POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE

WARSAW PACT

STUDY GUIDE

Lucas Pereira Rezende, Shnia Kellen de Lima

Guilherme Marques P. Araujo, Igor Andrade Vidal Barbosa

December 1981

Welcome Letter
Dearest delegates of the Warsaw Pact, it is with great pleasure that we welcome all of you to our
Organisation. Firstly, we would like to thank you for choosing participating in the Warsaw Pact and also to
congratulate you for your approval. It means you all were granted with our confidence. It also means that from
now on we share the responsibility of attaining the goal of having a great event: productive debates, good
resolution(s), a pleasant time together... In sum, an unforgettable experience.
As founders of TEMAS, we are very proud to present to you one of the best simulations ever held . The
proposal of TEMAS to be a thematic simulation could not start better with the theme of the Cold War, a period
so mysterious, emblematic and important in our recent history. It is difficult to bring up to our memory another
period in which we had so many political and ideological disputes as this one. Few of us really lived the Cold War
at its harshest times. What we have in our minds is its collapse, with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the
Soviet Union, one of the worlds superpower. But we all know the Cold War was not only that. TEMAS will give
us all the opportunity to experience a time in which there was the bipolar world and the fear of the nuclear
dispute. Never the world was so close to an end, never weapons were so powerful, never tensions were so high!
We now invite you to go into a time machine and travel to a glorious world, the world of the Soviet
Union! For the first time ever simulated in Brazil will the East version of the facts be simulated. We could not be
more excited about it! This unique experience will certainly be forever remembered for those who will have the
opportunity to take part in it, and we are very glad to have you all with us in this journey.
In a very few words, each one of us will introduce oneself:
Lucas Rezende: Having participated in Mini-ONU twice as a delegate, once as Assistant Director, once
as the Director of the Security Council (2003), and also as a delegate in many other models, such as AMUN,
Harvard WorldMUN and MONU, I can say I am one of the oldest fans of simulations nowadays in PUC-Minas.
This is my last opportunity to be a member of the chair, what at the same time makes me sad and also very
proud. I just think this is going to be the best model I have ever took part in, I am personally very involved with
it and I just hope you all enjoy it as much as I do!
Shnia Kellen: I study International Relations and this is my last year at PUC. As a real fan of
modelling I participated in some events such as Mini-ONU (as the Director of the Security Council, 2004),
AMUN (as a delegate at SpecPol, 2004), Harvard World Model United Nations (as assistant-director in the
Middle East Summit, 2002), among others. My expectations for TEMAS are significantly high and I am really
honoured to take part on this event, sharing the chair with my esteemed colleagues. I hope we perform a good
job and have a great time together.
Guilherme Marques: In 2005 I will be attending my second year in International Relations at PUC
Minas. I have not had yet much experience in MUN such as my esteemed directors, what does not mean I am
not fully engaged with the Warsaw Pact Organisation it is quite the contrary! My main objective in this project
is to learn and improve my skills on this area. I believe we will have a nice simulation in March.
Igor Vidal: I am in the third semester of International Relations at PUC and at the second semester of
Law at UFMG. I have always participated in models but this is my first time as an assistant director. I am
extremely happy to participate at this first TEMAS, not only because of the high quality of all the TEMAS staff, of
the opportunity to assist my former Security Council director and assistant-director, Lucas and Shnia,
respectively, of the Cold War theme that I find very interesting, but also because my good friend Guilherme will
be the other assistant director. I am sure that we, directors, assistant-directors and delegates of the Warsaw
Pact, will do a great job.
As your directors in this great opportunity, it is important to remind you of some facts. As citizens of the
West, we are already used to think from the Western point of view. Here, nevertheless, we must change our
mindsets and ratiocinate as an Eastern politician in the Cold War, over the strong influence of the Soviet Union.
It is difficult, but not impossible. To do so, therefore, it is essential that you prepare yourselves hardly to this
meeting, studying not only the Polish situation but also your own positions and also the Eastern position during
the Cold War. We are very much sure you are all capable to do that, as we trusted upon you the great
responsibility of your roles. We will be constantly open to help you whenever you may need. Good luck and
welcome to our Cold War World!
Lucas Rezende and Shnia Kellen Directors of the Warsaw Pact
Guilherme Marques and Igor Vidal - Assistant Directors of the Warsaw Pact

HISTORY OF THE WARSAW PACT

The Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, commonly

known as the Warsaw Pact, was created on 14 May 1955 in Warsaw, Poland. Its founding member
states were Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania and
the Soviet Union. This new alliance had two main objectives: to counterweight the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation (NATO) and, according to the USSR1, to guarantee the security of its
member-states against the aggressive actions of the Western countries; the latest one being the
admission of a re-militarised West Germany into NATO. The Treaty established that relations
between the signatories would be set in accordance with the principles of respect for the
independence and sovereignty of states, and also with the principle of non-interference on their
internal affairs2. By affirming this, the Warsaw Treaty Organisation came also to strengthen the
already existent bilateral agreements between the Soviet Union and Eastern European States.
The Pact was designed to exist for a twenty-year period and, if no member state declared
its willingness to withdraw from it. The Pact would remain effective for another 10 years, what
happened in 1975. The next meeting of the Warsaw Pact to define whether it will be extended or
not will take place in 1985.
From the very moment of its inception, the Warsaw Pact has acted in different manners
to live up to its main objectives. To guarantee the terms of the military mutual assistance, it was
extremely necessary that every member state had its own armed forces, what explains the
incorporation of East Germany (German Democratic Republic) to the Joint Command of the
Pact, responsible for defence issues, in early 1956, and the formation of an actual army in that
country, the National Peoples Army (NVA3) in the same year.
In 1962 the Warsaw Treaty had its only withdrawal case. Albania stopped participating in
the Pact and supporting the alliance in late 1961 due to diplomatic and ideological rifts with the
Soviet Union, guiding the country to progressively move out of the Soviet orbit and ally itself
with China4. In 1968 Albania formally withdrew from the Warsaw Pact.
The Warsaw Pact crossed the limits of the military mutual assistance guided for the
member-states defence when war plans came into light in the 1960s. One of those, the 1964 plan,

Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics.

