Ethics Compiled

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008-2015) Legal Ethics
LEGAL ETHICS
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
LETICIA A. ARIENDA vs. EVELYN A. MONILLA, COURT STENOGRAPHER III, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 4, LEGAZPI CITY
A.M. No. P112980, June 10, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Respondent Court Stenographer Monilla prepared an extra judicial settlement of estate for the
complainant Arienda and her siblings. In ruling that the respondent is guilty of simple misconduct, the
Supreme Court held that the preparation of an extrajudicial settlement of estate constitutes practice
of law as defined in Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210 (1991) to wit: Practice of law means any
activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training
and experience.
Facts:
This is an administrative complaint for conduct unbecoming a court employee and abuse of
authority filed by complainant Leticia A. Arienda against respondent Evelyn A. Monilla, Court
Stenographer III of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4 of Legazpi City. In her lettercomplaint
dated October 8, 2008, complainant alleged that respondent and Atty. Zaldy Monilla, respondents
husband (together referred to as the spouses Monilla), went to complainants house on January 13,
2002 and offered their services in settling the estate of complainants deceased mother. According
to the spouses Monilla, they would prepare an extrajudicial settlement for complainant and the
latters siblings, while respondents brother, Engineer Matias A. Arquero, would conduct the survey
of the estate.
In her comment dated May 23, 2009, respondent denied that it was she and her husband
who offered complainant their services in settling the estate of complainants deceased mother.
According to the respondent, complainant and her siblings, already wishing to partition their
deceased parents estate out of court, pleaded that respondent prepare an extrajudicial settlement.
Respondent declined to get involved at first because complainant and her siblings were
represented by a lawyer in the partition case before the RTC, but complainant and her siblings said
that they had no more money to pay for the continued services of their lawyer. Because of this,
respondent prepared and finalized the extrajudicial settlement and handed the said document to
complainant and her siblings.
In a Resolution dated June 23, 2010, the Court referred the instant administrative matter to
Vice Executive Judge Pedro R. Soriao (Investigating Judge Soriao) of RTC, Branch 5 of Legazpi City,
for investigation, report, and recommendation. After evaluation of Investigating Judge Sariaos
report, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) submitted to the Court its Memorandum dated
July 14, 2011, recommending that respondent be found guilty of simple misconduct.
Issues:
1. Whether respondent Monilla engaged in unlawful practice of law
2. Whether respondent Monilla is guilty of simple misconduct
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Ruling:
1. Yes. It bears to note that respondent admitted in her comment that she prepared and
finalized the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of complainants deceased mother. The
preparation of an extrajudicial settlement of estate constitutes practice of law as defined in
Cayetano v. Monsod, to wit: Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the
profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or
service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill. x x x.
Not being a lawyer, respondent had no authority to prepare and finalize an extrajudicial
settlement of estate. Worse, respondent also admitted receiving money from complainant for her
services. Being a court employee, respondent ought to have known that it was improper for her to
prepare and finalize the extrajudicial settlement of estate, a service only a lawyer is authorized to
perform, and to receive money therefor. It is true that respondent prepared and finalized the
extrajudicial settlement of estate pursuant to a private agreement between her and complainant.
However, respondent is an employee of the court whose conduct must always be beyond reproach
and circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility as to let her be free from any suspicion
that may taint the judiciary. She is expected to exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not
only in the performance of her official duties but also in her personal and private dealings with
other people to preserve the courts good name and standing. Respondents behavior and conduct,
which led other people to believe that she had the authority and capability to prepare and finalize
an extrajudicial settlement of estate even when she is not a lawyer, clearly fall short of the exacting
standards of ethics and morality imposed upon court employees.
2. Yes. Misconduct generally means wrongful, unlawful conduct, motivated by a
premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. Thus, any transgression or deviation from the
established norm, whether it be work related or not, amounts to misconduct. In preparing and
finalizing the extrajudicial settlement of estate and receiving compensation for the same even when
she is not a lawyer, respondent is guilty of simple misconduct, punishable under Section 52(B)(2) of
the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
SUSPENSION, DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF LAWYERS
CECILIA A. AGNO vs. ATTY. MARCIANO J. CAGATAN
A.C. No. 4515, July 14, 2008, J. Leonardo-De Castro
The right to institute a disbarment proceeding is not confined to clients nor is it necessary that
the person complaining suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing.
A lawyer who paid another with a personal check from a bank account which he knew has
already been closed exhibited an extremely low regard to his commitment to the oath he took when he
joined his peers, thereby seriously tarnishing the image of the profession which he should hold in high
esteem.
Facts:
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Atty. Cagatan was the President of International Services Recruitment Corporation (ISRC), a
corporation engaged in the recruitment of Filipino workers for overseas employment. During the
pendency of an application for the cancellation of license of ISRC, on August 9, 1992, Atty. Cagatan
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with a United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) national, Mr.
Khalifa H. Juma, the husband of herein complainant, Cecilia A. Agno.
On December 26, 1995, which was more than three (3) years after the execution of the
aforesaid agreement, a ComplaintAffidavit for disbarment was filed by Agno against Atty. Cagatan
claiming that the latter used fraud, deceit and misrepresentation, in enticing her husband, Khalifa,
to join ISRC and invest therein the amount of P500,000.00 and that although the Atty. Cagatan
received the aforesaid amount, Agno learned from her inquiries with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and the POEA that Atty. Cagatan failed to comply with the terms of the
Memorandum of Agreement.
The complainant prayed for the disbarment of the respondent for issuing a bouncing check
and for his act of dishonesty in assuring her and her husband that the Memorandum of Agreement
would suffice to install them as stockholders and officers of ISRC which induced them to invest in
said corporation the amount of P500,000.00.
On October 22, 2005, IBP passed a resolution suspending Atty. Cagatan from the practice of
law for two (2) years and ordered restitution of the money he received from Agno.
Atty. Cagatan contends that Agno, not being a party-in-interest in the agreement between
respondent and Mr. Khalifa H. Juma, has no legal standing to file the instant complaint.
Issue:
1. Whether Agno has personality to file the disbarment complaint
2. Whether Atty, Cagatan employed fraud, deceit or misrepresentation when he entered into
the Memorandum of Agreement
Ruling:
1. Yes.
Section 1, Rule 139B 24 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that proceedings for
disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu
proprio, or by the IBP upon the verified complaint of any person. The right to institute a disbarment
proceeding is not confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury
from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the only
basis for judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charges.
2. Yes.
Indeed, the deceit and misrepresentation employed by the respondent was seemingly
evident right at the outset when he entered into the MOA concerning the joint ownership and
operation of ISRC with the complainants husband, knowing fully well that he could not do so
without the consent of and/or authority from the corporations Board of Directors. The unilateral
execution by respondent of the Deed of Assignment is a lame excuse offered by the respondent. We
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agree with the observation of Commissioner San Juan that the said deed, which was not at all
mentioned in the MOA, was executed by the respondent after the complainant had conducted her
investigation of the true condition of the corporation. The socalled guarantee check appears to
have also been issued by respondent for the same reason.
The Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates the following: Canon 1. A
lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and
legal processes. Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession
and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
The issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct, as the effect transcends the
private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the
community at large.
JERRY T. WONG vs. ATTY. SALVADOR N. MOYA II
A.C. No. 6972, October 17, 2008, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Clearly, therefore, the act of a lawyer in issuing a check without sufficient funds to cover the
same constitutes such wilful dishonesty and immoral conduct as to undermine the public confidence in
the legal profession. He cannot justify his act of issuing worthless checks by his dire financial condition.
Moya II should have contracted debts which are beyond his financial capacity to pay. If he suffered a
reversal of fortune, he should have explained with particularity the circumstances which cause his
failure to meet his obligations. His generalized and unsubs-tantiated allegations as to why he reneged
in the payment of his debts promptly despite repeated demands and sufficient time afforded him
cannot withstand scrutiny.
Facts:
Complainant Wong, a businessman, retained the services of herein Respondent Moya II for
the purpose of collecting due and demandable debts in favor of his company. Aside from this, Moya
II handled some personal cases of Wong and his wife. Thereafter, Moya II asked financial help from
Wong for the construction of his house and purchase of a car. Pursuant thereto, Wong purchased a
car on instalment basis for Moya II and introduced the latter to the owner of Unisia Merchandising
Corporation from which the construction materials were obtained. Moya II issued several checks to
cover the credit extended by Wong, which were all dishonored upon presentment. Despite repeated
demands, Moya II refused to pay his monetary obligation.
In another incident, Moya II handled Wongs case against a certain Berting Diwa that was
decided in his clients favor. Upon execution, Diwa complied and paid a certain sum of money,
which Moya II appropriated to himself.
Wong then filed a disbarment case against Moya II before the Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD). In both the proceedings before the CBD and the IBP Board of Governors, Moya II
demonstrated obstinacy and filed dilatory motions. Ultimately, the IBP Governors adopted and
approved with modification the report coming from the CBD and meted out the penalty of two-year
suspension.
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Issue:
Whether or not the acts of Respondent Moya II constituted grave misconduct.
Ruling:
Yes, the acts of Moya II amounts to grave misconduct.
Moya II was charged for having failed to pay his debts and for issuing worthless checks as
payment for his loan from Wong and the latters friends. He did not deny these allegations but he
contended that he committed neither a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility nor any
dishonesty, immoral or deceitful conduct because he never denied his debts and he was only unable
to pay them on time due to financial constraints.
In Lao vs. Medel, the Court expressed that the issuance of worthless checks by a lawyer
constituted violation of Canon 1 of the Code as such act amounts to gross misconduct. In Cuizon vs.
Macalinao, the issuance of checks which were later dishonored indicates a lawyers unfitness for
the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows such lack of personal honesty and good moral
character as to render him unworthy of public confidence. In Sanchez vs. Somoso, the persistent
refusal to settle due obligations despite demand manifests a lawyers low regard to his commitment
to the oath he has taken when he joined his peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of
the profession he should, instead, hold in high esteem.
Clearly, therefore, the act of a lawyer in issuing a check without sufficient funds to cover the
same constitutes such wilful dishonesty and immoral conduct as to undermine the public
confidence in the legal profession. He cannot justify his act of issuing worthless checks by his dire
financial condition. Moya II should have contracted debts which are beyond his financial capacity to
pay. If he suffered a reversal of fortune, he should have explained with particularity the
circumstances which cause his failure to meet his obligations. His generalized and unsubs-tantiated
allegations as to why he reneged in the payment of his debts promptly despite repeated demands
and sufficient time afforded him cannot withstand scrutiny.
Lastly, the Court finds unmeritorious the justification of Moya II as to his failure to
immediately deliver to Wong the payment made by Diwa for the satisfaction of a judgment. Moya
IIs failure to explain such delay cannot be excused by his likewise bare allegation that the same had
already been transmitted to Wong.
WALTER WILKIE vs. ATTY. SINAMAR E. LIMOS
A.C. No. 7505, October 24, 2008, J. Leonardo-De Castro
The Court have held that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been
drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyers unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on
her. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render her unworthy of public
confidence. The issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows the remorseless attitude of
respondent, unmindful to the deleterious effects of such act to the public interest and public order. It
also manifests a lawyers low regard to her commitment to the oath she has taken when she joined her
peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession she should hold in high esteem.
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Facts:
Complainant Wilkie engaged the legal services of Respondent Limos regarding his intended
adoption of his wifes nephew. Having full trust and confidence, Wilkie lent the amount of
PhP250,000.00 to his lawyer herein Limos, who, in turn, issued two (2) post dated checks
representing the principal amount and the interest in the amount of PhP60,000.00. However, when
the checks became due, the same were returned DAIF and in spite repeated demands to make good
on the checks, Limos failed to perform her obligation.
The IBP Board of Governors, acting on the Investigating Commissioners Report, found
Limos guilty of the accusation but, instead of imposing the recommended penalty of two-year
suspension, merely reprimanded the latter.
Upon transmittal of the records of the case to the Court, Limos finally made somewhat a
response to the accusation in the form of a letter wherein she asserts that Wilkie had already
executed an Affidavit of Desistance and she was actually an accommodation party as the money
loaned went to her other client, Hilario Inocencio, who failed to send her the funds to cover the
checks issued in favor of Wilkie.
Issue:
Whether or not Limos is guilty of grave misconduct in issuing the inadequately funded
checks.
Ruling:
Yes, Limos is liable and should be penalized for issuing the checks.
Limos did not deny that she obtained a loan with interest from Wilkie and her bare claim
that she was merely an accommodation party cannot be given credence and, indeed, too specious to
be believed.
The Court have held that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having
been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyers unfitness for the trust and confidence
reposed on her. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render her
unworthy of public confidence. The issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows the
remorseless attitude of respondent, unmindful to the deleterious effects of such act to the public
interest and public order. It also manifests a lawyers low regard to her commitment to the oath she
has taken when she joined her peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the
profession she should hold in high esteem.
On another point, the reliance of Limos to the Affidavit of Desistance is misplaced. This is
because while Wilkie filed his Affidavit with the trial court handling the B.P. Blg. 22 case, he did not
do the same thing in this case. At any rate, the Court has consistently frowned upon the desistance
of complainants because of legal and jurisprudential injunction. Section 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules
of Court, is instructive on this matter, to wit:
Sec. 5. Service or dismissal
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xxxx
No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement,
compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute
the same.
Withal, an administrative sanction on Limos is warranted. The Court, though, disagrees with
the reprimand imposed by the IBP Board of Governors for being not commensurate to the gravity of
the wrong committed by Limos. In this case, Limos has fully paid her obligation to Wilkie, which
according to the receipts amounted to PhP400,000.00. The criminal cases filed by her erstwhile
client have been dismissed and this is the first time a complaint of such nature has been filed
against Limos. Under these circumstances, the Court rules and so holds that a suspen-sion of three
(3) months from the practice of law would be sufficient sanction on Limos.
CESAR TALENTO and MODESTA HERRERA TALENTO vs. ATTY. AGUSTIN F. PANEDA
A.C. No. 7433, December 23 2009, J. Leonardo-De Castro
A lawyer has the responsibility to diligently prosecute the case of his clients to the best of his
ability within the bounds of law. A lawyer, when he undertakes his clients cause, makes a covenant
that he will exert all efforts for its prosecution until its final conclusion.
Facts:
This is an administrative complaint filed by mother and son Modesta Herrera Talento and
Cesar Talento charging Atty. Agustin F. Paneda of violation of his oath as a lawyer and neglect of
duty.
According to the petitioners, a civil complaint was filed by Leticia Herrera for Quieting of
Title against them. Petitioners secured the services of Atty. Paneda to help and defend them in the
aforementioned case. Petitioners paid the attorneys fees he required.
Atty. Paneda filed petitioners answer to the complaint and the case was set for pre-trial.
The Court in an order required both parties counsels to submit their respective pre-trial briefs and
appear during the scheduled pre-trial hearing. Despite the order and notice, Atty. Paneda did not
file or submit a pre-trial brief. Much more to their surprise and predicament, although the
petitioners attended the pre-trial hearing, he did not appear.
Petitioners were declared in default because of the failure of to file and submit pre-trial
brief. The trial court allowed the case to be heard ex parte much to petitioners damage and
prejudice. According to the petitioners, the trial court issued a decision against petitioners simply
for failure of Atty. Paneda to submit pre-trial brief and for his failure to attend the pre-trial of the
case. It was simply because of technicality and not based on the merits of the allegations of both
parties that petitioners lost the case.
Atty. Paneda filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was dismissed. He told the petitioners
that he will appeal the case to the Court of Appeals and they agreed because they were confident of
their claim over the parcel of land subject of this case. Petitioners paid the required fees and he
even required them to shell out more money for the preparation of the Appeal brief. They found out
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later that the appeal was dismissed due to lack of an appeal brief only when petitioners went to
Atty. Paneda.
The Commission found him guilty of gross violation of his duties as a lawyer and of
inexcusable negligence with the recommendation that he be suspended from the practice of law for
a period of one year. IBP Board of Governors adopted this recommendation.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent committed gross negligence or misconduct in handling
petitioners case which led to its dismissal
Ruling:
Yes, he committed gross negligence and misconduct. The Court affirmed his suspension for
one year.
The pertinent Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:
CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE
MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.02 A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation.
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Atty. Paneda was remiss in his duty to display utmost diligence and competence in
protecting the interests of his clients. Petitioners lost their case mainly because they were barred
from presenting their evidence in court. This was a result of their being declared in default in the
said case as a consequence of Atty. Panedas failure to appear at the pre-trial conference. He
defended his non-appearance by stating that he had informed petitioners beforehand of a conflict of
schedule and that he had instructed them on what to do in his absence, but petitioners vehemently
denied this claim. This however does not excuse him from the fact that he was unable to file a Pretrial Brief at least three days prior to the scheduled pre-trial conference, as required by the Rules.
Atty. Paneda alleged that he already prepared the Pre-trial Brief but did not push through
with filing it because he was allegedly furnished by petitioner Modesta Herrera Talento with an
Amicable Settlement that was forged between the parties. He claims that he instructed his clients to
present said document during the pre-trial conference as he had another hearing to attend.
However, his excuse is untenable as any lawyer worth his salt would readily know that once
a case has been filed in court, any amicable settlement between the parties must be approved by
the court in order for it to be legally binding in accordance with Section 416 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 in relation to the last paragraph of Section 408 of the same Code. Thus,
he cannot assume that the case will be deemed closed by virtue of the supposed amicable
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settlement so as to excuse him from filing the Pre-trial Brief and from appearing at the pre-trial set
by the court.
With regard to his subsequent error of failing to file the required Appeal Brief which led to
the dismissal of his clients appeal before the CA, Atty. Paneda did not give any explanation other
than merely placing the blame on the incompetence of his secretary in not promptly informing him
about her receipt of the Notice of Submission of Appellants Brief. This mistake is even aggravated
by the fact that he did not care to inform his clients of the dismissal of their appeal in 2002 and it
was only in 2005 that his clients learned about this unfortunate turn of events.
The facts of this case illustrate Atty. Panedas dismal performance of responsibility to
diligently prosecute the case of his clients to the best of his ability within the bounds of law, which
in its totality could amount to a reprehensible abandonment of his clients cause.
A lawyer, when he undertakes his clients cause, makes a covenant that he will exert all
efforts for its prosecution until its final conclusion. He should undertake the task with dedication
and care, and he should do no less, otherwise, he is not true to his lawyers oath.
SPOUSES VIRGILIO and ANGELINA ARANDA vs. ATTY. EMMANUEL F. ELAYDA
A.C. No. 7907, December 15, 2010, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with
competence and diligence, and champion the latters cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and
devotion. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and
defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such
remedy or defense.
Facts:
The instant case stemmed from an administrative complaint filed by the spouses Virgilio
and Angelina Aranda (spouses Aranda) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Commission on Bar Discipline, charging their former counsel, Atty. Emmanuel F. Elayda (Atty.
Elayda), with gross negligence or gross misconduct in handling their case. The spouses Aranda
were the defendants in Civil Case No. 232-0-01, entitled Martin V. Guballa v. Spouses Angelina and
Virgilio Aranda, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, Branch 72.
In the Complaint, the spouses Aranda alleged that Atty. Elaydas handling of their case was
sorely inadequate, as shown by his failure to follow elementary norms of civil procedure and
evidence,
Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-128, adopting and
approving Investigating Commissioner Pizarras report, suspending Atty. Emmanuel F. Elayda from
the practice of law for six (6) months with warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will
merit a more severe penalty.
Aggrieved, Atty. Elayda filed with this Court a Petition for Review maintaining that he was
not negligent in handling the spouses Arandas case as to warrant suspension, which was too harsh
a penalty under the circumstances.
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Issue:
Whether or not the findings of the IBP Board of Governors, that Atty. Elayda was negligent
of his duties to his clients, is correct.
Ruling:
After a careful review of the records of the instant case, this Court finds no cogent reason to
deviate from the findings and the conclusion of the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Elayda was
negligent and unmindful of his sworn duties to his clients.
It is undisputed that Atty. Elayda did not act upon the RTC order submitting the spouses
Arandas case for decision. Thus, a judgment was rendered against the spouses Aranda for a sum of
money. Notice of said judgment was received by Atty. Elayda who again did not file any notice of
appeal or motion for reconsideration and thus, the judgment became final and executory. Atty.
Elayda did not also inform the spouses Aranda of the outcome of the case. The spouses Aranda
came to know of the adverse RTC judgment, which by then had already become final and executory,
only when a writ of execution was issued and subsequently implemented by the sheriff.
Evidently, Atty. Elayda was remiss in his duties and responsibilities as a member of the legal
profession. His conduct shows that he not only failed to exercise due diligence in handling his
clients case but in fact abandoned his clients cause. He proved himself unworthy of the trust
reposed on him by his helpless clients. Moreover, Atty. Elayda owes fealty, not only to his clients,
but also to the Court of which he is an officer.
On a final note, it must be stressed that whenever a lawyer accepts a case, it deserves his full
attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its importance and whether or not it is for a
fee or free. Verily, in Santiago v. Fojas, the Court held:
Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such
cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He
must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latters
cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire
devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of
his clients rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that
nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally
applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every
remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his
lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an
attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the
correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the
public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects
the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar,
and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.
RE-ADMISSION TO THE BAR
CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA vs. ATTY. DIONISIO C. ANTINIW
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A.C. No. 1302, June 30, 2008, J. Leonardo-De Castro
It is well settled that the objective of a disciplinary case is not so much to punish the individual
attorney as to protect the dispensation of justice by sheltering the judiciary and the public from the
misconduct or inefficiency of officers of the court. Restorative justice, not retribution, is our goal in
disciplinary proceedings.
Facts:
Atty. Antiniw was disbarred from the practice of law pursuant to the Decision promulgated
on April 26, 1991 which pertinently reads, as follows: There is a clear preponderant evidence that
Atty. Antiniw committed falsification of a deed of sale, and its subsequent introduction in court
prejudices his prime duty in the administration of justice as an officer of the court.
For eight (8) years he continuously pleaded for his reinstatement and that he had submitted
proof by way of testimonials of (a) his character and standing prior to his disbarment (b) his
conduct subsequent to his disbarment, and (c) his efficient government service.
In its Comment of September 9, 2002, the IBP, through its Commission on Bar Discipline
recommended that he be allowed to again practice the legal profession.
Issue:
Whether the disbarment of Atty. Dionisio may be lifted
Ruling:
Yes.
The record shows that the long period of respondents disbarment gave him the chance to
purge himself of his misconduct, to show his remorse and repentance, and to demonstrate his
willingness and capacity to live up once again to the exacting standards of conduct demanded of
every member of the bar and officer of the court. During respondents disbarment for more than
fifteen (15) years to date for his professional infraction, he has been persistent in reiterating his
apologies and pleas for reinstatement to the practice of law and unrelenting in his efforts to show
that he has regained his worthiness to practice law, by his civic and humanitarian activities and
unblemished record as an elected public servant, as attested to by numerous civic and professional
organizations, government institutions, public officials and members of the judiciary.
Moreover, it is well settled that the objective of a disciplinary case is not so much to punish
the individual attorney as to protect the dispensation of justice by sheltering the judiciary and the
public from the misconduct or inefficiency of officers of the court. Restorative justice, not
retribution, is our goal in disciplinary proceedings.
NOTARIAL PRACTICE
GERONIMO C. FUENTES vs. JUDGE ROMUALDO G. BUNO
A.M. No. MTJ991204, July 28, 2008, J. Leonardo-De Castro
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By failing to comply with the conditions set for SC Circular No. 190 and violating the provision
of the Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004, respondent judge failed to conduct himself in a manner that
is beyond reproach and suspicion. Judges are enjoined by the Code of Judicial Conduct to regulate their
extrajudicial activities in order to minimize the risk of conflict with their judicial duties.
Facts:
Geronimo Fuentes filed a complaint against Judge Buno having prepared and notarized an
ExtraJudicial Partition with Simultaneous Absolute Deed of Sale despite the fact that in his Special
Power of Attorney (SPA), he merely appointed his brother, Alejandro Fuentes to mortgage said
agricultural land but not to partition, much more to sell the same.
Judge Buno contended that he could not be charged of graft and corruption, since in a
municipality where a notary public is unavailable, a municipal judge is allowed to notarize
documents or deeds as ex officio notary public. In his attempt to explain his lack of malice, Judge
Buno narrated that after learning that the SPA only authorized his brother, Alejandro Fuentes to
mortgage the property, he summoned the latter, his mother and the buyer of the land.
In its Memorandum Report, the OCA recommended that the present case be redocketed as a
regular administrative matter and that respondent be fined in the amount of P10,000.00 for
unauthorized notarization of a private document, the same to be deducted from his retirement
benefit.
Issue: Whether the Judge Buno is administratively liable for notarizing the private document
Ruling:
Yes.
SC Circular No. 190 prohibits judges from undertaking the preparation and
acknowledgment of private documents, contracts and other deeds of conveyances which have no
direct relation to the discharge of their official functions. In this case, respondent judge admitted
that he prepared both the document itself, entitled Extrajudicial Partition with Simultaneous
Absolute Deed of Sale and the acknowledgment of the said document, which had no relation at all
to the performance of his function as a judge. These acts of respondent judge are clearly proscribed
by the aforesaid Circular.
While it may be true that no notary public was available or residing within respondent
judges territorial jurisdiction, as shown by the certifications issued by the RTC Clerk of Court and
the Municipal Mayor of Talibon, Bohol, SC Circular No. 190 specifically requires that a certification
attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in the said municipality or circuit be made in the
notarized document. Here, no such certification was made in the ExtraJudicial Partition with
Simultaneous Deed of Sale. Respondent judge also failed to indicate in his answer as to whether or
not any notarial fee was charged for that transaction, and if so, whether the same was turned over
to the Municipal Treasurer of Talibon, Bohol. Clearly, then, respondent judge, who was the sitting
judge of the MCTC, Talibon Getafe, Bohol, failed to comply with the aforesaid conditions prescribed
by SC Circular No. 190, even if he could have acted as notary public ex officio in the absence of any
lawyer or notary public in the municipality or circuit to which he was assigned.
Page 12 of 110

JUDICIAL ETHICS
DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY
RE: JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED IN THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (RTC), BRANCH 14,
DAVAO CITY, PRESIDED OVER BY JUDGE WILLIAM M. LAYAGUE.
A.M. RTJ072039, April 18, 2008, J. Leonardo-De Castro
The Court has always impressed upon all members of the judiciary the need to decide cases
promptly and expeditiously under the timehonored precept that justice delayed is justice denied. The
Constitution itself, under Section 15, Article VIII, mandates that lower courts have three (3) months
from the date of submission within which to decide the cases or matters pending before them. Rule
3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct directs judges to dispose of the courts business promptly
and decide cases within the required periods. Finally, Canons 6 and 7 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
exhort judges to be prompt and punctual in the disposition and resolution of cases and matters
pending before their court.
Facts:
On October 4 to 15, 2004, a judicial audit was conducted by the judicial audit team of the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 14, Davao City,
then presided over by Judge William M. Layague. The audit unearthed numerous
undecided/unresolved cases, prompting the filing of an Administrative Case against respondent
Judge William M. Layague.
The records show that as of audit date (October 4 to 15, 2004), the following facts were
established: (1) 83 cases were not decided within the reglementary period (2) pending incidents in
230 other cases remained unresolved even beyond the prescribed period to resolve and (3) no
appropriate action was made on 221 others (193 cases with no further action, 19 cases with no
further settings and 9 cases with no action taken yet since the filing thereof), despite the lapse of
considerable time. Worse, after his retirement, it was found out that he had left behind 53 cases
(not included in those cases stated in the courts resolution dated January 25, 2006 and September
20, 2006), all of which were beyond the reglementary period to decide/resolve.
Judge William M. Layague attributes his failure to fully comply with the Courts en banc
Resolution of January 25, 2005 to his failing health as evidenced by the medical certificates attached
to said letter
Issue:
Whether the Judge may be held administratively liable
Ruling:
Yes.
To ensure that the mandates on the prompt disposition of judicial business are complied
with, this Court issued Administrative Circular No. 1 dated January 26, 1988 requiring all
Page 13 of 110

magistrates to act promptly on all motions and interlocutory matters pending before their courts.
This was emphasized in Administrative Circular No. 399 dated January 15, 1999 which requires
judges to scrupulously observe the periods prescribed by Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution
in the adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters submitted to their courts. However, these
rules are not rigid. An extension of the period may be granted by this Court upon request by the
judge concerned on account of heavy case load, age, poor health or any other reasonable excuse.
In Cadauan v. Judge Alivia, the Court held that Decisionmaking, among other duties, is the
primordial duty of a member of the bench. The speedy disposition of cases in our courts is a
primary aim of the judiciary so the ends of justice may not be compromised and the judiciary will
be true to its commitment of providing all persons the right to a speedy, impartial and public trial
and to a speedy disposition of cases.
While it may be true that the delays incurred by respondent judge can be attributed in part
to his failing health, nonetheless, his illness should not be an excuse for his failure to render the
corresponding decisions or resolutions within the prescribed period. It was incumbent upon him to
inform this Court of his inability to seasonably decide the cases and he could have sought an
extension of the reglementary period within which to decide his cases if he thought that he could
not comply with his judicial duty. Poor health may excuse a judges failure to decide cases within
the reglementary period but not his failure to request an extension of time within which to decide
cases on time. We note that respondent judge made no such request long before an audit was
conducted in his sala. The fact that he was burdened with failing health, which adversely affected
his work efficiency, serves only to mitigate the penalty, not to exonerate him.
RONNIE C. DELA CRUZ vs. REDENTOR A. ZAPICO, QUIRINO Y. ITLIONG II, and ODON C. BALANI
A.M. No. 2007-25-SC, September 18, 2008, J. Leonardo-De Castro
The image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of
the men and women therein, from the judge to the least and lowest of its personnel; hence, it becomes
imperative and sacred duty of each and everyone in the court to maintain its good name and good
standing as a true temple of justice. The conduct of court personnel must be, and also perceived to be,
free from any whiff of impropriety, with respect not only to their duties in the judiciary but also in
their behavior outside the court.
Facts:
Complainant Dela Cruz filed an administrative case before the Office of Administrative
Services (OAS) against Respondents Zapico, Itliong II, and Balani for grave misconduct, conduct
unbecoming Court employee, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. According
to Dela Cruz, there was a verbal altercation and physical encounter between him and Zapico, Itliong
II, and Balani in a restaurant at Ermita, Manila. On the contrary, Zapico narrates that he was one
who engaged Dela Cruz on a fistfight as Itliong II and Balani merely prodded him to confront the
new Court employee and upstart Dela Cruz. As consequence, Dela Cruz needed medical attention
and was not able to report for work for two (2) days.
In their Comment/Explanation, Respondents argued that the incident, which took place
after office hours, was purely personal in character and in no way related to office work. They
prayed for the dismissal of the instant administrative complainant not only for lack of merit, but
also for want of jurisdiction of the OAS to entertain and take cognizance of the same.
Page 14 of 110

