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X he Platonic
argument
1079a9)x
(990b13;
that Aristotle
had
doubtless
premiss:
of some
virtue
The
following
:
premiss
are
We
or more
two
Whenever
to which
one
sentence
can
things
from
be
that
F-ness,
thing,
Plato's
in the habit
of assuming
we give
the same name.2
one
said
properly
are properly
to be
Form
F.
such
suggests
Republic
for each
is by
it
F,
called
they
set of many
things
if we
take Plato's
theory
There
1
Aristotle.
Line
references,
unless
otherwise
this way, we
ignore the per
are at least two distinguishable
One perplexity
is
like Plato's.3
identified,
are
to
the
works
of
2
from Plato
596A.
Translations
and Aristotle
of passages
Republic
our own.
3
are things
as they are?"
two questions,
and
Cf. David
Pears's
"Why
we
we
name
as
in
are
do?"
to
his
in
able
article,
"Universals,"
things
"Why
ed. by A. Flew
and Language
(2nd series),
(Oxford,
1953),
pp. 51-64.
Logic
are
631
is something
all wise
things
are
properly
they
in, by virtue of
participate
called
And what
"wise."
participation
men
all
is
refers
'aman' names
to)
in,
(or
something
participate
said to be a man.6
each is properly
by virtue of which
as a manner
of Forms
of speaking Plato's
Although
Theory
refers
to)
which
rise to
of these
It is not, however,
difficulties with candor and perspicuity.
Plato's
to assess here.
that we want
Instead we
candor or his perspicuity
answer
to the One-Over
shall concern ourselves with Aristotle's
we
shall
discuss
Aristotle's
Cate
Specifically
Many Argument.
their
names,"
Parmenides,
130E
and
Phaedo,
102B.
632
GARETH
B. MATTHEWS
AND
S. MARC
COHEN
as an answer
to Plato.
to try to show that the
We want
on at least one plausible
offers a more
Categories,
interpretation,
answer
to
Plato
than
has
to be the
been
thought
usually
general
some comments
case. We
shall then make
toward assessing
the
gories
and weaknesses
strengths
philosophical
of this Aristotelian
answer.
The
theme
is not
predication
one might
of Aristotle's
say, is that
Categories,
such a simple affair as Plato, with his One-Over
takes it as his
have us think.
Aristotle
would
Argument,
to sort out and clarify
task in the Categories
in which
be properly
said to
may
something
The first kind of case Aristotle marks
off is the
that he is a cat, or of Nellie that
say of Fenimore
Many
major
ways
we
the variety of
so-and-so.
be
case
in which
she is a cow.
are not
individual
somethings-or
individual men,
etc.
cows,
cats,
other, e.g.,
an
so
is
individual
And
such
individual
such-and-such.7
the
Every
is also the being or substance
of an individual
and-such
(o&ria) of
it
what
the
is
individual
is.
the individual;
are
of primary
In a way the notions
substance
and secondary
could
there
be
that
individuals
individual
individual
for
correlative,
is no
there
individual
and no such-and-such
such-and-such,
vidual such-and-such.
7
1961),
Cf. G. E. M.
pp.
identifying,
denies
that
such"
sophical
(p.
7-8.
Anscombe
Miss
rather
"one
10).
Quarterly,
and
contrasts
A.
16
a
identify
C. Lloyd,
(July
individual
P. T. Geach,
Three
Philosophers
this an epistemological
about
identity.
point
thing without
"Aristotle's
1966),
an
Anscombe
makes
a metaphysical
than
can
Cf.
Yet Aristotle
is not
that
without
pp.
identifying
Categories
258-267,
espec.
(Oxford,
about
point
Thus
she
it as a such-and
Today,"
p. 264.
The
Philo
633
THE MANY
Aristotle attaches
I am, so to speak,
chart is built up
to classification.
the individuals
from
it is individuals
the
that
that
individuals
by calling
Already we have
emphasized
classifies
substances.
primary
between
the distinction
it classifies.
the chart
individuals
of an answer
to Plato's
One
us
to suppose
that it is by
Argument.
Over-Many
that both Fenimore
and Felix are properly called
virtue of cathood
is something
cats.
"over against" Felix and Feni
But if cathood
must
Felix
and
Fenimore
be
more,
apart from cathood.
something
or Fenimore
would
principle
reflections
and
tional.
either Felix
to justify
and shadows
Schubert's
to things
its rejection
by pointing
or
that are essentially
constitutively
shadow, e.g., would
certainly not be what
Schubert's
Schubert's
shadow
could
like
rela
it is
not
(viz.,
shadow)?indeed
it
the shadowing
relation
from its bearing
be said to exist?apart
in
what
it
bears to Schubert.
fact
Schubert's
shadow's
is,
being
tied to its bearing
the relation
its very existence,
is essentially
it
to
Schubert.
bears
the need for this rejoind
We might
stop to notice that making
er clear does a great deal to undermine
the force of the One-Over
to be
That argument,
let us recall, is supposed
Many Argument.
an argument
the existence
general
of Forms.
of Forms by an extrapolation
terms.
it generalizes
In particular,
8
See,
e.g.,
2b7-22
and
2b29-3&7.
