Gross and Habitual Neglect of Duties Cases

GROSS AND HABITUAL NEGLECT OF DUTIES
CITIBANK, N.A v. GATCHALIAN

G.R. No. 111222
January 18, 1995
FACTS:
Petitioner bank received thirty-one (31) applications from alleged APBCI employees for
the issuance of Citibank credit cards, popularly known as Mastercard. A Citibank employee
verified by phone the data which appeared on the application forms. It was Florence Verendia, as
secretary of the APBCI General Manager, who answered the check calls. The applications were
then approved and the corresponding new and unsigned credit cards were issued. Petitioner
bank's policy is for new and unsigned credit cards to be released only to the cardholders
concerned or their duly authorized representatives. However, a Citibank employee may himself
take delivery of new and unsigned credit cards after accomplishing a Card Pull-Out Request
Form wherein the employee assumes the responsibility of delivering the same to the cardholder
concerned.
Teresita Supnad, an employee of petitioner bank and Florence Verendia, took delivery of
19 credit cards issued in the name of the said alleged APBCI credit applicants. On the other
hand, on 5 separate occasions, respondent Llonillo personally picked up the newly approved and
unsigned credit cards issued to the other 7 alleged APBCI employee and delivered them to
Verendia.
In July 1992, petitioner bank discovered that the credit card applications of the alleged
APBCI employees were fictitious. Per report of the PNP-Crime Laboratory, Supnad and
Verendia
falsified
the
signature
of
the
alleged
2
applicants. After getting the credit cards, the two used them to purchase goods and avail of
services from accredited commercial establishments worth more than P200,000.00. Petitioner
bank required respondent Llonillo to explain. In her reply, Llonillo admitted she personally
picked up 7 credit. She allegedly wanted to help the bank deliver "fast, competent and problemfree service to clients." She disclaimed knowledge that the APBCI applicants were fictitious. She
also denied participation in the fraudulent use of said credit cards.
On November 19, 1992, the committee recommended the termination of respondent's
employment with the bank for loss of trust and confidence and gross negligence. Petitioner bank
adopted the committee's recommendation and notified respondent of her immediate
dismissal. The bank also terminated the services of Supnad. In addition, it filed a case for estafa

through falsification of private/commercial documents against both Supnad and Verendia.
Pursuant to their existing Collective Bargaining Agreement, petitioner bank and respondent
union referred Llonillo's dismissal to the Grievance Machinery but the latter failed to resolve the
controversy. As a next step, the parties submitted the case for resolution to voluntary arbitrator
Dr. Jose C. Gatchalian. On the basis of the record and the evidence presented by petitioner bank,
voluntary arbitrator Dr. Gatchalian rendered a decision ordering the reinstatement of respondent
Llonillo without payment of backwages.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross negligence
RULING:
Respondent arbitrator gravely abused his discretion in finding that Llonillo did not
commit gross negligence in the performance of her duty. Gross negligence implies a want or
absence of or failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a
thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them.
All of the acts and omissions of respondent Llonillo were in patent violation of petitioner
bank's policy that an employee may take delivery of newly approved and unused credit cards
issued in another's name, but in doing so, he/she assumes the responsibility of delivering the
credit card to the cardholder concerned or to the latter's duly authorized representative.
We also rule that respondent Llonillo's negligence is both gross and habitual. It was
proved that she picked up the newly approved credit cards on five (5) separate occasions and
delivered the same to Verendia and the latter's messenger. Certainly, these repetitive acts and
omissions bespeak of habituality.
Respondent Llonillo's employment service for twenty-two (22) years would not, by itself,
mitigate her negligence, especially in view of the substantial loss incurred by petitioner bank. As
correctly pointed out by respondent voluntary arbitrator: The Union's claim for compassionate
justice on Emy's 22 years of service and as first offender merit scant consideration. The longer an
employe(e) stays in the service of the company, the greater is his responsibility for knowledge
and compliance with the norms of conduct, and the code of discipline of the company. . .
VALIAO v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 146621
July 30, 2004
FACTS:
On January 18, 1993, petitioner was absent from work without permission or notice to his
immediate superior. It turned out that he went to Bacolod City and was one of those arrested
during a raid in the house of one "Toto Ruiz," a suspected drug pusher and was brought to the
Bacolod Police Station along with four (4) other suspects. Petitioner was asked to explain within
24 hours why he should not be terminated as a result of the raid and the charges against him for
violation of Rep. Act No. 6425 as amended. Petitioner allegedly was not able to answer
immediately since he was in jail and received said memorandum only on January 30, 1993,
although his wife had earlier received the memorandum on January 28, 1993. On January 29,
1993, the petitioner was dismissed for failure to answer said memorandum.
On February 1, 1993, the petitioner wrote to the President of WNC explaining his side
and asking for due process. WNC cancelled its Notice of Termination and granted the petitioners
request. The petitioner was then placed under preventive suspension and an investigation
committee was organized to conduct the probe.
A notice of hearing/investigation was sent to the petitioner. After the investigation
attended by the petitioner and his counsel, the investigation committee recommended the
dismissal of petitioner. A notice of termination was then sent to petitioner informing him of his
termination from the service for serious misconduct and gross and habitual neglect of duty. The
petitioner received the notice but did not file a grievance concerning the notice of termination.

