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(Propriety of bail; issue centers on when a person is considered in the custody of the law as a necessary requisite before bail

could be granted)
G.R. No. 115407
August 28, 1995
REGALADO, J.:
PETITIONER:
MIGUEL P. PADERANGA
RESPONDENTS:
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
-Petition for review on certiorari of the CAs decision denying Paderangas right to bail
-Paderanga was mayor during the time he was accused and filed against an amended information for the crime of multiple murder for the death of the spouses Bucag and
their son.
-The original information did not implead Paderanga in the said crime. However, a person named Roxas was implicated in the crime who, not long after, said that Paderanga
was the mastermind of the killing.
-Atty. Paderanga assailed his indictment to the crime up to the Supreme Court. The SC, however, sustained the information filed against him. Hence, a warrant of arrest was
issued. However, before the same could be served to him, Atty. Paderanga filed a motion for admission to bail.
-The RTC held a hearing for the application for bail. This was granted on November 5, 1992 at the amount of P200,000.
-The State Prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration of the approval of bail. The RTC denied this motion. Hence, State Prosecutor elevated his motion to the CA who
reversed the RTC resolution granting bail to Paderanga.
-CA ruling reversing the resolution of the RTC to grant motion for bail:
1. At the time when bail was granted, Paderanga was not in the custody of the law because he filed his motion for admission to bail before he was actually arrested or had
voluntarily surrendered.
2. Crime charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua and evidence of guilt is strong. Hence, bail is improper.
3. Prosecution was not given the chance to oppose Paderangas application for bail contrary to the requirements of due process.
-Paderangas contentions:
1. He was in custody of the law upon his filing of his motion to bail. This mere act is an "invocation by the accused of the court's jurisdiction that is sufficient to vest the court
with jurisdiction over the person of the accused and bring him within the custody of the law."
2. No strong evidence to preclude him to bail.
3. Waiver of Regional State Prosecutor Abejo was binding to all parties of the prosecution and hence, State Prosecutor cannot allege deprivation of procedural due process.
4. Laches in the filing of the motion for reconsideration in the CA.
ISSUE/S:
WON Paderangas motion to be admitted to bail is proper for granting?
HELD:
- The Court finds merit for Paderanga.
- Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearing before any court. Its main
purpose, then, is to relieve an accused from the rigors of imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance at the trial. As bail is intended to obtain or secure
one's provisional liberty, the same cannot be posted before custody over him has been acquired by the judicial authorities, either by his lawful arrest or voluntary surrender. As
this Court has put it in a case "it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free.
- A person is considered to be in the custody of the law:
(a) when he is arrested either by virtue of a valid warrant of arrest, or by a valid warrantless arrest, or
(b) when he has voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to the proper authorities.
- Paderanga was found to be constructively under the custody of the law as he voluntarily submitted himself to the RTCs jurisdiction and that he made known to the same
court that he cannot personally appear to submit himself to its jurisdiction because of physical incapacity as that time, he was confined in Cagayan Capitol College General
Hospital suffering from acute costochondritis.
- Section 13, Article III of the Constitution lays down the rule that before conviction, all indictees shall be allowed bail, except only those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong. Section 4 of Rule 114 provides that all persons in custody shall, before conviction by a regional trial court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right. The right to bail, which may be waived considering its personal
nature and which arises from the time one is placed in the custody of the law, springs from the presumption of innocence accorded every accused upon whom should not be
inflicted immediate incarceration since after trial he may be entitled to acquittal.
-Hence, admission to bail is a right guaranteed by the Constitution itself and must be granted to all persons accused before conviction except if he is charged of a capital
offense, or those which are punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment and the evidence of guilt is strong. The hearing held for this purpose will discuss whether
the evidence of guilt is strong as must be proved by the prosecution and the terms of the provisional release, if admitted to bail.

