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A petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners assailing the constitutionality of RA 10367. Petitioners argue that biometrics validation rises to the level of an additional, substantial qualification where there is penalty of deactivation. The petitioners also argue that deactivation by November 16, 2015 would result in the premature termination of the registration period contrary to Section 8 of RA 8189.
A petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners assailing the constitutionality of RA 10367. Petitioners argue that biometrics validation rises to the level of an additional, substantial qualification where there is penalty of deactivation. The petitioners also argue that deactivation by November 16, 2015 would result in the premature termination of the registration period contrary to Section 8 of RA 8189.
A petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners assailing the constitutionality of RA 10367. Petitioners argue that biometrics validation rises to the level of an additional, substantial qualification where there is penalty of deactivation. The petitioners also argue that deactivation by November 16, 2015 would result in the premature termination of the registration period contrary to Section 8 of RA 8189.
COMELEC G.R. No. 221318 | December 16, 2016 Facts:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and
prohibition filed by herein petitioners, assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. (RA) 10367, entitled "An Act Providing for Mandatory Biometrics Voter Registration," as well as respondent Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, all related thereto. o COMELEC Resolution No. (CRN) 9721: IRR of RA 10367; o CRN 9863: Election Registration Board (ERB) shall deactivate the voters' registration records (VRRs) of those who "failed to submit for validation despite notice on or before October 31, 2015," and that the "deactivation for cases falling under this ground shall be made during the November 16, 2015 Board hearing." o CRN 10013: Provides for the "procedures in the deactivation of VRRs who do not have biometrics data in the Voters Registration System (VRS) after the October 31, 2015 deadline of registration and validation." Petitioners contentions: o biometrics validation rises to the level of an additional, substantial qualification where there is penalty of deactivation; o biometrics deactivation is not the disqualification by law contemplated by the 1987 Constitution; o biometrics validation gravely violates the Constitution, considering that, applying the strict scrutiny test, it is not poised with a compelling reason for state regulation and hence, an unreasonable deprivation of the right to suffrage; o voters to be deactivated are not afforded due process; and o poor experience with biometrics should serve as warning against exacting adherence to the system. Albeit already subject of a prior petition filed before this Court, petitioners also raise herein the argument that deactivation by November 16, 2015 would result in the premature termination of the registration period contrary to Section 8 of RA 8189.48 Ultimately, petitioners pray that this Court declare RA 10367, as well as COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, unconstitutional and that the COMELEC be commanded to desist from deactivating registered voters without biometric information, to reinstate voters who are compliant with the requisites of RA 8189 but have already been delisted, and to extend the system of contihuing registration and capture of biometric information of voters until January 8, 2016.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners have legal standing to
institute the instant petition Held: Yes
Citing Pabillo v. COMELEC, which cited Capalla v.
COMELEC and Guingona, Jr. v. COMELEC: o There can be no doubt that the coming 10 May 2010 in this case, the May 2016elections is a matter of great public concern. On Election Day, the country's registered voters will come out to exercise the sacred right of suffrage. Not only is it an exercise that ensures the preservation of our democracy, the coming elections also embodies our
people's last ounce of hope for a better
future. It is the final opportunity, patiently awaited by our people, for the peaceful transition of power to the next chosen leaders of our country. If there is anything capable of directly affecting the lives of ordinary Filipinos so as to come within the ambit of a public concern, it is the coming elections, xxx. Thus, in view of the compelling significance and transcending public importance of the issues raised by petitioners, the technicalities raised by respondents should not be allowed to stand in the way, if the ends of justice would not be subserved by a rigid adherence to the rules of procedure. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Issue: Whether or not RA 10367, as well as COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, all related thereto, are unconstitutional Held: No
As non-compliance with the same results in the
penalty of deactivation, petitioners posit that it has risen to the level of an unconstitutional substantive requirement in the exercise of the right of suffrage. o They submit that the statutory requirement of biometric validation is no different from the unconstitutional requirement of literacy and property because mere non-validation already absolutely curtails the exercise of the right of suffrage through deactivation. Further, they advance the argument that deactivation is not the disqualification by law contemplated as a valid limitation to the exercise of suffrage under the 1987 Constitution.