Petitioner filed a Complaint against WNC for illegal suspension, illegal dismissal,
backwages, salary differential for salary increases and other benefits granted after his dismissal
as well as for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. In its Answer, WNC alleged
that petitioner was dismissed on charges of serious misconduct, and gross and willful neglect of
duty.
After due proceedings, the Labor Arbiter found no justifiable reason to place the
petitioner under preventive suspension as there was no serious or imminent threat to the life or
property of his employer or co-workers. However, the Labor Arbiter found the dismissal of the
petitioner from WNC to be valid due to absenteeism and tardiness. The Labor Arbiter held that
frequent absenteeism and tardiness of the petitioner constituted not only willful disobedience but
also gross and habitual neglect of duties, which are valid grounds for termination of employment.
He stressed that the petitioners frequent absences without proper leave of absence was not only
unfair to WNC and the petitioners co-employees but also set an undesirable example to the
employees under his supervision, considering that the petitioner was not a mere rank-and-file
employee but one who owed more than the usual fealty to the organization.
On appeal to the NLRC, the latter affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter, sustained
the latters findings of facts, and made its own findings on the apprehension of the petitioner for
possession of prohibited drugs. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before
the Court of Appeals but this was dismissed for lack of merit
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was validly dismissed from employment on the ground of
serious misconduct and gross habitual neglect of duties, including habitual tardiness and
absenteeism.
RULING:
Petitioners dismissal from employment is valid and justified. For an employees
dismissal to be valid, (a) the dismissal must be for a valid cause and (b) the employee must be
afforded due process. Serious misconduct and habitual neglect of duties are among the just
causes for terminating an employee under the Labor Code of the Philippines. Gross negligence
connotes want of care in the performance of ones duties. Habitual neglect implies repeated
failure to perform ones duties for a period of time, depending upon the circumstances. The
Labor Arbiters findings that petitioners habitual absenteeism and tardiness constitute gross and
habitual neglect of duties that justified his termination of employment are sufficiently supported
by evidence on record. Petitioners repeated acts of absences without leave and his frequent

tardiness reflect his indifferent attitude to and lack of motivation in his work. More importantly,
his repeated and habitual infractions, committed despite several warnings, constitute gross
misconduct unexpected from an employee of petitioners stature. This Court has held that
habitual absenteeism without leave constitute gross negligence and is sufficient to justify
termination of an employee.
Needless to say, so irresponsible an employee like petitioner does not deserve a place in
the workplace, and it is within the managements prerogative of WNC to terminate his
employment. Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of employees, it must also protect the
rights of an employer to exercise what are clearly management prerogatives. As long as the
companys exercise of those rights and prerogative is in good faith to advance its interest and not
for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of employees under the laws or valid
agreements, such exercise will be upheld.
ORIENT EXPRESS PLACEMENT PHILIPPINES v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION
G.R. No. 113713

June 11, 1997
FACTS:
Antonio Flores was hired as crane operator with a monthly salary of US$500.00
(SR1,400) for 1 year, subject to a 3-month probationary period, by Orient Express Placement
Philippines in behalf of its foreign principal Nadrico Saudi Limited (NADRICO). However, after
only one (1) month and five (5) days in Saudi Arabia, Flores was repatriated to the Philippines.
Consequently, he filed a complaint with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) for having been terminated from work for no valid reason. ORIENT EXPRESS and
NADRICO countered that Flores was terminated for poor job performance as shown in
his Performance Evaluation Sheet dated 4 May 1991 and for his uncooperative work attitude.
On 14 July 1992 the POEA rendered a decision in favor of complainant holding that
when the ground invoked for the dismissal of an employee was incompetency or poor job
performance it must be shown that the reasonable standards of work prescribed by the employer
were made known to the employee and that the letter failed to conform to such standards. In the
case of respondent Flores, it was observed that neither ORIENT EXPRESS nor NADRICO
pointed out the reasonable standards of work required of Flores by which his incompetency was
adjudged; much less did they specify how the latter failed to live up to such reasonable
standards. Hence, his dismissal was unwarranted. As a consequence, ORIENT EXPRESS and
NADRICO were ordered jointly and severally to pay respondent Antonio F. Flores the sum of
US$5,416.66 or its peso equivalent representing salaries for the unexpired portion of the
contract.
The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the POEA decision on
appeal. In addition, it ruled that the designation of Flores as floorman instead of crane operator
for which he was hired violated his employment contract. The NLRC concluded that since Flores
never worked as crane operator, his foreign employer could not have observed and assessed his
performance as such and then come up with a performance evaluation sheet, especially
considering his consistent claim that he was made to work as floorman instead. A motion for
reconsideration filed by ORIENT EXPRESS and NADRICO was subsequently denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal is valid

RULING:
The services of an employee hired on a probationary basis may be terminated when he
fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by

the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. Antonios dismissal cannot be
sustained on this ground because Orient Express failed to specify the reasonable standards by
which Antonios alleged poor performance was evaluated, much less to prove that such standards
were made known to him at the time of his recruitment.
No standard whatsoever by which such probationary period could be hurdled was
specified and made known to him. Due process dictates that an employee be apprised beforehand
of the condition of his employment and of the terms of advancement therein. Precisely, implicit
in Art. 281 of the Code is the requirement that reasonable standards be previously made known
by the employer to the probationary employeeat the time of his engagement, as correctly
suggested by the POEA. Obviously, such an essential requirement was not met by petitioner,
even assuming that Flores' alleged unsatisfactory performance was true. Besides, unsatisfactory
performance is not one of the just causes for dismissal under the Labor Code.
A.M. ORETA & CO., INC., v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

G.R. No. 74004
August 10, 1989
FACTS:
Private respondent Grulla was engaged by Engineering Construction and Industrial
Development Company (ENDECO) through A.M. Oreta and Co., Inc., as a carpenter in its
projects in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The contract of employment, which was entered into June 11,
1980 was for a period of twelve (12) months. Respondent Grulla left the Philippines for Jeddah,
Saudi Arabia on August 5, 1980.
On August 15, 1980, Grulla met an accident which fractured his lumbar vertebra while
working at the jobsite. He was rushed to the New Jeddah Clinic and was confined there for
twelve (12) days. On August 27, 1980, Grulla was discharged from the hospital and was told that
he could resume his normal duties after undergoing physical therapy for two weeks. On
September 18, 1980, respondent Grulla reported back to his Project Manager and presented to
the latter a medical certificate declaring the former already fit for work. Since then, he started
working again until he received a notice of termination of his employment on October 9, 1980.
Respondent Grulla filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, recovery of medical benefits, unpaid
wages for the unexpired ten (10) months of his contract and the sum of P1,000.00 as
reimbursement of medical expenses against A.M. Oreta and Company, Inc., and Engineering
Construction and Industrial Development Co. (ENDECO) with the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA).lwph1.t
The petitioner A.M. Oreta and Company, Inc and ENDECO filed their answer and
alleged that the contract of employment entered into between petitioners and Grulla provides, as
one of the grounds for termination, violations of the rules and regulations promulgated by the
contractor; and that Grulla was dismissed because he has not performed his duties satisfactorally
within the probationary period of three months.