-On the allegation of the State Prosecutor of not providing them procedural due process to oppose the motion to be admitted on bail by Paderanga, the Court found no merit
on their arguments. The Court said that Regional Prosecutor Abejo has the authority to represent, and thereby waive the prosecutions right to present evidence against the
motion for bail of Paderanga as his authority was not yet withdrawn by Sec of Justice Drilon at the time the hearing of the motion to bail was held.
-Further, notwithstanding dispensation of the prosecution to present evidence against Paderangas motion to be admitted to bail, the RTC still proceeded to examine the
evidence adduced by the prosecution and the defense in the omnibus order. Only after this did the RTC decided that provisional release of Paderanga could be granted.
(Issue on excessive bail; guidelines used in setting up the amount of bail)
G.R. No. 141529
June 6, 2001 GONZAGA-REYES, J.
PETITIONER:
FRANCISCO YAP, JR., aka EDWIN YAP
RESPONDENTS:
COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
- Francisco is charged of estafa for alleged misappropriation amounting to P5,500,000. Francisco was convicted as charged by the RTC.
-During elevation of the case to the CA, Francisco filed a Motion to Fix Bail for the Provisional Liberty of Accused Appellant Pending Appeal. Commenting on the said motion,
the OSG suggested the amount of P5.5M as bail and a submission of a certification from the mayor of the residence of Francisco that he is a resident of the area and that he
will remain to be so until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court and private complainant. The OSG, in explaining
his comment anent the P5.5M bond, said that the P5.5M bail is proper considering the severity of the penalty imposed, the weight of the evidence against Francisco, and the
gravity of the offense of which Francisco was convicted by the RTC. He asserted that the P5,500,000.00 not only corresponded to civil liability but also to the amount of fraud
imputed to Francisco.
-Francisco countered the comments of the OSG averring his right against excessive bail. Nonetheless, the CA upheld the suggestion of the OSG and granted to post bail in
the amount of P5.5M. Francisco appealed to reduce the bail amount but was denied. Hence, the present appeal before SC.
-Francisco challenged the legal basis of the CA for setting a prohibitory amount of bail; for using his civil liability as basis for setting up the same. Instead, he proferred that the
amount of bail be fixed at P40,000 provided under the 1996 bail bond as the maximum amount of bail that can be posted for the crime of estafa.
ISSUE/S:
WON the CA erred in setting amount of bail to P5.5M as based on the possible civil liability?
HELD:
-The Court found merit on the alleged violation of Franciscos right against excessive bail.
- Franciscos case falls within the provisions of Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1997 Rules of Court which states:
SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary. -- Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
the court, on application, may admit the accused to bail.
The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty under the same bail bond during the period to appeal subject to the consent
of the bondsman.
If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, but not more than twenty (20) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail
previously granted shall be cancelled, upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:
(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or has violated the conditions of his bail without valid
justification;
(c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, or under conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit another crime.
- Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure advises courts to consider the following factors in the setting of the amount of bail:
(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;
(c) Penalty for the offense charged;
(d) Character and reputation of the accused;
(e) Age and health of the accused;
(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;
(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;
(h) Forfeiture of other bail;
(i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.
- The Court held that appropriate conditions have been imposed in the bail bond to ensure against the risk of flight, particularly, the combination of the hold-departure order and
the requirement that Francisco inform the court of any change of residence and of his whereabouts. Although an increase in the amount of bail while the case is on appeal may
be meritorious, the Court found that the fixing of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of Franciscos right to bail. The

purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the Court. The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of
the accused when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.
-The Court, in deciding as to the proper amount of bail to be imposed, acknowledged the merit in using the Bail Bond Guide issued by the Department of Justice but declared
that the same is not binding to the courts and any increase thereto could be made considering the attendant circumstances.
-The Court finally reduced the bail bond from P5,500,000 to P200,000 while affirming all other resolutions of the CA anent the bail bond.
(Tackled the applicability of the right to bail in extradition cases)
G.R. No. 148571
September 24, 2002 PANGANIBAN, J.:
PETITIONER:
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Represented by the Philippine Department of Justice
RESPONDENT:
HON. GUILLERMO PURGANAN, Presiding Judge Regional Trial Court of Manila and MARC JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARCIO BATACAN CRESPO
FACTS:
- This is a petition for certiorari of the ff two orders of the RTC:
1) US Govt application for the issuance of an arrest warrant for Mark Jimenez;
2) Granted issuance of the warrant and simultaneously granting bail.
The US Govt filed this petition in Court to annul the order granting bail and provisional release and take Mark Jimenez into legal custody.
-This petition started when the US Govt requested the Phil Govt for the extradition of Mark Jimenez pursuant to the RP-US Extradition Treaty. Before the DOJ could file a
petition for Marks extradition, Mark filed for and was granted a TRO prohibiting DOJ from filing of a case for Marks extradition. The RTC ordered too the SOJ to provide Mark
with a copy of the petition together with the attaching supporting documents. This is one of the alleged errors of the RTC in this present petition saying that the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion when it adopted this procedure of notice and hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Upon appeal by the SOJ before the SC, initially, the
Court affirmed the decision of the RTC but subsequently changed Its mind and favored the US Govt arguing that Mark is not clothed with the right to notice and hearing during
the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
-Hence, the US Govt, represented by DOJ, filed before the RTC an extradition case where the ff allegations were laid down:
(1) conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit certain offenses in violation of Title 18 US Code Section 371;
(2) tax evasion;
(3) wire fraud;
(4) false statements; and
(5) illegal campaign contributions
ISSUE/S:
1. In extradition proceedings, are prospective extraditees entitled to notice and hearing before warrants for their arrest can be issued?
2. Are they entitled to the right to bail and provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending?
HELD:
-As a general rule, extraditees are not entitled to notice and hearing before arrest warrants can be issued and extraditees are not entitled to the right to bail while the
extradition case is pending. The Court finds merit in the petition.
Resolving procedural issues: On Alleged Prematurity of Present Petition:
-The US Govt, thru the Phil Govt, did not file a motion for reconsideration in the RTC/Extradition Court and did not elevate the case to the CA but directly filed the petition
before the SC.
-The Court ruled as follows:
As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court will not prosper unless the inferior court has been given, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to
correct the errors imputed to it. This rule, though, has certain exceptions:
(1) when the issue raised is purely of law,
(2) when public interest is involved,
(3) in case of urgency, or
(4) when the questions raised are the same as those that have already been squarely argued and exhaustively passed upon by the lower court.
The Court resolved that aside from being of no 4 above in nature, the issues in the present case also involve pure questions of law that are of public interest. Hence, a motion
for reconsideration may be dispensed with. We resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present petition in the interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations so
as to promptly put an end to the present controversy which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked national interest because of the magnitude of the problem.
Moreover, requiring the petitioners to file their petition first with the Court of Appeals would only result in a waste of time and money.
On resolving the substantive issues, the Court deemed it necessary to discuss first the Five Postulates of Extradition
1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime.

Extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of suppressing crime by facilitating the arrest and the custodial transfer of a fugitive from one state to the other. Hence, it is
a major deterrent against affluent criminals who escape from the place of commission of the crime and avoid prosecution by escaping to another country.
2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused
An extradition treaty presupposes that both parties thereto have examined, and that both accept and trust, each others legal system and judicial process. Our affixing of our
signature on an extradition treaty signifies our confidence in the capacity and the willingness of the other state to protect the basic rights of the person sought to be extradited.
3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis
An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin
with, the process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state
where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extradite.
Criminal Proceeding
involve a fullblown trial
requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction
judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final

Extradition Proceeding
summary in nature
may be ordered extradited upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case
may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him

The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether the extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person
sought is extraditable.
4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.
The Phil Govt must fulfill its obligations under the Extradition Treaty as otherwise will paint a bad image for the country and will hinder other countries/states to enter into
treaties with us.
5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight
Persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This prima facie presumption finds reinforcement in the experience of the executive branch that nothing short of
confinement can ensure that the accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the requested state in order to thwart their extradition to the requesting state. The Court took notice of
the fact that Mark left the US even before his indictment proceedings were completed and that he stayed in the Phil despite knowledge that the US is asking for his return.
These circumstances manifest Marks propensity to flee.
First Substantive Issue:
Is Respondent Entitled to Notice and Hearing Before the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest?
-No, an extradite is not entitled to notice and hearing before arrest.
-Section 6 of PD 1069 (Prescribing the Procedure For The Extradition Of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes In A Foreign Country) provides:
SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing, Service of Notices.
(1) Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as practicable, summon the accused to appear and to answer the
petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. [H]e may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused which may be served anywhere within the
Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice. Upon receipt of
the answer, or should the accused after having received the summons fail to answer within the time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the case or set another
date for the hearing thereof.
(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be promptly served each upon the accused and the attorney having charge of
the case.
-The Court held that the word immediate modifies/qualifies the word arrest. Thereby concluding that a hearing is not necessary prior to the arrest as doing so will render
the provision in the Extradition Law for immediate arrest nugatory. The provision only requires the extradition court to make a prima facie finding to make a speedy initial
determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused based on the materials available to it and not to make an exhaustive inquiry.
-The Court opined that Judge Puruganan would have been able to establish that prima facie impression based on the attachments of the petition submitted by the US
Govt. Corollarily, no notice and hearing was necessary before arrest could be made. The Court also sided with the US Govt when it said that sending to persons sought
to be extradited a notice of the request for their arrest and setting it for hearing at some future date would give them ample opportunity to prepare and execute an
escape.
-The Court also found it proper to restate in clear language for the guidance of lower courts the ff procedure in extradition cases:
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must study them and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether (a) they
are sufficient in form and substance, (b) they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the person sought is extraditable. At his discretion, the judge
may require the submission of further documentation or may personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of this study and examination, no
prima facie finding is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the judge.
On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the judge must immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the
same time summoned to answer the petition and to appear at scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the

potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings. In our opinion, the foregoing
procedure will "best serve the ends of justice" in extradition cases.
Second Substantive Issue:
Is Respondent Entitled to Bail?
- Mark invokes his right to bail under Art III Sec 13 of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, US Govt avers this provision does not apply to extraditees.
- The Court found merit in the submission of the US Govt. The above constitutional provision only applies to a person who has been arrested and detained for violation of
Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. Mark should apply for bail
before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.
-The Court also disproved the averment of Mark that there was violation of due process of his fundamental right that "[n]o one shall be deprived of x x x liberty x x x without
due process of law. Based on jurisprudence, the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard but, at the same time, point out that the doctrine does not always call
for a prior opportunity to be heard where the circumstances such as those present in an extradition case call for it, a subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. In the
present case, Mark will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right
to due process and fundamental fairness.
-Nonetheless, there could be exceptions to the rule that the right to bail does not apply to extraditees, viz:
Only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and
(2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it
grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.
Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the
burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness.
-On this track, Mark argued that he would qualify for the ff reasons:
Reason
Alleged Disenfranchisement of Manila if he will be extradited since he was elected
HOR member

Jimenez further contends that because the extradition proceedings are lengthy, it
would be unfair to confine him during the pendency of the case
Jimenez further claims that he is not a flight risk because he has not left the country
even after learning of the extradition petition.

Court opinion
The Court has resolved this issue in a prior case where It ruled that elected officials
are not substantially different to warrant another classification to exempt from the
equal protection of the laws doctrine and that being an elected official does not
exempt him from being imprisoned. Election to the position of Congressman is not a
reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement.
extradition cases are summary in nature
not fleeing upon receipt of the extradition petition does not mean that he will not flee
upon nearing affirmation of the petition of the US Govt.

(Right against excessive bail; guidelines for the lower courts in fixing the amount of bail)
G.R. Nos. L-32951-2 September 17, 1971 FERNANDO, J.:
PETITIONER:
RICARDO DE LA CAMARA
RESPONDENTS:
HON. MANUEL LOPEZ ENAGE, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City (Branch II)
FACTS:
-Present case is a petition for certiorari against the resolution of CFI fixing bail at P1.2M for being an effective denial of the right to bail. However, during the pendency of
resolution to this petition, Ricardo escaped from the provincial jail rendering this case moot and academic. Nonetheless, the Court deemed it appropriate to discuss herein
relevant points to serve as guide for lower courts in fixing the amount of bail.
- Ricardo was then mayor of Misamis Oriental and he was impleaded in an information charging multiple murder, physical injuries and multiple frustrated murder. Despite
these, Ricardo maintained his innocence. Moreover, the prosecution has not presented any evidence against Ricardo as of the time of filing the instant petition.
- Judge Enage then issued an order granting Ricardos application for bail, admitting that there was a failure on the part of the prosecution to prove that Ricardo would flee if he
had the opportunity, and fixed the amount of the bail bond at the excessive amount of P1,195,200.00, the sum of P840,000.00 for the information charging multiple murder and
P355,200.00 for the offense of multiple frustrated murder. Sec of Justice notified Judge Enage of the exorbitance of the bail amount pegged. Ricardo motioned to reconsider.
However, Judge Enage sustained the amount at P1.2M.
ISSUE/S:
WON the CFI committed grave abuse of discretion in setting the amount of bail at P1.2M?
HELD:
- The Court held that, under the circumstances, there being only two offenses charged, the amount required as bail could not possibly exceed P50,000.00 for the information
for murder and P25,000.00 for the other information for frustrated murder. The Court reminded the court a quos that when the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered
nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive.

- Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charged with capital offenses when the evidence of guilt is strong. Such a right flows from the presumption of
innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
-In the case of Villaseor v. Abano, the guidelines in the fixing of bail was summarized, as follows:
(1) ability of the accused to give bail;
(2) nature of the offense;
(3) penalty for the offense charged;
(4) character and reputation of the accused;
(5) health of the accused;
(6) character and strength of the evidence;
(7) probability of the accused appearing in trial;
(8) forfeiture of other bonds;
(9) whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
(10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases.