After submission of other pleadings, the OAS rendered judgment finding Zapico guilty of
simple misconduct and severely reprimanded him. As the final arbiter, the Court hereby reviews
this administrative complaint against its employees.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the OAS has jurisdiction over the complaint and may take cognizance of
the present case.
2. Whether or not the conduct of respondents shows that they are liable for the offenses
charged and warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions.
Ruling:
1. Yes, the OAS has jurisdiction over the complaint.
The fact that the incident complained of was not related to respondents work or official
duties and took place after office hours and outside the Court does not warrant the dismissal of the
case, as respondents contend. The Court has held that employees of the judiciary should be living
examples of uprightness not only in the performance of their official duties, but also in their
personal and private dealings with other people, so as to preserve at all times the good name and
standing of courts in the community. Employees in the government service are bound by the rules
of proper and ethical behavior and are expected to act with self-restraint and civility at all times,
even when confronted with rudeness and insolence.
2.
Yes, the respondents can be administratively punished for their actions.
Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper, unlawful conduct motivated by a

premeditated, obstinate, or intentional purpose. Any transgression or deviation from the established norm of conduct, work-related or not, amounts to a misconduct.
The image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise,
of the men and women therein, from the judge to the least and lowest of its personnel; hence, it
becomes imperative and sacred duty of each and everyone in the court to maintain its good name
and good standing as a true temple of justice. The conduct of court personnel must be, and also
perceived to be, free from any whiff of impropriety, with respect not only to their duties in the
judiciary but also in their behavior outside the court.
Under Section 52(B)(2) of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in Civil
Service, it classifies simple conduct as a less grave offense punishable by suspension of one month
and one day to six month for the first offense. However, as recommended by the OAS, we shall
appreciate as mitigating circumstances the following: (a) respondents sixteen (16) years of service
in the Court; (b) his Very Satisfactory (VS) rating for the past three consecutive semes-ters; and (c)
this instance being his first time to have been charged administratively. This is also in consonance
with Section 53 of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service which
provides that in the determination of the penalties to be imposed, the extenua-ting, mitigating,
aggravating or alternative circumstances may be considered.
Page 15 of 110

Thus, the penalty of suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day should be imposed upon
Respondent Zapico for the commission of the first offense of simple misconduct with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
The Court likewise notes with disfavor the fact that although Itliong and Balani did not
appear to have helped in the attack on Dela Cruz, they failed to timely intervene between their
friend Zapico and Dela Cruz to prevent the incident from progressing to such a stage that
complainant, their co-employee, even sustained injuries. Itliong and Balani should be admoni-shed
for their deplorable conduct, which likewise falls short of the high standards of decorum and
propriety expected of them.
JUDGE PLACIDO C. MARQUEZ AND ATTY. LYN L. LLAMASARES vs. LUCILA C. PACARIEM
A.M. No. P-06-2249, October 8, 2008, J. Leonardo-De Castro
It must be stressed that all judicial employees must devote their official time to govern-ment
service. They must exercise at all times a high degree of professionalism and responsibility, as service
in the judiciary is not only a duty; it is a mission. To inspire public respect for the justice system, court
officials and employees are at all times behoved to strictly observe official time. Strict observance of
official time is mandatory lest the dignity of the justice system be compromised. Thus, Section 1, Canon
IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel mandates that the same shall commit themselves
exclusively to the business and responsibilities of their office during working hours.
In the case at bar, we find that [Pacariem] has failed to live up to the standard of efficiency
and professionalism that the judiciary demands from its court personnel. Furthermore, by writing false
and inaccurate entries in her former offices Logbook of Permission Slips and Logbook of Daily
Attendance of Court Personnel, [Pacariem] likewise failed to meet the standard of honesty.
Facts:
Petitioners Judge Marquez and Atty. Llamasares, former Presiding Judge and former Branch
Clerk of Court, respectively, of the RTC, Branch 40, Manila, charge Respondent Pacariem, former
Stenographer III of the said RTC and now detailed at RTC, Branch 23, Manila, with gross neglect of
duty, gross inefficiency, gross insubordination, and gross misconduct. Petitioners in their
voluminous complaint detail the infractions of Pacariem, to wit:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.
Numerous grammatical and typographical errors shown in 254 pages worth of

error-filled output;
Failure to submit the TSNs of forty-five (45) cases within twenty (20) days as
required under A.C. No. 24-90 and failure to report five (5) TSNs immediately after
the close of the sessions on which the same were taken in violation of Section 17,
Rule 136 of the Rules of Court;
Misleading Petitioner Llamasares to sign certifications of no pending stenograp-hic
notes;
Failure to file her application for sick leaves;
Several occasions of loafing revealed by conflicting entries on the Logbook of
Permission Slips and other logbooks of other government offices; and,
Three (3) consecutive unsatisfactory ratings; and,
A pending administrative case.
Page 16 of 110

For her part, Pacariem asserts that petitioners harbored resentment against her as a result
of her Joint Protest on the unsatisfactory ratings, the documents alleged to be laden with errors
were actually meant for correction, the delay in submitting the TSNs was brought about by heavy
workload, and she did not engage in loafing as in fact there were important matters she had to
handle during trips outside the court.
The OCA rendered judgment against Pacariem while the 1st Vice Executive Judge of the RTC
of Manila denied her protest, thus paving the way for the complaint to be raised to the Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Pacariem is guilty of the charges of inefficiency and dishonesty.
Ruling:
Yes, respondent is liable for the charges against her.
Petitioners have adequately shown that the unsatisfactory ratings given to respondent were
warranted in view of her error-filed outputs. While it may be true that respondent is only human
and may commit mistakes, there is simply no excuse for making the same mistakes repeatedly in
her drafts despite her superiors constantly calling her attention to correct them. Likewise,
Pacariems assertion of ill-will or prejudice in the filing of the complaint against her cannot be
sustained in view of the positive findings of the OCA and the Office of the 1 st Vice Executive Judge of
the RTC of Manila.
False certifications aside, the fact remains that she failed to submit TSNs within the period
prescribed under the pertinent circular. The Court will have to impose the appropriate penalty for
this infraction lest Pacariem may remain lax and defy her obligation under the circular.
As to the allegation of loafing, the discrepancies on the logbooks unquestionably reveal that
she stated false information thereon, which cannot be deemed inconsequential. It must be stressed
that all judicial employees must devote their official time to government service. They must
exercise at all times a high degree of professionalism and responsibility, as service in the judiciary
is not only a duty; it is a mission. To inspire public respect for the justice system, court officials and
employees are at all times behoved to strictly observe official time. Strict obser-vance of official
time is mandatory lest the dignity of the justice system be compromised. Thus, Section 1, Canon IV
of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel mandates that the same shall commit themselves
exclusively to the business and responsibilities of their office during working hours.
In the case at bar, we find that [Pacariem] has failed to live up to the standard of efficiency
and professionalism that the judiciary demands from its court personnel. Further-more, by writing
false and inaccurate entries in her former offices Logbook of Permission Slips and Logbook of Daily
Attendance of Court Personnel, [Pacariem] likewise failed to meet the standard of honesty.
ATTY. RAUL H. SESBREO vs. JUDGE IRENEO L. GAKO, JR. and MANUEL G. NOLLORA
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2144, November 3, 2008, J. Leonardo-De Castro
The unreasonable delay of the respondent judge in resolving the motion submitted for his
resolution clearly constituted a violation of complainants constitutional right to a speedy disposition
Page 17 of 110

of his case. Having failed to resolve the Motion for Reconsideration within the prescribed period of
time, respondent judge is liable for undue delay in resolving a decision or order which is considered a
less serious offense.
Facts:
An administrative complaint was filed by Atty. Raul H. Sesbreo charging Judge Gako with (a)
violation of Rule 3.05, Canon 3, in relation to Rule 1.02, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct for
his delay in resolving a Motion for Reconsideration filed in Special Proceedings No. 916-R
entitled Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo, (b) violation of Canon 2 of the said Code for acting on the
said case after he had recused himself from the case, and (c) incompetence, together with Clerk of
Court Nollora.
The complainant alleged that he filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated June
2, 2003 in the special proceedings which was considered submitted for resolution per the Order
dated July 4, 2003. According to the complainant, respondent Judge Gako deliberately failed to
resolve the motion within the ninety (90)-day period prescribed by the Constitution. Also, he
further alleged that respondent judge issued an Order inhibiting himself from handling Special
Proceedings. However, respondent judge still continued to act on the said case by issuing an Order
granting the Motion for Clarification/ Reconsideration filed by the heirs of Patrocino Borromeo
Herrera.
Respondent judge explained that the administrative matter stemmed from her denial of
Virginia Lim Sesbreos claim for attorneys fees from the estate of Vito Borromeo. From the denial of
his claim, complainant filed a motion for reconsideration. According to respondent judge, he did not
act on the said motion because he believed that Virginia Lim Sesbreo should be the person who
should have filed the motion for reconsideration and not herein complainant. With regard to his
action on the motion despite his Order inhibiting himself from proceeding with the said case,
respondent judge reasoned out that since the inhibition was voluntary on his part as the presiding
judge, he felt then that it was also his discretion to disregard his Order.
Issue:
Whether or not Respondent Judge is guilty of violating Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct
Ruling:
Yes.
The Constitution mandates all lower courts to decide or resolve cases or matters within
three (3) months from their date of submission. Accordingly, Rules 1.02 of Canon 1 and 3.05 of
Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct direct judges to administer justice impartially and without
delay and to dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.
Respondent judge failed to act on the Motion for Reconsideration within three (3) months
from the time said motion was submitted for resolution on July 4, 2003. His claim that the motion
was not filed by the proper party is not a valid excuse to simply ignore said motion. Instead, he
should have accordingly formally disposed of such motion. While it is true that respondent judge
Page 18 of 110

issued an Order voluntarily inhibiting himself from handling Special Proceedings No. 916-R,
however, it does not appear on record that the Executive Judge was furnished with a copy of the
said order for appropriate action. Respondent judge cannot also justify his inaction by his inhibition
since if it was really his intention to refrain from handling the case, he should not have acted on the
subsequent Motion for Clarification/Reconsideration filed by the heirs of Patrocino Borromeo
Herrera.
SERGIO & GRACELDA N. ANDRES vs. JUDGE JOSE S. MAJADUCON
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1762, December 17, 2008, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Raffling of cases: Respondent judge cannot excuse himself from his duty as Executive Judge by
dispensing with the raffle of the case and dismissing it outright on the pretext that it would be just a
waste of time on his part to raffle and entertain the case. As Executive Judge, he ought to know that
raffling of cases is his personal duty and responsibility. He is expected to keep abreast and be
conversant with Supreme Court rules and circulars that affect the conduct of cases before him and
strictly comply therewith at all times. Failure to abide by these rules undermines the wisdom behind
them and diminishes respect for the rule of law. Judges should therefore administer their office with
due regard to the integrity of the system of law itself, remembering that they are not depositories of
arbitrary power, but judges under the sanction of law.
Contempt of court: The salutary rule is that the power to punish for contempt must be
exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of
punishment. The courts must exercise the power to punish for contempt for purposes that are
impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the
functions that they exercise.
Facts:
A complaint-affidavit was filed of Sergio N. Andres, Jr. and Gracelda N. Andres charging
respondents Judge Jose S. Majaducon, Executive Judge, of RTC, General Santos City, and Presiding
Judge, Branch 23, with violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 7, Gross Ignorance of the Law and
Grave Misconduct.
The complaint stemmed from the Special Order of Demolition issued by Judge Majaducon in
connection with the consolidated civil case of action for declaration of nullity of documents and
recovery of possession of real property with writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and
damages. The said order directed the provincial sheriff to demolish the improvements erected by
the heirs of John Sycip and Yard Urban Homeowners Association on the land belonging to spouses
Melencio Yu and Talinanap Matualaga. To forestall the demolition of their houses, complainants,
who claimed an interest over the lot filed a Special Appearance informing the court of the pending
protest between them and the heirs of Melencio Yu and Talinanap Matualaga before the
DENR. Complainants alleged that they introduced improvements and authorized the construction of
several improvements on the said lot. They also averred that they are not bound by the judgment
rendered in the consolidated civil cases because neither they nor their predecessor-in-interest
were impleaded as parties therein. Notwithstanding complainants manifestation and letter, the
demolition of the improvements erected by the complainants and their predecessor-in-interest
proceed.
Page 19 of 110

Complainants then instituted, with the RTC of General Santos City, Civil Case No. 7066, an
action for Specific Performance, Reconveyance and Damages against the heirs of Melencio Yu and
impleaded Judge Majaducon, Lastimosa and Palati as co-defendants. The complaint alleged that
complainants title over the lot was valid and arbitrary demolition of their improvements had
unlawfully disturbed their peaceful occupation of the property. Complainants also filed an Urgent
Motion for Special Raffle of said Civil Case No. 7066. Judge Majaducon, acting as the Executive Judge
of RTC, General Santos City, denied the Urgent Motion for Special Raffle and dismissed outright Civil
Case No. 7066. On the same day, respondent judge issued another Order declaring complainants in
direct contempt of court for allegedly filing a complaint based on a quitclaim that had already been
pronounced null and void by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, complainants were ordered to pay a
fine of P2,000.00 and to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for ten (10) days. Hence, this
administrative complaint. Complainants averred that the actions of herein respondents constitute
bad faith, malicious motive, serious partiality, grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the
law. They also alleged that prior to his appointment in the judiciary, Judge Majaducon was the
former counsel of Melencio Yu and his mother Dominga Pinagawang.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Majaducon is guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave
Misconduct.
Ruling:
Yes.
With respect to the Special order of demolition, the evidence on hand shows that
respondent judge issued the special order of demolition only after carefully determining that there
was no more hindrance to issue the same. For one, the trial court in the consolidated civil cases had
already adjudged that the land in question belonged to spouses Yu and Matualaga and even
nullified the quitclaim and all documents of conveyance of sale in favor of complainants
predecessor-in-interest. It is thus beyond dispute that the judgment in the consolidated civil cases
had already attained finality. The special order of demolition was issued by respondent judge so
that the final judgment could be fully implemented and executed, in accordance with the principle
that the execution of a final judgment is a matter of right on the part of the prevailing party, and
mandatory and ministerial on the part of the court or tribunal issuing the judgment.
On the dismissal of Civil case No. 7066, respondent judge violated the explicit mandate of
the Court when he took cognizance of Civil Case No. 7066 wherein he was named as one of two
defendants and instantly dismissed it without first conducting the requisite raffle. Respondent
judge abused his authority in dealing with Civil Case No. 7066 which cast serious doubt as to his
impartiality. Respondent judge completely ignored the procedure for the raffling of cases mandated
by Supreme Court Circular No. 7, which provide:
All cases filed with the Court in stations or groupings where there are two or more
branches shall be assigned or distributed to the different branches by raffle. No case
may be assigned to any branch without being raffled. The raffle of cases should be
regularly conducted at the hour and on the day or days to be fixed by the Executive
Judge. Only the maximum number of cases, according to their dates of filing, as can
Page 20 of 110

be equally distributed to all branches in the particular station or grouping shall be
included in the raffle. x x x
Clearly, respondent judge violated the explicit mandate of the Court when he took
cognizance of Civil Case No. 7066 wherein he was named as one of two defendants and instantly
dismissed it without first conducting the requisite raffle. Respondent judge violated the canon when
he dispensed with the raffle and took cognizance of Civil Case No. 7066 as well as ordered its
outright dismissal and cited the complainants in contempt of court. He thus created the impression
that he intended to favor his former clients, Melencio and Dominga. His actuations gave ground for
the parties to doubt his impartiality and objectivity.
By declaring complainants guilty of direct contempt of court, respondent judge exhibited his
bias against herein complainants. Respondent judge cited complainants in direct contempt of court
for filing a complaint (Civil Case No. 7066) based on a deed of quitclaim that had already been
declared null and void, instead of having the said case, wherein he was one of the defendants,
raffled to the court which could properly act on the case. While the power to punish in contempt is
inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold due
administration of justice, still, judges must be slow to punish for direct contempt. This drastic
power must be used judiciously and sparingly. A judge should never allow himself to be moved by
pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the performance of his duties.
DOMINGA C. MENOR vs. TEODORA P. GUILLERMO
A.M. No. P-08-2587, December 18, 2008, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Complainant contends that she does not know how to sign her name and only affixes her
thumbmark to documents to signify her consent, while the signature of her husband appearing on the
document is very different from his customary signature. Respondent failed to sufficiently rebut the
complainants assertion that her signature in the deed of sale is forged, as complainant does not know
how to read and write and instead of signing documents, she merely affixes her thumbmark.
Facts:
An administrative complaint was filed by Dominga C. Menor against Teodora Palting
Guillermo, now retired Stenographer III RTC, Branch 20, Cauayan, Isabela, charging the latter with
Grave Misconduct. Complainant averred that she is the widow of the late Pedro Menor who, she
claimed, owned a parcel of land situated in Isabela. Complainant further averred that she and her
late husband had been occupying said land since 1946 and that sometime in 1998, she discovered
that respondent was able to secure title over the same through a falsified Deed of Absolute Sale of
Residential Lot whereby her husband, with her consent, purportedly sold their land to herein
respondent and her spouse Eduardo Guillermo. Complainant claimed that said document was
fabricated. Further, the signature appearing in the said document purporting to be the signature of
her late husband was very different from his true signature. She also denied that she ever signed
said Deed of Sale as she does not know how to read and write and uses only her thumbprint as her
signature. Lastly, she surmised that the fraudulent document was prepared by respondent while
she was employed with the RTC.
Respondent denied all the material allegations in the Complaint. She cited the fact that
complainant previously filed against her and her late husband for Falsification involving the same
property and the same document. The case was dismissed due to prescription. Respondent claimed
Page 21 of 110

that the Deed of Sale executed by the late Pedro Menor covering the parcel of land sold to her was
lawful and valid. She also interposed as defense that being a mere stenographer, she did not have
the power or influence to use her office in order to commit the crime imputed to her. Furthermore,
she averred that the sale of the land was made in her private capacity.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of Gross Misconduct.
Ruling:
The disputed deed of absolute sale is dated February 6, 1975. Pedro Menor, complainants
husband, died on March 3, 1976. However, the Original Certificate of Title No. P-4082 of the Office
of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Isabela was issued pursuant to a free patent granted to
respondents husband Eduardo Guillermo on August 7, 1981. The subject property was later on
transferred by respondent and her husband to their sons through a donation dated January 28,
1988 which was inscribed in the original certificate of title only on October 2, 1995. The transfer
certificate of title in the name of the donees was issued on the same date.
Complainant contends that she does not know how to sign her name and only affixes her
thumbmark to documents to signify her consent, while the signature of her husband appearing on
the document is very different from his customary signature. The copy of the Marriage Contract
between complainant and Pedro Menor supports complainants contention, as it bears not her
signature but her right thumbmark. Pedro Menors signature appearing thereon is similar to his
signature in the two other papers submitted by complainant along with her complaint. According to
complainant, these signatures of Pedro Menor are the genuine signatures of her late husband.
There are perceivable differences between the said three signatures of Pedro Menor and the
one appearing on the disputed deed of sale. Although the handwriting experts opinion is not
available in this case to establish with certainty the alleged falsification of the signature of Pedro
Menor, respondent failed to sufficiently rebut the complainants assertion that her signature in the
deed of sale is forged, as complainant does not know how to read and write and instead of signing
documents, she merely affixes her thumbmark. It is logical to conclude that respondent perpetrated
or is responsible for the falsification of the deed of sale imputed to complainant, since respondent
and her husband were benefited by it.
There exists substantial evidence, under the circumstances obtaining in the instant case, to
hold respondent liable for Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, which is
classified as a grave offense and is punishable with suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to
one (1) year.
LETTER OF JUDGE JOSEFINA D. FARRALES, ACTING PRESIDING
JUDGE, RTC, BR.72, OLONGAPO CITY RE: 30 CASES AND 84 MOTIONS SUBMITTED FOR
DECISION/ RESOLUTION IN THE SAID COURT
A.M. No. 06-3-196-RTC
AUDIT REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
(RTC), BR. 72,OLONGAPO CITY.
A.M. No. 06-7-416-RTC, December 24, 2008, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Page 22 of 110

The Court has incessantly admonished members of the bench to administer justice without
undue delay, for justice delayed is justice denied. The present clogged dockets in all levels of our
judicial system cannot be cleared unless every magistrate earnestly, painstakingly and faithfully
complies with the mandate of the law. Undue delay in the disposition of cases amounts to a denial of
justice which, in turn, brings the courts into disrepute and ultimately erodes the faith and confidence
of the public in the judiciary.
The Court wishes to remind that as an official of the Judiciary, a Judge is expected to follow the
rules laid down by this Court for the prompt and speedy disposition of cases. Failure to decide cases
and other matters within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the
imposition of administrative sanction. If a judge can not comply with this Courts directives on the
matter of disposition of cases, he may seek extensions from this Court to avoid administrative liability.
Facts:
A Judicial Audit was conducted at the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Br. 72, Olongapo City of
the Court Administrator, the Court issued Resolution preventively suspending Judge Eliodoro G.
Ubiadas. Subsequently, several judges were designated to preside over Branch 72, namely: Hon.
Ramon S. Caguioa, RTC, Br. 74, Olongapo City, from June 10, 2005 to January 25, 2006; and Hon.
Josefina D. Farrales, RTC, Br. 69, Iba, Zambales.
Upon her assumption, Judge Farrales immediately conducted an inventory of the pending
cases in Branch 72. Judge Farrales reported that there are still 30 cases and 84 motions submitted
for decision and resolution and that she requested for sixty (60) days extension to resolve the
same. Of the cases, 15 cases and 33 motions were already beyond the reglementary period to
decide/resolve even before Judge Ubiadas was suspended. The other 15 cases and 51 motions were
submitted for decision/resolution when Judge Caguioa took over as presiding judge of Branch 72, of
which 6 cases and 30 motions were already beyond the reglementary period. Apart from the 30
cases and 84 motions submitted for decision/resolution mentioned the audit team noted that there
were still other cases submitted for decision/resolution and matters which were not acted upon for
a considerable length of time. Judge Farrales had already resolved and acted upon all the cases and
unresolved motions pending in Branch 72.
The OCA recommended that Judge Ubiadas be held administratively liable for Gross
Misconduct, Gross Inefficiency and violations of SC Circular and he be fined in an amount equivalent
to his six (6) months salary.
In his letter, Judge Ubiadas cited his health conditions as an explanation for the delay in
deciding in Branch 72. Judge Ubiadas averred that on August 2, 1997, he suffered a heart attack,
diagnosed as myocardial infraction, and was confined in the intensive care unit (ICU) of
the UST Hospital. He had a second heart attack on January 2, 1998, this time it was diagnosed as
cardiac arrest. Again, he was confined in the ICU of the same hospital. Then a third heart attack
occurred in July 1998, which, although not as serious as the first and second attacks, nevertheless,
required his confinement at the James Gordon Memorial Hospital. Judge Ubiadas further explained
that he was confined since March 19, 1999 and subjected to a triple by-pass operation on April 13,
1999. It was only on June 1, 1999 that he was able to return to work. Notwithstanding his failing
health then, he still acted as the judge of the four (4) RTCs for two (2) months as: (1) presiding
judge of Br. 72; (2) pairing judge of Br. 73; [ (2) acting presiding judge of Br. 75; and (3) pairing
judge of Br. 74.
Page 23 of 110
Issue:
Whether Judge Ubiadas is guilty of gross inefficiency in the conduct of court business and
violations of existing SC circulars.
Ruling:
Judge Ubiadas is guilty of gross inefficiency in the conduct of court business and of
violations of existing SC circulars.
The Constitution provides that lower courts have three (3) months within which to decide
cases or resolve matters submitted to them for resolution. Moreover, the Code of Judicial Conduct
enjoins judges to dispose of their business promptly and decide cases within the required period.
In addition, this Court laid down guidelines in SC Administrative Circular No. 13 which
provides, inter alia, that judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII,
Section 15, of the Constitution for the adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters submitted
in their courts. Thus, all cases or matters must be decided or resolved within twelve months from
date of submission by all lower collegiate courts while all other lower courts are given a period of
three months to do so.
Judge Ubiadas failed to decide 15 cases and 33 motions which were beyond the
reglementary period to decide/resolve. Here were also other matters that were not acted upon. In
affirming the OCA recommended penalty, we took into consideration Judge Ubiadas health. We also
noted that his caseload then was1,300 more or less and that during his tenure, as in his letter, he
has done [his] best and in utmost good faith to serve the ends of justice and perform [his] duties as
a judge. However, previous administrative sanctions imposed upon him must likewise to given
appropriate weight. Aware of the caseload of judges, the Court has viewed with understanding
requests for extension made by judges. Hence, should a judge find himself unable to decide cases
within the 90-day period for doing so, he can ask for an extension of time for deciding the
same. Such requests are generally granted.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. JUDGE NORMA C. PERELLO, former Clerk of
Court LUIS C. BUCAYON II, Court Stenographers THELMA A. MANGILIT, CECILIO B. ARGAME,
MARICAR N. EUGENIO, and RADIGUNDA R. LAMAN and Interpreter PAUL M. RESURRECCION,
all of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 276, Muntinlupa City
As a trial judge, respondent is the visible representation of law and justice. Under Canon 1.01
of the Code of Judicial Conduct, she is expected to be the embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence. Judges are expected to keep abreast of developments in law and jurisprudence. He
should strive for excellence exceeded only by his passion for truth, to the end that he be the
personification of justice and the Rule of Law. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his
office to simply apply it; anything less than that would be gross ignorance of the law.
Facts:
A judicial audit was conducted by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in all seven
(7) branches of the Regional Trial Court in Muntinlupa City, including Branch 276 then presided by
Page 24 of 110

herein respondent Judge Norma C. Perello. The audit was prompted by reports of perceived
irregular disposition of petitions for habeas corpus by the said court.
The audit team reported that for the period 1998-2004, a total of 219 petitions for habeas
corpus were assigned to Branch 276. The records for 22 of these cases were not presented to the
audit team, while the case folders of about a hundred cases did not contain copies of the decisions
of conviction. The audit team also noted a huge disparity in the number of petitions for habeas
corpus raffled in Branch 276 as against those raffled in the other branches, which led the team to
doubt if the raffle had been conducted with strict regularity considering the fact that Judge Perello
was the Executive Judge that time. The audit team observed that in some of the petitions for habeas
corpus, respondent Judge erred in ordering the release of the prisoners before they have served the
full term of their sentence. The audit team recommended to the OCA to consider the judicial audit
report as an administrative complaint against Judge Perello and Clerk of Court Atty. Luis Bucayon II
for gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion and grave misconduct.
In her Comment, Respondent Judge opined that the Audit Team that evaluated these Habeas
Corpus cases filed with this Court are probably not lawyers, hence, are not conversant with the
Constitution, with jurisprudence, and the Rules on the grant of the Writ of Habeas Corpus and the
retroactivity of laws. She insisted that her decisions ordering the release of the prisoners who were
serving their sentence for illegal possession of firearms and violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act
were in accordance with law and jurisprudence. To refute the accusations against her, respondent
enumerated her credentials and qualifications and alleged that most of her decisions were upheld
by the Court attesting to her competence in applying the law. Respondent Judge asserted that she
had served with utmost dedication and honesty in all her more than 40 years of government
service. It is the contention of respondent that the prisoners she released were all convicted under
the old law, R.A. No. 6425, and not under the new law, R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 which imposes the penalty of life imprisonment
to death regardless of the quantity of the drug involved. She maintains that the provisions of R.A.
No. 9165 cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as these prisoners are concerned for the main
reason that it would not be favorable to them. Thus, according to respondent Judge, the provisions
of R.A. No. 6425, must be applied to the released prisoners. Citing the People vs. Simon case, she
insisted that the maximum imposable penalty for violation of R.A. No. 6425 where the quantity
involved is 750 grams or less is six (6) months only, which was the reason why she ordered the
immediate release of the prisoners because they had already served two (2) years of imprisonment.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Perello is guilty of misconduct.
Ruling:
Yes.
While the Court agrees with respondent judge that R.A. No. 9165 cannot be retroactively
applied to the prisoners involved in the cases audited, they, however, are not impressed with the
justification in granting the writs. Such ratiocination on her part betrays a lack of understanding of
the rule on graduation of penalties. Nowhere in the cited case of Simon does it state that the
maximum penalty shall be six (6) months where the quantity is less than 750 grams. The Simon
case clarified the penalty to be imposed vis--vis the quantity of the drug involved, such that prision
Page 25 of 110

