59. De Castro vs. JBC, G. R. No. 191002: March 17, 2010.

FACTS:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration on the March 17, 2010 decision of the
Court. The said decision directs the Judicial and Bar Council to resume its
proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy created by
the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010,
and to prepare the short list of nominees and submit it to the incumbent
President. Movants argue that the disputed constitutional provision, Art. VII,
Sec. 15 and Art. VIII, Sec. 4(1), clearly intended the ban on midnight
appointments to cover the members of the Judiciary, and they contended
that the principle of stare decisis is controlling, and insisted that the Court
erred in disobeying or abandoning the Valenzuela ruling.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial
determination.
HELD: There is a justiciable issue. The court holds that the petitions set forth
an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. The
reality is that the JBC already commenced the proceedings for the selection
of the nominees to be included in a short list to be submitted to the President
for consideration of which of them will succeed Chief Justice Puno as the next
Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that the JBC
began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and practices,
although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of nominees to the
incumbent outgoing President or to the next President, makes the situation
ripe for judicial determination, because the next steps are the public
interview of the candidates, the preparation of the short list of candidates,
and the interview of constitutional experts, as may be needed. The
resolution of the controversy will surely settle with finality the nagging
questions that are preventing the JBC from moving on with the process that it
already began, or that are reasons persuading the JBC to desist from the rest
of the process.
NACHURAS SEPARATE OPINION:
Consolidated petitions should be dismissed because they do not raise an
actual case or controversy ripe for judicial determination.
As an essential ingredient for the exercise of the power of judicial review, an
actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims susceptible to judicial resolution. The controversy must

be justiciable definite and concrete touching on the legal relations of parties

having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an
active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on one hand, and a denial
thereof, on the other; that is, the case must concern a real and not a merely
theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature,
as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts.
The rationale for this requirement is to prevent the courts through avoidance
of premature adjudication from entangling themselves in abstract
disagreements, and for us to be satisfied that the case does not present a
hypothetical injury or a claim contingent upon some event that has not and
indeed may never transpire.
Thus, justiciability requires (1) that there be an actual controversy between
or among the parties to the dispute; (2) that the interests of the parties be
adverse; (3) that the matter in controversy be capable of being adjudicated
by judicial power; and (4) that the determination of the controversy will
result in practical relief to the complainant.
By these standards, the consolidated petitions do not present a justiciable
controversy because of the absence of clashing legal rights. The JBC has
merely started the selection process by accepting applications and
nominations for the position of Chief Justice. This is only the initial stage of
the procedure for appointment of a Chief Justice. By the JBCs own admission,
it has yet to undertake the public interview of the applicants; it has yet to
prepare the shortlist and to decide whether it needs to interview
constitutional experts.
To repeat for emphasis, before this Court steps in to wield its awesome power
of deciding cases, there must first be an actual controversy ripe for judicial
adjudication. Here, the allegations in all the petitions are conjectural or
anticipatory. No actual controversy between real litigants exists. These
consolidated petitions, in other words, are a purely academic exercise.
Hence, any resolution that this Court might make would constitute an
attempt at abstraction that can only lead to barren legal dialectics and sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities.
Moreover, the function of the courts is to determine controversies between
litigants and not to give advisory opinions. Here, petitioners are asking this
Court to render an advisory opinion on what the JBC and the President should

do. To accede to it is tantamount to an incursion into the functions of the

executive department. This will further inappropriately make the Court an
adviser of the President.
60. Yap vs. Thenamaris Ships & Intermare Maritime, G.R. No.
179532: May 30, 2011
FACTS: Petitioner was employed as an electrician of the vessel by Intermare
Maritime Agencies, Inc. in behalf of its principal, Vulture Shipping Limited.
The contract was for 12 months. On 23 August 2001, Yap boarded the vessel
and commenced his job as electrician. However, on or about 08 November
2001, the vessel was sold.
Yap received his seniority bonus, vacation bonus, extra bonus along
with the scrapping bonus. However, he insisted that he was entitled to the
payment of the unexpired portion of his contract since he was illegally
dismissed from employment. He alleged that he opted for immediate
transfer but none was made.
Respondents contended that Yap was not illegally dismissed. They further
alleged that Yaps contract was validly terminated due to the sale of the
vessel and no arrangement was made for Yaps transfer to Thenamaris other
vessels.
Thus, Yap brought the issue before the Labor Arbiter (LA) which ruled
that petitioner was illegally dismissed; that respondents acted in bad faith
when they assured petitioner of re-embarkation but he was not able to
board; and that petitioner was entitled to his salaries for the unexpired
portion of his contract for a period of nine months (US$12,870.00), P100,000
for moral damages, and P50,000 for exemplary damages with 10% of the
same for Attys fees.
Respondents sought recourse from the NLRC which modified the award
of salaries from that corresponding to nine months to only three months
(US$4,290.00) pursuant to Section 10 R.A. No. 8042. NLRC affirmed the
finding of Illegal Dismissal and Bad Faith on the part of respondent. However,
the NLRC reversed its earlier Decision, holding that "there can be no choice
to grant only 3 months salary for every year of the unexpired term because
there is no full year of unexpired term which this can be applied."
Respondents filed an MR, which the NLRC denied. Undaunted,
respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA. The
CA affirmed the findings and ruling of the LA and the NLRC. However, the CA