Preamble of the Warsaw Treaty.
3 Original name Nationale Volksarmee.
4 http://foreignaffairs.tripod.com/armillotta/albania97_un.html.
1

consisted of an operation on Western Europe - more specifically south-eastern France brought

up by the Czechoslovak Peoples Army (SLA5) using conventional and nuclear arsenal.
There are also three important events whose description here is essential: the Polish
October and the Hungarian Revolution - also known as the Hungarian Uprising - in 1956 and the
Prague Spring in 1968.
The Polish October was one of the first attempts to reform the structure of a Soviet Bloc
country after Stalins death. Anti-Stalinist workers started a 15,000 men strike in June 1956, in
Poznan, to protest against the structure of the Polish state. The movement was suppressed and
many casualties were counted, shocking the entire country. There was a need for a new
leadership, which was fulfilled when Wladyslaw Gomulka became the First Secretary of the
Polish Communist Party (PUWP6) on 19 October. On that very day Nikita Khrushchev arrived in
Warsaw with Soviet Generals and Warsaw Pact Armed Forces Commanders. Khrushchev did not
want any changes in Communist Poland and threatened an invasion if the country left the
Warsaw Treaty Organisation. The PUWP First Secretary guaranteed that he would not try to
move Poland away from communism. From that point on there were changes on Polish - Soviet
accords on trade and military cooperation [], a significant reduction of political terror, an end
to forced collectivization, the release of Cardinal Wyszynski (followed by some concessions in the
religious field), and [new] contacts with the West, including freer travel 7.
The Hungarian Revolution happened almost simultaneously with the Polish October.
Having its basis on Stalins death, it was a march led by students and workers against the
Communist government. The revolutionary movement was crushed down by the Soviet Union
after the announcement of the Hungarian Prime Minister Imre Nagy, stating Hungarian
willingness to become a neutral country and to declare its withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact.
Soviet troops under the Warsaw Pact rule were headed the counter-movement.
In 1968 the Czechoslovak Communist Party, through his leader Alexander Dubek, tried to
liberalise the countrys economy and made a deep reform on its political and administrative
structures. Dubek wanted Socialism with human face without any authoritarian Stalinist
influence that still remained there. This period came to be known as the Prague Spring and
represents the peak of the Warsaw Pact military interventions up to the time. Almost 200,000
Pact Troops of all allies except Romania entered into the country in August and crushed down
any resistance, putting an end to the conflict.

Original name eskoslovensk lidova armda.

Original name Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza (PZPR). In English, Polish United Workers Party.
7 http://www.britannica.com/eb/print?tocId=9108559&fullArticle=true
5

STRUCTURE OF THE WARSAW PACT

The highest governing body of the Warsaw Pact is the Political Consultative Committee
(PCC). Its creation is determined in the text of the treaty, which gives it the power to set up
auxiliary bodies if it deems necessary. The permanent members of the PCC are the Communist
Party first secretaries, the premiers and the foreign ministers of the member-states. The PCC coordinates all activities that are not purely military and assesses whether specific international
developments pose a risk to the security of the member-states, besides requiring that selfdefence provisions are properly taken by the Warsaw Pact with respect to the military obligations
of the alliance.
In January 1956, two auxiliary bodies were created: the Permanent Commission and the
Joint Secretariat. The Permanent Commission is responsible for providing recommendations to
the PCC and the Joint Secretariat works on a common foreign policy to member-states. The Joint
Secretariat has command over the logistics, armaments and arms research of the Warsaw Pact
and records, and spreads the decisions of the PCC.
The highest military body of the Warsaw Pact is the Committee of Defence Ministers
(CDM). It was created in the 1969 PCC session in Budapest, which brought many reforms to the
structure of the Warsaw Pact. The CDM is composed by the ministers of defence of each member
state which was a permanent member of the PCC before 1969, and is subordinate to the latter.
The main function of the CDM is to co-ordinate the defence policies of the member states and
strengthen the defence capacity of the alliance.
Directly below in the hierarchy is the Command and Staff of the Warsaw Combined
Forces. The Staff of the Warsaw Pact Combined Armed Forces is subordinated to the Warsaw
Pact Commander-in-Chief and works continuously throughout the year. Because of this, it
handles most of the Warsaw Pact actions in the military area, such as large-scale manoeuvres,
joint exercises and multilateral meetings and contacts among military personnel at all levels. The
Warsaw Pact Chief of Staff monitors the activities of the Staff and the First Deputy Chief of Staff
is part of the additional personnel of the Staff and is appointed by the government of the country
in which the city of Moscow is located.
The Military Council was created in 1969 and sends reports to the CDM regarding the
work of the Staff. The chairman of the Military Council is the Warsaw Pact Commander in Chief.
Subordinated to the Military Council there is the Technical Committee of the Warsaw
Pact. Also created in 1969, this committee supervises matters related to military technology and
standardisation of armaments used by Warsaw Pact troops and member states.

The Committee of Foreign Ministers (CFM) was established in the 1976 PCC meeting and
came to regularise the previous informal meetings among representatives of the member states
of the Warsaw Pact. It had the official task of preparing recommendations and executing the
decisions of the PCC.

PROCEDURES OF THE WARSAW PACT

The procedures of the Political Consultative Committee (PCC) of the Warsaw Pact differ
from those of many other international organisations. The basic rules to be used within the
discussion are attached to this Guide. It is essential that the delegates have a thorough knowledge
of them. The following lines are for the presentation of the specific procedures that will guide the
meeting of December 8, 1981.
The first aspect regards the unmoderated and moderated caucus. The purpose of the
latter is to promote a more dynamic and focused debate, stimulating the participation of all
member states and staff members. The unmoderated caucus, in turn, is normally used to write
documents and to discuss the topic in a more informal, flexible manner.
Unmoderated caucus: On this Warsaw Pact meeting, larger time limits for the caucus will
be accepted so as to give the delegates the opportunity to work on specific matters. The delegates
and members of the WP Staff are supposed to remain in the chamber during the unmoderated
caucus and it is important that documents and negotiations have the participation of all of them.
After half of the stipulated time limit, delegates can, if they feel that they have achieved their
previously set objectives for the caucus, move for the closure of the latter. This is the only motion
accepted during the unmoderated caucus and must have a two-thirds majority of session quorum
to pass.
Moderated Caucus: Delegates that move the motion for a moderated caucus will have the
opportunity to moderate that caucus. The delegate has to declare if he is willing to assume this
duty or not and, if not, moderation automatically goes to the chair. It is worth emphasising that
moderating requires a satisfactory knowledge of the rules.
The second aspect refers to the different voting procedures. Only the seven (7) member
states of the Warsaw Treaty (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland,
Romania and the Union of the Socialist Soviet Republics) may vote on substantive matters. The
three (3) staff members of the Warsaw Treaty (Warsaw Pact Commander-in-Chief, Chief of Staff

and the First Deputy Chief of Staff) and the PUW First Secretary shall be allowed to vote on
procedural matters only.
The Political Consultative Committee is based on the principle of consensus. A
substantive matter (e.g., amendments or resolutions) can only be approved if there is no vote
against it. Besides that, at least four (4) affirmative votes are needed. More than three (3)
abstentions will lead to the non-approval of the matter.