The contestation is untenable.
As early as the 1936 case of The People of the
Philippine Islands v.
Corral, it has been recognized that "the right to
vote is not a natural right but is a right created by law. Suffrage is a privilege granted by the State to such persons or classes as are most likely to exercise it for the public good.
Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution
delineates the current parameters for the exercise of suffrage: Section I. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
Dissecting the provision, one must meet the
following qualifications in order to exercise the right of suffrage: o first, he must be a Filipino citizen; o second, he must not be disqualified by law; and o third, he must have resided in the Philippines for at least one ( 1) year and in the place wherein he proposes to vote for at least six ( 6) months immediately preceding the election. The second item more prominently reflects the franchised nature of the right of suffrage. The State
may therefore regulate said right by imposing
statutory disqualifications, with the restriction, however, that the same do not amount to, as per the second sentence of the provision, a "literacy, property or other substantive requirement." Based on its genesis, it may be gleaned that the limitation is geared towards the elimination of irrelevant standards that are purely based on socio-economic considerations that have no bearing on the right of a citizen to intelligently cast his vote and to further the public good. Properly speaking, the concept of a "qualification", at least insofar as the discourse on suffrage is concerned, should be distinguished from the concept of "registration", which is jurisprudentially regarded as only the means by which a person's qualifications to vote is determined. o In Yra v. Abano, citing Meffert v. Brown, it was stated that "the act of registering is only one step towards voting, and it is not one of the elements that makes the citizen a qualified voter [and] one may be a qualified voter without exercising the right to vote." o Thus, although one is deemed to be a "qualified elector," he must nonetheless still comply with the registration procedure in order to vote. Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the Voters Registration Act of 1996, primarily governs the process of registration. o It defines "registration" as "the act of accomplishing and filing of a sworn application for registration by a qualified voter before the election officer of the city or municipality wherein he resides and including the same in the book of registered voters upon approval by the [ERB]." o As stated in Section 2 thereof, RA 8189 was passed in order "to systematize the present method of registration in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters." To complement RA 8189 in light of the advances in modern technology, RA 10367, or the assailed Biometrics Law, was signed into law in February 2013. It built on the policy considerations behind RA 8189 as it institutionalized biometrics validation as part of the registration process. o "Biometrics refers to a quantitative analysis that provides a positive identification of an individual such as voice, photograph, fingerprint, signature, iris, and/or such other identifiable features." o Sections 3 and 10 of RA 10367 respectively require registered and new voters to submit themselves for biometrics validation. o Under Section 2 (d) of RA 10367, "validation" is defined as "the process of taking the biometrics of registered voters whose biometrics have not yet been captured." o The consequence of non-compliance is "deactivation," which "refers to the removal of the registration record of the registered voter from the corresponding precinct book of voters for failure to comply with the validation process as required by [RA 10367]. Notably, the penalty of deactivation, as well as the requirement of validation, neutrally applies to all voters. Thus, petitioners' argument that the law creates artificial class of voters is more imagined than real. o There is no favor accorded to an "obedient group." If anything, non-compliance by the "disobedient" only rightfully results into
prescribed consequences. Surely, this is
beyond the intended mantle of the equal protection of the laws, which only works "against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality." It should also be pointed out that deactivation is not novel to RA 10367. RA 8189 already provides for certain grounds for deactivation, of which not only the disqualifications under the Constitution or the Omnibus Election are listed. With these considerations in mind, petitioners' claim that biometrics validation imposed under RA 10367, and implemented under COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, must perforce fail. To reiterate, this requirement is not a "qualification" to the exercise of the right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the registration procedure, of which the State has the right to reasonably regulate. It was institutionalized conformant to the limitations of the 1987 Constitution and is a mere complement to the existing Voter's Registration Act of 1996. Petitioners would do well to be reminded of this Court's pronouncement in AKBAYAN-Youth, wherein it was held that: The act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage. For registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element in the election process. Thus, contrary to petitioners' argument, registration cannot and should not be denigrated to the lowly stature of a mere statutory requirement. Proceeding from the significance of registration as a necessary requisite to the right to vote, the State undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voter's registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-election activities could be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner - one which is not indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of the times. For another, petitioners assert that biometrics validation gravely violates the Constitution, considering that, applying the strict scrutiny test, it is not poised with a compelling reason for state regulation and hence, an unreasonable deprivation of the right to suffrage. Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the regulation passes the strict scrutiny test. o In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the standard for determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms. Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection. o As pointed out by petitioners, the United States Supreme Court has expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as suffrage, judicial access, and interstate travel. o Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that