correccional shall be imposed if the drug is below 250 grams; prision mayor if the quantity is from
250 to 499 grams; and reclusion temporal if the drug is from 500 to 750 grams. The same case
likewise declared that while modifying circumstances may be appreciated to determine the periods
of the corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case should such
graduation of penalties reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than prision correccional.
In obstinately granting the writs of habeas corpus even if the convicted prisoners had only
served the minimum period of their sentence, Judge Perello displayed a blatant disregard of the
rule on graduation of penalties as well as settled jurisprudence tantamount to gross ignorance of
the law. Respondent Judge must thereby have more than a cursory knowledge of the law on
graduation of penalties and the imposable penalty for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Indeed,
the facts obtaining in this case speak of other dubious circumstances affecting respondent Judges
integrity and competence too glaring to ignore. Also, the record shows that Judge Perello granted
the writs of habeas corpus even without the pertinent copies of detention and judgment of
conviction which is contrary to the provisions of Section 3(d) of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.
The Court agrees with the Court Administrator that there is no merit in the charge of grave
misconduct leveled against Judge Perello. For grave misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained
of should be corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law or a persistent disregard of wellknown legal rules. Here, it appears that she was not motivated by any corrupt or vicious motive.
The Court finds Judge Norma C. Perello guilty of gross ignorance of the law and abuse of discretion
AUREO BAYACA vs. JUDGE TRANQUILINO RAMOS
A.M. No. MTJ-07-1676, January 29, 2009, J. Leonardo-De Castro
The withdrawal of complaints cannot divest the Court of its jurisdiction nor strip it of its
power to determine the veracity of the charges made and to discipline, such as the results of its
investigation may warrant, an erring respondent.
Facts:
Complainant Aureo Bayaca was the accused in a criminal case for arson through reckless
imprudence. The case was assigned at the MCTC of Dupax del Norte Dupax del Sur A. Casteneda,
Nueva Vizcaya, presided by respondent Judge Tranquilino Ramos. After trial, Judge Ramos found
complainant Bayaca guilty as charged and imposing upon him the penalty of imprisonment of four
(4) months of arresto mayor as minimum and four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional as maximum with all the accessory penalties imposed by law and to pay costs and
actual damages in the amount of P100,000.00. Aggrieved, complainant appealed the case to the
Regional Trial Court. The RTC affirmed the finding of guilt but deleted the penalty of imprisonment.
Bayaca was ordered to pay a fine of Seventy-five pesos. Despite the deletion of the penalty of
imprisonment in the RTC decision, Judge Ramos issued a Warrant of Arrest and Commitment on
Final Sentence which led to complainants incarceration at the Solano District Jail from August 8 to
28, 2006. Hence, Bayaca charged Judge Ramos with gross misconduct, dishonesty, gross ignorance
of the law, arbitrary detention, incompetence, grave abuse of discretion, and conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service.
In his Counter-Affidavit, respondent Judge clarified that his issuance of the warrant of arrest
against herein complainant was a mistake done in good faith. He submitted copies of
acknowledgment receipt to show that complainant and his spouse had already agreed to amicably
Page 26 of 110

settle all the cases that they had previously filed against respondent Judge subject to their receipt of
the amount of P750,000.00. He further alleged that the civil case for damages previously filed
against him by complainant was already dismissed by virtue of an Order granting the joint motion
to dismiss filed by the parties. Respondent Judge further informed the OCA that the criminal
complaint for unlawful arrest and serious illegal detention pending before the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor was also dismissed after complainant filed an Affidavit of Desistance therein.
Judge Ramos claimed that the instant case was filed mainly to harass him when complainant
discovered that he had filed for optional retirement as MCTC Judge.
In its Report, the OCA, through Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock, found respondent
Judge guilty of Negligence and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service.
Issue:
1. Whether or not mere desistance or recantation by the complainant result in the dismissal of
an administrative complaint against any member of the bench;
2. Whether or not Judge Ramos was inexcusably negligent when he issued a Warrant of Arrest
and Commitment to Final Sentence despite the deletion by the appellate court of that
portion of the judgment imposing the penalty of imprisonment
Ruling:
1. No. We have repeatedly ruled in a number of cases that mere desistance or recantation by the
complainant does not necessarily result in the dismissal of an administrative complaint against any
member of the bench. The withdrawal of complaints cannot divest the Court of its jurisdiction nor
strip it of its power to determine the veracity of the charges made and to discipline, such as the
results of its investigation may warrant, an erring respondent. Administrative actions cannot
depend on the will or pleasure of the complainant who may, for reasons of his own, condone what
may be detestable. Neither can the Court be bound by the unilateral act of the complainant in a
matter relating to its disciplinary power. The Courts interest in the affairs of the judiciary is of
paramount concern. For sure, public interest is at stake in the conduct and actuations of officials
and employees of the judiciary, inasmuch as the various programs and efforts of this Court in
improving the delivery of justice to the people should not be frustrated and put to naught by private
arrangements between the parties as in the instant case.
Respondent Judge should not be allowed to capitalize on the Acknowledgement Receipt
showing that complainant and his spouse had already agreed to amicably settle the cases they
previously filed against him. This deplorable act of respondent Judge in giving money in exchange
for the withdrawal of the cases filed against him by the complainant cannot be countenanced, being
considered by law as an obstruction of justice.
Anent respondent Judges assertion that his optional retirement was effective April 30, 2007,
it must be stressed that the Court is not ousted of its jurisdiction over an administrative case by the
mere fact that the respondent Judge ceases to hold office during the pendency of his case. In Perez
vs. Abiera and as reiterated in Judge Rolando G. How vs. Teodora A. Ruiz, this Court ruled:
In other words, the jurisdiction that was Ours at the time of the filing of the
administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public
official had ceased to be in office during the pendency of his case. The Court retains
Page 27 of 110

its jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent official innocent of the charges
or declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustices and
pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications. x x x
2. Yes. We hold that respondent Judge was inexcusably negligent when he issued a Warrant of
Arrest and Commitment to Final Sentence despite the deletion by the appellate court of that portion
of the judgment imposing the penalty of imprisonment. In the performance of his duties,
respondent Judge failed to observe that diligence, prudence and circumspection which the law
requires in the rendition of any public service. If only respondent Judge had exercised the requisite
thoroughness and caution, he would have noted not only the modification of the monetary awards
by the appellate court, but also the deletion of the penalty of imprisonment upon which the
Warrant of Arrest and Commitment to Final Sentence that he signed was based.
Respondent Judge cannot pass on the blame to his Clerk of Court and/or Stenographer. A
judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or mismanagement of his very own court
personnel. Certainly, a judge is responsible not only for the dispensation of justice but also for
managing his court efficiently to ensure the prompt delivery of court services. In the discharge of
the functions of his office, respondent Judge must strive to act in a manner that puts him and his
conduct above reproach and beyond suspicion. He must act with extreme care for his office indeed
is laden with a heavy burden of responsibility. Surely, a judge is enjoined to pore over all
documents whereon he is required to affix his signature and give his official imprimatur. The
negligence of respondent Judge in this case simply cannot be countenanced.
EMILIA MARIAS vs. TERENCIO G. FLORENDO
A.M. No. P-07-2304, February 12, 2009, J. Leonardo-De Castro
The sheriff, as an officer of the court upon whom the execution of a final judgment depends,
must necessarily be circumspect and proper in his behavior.
Facts:
Complainant Emilia Marias alleged that the decision in Civil Case No. 5238-V was
promulgated on November 18, 2002 and the same became final and executory for failure of
defendant Cesar Zaplan to file his appeal. Thus, on May 19, 2003, the RTC issued a writ of execution
and respondent sheriff Terencio G. Florendo was assigned to implement the same. Respondent
Florendo assured complainant that the writ would be implemented and demanded from her seven
thousand pesos (P7,000.00) for sheriffs expenses which she readily gave to the
respondent. Complainant Marias repeatedly followed-up the execution of the writ of execution.
However, respondent Florendo failed to implement the writ for about three (3) years at the time of
the filing of her complaint. Hence, complainant Marias was constrained to file this complaint for
neglect of duty against respondent Florendo.
In his comment, respondent Florendo denied having solicited, much less,
received P7,000.00 from complainant. He, however, admitted that he received P1,000.00 from
complainant, but only because complainant herself offered the said amount. He claims that he asked
the assistance of Sheriff Fernando Austria of the RTC, Lingayen in conducting surveillance on
defendants Cesar Zaplans residence for two (2) days but the latter found nothing to report. On
November 27, 2003, Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff Alex R. Raqueno of the RTC, Vigan,
officially endorsed the subject writ of execution for further proceedings to his counterpart, Clerk of
Page 28 of 110

Court Alicia Favia of the RTC, Dagupan City, Pangasinan. According to respondent he transmitted,
via postal money order, the P1,000.00 given to him by complainant to the Office of the Clerk of
Court, Dagupan City, for sheriffs operational expenses. In fine, respondent contended that the
referral of the said writ transferred the task of enforcing the same to the RTC, Dagupan City. Finally,
respondent claimed that the search for the vehicle of the defendant in the case proved futile and
budgetary constraints prevented a longer stay in Dagupan City.
In its Memorandum Report, dated February 14, 2007, the Office of the Court
Administrator found Respondent Florendo negligent in the performance of his duty as sheriff. As
recommended, this complaint was re-docketed as a regular administrative matter.
Issue:
Whether or not Respondent Florendo was negligent in the performance of his duty as
sheriff
Ruling:
Yes.
Respondent did not comply with the mandate of Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court. Under the said rule, a sheriff is mandated to execute and make a return on the writ of
execution within the period provided by the Rules. In addition, he must make periodic reports on
partially satisfied or unsatisfied writs in accordance with the above-cited rule, in order that the
court as well as the litigants may be apprised of the proceedings undertaken in connection
therewith. The periodic reporting on the status of the writs must be done by the sheriff every 30
days regularly and consistently until they are returned fully satisfied. Here, no evidence was
presented to prove that respondent complied with the requirements mandated by the rule.
Respondent cannot evade liability by claiming that the duty of enforcing the subject writ was
already transferred to the RTC, Dagupan City when the said writ was officially endorsed by the RTC,
Vigan City Branch Clerk of Court Raqueno to Clerk of Court Favia of the RTC, Dagupan City. As the
sheriff assigned to the case, he should implement the writ personally. Even if the subject writ is to
be executed outside his territorial jurisdiction, respondent can seek the assistance of the sheriff of
the place where the writ of execution shall take place but the responsibility for its implementation
still remains with respondent.
Respondent disregarded Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. Under the said rule, the
sheriff and other persons serving processes are authorized to collect certain amounts from parties
while in the performance of their functions. However, the Rules also require the Sheriff to estimate
his expenses in the execution of the decision. The prevailing party will then deposit the said amount
to the Clerk of Court who will disburse the amount to the Sheriff, subject to liquidation. Any
unspent amount will have to be returned to the prevailing party. Thus, any amount received by the
Sheriff in excess of the lawful fees allowed by the Rules of Court is an unlawful exaction and renders
him liable for grave misconduct and gross dishonesty.
In this case, the fact that the P1,000.00 was offered to him by complainant to defray
expenses of execution is of no moment. It makes no difference if the money, in whole or in part, had
indeed been spent in the implementation of the writ. The sheriff may receive only the court-
Page 29 of 110

approved sheriffs fees and the acceptance of any other amount is improper, even if applied for
lawful purposes.
Respondent departed from the directive of the court by failing to make periodic reports on
the implementation of the writ and to fully implement the said writ. He failed to observe the degree
of dedication to the duties and responsibilities required of him as a sheriff. He breached his sworn
duty to uphold the majesty of the law and the integrity of the justice system. While the
recommended penalty of one-month suspension is reasonable, the same is not practical at this
point, considering that his work would be left unattended by reason of his absence. Furthermore,
he may use his suspension as another excuse to justify his inaction and inefficiency in other matters
pending before his office. Instead of suspension, we impose a fine equivalent to his one-month
salary, so that he can finally implement the subject writs and perform the other duties of his office.
MA. THERESA G. WINTERNIITZ and RAQUEL GONZALES vs. JUDGE LIZABETH GUTIERREZTORRES
A.M. No. MTJ-09-1733, February 24, 2009, J. Leonardo-De Castro
At the core of a judges esteemed position is obedience to the dictates of the law and justice
and so a judge must be the first to exhibit respect for authority.
Facts:
This administrative case stemmed from the criminal cases for unjust vexation, grave
coercion, and grave slander filed against complainants Ma. Theresa G. Winternitz and Raquel L.
Gonzalez, which were raffled to the sala of herein respondent, Judge Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres of
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City. According to complainants Winternitz and
Gonzalez, the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a resolution which directed the City Prosecutor of
Mandaluyong City to cause the withdrawal of the above-mentioned criminal cases against them. On
May 24, 2002, the City Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Information pursuant to the directive
of the DOJ. However, the respondent Judge Torres did not immediately act on said motion but
instead set the same for hearing several times. The motion was finally submitted for its resolution
on January 13, 2004. As of October 21, 2003, the motion remained unresolved despite the
complainants prayer for resolution. This prompted herein complainants to file the instant
administrative complaint alleging that the delay or inaction of the respondent on the motion
constituted a violation of Article 7, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution and Canon 3, Rules 3.08 and
3.09 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
The Court Administrator ordered respondent judge to file her comment within ten (10)
days from receipt of the same. Respondent judge requested a period of twenty (20) days to collate
all pertinent data and to submit a detailed comment which request was granted. Still, respondent
judge failed to file her comment within the extended period granted to her. She again asked for a
period of twenty (20) days to submit her comment which was again granted. She did not file again
her comment.
In a Resolution dated September 28, 2005, the Court required respondent judge to explain
her repeated failure to comment on the administrative complaints. In her comment dated February
20, 2006, respondent judge explained that she was unable to immediately act on the City
Prosecutors motion to withdraw information because there was no proof of service of the notice of
hearing upon private complainant and counsel in the aforesaid criminal cases and she may be
Page 30 of 110

accused of partisanship. She also attributed the delay to the heavy caseload when she assumed
office in 2001 and to the lack of personnel in her sala. She admitted culpability for her failure to
submit her comment on time and asked for consideration from this Court.
In his Report and Recommendation, Justice Barza found respondent to have been remiss in
her duty to resolve the motion to withdraw the criminal cases filed against herein complainants
with dispatch.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Torres had been remiss in her duty to resolve the motion
Ruling:
Yes.
We find unmeritorious respondent judges excuse that the reason for her delay in resolving
the motion to withdraw is the lack of notice of hearing upon the parties. Firstly, she should have
realized that almost one (1) year had already elapsed from the time of filing of the motion to
withdraw on May 24, 2002 up to its submission for resolution on January 13, 2003. Secondly, she is
duty-bound to comply with Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct providing that a
judge shall dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the prescribed periods.
This Canon is in consonance with the Constitutional mandate that all lower courts decide or resolve
cases or matters within three (3) months from their date of submission. Accordingly, Rule 1.02 of
Canon 1 and Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 provide as follows:
Rule 1.02. A judge should administer justice impartially and without delay.
Rule 3.05. A judge should dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases
within the required periods.
In line with the foregoing, the Court has laid down administrative guidelines to ensure that
the mandates on the prompt disposition of judicial business are complied with. Thus, SC
Administrative Circular No. 13-87 states, in pertinent part:
3. Judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII,
Section 15 of the Constitution for the adjudication and resolution of all cases or
matters submitted in their courts. Thus, all cases or matters must be decided or
resolved within twelve months from date of submission by all lower collegiate courts
while all other lower courts are given a period of three months to do so. x x x.
Furthermore, SC Administrative Circular No. 1-88 dated January 26, 1988 states:
6.1. All Presiding Judges must endeavor to act promptly on all motions and
interlocutory matters pending before their courts. x x x
Judge Torres failed to act on the Motion to Withdraw Information within three (3) months
from the time it was submitted for resolution on January 13, 2003. This Court cannot countenance
such undue inaction on the part of respondent judge, especially now when there is an all-out effort
to minimize, if not totally eradicate, the problems of congestion and delay long plaguing our courts.
Page 31 of 110

The requirement that cases be decided within the reglementary period is designed to prevent delay
in the administration of justice, for obviously, justice delayed is justice denied. Delay in the
disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its
standards and brings it to disrepute.
The Court also takes note of the fact that respondent judge submitted her comment on the
instant complaint only after more than two (2) years from the time the OCA required her to do so.
Her prolonged and repeated refusal to comply with the simple directives of the OCA to file her
comment constitutes a clear and willful disrespect for lawful orders of the OCA. It bears stress that
it is through the OCA that the Supreme Court exercises supervision over all lower courts and
personnel thereof. At the core of a judges esteemed position is obedience to the dictates of the law
and justice. A judge must be the first to exhibit respect for authority. Judge Torres failed in this
aspect when she repeatedly ignored the directives of the OCA to file her comment.
We hold that respondent judge is guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision or order.
Rule 140, as amended, of the Revised Rules of Court provides that undue delay in rendering a
decision or order is classified as a less serious charge punishable by suspension from office without
salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or a fine of more
thanP10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
MARIETTA DUQUE vs. JUDGE CRISOSTOMO L. GARRIDO
A.M. NO. RTJ-06-2027, February 27, 2009, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Any delay in the administration of justice, no matter how brief, deprives the litigant of his right
to a speedy disposition of his case, for, not only does it magnify the cost of seeking justice, it
undermines the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it to
disrepute.
Facts:
Complainant Marietta Duque is the alleged common-law wife of the murdered victim in the
aforementioned Criminal Case No. 2000-10-580. She claimed that the respondent Judge Crisostomo
L. Garrido violated Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution for rendering a decision beyond
the 90 day reglementary period without requesting an extension of time from this Court. She
alleged that the prosecution filed its Memorandum submitting the case for resolution on August 10,
2005, but the respondent issued a Decision on December 12, 2005 which was promulgated on
January 27, 2006. Complainant further alleged that neither the offended party nor the handling
prosecutor was notified of the promulgation.
In his comment, Judge Garrido explained that while the last pleading - the Memorandum for
the Prosecution - was filed on August 10, 2005, the Order declaring the case submitted for
resolution was issued on September 13, 2005. Respondent further explained that the Decision
dated December 12, 2005 was promulgated only on January 27, 2006 because he was on official
leave from December 15, 2005 to January 15, 2006 as he left for the United States. He reasoned that
the complainant is not entitled to be notified of the promulgation as she is neither the private
complainant nor a witness, while the prosecution was duly represented during the promulgation by
Prosecutor Edgar A. Sabarre who was also assigned in the RTC. Respondent pointed out that the
court had already set the schedule of the promulgation. Hence, when Prosecutor Visbal opted not to
attend, it was for a reason only known to him.
Page 32 of 110
Prosecutor Visbal averred that he was never informed of the date of the promulgation and
that he was surprised to learn that respondent judge promulgated the decision in Criminal Case No.
2000-10-580 with Prosecutor Sabarre appearing in his behalf. The OCA found respondent judge
administratively liable for rendering a decision beyond the 90-day period in violation of Section 15,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Garrido rendered the decision beyond the 90-day period in violation
of Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
Ruling:
Yes.
Section 15 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution mandates lower court judges to decide a case
within the reglementary period of 90 days, to wit:
(1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be
decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the
Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all
lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.
Likewise, the Code of Judicial Conduct under Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 dictates as follows:
Rule 3.05 A judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases
within the required periods.
Indeed, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are indispensable
to prevent needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of cases. Thus, the 90-day period
within which to decide cases is mandatory. The Court has consistently emphasized strict
observance of this rule in order to minimize the twin problems of congestion and delay that have
long plagued our courts. Any delay in the administration of justice, no matter how brief, deprives
the litigant of his right to a speedy disposition of his case, for, not only does it magnify the cost of
seeking justice, it undermines the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary, lowers its
standards and brings it to disrepute.
As readily gleaned from the records, the last pleading submitted i.e., the Memorandum for
the Prosecution, was filed on August 10, 2005. Thus, the case was deemed submitted for decision on
that date. Accordingly, the decision should have been rendered not later than November 8,
2005. However, respondent issued it only on December 12, 2005 which was more than four months
after the case had been submitted for decision.
Respondent did not proffer any tenable justification for the delay in rendering the
decision. He insisted that it was proper and procedural to first resolve the parties' memoranda
before the case may be considered submitted for decision. He, thus, would want the Court to
consider his Order dated September 13, 2005 resolving the memoranda of the parties and declaring
Page 33 of 110

the case submitted for resolution as the starting point of the 90-day period for deciding the case and
not on August 10, 2005, the date when the last pleading was filed.
Administrative Circular No. 28 issued by this Court on July 3, 1989 regarding the
submission of memoranda for purposes of deciding cases, clearly provides:
x x x The ninety (90) day period for deciding the case shall commence to run from
submission of the case for decision without memoranda; in case the court requires
or allows its filing, the case shall be considered submitted for decision upon the
filing of the last memorandum or upon the expiration of the period to do so,
whichever is earlier.
A judge cannot even justify his delay in deciding a case on the excuse that he was still
awaiting the parties' memoranda. In Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 55, Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, the Court held:
x x x judges should decide cases even if the parties failed to submit
memoranda within the given periods. Non-submission of memoranda is not a
justification for failure to decide cases. The filing of memoranda is not a part of
the trial nor is the memorandum itself an essential, much less indispensable
pleading before a case may be submitted for decision. As it is merely intended to
aid the court in the rendition of the decision in accordance with law and evidence which even in its absence the court can do on the basis of the judges personal notes
and the records of the case - non-submission thereof has invariably been considered
a waiver of the privilege.
For failure of respondent judge in this case to decide Criminal Case No. 2000-10-580 within
the prescribed period and taking into consideration the mitigating circumstance that it was his first
offense, we impose on him a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos.
ESTELITO R. MARABE vs. TYRONE V. TAN, SHERIFF IV, OCC, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
MALAYBALAY CITY, BUKIDNON
A.M. No. P-05-1996, April 21, 2009, J. Leonardo- De Castro
The failure to implement a writ of execution maybe classified as a less grave offense of simple
neglect of duty punishable by suspension from office for one month and one day to six months for the
first offense.
Facts:
This administrative case arose from a Letter-Complaint filed by complainant Estelito R.
Marabe, President and Chairman of the Board of Asian Hills Bank at Malaybalay, Bukidnon,
charging respondent, Tyrone Tan, Sheriff IV of the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC), Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Malaybalay City, Bukidnon with inefficiency and ineffectiveness for failing to
implement and execute writs of execution issued in favor of Asian Hills Bank despite having
received advanced amounts for expenses to be incurred in the implementation of the said writs.
The Investigating Judge found respondent liable for failure to act within a reasonable time on the
writs of execution endorsed to him for enforcement without any sufficient justification.
Consequently the Investigating Judge recommended the imposition of the appropriate penalty on
Page 34 of 110

respondent. On March 16, 2005, the OCC submitted its Memorandum concurring with the findings
of the Investigating Judge, recommended the imposition of a fine in the amount P5,000.00 with a
stern warning that the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely. Upon redocketing of the case to an administrative case however, the court while agreeing with the findings
of the OCC, moved to change the penalty imposed.
Issue:
Is the penalty imposed by the OCC proportionate to the offense committed by respondent
Tyrone Tan?
Ruling:
No, it is not.
The sheriff, as an officer of the court upon whom the execution of a final judgment depends,
must necessarily be circumspect and proper in his behavior. He is to execute the directives of the
court therein strictly in accordance with the letter thereof and without any deviation therefrom.
Here, respondent sheriff was clearly remiss in the performance of his mandated duties. While the
six writs of execution subject of this case were admittedly received by respondent, he only
implemented the same two years later and his partial reports only pertained to four writs issued in
four cases without sufficient and reasonable explanation regarding the two other writs. He likewise
did not render periodic reports on the writs of execution pursuant to Sec. 14, Rule 39 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
The failure to implement a writ of execution maybe classified as simple neglect of duty
which has been defined as the failure of an employee to give ones attention to a task expected of
him, and signifies a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference. Under the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, simple neglect of duty is a less grave
offense punishable by suspension from office for one month and one day to six months for the first
offense.
In the case at bar, not only was there a long delay in the full implementation of the writs of
execution but there was likewise an utter failure to implement the writs. As such, the imposition of
a penalty of suspension for three months would be more appropriate and in keeping with the law.
PETER B. MALLONGA vs. MARITES R. MANIO, Court Interpreter III, Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 4, Tuguegarao City
HON. LYLIHA ABELLA-AQUINO, Judge, RTC, Branch 4, Tuguegarao City vs. MARITES R. MANIO,
Court Interpreter III, RTC, Branch 4, Tuguegarao City
A.M. No. P-07-2298, A.M. No. P-07-2299, April 24, 2009, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Dishonesty or grave misconduct carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with
forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits but the court may nevertheless impose
fines to be deducted from the accrued leave credits for judgment based on another set of facts.
Facts:
The case is a consolidation of administrative charges filed against Court interpreter III
Page 35 of 110

Marites Manio for dishonesty and grave misconduct. A.M. No. P-07-2298 stemmed from a complaint
filed by a certain Peter B. Mallonga alleging that Manio volunteered the name of a certain lawyer to
aid him in his petition for correction of entry in his marriage certificate. Thereafter, he was asked to
pay a certain sum of money purportedly for attorneys fees and other expenses. After some time,
Manio handed him a resolution signed by Judge Lyliha L. Abella- Aquino pertaining to the matter.
However, when Mallonga asked for the production of a certificate of finality of the resolution, Manio
failed to hand over the same. Through Mallongas efforts, it was discovered that the docket number
which appeared in the resolution belonged to another case and that the resolution was a spurious
document, with Judge Abella-Aquinos signature forged. On the other hand, A.M. No. P-07-2299,
arose from a complaint filed by Bernadette Canlas-Bartolome mirroring almost the same set of
facts.
In a Letter dated April 23, 2004, Judge Abella-Aquino indorsed the complaint of Bartolome
against respondent Manio to the OCA and further reported that she confronted respondent Manio
about the complaint, and that the latter admitted forging the judges signature in the purported
resolution. After having given a number of opportunities to explain her side, Manio still refused to
answer the charges against her. The OCA then recommended that she be made liable for dishonesty
and grave misconduct. Meanwhile, on another case docketed as A.M. No. P-07-2397, Manio was
administratively held liable and meted the penalty of dismissal.
Issue:
Whether or not Manios dismissal in A.M. No. P-07-2397 rendered moot the two other
complaints against her.
Ruling:
No, it does not.
Respondent Manios dismissal from the service in A.M. No. P-07-2397 does not render moot
the subject complaints of Mallonga and Judge Aquino in A.M. P-07- 2298, which were founded on a
different set of facts. In the latter case, She took advantage of her official position and defrauded a
potential litigant. Her acts clearly constitute dishonesty. On the other hand, the forgery that she
committed in furtherance of the deceit constitutes grave misconduct.
Dishonesty or grave misconduct carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service
with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification
from reemployment in the government service. Hence, in view of Manios dismissal from service in
A.M. No. P-07-2397, the Court deemed it proper to impose upon her the penalty of fine in the
amount of P40,000.00 to be deducted from her accrued leave credits.
VENANCIO INONOG vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO B. IBAY, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 135, Makati City
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2175, July 28, 2009, J. Leonardo- De Castro
A person cannot, for disobedience, be punished for contempt unless the act which is forbidden
or required to be done is clearly and exactly defined, so that there can be no reasonable doubt or
uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is forbidden or required.
Page 36 of 110

