), pp. 55-57.
41 A/C. 3/SR. 53 (23 November, 1953).
42 A biographer speaks of Wahlverwandtschaft,
a rare linkingof minds. See
Emil Lengyel, Krishna Menon (New York, 1962), p. 99. Harold J. Laski was
Krishna Menon's guru in his formativeyears when he drew his political ideas
fromsources familiar to Nehru.
43Brecher,Nehru, p. 573.
40
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276
a prismwhichexaggerated
Nehru'smindwhere,as A. D. Gorwalla
wrotein 1959, "A considerable
tenderness
towardcommunism
is
discernible."44
The Hungariancrisisproduceda much discussedillustration
of the Indian leader'skindlytreatment
of Sovietmisdeeds. On
November9, 1956,he explainedto theIndianpeoplewiththeaid
of a note fromBulganinthat the unrestin Hungary,datingto
October23,was a confusing,
and he delayeduntil
domestic
conflict;
November19 beforeadvisingtheLok Sabha, aftermounting
critia genuine,nationalrevolt.
cism,thatSovietarmieshad suppressed
Even thenhe interpreted
Russianactionas an outgrowth
of the
WarsawPact, a reactionto NATO, and of theundesirable
notion
of military
alliances;he said thatthisdeplorableviolencewas not
akinto the aggression
againstEgypt.45That Nehrudistinguished
Soviet and Westernaggressions
was no surpriseto experienced
observers
of Indian foreignpolicywho knewthat he and other
Afro-Asians
had notconsidered
of Soviet
theactivities
imperialistic
Russia in EasternEurope after1945.46
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278
of JohnFosterDulles in mid-1956that"neutrality"
was obsolete
was an "immoraland
and apart fromveryspecialcircumstances
The Secretary
of Statelaterexplained
conception."48
shortsighted
was immoralonly when it meant denouncing
that neutrality
"genuine collectivesecurity.""49
tensionbetweennationswithmuchin
Behindthisunfortunate
commonthereweretwodifferent
waysoflookingat theworld,not
with
solelyto be explainedbytheabsenceofIndiandisillusionment
in contrastwith the Americanexperience.50The
communism
PrimeMinister's
visitto the UnitedStatesin the fallof 1956, alforvisitorand hostthanNehru'sfirstvisit
more
successful
though
narrowthegap betweenthetwo outin 1949,did notappreciably
of theproblem,the sendingof
looks. As a subsequentillustration
Americantroops into Lebanon in 1958 corroboratedIndian
while in the
fearsabout United Statesimperialism,
government
fromopening
Americanviewtheactionwas to preventrevolutions
thewayto communist
governments.
In the period,1951-58,eventsand Nehru'sresponding
policy
to the Marxiststrainsin his thought.51Theregave prominence
shiftin Indian foreignpolicyis evident.By
after,a perceptible
of Marxthe end of the 1959-63periodNehru'sreconsideration
ism,externalchangesand domesticeventshad dissolvedthe unity
of the nation'sinternational
policy,erasedmuchof the self-confias to the futureof
dence of its molderand produceduncertainty
In "The
theNehruvian
and
interests.
of
Indian
interpretation
goals
Basic Approach,"a sensitiveand revealingmemorandumfirst
circulatedin 1958 amonghis associates,Nehruoffered
privately
if Marxismhad everbeen an eschatology
that
forhimas it
proof
had beenforothers,52
itno longerattracted
himin thatway.53 For
48John Foster Dulles, quoted in Department of State Bulletin, XXXIV
50Cf. Phillips Talbot and S. L. Poplai, India and America (New York,
1958), p. 41.
51A penetrating
studypublishedtowardthe close of the 1951-58 phase
whichstresses
theMarxianoriginsof Nehru'sideas abouttheworldis Bozeman,
op. cit.
52 See Gabriel A. Almond, The Appeals of Communism (Princeton, 1954),
p. 377.
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279
he had movedsufficiently
far fromMarxismto reflecton some
to how it may
reasonswhymenhave adoptedit, callingattention
for
lost
notapplicable
a
an
faith, explanation
compensate
religious
to him,or fordisillusionment
withWesterncivilization,
whichis
to his case. He condemnedMarxian predisposition
to
pertinent
employviolence. In economicshe believed,withoutgivingany
details,that timehad outdatedsome partsof Marxian analysis,
economicprocesses.He foundtruth
althoughit did helpto clarify
and violence,
in the chargethatcapitalismis builton exploitation
and impliedthatMarxismavoidstheformer
and genuinely
seeksthe
man.
of
kingdom
Two themesin "The BasicApproach"are especiallyrelatedto
the studyof Nehru'spoliticalthoughtand Indian foreignpolicy.