interest, and the burden befalls upon the
State to prove the same. In this case, respondents have shown that the biometrics validation requirement under RA 10367 advances a compelling state interest. It was precisely designed to facilitate the conduct of orderly, honest, and credible elections by containing - if not eliminating, the perennial problem of having flying voters, as well as dead and multiple registrants. According to the sponsorship speech of Senator Aquilino L. Pimentel III, the objective of the law was to cleanse the national voter registry so as to eliminate electoral fraud and ensure that the results of the elections were truly reflective of the genuine will of the people. The foregoing consideration is unquestionably a compelling state interest.
and Falsification of Public Documents (OMB
Cases). Issue: Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 Held: Yes
The Ombudsman's argument against the CA's lack of
subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition, and her corollary prayer for its dismissal, is based on her interpretation of Section 14, RA 6770, or the Ombudsman Act,118 which reads in full: Section 14. Restrictions. - No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE
OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) AND JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR., Respondents. G.R. Nos. 217126-27 | November 10, 2015 (EB) Facts:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and
prohibition filed by petitioner Conchita Carpio Morales, in her capacity as the Ombudsman (Ombudsman), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), assailing: o the Resolution dated March 16, 2015 of public respondent the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, which granted private respondent Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.'s (Binay, Jr.) prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the implementation of the Joint Order of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-15-0058 to 0063 (preventive suspension order) preventively suspending him and several other public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati, for six (6) months without pay; and o the Resolution dated March 20, 2015 of the CA, ordering the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt6 in CAG.R. SP No. 139504. Background of the case: o A complaint/affidavit was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas "Ching" Enciso VI before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr., et al), accusing them of Plunder and violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, otherwise known as "The AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act," in connection with the five (5) phases of the procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking Building). o On September 9, 2014, the Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of Investigators to conduct a fact-finding investigation, submit an investigation report, and file the necessary complaint, if warranted (1st Special Panel). o Pursuant to the Ombudsman's directive, on March 5, 2015, the 1st Special Panel filed a complaint (OMB Complaint) against Binay, Jr., et al, charging them with six (6) administrative cases for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and six (6) criminal cases for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds,
No court shall hear any appeal or application for
remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law. Construing the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770: o As a general rule, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 bans the whole range of remedies against issuances of the Ombudsman, by prohibiting: (a) an appeal against any decision or finding of the Ombudsman, and (b) "any application of remedy" (subject to the exception below) against the same. o The subject provision, however, crafts an exception to the foregoing general rule. While the specific procedural vehicle is not explicit from its text, it is fairly deducible that the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 excepts, as the only allowable remedy against "the decision or findings of the Ombudsman," a Rule 45 appeal, for the reason that it is the only remedy taken to the Supreme Court on "pure questions of law," whether under the 1964 Rules of Court or the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure Validity of the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770: o The second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770's extremely limited restriction on remedies is inappropriate since a Rule 45 appeal -which is within the sphere of the rules of procedure promulgated by this Court - can only be taken against final decisions or orders of lower courts, and not against "findings" of quasi-judicial agencies. o By confining the remedy to a Rule 45 appeal, the provision takes away the remedy of certiorari, grounded on errors of jurisdiction, in denigration of the judicial power constitutionally vested in courts. In this light, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 also increased this Court's appellate jurisdiction, without a showing, however, that it gave its consent to the same. The provision is, in fact, very similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770, which was invalidated in the case of Fabian v. Desiertoni. o In Fabian, the Court struck down the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 as unconstitutional since it had the effect of increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Court without its advice and concurrence in violation of Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Since the second paragraph of Section
14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against "decision or findings" of the Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and thus - similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770142 - attempts to effectively increase the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction without its advice and concurrence, it is therefore concluded that the former provision is also unconstitutional and perforce, invalid. Consequence of invalidity: o With the unconstitutionality of the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, the Court, consistent with existing jurisprudence, concludes that the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition.