CONTEXT AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

As a first step towards a wide, reasonable comprehension of the Polish crisis some
elements and events that make up the context in which it evolved shall be properly addressed.
The situation in Poland in 1981 is the expression of a deep internal crisis heading for a social
chaos insofar as state and society do not concur on the direction of both domestic political
economy and, to some extent, the external affairs established with the two world superpowers.
Additionally, the matter undeniably reaches international dimensions and, therefore, scrutiny
over the broader environment in which it encompasses, namely Eastern Europe and even the
bipolar world, are paramount for its full understanding. Thus, this section aims to draw up the
international context in which the Polish crisis emerged and unfolded, outlining important
aspects regarding the implementation and development of socialism in Eastern Europe. A glance
will be taken at how this process occurred in a few representative countries. The objective here is
to provide important general information that may contribute to the comprehension of the roots
of the conflict in the Polish state as well as its implications for the international system, especially
the Communist world. Next, the situation in Poland in 1981 will be briefly addressed.
The expansion of the Soviet influence in East Europe began in the late years of the World
War II and the consolidation of such influence ensued in the early years of the Cold War. Two
important initiatives contributed to that end: the first was the sending of Soviet troops to
countries such as East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Albania, and
Romania after the War; the second refers to the USSR ever-increasing control over the East
European party leaderships. By taking the first initiative, the Soviet Union managed to assert its
physical presence in those countries, enhancing its capacity of military intervention and,
consequently, of bolstering the Communist regime. The deterrent aspect of that undertaking is
remarkable once in many countries loyal to the Soviet power where the Communist
governments were often unpopular and lacked enough legitimacy to assert its leading role in the

society the very fear of a Soviet military action has in some cases dissuaded the population
from taking extreme measures against their governments.
Equally significant, the control over the party elites has been steadily pursued since the
early 1920s when, in the aftermath of the Bolshevik revolution, Communist parties were created
in every East European country. Notably, among the conditions for joining the Communist
International (Comintern) was the subordination of the national party to the leadership of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). In effect, it was necessary to bind all the parties
together in their loyalty to the Central Communist Committee of the Soviet Union, for the
independence of one of them might threaten the whole Communist system. The Soviet influence
over national parties intensified in the 1930s, as the CPSU appointed and dismissed members of
the parties in the region and outlined the basic policies they should adopt domestically. In
addition, in the late 1940s Communist parties were installed in power in Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria. Such governments were supposed to carry out reforms such as
collectivisation of agriculture and rapid development of heavy industry.
The years that coincided with Stalins leadership of the CPSU witnessed a relative,
apparent success of the Party in exporting the Soviet model of Communism to East European
nations and in keeping the party elites in the region under the Soviet control, despite the existing
internal contradictions in the regional countries. Stalins death, in 1953, and the subsequent
accession of Khrushchev to the top of the CPSU, marked a turning point in the history of
socialism. Violent manifestations8 erupted among workers in East Germany and Czechoslovakia
in the same year and the party leadership was led to propose, for the sake of stability and the
maintenance of the Communist governments in power, a new course to be adopted by the
nations composing the socialist confederation. The new course required that the East European
Communist leaders adapt their domestic policies to fit local conditions with a view to satisfying
as much as possible the popular demands for consumer goods, and to appear as sovereign as
possible (JONES, 1981). The Twentieth Congress of the CPSU appeared to outline a new,
reformist environment in the Communist world9 which was both a reaction to anti-Communist
uprisings in socialist countries, and an event that encouraged attempts at pursuing alternative
paths in Poland, Hungary, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia. The First-Secretary Khrushchev,

8 It is worth mentioning that in the Khrushchev years the contestation by the intelligentsia and the students movements
intensified in some East European nations, backing the workers on their requests for change and expressing a wider social
discontent with the regime.
9 Signing a change in the Soviet police to East Europe, Khrushchev resumed relations with Titos Yugoslavia in 1955. The two
countries had experienced tense relations in the spring of 1948 when the Soviets accused the leadership of the Yugoslav
Communist Party (YCP) of several failings: hostility to Soviet military and economic advisors; favouritism to rich peasants
and the urban bourgeoisie; adoption of an overly ambitious industrialisation program; premature plans to collectivise
agriculture; merging the YCP into the Peoples Front, a union of political, economic, and cultural organisation; manifestations
of bourgeois nationalism; plans to align Yugoslavia with the West; and failure to attend a meeting with the other members of
the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) (JONES, p. 24).

who criticised the dictatorial administration of his antecessor, highlighting its repressive, illegal
character and blaming Stalin for committing several mistakes, then officially inaugurated the
process that he and his allies would name de-Stalinisation or democratisation. Additionally, the
Twentieth Congress proclaimed the renunciation of the leading role of the CPSU in relation to
the other Communist parties and, consonant with the Marxist-Leninist ideas, the Party
leadership admitted the existence of separate roads to socialism. The Soviet leadership indicated
that from then on Moscow would respect the independence of each Socialist country, which
would enjoy a greater deal of freedom.
Such striking news were promptly welcomed by the countries under the Soviet umbrella
and fueled radical changes in some nations, in particular in Poland and Hungary.
Notwithstanding, the Soviet reaction to those transformative movements was not that
welcoming. The Soviet army was ready to undertake a military intervention in Poland in 1956,
after the national party had been converted into a stage for internal struggles between
Moscovites associated with Stalin, on the one hand, and reformers compromised with
Khrushchevs words, on the other. The takeover by the leader of the reformers, Wladyslaw
Gomulka, halted the conflict temporarily and avoided the confrontation. Almost at the same
time, showing that the critical events in Poland were not merely isolated facts, a revolution broke
out in Hungary as two pillars of the Soviet socialism namely the unique party and the
subordination to Moscow were extinguished, giving room for democratic principles as political
pluralism10. An intraparty battle followed. In the face of that adverse situation about 20,000
Soviet troops were sent in to counter the counterrevolutionary putsch in Budapest. The military
action was not sufficient to put an end to the internal conflict, though. Counting on the consent
of both the Hungarian population and the Soviet Union, Imre Nagy, an exponent of the reformist
faction, acceded to the party leadership, cooling down the national effervescence. Moscow also
took measures with respect to Yugoslavia. The 1957 Moscow Declaration condemned the country
for its ideological deviations and proclaimed USSR as the leader of the Socialist camp. In 1961
another important event composed the set of crises faced by Khrushchev. It was the Albanian
crisis, which was stirred up by the Soviet attempt at overthrowing the leaders of the Albanian
party and installing a pro-Soviet leadership in the country11. In the Romanian case12, also in the
early 1960s, the crisis was triggered by a public declaration by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, the
10 The events in Hungary, as well as the relations that Nagy pursued with the USSR, were influenced to a certain extent by the
principles endorsed by the 1955 Bandung Conference such as national independence, sovereignty, equality, nointerference in
internal affairs, and self-determination. In the same year, the Soviet-Yugoslav declaration also asserted that each socialist
country is free to determine its own methods of socialist development.
11 On October 27th one of the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labour (APL), Enver Hoxha, made a speech in which he
emphatically rejected the right of the Soviet party congress to pass judgment on other parties.
12 The Romanian case is a special one particularly its relative independence from the Soviet Union and its adoption of a
strategy of territorial defence (which was inspired in Yugoslavia), entailing support from socialist countries and also the West.
It is also important to mention that the Soviet withdrew their troops from the country in 1958.