G.R. No. L-5371

March 26, 1953

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee


AQUINO MINGOA, defendant-appellant
Presumption of innocence.
Facts:
Found short in his accounts and unable to produce the missing fund amounting to P3,938 upon demand by the provincial auditor, municipal treasurer officer-incharge Aquino Mingoa, was prosecuted and convicted for the crime of malversation of public funds.

He now assails the constitutionality of Art. 217 of the RPC for authorizing presumptions of guilt from the mere fact of failure, upon demand, to produce any sum
lacking in accountability. Article 217 of the RPC reads:

The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly
authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use.

The assailed provision is, as argued, violative to the presumption of innocence under Sec 14 of the 1987 constitution and is hence, unconstitutional.
Issue:
WON the said RPC provision violates the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved?
Ruling:
- No, the RPC provision is not violative of the presumption of innocence guarantee.
-In many events, the validity of statutes establishing presumptions in criminal cases is now settled matter. "There is no constitutional objection to the passage of law
providing that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by contrary presumption founded upon the experience of human conduct, and enacting what
evidence shall be sufficient to overcome such presumption of innocence."
-In line with this view, it is generally held in the United States that the legislature may enact that when certain facts have been proven, they shall be prima facie evidence
of the existence of the guilt of the accused and shift the burden of proof to the accused, provided there be rational connection between that facts proved and the
ultimate fact presumed, so that the inference of the one from proof of the others is not unreasonable and arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in
common experience.

-The statute in the present case creates a presumption of guilt once certain facts are proved. Furthermore, the statute establishes only a prima facie presumption, thus giving
the accused an opportunity to present evidence to rebut it. The presumption is reasonable and will stand the test of validity.

G.R. No. L-52245 January 22, 1980


PETITIONERS:

PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, JR.

RESPONDENT:

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS:
-Petitioner Sigot and Salapantan, Jr. assail the validity of the following statutory provisions:
Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 Sec. 4. ...
Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified
to be a candidate for any of the offices covered by this Act, or to participate in any partisan political activity therein:
provided that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing of charges for the commission of such
crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact.
ISSUE/S:
WON the above statutory provision violates the presumption of innocence provided under the Constitution?
HELD:
-Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel.
-An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a
candidate is disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one
is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against whom charges have
been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office
(Right to be heard personally or by a counsel)

G.R. No. L-2809

March 22, 1950

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


FRISCO HOLGADO, defendant-appellant.

Facts:
-Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the CFI with slight illegal detention. Per the information filed, Holgado, as a private person, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag
in the house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving her personal liberty. Based on the transcripts, Holgado plead guilty with qualification:

Q. do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty? A. I have no lawyer and I will plead guilty.

Court:

Arraign the accused.

Note:
Interpreter read the information to the accused in the local dialect after which he was asked this question.

Q. What do you plead? A. I plead guilty, but I was instructed by one Mr. Ocampo.

Q. Who is that Mr. Ocampo, what is his complete name? A. Mr. Numeriano Ocampo.

The provincial fiscal is hereby ordered to investigate that man.

Fiscal:

I have investigated this case and found out that this Ocampo has nothing to do with the case and I found no evidence against this Ocampo.

Court: Sentenced reserved.

Issue:
-WON the qualified plea given by Holgado, who at that time was unaided by a counsel, without absolute any evidence to determine and clarify the true facts of the case is
binding to the court?
Ruling:

-No. The proceedings in the trial court are irregular from the beginning. It is expressly provided in our rules of Court, Rule 112, section 3, that:

If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney being arraigned, and must be asked if he desires the aid of
attorney, the Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney.

Under this provision, when a defendant appears without attorney, the court has four important duties to comply with:
1 It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned;
2 After giving him such information the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney;
3 If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him; and
4 If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him a reasonable time therefor.
-Not one of these duties had been complied with by the trial court. The record discloses that said court did not inform the accused of his right to have an attorney nor did it ask
him if he desired the aid of one. The trial court failed to inquire whether or not the accused was to employ an attorney, to grant him reasonable time to procure or assign an
attorney de oficio. The question asked by the court to the accused was "Do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty?" Not only did such a question fail to inform
the accused that it was his right to have an attorney before arraignment, but, what is worse, the question was so framed that it could have been construed by the accused as
a suggestion from the court that he plead guilty if he had no attorney. And this is a denial of fair hearing in violation of the due process clause contained in our Constitution.
-One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that all
accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given the opportunity to be heard by
counsel.
-The accused who was unaided by counsel pleaded guilty but with the following qualification: "but I was instructed by one Mr. Ocampo." The trial court failed to inquire as to
the true import of this qualification. The record does not show whether the supposed instructions was real and whether it had reference to the commission of the offense or to
the making of the plea guilty.No investigation was opened by the court on this matter in the presence of the accused and there is now no way of determining whether the
supposed instruction is a good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the confession. Therefore the lower courts judgment is reversed and case was remanded back to
it.
(Right to be informed)
G.R. No. L-23693