based"; and
Issue: Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to
issue a TRO and/or WPI enjoining the implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman
(3) "[T]he constitutional deliberations explain the
Constitutional Commissions' need for independence. In the deliberations of the 1973 Constitution, the delegates amended the 1935 Constitution by providing for a constitutionally-created Civil Service Commission, instead of one created by law, on the premise that the effectivity of this body is dependent on its freedom from the tentacles of politics. In a similar manner, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the Commission on Audit highlighted the developments in the past Constitutions geared towards insulating the Commission on Audit from political pressure. At bottom, the decisive ruling in Gonzales III, however, was that the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman, as well as that of the foregoing independent bodies, meant freedom from control or supervision of the Executive Department As may be deduced from the various discourses in Gonzales III, the concept of Ombudsman's independence covers three (3) things:
Held: Yes
The Ombudsman invokes the first paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770 in conjunction with her office's independence under the 1987 Constitution. She advances the idea that "in order to further ensure her office's independence, RA 6770 likewise insulated it from judicial intervention," particularly, "from injunctive reliefs traditionally obtainable from the courts," claiming that said writs may work "just as effectively as direct harassment or political pressure would."
Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
guarantees the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman:
First: creation by the Constitution, which means
that the office cannot be abolished, nor its constitutionally specified functions and privileges, be removed, altered, or modified by law, unless the Constitution itself allows, or an amendment thereto is made;
Section 5. There is hereby created the independent
Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas[,] and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise be appointed. (Emphasis supplied) Gonzales III v. Office of the President is the first case which grappled with the meaning of the Ombudsman's independence vis-a-vis the independence of the other constitutional bodies. Pertinently, the Court observed:
Third: insulation from executive supervision
and control, which means that those within the ranks of the office can only be disciplined by an internal authority.
(1) "[T]he independence enjoyed by the Office of the
Ombudsman and by the Constitutional Commissions shares certain characteristics - they do not owe their existence to any act of Congress, but are created by the Constitution itself; additionally, they all enjoy fiscal autonomy. In general terms, the framers of the Constitution intended that these 'independent' bodies be insulated from political pressure to the extent that the absence of 'independence' would result in the impairment of their core functions"; (2) "[T]he Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only [of] the express mandate of the Constitution, but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is
Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the
office "may not be obstructed from [its] freedom to use or dispose of [its] funds for purposes germane to [its] functions;168hence, its budget cannot be strategically decreased by officials of the political branches of government so as to impair said functions; and
Evidently, all three aspects
to protect the Office of political harassment and it from the "insidious
of independence intend the Ombudsman from pressure, so as to free tentacles of politics."
That being the case, the concept of Ombudsman
independence cannot be invoked as basis to insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power constitutionally vested unto the courts. Courts are apolitical bodies, which are ordained to act as impartial tribunals and apply even justice to all. Hence, the Ombudsman's notion that it can be exempt from an incident of judicial power - that is, a provisional writ of injunction against a preventive suspension order - clearly strays from the concept's rationale of insulating the office from political harassment or pressure. In Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, the Court instructed that "it is through the Constitution that the fundamental powers of government are established, limited and defined, and by which these powers are distributed among the several departments. The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer." It would then follow that laws that do not conform to the Constitution shall be stricken down for being unconstitutional. However, despite the ostensible breach of the separation of powers principle, the Court is not oblivious to the policy considerations behind the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, as well as other
statutory provisions of similar import. Thus, pending
deliberation on whether or not to adopt the same, the Court, under its sole prerogative and authority over all matters of procedure, deems it proper to declare as ineffective the prohibition against courts other than the Supreme Court from issuing provisional injunctive writs to enjoin investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman, until it is adopted as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued therefor. Hence, with Congress interfering with matters of procedure (through passing the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770) without the Court's consent thereto, it remains that the CA had the authority to issue the questioned injunctive writs enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. At the risk of belaboring the point, these issuances were merely ancillary to the exercise of the CA's certiorari jurisdiction conferred to it under Section 9 (1), Chapter I of BP 129, as amended, and which it had already acquired over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 case.