head of the party, who asserted the countrys complete independence from the Soviet Union,
following accusations of past interference of the Soviets in matters of policy and personnel in the
national party.
The Brezhnev years witnessed a partial restoration of Stalinism. However, the new
context of growing nationalism and the acute social conflicts in East European countries could
not be dismissed. Although the crises which have emanated in this era are not as numerous as in
the precedent years, the General Secretary of the CPSU was not immune from the vigour of
national upheavals. This was notable when the Prague Spring flourished in 1968. The
progressives in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia enhanced its influence in the party and
had a program encompassing the decentralisation of the economy, the government and even the
party. They were provided with strong support by the press, what favoured the attainment of
their objectives, namely to purge the conservatives of the party as well as enact the reforms they
regarded as necessary. In August the Soviet Union, claiming that the Communist Party of
Czechoslovakia had given up its leading role and lost control of political developments in the
country13, crunched the national movement by resorting to Soviet tanks. Such episode had a
world repercussion and stirred demonstrations of fraternity and sympathy with the Czechs in
some neighbouring countries14. It also showed the Soviet willingness to act when it deemed
necessary. Later on, Polish upheavals erupted in 1970, and again in 1976 (these events will be
properly addressed in the following section).
In this sense the General Secretary of the CPUS declared in the Twenty-Fourth Congress
in 1971 that a condition for the construction of socialism in the socialist confederation was a
correct combination of general and the national particular15, reinforcing a tendency that had
been delineated by the former CPSU leader16. Referring to a gradual drawing together of the
socialist countries in 1976 he also claimed that: Of course, much depends on the policy of the
ruling parties and their ability to safeguard unity, combat isolation and national exclusiveness,
honour their common international tasks, and act jointly in performing them17. Yet, the
beginning of the 1980s was again tumultuous. In January 1980 another crisis broke out in
Poland and, despite beliefs that the conflict had been solved by the approval of the Gdansk
accord in that years October, strikes were resumed as an expression of lingering dissatisfaction.

JONES, p. 40.
After the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviets in 1968, Albania left the Warsaw Pact.
15 The 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Moscow: Novosty Publishing House, 1971), p. 9.
16 A fragment of the 1957 Moscow Declaration states: Disregard of national peculiarities by a proletarian party inevitably
leads to its divorce from reality, from masses, and is bound to prejudice the cause of socialism and, conversely, exaggeration
of the role of these peculiarities is just as harmful to the socialist cause (Declaration of the Conference of the
Representatives of the Communist and Workers Parties of the Socialist Countries, Pravda, December 2, 1960, p.1).
17 XXV Sezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soiuza, [The 25th Congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union],
(Politizdat, 1976), p. 29.
13

14

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This year (1981) the situation has reached astonishing dimensions. In the following lines special
attention will be attached to the current state of affairs in the country.
Once more: the situation in Poland is definitely alarming. For the latest months the Poles
have witnessed a deep, relentless crisis for which there is no precedent even in the Communist
world. Tensions between state and society are more intense than ever. There is a widespread,
enduring fear that the Polish party, internally fragmented and lacking enough legitimacy to hold
national power in the model inherited from the Soviet Union, resort to harsh mechanisms (the
martial law, for instance) to restore its leading role and prevent the Polish nation from pursuing
a liberalising trend. Another some would qualify it as a remote, albeit real possibility,
namely an eventual Soviet military intervention in the country, has also been raised. To make
matters worse, the Polish state has accumulated a debt of almost US$ 30 billion to Western
banks, having been, therefore, under external pressure for changes such as wider
decentralisation and privatisation in its financial and economic systems. The economic
constrains imposed by the payment of the debt service as well as a significant reduction of the
national industrial production (about 15%) and exports, set the scene for a very unfavourable
economic situation which seems to deteriorate progressively. Equally important, it may be added
that the unfolding critical events in Poland pose an extra source of potential conflict between
East and West and may, alongside with similar movements in other socialist countries, be a sign
of deterioration of or a threat to the whole Communist system.
It is widely known that the crisis in Poland is a cyclical one. However, besides the adverse
economic setting in the country, some features of the current situation confer it a somewhat new,
diversified face. At this time the social effervescence, following a movement which started in the
late 1960s, is not only the expression of an unsatisfied working class searching for improvement
in life conditions. In fact, there is a nationwide discontent, comprising active members of the
intelligentsia, concerning both economic andpolitical elements. A broader range of issues
composes the agenda of the critics to the regime. In addition, the very establishment and
subsequent recognition of the labour union Solidarity by the state last year represented a striking
departure from the history of socialism in other countries. Solidarity has reached a historical
unparalleled power and organisational self-discipline to defend the demands of the workers,
leading some of its contenders into affirming that its role approximates more and more to the
role undertaken by political organisations. Notwithstanding the character of the union has not
been clearly defined yet, Solidaritys aims include the formulation of social and economic policies
as well as a far greater participation in the management of the Polish economy. This latter point
gravely concerns both the Polish Communist party and the Soviet Union once it might cause the

11

weakening of the PUWP, whose maintenance of its central power domestically figures among the
core tenets of the Soviet socialism.
In effect, the Polish Communist party has faced a serious challenge, which was
particularly worsened by two important elements. First of all, the outbreak of a wave of strikes
last October, as well as Walesas refusal to sign the Front of National Accord proposed by
Jaruzelski, displayed the strong willingness and capacity of the members of Solidarity to
coordinate their actions and to resist. Particularly the latest news referring to the Solidaritys
presidium in Radom last week (on the 3rd and 4th of December) put the party leadership in
serious alert and under strong pressure from other socialist countries. In the partys view the
need to restore its authority in the country, averting a complete social chaos, and its
responsibility to keep Poland on the path of socialism are imperative. The second element, in
turn, relates to the situation in the PUWP. The divisions within the party have reached
meaningful proportions, and marked disagreement on how to act in the face of the critical
situation does exist.
Bearing in mind the complexity of the situation at hand this is, in general terms, the
political, economic and social setting in Poland.