April 27, 1982

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE:
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT:

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES


RUDY REGALA and DELFIN FLORES, defendants, RUDY REGALA

Facts:
-Defendants Rudy Regala and Delfin Flores were charged with the crime of murder with assault upon an agent of a person in authority, Sgt Decilos Jr.
-That fateful night where the victim was guarding the Magallanes gate in the poblacion of Municipality of Masbate where he prevented the entry of the two accused as the said
gate was only utilized as an exit for a crowded local beauty pageant/dance event. Wherein apparently Regala suddenly stabbed the victim when the latter pushed Flores.
This was witnessed by ErlindaTidon and Juanito Evangelista whom both testified that they were at the scene of the crime and saw and identified the accused Rudy Regala as
the person who stabbed the Sgt Decilos.
- Regala claimed that prior to the killing, he was with his friends drinking beer in a canteen a short distance from the scene of the crime.
-It was established in the trial that both suspects were already convicted of a prior offense. Flores was paroled and released for murder while Regala was convicted of
physical injuries and other mischiefs. The RTC convicted Regala of homicide with insult to public authority because prosecution failed to establish any qualifying
circumstance. Flores was convicted as an accessory.
-It is the prior convictions of the accused that the appeal was anchored on which they accused the RTC judge of impartiality as he has made up his mind to convict them
based on their previous offense thus were denied due process of law.
Issue:
1. WON the accused were denied the right to impartial trial as expressed in Section 19, Article IV (Bill of Rights)?
2. WON Rudy Regala may be convicted of the complex crime of murder with assault upon an agent of a person in authority?
Ruling:

1. No. Appellant has not pointed to any part or stage of the trial betraying the trial Judge's hostility, bias and prejudice against the appellant after the prosecution had brought
forth the fact of appellant's previous criminal conviction. As a matter of fact, appellant's previous conviction of the crimes of malicious mischief and slight physical injuries was
testified to only by the witness last presented by the prosecution in its evidence in chief. And the trial Judge, contrary to the claim of the appellant, gave due consideration to
his evidence as shown by the fact that in the decision of conviction, the trial Judge examined extensively the testimonies of all the eight witnesses for the defense.

-Consequently, while the quoted portions of the judgment of conviction are interspersed with statements and phrases which properly should not have been made as they may
be wrongly interpreted as indicative of bias and prejudice, such aforestated statements and phrases in the judgment of conviction do not per se constitute evidence of bias
and impartiality in the conduct of the trial by the trial Judge as to violate appellant's right to an impartial trial. The Court view the trial Judge's aforequoted statements and
phrases as merely an expression, in the very words of appellant's counsel de officio herself, of the Judge's " ... fully justified indignation and revulsion at the commission of
such a monstrous crime ..."

-The trial court correctly rejected appellant Regala's defense of alibi and denial. Indeed such defenses cannot prevail over the affirmative testimonies of Tidon and Evangelista
who positively Identified appellant Rudy Regala as the one who inflicted the single but fatal wound on the deceased. And the exit gate where the stabbing took place was just
in the vicinity of about 15 meters from the canteen where appellant was allegedly drinking beer during the night until the early morning. Alibi, to be convincing must
preclude any possibility that the accused could have been physically present at the place of the crime nor its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. Furthermore,
appellant has not shown by evidence of any evil motive on the part of prosecution witnesses Tidon and Evangelista to testify in the manner they did. The absence of any such
improper motive enhances the credibility of said witnesses.