Issue: Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in
issuing the TRO and eventually, the WPI in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. based on the condonation doctrine Held: No
The CA's March 16, 2015 Resolution which directed
the issuance of the assailed TRO was based on the case of Governor Garcia, Jr. v. CA, wherein the Court emphasized that "if it were established in the CA that the acts subject of the administrative complaint were indeed committed during petitioner [Garcia's] prior term, then, following settled jurisprudence, he can no longer be administratively charged." o Thus, the Court, contemplating the application of the condonation doctrine, among others, cautioned, in the said case, that "it would have been more prudent for [the appellate court] to have, at the very least, on account of the extreme urgency of the matter and the seriousness of the issues raised in the certiorari petition, issued a TRO x x x"236 during the pendency of the proceedings.
The Ombudsman contends that it was inappropriate
for the CA to have considered the condonation doctrine since it was a matter of defense which should have been raised and passed upon by her office during the administrative disciplinary proceedings. o The Court agrees with the CA that it was not precluded from considering the same given that it was material to the propriety of according provisional injunctive relief in conformity with the ruling in Governor Garcia, Jr., which was the subsisting jurisprudence at that time. o Thus, since condonation was duly raised by Binay, Jr. in his petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453,244 the CA did not err in passing upon the same. Note that although Binay, Jr. secondarily argued that the evidence of guilt against him was not strong in his petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453,245 it appears that the CA found that the application of the condonation doctrine was already sufficient to enjoin the implementation of the preventive suspension order. Again, there is nothing
aberrant with this since, as remarked in the
same case of Governor Garcia, Jr., if it was established that the acts subject of the administrative complaint were indeed committed during Binay, Jr.'s prior term, then, following the condonation doctrine, he can no longer be administratively charged. In other words, with condonation having been invoked by Binay, Jr. as an exculpatory affirmative defense at the onset, the CA deemed it unnecessary to determine if the evidence of guilt against him was strong, at least for the purpose of issuing the subject injunctive writs. With this, the ensuing course of action should have been for the CA to resolve the main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 on the merits. However, considering that the Ombudsman, on October 9, 2015, had already found Binay, Jr. administratively liable and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal, which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office, for the present administrative charges against him, the said CA petition appears to have been mooted. As initially intimated, the preventive suspension order is only an ancillary issuance that, at its core, serves the purpose of assisting the Office of the Ombudsman in its investigation. It therefore has no more purpose - and perforce, dissolves - upon the termination of the office's process of investigation in the instant administrative case. This notwithstanding, this Court deems it apt to clarify that the mootness of the issue regarding the validity of the preventive suspension order subject of this case does not preclude any of its foregoing determinations, particularly, its abandonment of the condonation doctrine. As explained in Belgica, '"the moot and academic principle' is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case. The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review." In any event, the abandonment of a doctrine is wholly within the prerogative of the Court. As mentioned, it is its own jurisprudential creation and may therefore, pursuant to its mandate to uphold and defend the Constitution, revoke it notwithstanding supervening events that render the subject of discussion moot.
Issue: Whether or not the CA's Resolution dated March 20,
2015 directing the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 is improper and illegal Held: Premature issue
The sole premise of the Ombudsman's contention is
that, as an impeachable officer, she cannot be the subject of a charge for indirect contempt because this action is criminal in nature and the penalty therefor would result in her effective removal from office.