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HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM

Poland is a country that has fought against invasions for several times across its history.
Recalling recent history, only in early 20th century Poland was invaded by the Russians, the
Germans and the Soviets. It was Hitlers invasion of Poland in 1939 that started World War II.
After the end of the war, Poland was considered a Soviet sphere of influence. From that time on,
Peoples Poland was ruled by Communist order. To understand the situation that led Poland to
the 1980-1981 Solidarity crisis, it is necessary to comprehend the social movements of the
country when under the Soviet influence. During the Stalin years, Poland was controlled by
Boleslaw Bierut. After the Soviet leaders death in 1953, Poland faced a slight liberalisation. In
1956, Nikita S. Khrushchev, the new Soviet leader, showed great concern about the situation in
Poland, especially after Bieruts death. It was necessary a new leadership, and, despite
Khrushchevs threats to invade Poland if the radical leader Wladyslaw Gomulka were elected the
First Secretary of the Polish United Workers Party, he became the new Polish leader, promising
a way to socialism closer to Polish traditions. Only after Gomulka assured Khrushchev he would
keep the basic foundations of Polish communism the Soviet leader abandoned the threat of
invading Poland. This was called the Polish October.
Soon after the Polish October, Gomulka started being severe on the population control
again, in a clear contrast to his prior promises. It was when the labour restlessness got started. In
1957, he imposed censorship on the press and curtailed the power of Workers Councils in
factories. In 1959, Gomulka started the cleric persecution by prohibiting religious teaching at
schools and also closed many schools led by the Church doctrines. It was frequent during his
government the refusals for Church building, and disagreements were constant with the Church.
In 1966, the Polish Government refused to concede a visa to Pope Pius VI, when the country was
celebrating its Christianity millennium. In this same year, the government celebrated Polands
statehood millennium.
A group of intellectuals started a movement against the countrys political status. In early
1964, an open letter written by 34 intellectuals to the government was widely spread. On another
letter, two graduate History students from Warsaw University, Jacek Kuron and Karol
Modzelewski, invoked for a Workers Revolution, in which workers would take control of the
country and would rule through workers councils. Among their requests were also free trade
unions, the right to organise strikes, freedom of the press and free cultural and scientific activity.
The PUWP was accused of being an exploiting workers bureaucracy, and both of them were
arrested. In 1967, repression over the intellectuals was increased when many of them praised
Israelis victory over Egypt, what led some twenty thousand Polish-Jewish scholars, journalists

13

and bureaucrats to go in forced or even voluntary exile. In 1968, there was the Polish March.
After the prohibition of a play for being an anti-Russian work much applauded by the students,
on March 8 University students staged sit-ins calling upon for the end of the censorship. Spies
were sent into the University dressed as workers and beat up the students. Many of them went
into exile or were expelled. After this episode, things laid down. In August 1968 there was the
Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia and in early 1970, the government gained some support
when achieved an agreement with West Germany on the Oder-Neisse Line as Polands western
frontier, what was under discussion since many years ago.

The First Workers Strike: 1970

The revolt happened mainly because of Polands economic stagnation. Gomulka decided
to cease the subsidies on food and basic products because they were embezzling about one-third
of the countrys budget, and he refused to carry out economic reforms. On December 12, a rise on
the price of food and other supplies, some up to 60% (CIENCIALA, 2003), was announced by the
Warsaw radio, as well as the cancellation of the 13th salary and Christmas bonus. On 15
December, 3,000 workers from Gdansk went to the Party Headquarters to protest. A policeman
shot one of the workers, leading the rebels to shoot against the installations, and the staff was
forced to evacuate the building by chopper. The workers began sit-ins at the Gdansk and Gdynia
shipyards, but were persuaded by Party local representatives to quit it, and to support and to take
their demands to Warsaw. On December 16, Gomulka sent troops to defeat what he called the
counterrevolution in Gdansk. Many workers were shot when arriving at the Paris Commune
shipyard railway station nearby Gdynia. In Gdansk, Gdynia and Szczecin, strike committees were
organised; in the latter, an Interfactory Strike Committee was formed, and made many requests
to the Party. One of the requests was taken from the open letter written some years before by
Kuron and Modzelewski, and was the establishment of a non-party Trade Union leadership. The
strikes were repressed by force, and some 3 thousand were dead or injured. The fighting
persisted through December 18 and was extended to other parts of Poland. At this time, another
leadership was necessary to restore calm, and USSR advised upon Gomulkas replacement. On
December 19, Gomulka resigned alleging health problems and Edward Gierek was offered the
leadership by the Polish Politburo. Gierek appeared on TV on that day asking for calm and
regretting the bloodshed, and peace was restored.
On early January 1971, using old images Polish TV showed Gierek joking with workers of
the Szczecin shipyard, what unpleased them. To get things worse, a newspaper published

14

workers had signed a special production commitment, what did not happen, so they got on strike
again. At this time, they demanded Party representatives to talk to them, what happened on the
24th. Gierek asked for the workers help, and they answered positively to him. There were still
some other strikes, but they were soon controlled by Gierek. On March 1971, old prices were
restored and peace was established.
To keep peace, Gierek started granting relative autonomy to the press, as well as some
moves to please the intellectuals, such as the reform of the Warsaw Castle and autonomy to
academic publications and university studies. Making use of the Brezhnev-Nixon "detente" of the
1970s, Gierek wanted to modernise Polish industrial camp. At this time he started getting
massive credits from the West. This improved Polands economic condition. In 1974, however,
the economic situation worsened partly because of the raise of international oil prices.
Nevertheless, reforms were necessary since previous times, but Gierek was not willing to carry
them on. As the purchasing capacity of the Polish people decreased, the Party leaders enjoyed a
profuse life style (CIENCIALA, 2003).

The Second Workers Strike: 1976

In June 1976, the government announced a raise in prices for the critical situation in the
budget because of the subsidised prices. Although the government announced the workers had
agreed upon the hike, only the workers members of the Party did so. New strikes begun to
happen and were abruptly put off. The strikes at the Ursus Tractor Factory, near Warsaw, and in
Radom were violently repressed. With the support of the Catholic Church, which had already
helped civic and human rights during 1970, a new movement emerged, this time joining the
intelligentsia and the workers. Among the proposals of Cardinal Wyszynski, one of the Churchs
exponents in Poland, were freedom of conscience, freedom of religious belief, free cultural
activity, the right to truth and freedom of speech, free trade unions, an independent judiciary and
civil service, free elections to parliament, economic rights of private farmers, respect for the
indispensable civil rights of all Poles, and said the Constitution should not contain anything that
could limit the sovereignty of the Polish state (CIENCIALA, 2003). In 1976, the draft
Constitution established the subordination of Poland to the USSR and the conditionality of the
respect of human rights to the obedience of the Party. The government, to avoid other
insurgencies, cancelled the rise.