ISSUE: Whether respondent Grulla was illegaly terminated by petitioner
RULING:
The alleged ground of unsatisfactory performance relied upon by petitioner for
dismissing respondent Grulla is not one of the just causes for dismissal provided in the Labor
Code. Neither is it included among the grounds for termination of employment under Article VII
of the contract of employment executed by petitioner company and respondent Grulla. Moreover,
petitioner has failed to show proof of the particular acts or omissions constituting the
unsatisfactory performance of Grulla of his duties, which was allegedly due to his poor physical
state after the accident.
In view of the foregoing, the dismissal of respondent Grulla violated the security of
tenure under the contract of employment which specifically provides that the contract term shall
be for a period of twelve (12) calendar months. Consequently the respondent Grulla should be
paid his salary for the unexpired portion of his contract of employment which is ten (10) months.
FLORES v. FUNERARIA NUESTRO

G.R. No. L-66890
April 15, 1988
FACTS:
Petitioner spouses Herminio and Herminia Flores had worked for respondent Fortunato
Nuestro in his funeral parlor known as Funeraria Nuestro since June, 1976, respectively, as
helper- utility man and as bookkeeper, embalmer and cashier. On October 7, 1980, respondent
Fortunato Nuestro registered the petitioner spouses with the Social Security System, as his
employees with a monthly salary of P200.00 each. Thereafter, Herminio Flores was paid P750.00
a month, plus P200.00 monthly allowance, while Herminia's salary was increased to P500.00 a
month. The petitioners were given living quarters right inside the compound of the funeral parlor.

Herminio Flores and respondent Fortunato Nuestro had an altercation, during which the
former was physically assaulted by the latter and suffered a punctured wound on the lower and
an abrasion in the scapular region (L). Herminio was treated at the Bataan Provincial Hospital
and subsequently, he filed an action for slight physical injuries against the respondent, which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 2249 of the Municipal Court of Pilar, Bataan. Respondent,
however, claimed that he merely shoved the arm of Herminio when the latter pointed a finger at
him and uttered abusive remarks against him. As a result of the incident and fearing for his
safety, petitioner Herminio Flores, together with his family, was compelled to vacate his living
quarters at the funerall parlor and had to seek protection from the Integrated National Police of
Pilar, Bataan.
On November 15, 1982, petitioners filed a complaint against respondent for illegal
dismissal, underpayment of living allowances, non-payment of five (5) days incentive leave and
non-payment of overtime compensation. The respondent denied the existence of employeremployee relation with the petitioners and further alleged that in any event the petitioners had
abandoned their work on October 30, 1982.
On May 23,1983, Labor Arbiter Federico Bernardo rendered a decision finding that no
employer-employee relationship existed between the parties and dismissing the complaint. He
held that Herminio Flores was merely a contractual worker paid on a piece-work basis, while
Herminia Flores was a domestic helper; and that on October 30, 1982, they abandoned their
work. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission, while holding that an employeremployee relationship existed between the parties, found that the petitioners had abandoned their
work, thus precluding them from seeking reinstatement with backwages. However, the
Commission ordered respondent to pay the petitioners their living allowances from October 1980
until October 1982 when the employment relations were severed.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners abandoned their work
RULING:
In finding the distance of an employer-employee relationship between respondent and
petitioners, the NLRC committed no grave abuse of discretion. That the respondent had
registered the petitioners with the Social Security System is proof that they were indeed his
employees. The coverage of Social Security Law is predicated on the existence of an employeremployee relationship. However, the ruling of the NLRC that petitioners had abandoned their
employment to be contrary to the evidence. To constitute abandonment, there must be a clear and

deliberate intent to discontinue one's employment without any intention of returning back . 2 The
record shows that petitioners were only compelled to leave the premises, which they regarded as
their home, when the respondent inflicted physical injuries upon petitioner Herminio Flores.
Apparently, what they had given up was only their place of residence but not their jobs. The
immediate filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal against respondent with a prayer for
reinstatement shows that petitioners were not abandoning their work.
However, the circumstances in this case make the reinstatement of petitioners no longer
feasible; any possible confrontation between the parties in view of their already strained
relationship should be avoided.
SHOEMART, INC v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