It allegedly
establishes
from proper names to
on the relation
between
634
GARETH
a proper
embrace
name
AND
B. MATTHEWS
it names
and what
COHEN
as to be able
a way
in such
a general
S. MARC
to
term
it "names"
and what
a
to
be
this
is
non-circular
If
its meaning).
argu
argument
then we must be able to under
for the existence
of Forms,
a proper name and what
it names with
the relation between
(i.e.,
ment
stand
the relation
between
out antecedent
commitment
But can we do this?
To understand
names clearly
It begins
the relation between
what
the correct application
includes understanding
name consists
And
that
in.
surely involves understand
to Plato)
about the (according
relational
ing something
essentially
A dark spot on the
of the bearers
of proper names.
character
of a proper
bearing
that we
to suppose
proper name and what
that there are Forms.
able
Argument
of
to
relation
a certain
can
Form,
understand
then
it seems
unreason
the relation
between
it names without
the antecedent
assumption
And if this is so, then the One-Over-Many
for the existence
fails to provide a non-circular
argument
Forms.
to Ari
rejoinder
just argued that a certain Platonic
the force of the One-Over
stotle itself has the effect of weakening
to suggest
that Aristotle
But we do not mean
Many Argument.
We
have
this dialectical
Rather Aristotle
strategy against Plato.
employed
that primary
substances
took the much more direct line of denying
are relational
To adapt
entities
such as Felix and Fenimore
(8a16).
we
an Aristotelian
of
from the Categories
say
way
might
arguing,
there
said to be Felix (or the Felix)
of anything;
. Aristotle
are not "relatives"
fore Felix and Fenimore
(Ta tco?c ti)
some secondary
about whether
substances might
certainly worried
to
But
it
him
be "relatives"
seemed
(8a13f.).
quite clear that
that Felix
substances
primary
9
We
that
is not
not.9
little
did very
add that Plato
might
substances
Aristotle
called)
primary
the
how
he never
(say)
explained
of cathood.
off from
the Fenimore
(say)
(what
particular
marked
are
to make
good
are relational
Felix
of
his
cathood
suggestion
In
entities.
could
be
635
THE MANY
and Fenimore
If Felix
and Felicia
as before.
are not
relational
entities,
be what he is
the perplexity
remains
stand in. But how can he
of any relations he may
independent
a certain
be, if his being a cat is supposed to consist in his bearing
to cathood?
relation
then
In place
and
primary
of Plato's
Felix must
relational
account
substance
offers
secondary
what
it is for Felix
Aristotle's
doctrine
a non-relational
way
of
of
to be a cat.
is
Every individual
For Felix to be an individual
is already
so-and-so.
for him to be a cat. And for Socrates to be an individual
is already
for him to be a man.
To be sure, being an individual
and being
a cat are not, in general,
the same thing.
is
that means
But what
understanding
an individual
not
that
is a way
there
individual
to be an individual
is for
him
So far we
have
F
and
substance
talked
secondary
substance.
the case
x is a
primary
F, where
Let
us
now
say
a word
some
in which
is the differentia
of
(as,
species
Aristotle
in 'Callias is rational').
says very firmly that differ
are not in a subject
like substances,
but unlike qualities,
entiae,
And
classes
with
differentiae
substances
he
in another
(3*21-2).
a
too.
He
that
the
definition
of
like
the defini
differentia,
says
way,
a quality,
unlike
but
tion of a secondary
the
definition
of
substance,
about
e.g.,
of that of which
is predicated
Classing
differentiae
with
the differentia
is said
(3a25-6).
rather than
substances,
secondary
for Aristotle's
scheme.
categorial
qualities, makes
problems
here.
shall not try to discuss these problems
on
how
differentiae
commenting
understanding
with
We
with
what
Rational
10
the
John
The
of these
ideas
significance
of recent
of
discussions
light
R. Wallace,
"Sortal
Predicates
Philosophy,
But
it is worth
can perhaps
in
be better
appreciated
"sortal"
Cf.
predicates.
especially
and Quantification,"
The
Journal
of
636
GARETH
scus is rational.
B. MATTHEWS
AND
S. MARC
COHEN
But we must
as something
not think of rationality
and
in
which
Coriscus,11
against"
something
they
to participate.
For rationality
to
could both be thought
is essential
a
man.
a man's
to
To
is
Callias
to
be
be
and
be
rational,
being
or Coriscus
or some
is to be some man or other?Callias
rational
Callias
"over
one.
some
individuals
somehow
this classification
viduals,
provides
are said and seen to be individuals.
previously
the terms
marked
off as indi
in which
individuals
II
that Aristotle
lists in his Categories,
Of the ten categories
it is what he calls secondary
substance
and what he calls quality
in the application
of the One-Over
that are perhaps most
important
said
about
sub
So, having
secondary
something
Many Argument.
us
now
turn
to
most
of
the
devote
let
We
shall
stances,
qualities.
rest of the discussion
to that topic.
have already seen that, where F is a secondary
substance,
x
a
as
F
is
clas
of
that
it
conceives
basic
saying
making
We
Aristotle
I
When
substance.