The firstis a suspicionof poweritself,a distrust
of the chiefinof
This
outlook
gredient politics.
may originatein Nehru'sexto
British
liberal
and socialistthoughtor
posure nineteenth-century
to Buddhism. It may have contributed
in
to his indecisiveness
domesticand externalmatters
whichhe has shownduringhis own
tenureof power. The secondthemeinvolveshis judgmentthat
Marxismfailsbecauseof itsrigidity,
contradictions,
fundamentally
and lack of concernwiththe "essentialneedsof humannature."
whichanswered
Althoughhe had not foundanotherphilosophy
theseneeds,it was clearthathe had turnedfrompositions
heldin
1944 and notablyin 1934. In 1958 the implications
of these
themesforIndian foreignpolicywerethatNehru'squestforthe
best international
orderwould proceedwith less certainty
and
but
also
with
more
of
operationaleffectiveness,
appreciation the
liberalism
and freedom
in thecapitalist
as
bloc, wellas an increased
awareness
ofMarxianerrors.On thislastmatter,
itis probablethat
ofSovietthought
by 1958Nehruhad begunto realizethecoarseness
on worldpoliticsevenbehindthetalkofde-Stalinization
and peace.
whatGeorgeLiska finds,thatthe
Conceivablyhe had discovered
bloc in the developingworldare
specialfavorsof the communist
and limited,goingto the mostradicalanti-Western
unpredictable
member.54ClearlyNasserand Sukarnohad emergedby 1958 in
a play-offgame for which they were and are politicallyand
bettersuitedthantheIndianleader.
temperamentally
Accept Pandit Nehru's Approach?" World Marxist Review, I (December,
1958), 38-56.
54GeorgeLiska,NationsIn Alliance (Baltimore,1962), p. 252.
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281
Out of theseingredients
he had developedhis China policy,sentiabout
the
cultural
bondsbetweenthetwo greatAsian
mentalizing
too rapidlyand withoutdiplomaticcomnations,withdrawing
in Tibet,
fromthe"forward
pensation
policy"ofBritish
imperialism
and overlooking
in the revolutionary
Pekingregimewhat he did
not overlookin the acts of London or Washington.Although
critics,
Gandhian,AcharyaKripalani,56
especiallytheindependent
arose in 1959 and laterto challengeNehru'sChina policy,the
PrimeMinistermade fewconcessions
to thoseIndianswho argued
thatto continuePanch Shila meantto appease Peking. He declinedtotaketheTibetanhumanrights
issuetotheUnitedNations,
and afterdramatic,armedattacksin disputedareas by Chinese
forcesin the fallof 1959, he adopteda defensive,
nonprovocative
attitudetowardPeking,accompaniedby protestsagainsttrespass
and modeststepsto improveIndian defenses
and influence
in the
mountain
zones. NehruinvitedChou En-laito New Delhiin April,
discussions
1960,but thegestureand thesubsequentunsatisfactory
servedonlyto weakenIndia'sposition.57
The mostdecisiveact againstcommunism
was internal.58In
Prasad used
advice,President
July,1959,on the PrimeMinister's
Article356 ofthe Indian Constitution
to displacetheelectedcommunistgovernment
ofKerala and to installPresidential
rulewhich
lasted untilnew electionsin 1960 had returnedan anticommunistcoalition. The centerhad facedthispotentialYenan in Kerala
since 1957; but withmounting
local unrestovercaste,education,
and labor issues,New Delhi acted withpoliticalprofitwhenthe
CommunistPartyof India was dividedinto "nationalist,"
"Chinese," and undecidedfactions. Despitethe formalconstitutionalismofIndiancommunists
and therelativeneutrality
oftheSoviet
5 A formerPresidentof the Congresswho in 1951 moved into the
opis desirablebut that Nehru
position,Kripalani believes that nonalignment
to Tibet and China. See J. B. Kripalani,"For Principled
appliedit incorrectly
Neutrality,"
ForeignAfairs,XXXVIII (October,1959), 46-60.In 1962 Krishna Menon defeatedKripalaniin NorthBombayfora parliamentary
seat, but
in 1963 Kripalaniwon in Amroha,Uttar Pradesh,largelyon the China issue,
overa CabinetMinister,
HafizIbrahim,whomNehruendorsed.
to salvage his China policybetweenMarch,
5 The Indian leader's efforts
1959, and April, 1960, may be followedin Nehru, Indian ForeignPolicy,
pp. 313-385.
scene in 1959, see HarryGelman,"The
5sFor the Indian and communist
Communist
in Communist
Partyof India: Sino.SovietBattleground,"
Strategies
in Asia, A. Doak Barnett,ed. (New York,1963), pp. 107-113.