15

In late summer - early autumn 1976, a group of intellectuals created the KOR18, the
Committee for the Defence of Polish Workers, aimed at helping Polish workers. The Committee
published an underground bulletin, with the first being published in September. KOR adopted a
policy of open activism, what means that KOR members signed the bulletins with their demands,
based on the Polish Constitution and other international documents signed by the government,
with regard especially to human rights. In little time, other organisations emerged in the country,
such as the ROPCIO19, the Movement for the Defence of the Rights of Man and Citizen, formed
by right-wing intellectuals demanding moderated reforms and the KPN20, the Confederation For
and Independent Poland, also a right-wing movement. In 1978 it was created the TKN21, the
Association for Scholarly Courses, an underground educational organisation that organised
seminars to teach what was not taught or was distorted at official universities22. The government
response came through fines, threat of loosing jobs and salaries. However, with the help of the
Church, the movement persisted. In February 1978, Mloda Polska - Young Poland, another rightwing organisation - in cooperation with the KOR, established the Free Baltic Trade Union in
Gdansk, an institution where future workers leaders were taught. KOR also published
Robotnik23, an underground paper made for the workers. These organisations joined together to
celebrate national symbols and dates, such as annual celebrations for the Polish Constitution of
1791 on May 3, on September 17 in memory of the Soviet invasion or Easter Poland in 1939, and
on November 11 to celebrate the Independence Day in the pre-war period. The demonstrations
were also to protest against the government, and were frequently repressed by the police.
Samizdat, the Polish underground press, developed significantly from 1976 to 1980, in spite of
the governments attempt to persecute the dissident movements. The PUWP had to act very
carefully, in order to avoid causing mass unrest and the opposition of the U.S. government and
of the Church. During the 1970s, Poland received the visit of 3 U.S. presidents: Richard Nixon in
1972, Gerald Ford in1975 and Jimmy Carter in 1977.
Karol Wojtyla, the Archbishop of Krakow, was elected Pope on 16 October, 1978,
therefore aggravating the governments concerns. Soon after his election, Wojtyla, now John Paul
II, announced his will to visit Poland, which happened in June 1979. The impact on the country
was enormous. 200,000 people went to hear him in Warsaw; 1,000,000 visited the monastery of
Jasna Gora at Czestochowa; and more than a million attended in and around Krakow, everything
carefully being secured by the police. The Popes speeches dealt on right of freedom and the
Original name Komitet Obrony Robotnikow.
Original name Ruch Obrony Praw Czlowieka i Obywatela.
20 Original name Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej.
21 Original name Towarzystwo Kursow Naukowych.
22 The seminars were done in private flats, in the model of the underground education that happened in Poland during the
Russian occupation of 1890-1914 and German occupation during World War II.
23 The name of the paper is the same used in a publication made before World War I by Jozef Pilsudski and means The
Worker.
18
19

16

importance of Gods presence in ones life. The visit was certainly a turning point for the Polish
social movements.
1979 saw a strong decreasing of the Polish standard of life with the economic crisis.
Investments on power supply were lacking. The transport system, including roads and railroad
tracks, were in bad condition; food production declined due to poor harvests and the
governments policies of discrimination of private farmers24; the health system was in shambles;
great disparities could be noted between the elites, those who were part of the PUWP, and the
lower classes. Party and government officials, high police and military officers and industrial
managers enjoyed a pompous lifestyle while the mass was in hardship. In February 1980, the
government allowed a fairly open coverage of public opinion during the elections to the Eighth
Party Congress, which were to take place later that month. Mass complaints about authority
abuses were aired on national TV and led to the dismissal of premier Piotr Jaroszewicz. Gierek
appointed as his substitute his friend Edward Babiuch. By May-June 1980, unrest was
widespread and the population was considering strikes and sit-ins.

The Solidarity Movement

Premier Babiuch announced a raise on prices on 1 July 1980, which ensued strikes all
over the country. The strikes were nonetheless uncoordinated and the government could put
them off by negotiation. In late July, however, there was a city-wide strike at Lublin. All factories
stopped working and Polish consumer goods were distributed to the local population instead of
being sent to the USSR. Deputy Premier Mieczyslaw Jagielski could control the strikes,
Nevertheless other strikes in Gdansk and other coastal cities became coordinated. In August
there was a strike at the Lenin Shipyard, Gdansk, where some workers were killed on the
December 1970 insurrection, because of the prices raise and the dismissal of Anna
Walentynowicz, a member of the Free Baltic Trade Union. The shipyard manager could reach an
agreement with the employees and the strike came to an end. None the less, an electrician who
was a worker leader in December 1970 and member of the Baltic Trade Union tried in vain to
persuade workers not to go back to work. His name: Lech Walesa.
In coordination with Walentynowicz, a nurse named Alina Pienkowska and Henryka
Krzywonos, a street car driver, Walesa persuaded 400 out of 10,000 workers to coordinate the
movement joining them, and they not just accepted but also brought some 600 more. On 16

17

August, the MKS (Interfactory Strike Committee) was formed, which gathered enterprises from
all parts of Poland. It soon became the Provisional Coordinating Commission (TKK), aimed to
coordinate the movement all over the country. A group of advisors was formed under
coordination of Tadeusz Mazowieck, with local and KOR intellectuals coming from Warsaw. The
government cut off all communications from Gdansk and the rest of Poland and proposed
negotiations - the rebels, however, said no negotiation would take place unless all
communications were restored. Tadeusz Pyka, a Deputy Premier, was unsuccessful on the
negotiations and the Lublin strike negotiator Jagielski replaced him. The meetings between the
government and the MKS representatives were recorded and later widely broadcast, what was
known as the cassette revolution. The main negotiation, nevertheless, was carried out by the
workers advisory group. The Gdansk Agreement put an end to the strike. The agreement,
commonly known as the 21 Points, was signed on August 31, and is similar to another agreement
signed on the 30th in Szczecin, and the main results achieved were25:
(a)

establishing a Free Trade Union and safeguarding the right to strike,

(b)

demanding self-management, that is, Workers Councils to run state enterprises;

(c)

a sliding pay scale to guard against price hikes without increasing wages;

(d)

the state was to consult Solidarity and society in general on economic policy,
restricting exports, improving food supplies, abolishing foreign currency shops
[where people with foreign currency could buy goods unavailable in other shops];

(e)

improving work conditions, health services, medication supplies, free Saturdays,

and vacations, also increasing the amount of housing available;

(f)

defining censorship;

(g)

safeguarding Solidarity and Church access to the media;

(h)

and release of all political prisoners and reinstatement of workers fired after
strikes and university students expelled for their opinions.

Solidarity demanded a law to quit censorship, but it had also to recognise the Polish
United Workers Party as the government authority and the existence of international alliances,
in a reference to the Warsaw Pact. The government postponed the recognition of Solidarity at
most, having recognised it only in November 1980 and the Rural Solidarity only in April 1981. On
September 1980, following instructions from Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet leader, Gierek
resigned, pleading health problems and was replaced by Stanislaw Kania. The the ensueing
months saw a great joy in the nation, with free speech and elections of leaders in every type of
civil and institutional organisations. Some 1,000,000 people, one third of the Party members,
joined Solidarity during late 1980 and mid 1981. On 8 December 1980, right one year ago, a
24 Private farmers owned 78% of the land at that time, but could only buy fertilisers and machineries from the West and in US
dollars. The government purchased prices too low to cover their costs and imposed high taxes on extra production to avoid
private wealth (CIENCIALA 2003).
25 Passage taken from CIENCIALA, Anna. 2003.