But suppose F is not a secondary
am
I
Feni
that
Fenimore
is
for
grey,
say
again classifying
example,
It may seem so. After all, cats can be classified
more?
according
from what
to their color.
But classification
is here rather different
it was in the case of our saying that Fenimore
is a cat. For in that
sification.
11
in two
One
of
might,
different
entirely
of
independence
however,
Aristotle,
entiae
of genera
also
different
any
course,
expect
classification
individual
that
would
differentia
appear
a certain
achieve
thereby
one
of these
schemes.
by only
when
he
"Differ
says,
possibility
classified
this
denies
explicitly
that are different
and not
in kind"
(lb16-7).
a single
and
schemes
subordinate
one
to another
are
637
Fenimore
So saying
(or any other cat) appears.
not
that he is grey is
of Fenimore
in the way
Fenimore
classifying
that saying of him that he is a cat is classifying
him.
A natural
to this sort of consideration
would
be to
response
a
is
'Fenimore
is
for
that
'Fenimore
is
say
grey
elliptical
grey'
one might
the symmetry,
This will preserve
cat'.
for in
suppose;
a classification
as a species,
table in which
it
'grey cat' appeared
would
for the name of an individual grey cat, like
be appropriate
to
Fenimore,
appear
himself
as well.
this move
consider
But it is
explicitly.12
an
on
out
his
behalf.
easy enough
appropriate
reply
as a grey cat (in much
the
If we could really classify Fenimore
a
we
as
a
then
for
cat
to
him
cat
b
and
be
both
cat),
way
classify
would
be for them to be the same grey cat.13 But, of
Fenimore
Aristotle
does
not
to figure
being
12
At
later works
13
Cf.
1957),
p.
not
in the Categories.
relevant.
are, of course,
Three
p.
Philosophers,
69.
least
Discussions
(Cf. Metaphysics
8; P. T. Geach,
of
unity
Z4-5.)
Mental
of
definition
Acts
(London,
in
638
GARETH
B. MATTHEWS
it is in" (la24-5).
the notion of being
AND
S. MARC
COHEN
to conclude
has in mind with
this idea is not
that what Aristotle
a technical notion.
to assume that,
it is natural
More specifically,
x is a subject, 9 is said of x if and only if, x is said to be 9.
where
For at 2a32 Aristotle
But this will not do.
agrees that a body is
<xw?jia
And
what he goes on
said to be white
(^euxov y?p
Xeyexai).14
as
a
to say entails that white
he
is not said of
subject. What
body
never
be predicated
of white will
goes on to say is that the definition
And he has said earlier that
of the body (2a32-4).
said of a subject both its name and its definition
is
if something
are necessarily
of the subject
(2a19-21).
predicated
So what
is it to say something
of a subject?
At 2a19 we learn
two necessary
If 9 is said
and perhaps jointly sufficient conditions.
a
name
of 9 and the definition
of 9
of
subject, x, then both the
clear
Aristotle makes
be predicated
of x.
(i.e., predicable)
of the
that the part about the name being predicable
is the weaker
two conditions.
is
The name of (the color) white,
viz.,
'white',
swan
a
swan
when
I
of
"The
is
white"),
(as
say,
though
predicable
is not predicable
of the
the name of beauty,
say, (viz.,
'beauty')
will
14
ence,"
Cf. G. E.
Or perhaps
in color"
).
( Xeuxov
"light
X
Pronesis,
(1965),
p. 98.
15
Contrast
185a32.
In the Categories.
Physics
16
in an absolutely
of course,
fundamental
"Classified,"
L.
Owen,
way.
"Inher
639
(4) things
(3) things both said of a subject and in a subject;
neither
said of a subject nor in a subject.
The following will serve as examples to illustrate what Aristotle
this classification
scheme.
(1) Cat is
may have had in mind with
I say that Fenimore
is a cat), but cat
said of a subject
(as when
is not in any subject.
(Feni
(2) This bit of grey is in a subject
not
is
said
of
but
it
,
any subject, for I do not say of Fenimore
more)
(3) Grey is said
else) that he is a this-bit-of-grey.
(or anything
a subject when
said
is
of
of a subject and is also in a subject;
grey
a
if Fenimore
Fenimore
is grey, and grey is in
I say that charcoal
in a subject nor said of
is himself neither
is grey.17
(4) Fenimore
a subject.
The second depends
The first part is obvious.
upon
or a kind of
is said to be a Fenimore,18
the fact that nothing
Fenimore.19
in these examples,
secondary
unit
to class (2), universal
(1),
qualities
In order
to class (4).
qualities to class (3) and primary substances
we
need
to justify our use of this rather traditional
interpretation
to say something more about classes
(2) and (3).