Facts:
The complaint involved an incident in the Makati City Hall basement parking lot for which
respondent judge cited complainant in contempt of court because complainant parked his
superiors vehicle at the parking space reserved for respondent judge. Inonog is the security-driver
of the Chief of the Business Permit Division of Makati City. At around 1:00 a.m. of March 18, 2005,
he parked the vehicle that he drives for his boss in a vacant parking space at the basement of the
Makati City Hall because the slot where he usually parked was already occupied. At the time, the
parking slots at the basement of the Makati City Hall were indicated only by numbers and not by
names of officials to whom they were assigned. Later that day, he was informed of an information
for contempt filed against him for parking his vehicle at Judge Ibays slot. The respondent judge
blamed the usurpation of the said parking space for the delay in the promulgation of the decision in
Criminal Case Nos. 02- 1320, 02-3046, 02-3168-69, and 03-392-393 scheduled at 8:00 a.m. of
March 18, 2005 because the latter had a hard time looking for another parking space. Upon failure
to appear on the time scheduled for hearing, Inonog found that he had already been adjudged guilty
of contempt of court by respondent judge for delaying in the administration of justice. He was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment for five days and to pay a fine of one thousand pesos. A warrant
for his arrest was also issued.
Issue:
Whether the Judge abused his authority by misusing his contempt powers.
Ruling:
Yes, he did.
The act of complainant Inonog in parking his car in a slot allegedly reserved for respondent
judge does not fall under the category of any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice. There was no showing that he acted
with malice and/or bad faith or that he was improperly motivated to delay the proceedings of the
court by making use of the parking slot supposedly reserved for respondent judge. The incident is
too flimsy and inconsequential to be the basis of an indirect contempt proceeding.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial
proceedings as well as to uphold the administration of justice. The courts must exercise the power
of contempt for purposes that are impersonal because that power is intended as a safeguard not for
the judges but for the functions they exercise. Thus, judges have, time and again, been enjoined to
exercise their contempt power judiciously, sparingly, with utmost restraint and with the end in
view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, not for
retaliation or vindication. Judge Ibays act of unceremoniously citing complainant in contempt is a
clear evidence of his unjustified use of the authority vested upon him by law.
LOLITA S. REGIR vs. JOEL T. REGIR
A.M. No. P-06-2282, August 4, 2009, J. Leonardo-De Castro
The act of a married man cohabiting with a woman not his spouse constitutes an immoral
conduct and the employment of the defense of denial cannot overthrow the positive testimonies of the
witnesses.
Page 37 of 110

Facts:
Joel T. Regir is a Process Server at the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 37 in Caibiran,
Biliran. Lolita S. Regir was the lawful wife of Joel. She filed an administrative complaint with the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) against Joel alleging that he carried on an illicit relationship
with another woman, Vilma Sabinay, with whom he begot a child and has stopped giving Lolita and
their children financial support. Joel, on the other hand, contended that Lolita instituted the
complaint due to misunderstandings between them and that he did not know any Vilma Sabinay
nor engaged in any extramarital affair with the same.
After due investigation by the judge, it was found out that Joel was cohabiting with Vilma in
several boarding houses where Lolita found them upon one of her visits and the latter was
introduced by Joel as his girlfriend to one of his co-workers. Furthermore, Vilma conceived a child
with Joel and gave birth in a hospital. Lolita and her friend Isabelle Belcia went to visit Vilma after
she gave birth when they saw Joel who immediately ran away. The judge indicated his observation
that the issue of immorality has not been refuted by the respondent since his defense does not go
beyond a mere complete and bare denial of the charge hurled against him and that the witnesses
against respondent were not shown to have been motivated by improper motives. The judge made
a recommendation of suspension for 2 months without pay.
Issue:
Whether or not Joel is guilty of immoral conduct
Ruling:
Yes. We agree with the Investigating Judges finding of guilt.
Well-settled is the rule that bare denials cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of the
witnesses. Positive and forthright declarations of witnesses are often held to be worthier of
credence than the self-serving denial of an accused. Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, is a self-serving assertion that deserves no weight in law.
The evidence presented is enough to hold Joel guilty of the charge of immorality or
disgraceful and immoral conduct. It is elementary that administrative proceedings are governed by
the substantial evidence rule. Substantial evidence is such amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The standard of substantial
evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that the person indicted was
responsible for the alleged wrongdoing or misconduct.
The acts imputed against respondent, a married man, consist of his cohabitation with a
woman other than his legal wife and there is a strong likelihood that respondent fathered a child
with the said woman. It is morally reprehensible for a married man or woman to maintain intimate
relations with a person other than his or her spouse. Moreover, immorality is not based alone on
illicit sexual intercourse. It is not confined to sexual matters, but includes conducts inconsistent
with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful,
flagrant or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of
the community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare.
Page 38 of 110

It is of no moment that Joels immoral acts were committed outside the confines of his work
as an employee of the judiciary. This Court has previously ruled that the conduct of all court
personnel must be free from any whiff of impropriety not only with respect to their duties in the
judicial branch but also as to their behavior outside the court as private individuals. The Court
likewise finds unpersuasive Judges opinion that since Joel is new in the civil service and unfamiliar
with the norms of conduct for public servants, and taking into account that this is the first time he is
charged with immorality, a lighter penalty may be imposed upon him with a stern warning for a
heavier penalty should he commit the same or similar offense.
The exacting standards of ethics and morality upon court employees are required to
maintain the peoples faith in the courts as dispensers of justice, and whose image is mirrored by
their actuations. Thus, this Court has no other recourse but to follow the strict letter of the law in
disciplining errant court personnel. Under civil service rules, disgraceful and immoral conduct is a
grave offense for which a penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year
shall be imposed for the 1st offense while the penalty of dismissal is imposed for the
2nd offense. Since this is respondents first offense, the proper penalty is suspension in its minimum
period.
HEIRS OF THE LATE REV. FR. JOSE O. ASPIRAS vs. JUDGE CLIFTON U. GANAY, PRESIDING
JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 31, Agoo, La Union
Judges must avoid not only impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety. They are
mandated not to allow family, social or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment,
nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence
the judge.
Facts:
The case stemmed from an unsigned letter-complaint filed by the heirs of the late Reverend
Father Jose O. Aspiras addressed to the Court Administrator, requesting that an investigation be
conducted by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) on the alleged abuse of authority of Judge
Clifton U. Ganay, in connection with Special Proceeding Case entitled In the Matter of the
Guardianship of Rev. Fr. Jose O. Aspiras.
In the letter, the following was alleged: That Judge Ganay has been abusing his authority as
he previously ordered to withdraw the amount of P50,000.00 in his favor from the bank account of
the late Rev. Fr. Jose O. Aspiras for him to purchase law books. As per his order, Judge Ganay alleged
that in the spirit of this Yuletide season and considering the efforts of the Judge of this Court, the
guardians in the said case deemed it best to give him P50,000.00 worth of law books to aid him in
his work as a judge. The truth of the matter is that this has been the idea of Judge Ganay, himself,
and was never permitted by the guardians. There are still other orders issued by Judge Ganay
ordering the bank to release certain amounts from the bank account in his favor without the
written consent of the guardians. The copies can be found in the records of the case being kept by
the said court.
The OCA conducted a surprise investigation and examination of the records of the said case.
The investigating team found that the order was indeed issued by Judge Ganay. For the money
received from the said order, Judge Ganay even issued an Acknowledgement Receipt. The team also
Page 39 of 110

discovered that on several occasions, Judge Ganay issued numerous orders directing the manager of
the Philippine National Bank, Agoo, La Union Branch, to draw checks from the account of the late
Rev. Fr. Aspiras amounting to several thousands of pesos in the name of the Officer-inCharge/Branch Clerk of Court Precilla Olympia P. Eslao (OIC-Clerk of Court Eslao) for the purpose
of purchasing cellular phone prepaid cards. The said cards were received by Judge Ganay and OICClerk of Court Eslao as evidenced by acknowledgement receipts signed by them on several dates.
The investigating team also discovered two other orders issued directing the manager of
PNB, Agoo, La Union Branch to draw from the account checks in the amount of P40,000.00 each for
the purpose of purchasing three cellular phones. Eslao has submitted a Report on Expenses
enumerating in detail how the money was spent for buying three cellular phones.
The Court directed Judge Ganay and OIC-Clerk of Court Eslao to submit their respective
comments therein. Judge Ganay sent a letter stating that he had yet to receive a copy of the lettercomplaint of the heirs of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras against him and the report made by the OCA
lawyers. He further stated that he should be given a medal for effecting a speedy settlement of the
estate of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras among his heirs. He maintained that all his actions merely
implemented the orders of the two property guardians.
Judge Ganay explained that the cellular phones were purchased upon the orders of the two
property guardians of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras. The communication devices were said to be for the
fast networking of information for the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras who was then the ward of the court. He
alleged that the two property guardians kept on asking him what they could do to help the court. He
mentioned then that law books would enhance the appearance of his office and make it look
scholarly and presentable. They then appropriated P50,000.00 for the purchase of books.
In detail, he explained the system of checks and balances he devised for handling the funds.
He stated that he was the implementor of the orders of the guardians, adding that he will only
implement if the order is unanimous or if both property guardians assent. Judge Ganay said this
was to safeguard Reverend Aspiras wealth, so that one property guardian will not be taking
advantage of the other. Only by the judges order that the money will be released.
Judge Ganay further narrated the specific details of the case, stating that there was nothing
irregular about his orders, and that the heirs have peacefully settled among themselves.
The OCA rejected the explanations of respondent Judge Ganay and found him guilty of
violating Sections 13 and 14 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary. OCA recommended Judge Ganay and OIC-Clerk of Court Eslao to be fined P5,000.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Ganay violated the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary
Ruling:
Yes, the Court held that Judge Ganay violated Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, of
Canon 4 of the New Code of Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary:
Page 40 of 110

SEC. 13. Judges and members of their families shall neither ask for, nor accept, any gift,
bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by him or
her in connection with the performance of judicial duties.
SEC. 14. Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to their influence,
direction or authority, to ask for, or accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything
done or to be done or omitted to be done in connection with their duties or functions.
SEC. 15. Subject to law and to any legal requirements of public disclosure, judges may
receive a token gift, award or benefit as appropriate to the occasion on which it is made provided
that such gift, award or benefit might not reasonably be perceived as intended to influence the
judge in the performance of judicial duties or otherwise give rise to an appearance of partiality.
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the
activities of a judge. Lower court judges play an important role in the promotion of the people's
faith in the judiciary. They are front-liners who give human face to the judicial branch at the
grassroots level in their interaction with litigants and those who do business with the courts. Thus,
the admonition that judges must avoid not only impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety
is more sternly applied to them.
In Dulay v. Lelina, Jr., it was held that judges are mandated not to allow family, social or
other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment, nor convey or permit others to
convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.
Judge Ganay clearly fell short of the standards set. His acts of receiving lawbooks, cellular
phones and monthly cellular phone prepaid cards from the property guardians of the late Rev. Fr.
Aspiras, who was then the ward of the court, constitute impropriety which the Court cannot allow.
Judge Ganays act of issuing Orders directing the manager of the PNB, La Union Branch to draw
checks amounting to thousands of pesos from the account of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras creates the
impression of impropriety and subjects the court to suspicion of irregularities in the conduct of the
proceedings.
The recommendation to fine Eslao was held to be without basis. Eslao sufficiently explained
that she merely followed the official orders of respondent Judge Ganay in issuing the
Acknowledgment Receipts for the prepaid cards for the cellular phones. Also, OCA did not discuss
Eslaos participation in the irregularities of the case.
Judge Ganay was fined in the amount of P20,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of
similar infractions shall be dealt with more severely.
MAYOR HADJI AMER R. SAMPIANO, SOMER ABDULLAH, SALIC TAMPUGAO, ANTHONY ABI,
SAGA POLE INOG, TORORAC DOMATO, KING MARONSING, MARGARITA SOLAIMAN, HADJI
ACMAD MAMENTING and BILLIE JAI LAINE T. OGKA vs. JUDGE CADER P. INDAR, Acting
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Malabang, Lanao del Sur
The Rules of Court expressly prohibits the grant of preliminary injunction without hearing and
prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. In this case, the judge has issued an order
Page 41 of 110

which was in effect a TRO ex parte in violation of the rules, and thus, is found guilty of ignorance of
law.
Facts:
Incumbent Mayor Sampiano filed before the Commission on Elections a Petition for
Annulment of Proclamation with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction/TRO against his rival mayoralty
candidate, his uncle Ogka, and the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur. The
Comelec issued the following: (1) Order authorizing the vice-mayor to temporarily assume the
duties and responsibilities as mayor due to the double proclamation of Sampiano and Ogka for the
position of mayor, (2) Order recalling the Order authorizing the assumption of the vice-mayor as
the mayor, and instead maintaining the status quo prevailing at the time of the issuance of the said
Order, and (3) Order dated September 9, 2004 (clarifying the previous order)
Pursuant to the said Orders, Sampiano was ordered to act, perform and discharge the
duties, functions and responsibilities as mayor t pending determination and final resolution of the
controversy involving the mayorship of the Municipality of Balabagan.
Aggrieved, Ogka filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the September 9, 2004
Order. He also informed in writing the Chief Legal Counsel of PNB, Atty. Alvin C. Go, and asked him
not to release the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Municipality of Balabagan, Lanao del
Sur until the controversy has been resolved. He cited Section 2, Rule 19 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure which provides that a motion for reconsideration, if not pro-forma, suspends the
execution or implementation of the decision, resolution, order or ruling.
However, on the basis of the Comelec Order, Go directed PNB-Marawi to IRA for the
Municipality of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur. In turn, PNB-Marawi released the pending IRA for the
months of July to September 2004.
To temporarily suspend the release by the PNB-Marawi of the October 2004 IRA while his
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Comelec Order is pending resolution, Ogka filed on a
special civil action for Prohibition and Injunction with TRO and Preliminary Injunction with the
RTC, Branch 12, Malabang, Lanao del Sur presided over by Judge Indar.
On the same day, Judge Indar issued an Order setting the hearing and directed the PNBMarawi to hold or defer the release of the IRA for the Municipality of Balabagan unless ordered
otherwise by the court.
Sampiano alleged that during hearing, his counsel clarified with Judge Indar if the October
11, 2004 Order was in the nature of a TRO. Judge Indar replied that it was not. Sampiano likened
the said Order to a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction, and insisted that in both instances,
prior notice and hearing are required. He added that a TRO has a limited life of 20 days while a writ
of preliminary injunction is effective only during the pendency of the case and only after posting the
required injunction bond. He further claimed that it was issued in violation of Section 286 of the
Local Government Code, which provides for the automatic release of the share of the local
government unit from the national government.
Sampiano filed complaint, praying that Judge Indar be dismissed from judicial service for
gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority, manifest partiality and serious acts of
Page 42 of 110

impropriety for: (1) Assumption of jurisdiction over the case the subject matter of which concerns
the enforcement of election laws by the Comelec; and (2) Ex-parte issuance of the order freezing
the IRA of the Municipality of Balabagan unless ordered otherwise by the Court.
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that Judge Indar should be found
guilty of ignorance of the law or violating Section 5 of Rule 58, Revised Rules on Civil Procedure and
that he be imposed a penalty of fine amounting to P10,000.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Indar is guilty of ignorance of the law
Ruling:
Yes, he is guilty of ignorance of the law. The Court held that the order issued by Judge Indar
is essentially a preliminary injunction order, and that Judge Indar failed to comply with the
provisions of Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.
Undeniably, the RTC has jurisdiction over special civil action filed by Ogka pursuant to
Section 21 of BP 129 wherein Regional Trial Courts shall exercise original jurisdiction in the
issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction
which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions.
The Court agreed with Judge Indar that the automatic release of the IRA from the national
treasury does not prevent the proper court from deferring or suspending the release thereof to
particular local officials when there is a legal question presented in the court pertaining to the
rights of the parties to receive the IRA or to the propriety of the issuance of a TRO or a preliminary
injunction while such rights are still being determined.
However, the Court concluded that the order was in effect a TRO or preliminary injunction
order, since it directed PNB to hold or defer the release of the IRA while the petition is pending
resolution of the trial court and unless ordered otherwise by the court. This Order was merely
consistent with the relief prayed for in the petition for prohibition and injunction.
Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court expressly prohibits the grant of preliminary
injunction without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. However,
courts are authorized to issue ex parte a TRO effective only for 72 hours if it should appear from the
facts shown by affidavits or by the verified petition that great or irreparable injury would result to
the applicant before the matter could be heard on notice. Within the aforesaid period of time, the
Court should conduct a summary hearing to determine if a TRO shall be issued. The TRO, however,
shall be effective only for a period of 20 days from notice to the party or person sought to be
enjoined. During the 20-day period, the judge must conduct a hearing to consider the propriety of
issuing a preliminary injunction. At the end of such period, the TRO automatically terminates
without need of any judicial declaration to that effect, leaving the court no discretion to extend the
same.
In this case, Judge Indar issued the Order on the very same day it was filed and without any
hearing and prior notice to the complainants. As discussed, he was allowed by the Rules to issue ex
parte a TRO of limited effectivity and, in that time, to conduct a hearing to determine the propriety
Page 43 of 110

of extending the TRO or issuing a writ of preliminary injunction. Judge Indar conducted the hearing
three days after the issuance.
The Court also noted that said order was lifted by incoming Acting Presiding Judge, Judge
Rosad B. Balindong, who took over the case after Judge Indar was assigned to RTC Cotabato City, on
the ground that the requisites for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction were not present. The
TRO issued ex parte was in effect for 11 days in violation of the Rules. Only a TRO issued after a
summary hearing can last for a period of 20 days.
Since there is no showing that Judge Indar was motivated by bad faith or ill motives, and
this is his first offense, the Court sustained the penalty recommended by the OCA.
EMMA B. RAMOS vs. APOLLO R. RAGOT, Sheriff III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Gingoog
City
A.M. No. P-09-2600, December 23 2009, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Sheriffs play an important role in the administration of justice, and as agents of the law, high
standards are expected of them. They are duty-bound to know and to comply with the very basic rules
relative to the implementation of writs of execution.
Facts:
Emma B. Ramos charged Apollo R. Ragot, Sheriff III with grave misconduct, neglect of duty
and dishonesty in connection with the implementation of the writ of execution in a criminal case.
Ramos filed a criminal case against a Mrs. Neneth Kawaling for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 before the MTCC in Gingoog City. The case was decided on the basis of a Compromise
Agreement, wherein Mrs. Kawaling promised to pay a total of P60,000.00 in monthly installments
of P10,000.00 each. However, for failure of the accused to comply, Ramos filed a motion for
execution which the trial court granted.
In order to enforce the said writ, Ramos coordinated with Sheriff Ragot. Ramos and her
husband accompanied Sheriff Ragot to Mrs. Kawalings residence in Butuan City. The Ramoses used
their own vehicle and spent for all the expenses for the trip.
In Butuan City, Sheriff Ragot was able to serve the writ on Mrs. Kawaling. Ramos just
allowed the sheriff to discuss the writ with Mrs. Kawaling while watching from a distance. Sheriff
Ragot informed the couple that Mrs. Kawaling promised to pay her obligations and the three of
them traveled back to Gingoog City. When they reached Gingoog City, Sheriff Ragot allegedly asked
for the amount of P1,000.00 from Ramos. When he told her that the payment was the usual SOP, she
paid, to which he acknowledged in a receipt. A week later, Mrs. Kawaling sent a check to the court in
the amount of P10,750.00 in partial payment of her obligation.
In the following months, Ramos repeatedly followed up the full implementation of the writ
of execution with Sheriff Ragot since Mrs. Kawaling failed to make any further payments. However,
the sheriff purportedly kept telling her to just wait for Mrs. Kawaling to make voluntary payments
since levying Mrs. Kawalings real properties would take years.
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Thereafter, the sheriff allegedly asked Ramos for P500.00 to be used for his trip to the
Register of Deeds in Butuan City so that he can levy whatever real property he can find in the name
of Mrs. Kawaling. Again, she paid and a receipt was issued. After a few days, the sheriff informed her
that he had already made a levy with the Register of Deeds but he left the file behind because the
signatory was absent.
Sheriff Ragot handed then Ramos a copy of what appeared to be a court-approved Itemized
Estimated Amount of Expenses in the amount of P4,100.00 but he allegedly told her that there was
no need to deposit the said amount in court. Instead, he told her to just give him some amount for
his trip back to Butuan City to follow-up the levy. Ramos did not give the amount requested because
the sheriff refused to issue a receipt for the same.
In a letter, Ramos, through counsel, requested the sheriff to complete the implementation of
the writ of execution. The sheriff replied and furnished a copy of Sheriffs Return of Service,
indicating partial satisfaction of the writ of execution. No further action was made by the sheriff
with regard to the writ. As of the time of the filing of the complaint, the amount of P33,000.00
purportedly remained unsatisfied.
The sheriff admitted that Ramos and her husband accompanied him to Butuan City to serve
the writ of execution on Mrs. Kawaling. Sheriff Ragot purportedly told the couple not to worry
about the sheriffs expenses since they would be accounted for and refunded by the losing party. He
then suggested that they charge Mrs. Kawaling the amount of P1,000.00 for gasoline, meals and the
fees paid at the Butuan City Assessors Office. He was then made to sign a ready-made receipt to
acknowledge their expenses.
He denied having solicited the amount of P1,000.00 from complainant. He, however,
admitted that he asked for and received from the complainant the amount of P500.00 when he
went back to Butuan City to file the notice of levy. He claimed that his request for this amount was
allowed under Section 10 of Amended Administrative Circular No. 35-2004 on the Guidelines in the
Allocation of Legal Fees. After the trip, he purportedly liquidated his expenses and signed a receipt
for the amount he received.
Office of the Court Administrator found the sheriff guilty of simple neglect of duty and
suspended him for one month and one day.
Issue:
Whether or not the sheriff is guilty of the charges
Ruling:
Yes, the Court found him guilty of simple neglect of duty and adopted the OCAs
recommendation of suspension.
By the very nature of their functions, sheriffs are under obligation to perform the duties of
their office honestly, faithfully and to the best of their ability, and must conduct themselves with
propriety and decorum, and above all else, be above suspicion.
Page 45 of 110

In the implementation of writs or processes of the court for which expenses are to be
incurred, sheriffs are mandated to comply with Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 10. With regard to sheriffs expenses in executing writs issued pursuant to court orders
or decisions or safeguarding the property levied upon, attached or seized, including kilometrage for
each kilometer of travel, guards fees, warehousing and similar charges, the interested party shall
pay said expenses in an amount estimated by the sheriff, subject to the approval of the court. Upon
approval of said estimated expenses, the interested party shall deposit such amount with the clerk
of court and ex-officio sheriff, who shall disburse the same to the deputy sheriff assigned to effect
the process, subject to liquidation with the same period for rendering a return on the process. The
liquidation shall be approved by the Court. Any unspent amount shall be refunded to the party
making the deposit. A full report shall be submitted by the deputy sheriff assigned with his return,
and the sheriffs expenses shall be taxed as costs against the judgment debtor.
In this case, the sheriff served the writ of execution without presenting complainant with a
court approved estimate of expenses and without the required deposit from the complainant to the
clerk of court. While the records reveal the existence of an approved Itemized Estimated Amount of
Expenses, a copy was only given to Ramos almost four months after the writ of execution was
served on the losing party.
Likewise in contravention of Rule 141, the sheriff directly received money from the Ramos.
His denial that he solicited the amount of P1,000.00 from Ramos cannot be given credence for he
had even signed a receipt for such amount. That his solicitation and receipt of the amount of
P500.00 were allowed under Section 10 of Amended Administrative Circular No. 35-2004 cannot be
sustained. Nowhere in Section 10 is it provided that sheriffs are tasked to directly solicit and
receive money for expenses relative to the implementation of a writ of execution.
Whether the money was solicited or voluntarily given to him is of no moment. The fact
remains that he personally accepted money from complainant to implement the writ of execution
and, worse, without furnishing the latter an estimate of expenses approved by the court in violation
of the rules. In Bunagan v. Ferraren, it was declared that a sheriff cannot just unilaterally demand
sums of money from a party-litigant without observing the proper procedure, to do so would be
tantamount to dishonesty or extortion.
The sheriff also failed to render periodic reports every 30 days from his receipt of the writ
of execution in violation of Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. A sheriff must make periodic
reports on partially satisfied or wholly unsatisfied writs in accordance, in order to apprise the court
and the parties of the proceedings undertaken in connection with the writs.
Sheriffs play an important role in the administration of justice and as agents of the law, high
standards are expected of them. They are duty-bound to know and to comply with the very basic
rules relative to the implementation of writs of execution.
HON. HECTOR B. BARILLO, Acting Presiding Judge, MTC Guihulngan, Negros Oriental vs.
HON. RALPH LANTION, HON. MEHOL K. SADAIN and HON. FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., The
Commissioners of the Second Division, Commission on Elections, Manila; and WALTER J.
ARAGONES
G.R. No. 159117, March 10, 2010
Page 46 of 110

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
WALTER J. ARAGONES vs. HON. HECTOR B. BARILLO, Municipal Trial Court, Guihulngan,
Negros Oriental
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1752, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Absent any evidence showing outright bad faith, a judge should not be held liable for gross
misconduct and gross ignorance of the law. Thus, for committing acts that manifested poor judgment
and negligence, he is only guilty of simple misconduct and a penalty of suspension for a period of three
months shall be imposed upon him.
Facts:
Walter J. Aragones (Aragones) and Oscar C. Lasola (Lasola) vied for the position of Punong
Barangay of Poblacion, Guihulngan, Negros Oriental in the July 15, 2002 Barangay Elections. After
the votes were canvassed, Aragones was proclaimed the winning candidate. On July 24, 2002,
Lasola duly filed an election protest before the MTC of Guihulngan, which was docketed as Election
Case No. 7-2002 (Election Case). Eventually, Lasola filed an election protest and prayed that a
recount of the votes be conducted. On July 25, 2002, Judge Hector Barillo (Judge Barillo), of the MTC
of Guihulngan, issued an Order, directing the Clerk of Court of the MTC to issue summonses to
Aragones, the Acting Election Officer Raytheon Roy C. Aragones, the Board of Canvassers and the
Board of Election Tellers of Barangay Poblacion, Guihulngan, Negros Oriental, requiring the
aforesaid individuals to file their respective answers within five days from receipt of the notice of
the above Order. He likewise directed all ballot boxes containing ballots and their keys, list of voters
with voting records, book of voters, and other documents used in the said election to be
surrendered to the custody of the MTC Clerk of Court. Thereafter, Judge Barillo issued another
Order which stated that there was a need for the revision of ballots in consonance with the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Lasola was, thus, ordered to deposit in cash the amount of P150.00
for every ballot box for the compensation of the revisors in an amount to be fixed by the MTC.
Consequently, a Revision Committee was also created by Judge Barillo.
On July 31, 2002, the counsel of Aragones, Atty. Francisco D. Yap, filed an Entry of
Appearance with Motion to Disqualify Counsel for Protestant (Lasola) in the Election Case. Atty. Yap
manifested before the MTC that Lasolas counsel, Atty. Justo J. Paras, was suspended from the
practice of law by this Court in an administrative case docketed as A.C. No. 5333 and the latter has
filed a Motion to Lift Suspension, which was yet to be acted upon. Thus, he asserted that pending a
reinstatement, Atty. Paras was not legally permitted to appear as counsel in any court in the
Philippines. Furthermore, the law firm of Paras and Associates, of which Atty. Paras was a partner,
was allegedly owned by the then incumbent Congressman Jacinto V. Paras, such that the law firm
was disqualified to appear as counsel, in view of the prohibition found in Section 14, Article VI of
the Constitution that "[n]o Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally
appear as counsel before any court of justice."
On even date, Aragones also filed an Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim,
which denied the material averments in Lasolas Petition. He argued that the same was based
merely on the speculations, surmises and conclusions of a losing candidate, without any supporting
affidavits attached thereto. As such, he prayed for the dismissal of the Petition.
On August 2, 2002, Judge Barillo issued an Order in the Election Case, setting the hearing on
the revision of official ballots on August 9, 2002. In the same order, it was also held that in order not
Page 47 of 110