G.R. No. 74229
August 11, 1989
FACTS:
Respondent Maxima R. Soriano was employed by petitioner Shoemart, Inc., on July 5,
1973, as salesclerk involved in its cosmetics department. On March 17, 1981, Shoemart sent
Soriano a notice of termination on the ground of abandonment of work from February 13, 1981
to March 17, 1981. Soriano, in turn filed a complaint with the then Ministry of Labor and
Employment for illegal dismissal and certain money claims. While the case was pending before
the labor arbiter, Soriano was allowed to resume work on July 21, 1981 at the Company's Cubao
store.
Meanwhile, after her reinstatement, due to a difficult pregnancy, Soriano filed successive
leaves of absences. When she was 4 months pregnant, she applied for a 15 day sick leave, due to
threatened abortion. On October 20, 1981 she applied for 4 months vacation leave commencing
upon her physician's advice to avoid possible complications in her pregnancy. Then Soriano
applied for 45 days maternity leave (February 21, 1982 to April 7, 1982) giving February 22,
1982 as her expected date of confinement. All these applications were granted.
After the expiration of her maternity leave, Soriano did not report back for work. No
leave extension having been granted nor any word sent to Shoemart as to why she could not
report for work, her continued absence was marked unauthorized. On April 15, 1982, Soriano
sent a notice to Shoemart stating that she had not yet delivered her baby, and that she could have
been mistaken in her "counting." Shoemart's department manager accepted the note but informed
its bearer (Soriano's husband) that Soriano should report for work on May 30, 1982. However, on
May 30,1982 and on the succeeding days, Soriano did not return to work. She did not inform
Shoemart of her condition nor give any reason for her unexplained absence. Consequently,
Shoemart was prompted to terminate her services for gross neglect of duty amounting to
abandonment of work under Article VI of its Rules and Regulations which is also a ground for
dismissal under the New Labor Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the denial of due process under the circumstances of this case makes the
dismissal for just cause so arbitrary and illegal as to warrant reinstatement and payment of
backwages
RULING:
While it appears that Shoemart failed to observe due process in the termination of
Soriano's employment, the clearly apparent conclusion in this case is that respondent Soriano is
not entirely without fault. She was grossly remiss in her duties toward her employer, as shown by
her frequent, prolonged and unexplained absences. She was intermittently absent from
September 30, 1981 to October 14, 1981 and from October 21, 1981 until the present complaint
for illegal dismissal was filed on October 7, 1983. And while there might have been occasions
when petitioner was apprised of the reasons for her non-appearance, the fact remains that from
May 30,1982 and onwards to October 7, 1983, there was absolutely no communication from her.
Otherwise stated, the petitioner was justified in assuming that Soriano was no longer
interested in resuming her employment. "Abandonment" of work is manifest. It can not be said
that Soriano was not aware of the consequences of her acts under the circumstances of this case.
The petitioner cannot be faulted for not continuing Soriano in her employment.
In the final analysis, respondent Soriano was afforded due process although belatedly
before the Labor Arbiter and then before the NLRC. As we have ruled, the purpose of the law is
to insure that the employer's prerogative to dismiss or lay-off an employee is exercised without
abuse of discretion or arbitrariness. The proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the National
Labor Relations Commission have upheld this guarantee. The rights of the employee have been
effectively safeguarded.
ASPHALT AND CEMENT PAVERS INC v. LEOGARDO

G.R. No. L-74563
June 20, 1988
FACTS:
Private respondent Ignacio Villafuerte was employed by petitioner, a corporation engaged
in the construction business, as a heavy equipment mechanic. On August 17,1978, he filed an
application for a leave of absence from August 16 to 31, 1978. His application was approved.
During his leave he was contracted to overhaul a bulldozer for Super Structures, Inc., another
construction company, on a "pakiao" basis. As he was not able to finish the overhaul of the
bulldozer, he applied for and was granted on September 1, 1978 an extension of his leave of
absence up to September 7, 1978. He failed to report for work on September 8, 1978. Thus, on
September 12, 1978, petitioner wrote him a letter advising him that he had incurred absence

without leave and giving him three (3) days to reply. He did not reply. On September 25,1978,
petitioner filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment an application to terminate
Villafuerte for abandonment of work.
On the other hand, private respondent Loreto San Juan was employed by petitioner as a
heavy equipment operator. On April 14, 1978, he was allowed by petitioner to temporarily work
for Super Structures, Inc. On August 29, 1978, he was advised by petitioner to report back to
work on September 1, 1978 as his services were already needed. San Juan returned to work on
September 1, 1978. However, he was absent without leave from September 12 to 18, 1978. On
September 19, 1978, he went to petitioner to ask its president, Antonio B. Cruz, for permission to
go on leave from September 20 to October 5, 1978. Although he was unable to see Cruz, he was
advised by Florida Aguilar petitioner's office manager and accountant, that he could go on leave
and assured that his application for leave would be approved. He was also advised to return on
another day to claim his unpaid vacation leave pay. When he returned on September 25,1978,
Cruz informed him that he had been absent without leave since September 14, 1978. He
explained that he could not be considered absent without leave because he had filed an
application for a leave of absence on September 19, 1978. Cruz told him to return on October 2,
1978 to get the amount he was claiming. On September 29, 1978, petitioner filed an application
to terminate San Juan for abandonment of work. Thus, when San Juan returned on October 2,
1978, he was informed by petitioner that he had been dismissed from his job because he had
been absent without leave since September 14,1978.
On October 3, 1978, private respondents Ignacio Villafuerte and Loreto San Juan filed
with the Ministry of Labor and Employment a joint complaint against petitioner for illegal
dismissal, unpaid wages, underpayment, non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, premium
pay and violation of P.D. No. 525.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent abandoned their work
RULING:
The Court agrees with petitioner and the Solicitor General that, indeed, Ignacio
Villafuerte had abandoned his job when he went on absence without leave and was employed by
Super Structures, Inc. on September 16, 1978. Thus, petitioner was justified in terminating his
employment. However, as correctly contended by the Solicitor General, the case of Loreto San
Juan should be distinguished and treated differently from that of Ignacio Villafuerte, who had

clearly manifested his intention to abandon his job in favor of employment with Super
Structures, Inc. for a higher salary.
Finally, the fact that San Juan filed his complaint the day after he was informed that he
was dismissed negates the claim that he had abandoned his work. It is a recognized principle that
abandonment of work by an employee is inconsistent with the immediate filing of a complaint
for illegal dismissal, for it is illogical for an employee to abandon his work and then immediately
seek reinstatement. Petitioner failed to prove just cause for his dismissal. In fact, it failed to
present any evidence that would support a finding of abandonment of work.
Petitioner Asphalt and Cement Pavers, Inc. is ordered to reinstate private respondent
Loreto San Juan to his previous position without loss of seniority rights with backwages for a
period of 3 years without qualification or deduction. Should reinstatement no longer be feasible,
petitioner is ordered to pay, in addition to backwages, separation pay as provided by law. The
dismissal of private respondent Ignacio Villafuerte by petitioner is upheld.
EGYPTAIR and SAYED EZZAT v. NLRC