Aristotle's
First, a remark about class (3).
only immediate
he
in
is
this
class
of
Knowledge,
knowledge.
something
example
a
a
said
and
the
of
is
in
both
soul,
says,
subject, grammar
subject,
an item in this class is
the subject which
(lbl-3).
Presumably
the interpretation
substances belong to class
On
embodied
said of, will always be different from the subject or subjects it is in.
Grey, for example, will be said of the subject, charcoal grey, but it
17
is a paronymous
relation
between
what
is in a
is said to be by virtue
that in it: e.g.,
of having
thing
of having
in him
is said to be brave by virtue
(10a27-9).
bravery
18
true.
cat that he is a
I can say of my
This
is not, of course,
strictly
and mean
that he is among
the cats called
Aristotle
Fenimore
"Fenimore."
in this sort of case.
is not
interested
19
from G. E. L. Owen's
is very different
claim
will
This
that "Aristotle
to occur
not allow
of a primary
substance
in the predicate
the designation
subject
a man
position."
In general
and what
op.
cit.,
there
the
p.
97.
640
AND
B. MATTHEWS
GARETH
S. MARC
COHEN
More generally,
is in, say, Fenimore.
grey will be said of a color,
It may be said of the color of a body, but it
but will be in a body.
be to classify the
will not be said of the body (for to do so would
body
as a color).
should now
We
to which
"the only item from any category
that
Aristotle
according
sense
can be present
in
the
of
in an individual
subject,
requisite
one
determinate
but
that
not
is
is
non-recurrent;
'in',
only quite
case against this
a unit property
in Russell's
sense" (p. 99). Owen's
Aristotle
When
is completely
says that
convincing.
"dogma"
in an individual body"
"color is in body, and therefore
(2bl-2) he
to be saying just what he says.
surely means
to Aris
in rejecting
the "dogma"
that, according
However,
Owen
substances,
totle, only unit properties
may be in primary
seems also to be rejecting
alto
the idea of individual
properties
means
at
what
of
Aristotle
Or
least, his notion
by an
gether.
a
in the category of quality
is such that
shade
individual
particular
of color would
illustrate
what
Aristotle
has
say,
this way:
in mind
Owen
rather
supports
his
than,
case
'Animal'
is
with
the predicate
'colour'.
the predicate
'animal'
are
and
'man'
of man,
'animal'
in turn predicable
of
and
His
is just that he, or his name,
the individual.
individuality
less general;
and
since
of anything
he is an
is not predicable
further,
in the way
in any individual
that he is not
found
individual
substance,
are
sizes
found
their
and
and
in
that
colours
possessors.
shapes
Compare
predicable
Socrates
on
'Colour'
'pink'
those
number
specimen
quality,
are
the
in
shades
hand,
is discriminated
shade
analogous
convincing.
of pink,
and
'colour'
and
of pink?any
shade
of
any particular
a finite
to prove
that only
is ready
Call
the
(Sens.
445b20-446a20).
sight
vink
is an individual
of
in the category
is predicable
of
predicable
Aristotle
of which
As an account
is not
other
turn
'vink'.
by
Then
to Socrates
of what
goes
For Aristotle
in the
category
in class
speaks
of
substance.20
30
Ibid.,
p. 98.
some
of them.
Or perhaps
But
Aristotle's
only
although
him
to the view
that all members
not commit
of class
(2) are
21
does
language
individual
641
to that which
is not
is here simply another way of referring
said of any subject.
Then a specifi
shade of color like vink might
be called one in number
simply because no (shade of) color is said
to be (i.e., none is classified
The following
passage
as) a vink.
ber"
the Metaphysics
from
might
seem
to support
this reading
'one
of
in number':
. . . there
vidual'.
'universal'
is no
For
by
what
difference
between
we mean
'individual'
is [said or predicated]
'one
saying
what
of
in number'
is one
individuals.
'indi
and
in number,
and
by
(999b33-1000al)
of this interpretation
It would be a consequence
that, accord
to
in
this
and
the
in that rib
the
ribbon
color
color
Aristotle,
ing
were
would also
bon, provided
indistinguishable,
qualitatively
they
seem
But nowhere
does Aristotle
identical.
have to be numerically
even implicitly.
to agree to any such doctrine,
In fact, just before
the passage
run
seems
to
counter
that
something
cited
above,
to this
Aristotle
of
says
'one
interpretation
letters and syllables;
and he says
in number'.
He is discussing
that being one in kind (t<?>e?oet) is a necessary,
but not a sufficient
condition
for numerical
and their con
among
identity
syllables
He is thus using the contrast between what
stituent letters.
is one
in number and what
is one only in kind to mark what philosophers
distinction.
today refer to as the token-type
a
a
in
token
of a given word
letter
is, in the
Presumably
like a color in a piece of ribbon.
relevant respect,
seems quite clear that for Aristotle
it is this vink
to make
sense of the suggestion
in number,
it is difficult
that perhaps
are and some are not.
22
are not said of any
that are individual
and one
in number
"Things
some
but
of them
from
in a
whatsoever,
nothing
prevents
subject
being
bit of grammar
is among
in a subject."