However, a reading of the aforesaid March 20, 2015
Resolution does not show that she has already been subjected to contempt proceedings. This issuance, in fact, makes it clear that notwithstanding the directive for the Ombudsman to comment, the CA has not necessarily given due course to Binay, Jr.'s contempt petition: Without necessarily giving due course to the Petition for Contempt respondents [Hon. Conchita
Carpio Morales, in her capacity as the Ombudsman,
and the Department of Interior and Local Government] are hereby DIRECTED to file Comment on the Petition/Amended and Supplemental Petition for Contempt (CA-G.R. SP No. 139504) within an inextendible period of three (3) days from receipt hereof. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Thus, even if the Ombudsman accedes to the CA's directive by filing a comment, wherein she may properly raise her objections to the contempt proceedings by virtue of her being an impeachable officer, the CA, in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, may still opt not to give due course to Binay, Jr.'s contempt petition and accordingly, dismiss the same. Simply put, absent any indication that the contempt petition has been given due course by the CA, it would then be premature for this Court to rule on the issue. The submission of the Ombudsman on this score is perforce denied.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN
(THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents G.R. No. 213847 | August 18, 2015 (EB) The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is ultimately an incident of the judicial power to hear and determine his criminal case. The strength of the Prosecutions case, albeit a good measure of the accuseds propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial. Facts:
Before the Court is the petition for certiorari filed by
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile to assail and annul the resolutions dated July 14, 2014 and August 8, 2014 issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238, where he has been charged with plunder along with several others. Enrile insists that the resolutions, which respectively denied his Motion To Fix Bail and his Motion For Reconsideration, were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Background of the case: o On June 5, 2014, Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of his purported involvement in the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Scam. Initially, Enrile in an Omnibus Motion requested to post bail, which the Sandiganbayan denied. On July 3, 2014, a warrant for Enrile's arrest was issued, leading to Petitioner's voluntary surrender. o Petitioner again asked the Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Fix Bail which was heard by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argued that: (a) Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) that, because of his advanced age and voluntary surrender, the penalty would only be reclusion temporal, thus allowing for bail and; (c) he is not a flight risk due to his age and physical condition. Sandiganbayan denied this in its assailed resolution. Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner can properly be granted the
right to bail Held: Yes
Bail as a matter of right due process and
presumption of innocence.
Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987
Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This right is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail. o The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at trial and so the amount of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but no higher than what may be reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. Bail as a matter of discretion o Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit: o
Capital offense of an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. The general rule: Any person, before conviction of any criminal offense, shall be bailable. o Exception: Unless he is charged with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua [or life imprisonment] and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is strong. Where evidence of guilt is not strong, bail may be granted according to the discretion of the court. Admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua is subject to judicial discretion. In Concerned Citizens vs. Elma, the court held: Such discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty. Bail hearing with notice is indispensable (Aguirre vs. Belmonte). The hearing should primarily determine whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. The procedure for discretionary bail is described in Cortes vs. Catral: 1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended); 2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong
based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution; 4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied. Enriles poor health justifies his admission to bail o The Court is guided by the earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the
court. The Court is further mindful of the
Philippines responsibility in the international community arising from the national commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights
as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights. The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances. In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation in both his public and his private lives, his long years of public
service, and historys judgment of him being
at stake, he should be granted bail. o The currently fragile state of Enriles health presents another compelling justification for his admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize. o Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during the trial. It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to have his medical condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but, more importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial. On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish before a meaningful consideration of the application for bail can be had is to defeat the objective of bail, which is to entitle the accused to provisional liberty pending the trial. There may be circumstances decisive of the issue of bail whose existence is either admitted by the Prosecution, or is properly the subject of judicial notice that the courts can already consider in resolving the application for bail without awaiting the trial to finish.49 The Court thus balances the scales of justice by protecting the interest of the People through ensuring his personal appearance at the trial, and at the same time realizing for him the guarantees of due process as well as to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the appearance of the accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile health and advanced age of Enrile. As such, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying Enriles Motion To Fix Bail. Grave abuse of discretion, as the ground for the issuance of the writ of certiorari, connotes whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or lack of jurisdiction.50 The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.