ruled that the NLRC erred in sustaining the LAs interpretation of Section 10 of
R.A. No. 8042. The CA relied on the clause "or for three months for every
year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" provided in the 5th paragraph
of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042.
ISSUE: Whether the doctrine of operative fact is applicable in this case
HELD: No, as a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no
rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is
inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. The doctrine of operative fact
serves as an exception to the aforementioned general rule.
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only
applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an
unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a
determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration.
The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will
impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it
was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality
would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts
done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.
This case should not be included in the aforementioned exception.
After all, it was not the fault of petitioner that he lost his job due to an act of
illegal dismissal committed by respondents. To rule otherwise would be
iniquitous to petitioner and other OFWs, and would, in effect, send a wrong
signal that principals/employers and recruitment/manning agencies may
violate an OFWs security of tenure which an employment contract embodies
and actually profit from such violation based on an unconstitutional provision
of law.
61. Hacienda Luisita, Inc. vs. PAR Council, GR No. 171101:
November 2011

22

FACTS: On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (110) to DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS
the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLIs Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and
placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.

The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5,
the Court noted that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim
and which the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the
revocation of the SDP must, by application of the operative fact principle,
give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries
(FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or
[choose actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) to immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs
and explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical
implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest,
in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing
their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.
The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration
of the Court decision.
ISSUE: Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case?
HELD: Yes, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case. The Court
maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this
case since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not
limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions
made by the President or the administrative agencies that have the force
and effect of laws.
Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have
produced acts and consequences that must be respected. It is on this score
that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences
that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the
SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that the application of the operative fact
doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact favorable to the
FWBs because not only were they allowed to retain the benefits and
homelots they received under the stock distribution scheme, they were also
given the option to choose for themselves whether they want to remain as
stockholders of HLI or not.
62. Gonzales vs. Narvasa, G.R. No. 140835: 14 August 2000
FACTS: Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and
taxpayer, filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus assailing the
constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on

Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential consultants,

advisers and assistants.
The Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was
created by President Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive
Order No. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in order to study and recommend proposed
amendments and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the manner of
implementing the same. Petitioner disputes the constitutionality of the
PCCR based on the grounds that it is a public office which only the legislature
can create by way of a law. It is alleged by respondents that, with respect to
the PCCR, this case has become moot and academic.
ISSUE: Whether the allegation of respondents is correct
HELD: Yes, it has become moot and academic. An action is considered moot
when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues
involved have become academic or dead. Under E.O. No. 43, the PCCR was
instructed to complete its task on or before June 30, 1999. However, on
February 19, 1999, the President issued Executive Order No. 70 (E.O. No. 70),
which extended the time frame for the completion of the commissions work,
viz SECTION 6.
Section 8 is hereby amended to read as follows:
Time Frame. The Commission shall commence its work on 01 January
1999 and complete the same on or before 31 December 1999. The
Commission shall submit its report and recommendations to the
President within fifteen (15) working days from 31 December 1999.
The PCCR submitted its recommendations to the President on December 20,
1999 and was dissolved by the President on the same day. It had likewise
spent the funds allotted to it. Thus, the PCCR has ceased to exist, having lost
its raison detre. Subsequent events have overtaken the petition and the
Court has nothing left to resolve.
The staleness of the issue before us is made more manifest by the
impossibility of granting the relief prayed for by petitioner. Basically,
petitioner asks this Court to enjoin the PCCR from acting as such. Clearly,
prohibition is an inappropriate remedy since the body sought to be enjoined
no longer exists. It is well established that prohibition is a preventive remedy
and does not lie to restrain an act that is already fait accompli. At this point,
any ruling regarding the PCCR would simply be in the nature of an advisory
opinion, which is definitely beyond the permissible scope of judicial power.