This
the things
(lb6-9)
subject.
and
one
If so, then it
in this ribbon
some
Cf.
4a10-21.
642
B. MATTHEWS
GARETH
AND
S. MARC
COHEN
in that ribbon
and
(like this 'a' in this token word
'a' in that) that are individual
and one in number,
and not
the letter type 'a'.
vink tout court, or, of course,
to Aris
Professor Owen is surely right to insist that, according
totle, pink, and not merely
vink, can be in a given piece of ribbon.
is just for some
In fact for pink to be in a given piece of ribbon
and that vink
that
story,
on
whereas
our
reading
Aristotle
wants
to go
on
and
a dog is just to
case the dog is
Boso.
talk of individual
colors that are one in number
to
conceive
of something's
suggests
ought
being pink (or
the
lines
of
For this particular
Callias's
having a dog.
grey) along
piece of ribbon to be pink is just for it to have in it the bit of pink
that it has.
To be sure, being pink is not, in general,
the same as
Aristotle's
that we
relative with
from
individuals,
its exemplifying
it is nothing.
Apart
color
such
colors
its color
either.
between
643
partaking
Ill
Let us see exactly how
that we are reconstructing
One-Over-Many
fore (according
this understanding
of quality attribution
from Aristotle's
bears on the
Categories
there
is grey, Felix is grey;
Fenimore
Argument.
to the One-Over-Many
be
there must
Argument)
are
virtue
of
which
said
both
greyness,
something,
by
they
properly
answers that that by virtue of which
to be grey.
the two
Aristotle
to
cats are both properly
be
is
this
bit
for
said
of grey
Feni
grey
more and that bit for Felix.
Fenimore's
having his bit of grey in
him is what makes him grey, just as Callias's
is what
dog, Boso,
a dog-owner.
makes
him
in him without
cat's greyness
accrues
to him by virtue
bit of
grey.
of quality attribution
is a natural
Clearly this understanding
extension
of the Aristotelian
of
substantial
conception
predication
we discussed
in section I. Both arise from the idea of basic clas
In the case of substantial predication,
sification.
to say of x that it
to classify x; in the other case, to
to Aristotle)
is F is (according
x
our
is
F
to classify
it
is
of Aristotle)
of
that
(on
say
reading
x.
in
of
that we
Both
something
analyses provide ways
denying
or
to
to
reference
F-ness
it is
what
make
understand
should,
need,
for x to be F.
that we need or should make
refer
But the point in denying
ence to F-ness
to understand
what
it is for x to be F differs in the
two cases. Where
F is a secondary
the point is to avoid
substance,
the dilemma,
either Felix is what he is independent
of participating
in cathood
that might
(and is therefore a bare individual, whatever
to be) or else he is a mere
be thought
relational
(like a
entity
shadow
or
a reflection,
or,
to use
an Aristotelian
example,
a thresh
644
GARETH
B. MATTHEWS
AND
S. MARC
COHEN
to
existence
that owes its identity and continued
(1042b26))
non-relational
the relation
else.
Aristotle's
it bears to something
account goes between
the horns of this dilemma.
old
a quality
'F' attributes
to x, the point
is
Where,
however,
same
will
not
This time there
be the
about
worry
quite different.
x is supposed to be whatever
of
it is independent
what
(or whether)
with
differentiae
sub
F-ness.
Since Aristotle
groups
secondary
as qualities
stances rather than with qualities, what he recognizes
can lose without
be things an individual
losing its identity or
to
with conundra
that
to
time
is
deal
this
exist.
The
ceasing
point
arise from the notion of F-ness being in some thing or other. Among
about how one Form can
the many places in which Plato worries
will
the most
is Parmenides
interesting
perhaps
be in the
that the Form must
Plato argues
a
as
a
or
as
whole
in
If
then the
it
in
either
is
whole,
part.
things
If in part, then other paradox
Form will be separate from itself.
in x will be smaller
ical results will follow, e.g., that the smallness
in many
130E-131E.
be
things,
There
than Smallness
itself.
avoid
this conundrum
property having
Fenimore's
analogy,
Felix's
color.
on Aristotle's
to the notion
behalf,
already objected,
and
Fido
have
that Boso
(Coriscus's
(Callias's dog)
dogness
dog)
that notion
is the suggestion
in common.
One thing wrong with
somehow
be something
of
that Boso and Fido might
independent
We
have
645
A similar
in which
the dogness
participate.
they both allegedly
point could be made about the particular bit of grey Felix has and
the particular
bit Fenimore
has. We
cannot, without
absurdity,
in common
For it would
either.
suppose these to have greyness
to think
be ridiculous
more's
It
to speak of classification,
But clas
is all very well
he may
say.
or
else it is arbitrary.
sification must be based upon something,
If
x and y are both
as F, it must be because
classified
properly
they
have something
in common.
a given
about whether
classification
is
system
problem
an
But
and
is, indeed,
interesting
important
question.
arbitrary
a good first thing to say about this
is that platonic realism
problem
I decide to call each of the next
is quite irrelevant to it. Suppose
cer
ten people Imeet
The
classification,
tenpod, would
tenpods.