G.R. No. L-63185
February 27, 1987
FACTS:
John Joseph was employed as sales promotion and press relations officer by the United
Arab Airlines [UAA] which later became known as Egyptair. Thereafter, he was appointed by
said company as acting sales manager. While holding said position, Joseph concurrently acted as
sales manager of Atlantic Pacific Corporation [ATPACO] the general sales agent of UAA.
Joseph's appointment as sales manager in the Philippines was confirmed by the general
commercial manager of UAA. On April 15, 1969, the district manager in the Philippines of
Egyptair, Mr. Gamal El-Desouki, informed Joseph that his gross salary had been increased to
P2,000 a month.
On January 22, 1974, Joseph was appointed marketing adviser to Sayed Ezzat, Egyptair's
manager in the Philippines. Four months later, he received a letter from Ezzat reading:
Since January 22, 1974 up to May 6, 1974 you have not reported to work in the office
whereby we have no records to show that you are on an approved sick or vacation leave.
Due to your above-mentioned continued unexcused absences, I wish to inform you that
you are resigned from the company effective May 6, 1974.
Two days after he received that letter, Joseph filed with the National Labor Relations
Commission [NLRC] a complaint against Egyptair and/or Sayed Ezzat for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of wages, sick and vacation leave benefits, and commissions.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is abandonment of work
RULING:
We are bound by the findings of both the labor arbiter and the NLRC that Joseph did not
abandon his job from January 23, 1974 until May 6, 1974. The NLRC found that as marketing
adviser, Joseph had to work outside his office in order to solicit passengers and cargoes for the
petitioners' from the different airline agents and shippers. Besides, petitioners' allegation that
Joseph abandoned his job is belied by the fact that two days after receiving Sayed Ezzat's letter
terminating his services, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. It would be illogical for him to
have left his job and later on, file said complaint. Furthermore, petitioner airline's own actuation
proves that at least from January, 1974 to April 1974, it still considered Joseph as an employee
because it paid him his salary for said months.
Other than the alleged abandonment of work, petitioners failed to present convincing
reasons for their precipitate dismissal of Joseph. As the burden of proof rests on the employer to
show that the dismissal was for a just cause, petitioners' failure to do so necessarily meant that
said dismissal was not justified.
ARC-MEN FOOD INDUSTRIES v. NLRC

G.R. No. 113721
May 7, 1997
FACTS:
Private respondent alleges that he was a regular employee of the petitioner firm as a
company driver from September 1985 until he was unlawfully terminated on January 23, 1990.
That as a company driver he was required to render his services to both the petitioner's food and
construction business; that since his employment, he has never enjoyed the minimum wage,
ECOLA and service incentive leave pay.

It was disclosed that petitioner acted arbitrarily, unjustifiably and without any reason at
all, [and] he was terminated from his employment contrary to the provision of Article 283 of the
Labor Code, as amended by B.P. 130. Private respondent] has been in the employ for four years
and four months of which he has been rendering faithful services and following the rules and
regulations of the company and in fact should have been given more benefits that are necessary
instead of terminating his employment.
Rising to their defense, petitioner belied the allegations of the private respondent. They
claimed that private respondent was not illegally dismissed from his employment but it was he
who has abandoned his work. Anent the issue of termination, from December 2, 1989 up to
February 25, 1990, the plant was not in full operation and employees directly connected with the
plant including herein complainant were advised of the shutdown and were told not to report for
work. To prove that private respondent was not terminated on January 23, 1990 is the fact that on
January 29, 1990, he secured and was given a cash advance of P700.00 as shown by the
Temporary Cash Advance Slip. It is inconceivable for the company to give cash advance "against
salary deductions" if he was already terminated on January 23, 1990 or six days before private
respondent was given the said cash advance.
Another evidence that private respondent was not dismissed is the fact that petitioner
formally advised him to report for work on February 25, 1990 . which was hand-delivered by
Noli Paglinawan. Despite being advised to report for work private respondent refused.
The Labor Arbiter concluded that "the allegation that it was private respondent who had
abandoned his job is belied by the fact that he immediately filed his complaint after he was
terminated from his work on January 23, 1990 and that the report-to-work letter and cash
advance slip were dubious, the former being a mere after-thought and the latter bearing an
alleged forged signature of private respondent. Totally aghast over the decision of the Labor
Arbiter which struck petitioner as grossly contrary to the evidence presented before him,
petitioner appealed to the NLRC. But the NLRC did not oblige. Instead, the NLRC upheld the
findings of the Labor Arbiter.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is abandonment of work
RULING:
The petition is imbued with merit. Undeniable is the over-reliance of both the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC on the notion that the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is

inconsistent with the employer's defense of abandonment by the employee of his work. While the
burden of refuting a complaint for illegal dismissal is upon the employer, fair play as well
requires that, where the employer proffers substantial evidence of the fact that it had not, in the
first place, terminated the employee but simply laid him off due to valid reasons, neither the
Labor Arbiter nor the NLRC may simply ignore such evidence on the pretext that the employee
would not have filed the complaint for illegal dismissal if he had not indeed been dismissed. This
is clearly a non sequitur reasoning that can never validly take the place of the evidence of both
the employer and the employee.
The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, instead of at least reviewing whatever countervailing
evidence private respondent had vis-a-vis petitioner's aforedescribed documentary proofs, simply
swept under the rug the issues of lay-off and abandonment of work, relying as they did on the
earlier mentioned notion of the inconsistency between the filing of a complaint for illegal
dismissal and the interposing of the defense of abandonment by the employee of his work. The
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC is thus guilty of misappreciating the facts and rendering judgment
on dubious factual and legal basis. In other words, herein assailed decisions are illustrative of a
patent case of grave abuse of discretion.
SAJONAS v. NLRC
G.R. No. L-49286
March 15, 1990
FACTS:
Sometime in the first week of April, 1974, petitioners and the Supervisors and Managers
Association of Marsman jointly filed charges of unfair labor practice against respondent
company. On April 30, 1974, Sajonas was invited to attend a conference with said private
respondent's management committee. Thereafter, in the same conference, he was charged and an
investigation was conducted involving his alleged acts of insubordination, unsatisfactory
attendance record, gross disrespect to company officials, fraud and deceit, and making false and
malicious statements concerning the company. Said investigation was reduced to writing and a
corresponding report was duly submitted which recommended the termination of Sajonas from
his employment.
In a separate conference on the same day, Santos was also investigated by said
management committee on charges of insubordination, habitual tardiness, gross disrespect of
company officials, fraud and deceit, and misrepresentation about the company, the result of
which was an order for the termination of his services. 3
On May 2, 1974, petitioners were placed under preventive suspension. On May 7, 1974,
private respondent filed with the National Labor Relations Commission a request for clearance to
terminate the services of petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is neglect of duty on the part of petitioner
RULING:

On the charge of unsatisfactory attendance or habitual tardiness, there is no dispute that
private respondent had a standing requirement that all supervisors and detailmen of its Leo
Pharmaceuticals department, which include petitioners, should report to the office at 8:00 o'clock
in the morning but, as found by respondent commission, this rule was habitually violated by
petitioners.
We agree with public respondent that the acts of insubordination, coupled with habitual
tardiness, are sufficient causes for petitioners' dismissal, especially considering the fact that the
employees involved in this case were not mere rank and file employees but supervisors who
owed more than the usual fealty to the organization and were, therefore, expected to adhere to its
rules in an exemplary manner. Petitioners did not even reflect upon and consider the undesirable
example that they were setting to those who were under their supervision.
RIZAL EMPIRE INSURANCE GROUP v. NLRC

G.R. No. 73140
May 29, 1987
FACTS:
In August, 1977, herein private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was hired by herein
petitioner Rizal Empire Insurance Group as a casual employee with a salary of P10.00 a day. On
January 1, 1978, he was made a regular employee, having been appointed as clerk-typist, with a
monthly salary of P300.00. Being a permanent employee, he was furnished a copy of petitioner
company's "General Information, Office Behavior and Other Rules and Regulations." In the
same year, without change in his position-designation, he was transferred to the Claims
Department and his salary was increased to P450,00 a month. In 1980, he was transferred to the
Underwriting Department and his salary was increased to P580.00 a month plus cost of living
allowance, until he was transferred to the Fire Department as filing clerk. In July, 1983, he was

made an inspector of the Fire Division with a monthly salary of P685.00 plus allowances and
other benefits.
On October 15, 1983, private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was dismissed from work,
allegedly, on the grounds of tardiness and unexcused absences. Accordingly, he filed a complaint
with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE), and in a Decision dated March 14, 1985,
Labor Arbiter Teodorico L. Ruiz reinstated him to his position with back wages. Petitioner filed
an appeal with the National labor Relations Commission (NLRC) but, in a Resolution dated
November 15, 1985, the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the same had been filed out of
time. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent was illegally dismissed
RULING:
The Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission are clear and explicit
and leave no room for interpretation. Moreover, it is an elementary rule in administrative law that
administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law
which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect
(Espanol v. Philippine Veterans Administration, 137 SCRA 314 [1985]).
Under the above-quoted provisions of the Revised NLRC Rules, the decision appealed from in
this case has become final and executory and can no longer be subject to appeal.
Even on the merits, the ruling of the Labor Arbiter appears to be correct; the consistent
promotions in rank and salary of the private respondent indicate he must have been a highly
efficient worker, who should be retained despite occasional lapses in punctuality and attendance.
Perfection cannot after all be demanded. Petition is dismissed.
CANDO v. NLRC
G.R. No. 91344

September 14, 1990
FACTS:
Petitioner was a senior distributing clerk in Filipinas Bank and a ranking officer of the
employees union. In September 1984, the union declared a strike against the respondent bank
which lasted around a month. Thereafter, then Minister of Labor Blas Ople issued an order
enjoining the strike and directing the striking workers to return to work. Inasmuch as the union
refused to comply with the said order, the Ministry of Labor and Employment issued another
order dated October 29, 1984 instructing the workers to return to work under the same terms and
conditions obtaining before the strike. While the striking employees followed the return-to-work
order, the petitioner still failed to report for work. His absence was to last for quite some time.
The petitioner managed to file an application to go on official leave from November 5 to
21, 1984. In fine, however, he did not report for work from October 29, 1984 to the end of
February 1985-a period of more than four months. His time cards for the months of December
1984 and January 1985 recited entries like "union matter" and "hearing." His time card for
February 1985, however, was devoid of any entry. All in all, his absences from October 29, 1984
up to the end of February 1985 were unauthorized, save for the brief period covering his
application to go on official leave.
The respondent bank instructed the petitioner to explain in writ, within 48 hours, why
appropriate discipline measures should not be taken against him in view of his numerous
absences It was only on March 7, 1985 when the petitioner submitted his written explanation. He
contended that his numerous absences were prompted by various matters affecting the union
which needed immediate attention.
After an administrative investigation done by a committee, the bank terminated his
employment. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal which the Labor Arbiter dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was illegally dismissed
RULING:
It appears that the dismissal of the petitioner is based on his unjustified absences for a
number of months. As an employee, the petitioner is expected to be aware of the rules and

regulations of the bank regarding leaves of absences. As observed by the Commission, the
absences of the petitioner were not authorized. On this score, his dismissal appears to be
warranted.
His argument that his absences were nonetheless condoned by his superiors has no legal
basis. The respondent bank took steps to look into his alleged violation/s of bank rules and
regulations governing leaves of absences. An investigation ensued where he was given the
opportunity to defend himself. In due time, disciplinary measures were taken against him.
Besides, the petitioner did not show any proof of the alleged condonation on the part of his
superiors.
All in all, the Court is convinced that there is substantial evidence to support the
questioned decision of the respondent Commission. His violation of the rules and regulations of
the bank governing absences of employees was demonstrated in the course of an investigation on
the matter. He was given a chance to defend himself in the investigation. His testimony before
the labor arbiter was, at the least, hardly in accord with his explanation as to his absences.
Inasmuch as the findings of facts made by the respondent Commission are supported by
substantial evidence, the same will be accorded respect and finality.
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY v. TEVES

