Manaya V.

Alabang Country Club (2007)

Facts:

Manaya alleged that he was hired as initially by Alabang as Maintenance Helper

then was late designated as electrician. Later, he was informed that his serices
are no longer needed and therefore he was removed from his job with him
committing any infractions or violations to policies.
He filed complaint at the LA for illegal dismissal and non-payment of SIL, 13 th
month pay with reinstatement.
LA decided in his favor. Alabang filed its appeal with the NLRC but was dismissed
for failure to perfect appeal within the statutory period.
Alabang filed for reconsideration but was denied.
Alabang filed a petition for Certiorari. CA granted petition then ordered NLRC to
give due course to the appeal.
Manaya filed for a reconsideration but was denied by CA.

Issue:
W/o CA committed error in ordering NLRC to give due course to the appeal.
Ruling:
Yes.
CA relied on a ruling that that litigation must be decided on the merits and not on
technicalities. The appellate court further justified the grant of respondents petition by
saying that the negligence of its counsel should not bind the respondent.--------- For
negligence not to be binding on the client, the same must constitute gross negligence
as to amount to a deprivation of property without due process. This does not exist in the
case at bar.
---the Court only allows liberal interpretations given extraordinary circumstances that
justify a deviation from an otherwise stringent rule.
---the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is
not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and the failure to perfect the appeal renders
the judgment of the court final and executory. Just as a losing party has the right to file
an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right
to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his/her case.
---ART. 223. APPEAL. Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and
executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10)
calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. Such appeal may be
entertained only on any of the following grounds:
(a) If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor
Arbiter;
(b) If the decision, order or award was secured through fraud or coercion, including
graft an corruption;
(c) If made purely on question of law; and
(d) If serious errors in the finding of facts are raised which would cause grave or
irreparable damage or injury to the appellant.

Metro Transit V. PIGLAS (2008)

Facts:

Metro Transit lost in the LA a case file against it by the organization of its
employees PIGLAS.
Upon appeal in the NLRC, it filed a property bond which the NLRC accepted on
certain conditions; as what was required by law to perfect appeal is either cash or
surety bond. The Metro Transit failed to comply with the conditions, therefore,
appeal was dismissed for non-perfection.
Metro did not file a reconsideration of the dismissal but rather filed certiorari
with the CA; CA dismissed the appeal for failure to comply with the condition
precedent for filing a certiorari-which is a motion for reconsideration to a lower
courts decision/resolution----the rationale being that the lower court should be
given the opportunity to correct its error before recourse to the higher court is
made.
Metro Transit moved for reconsideration of the CAs decision. CA denied.

Issue:
W/O CA erred in dismissing petition for failure of Metro to move reconsideration of the
lower courts decision;
W/O the appeal in the NLRC was perfected
Ruling:
1. No. It must be primarily established that petitioners contravened the procedural
rule for the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. The rule is, for the writ to issue, it
must be shown that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
---The settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non
for the filing of a petition for certiorari.[11] Its purpose is to grant an opportunity
for the court to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the reexamination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.[12] The rationale
of the rule rests upon the presumption that the court or administrative body
which issued the assailed order or resolution may amend the same, if given the
chance to correct its mistake or error.
---Except: (1) when the issue raised is purely of law; (2) when public interest is
involved; (3) in case of urgency; or when the questions raised are the same as
those that have already been squarely argued and exhaustively passed upon by
the lower court.
2. No. In cases involving a monetary award, an employer seeking to appeal the
decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC is unconditionally required by Article
223[22] of the Labor Code to post a cash or surety bond equivalent to the amount
of the monetary award adjudged.[23] It should be stressed that the intention of
lawmakers to make the bond an indispensable requisite for the perfection of an
appeal by the employer is underscored by the provision that an appeal by the
employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond.[24]
The word only makes it perfectly clear that the lawmakers intended the posting of
a cash or surety bond by the employer to be the exclusive means by which an
employers appeal may be perfected.

---In cases involving a monetary award, an employer seeking to appeal the

decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC is unconditionally required by Article
223 of the Labor Code to post a cash or surety bond equivalent to the amount of
the monetary award adjudged. It should be stressed that the intention of
lawmakers to make the bond an indispensable requisite for the perfection
of an appeal by the employer is underscored by the provision that an
appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash
or surety bond. The word only makes it perfectly clear that the lawmakers
intended the posting of a cash or surety bond by the employer to be the exclusive
means by which an employers appeal may be perfected. Moreover, it bears
stressing that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the
period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional,and
failure to conform to the rules will render the judgment sought to be
reviewed final and unappealable.

Diokno V. Cacdac (2007)

Facts:
FLAMES, the Supervisor's Union for MERALCO, held a Union Election. It formed its
own COMELEC for the purpose of conducting fair elections, with Dante Tong as its
Chairman.
Jimmy Ong and others filed their certificates of candidacy (CoC). But these were
rejected by the COMELEC on the ground that Ong was not a member of FLAMES, and
that the others were confidential employees.
Another group, that of Edgardo Daya, also filed their CoCs. Other members of FLAMES
petitioned the COMELEC to have them disqualified. The COMELEC disqualified Daya
on the ground that they were committing acts of disloyalty which are inimical to the
interest FLAMES, as provided for in their Constitution and By-Laws (CBL). It was
alleged that, in their campaign, they had solicited support from non-union members,
particularly from officers of the MEMABA and the MESALA.
The union elections proceeded, then COMELEC declared Diokno and other petitioners
as the new President, etc. of FLAMES.
Ong's group filed a petition to annul the COMELEC's Order rejecting their CoCs.
Daya's group likewise filed their petition to annul their disqualification, to nullify the
election proceedings and counting of votes, to declare a failure of election, and to
declare the holding of a new election to be controlled and supervised by the DOLE.
And yet another group, that of Gaudencio Jimenez, filed another petition alleging that
the union elections were not free, orderly and peaceful.
All of these petitions were filed separately before the Med-Arb Unit of the DOLE, and
were subsequently consolidated.
Meanwhile, a new election was held, this time with Daya's group participating.
Eventually, the CA upheld the validity of the new elections, and the declaration of
Daya's group as the duly elected winners.