to delay the speedy administration of justice, Atty. Justo J. Paras (unless this court has received copy
of the Supreme Courts Resolution for his suspension or disbarment from the practice of law),
and/or his associates or any authorized counsel for Protestant Oscar C. Lasola were allowed to
appear.
On August 7, 2002, Aragones filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Orders issued by
Judge Barillo. However, the same was denied. In such Order of Denial, Judge Barillo appeared to rely
on the fact that more than one year had already lapsed since the effectivity of the suspension order
against Atty. Paras on May 23, 2001. He seemed to consider the said suspension to have already
been served out by the end of May 2002; and thus, when the election protest was instituted in the
MTC by Lasola through Atty. Paras on July 24, 2002, said counsel was supposedly no longer
suspended.
Aggrieved, Aragones instituted a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, (and) Mandamus, with
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Mandatory Injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental, which was docketed as Special
Civil Action No. 02-01-G (Special Civil Action). Judge Barillo and Lasola were named as respondents
in the petition. Therein, he prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued, directing Judge
Barillo to cease and desist from hearing the Election Case until further orders from the RTC; that
the MTC Order dated August 7, 2002 be set aside; that an order be issued directing the MTC to
disqualify Atty. Paras from appearing until the lifting of his suspension by the Court; and that Judge
Barillo be ordered to voluntarily inhibit himself from handling the case.
On August 8, 2002, Atty. Paras filed a Comment on Atty. Yaps motion to disqualify him in
the Election Case. While he admitted that he was indeed suspended by the Court for a period of one
year, which commenced on May 23, 2001 and ended on May 22, 2002, he averred that contrary to
Atty. Yaps theory, a formal reinstatement by the Court was not necessary before he could resume
his practice of law as the penalty imposed upon him has a fixed and definite period of effectivity.
On August 9, 2002, Aragones filed a Motion for Inhibition in the Election Case against Judge
Barillo on the ground that the latters demeanor, ruling and pronouncements demonstrated his bias
and partiality towards Lasola, thereby violating his rights to due process and an impartial tribunal.
He further ascribed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of Judge Barillo, when the latter gave due course to the Petition filed by Lasola despite the
deficiency of the cash deposit per ballot box and allowed a suspended lawyer to appear before the
MTC. He also filed on the same date, a Motion/Manifestation in the Election Case, asserting that the
Motion for Reconsideration that he filed on August 7, 2002 was set for hearing on August 16, 2002
and yet Judge Barillo promptly denied the motion on the same day it was filed. He stressed that
such acts revealed the manifest bias and partiality of Judge Barillo and denied the parties the
chance to elevate to a higher court the issues raised in the motion. Again in the said motion, he put
forward arguments he previously raised in the other pleadings he filed. Lastly, he disclosed that he
also found out that Judge Barillo was a close relative of Atty. Paras. However, on the same date,
Judge Barillo issued a Resolution denying the said Motion for Inhibition.
On August 12, 2002, the RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 64, (RTC Br.64) through Judge Felix
G. Gaudiel, Jr. issued an Ex-Parte Order in the Special Civil Action stating that the Entry of
Appearance with Motion to Disqualify Counsel for Protestant (Lasola) filed by Atty. Yap was a
motion that was litigious; hence, it should have been heard and not denied outright. Furthermore,
Judge Barillo was directed to cease and desist from proceeding with the hearing of the Election Case
Page 48 of 110

within a period of 20 days from receipt of the order, given the perception of the RTC that the
continuance of the acts of Judge Barillo complained of would probably work injustice to Aragones.
The RTC further cautioned Judge Barillo that any proceeding or action taken by the lower court
after the filing of the Petition would be declared null and void.
Both Lasola and Judge Barillo sought for the dismissal of the Petition in the Special Civil
Action. The former, by way of a Motion to Dismiss, contended that the RTC had no appellate
jurisdiction over the election case under consideration, since the same was lodged with the
COMELEC, in accordance with Section 2(2), Article IX-C of the Constitution and Section 1, Rule 28 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. The latter, on the other hand, manifested that Rule 143 of the
Rules of Court specifically provides that the said rules shall not apply election cases except by
analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.
Aragones opposed the Motion to Dismiss the Petition in the Special Civil Action praying that
the same be denied outright. He argued that the action filed before the RTC was an independent
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, not a petition for certiorari as a mode of
appeal. The petition was also not a case filed with the RTC in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. He also
pointed out that the petition involved was not an election matter, but one that involved a violation
of constitutional rights; a violation of the order of the Court suspending a lawyer, which suspension
was yet to be lifted; and a violation of Section 14, Article VI of the Constitution, which prohibits a
member of the Senate or the House of Representatives from personally appearing as counsel in any
court of justice.
On September 2, 2002, Judge Barillo filed a Comment/Answer in the Special Civil Action,
wherein he outlined the proceedings undertaken in the MTC and once more pleaded the lack of
jurisdiction of the RTC over the Petition filed by Aragones.
On October 28, 2002, the RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 64, (RTC Br.64) promulgated a
Decision in the Special Civil Action granting Aragones petition. As such, it has been declared that
the proceedings in the MTC before Judge Barillo were null and void. Apparently, despite the date of
the said decision, the same was released only on December 3, 2002.
On November 25, 2002, presumably before he received a copy of the aforementioned RTC
Decision, Judge Barillo filed an Urgent Motion for Immediate Resolution of the Special Civil Action.
Insisting on the lack of jurisdiction of the RTC, Judge Barillo sought the immediate rendition of the
RTC Decision on the said issue, given the impending retirement of RTC Judge Felix G. Gaudiel, Jr. on
December 4, 2002 and in order that the decision in the Election Case may be finally promulgated.
On November 27, 2002, the MTC of Guihulngan, through Judge Barillo, rendered a Decision
in the Election Case stating that RTC Br.64 has no jurisdiction to hear and decide said case involving
a barangay election case because the same is vested or conferred by law to the Municipal Trial
Court pursuant to Section 1, Rule 37 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. It also held that it was
Lasola who actually won in the said election.
Soon after, on December 2, 2002, Judge Barillo issued an Order in the Election Case
disclosing the fact that he allegedly received on November 26, 2002 the Decision of the RTC Br.64 in
the Special Civil Action, which dismissed the petition for lack of factual and legal merits. Judge
Barillo then directed the Clerk of Court of the MTC to issue to the parties therein the Notices of
Promulgation of the MTC Decision on December 9, 2002, in compliance with Section 19, Rule 37 of
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the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. As stated in the said provision, Judge Barillo warned that no
motion for reconsideration would be entertained.
On December 5, 2002, Aragones filed a Manifestation and Motion in the Election Case,
praying for the cancellation of the scheduled promulgation of the said MTC Decision. He declared
that he had not yet received the Decision of the RTC Br. 64 in the Special Civil Action, purportedly
dismissing his petition. As regards the prohibition on the filing of a motion for reconsideration, he
insisted that his constitutional right to due process should not be undermined by judicial
pronouncements, which had no basis in law. He also accused Judge Barillo of being biased and
partial, seeing the latters personal interest in resolving the election protest with undue haste in
favor of Lasola.
On December 12, 2002, Judge Barillo filed a Manifestation in the Special Civil Action
notifying the RTC of the fact that on November 26, 2002, a day before the promulgation of the said
MTC Decision in the Election Case, the Clerk of Court of the MTC allegedly received through
personal delivery by RTC personnel the RTC Decision dated October 28, 2002 which dismissed
Aragones Petition for lack of merit. Thus, on December 9, 2002, the promulgation of the MTC
Decision proceeded as scheduled. Therein, he also averred that on December 10, 2002, he received
another RTC Decision dated October 28, 2002, which, allegedly to his surprise, had a dispositive
portion completely opposite to the decision he previously received. Nonetheless, he posited that the
above RTC Decisions, whether or not affirmative of his actions, were null and void since the
jurisdiction to hear and decide a barangay election case is vested in the MTC and the COMELEC. He
argued that the second RTC Decision granting Aragones petition was already moot and academic
and contravened the provisions of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
On December 16, 2002, Lasola filed a Motion for Execution of the MTC Decision dated
November 27, 2002 in the Election Case given the failure of Aragones to file an appeal thereof
within five days after the promulgation of the said Decision on December 9, 2002. In a Resolution,
on the same date, Judge Barillo, ordered him to assume and take his oath of office as the duly
elected Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Guihulngan, Negros Oriental. The next day, the MTC Clerk of
Court issued an Entry of Final Judgment, certifying that the said MTC Decision in the Election Case
became final and executory on December 16, 2002.
On December 27, 2002, Aragones filed a Motion for Direct Contempt against Judge Barillo,
which was lodged with the RTC Br.64, then presided over by Judge Rosendo B. Bandal, Jr and
docketed as Special Civil Action No. 02-03-G. However, the said motion was denied. Judge Bandal
held that the Decision of Judge Gaudiel, Jr. in the Special Civil Action which granted Aragones
Petition and declared null and void the proceedings before the MTC, was without legal basis for
absence of jurisdiction. He ruled that Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction over election cases
involving barangay officials.
On January 8, 2003, Aragones instituted with the Comelec Second Division a Petition to
Declare Null and Void the Decision dated November 27, 2002, Certiorari, Prohibition, [and]
Mandamus, with Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, which
was docketed as SPR No. 2-2003. In a Comment/Answer dated February 10, 2003, Judge Barillo
again pleaded the lack of jurisdiction of the RTC in the Special Civil Action, as well as the finality of
the MTC Decision in the Election Case, in view of the failure of Aragones to file an appeal.
Page 50 of 110

In a Resolution dated June 11, 2003, the COMELEC Second Division granted the petition
filed by Aragones in SPR No. 2-2003. Disagreeing with the said ruling, Judge Barillo filed with the
Court, on July 1, 2003, the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which
was docketed as G.R. No. 159117.
On August 5, 2003, another Petition for Certiorari was filed with this Court, this time by
Lasola, likewise assailing the Resolution dated June 11, 2003 of the COMELEC Second Division.
However, the same was dismissed as the full deposit for costs was not paid and the petition was not
accompanied by a legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the questioned resolution.
Lasola sought a reconsideration of the aforesaid resolution, but the same was denied with finality.
On January 8, 2003, the same day that the petition in SPR No. 2-2003 was filed, Aragones
likewise filed a Complaint with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), charging Judge Barillo
with violations of his constitutional rights, violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, manifest bias
and partiality, gross ignorance of the law and abuse of authority. The charges in the complaint
pertained to the acts of Judge Barillo of rendering and promulgating the Decision dated November
27, 2002 in the Election Case; allowing Atty. Paras to appear and represent a party in the MTC; and
pleading the case of Lasola in the Special Civil Action.
On January 30, 2004, Aragones filed in G.R. No. 159117 a Manifestation and/or Motion for
Consolidation with Leave of Court, asking for the consolidation of the said petition filed by Judge
Barillo with the administrative case (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1752) initiated by Aragones. Hence, the two
cases were ordered consolidated.
Issue:
Whether Judge Barillo shall be held administratively liable.
Ruling:
The Court rules that Judge Barillo is guilty of simple misconduct in view of the commission
of acts which subjected the MTC to distrust and accusations of partiality. Thus, we find that the
penalty of suspension for a period of three months is in order.
In the case at bar, the Court finds that Judge Barillos deportment fell below the level
required of the members of the bench. The Court did not fail to note that the various controversies
in this case began immediately after the filing of the election protest before his sala. Specifically, the
conflict first arose when he allowed Atty. Paras to appear and represent Lasola despite the motion
for the said counsels disqualification filed by Aragones. It was manifested that, on October 18,
2000, Atty. Paras was suspended by the Court in the administrative case A.C. No. 5333 for a period
of one year and six months, to be served simultaneously. The suspension order became effective on
May 23, 2001 when Atty. Paras received a copy of the Courts Resolution denying with finality his
Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, his suspension should have lasted until May 23, 2002. In the
Order dated August 2, 2002 in the Election Case, Judge Barillo ordered Atty. Paras to appear during
the subsequent scheduled hearings of the case, unless he received a copy of a Supreme Court
resolution ordering the latters suspension or disbarment. Subsequently, Judge Barillo tried to
justify the said Order by claiming that the suspension of Atty. Paras was for a period of one year
only, which has already lapsed before the filing of the Election Case on July 24, 2002. Judge Barillo is
grievously mistaken. Verily, it has been settled that the lifting of an order of suspension is not
Page 51 of 110

automatic upon the end of the period stated in the Courts decision, and an order from the Court
lifting the suspension at the end of the period is necessary in order to enable a lawyer to resume the
practice of his profession.
To aggravate this mistake, there was no showing from Judge Barillo that he exerted any
effort at all to ascertain the correct rule or procedure regarding the lifting of suspension of lawyers,
or to determine if the suspension of Atty. Paras had indeed already been lifted before the said
counsel was allowed to resume his practice of law. Significantly, upon verification by the Court of
the status of the suspension of Atty. Paras, it appeared that, based on the records of the Office of the
Bar Confidant, the suspension imposed on Atty. Paras was yet to be lifted. In our opinion, Judge
Barillo was negligent in failing to confirm such fact.
As regards the act of Judge Barillo of filing the Petition for Certiorari subject of the instant
case, the Court finds the same to be highly irregular. He should be a mere nominal party in the
proceedings where his decisions or orders are being assailed. In the instant case, he even preempted the petition filed by Lasola, the real party aggrieved by the COMELEC Resolution dated June
11, 2003. In so doing, he gave the impression of manifest bias and partiality in favor of Lasola, for
which infraction he should be held liable.
In connection with the two apparently conflicting Decisions of the RTC of Negros Oriental,
Branch 64, in the Special Civil Action, it is clear that the first RTC Decision purportedly dismissing
the petition filed by Aragones could not be established to be an authentic issuance from the RTC.
His attitude towards the first RTC Decision was both cavalier and careless. What is baffling is that
he did not care to question the dubious circumstances surrounding the first RTC Decision since, in
his own words, the same was in his favor. Avowedly, he was candid enough to admit that after he
received the first RTC Decision, he immediately promulgated the MTC Decision. With respect to the
second RTC Decision, which was in fact certified by the RTC Clerk of Court to be the authentic
Decision in the Special Civil Action, he was equally dismissive. He merely brushed aside the same on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC over the petition filed by Aragones. The
Court, therefore, finds that Judge Barillo was at the very least decidedly lackadaisical in the
management of the affairs of his sala.
The above disquisition notwithstanding, the Court is not convinced that Judge Barillo
should be held liable for gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law absent any evidence
showing outright bad faith. For administrative liability to attach it must be established that the
respondent was moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other like motive. In the instant
case, it may truly be said that the various faux pas committed by Judge Barillo are examples of poor
judgment and negligence. However, equally important to note is the fact that there is no allegation,
much less a genuine showing, that he was impelled by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other
corrupt motive in committing the acts for which he was charged. Neither were allegations of
corruption nor imputations of pecuniary benefit ever asserted against him. Indeed, what Judge
Barillo had been harking on during the entirety of the proceeding before him was the provision of
Section 17, Rule 37 of the 1988 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which mandates that "the court shall
decide the protest within fifteen (15) days from its filing and shall declare who among the parties
has been elected, or in a proper case, that none of them has been legally elected." Thus, contrary to
the findings of the OCA, the transgressions committed by Judge Barillo in this case are not flagrant
enough or motivated by any ill motive so as to be classified as grave misconduct or to warrant a
finding of gross ignorance of the law.
Page 52 of 110

CECILIA GADRINAB SENARLO vs. JUDGE MAXIMO G.W. PADERANGA, RTC, BRANCH 38,
CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2025, April 5, 2010, J. Leonardo-De Castro
A judge must not sacrifice the orderly administration of justice in favor of a speedy but reckless
disposition of a case. A prudent judge should have ascertained the facts before reaching conclusions
and issuing orders. Thus, a judge is liable for simple negligence in dismissing a case due to the nonappearance of the plaintiff on the scheduled date for mediation, the latter being declared a regular
holiday and despite the request for the resetting of the same.
Facts:
Civil Case No. 2005-160, an action for reconveyance and quieting of title, was instituted by
Lorna Cabarrubias Bacalzo (Bacalzo) against the Archbishop of the Roman Catholic Church of
Cagayan de Oro City before the RTC Branch 38 of Cagayan de Oro City, presided over by Judge
Maximo Paderanga. As she was already residing in the United States of America, she was
represented by her granddaughter, Cecilia Gadrinab Senarlo (Senarlo), herein petitioner.
In an Order dated October 7, 2005, Judge Paderanga referred the said case for mediation to
the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC) and set November 4, 2005 for the conduct of mediation
proceedings. Subsequently, on October 14, 2005, Presidential Proclamation No. 993 was issued
declaring November 4, 2005 a regular holiday, in celebration of the Feast of Ramadan (Eidl Fitr). As
such, Bacalzo, who arrived from the U.S.A., went with her counsel to the PMC on November 7, 2005,
instead of November 4, 2005. On the said date, they also signed a Request for Resetting of
Mediation Conference which was, however, not signed by the respondent who failed to appear.
Thereafter, she again executed another undated request for resetting which was approved.
Regardless of the resetting of the PMC mediation proceedings, Judge Paderanga issued on
November 9, 2005 an Order dismissing the said case per mediators report that both parties failed
to appear and declared that the plaintiff is non-suited. Consequently, Senarlo filed the present
administrative Complaint against Judge Paderanga for gross ignorance of the law, knowingly
rendering unjust judgment, and grave abuse of authority,
The OCA in its recommendation found Judge Paderanga guilty of grave abuse of authority
and accordingly meted a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos.
Issue:
Whether Judge Paderanga is liable for grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the
law in issuing the afore-mentioned Order.
Ruling:
The Court, although finding that Judge Paderanga is administratively liable for issuing the
assailed Order, does not fully agree with the findings and conclusions of the OCA.
To the eyes of this Court, Judge Paderanga is not guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
procedure. A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA otherwise known as the Second Revised Guidelines for the
Implementation of Mediation Proceedings and Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court grant judges
Page 53 of 110

the discretion to dismiss an action for failure of the plaintiff to appear at mediation proceedings
which is considered a part of pre-trial.
While there was ostensible legal basis for Judge Paderanga to dismiss an action for failure of
the plaintiff to attend the mediation conference, his Order of dismissal was improperly and
prematurely issued. He failed to take into consideration that Bacalzo could not have attended the
mediation conference scheduled on November 4, 2005 because the said date had been declared a
regular holiday. As the said declaration was a development totally outside Bacalzos control, she
should not be sanctioned with the dismissal of Civil Case No. 2005-160.
While it is true that when he issued the said Order, November 4, 2005 had not yet been
declared a holiday, Presidential Proclamation No. 933 was issued only on October 14, 2005.
Nevertheless, the Order dismissing the said case was issued by him on November 9, 2005, well after
the issuance of Presidential Proclamation No. 933 on October 14, 2005, and the actual celebration
of the holiday of Eidl Fitr on November 4, 2005. By the time he ordered Civil Case No. 2005-160
dismissed, he should have already been aware that November 4, 2005 was a regular holiday.
Judge Paderanga cannot entirely put the blame on the supposedly misleading Mediators
Report received on November 8, 2005, taking into consideration that his assailed order of dismissal
was issued immediately the next day. The said report indicated a request for the resetting of the
mediation conference. He could have easily inquired with the PMC or required them to explain the
reason for the resetting. Yet, he no longer bothered to do so. Without providing any reasons
therefor, he chose to ignore the request for resetting and immediately ordered the dismissal of the
said case. His action is contrary to the policy that the judge referring the case to mediation should
extend to the mediator every possible support and assistance. Courts and litigants should give the
mediation process a fair chance to work in order for mediation to become an effective tool in
facilitating amicable settlement of cases.
A heavy workload does not excuse Judge Paderanga from ascertaining all pertinent facts
that would have enabled him to justly resolve or decide a case. A judge must not sacrifice the
orderly administration of justice in favor of a speedy but reckless disposition of a case. A prudent
judge should have ascertained the facts before reaching conclusions and issuing orders. It is
routinary in every case that the judge carefully evaluates facts before issuing an order in court.
Otherwise, the judge may be held liable for culpable negligence.
Evidently, Judge Paderanga failed to exercise the necessary diligence before issuing the said
Order of dismissal, to the prejudice of Bacalzo. This, however, makes him liable for simple
negligence, and not gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of authority, as charged by Senarlo.
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, which pertains to the Discipline
of Justices and Judges, does not provide any penalty for simple negligence. The Court, though,
deems simple negligence as falling within the ambit of simple misconduct which is considered a less
serious offense, sanctioned with suspension without pay for not less than one month but not more
than three months, or a fine of not less than Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) but not exceeding
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00). In the case at bar, his personal records show that he had
been charged with and found guilty of committing several other administrative infractions, and that
he was already dismissed from service. Hence, for the simple negligence he committed, the Court
imposes upon Judge Paderanga a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) to be deducted from his
accrued leave credits withheld by the Court.
Page 54 of 110

RE: CASES SUBMITTED FOR DECISION BEFORE HON. TERESITO A. ANDOY, former Judge,
Municipal Trial Court, Cainta, Rizal
A.M. No. 09-9-163-MTC, May 6, 2010, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Every judge should decide cases with dispatch and should be careful, punctual, and observant
in the performance of his functions for delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence
of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute. However, in imposing
the penalty of fine, other circumstances may be considered such as the judges continuous service in
the judiciary, his avowed dire need of funds, and his expressed willingness to abide by whatever
penalty the Court may impose upon him.
Facts:
Judge Andoy, former Judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Cainta, Rizal, compulsorily
retired on October 3, 2008. In his request for the approval of his retirement papers, he particularly
asked for the payment of his earned vacation/sick leaves, as well as the release of his withheld
September 2008 Special Allowance for the Judiciary (SAJ) allowance, loyalty award checks, and all
other allowances to which he was entitled prior to his retirement. Thereafter, a computation of the
said benefits was rendered by the Fiscal Management Office of the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA). Judge Andoy, for his part, admitted having unaccounted property accountabilities in the
amount of P16,284.20 and a pending administrative case (MTJ-09-1738), but expressed his
willingness to pay for whatever penalty would be imposed upon him by means of deduction from
his retirement benefits. In the end, he prayed that a clearance be issued with respect to the
monetary value of his accumulated leave credits so that the release of his retirement benefits may
already be processed.
Based on the list prepared by Celestina I. Cuevas, and certified by Leticia C. Perez, Clerk of
Court II, MTC, Cainta, Rizal, Judge Andoy failed to resolve within the reglementary period 139 cases
submitted for decision. As such, the OCA recommended that he be fined in the amount of SEVENTY
THOUSAND (P70,000.00) PESOS for gross inefficiency, the amount to be deducted from the
retirement/gratuity benefits due him.
Issue:
Whether the OCA has recommended the appropriate penalty in the amount of Seventy
Thousand (70, 000.00) Pesos.
Ruling:
The Court agrees in the findings of the OCA, except as to the recommended penalty.
Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution mandates lower court judges to decide a
case within the reglementary period of 90 days. The Code of Judicial Conduct under Rule 3.05 of
Canon 3 likewise enunciates that judges should administer justice without delay and directs every
judge to dispose of the courts business promptly within the period prescribed by law. Rules
prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are indispensable to prevent needless
delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of cases. Thus, the 90-day period is mandatory.
Page 55 of 110

The Court has consistently impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and
expeditiously under the time-honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied. Every judge
should decide cases with dispatch and should be careful, punctual, and observant in the
performance of his functions for delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of
our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute. Failure to decide a case
within the reglementary period is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the
imposition of administrative sanctions on the defaulting judge.
The inefficiency of Judge Andoy is evident in his failure to decide 139 cases within the
mandatory reglementary period for no apparent reason. Some of these cases have been submitted
for resolution as early as 1997. Judge Andoy, upon finding himself unable to comply with the 90-day
period, could have asked the Court for a reasonable period of extension to dispose of the cases. The
Court, mindful of the heavy caseload of judges, generally grants such requests for extension. Yet,
Judge Andoy also failed to make such a request.
Under the new amendments to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a
decision or order is a less serious charge, for which the respondent judge shall be penalized with
either (a) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more
than three months; or (b) a fine of more than P10,000.00, but not more than P20,000.00. The fines
imposed on each judge may vary, depending on the number of cases undecided or matters
unresolved by said judge beyond the reglementary period, plus the presence of aggravating or
mitigating circumstances, such as the damage suffered by the parties as a result of the delay, the
health and age of the judge, etc. Moreover, the Court also variably set the fines at more than the
maximum amount, usually when the judges undue delay was coupled with other offenses.
In the case at bar, while the Court agrees that the total number of cases which Judge Andoy
failed to timely decide, act on, or archive, merits a fine higher than that prescribed by the rules, it
deems that a fine of P40,000.00 is already sufficient penalty given Judge Andoys 21 years of
continuous service in the judiciary, his avowed dire need of funds, and his expressed willingness to
abide by whatever penalty the Court may impose upon him.
OLIVIA LAUREL, Court Stenographer III, DIANA RAMOS, Utility Worker, both of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 25, Bian, Laguna and HERMINIA JAVIER, Clerk III, RTC-Office of the
Clerk of Court, Bian, Laguna, and ALBERTO R. NOFUENTE, 3rd Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor of Laguna vs. JUDGE PABLO B. FRANCISCO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 26, Sta. Cruz, Laguna
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1992, July 6, 2010, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Judge Francisco filed contempt against his two employees which thereby is baseless. It is wellsettled that the power to punish a person in contempt of court is inherent in all courts to preserve
order in judicial proceedings and to uphold the orderly administration of justice. However, judges are
enjoined to exercise the power judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in
view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, and not for
retaliation or vindictiveness. It bears stressing that the power to declare for contempt must be
exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of
punishment.
Facts:
Page 56 of 110

Judge Francisco was originally assigned as the Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 26 of Sta.
Cruz, Laguna. After encountering a disconcerting problem in an election case, Judge Francisco
requested that he be detailed elsewhere. He was thereafter detailed as the acting Presiding Judge of
RTC-Branch 25 of Bian, Laguna from January 1996 to January 1998, and then of RTC-Branch 24,
also of Bian, Laguna, from February 1998 to September 1998. At first, the relations between Judge
Francisco and the personnel of the RTC of Bian, Laguna, were friendly and harmonious, but
animosity crept in after some time. Even then Executive Judge Helario Corcuera (Executive Judge
Corcuera) and Judge Rodrigo Cosico of the RTC of Bian, Laguna, were brought into the fray, with
Judge Francisco filing various administrative complaints against the previous two judges, which
were eventually dismissed. Two (2) employees and one (1) from the Office of the Clerk of Court and
even the Assistant Provincial Public Prosecutor were likewise victims of his suspicious mind when
he cited them in direct contempt based on concocted ideas which could have cost their liberties for
a period of nine (9) days if not for the timely temporary restraining order issued by the Honorable
Court of Appeals
Issue:
Whether or not the contempt case filed by Judge Francisco against his employees would
prosper
Ruling:
No. the cases filed by Judge Francisco for contempt will not prosper
Contempt of court is defined as "some act or conduct which tends to interfere with the
business of the court, by a refusal to obey some lawful order of the court, or some act of disrespect
to the dignity of the court which in some way tends to interfere with or hamper the orderly
proceedings of the court and thus lessens the general efficiency of the same." It has also been
described as "a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to
bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice
parties litigants or their witnesses during litigation." Simply put, it is despising of the authority,
justice, or dignity of the court.
Direct contempt is one done "in the presence of or so near the court or judge as to obstruct
the administration of justice." It is a contumacious act done facie curiae and may be punished
summarily without hearing. In other words, one may be summarily adjudged in direct contempt at
the very moment or at the very instance of the commission of the act of contumely. Considering that
the acts alluded to as the basis by which the Respondent [Judge Francisco] declared the petitioners
[Javier, Laurel, Ramos, and Pros. Nofuente] in contempt of court, are neither constitutive of direct or
indirect contempt, this Court is of the opinion that the Order of Respondent declaring petitioners in
contempt and imposing a penalty of nine (9) days imprisonment is a GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION. Judge Franciscos issuance of the Direct Contempt Order is completely baseless and
unjustified. There is utter lack of evidence that Javier, Laurel, Ramos, and Pros. Nofuente committed
any contemptuous act. Other than his own allegations, Judge Franciscos only evidence to prove that
Pros. Nofuente disrupted the hearing of Sp. Proc. No. B-2433 on July 14, 1998 was the TSN for said
proceedings, taken down by Lopez. The testimonies of Lopez and Sevilla prove that although
distracted by the outside noise, Judge Francisco was still able to proceed with and finish the hearing
of Spec. Proc. No. B-2433 on July 14, 1998. Moreover, during and immediately after said hearing,
Judge Francisco was unaware of who made the noise, so he could not have summarily cited anyone
for direct contempt.
Page 57 of 110

It is well-settled that the power to punish a person in contempt of court is inherent in all
courts to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold the orderly administration of justice.
However, judges are enjoined to exercise the power judiciously and sparingly, with utmost
restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the
dignity of the court, and not for retaliation or vindictiveness. It bears stressing that the power to
declare for contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the
corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment. The integrity of the judiciary rests not only upon
the fact that it is able to administer justice but also upon the perception and confidence of the
community that the people who run the system have done justice. The assumption of office by a
judge places upon him duties and restrictions peculiar to his exalted position. He is the visible
representation of law and justice. He must be perceived, not as a repository of arbitrary power, but
as one who dispenses justice under the sanction of the rule of law. The behavior and conduct of
judges must reaffirm the peoples faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be
done but must also be seen to be done. In the present case, respondent Judge may not have been
urged by ulterior motives in citing complainant in contempt and in subsequently sending him to jail
for putting off the lights in the 12th floor including his sala; nevertheless, his actuation can easily be
perceived as being a repository of arbitrary power. His actuation must never serve to fuel suspicion
over a misuse of the prestige of his office to enhance his personal interest.
ATTY. JOSE A. BERNAS vs. JUDGE JULIA A. REYES, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH
69, PASIGCITY
A.M. No. MTJ-09-1728, July 21, 2010, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Judge was charged of being manifest bias, partiality and grave abuse of authority. The court
ruled Established is the norm that judges should not only be impartial but should also appear
impartial. Judges must not only render just, correct and impartial decisions, but must do so in a
manner free from any suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and integrity.
Facts:
Atty. Jose A. Bernas was the counsel for Oakridge Properties, Inc. (Oakridge) in an eviction
suit filed by the latter against Atty. Joseph M. Alejandro, a tenant in one of its condominium units,
who had refused to pay rentals and common expenses. For his part, Atty. Alejandro explained that
his failure to pay rentals was justified since the air-conditioning unit which Oakridge provided in
the leased premises was allegedly defective. During the pendency of the eviction suit, Oakridge
padlocked the leased premises, alleging that it was authorized to do so by the terms and conditions
of the Contract of Lease. Respondent Judge rendered a Decision which effectively disposed of the
matter covered by the show cause order, as well as the merits of the case itself, notwithstanding the
fact that there was still a pre-scheduled hearing and several motions pending action from
respondent Judge. Hence, the instant complaint alleging that Judge Julia Reyes displayed gross
ignorance of the law and manifest partiality. Atty. Jose A. Bernas alleged that Judge Julia Reyes
committed a flagrant violation of the rules when she unduly extended the 20-day lifetime of a
TRO. Likewise, complainant maintained that respondent Judge erroneously granted a relief which
was not prayed for and even awarded damages which were way beyond the jurisdiction of a firstlevel court.
Issue:
Page 58 of 110