63. Garcia vs. Executive Secretary, G.R No. 157584: 02 April 2009
FACTS: After years of imposing significant controls over the downstream oil
industry in the Philippines, the government decided in March 1996 to pursue
a policy of deregulation by enacting Republic Act No. 8180 (R.A. No. 8180) or
the Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996. However, the law was
struck down as invalid because the three key provisions intended to promote
free competition were shown to achieve the opposite result; contrary to its
intent, R.A. No. 8180s provisions on tariff differential, inventory
requirements, and predatory pricing inhibited fair competition, encouraged
monopolistic power, and interfered with the free interaction of market forces.
Congress responded to the decision by enacting a new oil deregulation
law, R.A. No. 8479. This time, Congress excluded the offensive provisions
found in the invalidated law.
For the second time, petitioner asks the Court to examine the
constitutionality of Section 19 of R.A. No. 8479, otherwise known as the Oil
Deregulation Law of 1998, through this petition for certiorari. He raises once
again the propriety of implementing full deregulation by removing the
system of price controls in the local downstream oil industry a matter that
we have ruled upon in the past.
He contended that implementing full deregulation and removing price
control at a time when the market is still dominated and controlled by an
oligopoly would be contrary to public interest, as it would only provide an
opportunity for the Big 3 to engage in price-fixing and overpricing. He
averred that Section 19 of R.A. No. 8479 is glaringly pro-oligopoly, anticompetition, and anti-people, and thus asked the Court to declare the
provision unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether the issue raised by petitioner is a political question
HELD: Yes. Directly supporting that he raises a political question is his
proposal to adopt instead a system of partial deregulation a system he
presents as more consistent with the Constitutional dictate. He avers that
free market forces (in a fully deregulated environment) cannot prevail for as
long as the market itself is dominated by an entrenched oligopoly. In such
situation, he claims that prices are not determined by the free play of supply
and demand, but instead by the entrenched and dominant oligopoly where
overpricing and price-fixing are possible. Thus, before full deregulation can

be implemented, he calls for an indefinite period of partial deregulation

through imposition of price controls.
Petitioners thesis readily reveals the political, hence, non-justiciable,
nature of his petition; the choice of undertaking full or partial deregulation is
not for this Court to make. By enacting the assailed provision Section 19 of
R.A. No. 8479, Congress already determined that the problems confronting
the local downstream oil industry are better addressed by removing all forms
of prior controls and adopting a deregulated system.
Recourse to the political question doctrine necessarily raises the
underlying doctrine of separation of powers among the three great branches
of government that our Constitution has entrenched. When political
questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination as to
whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being
questioned.
64. COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the
Properties Purchased by the Retired Chief/ Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court.
FACTS: This issue has its roots in the June 8, 2010 Opinion issued by the
Legal Services Sector, Office of the General Counsel of the Commission on
Audit (COA), which found that an underpayment resulted when five (5)
retired Supreme Court justices purchased from the Supreme Court the
personal properties assigned to them during their incumbency in the Court.
The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the Property
Division of the Supreme Court of the wrong formula in computing the
appraisal value of the purchased vehicles.
In her Memoandum, Atty. Candelaria recommended that the Court
advise the COA to respect the in-house computation based on the CFAG
formula, noting that this was the first time that the COA questioned the
authority of the Court in using CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines
in the appraisal and disposal of government property since these were issued
in 1997. As a matter of fact, in two previous instances involving two (2)
retired Court of Appeals Associate Justices, the COA upheld the in-house
appraisal of government property using the formula found in the CFAG
guidelines. More importantly, the Constitution itself grants the Judiciary fiscal
autonomy in the handling of its budget and resources.

ISSUE: Whether Atty Candelarias recommendation is tenable

HELD: Yes. The COAs authority to conduct post-audit examinations on
constitutional bodies granted fiscal autonomy is provided under Section 2(1),
Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. This authority, however, must be read
not only in light of the Courts fiscal autonomy, but also in relation with the
constitutional provisions on judicial independence and the existing
jurisprudence and Court rulings on these matters.
Under
the
Judiciarys
unique
circumstances,
independence
encompasses the idea that individual judges can freely exercise their
mandate to resolve justiciable disputes, while the judicial branch, as a whole,
should work in the discharge of its constitutional functions free of restraints
and influence from the other branches, save only for those imposed by the
Constitution itself.12 Thus, judicial independence can be broken down into
two distinct concepts: decisional independence and institutional
independence.
Decisional independence refers to a judges ability to render decisions
free from political or popular influence based solely on the individual facts
and applicable law. On the other hand, institutional independence
describes the separation of the judicial branch from the executive and
legislative branches of government. Simply put, institutional independence
refers to the collective independence of the judiciary as a body."
The Constitution expressly prohibits Congress from depriving the
Supreme Court of its jurisdiction, as enumerated in Section 5, Article VII of
the Constitution, or from passing a law that undermines the security of
tenure of the members of the judiciary. The Constitution also mandates that
the judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy, and grants the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and judicial personnel.