The Med-Arb ruled that Ong's petition was rendered moot and academic, and that
Jimenez's petition was premature for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies within
the COMELEC. With respect to Daya's petition, the Med-Arb ruled that Daya's
disqualification was improper because it was not supported by substantial evidence,
and that the grounds used by the COMELEC as a basis for disqualifying Daya, Art. IV,
Sec. 4(a)(6) of the FLAMES CBL, actually referred to the grounds for Expulsion of a
member from the union, and not Disqualification from the election.
In all cases, the Med-Arb asserted its jurisdiction.
The BLR and the CA affirmed the Med-Arb's decision.
Diokno and his group argued that the Med-Arb was without jurisdiction over the
disputes, because Art. 226 which grants power to the BLR to resolve inter- and intraunion disputes is dead law, and has been amended by Sec. 14, RA 6715 whereby the
conciliation, mediation and voluntary arbitration functions of the BLR had been
transferred to the NCMB. They also contended that the COMELEC had the sole and
exclusive power to rule upon the qualification of any candidate, and therefore it has the
correlative power to disqualify any candidate in accordance with its guidelines.
Issues:
1. W/O the BLR has jurisdiction;
2. W/O petitioners failed to exhaust all administratve remedies;
3.
Ruling:
1. The controversy in the case at bar is an intra-union dispute. There is no question
that this is one which involves a dispute within or inside FLAMES, a labor union.
At issue is the propriety of the disqualification of private respondents Daya, et al.,
by the FLAMES COMELEC in the 7 May 2003 elections. It must also be stressed
that even as the dispute involves allegations that private respondents Daya, et al.,
sought the help of non-members of the union in their election campaign to the
detriment of FLAMES, the same does not detract from the real character of the
controversy. It remains as one which involves the grievance over the constitution
and bylaws of a union, and it is a controversy involving members of the union
2. Among the established exceptions are: 1) when the question raised is purely legal;
2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; 3) when the act complained of is
patently illegal; 4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; 5) when
the claim involved is small; 6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; 7) when
there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy; 8) when strong public
interest is involved; 9) when the subject of the proceeding is private land; 10) in
quo warranto proceedings;[38] and 11) where the facts show that there was a
violation of due process.
3. If, indeed, there was a violation by private respondents Daya, et al., of the
FLAMES CBL that could be a ground for their expulsion and/or dismissal from the
union, which in turn could possibly be made a ground for their disqualification
from the elections, the procedural requirements for their expulsion should have
been observed. In any event, therefore, whether the case involves dismissal
and/or expulsion from the union or disqualification from the elections, the proper
procedure must be observed. The disqualification ruled by the COMELEC against
private respondents Daya, et al., must not be allowed to abridge a clear
procedural policy established in the FLAMES CBL. If we uphold the COMELEC,
we are countenancing a clear case of denial of due process which is anathema to
the Constitution of the Philippines which safeguards the right to due process.

St. Martin V. NLRC (1998)

Facts:

Aricayos filed illegal dismissal case against St. Martin where LA ruled in favor of
St. Martin finding no employer-employee relationship.
Aricayos appealed in the NLRC where the latter ruled in his favor. NLRC
remanded the case to the LA for appropriate proceedings;
St. martins moved for reconsideration but was denied. Then it filed a petition for
certiorari directly to the Supreme Court under Rule 65.

Issue:
1.

W/O certiorari under 65 to the SC is proper.

Ruling:
1. No. It must be filed first to the CA.
2. Congress did intend to provide for judicial review of the adjudications of the
NLRC in labor cases by the Supreme Court, but there was an inaccuracy in the
term used for the intended mode of review. This conclusion which we have
reluctantly but prudently arrived at has been drawn from the considerations
extant in the records of Congress, more particularly on Senate Bill No. 1495.
3. The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the
NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that
the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial
review of decisions of the NLRC. The use of the word appeal in relation thereto
and in the instances we have noted could have been a lapsus plumae because
appeals by certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes of
judicial review addressed to the appellate courts. The important distinction
between them, however, and with which the Court is particularly concerned here
is that the special civil action of certiorari is within the concurrent original
jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of Appeals;[23] whereas to indulge in the
assumption that appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court are allowed would
not subserve, but would subvert, the intention of Congress as expressed in the
sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1495.
4. While we do not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere on the matter of
the wisdom of a law, on this score we add the further observations that there is a
growing number of labor cases being elevated to this Court which, not
being a trier of fact, has at times been constrained to remand the case to
the NLRC for resolution of unclear or ambiguous factual findings; that the
Court of Appeals is procedurally equipped for that purpose, aside from the
increased number of its component divisions; and that there is undeniably an
imperative need for expeditious action on labor cases as a major aspect of
constitutional protection to labor.