2. No, Rudy Regala cannot be convicted of the complex crime of murder with assault upon an agent of a person in authority. First, there was no treachery or evident
premeditation that can be gleaned from the records of the case.
Second, in order to be convicted of the crime of assault upon an agent of a person in authority, the prosecution must have been able to establish that prior or at the time of the
assault, the assailants knew that the person assaulted is a person in authority. Although, it is undisputed that the victim was in uniform, the Prosecution failed to allege
knowledge on the part of Rudy Regala that the victim is a person in authority in the information. Hence, Rudy Regala cannot be convicted of this crime as doing so
would violate his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Refurnishing below information filed by the prosecution:
That on or about the 13th day of June, 1964, at the Magallanes Gate in the poblacion of the Municipality of Masbate, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring together and helping each other, with deliberate intent to kill, with evident premeditation and
treachery and taking advantage of nighttime, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab with. a knife (cuchillo) one Sgt. Juan Desilos

Jr., a member of the Philippine Constabulary while he was then in the performance of his official duty, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious stab wounds at
the mid-epigastric region penetrating abdominal cavity and perforating cordial and cardiac regions which injury directly caused his instantaneous death.

-In Rodil case, it was stated that "[L]ike a qualifying circumstance, such knowledge must be expressly and specifically averred in the information; otherwise, in the absence of
such allegation, the required knowledge, like a qualifying circumstance, although proven, would only be appreciated as aggravating circumstance. Applying this principle, the
attack on the victim, who was known to the appellant as a peace officer, could be considered only as aggravated by being 'in contempt or with insult to the public authorities'
or as an insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank ..."

-Hence, the Court ruled that Rudy Regala can only be convicted of the crime of homicide, aggravated by the circumstance of "in contempt or with insult to the public
authorities" or as an "insult or in disregard of the respect due to the offended party on account of his rank ..."

-WHEREFORE, APPELLANT RODOLFO REGALA ALIAS RUDY REGALA IS HEREBY FOUND GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE
AGGRAVATED BY RECIDIVISM AND BY CONTEMPT FOR OR INSULT TO A PUBLIC AUTHORITY OR DISREGARD OF THE RESPECT DUE THE OFFENDED PARTY
ON ACCOUNT OF HIS RANK, WITHOUT ANY MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE

G.R. No. L-11601

June 30, 1959

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE:
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT:

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES


DOMINGO SALAZAR alias DARQUEZ

FACTS:

-Domingo Salazar had suspicions that his wife has an illicit relationship with another man and that the child she bears is that of the latter. Because of this, he went amuck,
killed, frustrated in killing and attempted in killing several people. He was charged and convicted by the CFI of multiple murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder
qualified by treachery and evident premeditation.

-Salazars arguments:

1. Plea of guilty did not extend to the admission of the correctness of the qualification of his acts i.e., treachery and evident premeditation
2.Running amuck, or becoming a "juramentado" is a cult among the Moros that forms part of their religion

ISSUE/S:

1. WON the plea of guilty extends to the qualifying circumstances allegedly existing on the occasion of the crime charged?

2. WON running amuck or becoming a juramentado from religious origins can mitigate the accuseds liability?

3. WON the right to be informed of the accused was upheld by the courts?

HELD:

1. No merit in the first argument. Plea of guilty extends to treachery and evident premeditation. A plea of guilty is an admission of all the material facts alleged in the
information. A plea of guilty when formally entered on arraignment is sufficient to sustain conviction of the offense charged without introduction of further evidence, upon the
theory that the defendant himself has supplied the necessary proof by his plea of guilty. By his plea, the accused is deemed to have admitted not only the commission of the
offense charged, but the circumstances surrounding their commission, such as evident premeditation, taking advantage of superior strength, alevosia, and dwelling.

We are, therefore, constrained to hold that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of multiple murder, frustrated murder, and attempted murder, all
qualified by evident premeditation as charged in the information.

2. No, Our penal laws enumerate the circumstances which mitigate criminal liability, and the condition of running amuck is not one of them. In so far as they are applicable
they must be applied alike to all criminals be they Christians, Moros or Pagans. More so in the case of the accused who though Moro by blood, has however settled for many
years before the occurrence of the tragedy in christian community and lived there with a Christian common-law wife and relatives. Under such atmosphere, he must have
been indoctrinated into the Christian way of life to such extent that he should have known that running amuck is abhorred in our society and punished by our law.

3. Yes, the right of the accused to be informed was properly observed by the courts.

- Arraignment was held in the local dialect of the accused. The Provincial Commander of Puerto Princesa who investigated the accused testified that he propounded the
questions to him in Tagalog, which is the dialect known to him, while Justice of the Peace Oscar Siat, before whom the confession was subscribed and sworn to, testified that
he read the document and translated it into Tagalog for the benefit of the accused, and when he asked him if he was coerced into making the statement, he acknowledged
that it was voluntarily given by him.