The
to keep me from
be arbitrary.
But there would
be nothing
to
this
situation
and
the
Argument
applying
One-Over-Many
of
that
it
is
virtue
that
these
announcing
by
tenpodity
people are
tainly
all to be called
Or consider
tenpods.
the question
of what
colors
are
It
primary colors.
to argue that a classification
scheme
is, to be sure, quite possible
with blue, green, yellow and red as primary colors is less
arbitrary
than one in which
are the prim
and yellow-red
purple, blue-green
ary colors.
psychology,
to do with
turn on questions
would
of physics,
argument
and
art.
it
But
would
have
language
perhaps
nothing
the One-Over-Many
Argument.
The
if Felix
surely, the Platonist may insist as a final protest,
are the exact same shade of grey, then, according
and Fenimore
to
But
classification
any non-arbitrary
scheme,
they will have the same
a
reason
will
and
be
the
that
have
color,
they
completely
specific
and determinate
shade of grey in common.
shades of pink arranged on a color chart
Imagine ten different
in spectral order such that there is no discriminable
shade of pink
on
two
between
shades
the
chart.
if
I
Now
decide to call
any
lying
or
of
shades
7
10
and
of shades
1, 4, 5,
anything
anything
"plink"
2, 3, 6, 8 or 9 "pfink"
then my
classification
scheme will
certainly
646
GARETH
B. MATTHEWS
AND
S. MARC
COHEN
are
the demands
of Platonic
realism
be arbitrary?even
though
x
are
met.
realism
demands
of
Platonic
for
if
is
(The
easily met,
x
no
matter
if
1
is
and
is
of
of
is
shade
shade
and
10,
y
y
plink
plink,
we can always say that it is by virtue of plinkity
that they are to be
called plink.)
But if I decide
that
ribbon
IV
reasons for rejecting
the
Aristotelian
as
like
be
to
statements
it
might
Argument
One-Over-Many
applied
is a cat' and 'Felix is a cat'.
On Aristotelian
'Fenimore
reasoning
as something
to think of cathood
"over against"
it is a mistake
be applied
Felix and Fenimore.
(A similar point, as we saw, might
In part
I we
considered
as well.)
seems
from what
In part II we considered Aristotelian
reasons,
reconstruction
of
the
for reject
to be the most plausible
Categories,
as applied
to
like
statements
the
Argument
One-Over-Many
ing
This time Aristotle's
view
is grey' and 'Felix is grey'.
'Fenimore
turns on the notion
of queer entities
like
(on our interpretation)
to differentiae
But this
a philosopher's
bit of grey is surely as much
entity as is Plato's
are
reasons
at least two
for saying this.
There
Form, greyness.
state
We might
suppose that the following,
non-philosophical,
use
ments
make
?qualities :
of
something
John's
3)
The
generosity
like
the Aristotelian
is a dark grey.
is his outstanding
is convex.
virtue.
idea of unit
647
intro
as it may be to suppose that these statements
Tempting
on
reflection
us
unit
Aristotelian
to something
like
duce
qualities,
remove
that temptation:
statements will surely
the following
4)
Felix's
color has
recently
5)
John's
generosity
has
6)
The
What
turned
turned
will
statements
last
into mere
change
indulgence.
under
is that
show
inclined
darker.
extreme
insofar
as we
heat.
are
or
person
to that extent we are also
some
that
individual
thing,
individualized
This
undergo
change.
the case of substance,
receive contraries
(4a10-21).
unit qualities
that Aristotelian
There is another way of showing
are not embodied
In the
in our non-philosophical
ways of talking.
above we said that, where x is a
of secondary
substance
discussion
if x is F and also
substance
and F a secondary
substance,
with y, then x and y are the same F.
(E.g., Tully and
should hold for
Cicero are the same man.)
Something
analogous
a
we
use
same color',
do
have
for
Now
'the
qualities.
certainly
But
'the same shape', etc. in non-philosophical
consistent
prose.
primary
identical
unit qualities
itwould be only of, say,
of Aristotelian
that I could say
of this ribbon on two different occasions
never of the color of two different
ribbons.
color"?and
the notion
with
the color
"same
Yet
the
use
non-philosophical
allows
condition'
of Aristotelian
23
unit
talk of qualities,
sophical
Cf. Wittgenstein's
have
the same
'two
books
can't
have
the
same
colour,
'same
'same
color',
shape',
'same
(etc.)
"same color,"
ribbons,
to say of
"same shape,"
"same condition"
patients,
notion
of
us
the
condition
of
two
different
heart
Blue
(etc.).
Book
colour',
because,
: "We use
the phrase
1958)
(Oxford,
we
could
well
say:
'They
perfectly
after all, this book has
its own
colour,
but
648
notion
To say that it is a philosopher's
is not to damn the con
to
But
it
is
of
unit
indicate
that the philosopher
ception
qualities.
to make use of this notion
to be in a position
who wants
ought
to sell us on its merits.