G.R. No. 143511
November 15, 2010
FACTS:
Respondent was employed as Clerk of PLDT until he was terminated because he violated
the (3) unauthorized leaves of absence committed within 3 years, contrary to the policy of PLDT.
From 1990 and 1992, there were 3 instances of unauthorized leaves of absence from the
Respondent. On the final instance, the explanation of Teves was unmeritorious, which led to his
dismissal. He filed a complaint of illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter.
The Arbiter found out that the dismissal was legal, but it ordered PLDT to give 20,000
php to Teves. Teves appealed to the NLRC, which reversed the Arbiters decision. It upheld the
validity of the absence on account of Teves wife having complications during childbirth. PLDT
filed a petition for Certiorari with the CA, which affirmed the decision of the NLRC. The CA
found that respondent's comportment cannot be characterized as grave so as to constitute grave
misconduct; that his first two leaves of absence were satisfactorily justified.
ISSUE: Whether the conduct of Teves warrants and justifies dismissal
RULING:
Even assuming that respondent's absenteeism constitutes willful disobedience, such
offense does not warrant respondent's dismissal.Not every case of insubordination or willful
disobedience by an employee reasonably deserves the penalty of dismissal. There must be a
reasonable proportionality between the offense and the penalty.
While management has the prerogative to discipline its employees and to impose
appropriate penalties on erring workers, pursuant to company rules and regulations, however,
such management prerogatives must be exercised in good faith for the advancement of the
employers interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the

employees under special laws and valid agreements. The Court is wont to reiterate that while an
employer has its own interest to protect, and pursuant thereto, it may terminate an employee for a
just cause, such prerogative to dismiss or lay off an employee must be exercised without abuse of
discretion.Its implementation should be tempered with compassion and understanding.The
employer should bear in mind that, in the execution of said prerogative, what is at stake is not
only the employees position, but his very livelihood,his very breadbasket.
CALIPAY v. NLRC
G.R. No. 166411
August 3, 2010
FACTS:
On July 16, 1999, a Complaint3 for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, underpayment
of wages and 13th month pay, non-payment of service incentive leave pay, overtime pay,
premium pay for holiday, rest day, night shift allowances and separation pay was filed by herein
petitioner Elpidio Calipay, together with Alfredo Mission and Ernesto Dimalanta against herein
private respondents Triangle Ace Corporation (Triangle) and Jose Lee.
Calipay and the other complainants alleged in their Position Paper that in the course of
their employment, they were not given any specific work assignment; they performed various
kinds of work imposed upon them by Lee; in discharging their functions, they were required by
Lee to work for 9 hours a day, beginning from 7:00 a.m. and ending at 6:00 p.m. with a break of
one hour at 12:00 noon; they were also required to report from Monday to Sunday; for work
rendered from Mondays to Saturdays beyond the normal 8 working hours in a day, they were
paid a uniform daily wage in the amount of P140.00 even during holidays; for work performed
on Sundays, they were not paid any wage due to the policy of Lee that his workers must provide
work without pay at least a day in the week under his so-called "bayanihan system"; in receiving
their wages, they were not given any duly accomplished payslips; instead, they were forced to
sign a blank form of their daily time records and salary vouchers.
It was further alleged that in May 1998, Lee confronted Calipay and Mission regarding
their alleged participation and assistance in Dimalantas claim for disability benefits with the

Social Security System; despite their denials, Lee scolded Calipay and Mission; this incident
later led to their dismissal in the same month. Private respondents countered that the termination
of Calipay and the other complainants was for a valid or just cause and that due process was
observed. They claimed, among others, that Calipay was on absence without leave (AWOL)
status from November 2, 1998 up to November 17, 1998
ISSUE: Whether or not there is abandonment

RULING:
Petition is denied.
Jurisprudence has held time and again that abandonment is totally inconsistent with the
immediate filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal, more so if the same is accompanied by a
prayer for reinstatement. In the present case, however, petitioner filed his complaint more than
one year after his alleged termination from employment. Moreover, petitioner and the other
complainants inconsistency in their stand is also shown by the fact that in the complaint form
which they personally filled up and filed with the NLRC, they only asked for payment of
separation pay and other monetary claims. They did not ask for reinstatement. It is only in their
Position Paper later prepared by their counsel that they asked for reinstatement. This is an
indication that petitioner and the other complainants never had the intention or desire to return to
their jobs. In fact, there is no evidence to prove that petitioner and his former co-employees ever
attempted to return to work after they were dismissed from employment.
On the other hand, private respondents were able to present memoranda or show-cause
letters served on petitioner and the other complainants at their last known address requiring them
explain their absence, with a warning that their failure would be construed as abandonment of
work. Also, private respondents served on petitioner and the other complainants a notice of
termination as required by law. Private respondents compliance with said requirements, taken
together with the other circumstances above-discussed, only proves petitioner and the other
complainants abandonment of their work.
NATIONAL BOOKSTORE v. CA
G.R. No. 146741
February 27, 2002
FACTS:
Petitioner National Bookstore, Inc., employed private respondent Marietta M. Ymasa and
private respondent Edna L. Gabriel. On 28 August 1992 when both claimed to have been
illegally dismissed from employment, private respondents Ymasa and Gabriel were Cash
Custodian and Head Cashier of petitioner National Bookstore, respectively.
On 28 June 1992, a Sunday, private respondents reported for work at their place of
assignment, i.e., the SM North Edsa Branch of petitioner National Bookstore to count the
previous days sales proceeds as a matter of routine. Private respondent Ymasa counted the
money intended to be deposited with INTERBANK while private respondent Gabriel attended to
the money for deposit with PCIB. The counting was done in the presence of a watcher. After
preparing the corresponding deposit slips which Cupcupin accordingly signed, the counted
money was placed inside 2 separate plastic bags which were sealed with scotch tapes. The plastic
bags were then tied together with rubber band, with the bag containing the money intended for