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282
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283
case withPeking;contrariwise,
the "NATO reaction,"and proIndian responsesin the new statesstrengthened
Nehru'shand in
hisattempt
to findhisownwayoutoftheborderproblems.Semiisolatedfromall campsexceptthethirdworld,Nehrudescribedhis
to negotiatewithan
approachin March, 1962, as a willingness
mind
and
to
Aksai Chin road in
Chinese
use
of
the
open
permit
a
settlement.60
Underneath
thispermissiveness
Ladakh,pending
a
conviction
the
facts
do
which
not
lay
necessarily
justify,that
and
the
had
determined
entire
Sinocustom
treaties,geography
Indianfrontier
and madeit a closedboundary,
to
subjectonly small
the
end
of
this
external
1961,
conviction,
changes. By
September,
evidenceof Sovietand Americanpressureon CommunistChina,
and overestimation
of the Indian Army'seffectiveness
had contributedto an unrealistic
posture,revealedin Nehru'sstatements
aboutrecapturing
and rigidpreconditions
forresumption
territory
ofnegotiations.61
India and Chinablamedeach otherwhenmajor
hostilities
to a detailedstudy"China
beganin October. According
to
have
an
baited
elaborate
appears
trap"so thatIndia seemedbut
was notresponsible
forthehostilities.62
The clear defeatof ill-equippedIndian forcesin the Northeastand Ladakh duringOctober,and November,1962,profoundIndia and muchof the world.The mainresponseof
ly disturbed
the Afro-Asian
neutralscame in the Colombo Proposals,63dein
veloped December,1962, by Ceylon,Indonesia,the United
Arab Republic,Ghana, Cambodia and Burma, which lean in
the Indian direction
but have been acceptedin principlewithout
difficulty
by Mao's regime.AlthoughIndia has agreed to the
and substanceof the ColomboProposals,providedthat
principles
60 The Hindu, March 27, 1962.
1xKlaus H. Pringsheim, "China,
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284
Communist
Chinaacceptsthemin fullwithoutreservation,
to date
the propagandaresultof theseoutsideefforts
has been as much
to Peking'sinterests
as to New Delhi's. Involvedin its Cuban
adventure,Russia firstreactedto the 1962 crisisin a relatively
pro-Chinesemanner,but later swung to condemnPeking for
Moscow
usingforceto settlefrontier
questions;yet increasingly
has been unable to do what Nehruhas anticipatedsince 1958,
to moderateor checkPeking'sforeign
policyto India's advantage.
Westernmilitary
and psychological
assistance,
soughtand receivedby the Indian government,
has opened the door to new
Indian problemssincelate 1962. These problemsincludean overrelianceon Westernresources;embarrassment
about a formally,
nation
and
nonaligned
receiving
displaying
foreignarms; friction
about militaryparitywith Pakistan;dilemmasabout balancing
democratic
the
help withSovietaid; and questionsof readjusting
to
economy meetdefenseneeds.At a deeperlevel Indian politics
inwardin Gandhianfashion,bringbeganto turnthe searchlight
ing in August,1963, the firstmotionof censureagainstthe Consince freedom.Althoughdefeated,the motion
gressgovernment
providedinsight,
especiallyin the chargeof M. S. Masani of the
SwatantraPartythatIndian nonalignment
had collapsedbecause
of the government's
basic misunderstanding
of communism
and
and
measures.
faultydiplomatic security
From the 1959-1963recordtherearisesthe urgentneed to
the nation'sforeignpolicyfollowingthe virtualterreconstruct
minationof its China policyand the raisingof seriousquestions
about futurerelationswiththe SovietUnion and the Afro-Asian
neutralists.
It is unlikelythat PrimeMinisterNehru,because of
habitsof mindand declining
health,is equippedto meettheneed.
On the China issue,he has foundthe rootproblemin Peking's
returnto a "two camp" doctrine,
producinga driveagainstIndia
as an outstanding
memberof the nonalignedworldwhichdoes
notdeserveto exist.He has avoidedopenexamination
of his own
ideas and of errorswithinIndia, althoughhe has showna new
in worldpolitics.64
insightinto the limitsof peacefulintentions
India remainson friendly
termswiththe Soviet Union as part
of its refusalformally
to alignwiththe Westand to secureRussian economicand military
assistance.
" Jawaharlal Nehru, "Changing
India," Foreign Affairs, XLI
1963), 460-461.
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(April,
285
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