Fenimore
illumination
shed by this Aristotelian
way
on
of conceiving
is shed
the connection
e.g.,
between,
'John's ball is crimson'
and 'John's ball is red'.
Aristotle
rejects
as x's having
some
the notion
that x's being F is to be understood
to the F-ness
that all things that are F have in common.
relation
Instead he says that x's being F is to be understood
either as a
Perhaps
of x or else
classification
as a classification
of something
in x.
makes
it clear why
'Socrates is a
is also an animal;
it also makes
clear
Appeal
entails
man'
that Socrates
related
that is crimson
conceive
might
Thus
inclusion.
and
the
other
grammatical
usage"
(p.
book
rule?a
55).
has
rule,
its own
that participates
colour
incidentally,
too'.
not
in Crimsonness
This
also
in accordance
would
with
he
our
would
stating
ordinary
thereby
649
to participate
in Redness;
and anything
that partic
would have to participate
in Coloredness.
in Redness
ipates
Yet
this
the meanings
is not
of
enough.
'crimson',
It is by virtue
and
'red',
'colored'
of a relation
that
between
'x is crimson'
account
how many
a
to a Form in that Form's
relation to various other Forms,
puzzle
more puzzling
than the original puzzle will
How can a
appear.
to many
single "name" refer to one thing in its relation
things?
can
at
find
who
himself
with
this
last
peace
Anyone
puzzle will not
find
redness?
V
notion of
In the last section we pointed out that the Aristotelian
seem to be the conception
that finds expression
unit qualities might
'John 'sgener
like 'the color of Felix',
in phrases of ordinary English
650
GARETH
AND
B. MATTHEWS
S. MARC
COHEN
on to argue
But we went
and 'the shape of that mirror'.
osity',
and
that these phrases do not, in fact, express Aristotle's
notion,
notion.
notion is, instead, a technical, philosophical
that Aristotle's
There is often, of course, real point in introducing
technical,
philo
that
and we tried to offer several considerations
sophical notions;
give point to this one.
One might wonder,
that finds
the notion
whether
however,
of Felix',
of
'the
color
like
ordinary English
expression
etc. would not itself offer a good basis for deal
'John's generosity',
about the One and the Many, and if so, just how
ing with problems
an account
based upon
this notion would
of quality
attribution
in locutions
The remainder
an
account.
such
from Aristotle.
differ
to sketch
attempt
F-ness
Where
of
this
paper
will
be
an
to be in some primary
sub
is said by Aristotle
in Fenimore)
it will be the case that there
stance, s, (e.g., greyness
is some generic quality 9 (e.g., color)
such that to say of s that it
is F is to classify either a 9 of s, or else the cpof s. Thus to say
that he is grey is to classify the color of Fenimore
of Fenimore
(or,
at least, a color of Fenimore).
is to classify a vice of Nellie.
should be called
One may wonder why the color of Fenimore
a quality
is
not
it
that
the
color
of Fenimore
individual.
be
May
of
Felix?
the
color
identical with the color of something
else, say,
And is it not then a universal
rather than an individual?
Of course
undergo
change?"receive
contraries,"
in Aristotle's
phrase.
The
651
color
In this
a color
nor will
is one
that
the
and
same
for other
one
and
similarly
something
the
action,
same
in number
one
in number,
that are not
things
the same
in number
will
be
not
both
substance.
that can
be white
bad
and
But
receive
and
black;
and
good;
substance
is
contraries.
(4a14-18)
What we want to call here a quality individual could hardly be
one the Avay Aristotle wants to say that "this
said to be numerically
is that
But the point to emphasize
bit of black" is one in number.
can
we
a
are
and
individual
what
undergo
change;
calling
quality
"this bit of black" cannot.
Aristotle's
indi
about the fact that quality
There is nothing mysterious
can undergo
to
Felix
For
the
of
color
undergo
change.
a change
change is nothing more nor less than for Felix to undergo
in color?to
be, say, now light grey and later dark grey, or now
viduals
white
It might
in supposing
to follow Aristotle
that, where F-ness
to say of x that it is F is to
and x a primary
substance,
individual.
viz., what we are calling a quality
something,
classify
here.
We have said that the
But there is an apparent difficulty
We
is a quality
quality
individual,
of Felix, may
the color of Fenimore.
Do we not have to agree
the color
individual,
quality
in fact, identical.
color of Felix I am eo ipso also classifying
if to say of Felix that he
And therefore
be
identical
with
the
the two
are,
Suppose
that in classifying
the
the color of Fenimore?
is grey
is to classify
the
652
GARETH
B. MATTHEWS
AND
S. MARC
COHEN
of Felix,
in saying of Felix that he is grey, am I not thereby
of
Fenimore
that he is grey?
saying
Surely to claim that would be
color
absurd.
One
supplied
opaque.
color of Felix
with
out
this difficulty
is to insist that the context
. . .' is
am
'I
like
by expressions
classifying
referentially
case
And therefore
that I am classifying
it can be the
the
way
the color
of
without
the color
its being
of Felix
the case
also classifying
the color of Fenimore.