deposit with INTERBANK placed on top. Thereafter, private respondent Ymasa put the plastic
bags inside her cabinet which she accordingly locked.
Private respondents retrieved from the Assistant Manager the money already counted and
placed inside the sealed plastic bags to be picked up by the roving tellers of INTERBANK and
PCIB. But before being deposited, the money was again counted. The amount for deposit to
PCIB was found short of P42,758.70. All efforts made to locate the missing amount failed. The
Management placed private respondents under preventive suspension effective immediately.
Petitioner National Bookstore, after finding the explanations of private respondents
unsatisfactory, notified them on 29 August 1992 of the termination of their services for gross
neglect of duty and loss of confidence to take effect immediately and without prejudice to
appropriate legal action that the Management may take for the restitution of the missing
Company funds.
Private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner before the Labor
Arbiter who ruled in favor of private respondents on 20 June 1994. According to the Labor
Arbiter, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by the parties showed that although
private respondents were afforded due process before being dismissed, their dismissal was not
founded on valid and justifiable grounds as provided under Art. 282 of the Labor Code, as
amended. Thus, the Labor Arbiter declared private respondents to be entitled to reinstatement
with payment of full back wages under Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended. But after
considering the strained relations among the parties brought about by the litigation, the Labor
Arbiter instead ordered petitioners to pay private respondents separation pay, back wages, moral
and/or actual damages and attorneys fees.
On 8 October 1997 petitioners appeal before the NLRC was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents were illegally dismissed
RULING:
Gross negligence has been defined as the want or absence of or failure to exercise slight
care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of
consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. A perusal of the records of the case
does not in any way show that private respondents were even remotely negligent of their duties
so as to cause the loss of petitioner National Bookstores funds. Private respondents were able to
illustrate with candor and sincerity the procedure they took prior to the loss which was witnessed

by an employee of petitioner National Bookstore. They were in fact subjected to a thorough body
search by petitioner National Bookstores lady guard before leaving their place of work on the
date in issue, a claim not controverted by petitioners. Moreover, it was not even shown that they
had access to the vault where the money was kept.
Significantly, in order to constitute a just cause for the employees dismissal, the neglect of
duties must not only be gross but also habitual. Thus, the single or isolated act of negligence does
not constitute a just cause for the dismissal of the employee. Verily, assuming arguendo that
private respondents were negligent, although we find otherwise, it could only be a single or an
isolated act that cannot be categorized as habitual, hence, not a just cause for their dismissal.
ST. LUKES MEDICAL CENTER v. NOTARIO

GR No. 152166

October 20, 2010
FACTS:
St. Lukes Medical Center, Inc.employed respondent as In-House Security Guard. In
August 1996, Nimaya Electro Corporation installed a closed-circuit television (CCTV) system in
the premises of petitioner hospital to enhance its security measures and conducted an orientation
seminar for the in-house security personnel on the proper way of monitoring video cameras,
subject to certain guidelines.
On December 30, 1996, respondent was on duty from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. of the
following day, December 31, 1996. His work consisted mainly of monitoring the video
cameras. In the evening of December 30, 1996, Justin Tibon, a foreigner from Majuro, Marshall
Island, then attending to his 3-year-old daughter, who was admitted since December 20, 1996 at
room 257, reported to the management of petitioner hospital about the loss of his mint green
traveling bag. Acting on the complaint of Tibon, the Security Department of petitioner hospital
conducted an investigation. When the tapes of video camera recorder (VCR), it was shown that
the VCR was focused on camera no. 2 (Old Maternity Unit), from 2103H to 2215H [or 9:03 p.m.
to 10:15 p.m.] of December 30, 1996, and camera no. 1 (New Maternity Unit), from 0025H to
0600H [or 12:25 a.m. to 6:00 a.m.] of December 31, 1996. The cameras failed to record any
incident of theft at room 257.
On January 6, 1997, petitioner hospital, issued a Memorandum to respondent directing
him to explain in writing, within 24 hours upon receipt thereof, why no disciplinary action
should be taken against him for violating the normal rotation/sequencing process of the VCR
and, consequently, failed to capture the theft of Tibon's traveling bag at room 257. In his letter,
respondent explained that on the subject dates, he was the only personnel on duty as nobody
wanted to assist him. Because of this, he decided to focus the cameras on the Old and New
Maternity Units, as these two units have high incidence of crime.
Finding the written explanation of respondent to be unsatisfactory, petitioner hospital,
served on respondent a copy of the Notice of Termination, dismissing him on the ground of gross
negligence/inefficiency under Section 1, Rule VII of its Code of Discipline.
Thus, respondent filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner, seeking
reinstatement with payment of full backwages from the time of his dismissal up to actual
reinstatement, without of loss of seniority rights and other benefits. Petitioners countered that
they validly dismissed respondent for gross negligence and observed due process before
terminating his employment.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was illegally dismissed
RULING:
Petitioners lack of just cause and non-compliance with the procedural requisites in
terminating respondents employment renders them guilty of illegal dismissal.Consequently,
respondent is entitled to reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority rights and
payment of backwages. However, if such reinstatement proves impracticable, and hardly in the
best interest of the parties, perhaps due to the lapse of time since his dismissal, or if he decides
not to be reinstated, respondent should be awarded separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.
Under Article 282 (b) of the Labor Code, an employer may terminate an employee
for gross and habitual neglect of duties. Neglect of duty, to be a ground for dismissal, must be

both gross and habitual. Gross negligence connotes want of care in the performance of ones
duties. Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform ones duties for a period of time,
depending upon the circumstances. A single or isolated act of negligence does not constitute
a just cause for the dismissal of the employee. Under the prevailing circumstances, respondent
exercised his best judgment in monitoring the CCTV cameras so as to ensure the security within
the hospital premises. Verily, assuming arguendo that respondent was negligent, although this
Court finds otherwise, the lapse or inaction could only be regarded as a single or isolated act of
negligence that cannot be categorized as habitual and, hence, not a just cause for his dismissal.

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CITIBANK, N.A v. GATCHALIAN