18

crucial decision for the future of Poland and of Solidarity was taken: the Warsaw Pact hosted a
meeting to discuss the Polish situation and decided, at that moment, not to intervene and let
Polish government take care of Solidarity. The situation in one year was about to be drastically
changed.
General Wojciech Jaruzelski, who was the Polish Minister of Defense, became the Prime
Minister of Poland in February. In March, a general strike in reaction to the economic situation
in Poland was avoided due to negotiations between Walesa and Deputy Premier Mieczyslaw F.
Rakowski. At this time, the Warsaw Pact exercised manoeuvres in Poland and there were
rumours of a military intervention in the country. On May 13 1981, there was an attempt to kill
Pope John Paul II in Rome. The Pope survived the attempt, although he was seriously injured. At
the time, it was raised a Bulgarian connection, but nothing was proved by the Italian authorities.
A few days later, Cardinal Wyszynski passed out because of a cancer. Both religious were great
supporters of Solidarity. The changes in the Party, however, continued. The pressure from the
Soviet leaders for the total suppression of Solidarity was increasing. On June 5, the Soviet
Central Committee sent a letter to the Polish Committee mentioning the threat to the
revolutionary achievements of the Polish people26. Soviets openly gave support to the hardliners,
and demanded the Solidarity suppression by force.
In July 1981 there was the Extraordinary Party Congress, where were elected, by secret
ballot, delegates and the Central Committee. However, no reforms such as economic or political
were done, which earned but a negative response from the population. At this time, food
shortage was vastly growing in Poland. Marshall Kulikov, Commander in Chief of Warsaw Pact,
spent the month of August in Poland, making pressure on Kania to crush Solidarity. In this same
month, Brezhnev sent Kania a telegram asking for a plan to defeat the movement. On the 14th,
the Soviet leader met with Kania and Jaruzelski and insisted on the use of force. On the 20th, the
Soviet government announced a drastic cut of supplies to Poland in the following year. On 20
September , Brezhnev called the PUWP leader and asked him to immediately implement martial
law in Poland, saying that there would be a reaction by member-states should Warsaw Pact lines
be threatened. These were clear economic and military pressions on Kania. In September
October 1981, there was a Solidarity Congress in Gdansk, where Walesa was re-elected and the
Solidarity Program was developed, fully adopted in October. Right in this month, Jaruzelski
replaced Kania as the Head of State. In November, a Solidarity-Church-Party meeting took place.
At this meeting, Jaruzelski proposed a National Front, led by the Party. Walesa and Cardinal
Jozef Glemp, the Church representative, saw it as an attempt of the state to have full control of

26

CIENCIALA, Anna. 2003.

19

Poland and rejected it, just as Jaruzelski rejected Walesas plans to strengthen relations between
the state and Solidarity.
On 27 and 28 November, there was the 6th PUWP Plenum27, which decided that the Party
had to take an emergency action to protect Polish citizens and state. Cardinal Glem opposed the
decision but tried unsuccessfully to appease Solidaritys members. At that time, front
confrontation seemed very close. Also in late November Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski was extracted
from Poland to the United States - there are rumours he could have been a Western spy in
Poland. On 3 and 4 December, Solidarity Presidium met in Radom and agreed to have a Front of
National Understanding under some conditions28, and voted for a 24 hour strike if the
parliament voted for total power to the government. At the meantime, tapes of Solidarity leaders
rumouring a takeover of the governments came up and the political situation deeply worsened.
On 5 and 6 December, Solidarity delegates from the Mazowsze region met and called for a
protest in the centre of Warsaw on 17 December. On 7 December, Jaruzelski had a telephone talk
with Brezhnev, in which the Soviet conductor said: The counterrevolution is sitting on the back
of your neck. If you dont take necessary measures it will be too late. And now this concerns us
all. () This is not just your affair! (CIENCIALA, 2003). The Polish leader said he still believed a
peaceful settlement was possible and asked to see the Deputy Chairman of the Council of
Ministers, Chief of Soviet Economic Planning, Nikolai K. Baibakov, what was conceded by
Brezhnev.

A kind of conference in which very important decisions were taken, including the Partys policies.
The conditions were: (i) a decree on Trade Unions which would include Solidarity proposals; (ii) the government would
give up the so-called provisional economic regulations; (iii) Solidarity would be guaranteed access to radio and TV.
(CIENCIALA, Anna. 2003)
27

28

20

POSITIONS

Bulgaria

Expressing great concern in regard to the mounting instability in Poland, Bulgaria once
again confirms itself as one of the most reliable allies in the socialist bloc. Fearing that any delay
in action against the anti-socialist forces could lead the Polish Communist Party to the brink of
ruin, the Bulgarian leadership has, even thought publicly not as actively as some other member
states of the Warsaw Pact, emphasised that the socialist bloc must assist Poland in this moment
of crisis and fulfil its obligations to the Warsaw Pact. Bulgaria is following closely the
development and the effects of the Polish crisis.

East Germany

It is clear that Solidarity is a threat to the stability of socialist Poland. The suppression of
the counterrevolutionary forces by Polish authorities has been claimed for a long time - without
any apparent success. The East-German government believes it is time to consider the possibility
of a military intervention before loosing control over the situation. It is the duty of the Warsaw
Pact members to help the Polish comrades to overcome the crisis.

Hungary

As it is generally believed by the state members of the Warsaw Pact, Hungary concurs that
overcoming the extraordinary events in Poland is a complex, pressing task to be fulfilled mostly
by the leadership of the PUWP. Such an end requires the elaboration of a precise, consistent plan
with a view to securing the restoration of the authority of the Polish Communist Party. Only with
the implementation of a set of effective measures to curb the counterrevolution will the friendly
relations in the Communist world, as well as multilateral cooperation and the system of socialist
alliance, be revitalised and reinforced. Needless to say, to grasp the Hungarian stance on the
issue one should take a proper account of the nations past experience particular as it may be.

21

Poland

Jaruzelkis representatives, albeit deeply weakened because of its lack of legitimacy upon
its population, are looking forward for a quick solution to the Solidarity case. It has been pressed
by the other Warsaw Pact countries to put an end to the internal conflict as soon as possible.
Strongly opposing ifluence from the West and from the Church, the Polish government has do
deal very carefully with the matter because it fears an even wider revolt. Its compromises are to
keep socialism in the country as well as its commitment to the Warsaw Pact. The government
also fears a Soviet invasion to the country, but considers it is a possibility, just as the
establishment of a Martial Law, as the Brezhnev government has been attempting to force.
Jaruzelski and the government know a fast and effective solution has to be taken in the next days
or they may be either invaded by the USSR or totally lose the control of the country. The Polish
head of state also knows he is in a very delicate situation: either he finds a definite solution to the
Solidarity question or he is replaced, just as his predecessors that failed in controlling the
countrys situation.

Romania

The Rumanian People's Republic is extremely concerned about the situation in Poland
and believes that the problem must be solved from the inside. It is essential that the statemembers of the Warsaw Pact keep that in mind and act through diplomatic channels to keep the
crisis under control. An invasion from outside would bring more instability not only to the
situation in Poland, but also to the international scenario. Romania affirms that it is important
for the Polish Communist Party to focus its attentions on the working class - which is not fully
represented by the Solidarity movement.