Whether or not the Judge Julia Reyes is guilty of manifest bias, partiality, and grave abuse of
authority
Ruling:
Yes. Judge Julia Reyes is guilty of manifest bias, partiality, and grave abuse of authority
A resolution of the Supreme Court requiring comment on an administrative complaint
against officials and employees of the judiciary should not be construed as a mere request from the
Court. Nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively. Respondents in
administrative complaints should comment on all accusations or allegations against them because
it is their duty to preserve the integrity of the judiciary. In the instant case, the respondent judges
continued failure to comply with the directive of the Court underscores her lack of respect for and
defiance of authority. Respectful obedience to the dictates of the law and justice is expected of every
judge. Willfully omitting to comply with the Courts directive already exposes the respondent judge
to administrative sanction.
Thus, in the case of Wingarts v. Mejia, this Court ruled: A judge should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence and should administer justice impartially and without
delay. He should be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence, dispose of the courts
business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. This reminder applies even more
to lower court judges like herein respondent because they are judicial front-liners who have direct
contact with litigants.
As a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his
official duties renders him liable. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a
judge in his official capacity do not always constitute misconduct although said acts may be
erroneous. It is true that a judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment absent proof that
such error was made with a conscious and deliberate intent to cause an injustice. This does not
mean, however, that a judge need not observe propriety, discreetness and due care in the
performance of his official functions. Indeed, all members of the Bench are enjoined to behave at all
times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
NARCISO BERNARDO, JR. vs. JUDGE PETER M. MONTOJO, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT,
ROMBLON
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1754, October 20, 2010, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Canons 2, 6 and 31 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, provide, respectively, that the
administration of justice should be speedy and careful that judges should be prompt in disposing of
all matters submitted to them, remembering that justice delayed is often justice denied and that in
the discharge of his judicial duties, a judge should be conscientious thorough.
Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct expressly directs that a judge should dispose
of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.
Facts:
Narciso Bernardo (Bernardo) is one of the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 4173-4176, all
entitled People of the Philippines v. Narciso Bernardo, et al., for violation of Sections 86, 89, 90, and
Page 59 of 110

104 of Republic Act No. 8550, otherwise known as The Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998. He is also
a member of the Kooperatiba sa Ikauunlad ng Mga Maliit na Mangingisda ng Romblon (KAMMARO),
a cooperative which filed Civil Case No. 490, entitled KAMMARO (Kooperatiba sa Ikauunlad ng Mga
Maliit na Mangingisda ng Romblon), Eddie Cajilig, et al. v. Perpetuo Ylagan, et al., for damages. All
these cases had been pending before respondent Judge Montojos sala.
He filed and administrative complaint against Judge Peter Montojo (Judge Montojo) for
undue delay in the disposition of Criminal Case Nos. 4173-4176 and Civil Case No. 490.
Judge Montojo conducted only two hearings on August 16, 2007 and October 9, 2007 in
Criminal Case Nos. 4173-4176. Since the October 9, 2007 hearing, Judge Montojo no longer acted
upon said criminal cases.
Bernardo alleged that he was supposed to be arraigned during the hearing of Criminal Case
Nos. 4173-4176 on August 16, 2007, but he did not have any counsel to represent him. Although
Bernardo wanted to wait for a lawyer from the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), Judge Montojo
wanted to proceed with his arraignment, intimating that he could be represented by Atty. Karen
Silverio Buffe (Atty. Buffe), the Clerk of Court of the RTC Romblon, Branch 81. But, Atty. Buffe said
after hearing that she was proscribed from representing any party in a case.
Bernardo further questioned Judge Montojos private talk with Atty. Jay Formilleza (Atty.
Formilleza) inside the court staff room in one instance. Atty. Formilleza represented all the accused
in Criminal Case Nos. 4173-4176, except complainant Bernardo. He claimed that he was dropped as
client by Atty. Formilleza because said lawyer is the employee of Romblon Provincial Governor
Natalio Beltran III, who belonged to the same election ticket as Judge Montojos son, Romblon
Municipal Mayor Gerard Montojo; while complainant Bernardo openly supported the Montojos
political rival in the last election.
Bernardo moved for Judge Montojos inhibition from Criminal Case Nos. 4173-4176, but
Judge Montojo refused. Bernardo called attention to a similar delay in Civil Case No. 490. Judge
Montojos last action in said civil case was in November 2007, when he conducted a hearing on
therein defendants Motion to Dismiss. Judge Montojo attributed the delay in Criminal Case Nos.
4173-4176 to complainant Bernardo himself, who insisted on being represented by a PAO lawyer.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Montojo acted with undue delay in the disposition of Criminal Case
Nos. 4173-4176 and Civil Case No. 490.
Ruling:
Judge Montojo is guilty of unjustified delay in resolving Criminal Case Nos. 4173-4176 and
Civil Case No. 490.
Canons 2, 6 and 31 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, provide, respectively, that the
administration of justice should be speedy and careful; that judges should be prompt in disposing of
all matters submitted to them, remembering that justice delayed is often justice denied; and that in
the discharge of his judicial duties, a judge should be conscientious and thorough. Moreover, Rule
Page 60 of 110

3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct expressly directs that a judge should dispose of the
courts business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.
The Court cannot overstress the policy on prompt disposition or resolution of cases. Delay
in case disposition is a major culprit in the erosion of public faith and confidence in the judiciary
and the lowering of its standards. The suffering endured by just one person whether plaintiff,
defendant or accused while awaiting a judgment that may affect his life, honor, liberty or property,
taints the entire judiciarys performance in its solemn task of administering justice.
Judge Montojos reason for the delay in resolving Criminal Case Nos. 4173-4176, i.e.,
complainant Bernardos insistence on being represented by a PAO lawyer, is not acceptable. A judge
should not be at the mercy of the whims of lawyers and parties for it is not their convenience which
should be the primordial consideration but the administration of justice. Judge Montojos duty was
to ascertain that complainant Bernardo was properly represented during trial and Judge Montojo
could have complied therewith by appointing a counsel de oficio for Bernardo.
Respondent Judge Montojos delay in acting on pending cases clearly demonstrated his
inefficiency. A judge should at all times remain in full control of the proceedings in his sala. Court
management is ultimately his responsibility.
The Court, though, dismisses complainant Bernardos charge that respondent Judge Montojo
was manipulating Criminal Case Nos. 4173-4176 and Civil Case No. 490 for political reasons. Other
than his bare allegations, complainant Bernardo was unable to substantiate the same with any
evidence. The basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence, and is not equivalent to proof.
ATTY. NORLINDA R. AMANTE-DESCALLAR vs. HON. REINERIO (ABRAHAM) B. RAMAS
A judges submission of false certificates of service seriously undermines and reflects on the
honesty and integrity expected of an officer of the court. This is so because a certificate of service is not
merely a means to one's paycheck but is an instrument by which the Court can fulfill the constitutional
mandate of the people ' s right to a speedy disposition of cases.
Facts:
This case stemmed from Administrative Case No. 05-222-P instituted by Judge Reinerio
(Abraham) B. Ramas (Judge Ramas) of the RTC-Branch 18 of Pagadian City, Zamboanga del Sur,
against Atty. Norlinda R. Amante-Descallar (Atty. Descallar), Clerk of Court of the same court, for
Grave Misconduct. Atty. Descallar allegedly showed the unopened ballot boxes inside Judge Ramas
chambers to a certain Allan Singedas (Singedas).
In a Verified Comment/Counter-Complaint, Atty. Descallar vehemently denied the
accusations against her and countercharged Judge Ramas of bringing home a complete set of
computer, which was submitted as evidence in Criminal Case Nos. 5294 and 5295, entitled People v.
Tesoro, Jr., for Theft. She also accused Judge Ramas of dishonesty when the latter did not reflect in
his Certificates of Service for May and June 2005 his absences on May 12 and 13, 2005; for several
more days after promulgation of the decision in Election Protest Case No. 0001-2K4 on May 16,
2005; and from June 1 to 21, 2005.
Page 61 of 110

Atty. Cerilles claimed to know Judge Ramas very well since the latter is his godfather and
wedding sponsor. Atty. Cerilles admitted that he had many pending cases before Judge Ramas sala,
including Criminal Case No. 04-7003, entitled People v. Dizon, for Slight Illegal Detention, which
involved his grandnephews. On May 12, 2005, Atty. Cerilles went to the RTC-Branch 18 to find out if
his grandnephews Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation could be heard. However, upon inquiry, he
was told that Judge Ramas was not around because his estranged wife arrived. When Atty. Cerilles
returned to the RTC-Branch 18 the following day, May 13, 2005, he was informed that Judge Ramas
was still absent.
Atty. Descallar testified that Judge Ramas failed to indicate his absences on May 12, 13, 24,
and 27 to 30, 2005, and June 1 to 21, 2005 in his Certificates of Service for the months of May and
June 2005. The absence of Judge Ramas can be gleaned from the court calendar of hearings and his
failure to attend the raffle of cases done every Thursday of the week. Also, the Omnibus Order dated
May 23, 2005 issued by Judge Ramas manifested his momentary desistance from performing
judicial functions from May 24, 2005 onwards.
Judge Ramas refuted the charges against him in his Memorandum, in which he averred that:
On May 12, 2005, he was late in coming to the office because he has to make the draft decision of
the much awaited election protest case at home. It was very lengthy as it involved several precincts.
In fact, on the same date, May 12, 2005, he was still able to officiate a marriage. On May 13, 2005,
the undersigned did go to the office and issued an order setting the promulgation of the decision to
May 16, 2005. Such order is a part of the record of Election Protest Case No. 0001-2K4. It was not
cowardice to shy away from imminent danger; it was the best thing to do under the circumstances.
He was betrayed by his own Clerk of Court. Such betrayal is the subject of the Administrative
Complaint.
The court agrees with the conclusion that Judge Ramas is guilty of declaring untruthful
statements in his Certificates of Service for May and June 2005.
Issue:
Whether or not the Judge Ramas is guilty of making untruthful statements in his Certificates
of Service for the months of May and June 2005.
Ruling:
The Court views Judge Ramas conduct as inexcusable.
Judge Ramas is presumed to be aware of his duties and responsibilities under the Code of
Judicial Conduct. Canon 3 generally mandates that a judge should perform official duties honestly,
and with impartiality and diligence. Rule 3.01 requires that a judge be faithful to the law and
maintain professional competence, while Rule 3.09 commands a judge to observe high standards of
public service and fidelity at all times. Judge Ramas irrefragably failed to observe these standards
by making untruthful statements in his Certificates of Service to cover up his absences.
The Court has previously held that a judges submission of false certificates of service
seriously undermines and reflects on the honesty and integrity expected of an officer of the
court. This is so because a certificate of service is not merely a means to one's paycheck but is an
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instrument by which the Court can fulfill the constitutional mandate of the people ' s right to a
speedy disposition of cases.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. JUDGE MA. ELLEN M. AGUILAR, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 70, Burgos, Pangasinan
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2087, June 7, 2011, J. Leonardo-De Castro
The accomplishment of the PDS is a requirement under the Civil Service Rules and Regulations
for employment in the government. Since truthful completion of PDS is a requirement for employment
in the Judiciary, the importance of answering the same with candor need not be gainsaid.
Furthermore, in the determination of the penalties to be imposed, extenuating, mitigating,
aggravating or alternative circumstances attendant to the commission of the offense shall be
considered. Among the circumstances that may be allowed to modify the penalty are (1) length of
service in the government, (2) good faith, and (3) other analogous circumstances.
Facts:
Sometime on July 2, 1998, while Atty. Aguilar was still the Legal Officer of Olongapo City,
notarized a prepared real estate mortgage contract executed by Lourdes Sison (mortgagor) and
Angelina Cuevas (mortgagee). The document showed that it was a security for a loan of
P120,000.00. Later, the parties returned with a different document. It was obviously the same real
estate mortgage contract between the parties but the amount of the loan was now raised to
P140,000.00. Judge Aguilar notarized it in replacement of the previous document. Hence, the
second document carried the same entries like document number, book number and the like as the
first document. Either by oversight or inattentiveness, the secretary of Atty. Aguilar put the two
documents together.
Sometime in 2002, Arnel Sison, the son of mortgagor Lourdes Sison, discovered the
existence of the two documents with different amounts but one notarial document number.
Furious, he went to see then Atty. Aguilar. She explained to him the circumstances under which
both documents were notarized. Unappeased, Arnel Sison filed complaints for Falsification of Public
Document, Perjury and Estafa against Atty. Aguilar and Angelina Cuevas before (1) the Office of the
Regional State Prosecutor of Bataan and (2) the Office of the Ombudsman.
After preliminary investigation, Angelito V. Lumabas, Acting City Prosecutor of Olongapo
City, issued a Resolution dated March 2, 2004, dismissing the complaint for lack of probable cause.
Atty. Aguilar filed her retirement as City Legal Officer of Olongapo. She then filed an
application for the position of judge in Iba, Zambales. She accomplished and submitted a Personal
Data Sheet. In the said sheet, she remarked that she had no pending civil, criminal or administrative
(including disbarment) case or complaint filed against you pending before any court, prosecution
office, any other office, agency or instrumentality of the government, or the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. Atty. Aguilar was appointed as RTC Judge of Burgos, Pangasinan, on October 15, 2005.
After her appointment to the Judiciary, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon rendered a
Decision in OMB-L-A-03-0718-G on November 29, 2005, finding no liability on Atty. Aguilars part
for dishonesty but only for misconduct. Judge Aguilar filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied. However, the decision was modified as to the penalty imposed. It was changed from one
month suspension to a fine of one month pay.
Page 63 of 110
Atty. Aguilar assumed her judicial position on February 8, 2006. She accomplished another
PDS for submission to the Supreme Court on March 6, 2006. In the said PDS, she denied having been
formally charged, guilty of any administrative offense and convicted of any crime or violation of any
law, decree, ordinance or regulation by any court or tribunal.
On March 6, 2006, the Office of the Chief Justice (OCJ) received Ligayas undated letter,
bringing to the attention of said office two criminal cases still pending against Judge Aguilar. Then
Chief Justice Panganiban endorsed Ligayas letter to the JBC. Upon the recommendation of
succeeding Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao, the administrative matter was referred to the
Court of Appeals.
Investigating Justice Dy-Liacco Flores submitted her report, finding Judge Aguilar guilty of
dishonesty. She further recommended that the penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture of
all benefits except earned leave credits, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to
any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. On May 6, 2009, the
OCA, concurred with the findings of Investigating Justice Dy-Liacco Flores.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Aguilar is guilty of dishonesty
Ruling:
Yes. The Court agrees with the reports of the OCA and Investigating Justice Dy-Liacco Flores
adjudging Judge Aguilar guilty of dishonesty in filling out her PDS, but modifies the recommended
penalty of dismissal to suspension of six (6) months given the attendant circumstances.
The accomplishment of the PDS is a requirement under the Civil Service Rules and
Regulations for employment in the government. Since truthful completion of PDS is a requirement
for employment in the Judiciary, the importance of answering the same with candor need not be
gainsaid.
Judge Aguilars failure to disclose OMB-L-A-03-0718-G in her PDS filed upon her
assumption of office when she already had notice of the adverse decision therein constitutes
dishonesty, considered a grave offense under the Administrative Code of 1987, as well as the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (Civil Service Rules), with the
corresponding penalty of dismissal from service even for the first offense.
Nonetheless, Rule IV, Section 53 of the Civil Service Rules also provides that in the
determination of the penalties to be imposed, extenuating, mitigating, aggravating or alternative
circumstances attendant to the commission of the offense shall be considered. Among the
circumstances that may be allowed to modify the penalty are (1) length of service in the
government, (2) good faith, and (3) other analogous circumstances.
Drawing on the same compassion displayed by the Court in the foregoing catena of cases,
the Court should take into consideration the following mitigating circumstances existent in the case
at bar:
Page 64 of 110

a) The criminal complaint for falsification, perjury and estafa against Judge Aguilar was dismissed
by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for lack of probable cause. The administrative case against
Judge Aguilar was already decided by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, suspending
Judge Aguilar for one month (later modified to a fine equivalent to one month salary by reason of
her voluntary retirement from office) for misconduct but not for dishonesty. Both the dismissed
criminal complaint and decided administrative case against Judge Aguilar concern her notarization
of private documents that bore no relation to the performance of her functions as City Legal Officer;
b) Judge Aguilar appeared to have believed that she was authorized to notarize said private
documents as part of her duties as City Legal Officer, and she neither charged any fee nor received
any consideration therefor;
c) Setting aside for the moment her previous administrative case, Judge Aguilar had otherwise
strong credentials for her appointment as a judge;
d) Judge Aguilar has rendered more than 20 years of government service;
e) This is Judge Aguilars first and only administrative charge in the Judiciary for which she was
found guilty; and
f) Judge Aguilar readily acknowledged her offense, apologized, and promised to be more
circumspect and accurate in her future submissions.
Accordingly, the Court finds it appropriate to impose a suspension of six months without
pay in light of the above discussed extenuating circumstances.
ATTY. FACUNDO T. BAUTISTA vs. JUDGE BLAS O. CAUSAPIN, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 32, Guimba, Nueva Ecija
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2044, June 22, 2011, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Where the law involved is simple and elementary, lack of conversance therewith constitutes
gross ignorance of the law. Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural laws. They must know the laws and apply them properly in all good faith.
Judicial competence requires no less. The mistake committed by respondent Judge is not a mere error
of judgment that can be brushed aside for being minor. The disregard of established rule of law which
amounts to gross ignorance of the law makes a judge subject to disciplinary action.
Facts:
The heirs of Baudelio T. Bautista, represented by Delia R. Bautista through counsel, Atty.
Bautista, filed a Complaint for Partition before the RTC against Jose Bautista and Domingo T.
Bautista (defendants), docketed as Civil Case No. 1387-G. Civil Case No. 1387-G was raffled to Judge
Causapins branch.
Defendants had until January 26, 2006 to file their answer, but on January 24, 2006, they
filed a motion for an extension of 15 days within which to file the said pleading. Judge Causapin
granted defendants motion in an Order dated January 25, 2006. Three motions for an extension
was filed by the defendants which Judge Causapin has all granted.
Page 65 of 110

Plaintiffs countered by filing on March 27, 2006 a motion to declare defendants in default.
Judge Causapin set the plaintiffs motion for hearing on April 28, 2006. For 3 times, the defendants
were absent during the time set for the hearing on the motion. Hence, Judge Causapin rescheduled
and reset the same.
At the hearing on August 28, 2006, the parties and their counsels were present. Judge
Causapin finally submitted for resolution plaintiffs motion to declare defendants in default. In the
Resolution of Motion to Hold Defendants in Default3 dated September 18, 2006, Judge Causapin
dismissed the complaint without prejudice on the ground that plaintiffs Reynaldo Mesina and
Nancy Polangco did not sign the verification and certification on non-forum shopping.
Consequently, Atty. Bautista filed the present administrative Complaint against Judge
Causapin for Gross Ignorance of the Law, utter lack of professional competence and gross
misconduct for issuing (1) the Orders which granted defendants motions for extension of time to
file their without notice of hearing; and (2) the Resolution dated which summarily dismissed the
complaint without ruling on the plaintiffs motion to declare defendants in default.
Atty. Bautista also questioned Judge Causapins impartiality considering that (1) Judge
Causapin was seen having a drinking spree with Jose T. Bautista, and (2) Judge Causapin and Jose
Bautista, the other defendant, are both active members of the Masonic Organization and drink
together regularly.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), through then Court Administrator Christopher
O. Lock, required Judge Causapin to comment on Atty. Bautistas complaint. On November 22, 2006,
while the OCA was still awaiting Judge Causapins comment to Atty. Baustistas complaint, said
judge issued a Resolution of Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration wherein he clarified his reasons
for dismissing Civil Case No. 1387-G. On December 6, 2006, Judge Causapin filed his Comment14 to
Atty. Bautistas complaint against him, essentially reiterating the ratiocinations in his Resolution
The OCA submitted its Report recommending that the instant case be re-docketted as an
administrative matter; and the judge be FINED in the amount of P20,000.00.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Causapin is guilty of gross ignorance of law and gross misconduct
Ruling:
Yes, the Court finds that Judge Causapin is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the
law and gross misconduct.
Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court which already incorporated Supreme Court Circular
No. 28-91,19 as amended by Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-9420 requires the
plaintiff or principal party to execute a certification against forum shopping, to be simultaneously
filed with the complaint or initiatory pleading.
Nevertheless, in Cavile, the Court recognized an exception to the general rule, allowing
substantial compliance with the rule on the execution of a certificate of non-forum shopping. the
Court has also stressed that the rules on forum shopping, which were designed to promote and
Page 66 of 110

facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should not be interpreted with such absolute
literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective. The rule of substantial
compliance may be availed of with respect to the contents of the certification.
Judge Causapin concluded that Cavile does not apply to Civil Case No. 1387-G because the
plaintiffs in the latter case do not have a common interest. Without notice and hearing, Judge
Causapin dismissed the complaint in the said civil case because of the purported defect in the
certificate of non-forum shopping. Thus, plaintiffs were not afforded the opportunity to explain,
justify, and prove that the circumstances in Cavile are also present in Civil Case No. 1387-G.
Before a complaint can be dismissed for lack of a proper certificate of non-forum shopping,
notice and hearing are required.
Where the law involved is simple and elementary, lack of conversance therewith constitutes
gross ignorance of the law. Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural laws. They must know the laws and apply them properly in all good faith.
Judicial competence requires no less. The mistake committed by respondent Judge is not a mere
error of judgment that can be brushed aside for being minor. The disregard of established rule of
law which amounts to gross ignorance of the law makes a judge subject to disciplinary action.
Atty. Bautista also charges Judge Causapin with gross misconduct, alleging that said judge
had been having drinking sprees with the defendants in Civil Case No. 1387-G, and categorically
requested Atty. Bautista to withdraw plaintiffs motion to declare defendants in default in Civil Case
No. 1387-G.
As the OCA pointed out, Judge Causapin failed to deny Atty. Bautistas allegations; and the
Court deems Judge Causapins silence as admission of the same. Judge Causapin could have easily
denied the allegations and adduced proof to rebut the same, but he chose to sidestep said issue by
being silent, notwithstanding that these constitute one of the principal charges against him.
These render suspect his impartiality. A judge should so behave at all times as to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. The conduct of a judge must be
free from any whiff of impropriety not only with respect to the performance of his judicial duties
but also to his behavior outside his sala and even as a private individual.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. ANTONIO T. REYES
G.R. No. 170512, October 5, 2011, J. Leonardo-De Castro
The Ombudsman rendered a decision adjudging both LTO officers, Reyes, guilty of grave
misconduct and Pealoza guilty of simple misconduct. In administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings,
only substantial evidence is necessary to establish the case for or against a party, however, under wellestablished doctrine of due process in administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving
reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute
the minimum requirements of due process.
Facts:
On January 11, 2001, Jaime B. Acero executed an affidavit against herein respondent
Antonio Reyes and Angelito Pealoza, who were the Transportation Regulation Officer II/Acting
Page 67 of 110

Officer-in-Charge and Clerk III, respectively, of the Land Transportation Office District Office in
Mambajao, Camiguin. Acero narrated That, on January 10, 2001, at about 2:00 oclock P.M. he went
to the Land Transportation Office, at Mambajao, Camiguin to apply for a drivers license; That, he
was made to take an examination for drivers license applicants by a certain Tata Pealoza whose
real name is Angelito, a clerk in said office; after the examination, Pealoza informed Acero that he
failed in the examination; however if he am willing to pay additional assessment then they will
reconsider my application referring to Pealoza and Reyes; and Acero asked how much will that be
and Pealoza in the presence of Reyes answered P680.00, so Acero agreed; That, I then
handed P1,000.00 to Pealoza and Pealoza handed it to the cashier; And, Pealoza in turn handed to
me the change of P320.00 only and a little later Acero was given the LTO Official Receipt No.
62927785 but only for P180.00 which O.R. serves as my temporary license for 60 days; and the
balance of P500.00 was without O.R. and retained by Pealoza. When the cashier asked for Aceros
payment, the latter gave Pealoza a one-thousand-peso bill. The cashier, in turn, handed to Pealoza a
change of P820.00. From the said amount, Pealoza gave to Acero P320.00, while P500.00 was given
to Reyes
Pealoza also submitted in evidence the affidavit of Rey P. Amper. Amper narrated that he
started working at the LTO in Mambajao, Camiguin. Reyes verbally instructed Amper to send to him
all the applicants for drivers licenses who failed the examinations. Reyes gave Amper a piece of
paper containing the rates to be charged to the applicant-flunkers in addition to the legal
fees. Amper was also told to deliver the additional payments to Reyes. Reyes would allegedly tell
the applicant-flunkers to either re-take the examinations or pay additional costs. Reyes would then
instruct Amper to add more points to applicant-flunkers scores, which meant that Reyes and the
applicants concerned had come to an agreement for the payment of additional costs. Amper added
that the said practice of Reyes was a goad to his conscience and he talked about it to Pealoza.
The affidavit of Margie B. Abdala was also presented by Pealoza. Abdala stated that she
accompanied Pealoza to the house of Acero. Acero assured them that his complaint was principally
directed against Reyes for requiring him to pay additional costs for which he was not issued any
official receipt. Pealoza brought with him Aceros application form for a drivers license, which had
already been approved by Reyes, and he asked the latter to complete the same. Pealoza also tried to
return the P500.00 from Reyes that was not covered by a receipt. Acero, however, refused to fill up
the application form and to accept the money. In his counter-affidavit, Reyes claimed that Aceros
complaint was a blatant distortion of the truth and a mere fabrication of the complainant. Reyes
asserted that a perusal of the affidavit-complaint revealed that the only imputation against him was
that Pealoza allegedly told Acero to pay P680.00 in his Reyes presence. The affidavit revealed that it
was Pealoza who processed the application of Acero; the money was allegedly given to Pealoza and
it was he who handed the change back to Acero; and he had no participation and was not present
when the money changed hands. In his affidavit, Valdehueza stated that he applied for a drivers
license with the LTO in Mambajao, Camiguin. He took an examination on that day, Valdehueza was
told that he got a failing score. His application was then turned over to Pealoza, who told him to see
Reyes.
On September 24, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao rendered a, adjudging
Reyes guilty of grave misconduct and finding Pealoza guilty of simple misconduct. The Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao issued a Joint Order, denying the aforesaid motions of Reyes and Pealoza.
Reyes elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review. The Court of Appeals
granted the petition of Reyes and reversed the judgment of the Office of the OmbudsmanMindanao. Hence, the Office of the Ombudsman filed the instant petition.
Page 68 of 110
Issue:
Whether or not the charge of grave misconduct against Reyes was sufficiently proven by
substantial evidence.
Ruling:
Indeed, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 mandates that the findings of fact by the Office
of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence. In administrative and
quasi-judicial proceedings, only substantial evidence is necessary to establish the case for or
against a party.
The well-established doctrine of due process in administrative proceedings as follows:
In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the
person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements
of due process. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of.
Due process in administrative proceedings requires compliance with the following cardinal
principles: (1) the respondents right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones case and
submit supporting evidence, must be observed; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented; (3) the decision must have some basis to support itself; (4) there must be substantial
evidence; (5) the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the
tribunal must have acted on its own consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy and
must not have simply accepted the views of a subordinate; and (7) the decision must be rendered in
such manner that respondents would know the reasons for it and the various issues involved.
In the present case, the fifth requirement stated above was not complied with. Reyes was
not properly apprised of the evidence offered against him, which were eventually made the bases of
petitioners decision that found him guilty of grave misconduct. While Pealoza acknowledged in his
counter-affidavit his participation in the illicit transaction complained of, he pointed to Reyes as the
main culprit. Pealoza thereafter submitted the affidavits of Amper and Valdehueza as witnesses
who would substantiate his accusations. However, the records reveal that only the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao and Acero were furnished copies of the said affidavits. Thus, Reyes was able
to respond only to the affidavit of Acero. It would appear that Reyes had no idea that Pealoza, a corespondent in the administrative case, would point an accusing finger at him and even supply the
inculpatory evidence to prove his guilt. There is nothing on record to show that Reyes was
furnished with, or had otherwise received, a copy of the affidavits of Pealoza, Amper and
Valdehueza, whether before or after the Decision dated September 24, 2001 was issued. Thus, it
cannot be said that Reyes had a fair opportunity to squarely and intelligently answer the
accusations therein or to offer any rebuttal evidence thereto.
It is true that, in the past, this Court has held that the right to due process of a respondent in
an administrative case was not violated if he was able to file a motion for reconsideration to refute
the evidence against him. In the instant case, petitioner plainly disregarded Reyes protestations
without giving him a similar opportunity, to be belatedly furnished copies of the affidavits
Page 69 of 110

