People
Concepcion, Jr, J:
Doctrine:
Considering that the order of acquittal was promulgated five (5) days before the
expiration of the 30-day period. The petitioner was relieved of its duty to produce the
body of the accused Allan Pangilinan, and to show cause why no judgment should be
rendered against it for the amount of the bond.
If the acquittal was promulgated days before the expiration of the 30 day period under
section 15 Rule 114, the jurisdiction over the person of the accused and the jurisdiction
over the issue of the bond ceases.
Nature:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction
Facts:
An information was filed with the Circuit Criminal Court of San Fernando, Pampanga,
charging the accused Allan Pangilinan, Angelito Pangilinan, Reynaldo Tiotuico, and Lauriano
Tiamzon with the crime of murder. All the accused posted their bail bonds for their provisional
liberty. The petitioner Belfast Surety and Insurance Co., Inc., executed the bail bond for the
accused Allan Pangilinan in the sum of P20,000.00. All the accused entered a plea of not guilty
then trial proceeded. However, on April 29, 1976, the accused Allan Pangilinan failed to appear,
despite the fact that he was notified of said trial thru the petitioner.
The Court hereby orders the arrest of accused Allan Pangilinan, for his failure to appear
this afternoon, as well as the forfeiture of the bond posted for him by his Surety is hereby
directed to produce the person of the said accused and show cause why no judgment should be
rendered against it in the amount of its bond, within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of
this Order. at Again, the accused Allan Pangilinan failed to appear on a trail, the respondent
Judge issued an order.
After the prosecution had rested its case on May 13, 1976, the accused instead of
presenting their evidence moved that they be allowed to file a motion to dismiss (demurrer to
evidence), and there being no opposition on the part of the prosecution, the respondent Judge
granted the same. The accused filed their demurrer to evidence. Acting upon the said "Demurrer
to Evidence", the respondent Judge orders the ACQUITTAL of all the said accused of the charge
in the above-entitled case with costs de oficio, and the cancellation of the bail bond posted for
the accused, Angelito Pangilinan, Lauriano Tiamzon and Reynaldo Tiotuico only.
On June 29, 1976, or twenty-nine (29) days after the promulgation of the order of acquittal, the
respondent Judge rendered a judgment.
On April 29, 1976, the Court issued an Order for the arrest of the accused Allan
(or Arnold) Pangilinan and the forfeiture of his bond for his failure to appear for
trial on the said date, and for his surety, the Belfast Surety and Insurance
Company, Inc. to produce the person of the accused and to show cause why no
judgment in the amount of its bond should be rendered against it, within thirty
(30) days from its receipt of the said Order. The said surety received a copy of the
said Order of April 29, 1976, on May 6, 1976. Up to now, it has neither
surrendered the person of the said accused to the Court, nor given any reason for
its failure to produce him before the Court; it has likewise given no satisfactory
explanation why the accused did not appear before the Court on April 29, 1976.
The petitioner Belfast Surety moved to reconsider, however, the same was denied by the
respondent judge. The petitioner filed a motion to recall and/or set aside the judgment dated
June 29, 1976, on the ground of want of jurisdiction on the part of the court to render the same.
The said motion, however, was denied by the respondent judge.
the petitioner interposed the present petition for CERTIORARI, to annul and set aside the
judgment dated June 29, 1976 as well as the orders dated March 3, 1977, June 30, 1977 and
September 8, 1977 as having been rendered and issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and PROHIBITION to inhibit
and enjoin the respondent judge from further issuing orders, writs and/or processes to enforce the
questioned judgment and orders.
The Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order, enjoining the respondent judge
from enforcing and/or carrying out the judgment dated June 29, 1976 and the order dated March
3, 1977, as well as all other subsequent orders issued pursuant to said judgment, given in
Criminal Case No. CCC-V-1142, entitled "People of the Philippines, plaintiff vs. Allan
Pangilinan, accused," of the Circuit Criminal Court, Fifth Judicial District of San Fernando,
Pampanga, and required the respondents herein to comment on the petition.
The respondent judge and the Solicitor General, as counsel for the respondent People of
the Philippines, filed their respective comment, 22 on the petition, on January 5, 1978 and
February 17, 1978. On October 9, 1978, the Court resolved to consider respondents' comments
as answers to the petition and the case submitted for decision.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction for arresting accused Allan
Pangalinan for its failure to show those trials and for the forfeiture of the bail by the
petitioner?
2. Whether or not petition for certiorari is proper remedy in the case?
Held:
1. Yes, respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction for arresting accused Allan Pangalinan for its
failure to show those trials and for the forfeiture of the bail by the petitioner.
2. Yes, petition for certiorari is proper remedy in the case
Ratio:
2. Section 15, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides as follows:
of was either issued in excess of or without jurisdiction. Besides, appeal under the circumstances
of the present case is not an adequate remedy since the trial court had already issued a writ of
execution. Hence, the rule that certiorari does not the when there is an appeal is relaxed where, as
in the present case, the trial court had already ordered the issuance of a writ of execution.