G.R. No. L-21741

January 25, 1924

PETITIONER:

AURELIA CONDE

RESPONDENTS:

PABLO RIVERA, acting provincial fiscal of Tayabas, and FEDERICO M. UNSON, justice of the peace of Lucena, Tayabas

FACTS:

-Aurelia is a municipal midwife and was charged with various crimes and misdemeanors. She appeared, together with counsel, at hearings for no less than 8 occasions only
to find out that the hearings are postponed. More than one year after the first information was filed, trial has not yet commenced.

-Aurelia now comes before this Court to alleviate her from her agony by dismissing the case on the ground of her right to speedy trial.

ISSUE/S:

WON the prayer to dismiss the cases filed against her is proper on the ground of her right to speedy trial?

HELD:

-Yes, the Court granted dismissal of the case anchored on the submitted ground.

- Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde, like all other
accused persons, has a right to a speedy trial in order that if innocent she may go free, and she has been deprived of that right in defiance of law. Dismissed from her humble
position, and compelled to dance attendance on courts while investigations and trials are arbitrarily postponed without her consent, is palpably and openly unjust to her and a
detriment to the public.

- We lay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a
reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if
he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom.

(Right to public trial)


G.R. No. L-30104 July 25, 1973
PETITIONERS:

HON. GREGORIO. N. GARCIA, Judge of the City Court of Manila, and FRANCISCO LORENZANA,

RESPONDENTS:

HON. FELIX DOMINGO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, EDGARDO CALO and SIMEON CARBONNEL

FACTS:

-The Case arose from a mere altercation between Francisco Lorenzana and the two policemen Edgardo Calo and Simeon Carbonnel at the time when the policemen
accosted and admonished Francisco for a traffic violation. Francisco asserts employment of force by the policemen.

-The hearings for the trial was conducted not in open court but inside the chambers of Judge Garcia. The parties had also agreed to hold the hearings on a Saturday due to
their mutual desire to proceed and end the case as soon as possible as there were many cases scheduled for trial on the usual criminal trial days. Several hearings have
passed and the policemen had not raised any concern on irregularity of the proceedings. Until the policemen filed a case before Judge Domingo praying for preliminary
prohibitory and mandatory injunction alleging irregularity of the proceedings.

-Judge Domingo then released a restraining order and deferment of the promulgation of the judgment by Judge Garcia. In the same order, Judge Domingo declared that 'the
constitutional and statutory rights of the accused' had been violated, adversely affecting their 'right to a free and impartial trial' [noting] 'that the trial of these cases lasting
several weeks held exclusively in chambers and not in the court room open the public';

-Motion for reconsideration was filed by Francisco Lorenzana but was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S:

WON the right to a public trial was violated by Judge Garcia?

HELD:

- No, right to public trial was not violated.

- The trial must be public. It possesses that character when anyone interested in observing the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There
is to be no ban on such attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment. No relationship to the parties need be shown. The thought that lies behind this
safeguard is the belief that thereby the accused is afforded further protection, that his trial is likely to be conducted with regularity and not tainted with any impropriety. A
deterrence to arbitrariness.

- There is the well recognized exception though that warrants the exclusion of the public where the evidence may be characterized as "offensive to decency or public morals.

- What did occasion difficulty in this suit was that for the convenience of the parties, and of the city court Judge, it was in the latter's air-conditioned chambers that the trial was
held. There is no showing that the public was thereby excluded. It is to be admitted that the size of the room allotted the Judge would reduce the number of those who could
be our present. Such a fact though is not indicative of any transgression of this right. Courtrooms are not of uniform dimensions. Some are smaller than others. Moreover, as
admitted by Justice Black in his masterly In re Oliver opinion, it suffices to satisfy the requirement of a trial being public if the accused could "have his friends, relatives and
counsel present, no matter with what offense he may be charged.

G.R. No. 140529


PETITIONER:

September 6, 2001
JOSE P. LOPEZ, JR.

RESPONDENTS:
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO and HON. MARGARITO P. GERVACIO, JR. in their official capacities as Ombudsman
and Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, respectively, and the Sandiganbayan

Speedy Trial
The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and
administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. (Lopez vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 140529. September 6, 2001)

Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious action on all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice. (Lopez vs. Office of the
Ombudsman, G.R. No. 140529. September 6, 2001)

However, the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or even without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a
speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant is weighed, and such factors as the length of the delay, the
reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. The concept of speedy disposition is a relative term
and must necessarily be a flexible concept. (Lopez vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 140529. September 6, 2001)