of Pealoza, Amper and Valdehueza to enable him to refute the same. As it were, petitioner rendered
its Decision dated September 24, 2001 on the basis of evidence that were not disclosed to Reyes. A
judgment in an administrative case that imposes the extreme penalty of dismissal must not only be
based on substantial evidence but also rendered with due regard to the rights of the parties to due
process. The records of the case are remanded to the Office of the Ombudsman, which is hereby
ordered (a) to furnish respondent Antonio T. Reyes copies of the affidavits of Angelito G. Pealoza,
Rey P. Amper and Rickie Valdehueza, and (b) to conduct further proceedings as may be
appropriate.
FALSIFICATION OF DAILY TIME RECORDS OF MA. EMCISA A. BENEDICTOS, ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICER I, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MALOLOS CITY, BULACAN
A.M. No. P-10-2784, October 19, 2011, J. Leonardo-De Castro
The Court deems Benedictos falsification of her bundy cards tantamount to dishonesty.
Benedictos silence on a principal charge against her is admission, especially considering that she was
given ample opportunity to deny the same. In several administrative cases, the Court refrained from
imposing the actual penalties in the presence of mitigating factors.
Facts:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint charging Ma. Emcisa A. Benedictos,
Administrative Officer I, Regional Trial Court, Office of the Clerk of Court, Malolos City, Bulacan,
with dishonesty for falsifying her Daily Time Records (DTRs)/bundy cards. The Office of the Court
Administrator sent a telegram requesting Executive Judge Guillermo Agloro of the RTC, OCC,
Malolos City, Bulacan, to instruct Benedictos to submit her DTRs/bundy cards for September and
October 2004 within five days, otherwise, the OCA would recommend the withholding of
Benedictoss salaries. Benedictos submitted her bundy cards for August, October, and November
2004, which the OCA referred to Atty. Emmanuel L. Ortega, Clerk of Court VII, RTC, Malolos City,
Bulacan, for verification of his signatures appearing thereon. In a letter to the OCA, Atty. Ortega
reported that only his signature on Benedictoss bundy card for November 2004 was true and
genuine; and he disowned his purported signatures on Benedictoss bundy cards for August and
October 2004. The OCA required Benedictos to file her comment on Atty. Ortegas letter within 10
days from notice, however, Benedictos failed to comply. In a Resolution, the Court withheld
Benedictoss salaries and benefits until she submitted her DTRs/bundy cards for September 2004.
The OCA again instructed Benedictos to file her comment on Atty. Ortegas letter within 10 days
from notice, but Benedictos still failed to do so.
Thus in a Resolution the Court directed Benedictos (1) to show cause why she should not be
administratively dealt with for refusing to submit her comment despite the two directives from the
OCA; and (2) to submit the required comment within five days from notice, otherwise the Court
shall take the necessary action against her and decide the administrative complaint on the basis of
the record on hand. When Benedictos failed once more to file a comment, the Court issued a
Resolution ordering Benedictos to pay a fine of P1,000.00. Yet, Benedictos did not pay the fine nor
submitted her comment on Atty. Ortegas letter. The Court already referred the case against
Benedictos to the OCA for evaluation, report, and recommendation. The OCA submitted its Report
with the following recommendations: Ma. Emcisa A. Benedictos, Administrative Officer I, be found
GUILTY of Dishonesty; and that considering that this is respondents first administrative offense, the
minimum penalty of SUSPENSION for six (6) months and one (1) day, effective immediately, be
meted upon her.
Page 70 of 110
Issue:
Whether or not Benedictos is guilty of dishonesty for falsifying her DTRs/Bundy cards.
Ruling:
Yes, Benedictos is guilty of dishonesty.
Benedictos silence on a principal charge against her is admission, especially considering
that she was given ample opportunity to deny the same. Benedictos refusal to face the charges
against her head-on is contrary to the principle in criminal law that the first impulse of an innocent
person, when accused of wrongdoing, is to express his or her innocence at the first opportune time.
Moreover, as a result of its own analytical study of the evidence on record, the Court is convinced
that Atty. Ortegas signatures appearing on Benedictoss bundy cards for August and October 2004
were indeed forged. The marked differences between Atty. Ortegas purported signatures on
Benedictoss bundy cards for August and October 2004, on one hand, and Atty. Ortegas admitted
genuine signatures on Benedictoss bundy cards for September and November 2004, on the other,
are easily discernible even to the naked eye.
In determining the appropriate penalty, the Court deems Benedictos falsification of her
bundy cards tantamount to dishonesty. However, in several administrative cases, the Court
refrained from imposing the actual penalties in the presence of mitigating factors. There were
several cases, particularly involving dishonesty, in which the Court meted a penalty lower than
dismissal because of the existence of mitigating circumstances.
In the case at bar, this is Benedictoss first administrative case in her 19 years in government
service, for which six months suspension is already sufficient penalty. The Court bears in mind
Benedictos failure to submit her comment, which constitutes clear and willful disrespect, not just
for the OCA, but also for the Court, which exercises direct administrative supervision over trial
court officers and employees through the former. In fact, it can be said that Benedictoss noncompliance with the OCA directives is tantamount to insubordination to the Court itself. Benedictos
also directly demonstrated her disrespect to the Court by ignoring its Resolutions.
A resolution of the Supreme Court should not be construed as a mere request, and should be
complied with promptly and completely. Benedictoss insolence is further aggravated by the fact
that she is an employee of the Judiciary, who, more than an ordinary citizen, should be aware of her
duty to obey the orders and processes of the Supreme Court without delay. For her non-compliance
with the show cause order and nonpayment of the fine imposed upon her in the Supreme Court
Resolutions, Benedictos is ordered to pay an additional fine of P2,000.00, in addition to the original
fine of P1,000.00.
RE: REPORT ON FINANCIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED AT MCTC, SANTIAGO-SAN ESTEBAN, ILOCOS
SUR
A.M. No. P-11-2950, January 17, 2012, J. Leonardo-De Castro
"A resolution of the Supreme Court should not be construed as a mere request, [and] should be
complied with promptly and completely." Such "failure to comply betrays not only a recalcitrant
streak in character, but also a disrespect for the Courts lawful order and directive." Furthermore, this
Page 71 of 110

contumacious conduct of refusing to abide by the lawful directives issued by the Court has likewise
been considered as an utter lack of interest to remain with, if not contempt of, the system.
The conduct or behavior of all court personnel is circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility. Time and again, the High Court affirms the practical reality that the image of the court
as a true temple of justice is mirrored by the conduct of everyone who works therein, from the judge to
the lowest clerk. It is therefore imperative that those involved in the administration of justice must live
up to the highest standard of honesty and integrity in the public service.
Facts:
This case is an administrative case against two clerk of courts namely Angeles Ancheta and
Virginia Hufuna. An administrative investigation was conducted upon a finding that these two
clerks did not provide adequate reports regarding the judicial deposits and collections they
collected during their term of office. The Office of the Court Administrator then sent letters to
Ancheta and Hufuna requiring them to state in writing why they should not be administratively
liable. However, despite this, both of them still failed to face their charges and serve their letter of
explanation.
Issue:
Whether or not Ancheta and Hufuna may be held administratively liable for failure to serve
their letter of explanation.
Ruling:
The Court has already given Hufana and Ancheta more than enough opportunity to explain
their side. With their obstinate defiance and incessant refusal to submit their compliance to this
Court, despite the latters repeated directives and stern admonitions, Hufana and Ancheta displayed
their insolence and disrespect for the lawful orders of the Court. "A resolution of the Supreme Court
should not be construed as a mere request, [and] should be complied with promptly and
completely." Such "failure to comply betrays not only a recalcitrant streak in character, but also a
disrespect for the Courts lawful order and directive." Furthermore, this contumacious conduct of
refusing to abide by the lawful directives issued by the Court has likewise been considered as an
utter lack of interest to remain with, if not contempt of, the system. Hufana and Anchetas
transgression is highlighted even more by the fact that they are employees of the Judiciary, who,
more than an ordinary citizen, should be aware of their duty to obey the orders and processes of
the Supreme Court without delay. Their willful disobedience to and disregard for the directive of
this Court constitute grave and serious misconduct, which cannot be tolerated.
The Court shall no longer wait for Ancheta and Hufana, who have clearly forfeited their
chance to be heard on the charges against them. It now proceeds to resolve this administrative
matter based on the present contents of the record, the most significant of which are the report and
recommendations of the CMO-OCA Audit Team and their annexes, as adopted by the OCA.
Clerks of Court are the chief administrative officers of their respective courts; with regard to
the collection of legal fees, they perform a delicate function as judicial officers entrusted with the
correct and effective implementation of regulations thereon. Even the undue delay in the
remittances of amounts collected by them at the very least constitutes misfeasance. On the other
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hand, a vital administrative function of a judge is the effective management of his court and this
includes control of the conduct of the courts ministerial officers. It should be brought home to both
that the safekeeping of funds and collections is essential to the goal of an orderly administration of
justice and no protestation of good faith can override the mandatory nature of the Circulars
designed to promote full accountability for government funds.
Ancheta and Hufanas refusal to face head-on the charges against them is contrary to the
principle that the first impulse of an innocent person, when accused of wrongdoing, is to express
his/her innocence at the first opportune time. Ancheta and Hufanas silence and non-participation
in the present administrative proceedings, despite due notice and directives of this Court for them
to submit documents in their defense, i.e., a written explanation, an accounting, and missing
receipts, strongly indicate their guilt. Moreover, the "[f]ailure of a public officer to remit funds upon
demand by an authorized officer [shall be] prima facie evidence that the public officer has put such
missing funds or property to personal use." In the total absence of rebutting or contrary evidence,
then the Court can only conclude that Ancheta and Hufana have misappropriated the
unaccounted/unremitted court funds in their care and custody.
Ancheta and Hufanas failure to remit their collections, amounting to P390,048.00 and
P33,603.80, constitutes gross neglect of duty, dishonesty, and grave misconduct.19 They have
transgressed the trust reposed in them as cashiers and disbursement officers of the Court. On court
employees who have fallen short of their accountabilities, particularly, Clerks of Court who are the
custodians of court funds and properties, the Court has not hesitated to impose the ultimate
penalty. This Court has never tolerated or condoned any conduct that would violate the norms of
public accountability and diminish, or even tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the justice
system.
LEAVE DIVISION, OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES, OFFICE OF THE COURT
ADMINISTRATOR vs. LEONCIO K. GUTIERREZ III, CLERK III, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 116, PASAY CITY
A.M. No. P-11-2951, February 15, 2012, J. Leonardo-De Castro
It is well to remind Gutierrez that dishonesty is a malevolent act that has no place in the
judiciary. Public service requires utmost integrity and discipline. A public servant must exhibit at all
times the highest sense of honesty and integrity, for no less than the Constitution declares that a public
office is a public trust, and all public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, and serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. These are not mere
rhetorical words to be taken lightly as idealistic sentiments, but as working standards and attainable
goals that should be matched with actual deeds.
Facts:
Before Us is an administrative complaint charging Leoncio K. Gutierrez III (Gutierrez), Clerk
III of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 116 of Pasay City, with dishonesty for falsifying his
Daily Time Records (DTRs)/bundy cards. In a letter dated August 23, 2010, Court Administrator
Marquez required Gutierrez to explain his non-submission of an application for leave for February
26, 2010, otherwise, the OCA would be constrained to bring the matter to the Court for whatever
action deemed appropriate.
Page 73 of 110

Gutierrez wrote Court Administrator Marquez a letter dated September 24, 2010 reiterating
that he was unaware of who punched his DTR on February 26, 2010. As a gesture of his good faith,
Gutierrez subsequently filed his application for leave but the same was not acted upon because
Judge Abary-Vasquez had already reported the matter to Executive Judge Corales. Gutierrez prayed
that he be cleared of the matter.
On May 9, 2011, Deputy Court Administrator Nimfa C. Vilches, as Officer-in-Charge of the OCA,
together with Assistant Court Administrator Thelma C. Bahia and Atty. Geronga, submitted to us a
report with the following recommendations:
RECOMMENDATION: In view of the foregoing, we respectfully submit for the consideration of the
Honorable Court the following recommendations:
1. The instant administrative complaint against Leoncio K. Gutierrez III, Clerk III, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 116, Pasay City, be RE-DOCKTED as a regular administrative matter;
2. Leoncio K. Gutierrez III be found GUILTY of DISHONESTY and FINED the amount of Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), with STERN WARNING that the commission of the same or similar
offense in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Issue:
Whether or not Guitierrez should be held administratively liable.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that Guitierrez is guilty of dishonesty and must be held
administratively liable.
It is undisputed that Gutierrez was absent on February 26, 2010. Gutierrez himself admitted
such fact. Equally unchallenged is the fact that someone punched Gutierrezs DTR on February 26,
2010 making it appear that he was at work on said date from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon and from
12:00 noon to 4:00 p.m. Involved herein is Gutierrezs DTR and the entries therein could be
reasonably presumed to have been done by Gutierrez himself. Gutierrezs only defense was to deny
that he was the one who punched his DTR on February 26, 2010 and to claim that despite his
diligent efforts, he failed to determine who actually punched his DTR on the date in question.
Rule 131, Section 1 of the Rules of Court assigns the burden of proof upon the party who
alleges the truth of his claim or defense or any fact in issue. In this case, we only have Gutierrezs
bare denial and allegations. Gutierrez did not submit any evidence in support of his defense. There
is no showing at all that Gutierrezs DTR could have been accessed by other people, or that he could
not have previously known of the February 26, 2010 entries in his DTR, or that he immediately
sought to correct said false entries in his DTR upon his discovery thereof. Given the total absence of
evidence to the contrary, the presumption that Gutierrez himself punched his DTR to make it
appear he was at the office on February 26, 2010 still prevails.
Gutierrezs deliberate attempt to conceal or suppress his absence on February 26, 2010 by
falsifying his DTR manifested his lack of integrity and responsibility. His act constitutes dishonesty.
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Dishonesty has been defined as "the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of
fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray."
It is well to remind Gutierrez that dishonesty is a malevolent act that has no place in the
judiciary. Public service requires utmost integrity and discipline. A public servant must exhibit at all
times the highest sense of honesty and integrity, for no less than the Constitution declares that a
public office is a public trust, and all public officers and employees must at all times be accountable
to the people, and serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. These are
not mere rhetorical words to be taken lightly as idealistic sentiments, but as working standards and
attainable goals that should be matched with actual deeds.
Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal
from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and perpetual
disqualification for reemployment in government service.
However, in several administrative cases, we refrained from imposing the actual penalties
in the presence of mitigating factors. There were several cases, particularly involving dishonesty, in
which we meted a penalty lower than dismissal because of the existence of mitigating
circumstances.
The compassion we extended in the aforementioned cases was not without legal basis. Rule
IV, Section 53 of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, grants the
disciplining authority the discretion to consider mitigating circumstances in the imposition of the
proper penalty.
We note that Gutierrez readily admitted that he was not at the office on February 26, 2010
and the entries in his DTR for said date were falsified. This is also Gutierrezs first administrative
case in his five years in government service. However, as correctly observed by the OCA, Gutierrezs
subsequent filing of an application for leave for February 26, 2010 could not be considered in his
favor for it was obviously a mere afterthought, an attempt to cover up his infraction after already
being found out by Judge Abary-Vasquez. In consideration of the foregoing, we deem the imposition
of a fine of P5,000.00 upon Gutierrez, as recommended by the OCA, as already sufficient.
DR. RAMIE G. HIPE vs. JUDGE ROLANDO T. LITERATO, MUNICPAL TRIAL COURT, MAINIT,
SURIGAO NORTE
A.M. No. MTJ-11-1781, April 25, 2012, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Competence is a mark of a good judge. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with
the rules, he erodes the publics confidence in the competence of our courts. It is highly imperative that
judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles. Basic legal procedures must be at the
palm of a judges hands.
Facts:
This is an administrative case for gross ignorance of the law, gross incompetence and gross
dereliction of duty filed by Dr. Raime G. Hipe against Judge Rolando T.Literato, in relation to a civil
case for unlawful detainer.
Page 75 of 110

Municipality of Mainit of Surigao, Del Norte instituted an action for unlawful detainer
against the spouses Dr. Hector and Dr. Raime Hipe (spouses Hipe). It was stated in the complaint
that Dr. Hector Hipe served as a Municipal Health Officer of Mainit until he resigned in April,2007.
As a Municipal Health Officer, Dr. Hector Hipe had the privilege of using the doctors quarters a twostorey residential building which owned by the Municipal of Mainit. The spouses Hipe continued to
stay at the said building notwithstanding Dr. Hipes resignation. Despite several demands, the
spouses Hipe refused to vacate the building.
Hence, summons was served upon the spouses Hipe. On February 25, 2008, Dr. Ramie Hipe
filed a motion to transfer the date of preliminary hearing which was granted by Judge Literato.
Subsequently, on June 10, 2008, after the end of the hearing to resolve the spouses Hipes
affirmative defenses, Judge Literato issued an Order submitting the motion for resolution. On April
28, 2009, the judge rendered a decision in favor of the Municipality of Mainit.
As result of the decision, Dr. Raime filed an administrative complaint against Judge Literato
on the ground that from June 10,2008 until April 28, 2009, a period of 322 days, Judge Literato took
no further action in the case for unlawful detainer in violation of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure.
The Office of the Court Administrator submitted its report finding that Judge Literato be
fined for failure to observe the reglementary periods for disposing of motions and cases.
Issue:
Whether Judge Literato is administratively liable for his alleged disregard of the rules and
delay in rendering judgment in the civil case of unlawful detainer filed by the Municipal of Mainit
Ruling:
Yes.
Judge Literatos inaction for 322 days constitutes utter disregard for the summary nature of
an ejectment case.
Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall dispose of the
courts business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.
In general, courts are required to decide cases submitted for decision within three months
from the date of such submission. With respect to cases falling under the Rule on Summary
Procedure, first level courts are only allowed 30 days following the receipt of the last affidavit and
position paper, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, within which to render judgment.
Competence is a mark of a good judge. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity
with the rules, he erodes the publics confidence in the competence of our courts. It is highly
imperative that judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles. Basic legal procedures
must be at the palm of a judges hands.
Judge Literato irrefragably failed to promptly decide in accordance with the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure. Judge Literatos inaction is contrary to the rationale behind the Rule on
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Summary Procedure, which was precisely adopted to promote a more expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases, and to enforce the constitutional rights of litigants to the speedy disposition
of cases.
FE D. VALDEZ vs. JUDGE LIZABETH G. TORRES, MeTC, Branch 60, MandaluyongCity,
A.M. No. MTJ-11-1796, June 13, 2012, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Section 15(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, mandates that cases or matters filed with the
lower courts must be decided or resolved within three months from the date they are submitted for
decision or resolution. With respect to cases falling under the Rule on Summary Procedure, first level
courts are only allowed 30 days following the receipt of the last affidavit and position paper, or the
expiration of the period for filing the same, within which to render judgment. Unfortunately, Judge
Torres failed to live up to the exacting standards of duty and responsibility that her position
requires. Civil Case No. 20191 was submitted for resolution on July 19, 2006, yet it was still pending
when Valdez filed the present administrative complaint on June 4, 2010, and remained unresolved per
complainants manifestation filed on September 8, 2010. More than four years after being submitted
for resolution, Civil Case No. 20191 was still awaiting decision by respondent. Records also do not
show that Judge Torres made any previous attempt to report and request for extension of time to
resolve Civil Case No. 20191.
Facts:
Civil Case No. 20191 was an action for damages and attorneys fees instituted on October
25, 2005 by petitioner Fe D. Valdez against Prudential Guarantee & Assurance, Inc. (PGAI) and
Charlie Tan (Tan), which was raffled to the Mandaluyong MeTC-Branch 60, presided over by
respondent Judge Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres. Valdez alleged that she bought comprehensive
insurance policy for her motor vehicle from PGAI, through broker Tan and that PGAI and Tan
refused to pay her insurance claim despite several demands after her motor vehicle was damaged.
Judge Torres proceeded to hear Civil Case No. 20191 in accordance with the Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure and after the parties had filed their respective position papers, respondent
submitted Civil Case No. 20191 for decision on July 19, 2006. Unfortunately, almost a year had
passed but Civil Case No. 20191 remained unresolved, prompting Valdez to file six (6) motions for
immediate resolution during the span of three (3) years (2006-2008) and two (2) motions to
resolve during the span of two (2) years (2009-2010). Frustrated by the long wait for the
resolution of Civil Case No. 20191, Valdez filed the present administrative complaint on June 4,
2010 against Judge Torres, alleging unreasonable delay by the latter in the disposition of said case
to the damage and prejudice of the former.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Torres is guilty for the undue delay in resolving Civil Case No. 20191.
Ruling:
Yes.
lower courts must be decided or resolved within three months from the date they are submitted
Page 77 of 110

for decision or resolution. With respect to cases falling under the Rule on Summary Procedure, first
level courts are only allowed 30 days following the receipt of the last affidavit and position paper,
or the expiration of the period for filing the same, within which to render judgment.
Judges are oft-reminded of their duty to promptly act upon cases and matters pending
before their courts. Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, directs judges to dispose of
the courts business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. Canons 6 and 7 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics further exhort judges to be prompt and punctual in the disposition and
resolution of cases and matters pending before their courts. Administrative Circular No. 1 dated
January 28, 1988 once more reminds all magistrates to observe scrupulously the periods
prescribed in Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution, and to act promptly on all motions and
interlocutory matters pending before their courts.
Unfortunately, Judge Torres failed to live up to the exacting standards of duty and
responsibility that her position requires. Civil Case No. 20191 was submitted for resolution on July
19, 2006, yet it was still pending when Valdez filed the present administrative complaint on June 4,
2010, and remained unresolved per complainants manifestation filed on September 8, 2010. More
than four years after being submitted for resolution, Civil Case No. 20191 was still awaiting decision
by respondent. Moreover, Judge Torres Indeed irrefragably failed to decide Civil Case No. 20191
within the 30-day period prescribed by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Her inaction in
Civil Case No. 20191 is contrary to the rationale behind the Rule on Summary Procedure, which was
precisely adopted to promote a more expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases, and to
enforce the constitutional rights of litigants to the speedy disposition of cases. Indeed, Judge Torres
even failed to decide Civil Case No. 20191 within the three-month period mandated in general by
the Constitution for lower courts to decide or resolve cases. Records do not show that Judge Torres
made any previous attempt to report and request for extension of time to resolve Civil Case No.
20191.
CITY PROSECUTOR ARMANDO P. ABANADO vs. JUDGE ABRAHAM A. BAYONA, Presiding
Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 7, Bacolod City
A.M. No. MTJ-12-1804, July 30, 2012, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Not every judicial error is tantamount to ignorance of the law and if it was committed in good
faith, the judge need not be subjected to administrative sanction. While Judge Bayona admitted that he
erred in insisting on the production of the Jarder Resolution despite the provisions of the DOJ-NPS
Manual, such error cannot be categorized as gross ignorance of the law as he did not appear to be
motivated by bad faith. Indeed, the rules of procedure in the prosecution office were not clear as to
whether or not an investigating prosecutors resolution of dismissal that had been reversed by the city
prosecutor should still form part of the records.
Facts:
This case sprang from Criminal Case No. 09-03-164 7 4. On March 24, 2009, complainant
City Prosecutor Armando P. Abanado filed the Information in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
which was eventually raffled to respondent Judge Abraham A. Bayona. In view of the information
filed before him, Judge Bayona issued an order in Criminal Case No. 09-03-16474 requiring City
Prosecutor Abanado to submit among others the Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor Dennis
S. Jarder (Jarder Resolution) on the information filed before the court. As a reply, City Prosecutor
Abanado discussed that the case was initially handled by ACP Jarder who found no probable cause
Page 78 of 110

against the accused in Criminal Case No. 09-03-16474. However, Prosecutor Abanado found
otherwise; that is, there was probable cause against Palo. Thus, City Prosecutor Abanado
disapproved Jarders Resolution and filed the Information in court.
Dissatisfied with the explanation of Prosecutor Abanado, Judge Bayona in an order stated
that the Jarder Resolution (dismissing the complaint) was part and parcel of the official records of
the case and, for this reason, must form part of the records of the preliminary investigation. He
further stated that because there was a conflict between Jarders and Prosecutor Abanados
resolutions, those documents were necessary in the evaluation and appreciation of the evidence to
establish probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Palo.
In view of the above order, Prosecutor Abanado again explained the impossibility of
submitting the Jarder Resolution to the court. The letter stated that the Jarder Resolution was no
longer part of the records of the case as it was disapproved by Prosecutor Abanado and stated that
all resolutions prepared by an Investigating Prosecutor after preliminary investigation shall form
part of the record of the case but if they have been disapproved by the Provincial/City Prosecutor,
the same shall not be released to the parties and/or their counsels. Thus, only resolutions approved
by the Provincial/City Prosecutor for promulgation and release to the parties shall be made known
to the parties and/or their counsel. Judge Bayona still did not accept the explanations made by the
Office of the City Prosecutor and insisted instead that the Jarder Resolution should form part of the
records of the case. Thus, in an Order, he required Prosecutor Abanado t to explain within five days
from the receipt thereof why he should not be cited for contempt.
Consequently, Prosecutor Abanado executed the present administrative complaint.
Prosecutor Abanado alleged therein that Judge Bayona was guilty of gross ignorance of the law or
procedure, gross misconduct, and violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 12 dated June 30, 1987.
He essentially asserted that Judge Bayona unduly burdened himself by obsessing over the
production of the records of the preliminary investigation, especially the Jarder Resolution.
Judge Bayona, in his Comment with Counter-Complaint for Disbarment of Prosecutor Abanado,
essentially reiterated the importance of the Jarder Resolution.
As for Judge Bayonas
countercharge, he claimed complainant should be disbarred for (a) filing a malicious and
unfounded administrative complaint; (b) disrespect and disobedience to judicial authority; (c)
violation of the sanctity of public records; (d) infidelity in the custody of documents; and (e)
misconduct and insubordination.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Judge Bayona is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law,
gross misconduct and violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 12 dated June 30, 1987
for requiring the Office of the City Prosecutor to submit the Jarder Resolution to the
court despite the reversal thereof.
2. Whether or not City Prosecutor should be disbarred.
Ruling:
1. No.
One of the guidelines for the documentation of a resolution by an investigating prosecutor,
who after conducting preliminary investigation, finds no probable cause and recommends a
dismissal of the criminal complaint is that the resolution of the investigating prosecutor, the
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complainant's affidavit, the sworn statements of the prosecution's witnesses, the respondent's
counter-affidavit and the sworn statements of his witnesses and such other evidence, as far as
practicable, shall be attached to the information. We find that there is nothing in the DOJ-NPS
Manual requiring the removal of a resolution by an investigating prosecutor recommending the
dismissal of a criminal complaint after it was reversed by the provincial, city or chief state
prosecutor. Nonetheless, we also note that attaching such a resolution to an information filed in
court is optional under the aforementioned manual. The DOJ-NPS Manual states that the resolution
of the investigating prosecutor should be attached to the information only "as far as practicable."
Thus, such attachment is not mandatory or required under the rules.
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that Judge Bayona erred in insisting on the
production of the Jarder Resolution when all other pertinent documents regarding the preliminary
investigation have been submitted to his court, and in going so far as to motu proprio initiating a
proceeding for contempt against Prosecutor Abanado.
However, not every judicial error is tantamount to ignorance of the law and if it was
committed in good faith, the judge need not be subjected to administrative sanction. While Judge
Bayona admitted that he erred in insisting on the production of the Jarder Resolution despite the
provisions of the DOJ-NPS Manual, such error cannot be categorized as gross ignorance of the law
as he did not appear to be motivated by bad faith. Indeed, the rules of procedure in the prosecution
office were not clear as to whether or not an investigating prosecutors resolution of dismissal that
had been reversed by the city prosecutor should still form part of the records.
Neither did Judge Bayonas action amount to gross misconduct. Gross misconduct
presupposes evidence of grave irregularity in the performance of duty. In the case at bar, Judge
Bayonas act of requiring Prosecutor Abanado to explain why he should not be cited in contempt for
his failure to submit the Jarder Resolution in court was in accordance with established rules of
procedure. Furthermore, Judge Bayona did not abuse his contempt power as he did not pursue the
proceedings. Lastly, as previously discussed, Judge Bayona issued those orders in good faith as he
honestly believed that they were necessary in the fair and just issuance of the warrant of arrest in
Criminal Case No. 09-03-16474.
2. No.
It appears from the records that Prosecutor Abanados non-submission of the Jarder
Resolution was motivated by his honest belief that his action was in accord with the procedures in
the prosecution office. It likewise cannot be said that the filing of the present administrative case
against Judge Bayona was tainted with improper motive or bad faith.
ANECITA PANALIGAN vs. ETHELDA B. VALENTE, Clerk of Court II, 3rd Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Patnogon, Antique
A.M. No. P-11-2952, July 30, 2012, J. Leonardo-De Castro
The rule is that those involved in the administration of justice from the highest official to the
lowest clerk must live up to the strictest standards of honesty and integrity in the public service. As an
officer of the court, Valente was duty-bound to use reasonable skill and diligence in the performance of
her officially-designated duties as clerk of court. If indeed Panaligan was at the MCTC office and was
personally furnished a copy of the notice of hearing by Valente herself, then Valente should have
required Panaligan to sign the original copy of said notice as proof of receipt. Valentes failure to
Page 80 of 110