The Peoples Republic of Czechoslovakia

Since the beginning of the counterrevolutionary movement in Poland, Czechoslovakia has

kept a day-by-day watch on the situation. It is the Czech governments view that the crisis is a
clear attempt of the international imperialism to wither away socialism in Poland by exploiting
the dire situation that this country encounters itself in. The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
sees in the 1968-1969 Czechoslovak crisis an incredibly insightful parallel to the ongoing anti-

22

socialist movement in Poland. The latter has to regain control over society and its allies have the
duty to assist it at all costs. Czechoslovakia is willing to take every possible measure to buttress
Poland.

Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics

Regarding the situation in Poland as deeply alarming and posing a great danger for the
Communist system, it is the Soviet Union stand that it must be handled in an effective, decisive
manner. Hence, in the face of the advanced stage of the crisis, the leadership of the PCSU has
reiterated its requests that the Polish authorities undertake a decisive action against
counterrevolution, making use of all the necessary mechanisms to hinder increasing anarchy in
the country as well as the undermining of governmental authority. The USSRs primary alleged
aims encompass the saving socialism in the Polish state, the avoidance of an escalation of the
conflict to other nations in the region, and the preservation of Poland as an ally as well as a loyal
party to the Warsaw Pact. The enduring Western influence in the Polish case is also an issue of
grave concern to the Soviets. At the same time, however, a certain deal of caution is in order in
this regard, given the current international policy of dtente and the potential of the matter to
cause a wider, bipolar confrontation.

First Deputy Chief of the Warsaw Pact Staff Lieutenant General K. K. Pashuk

General Pashuk is the responsible for the military operations of the Warsaw Pact. He is
the one that, in the case of a military intervention, will coordinate the operation. His position at
the meeting is to present tactics for a possible military intervention in Poland and also to assist
the PCC in any matter regarding military operations.

Warsaw Pact Commander in Chief Marshall Viktor G. Kulikov

Concerned with the crisis in Poland and the possible consequences that it might have in
other member-states of the Warsaw Pact, Viktor G. Kulikov reiterates that the Polish Communist
Party must regain its once uncontested position in the country. The demise of socialism in
Poland would lead to the inevitable withdraw of the latter from the Warsaw Pact and would

23

weaken the socialist alliance. The Warsaw Pact Commander in Chief insists that a firm and
decisive action must be taken to deter the counterrevolutionary movement that has plagued the
country and that Poland has the means to resolve the problem on its own. As the Deputy
Defence Minister of the USSR, Marshall Kulikov also supports Brezhnevs demands to crush
Solidarity.

Warsaw Pact Chief of Staff General Anatoli Gribkov

General Anatoli Gribkov is the responsible for the political coordination of the Warsaw
Pact. His position is, at the meeting, to measure the political results of the possible solutions to
be taken upon the Polish situation and to advise the PCC on the political results, both Eastern
and Western, of the Warsaw Pact actions.

24

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION AND QUESTIONS A RESOLUTION SHALL ADDRESS

A productive debate on the Polish crisis demands sufficient knowledge of the matter as
well as strong will to handle it in appropriate manner. To that end, important questions shall be
carefully considered while the discussion is held. A few of them are presented below and they
may be especially useful at the time of drawing up a resolution of the Warsaw Pact meeting.
Bearing continuously in mind the complexity of the current situation in Poland:
!

What measures should be taken to handle the critical events in Poland? Who should be
the agent(s) in charge of transforming this situation?

Do the latest events in Poland pose a threat to Communism? If so, how to preserve the
Communist system?

Should the socialist model adopted by the Polish state remain untouched or measures
should be devised to fit such model to the demands of the Poles?

Should the leading role of the PUWP be restored? If so, how could this aim be attained?

What should be done in relation to Solidarity and its actions and demands?

What should the participation of the Warsaw Pact and its members be in this case?

How to deal with the influence of the West in Poland?

Should any measures be taken in order to relief the suffering of the population due to the
deteriorating economic situation in the country?
A couple of final remarks is in order at this time. Nowadays, the international system has

experienced a delicate moment in which stability is arduously desired and pursued by most
countries. The critical events in Poland must be coped with as soon and wisely as possible so as
to prevent a disaster for the Poles and, eventually, for the world. Therefore, it is your utmost
duty, representatives to the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact, to devise
effective measures to handle the Polish situation and restore stability in Poland. We shall also
remind you that all of you invited for the meeting of 8 December, 1981, may write a one page
document stating your positions regarding the topic at hand for the other members of the
meeting appreciation.

25

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES

BAEV, Jordan. The organizational and doctrinal evolution of the Warsaw Pact (19551969)

CD

Documentary

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Sofia.

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at:

http://www.coldwar.hu/html/en/publications/organizational.html
BYRNE, Malcolm. New Evidence on the Polish Crisis: 1980-1982. Cold War International
History Project Bulletin II, 1997. Available at: http://wwics.si.edu/topics/pubs/ACFC43.pdf
CASTILHO, Carlos.; WAACK, William. Polnia: A crise de 500 dias que abalou o
socialismo (Poland: The 500 day crisis that shook socialism). Rio de Janeiro. Codecri, 1982.
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CIENCIALA, Anna M. Poland 1957-1980/81. Czechoslovakia and Hungary 1956/68 1980.

Lecture

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18.

Hist.557.

(revised

Nov.

2003).

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at:

http://raven.cc.ku.edu/~eceurope/hist557/lect18a.htm
CLAUDN, Fernando. A Oposio no Socialismo Real: Unio Sovitica, Hungria,
Polnia, Tcheco-Eslovquia. Ed. Marco Zero, Rio de Janeiro, 1981.
FALLENBUCHL, Zbigniew M. Poland: Command Planning in Crisis. Challenge, JulyAugust 1981.
GATI, Charles. Polish Futures, Westerns Options. Foreign Affairs, s/d.
IRVING, David. Uprising! One nations nightmare: Hungary 1956. Parforce UK, 2001.
Available at: http://www.fpp.co.uk/books/Uprising/
JORDAN, Alexander T. One Year Later - Poland Under the Cannon. National Review,
October 2, 1981.
JONES, Christopher D. Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and
the Warsaw Pact. Praeger Publishers, New York, 1981.
LEWIS, William. The Warsaw Pact: Arms, Doctrine and Strategy. New York: McGraw-Hill
Publications, 1982. 471p.
MACEACHIN, Douglas J. US Intelligence and the Polish Crisis: 1980-1981. United States
Central Intelligence: Agencys Center for the Study of Intelligence. 2001. Available at:
http://wings.buffalo.edu/info-poland/web/history/socialism/1980/link.shtml
MICGIEL, John S.Poland, 1980-1982: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions. 8-10
November 1997. East Central European Center, Columbia University.

26

SHAPIRO, Ian. Fiscal crisis of the Polish state. Genesis of the 1980 strikes. In: Theory and
society. Renewal and critique in social theory, Volume 10, 1981, ss. 469-502
WINSTON. The Current Wisdom - The Polish Conundrum. National Review, August 7,
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