There may seem to be another difficulty.
We
now
can
But
individual
undergo
quality
change.
color
of Felix
is grey.
This
color
apparent
of Felix were
Surely grey
difficulty would
identical
with
cannot
indeed
is identical
that I am
have
said that a
suppose
that the
undergo
change.
be a serious one
But
if the
What we
is for the color of
it is not.
grey.
is that for Felix to be grey
Felix to be properly
Since being
classified as grey (or as a grey).
classified as grey is not the same thing as being identical with grey,
we may
the the color of Felix has changed,
and that the
suppose
have
been
suggesting
color
of Felix
then
committed
was
that grey
grey, without
supposing,
absurdly,
itself has changed.
We
allowed?even
insisted?that
the color
have, however,
Are we not
of Felix may be identical with the color of Fenimore.
Felix
changes
The first
conditions
obtained:
the color
of Feni
653
Jed differ
which
the color
to say
of Jed
that
changes.)
The
thing
one with
there is also the possibility
of identifying
a temporal qualification.
That is, the color of Felix
of his life, might
be said to
today, or during the first three weeks
or
be identical with
the color of Fenimore
the
yesterday,
during
If they are identified
month
of August.
in
this
only
temporally
of the other),
the other with
Aristotle
Felix?
and numerically
particular
it is properly
certain kind;
in both Felix
that
and Fenimore
as a greyness.
classified
of a quality
individual
is properly
The notion
so by breaking
and a universal.
too.
It does
an individual
Austin
that
suggests
down
the terms
bears
on this conundrum,
contrast between
the absolute
In his Sense
'sense-data'
and Sensibilia,
John
'material things'
is spurious
is not
and
Austin
adds these
or
and
is similar
in
'individual',
'particular',
not
of course
in all.
In philosophy
it is often
though
one member
of a putative
where
good policy,
pair falls under
suspicion,
as well.25
to view
the more
party
suspiciously
innocent-seeming
case
The
some
'universal'
of
respects
24
25
Oxford,
Ibid.
1962,
p.
4.
654
GARETH
The
conundrum
B. MATTHEWS
loses
above
its force
AND
S. MARC
once we
COHEN
come
to think
are in
which
that there may be things like the color of Fenimore
a certain respect individual,
and in a certain respect universal.
The
is individual
insofar as it is subject to change.
color of Fenimore
himself
in color.
It changes,
in fact, if and when Fenimore
changes
a
insofar as the color of Fenimore
It is universal
certain
time,
(at
or simpliciter)
the color of Felix.
may be identical with
a quality individual count as a relative for Aristotle
and relations?
between
the distinction
threaten
qualities
seem
so.
the
Felix
is
color
The
color
of
of something;
might
is the shape of something.
the shape of that mirror
Would
and
It
thus
and
is surely 'No'
But the proper answer to the question
Accord
two
the
Aristotle
in
of
to
broader
definitions
the
that
presents
ing
a
to
said
relative is something
be just what
the Categories
(6a36)
it is of other things.
Thus, a father is said to be father of something
and a double is said to be double of something.
But
(or someone)
nor a horse, horse of any
aman is not said to be man of anything,
said to be a color;
Now the color of Felix
is, of course,
thing.
to
But it is a color
be
color
is
said
it
the
indeed,
of something.
of the form 'a <pof s' or 'the <p
individual only under a description
And the color of Felix is certainly not the-color-of-Felix
of s\
of
the color of Felix is not a relative and, more
Therefore
anything.
are not relatives.26
quality individuals
generally,
that quality
individuals
To say this is not to deny, of course,
and ontologically
have a status that is both
dependent.
logically
of a
insofar as the designation
Their status is logically dependent
a
of
individual
includes
the
substance
designation
primary
quality
for example,
the name of Felix),
includes
('the color of Felix',
a primary
whereas
26
The
a relative
substance
following
in Aristotle's
Aristotelian
sense,
father
may
be designated
without
be instructive.
may
parallel
it is said to be what
it is
in Aristotle's
of Socrates
is not,
for
But
the
of something.
for it is not said to be what
tive,
a double
is a relative
Similarly,
(a double)
of something.
it is?the
said to be what
be gleaned
would
call
of
s* need
designat
father
a
(i.e.,
sense,
is
father)
a rela
of Socrates)
it is (i.e.,
father
of anything.
for Aristotle,
it is said to be what
since
it is
of five is not a relative,
But
for it is not
the double
to
The general
double
of five?of
point
anything.
from
if V
these
is this. Even
examples
a relative,
and
it is said to be a p because
a relative.
not denote
denotes
it is the
what
<pof
Aristotle
s,
'the
<p
655
rather by virtue of the fact that the color of each one is properly
as a grey that they are all to be called grey.
classified
Greyness,
is a classification.
And there being a clas
like man and animal,
sification
of a certain sort is a fact correlative with
there being
the classification
in the way
in question would
things classifiable
classify
them.
University
of Minnesota.