secure Panaligans signature as proof of receipt of a copy of the notice of hearing exhibited lack of due
diligence required by her position as Clerk of Court.
Facts:
Civil Case No. 2-P is a small claims action for collection of sum of money instituted by
Panaligan before the MCTC on July 13, 2010, alleging that Reynold Tumolin obtained a loan from
Panaligan and that Reynold Tumolin left unheeded Panaligans written request for payment of the
said loan loan.
Judge Felixberto P. Barte (Judge Barte), Acting Presiding Judge of 3rd MCTC of Patnogon,
Antique, issued an Order dismissing Civil Case No. 2-P on the ground that he case was called for
hearing and the Court Interpreter even called the parties for three (3) times but none of them
appeared. For failure of the plaintiff to appear despite due notice, as she was furnished personally
by the Clerk of this Court with the copy of the said Notice of Hearingis a clear indication that she
lacks interest to prosecute her case.
Panaligan filed the instant complaint against Ethelda R. Valente (Valente), Clerk of Court II
of the 3rd Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) charging the latter with dereliction of duty, abuse of
authority, and dishonesty. Panaligan averred that in truth and in fact, Panaligan did not receive a
copy of said notice of hearing from Valente and that Valente subsequently retracted her previous
claim and then blamed Process Server Nelson Magbanua (Magbanua) for the failure to serve the
notice of hearing upon Panaligan; that due to Valentes erroneous statement and dishonesty, Civil
Case No. 2-P was dismissed and Panaligan could no longer collect the amount she loaned to Reynold
Tumolin.
In her Answer, Valente denied the charges. According to Valente, she issued a notice setting
Civil Case No. 2-P for hearing and such notice was personally served to Panaligan when the latter
herself went to MTC. However, Valente inadvertently failed to have Panaligan acknowledge her
receipt of a copy of the notice of hearing. Although Panaligan already personally received a copy of
the notice of hearing for August 12, 2010, Valente avowed that she still instructed Magbanua, the
Process Server, to serve copies of the same notice to Panaligan and all other parties involved in Civil
Case No. 2-P.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Valente is liable for neglect of duty, for her failure to furnish a copy of
the notice of hearing to Panaligan,
2. Whether or not Valente is liable for dishonesty, for relaying to Judge Barte that she
personally gave a copy of the notice of hearing to Panaligan.
Ruling:
1. Yes.
The Court takes note of Panaligans consistent statement that she did not receive any notice
setting Civil Case No. 2-P for hearing. Court personnel confirmed that no notice of hearing was
served upon the parties in Civil Case No. 2-P. Court records are also totally bereft of any proof of
service upon and receipt by Panaligan of such a notice. In contrast, the Court is faced with Valentes
bare allegation that she was able to personally give a copy of the notice of hearing to Panaligan
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when the latter visited the MCTC office. Mere allegation is not evidence, and is not equivalent to
proof.
While it may be true, as Valente argued, that not everyone who visited the MCTC actually
logged in the MCTC logbook, thus making the logbook an unreliable proof that Panaligan had not
been to the MCTC office, it is still insufficient to absolve Valente of all administrative liability. If
indeed Panaligan was at the MCTC office and was personally furnished a copy of the notice of
hearing by Valente herself, then Valente should have required Panaligan to sign the original copy of
said notice as proof of receipt. Valentes failure to secure Panaligans signature as proof of receipt of
a copy of the notice of hearing further exhibited lack of due diligence required by her position as
Clerk of Court.
The rule is that those involved in the administration of justice from the highest official to the
lowest clerk must live up to the strictest standards of honesty and integrity in the public service. As
an officer of the court, Valente was duty-bound to use reasonable skill and diligence in the
performance of her officially-designated duties as clerk of court. Valente fell short of this standard.
Valente attempts to shift blame to Magbanua, the Process Server, for the failure to serve a
copy of the notice of hearing upon Panaligan. Yet again, there is no evidence when Valente actually
endorsed the notice of hearing to Magbanua for service upon the parties. And even granting that
Magbanua had been remiss in his duties as process server, for which he should be administratively
sanctioned, Valente is still not off the hook. As Clerk of Court, Valente exercises administrative
supervision over Magbanua and it falls upon Valente to ascertain that Magbanua properly
performed his duties. This Valente failed to do. There is no showing at all that Valente followed-up
with Magbanua and put Magbanua to task when the latter did not submit any report and/or proof
of service of the notice of hearing upon the parties.
2. No.
The Court does not hold Valente administratively liable for dishonesty. Dishonesty implies a
"disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; unworthiness; lack of integrity." Valente, in telling
Judge Barte that Panaligan was served with a notice of hearing, may have sincerely but mistakenly
remembered and/or believed herself personally handing over such a notice to Panaligan; as well as
casually assumed that Magbanua had served the notice of hearing upon Panaligan in the regular
performance of Magbanuas duties as Process Server. In the absence of substantial evidence, the
Court cannot lightly attribute to Valente an intent to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud anyone.
MEMORANDA OF JUDGE ELIZA B. YU ISSUED TO LEGAL RESEARCHER MARIEJOY P. LAGMAN
AND TO COURT STENOGRAPHER SOLEDAD J. BASSIG, ALL OF METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 47, PASAY CITY
The Court holds that the mistakes or errors in the contents of the orders, subpoena, and
Minutes of the Hearing committed by respondents Lagman (Legal Researcher) and Bassig
(Stenographer) could be attributed to their lack of attention or focus on the task at hand. These could
have easily been avoided had they exercised greater care and diligence in the performance of their
duties. We find respondents Lagman and Bassig liable for simple neglect of duty.
Facts:
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The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) required Judge Yu to submit certified
photocopies of the documents pertinent to her complaints against respondents Lagman and Bassig.
In her response, Judge Yu submitted the required documents and in a letter charged respondent
Lagman, legal researcher, with grave misconduct, falsification, usurpation of judicial functions, and
dishonesty. Judge Yu likewise charged respondent Bassig, Court Stenograher, with misconduct,
falsification, usurpation of judicial functions, and gross insubordination.
The charges of grave misconduct, falsification, usurpation of judicial functions, and
dishonesty against respondent Mariejoy P. Lagman
Judge Yu, in several Memoranda, directed respondent Lagman to explain her alleged
wrongdoings as legal researcher namely: 1) Lagmans act of including and calling Civil Case No. MPSY-09-09232, during the hearing on June 9, 2010, when the said case was not even calendared on
that day; 2) Lagmans discrepancy in the dates in Civil Case No. 482-01 wherein Constancia dated
April 22, 2010 stated that the hearing had been reset to June 17, 2010, while the Minutes of the
Hearing dated April 22, 2010 indicated the resetting to July 1, 2010 and that Constancia stated that
she was in Cardona, Rizal, when in fact, she was attending the 57th Orientation of Newly-Appointed
Judges; 3) Lagmans discrepancy in a similar mistake she made in connection with the preparation
of the Minutes of the Hearing for Civil Case No. SCC-10-55 wherein she prepared the Minutes of the
Hearing on May 28, 2010 when no such hearing was conducted on the said date and that
respondent Lagman wrote in the said Minutes that the hearing of the case was terminated and
thereafter submitted the case for decision; 4) Lagmans discrepancy in the total number of pending
criminal and civil cases indicated in the physical inventory conducted and those recorded in the
January and February 2010 monthly reports.
The charges of misconduct, falsification, usurpation of judicial functions, and gross
insubordination against respondent Soledad J. Bassig
In several memoranda, Judge Yu also required respondent Bassig to explain why the latter
should not be liable for the following mistakes: 1) Bassigs drafting of the Minutes of the Hearing in
Civil Case No. B-03-08 and letting the counsels of the parties sign therein, when in fact no hearing
was conducted on the said date; 2) Bassigs sending of subpoena to witnesses which bore trial
dates different from the trial dates specified in the Order and in the Transcript of Stenographic
Notes;3) Bassigs mistake in drafting an Order which stated that in the Sheriffs Return, the
Summons was not served since the defendants cannot be located at their given address. Judge Yu
claimed that the Sheriffs Return,on the contrary, clearly stated that the summons was duly served.
Issue:
Whether or not Lagman and Bassig are administratively liable for the above acts.
Ruling:
They are liable for simple neglect of duty. Simple neglect of duty is defined as the failure to
give attention to a task or the disregard of a duty due to carelessness or indifference.
Lagmans Liability
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Here, respondent Lagman showed carelessness or indifference in the performance of her
duties. As Officer-in-Charge, she was remiss in her duties to give due care and attention to
established procedure in the calendar of cases. Respondent Lagman should have properly informed
Judge Yu of the inadvertent omission of Civil Case No. M-PSY-09-09232 in the list of calendared
cases for hearing. With regard to the discrepancies in the dates in Civil Case No. 482-01, we
understand that the said mistakes could not be blamed solely on respondent Lagman as she was not
the one who prepared the documents. However, the errors in the Constancia and in the Minutes of
the Hearing could have been avoided and corrected had respondent Lagman paid more attention to
the details specified in the documents. Similarly in Civil Case No. SCC-10-55, respondent Lagman
did not follow established procedure when she allowed one of the parties to sign the Minutes of the
Hearing without waiting for the arrival of Judge Yu. It must be remembered that the Minutes of the
Hearing is a very important. It is, in fact, a capsulized history of the case at a given session or
hearing, for it states the date and time of session. However, there was actually no usurpation of
judicial authority, since contrary to the allegations of Judge Yu, the Minutes of the Hearing did not
state that the case had been submitted for decision but merely indicated the appearance of the
complainant and the absence of defendant and his failure to file his answer. Likewise, with regard
to the alleged discrepancies in the number of pending cases in the inventory and monthly reports,
respondent Lagman had clearly explained and clarified the reports and inventory that she had
submitted to the Court Management Office of the Supreme Court.
Bassigs Liability
With regard to respondent Bassig, we also find her liable for simple neglect of duty for her
failure to follow the established procedure in the conduct of hearings. In the instant case,
respondent Bassig could have rectified the inadvertent mistakes in the drafting of the subpoena,
order, and Minutes of the Hearing had she given more effort and attention in reviewing the drafts
and not putting the blame on other court personnel. She should have gone over the drafts and made
sure that the papers were correct and in order. Thus, it is clear that respondent Bassig was remiss
in her duties as the Officer-in-Charge. She failed to supervise her subordinates well and to
efficiently conduct the proper administration of justice.
From the foregoing, we hold that the mistakes or errors in the contents of the orders,
subpoena, and Minutes of the Hearing committed by respondents Lagman and Bassig could be
attributed to their lack of attention or focus on the task at hand. These could have easily been
avoided had they exercised greater care and diligence in the performance of their duties. We find
respondents Lagman and Bassig liable for simple neglect of duty.
ASTORGA AND REPOL LAW OFFICES, represented ATTY. ARNOLD B. LUGARES vs. LEODEL N.
ROXAS, SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 66, MAKATI CITY
Neither the Rules nor jurisprudence recognizes any exception from the periodic filing of
reports by sheriffs as pursuant to Rule 39, Section 14 of the Rules of Court. If only Sheriff Roxas
submitted such periodic reports, he could have brought his predicament to the attention of the RTC
and FGU and he could have given the RTC and FGU the opportunity to act and/or move to address the
same.
Facts:
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This is an administrative complaint filed by complainant Astorga and Repol Law Offices
against respondent Leodel N. Ro as Sheriff for willful neglect of duty, relative to Civil Case No. 011002. Civil Case No. 01-1002 is an action for damages wherein the RTC rendered a decision in favor
of FGU and against the defendant NEC Cargo Services, Inc., ordering the latter to pay the plaintiff.
Pursuant to the Writ of Execution, an auction sale was set on July 19, 2006 at Hall of Justice
of Makati City. However, Catalon filed on July 17, 2006 an Affidavit of Third Party Claim, asserting
ownership over the levied properties.Sheriff Roxas personally furnished Astorga and Repol Law
Offices, through Atty. Lugares, on July 18, 2006 a copy of the Notice of Third Party Claim, together
with a copy of Catalons Affidavit of Third Party Claim. Since FGU failed to post an indemnity bond
in favor of third party claimant Catalon, Sheriff Roxas did not proceed with the scheduled auction
sale. Since then, there appears to have been no further development in the execution of the RTC
Decision.
Thus, Astorga and Repol Law Offices filed the instant Complaint-Affidavit against Sheriff
Roxas, alleging, among other things that Sheriff Roxas actually thwarted the Decision by refusing to
execute it; that at present, the Decision in FGUs favor still remains to be executed, while Sheriff
Roxas does nothing to execute the same. This should not be the case because [FGU] as the
prevailing party is entitled to the fruits of the Decision. Something must be done in order to have
the Decision executed and that it is respectfully submitted that Sheriff Roxas should be penalized
and removed from service for willfully refusing to comply with his sworn duty to execute the
Decision, which is his job, and obey the order/writ of the court.
Issue:
Whether or not Sheriff Ramos is administratively liable.
Ruling:
Yes. Sheriff Ramos is liable for simple neglect of duty.
Taking into consideration of the mandate of Rule 39, Section 14 of the Rules of Court, herein
Sheriff Roxas had undeniably failed to file periodic reports on the Writ of Execution dated July 10,
2006. Sheriff Roxas received a copy of said Writ also on July 10, 2006 and he filed a Sheriffs Report
on August 7, 2006. The Sheriffs Report dated August 7, 2006 was the first and last filed by Sheriff
Roxas in connection with the Writ of Execution dated July 10, 2006, until the instant administrative
complaint dated April 29, 2008 was filed against him. For almost two years, Sheriff Roxas was
completely remiss in filing the mandated periodic reports on the Writ of Execution dated July 10,
2006. Consequently, for the same period of time, FGU, the prevailing party in Civil Case No. 011002, was left unaware of any steps taken by Sheriff Roxas to satisfy the Decision dated January 16,
2006. Ultimately, it is apparent that Sheriff Roxas did not file any periodic report because he had
nothing to state therein as he failed to take any further action to satisfy the Decision dated January
16, 2006 and implement the Writ of Execution dated July 10, 2006.
In his defense, Sheriff Roxas claimed that there is no other NEC property which he could
levy or garnish to satisfy the Decision dated January 16, 2006. Sheriff Roxas averred that he could
not garnish the unpaid subscriptions of NEC incorporators, as complainant wished, because the
unpaid subscriptions were not specified in the dispositive portion of the judgment to be
implemented. Sheriff Roxass reasoning is unacceptable. Difficulties or obstacles in the satisfaction
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of a final judgment and execution of a writ do not excuse Sheriff Roxass total inaction. Neither the
Rules nor jurisprudence recognizes any exception from the periodic filing of reports by sheriffs. If
only Sheriff Roxas submitted such periodic reports, he could have brought his predicament to the
attention of the RTC and FGU and he could have given the RTC and FGU the opportunity to act
and/or move to address the same.
GERLIE M. UY and MA. CONSOLACION T. BASCUG, Complainants, vs. JUDGE ERWIN B.
JAVELLANA, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, LA CASTELLANA, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL,
A.M. No. MTJ-07-1666, September 5, 2012, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Judges should remember that they must not only avoid impropriety, but the "appearance of
impropriety" as well.
Also, the previous Code of Judicial Conduct specifically warned the judges against seeking
publicity for personal vainglory. Vainglory, in its ordinary meaning, refers to an individuals excessive
or ostentatious pride especially in ones own achievements.
Facts:
This administrative case arose from a verified complaint for "gross ignorance of the law and
procedures, gross incompetence, neglect of duty, conduct improper and unbecoming of a judge,
grave misconduct and others," filed by Public Attorneys Gerlie2 M. Uy (Uy) and Ma. Consolacion T.
Bascug (Bascug) of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), La Carlotta District, against Presiding Judge
Erwin3 B. Javellana (Javellana) of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), La Castellana, Negros Occidental.
According to the petitioners, respondent Judge the gave the impression that he was a coagent in a surety company with a certain Leilani "Lani" Manunag (Manunag). Resondent Judge had
conveyed to the public on several occasions that Manunag was in a special position to influence him
in granting provisional liberty to the accused.
Respondent was also habitually tardy and whimsically or inconsistently implemented laws
and rules depending on stature of the parties, persons accompanying the parties, lawyers of the
parties, and his personal relations with the parties/lawyers. He spends more time conversing in
cafeterias than stay in the court. Litigants who are in a hurry to go home would bring the affidavits
to the cafeteria for Judges signature.
Most of the time, in Court, in front of litigants as audience and even while solemnizing civil
marriage Respondent would keep repeating conceited remarks as if he is the only intelligent,
credible and qualified judge in the whole world.
Respondent also tolerates the negligence of duty of his court utility worker. Said utility
worker never reports to open or close the court; he never cleans the courtroom; most of the time he
stays in his Karaoke bar which is some few meters away from the MTC of La Castellana. As a matter
of fact the MTC of La Castellana is the dirtiest of all the courtrooms in the whole province.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), in its report27 dated January 2, 2006, found
Judge Javellana liable for gross misconduct when he got involved in business relations with
Manunag, implemented the law inconsistently, and mentioned his accomplishments for publicity.
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The OCA thus recommended that the instant administrative complaint be REDOCKETED as a
regular administrative matter and that Respondent be SUSPENDED from office without salary.
Issue:
Whether or not Respondent Judge is guilty of gross misconduct.
Ruling:
Yes, he is.
Judges are enjoined by the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary to act
and behave, in and out of court, in a manner befitting their office, to wit:
Canon 2, INTEGRITY; Canon 3 IMPARTIALITY; Canon 4 PROPRIETY; Canon 5 EQUALITY;
and Canon 6 COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Judge Javellana had violated the aforequoted canons/standards in several instances. Judge
Javellana did not admit having a business relationship with Manunag, contrary to the finding of the
OCA. What Judge Javellana stated in his Comment was that his relationship with Manunag was
"purely on official business," since Manunag was a duly authorized agent of a credited bonding
company. Nonetheless, Judge Javellana, by referring the accused who appeared before his court
directly to Manunag for processing of the bail bond of said accused, gave the impression that he
favored Manunag and Manunags bonding company, as well as the reasonable suspicion that he
benefitted financially from such referrals. Judge Javellana should remember that he must not only
avoid impropriety, but the "appearance of impropriety" as well.
Moroever, Judge Javellana himself admitted that he often mentioned his previous
accomplishments as counsel in big and controversial cases, claiming that he only did so to impress
upon the parties that he meant business and that he relied greatly upon God to survive the trials
and threats to his life. We are not persuaded.
The previous Code of Judicial Conduct specifically warned the judges against seeking
publicity for personal vainglory. Vainglory, in its ordinary meaning, refers to an individuals
excessive or ostentatious pride especially in ones own achievements. Even no longer explicitly
stated in the New Code of Judicial Conduct, judges are still proscribed from engaging in selfpromotion and indulging their vanity and pride by Canons 1 (on Integrity) and 2 (on Propriety) of
the New Code.
The Court has previously strongly reminded judges in that:
Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct says in no uncertain terms that "a
judge should not seek publicity for personal vainglory." A parallel proscription, this time for
lawyers in general, is found in Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: "a
lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services." This means that lawyers and judges alike, being limited by the exacting standards
of their profession, cannot debase the same by acting as if ordinary merchants hawking
their wares. As succinctly put by a leading authority in legal and judicial ethics, "(i)f lawyers
are prohibited from x x x using or permitting the use of any undignified or self-laudatory
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statement regarding their qualifications or legal services (Rule 3.01, Code of Professional
Responsibility), with more reasons should judges be prohibited from seeking publicity for
vanity or self-glorification. Judges are not actors or actresses or politicians, who thrive by
publicity.
Judge Javellanas actuations as described above run counter to the mandate that judges
behave at all times in such a manner as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary. We cannot stress enough that "judges are the visible representations of
law and justice. They ought to be embodiments of competence, integrity and independence. In
particular, municipal judges are frontline officers in the administration of justice. It is therefore
essential that they live up to the high standards demanded by the Code of Judicial Conduct."
LUCIA NAZAR VDA. DE FELICIANO, Complainant, vs. ROMEO L. RIVERA, SHERIFF IV,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, VALENZUELA CITY
A.M. No. P-11-2920 September 19, 2012, J. Leonardo-De Castro
When a motion to quash a writ of execution was filed by the petitioner and such motion was
already set for a hearing, the Court ruled that the prudent course of action of the Sheriff was to defer
implementation of the writ of execution until a determination of the motion to quash. However, when
a motion to quash the Writ was just filed and was not yet even set for hearing, in the absence of a court
order, Sheriff has to proceed without haste and to employ such means as necessary to implement the
subject Writ of Execution and to put complainant in possession of the disputed properties.
Also, it is worthy to note that once the RTC has rendered a decision in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction, such decision shall, under Rule 70, Section 2120 of the Rules of Court, be
immediately executory, without prejudice to an appeal via petition for review before the Court of
Appeals and/or Supreme Court. The decision of the regional trial court in civil cases governed by this
Rule, including forcible entry and unlawful detainer, shall be immediately executory, without prejudice
to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom.
Facts:
This is an administrative complaint for dishonesty, gross neglect of duty, and misconduct,
filed by petitioner against respondent involving an ejectment case instituted by petitioner. The
MeTC rendered a decision in petitioners favor. On appeal, the RTC rendered a decision affirming
the assailed MeTC judgment. Accordingly, the Branch Clerk of Court, issued a Writ of Execution.
On October 12, 2009, respondent served a notice dated October 9, 2009 addressed to the
Barangay Council of Barangay Ugong, represented by their Barangay Chairman Lota, and all
barangay officials and persons claiming rights from them, to vacate within ten (10) days upon
receipt hereof the subject properties. Thereafter, no other action was undertaken by respondent to
implement the subject Writ of Execution.
The Writ of Execution was issued on October 5, 2009. Respondent served notice on October
12, 2009 giving Lota and those claiming rights from Lota only 10 days from date of receipt or until
October 22, 2009 within which to vacate the disputed properties and remove all improvements
thereon. October 22, 2009 came to pass and Lota and those claiming rights from Lota were still
occupying the disputed properties. Upon follow-up, complainant learned that respondent was not
at the office on October 27, 2009 and was in Cagayan de Oro to implement the Writ of Execution in
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another case. When respondent returned, he explained to complainant that he was not taking
further action to implement the Writ of Execution because Lota already filed a motion to quash said
writ. More than two months from its issuance, the Writ of Execution remained unsatisfied, thus,
prompting complainant to file the instant administrative complaint against respondent.
On January 9, 2011, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that the
instant matter be RE-DOCKETTED as a regular administrative matter against respondent
respondent and that he be found GUILTY of Simple Neglect of Duty and be FINED in the amount of
Five Thousand (P 5,000.00) Pesos and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely.
In a Resolution dated March 14, 2011, the Court re-docketed the administrative complaint
against respondent as a regular administrative matter and required the parties to manifest within
10 days from notice if they were willing to submit the matter for resolution based on the pleadings
filed.
Issues:
1. Whether or not respondent is guilty of simple neglect of duty.
2. Whether or not respondent erred in not taking further action to implement the Writ of
Execution because of a motion to quash said writ filed by the petitioner.
Ruling:
Petition is meritorious.
Sheriffs play an important role in the administration of justice. They are tasked to execute
final judgments of the courts. If not enforced, such decisions become empty victories of the
prevailing parties. As agents of the law, sheriffs are called upon to discharge their duties with due
care and utmost diligence because in serving the courts writs and processes and implementing its
orders, they cannot afford to err without affecting the integrity of their office and the efficient
administration of justice. (Citation omitted.)
The duty of sheriffs to promptly execute a writ is mandatory and ministerial. Sheriffs have
no discretion on whether or not to implement a writ. There is no need for the litigants to "followup" its implementation. When writs are placed in their hands, it is their ministerial duty to proceed
with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute them in accordance with their mandate. Unless
restrained by a court order, they should see to it that the execution of judgments is not unduly
delayed.
Indeed, sheriffs ought to know that they have a sworn responsibility to serve writs of
execution with utmost dispatch. They must comply with their mandated ministerial duty as
speedily as possible. Good faith on their part, or lack of it, in proceedings to properly execute their
mandate would be of no moment, for they are chargeable with the knowledge that being officers of
the court tasked therefore, it behooves them to make due compliances. Their unreasonable failure
or neglect to perform such function constitutes inefficiency and gross neglect of duty.
In the instant case, the Court perceives the respondents indifferent attitude in the
enforcement of the Writ of Execution in Civil Case No. 174-V-07. The Court reiterates that it is the
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mandatory and ministerial duty of the sheriff to execute judgments without delay "unless
restrained by a court order."
Respondent cited Quilo v. Jundarino, where the Court ruled that the prudent course of
action of the Sheriff was to defer implementation of the writ of execution until a determination of
the motion to quash. Quilo is an exception to the general rule, but respondents reliance on the case
is misplaced. There are particular circumstances in Quilo which justified the pronouncement of the
Court that it would have been more prudent for Sheriff Jundarino to defer implementation of the
writ of execution until a determination of the motion to quash the same. Sheriff Jundarino was
liable for misconduct for his unreasonable insistence on implementing the writ of execution on
March 27, 2008 despite the fact that Quilos motion to quash said writ was already scheduled for
hearing the very next day, March 28, 2008. Moreover, Quilo was precisely questioning in his motion
to quash the proper address where the writ should be implemented, whether at No. 2519 Granate
St., Sta. Ana, Manila or at No. 2518 Granate St., San Andres Bukid, Manila.
No such compelling circumstances exist in the case at bar. Lota had just filed a motion to
quash the Writ of Execution, and the motion was not yet even set for hearing. Also, the only basis
for Lotas motion to quash was his pending appeal before the Court of Appeals. It is worthy to note
that once the RTC has rendered a decision in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, such decision
shall, under Rule 70, Section 2120 of the Rules of Court, be immediately executory, without
prejudice to an appeal via petition for review before the Court of Appeals and/or Supreme Court.
More specifically, the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, governing ejectment cases, clearly
provides:
SEC. 21. Appeal. The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate
regional trial court which shall decide the same in accordance with Section 22 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129. The decision of the regional trial court in civil cases governed by this
Rule, including forcible entry and unlawful detainer, shall be immediately executory,
without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom. Section 10 of Rule 70
shall be deemed repealed.
In the absence of a court order, it was incumbent upon respondent to proceed without haste
and to employ such means as necessary to implement the subject Writ of Execution and to put
complainant, as the prevailing party in Civil Case No. 174-V-07, in possession of the disputed
properties. Respondent could hardly be considered as having discharged his duty by serving a
notice to vacate upon Lota but nothing more for the two months following the issuance of the Writ
of Execution.
Respondents unreasonable delay in implementing the Writ of Execution in Civil Case No.
174-V-07 constitutes simple neglect of duty, defined as the failure of an employee to give ones
attention to a task expected of him, and signifies a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness
or indifference. Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 19, series of 1999, classifies
simple neglect of duty as a less grave offense, punishable by suspension without pay for one (1)
month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense. However, the penalty of fine may be
imposed instead of suspension.22 This being respondents first offense in his twenty-four (24)
years in government service, the penalty recommended by the OCA of a fine of P 5,000.00 is
appropriate.
MARCELINO MAGDADARO vs. JUDGE BIENVENIDO SANIEL, JR.
A.M. NO. RTJ-12-2331, December 10, 2012, J. Leonardo-De Castro
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In this case, there is absolutely no showing that Judge Sario was motivated by bad faith or ill
motive in rendering the decision in Civil Case No. CEB27778. Thus, any error Judge Sario may have
committed in dismissing Civil Case No. CEB-27778 may be corrected by filing an appeal of respondents
decision before the Court of Appeals, not by instituting an administrative case against the respondent
before this Court. Moreover, records show that Magdadaro did file an appeal before the Court of
Appeals. Said appeal, is still pending before the appellate court. An administrative complaint against a
judge cannot be pursued simultaneously with the judicial remedies accorded to parties aggrieved by
his erroneous order or judgment. Administrative remedies are neither alternative nor cumulative to
judicial review where such review is available to aggrieved parties and the same has not yet been
resolved with finality. For until there is a final declaration by the appellate court that the challenged
order or judgment is manifestly erroneous, there will be no basis to conclude whether respondent
judge is administratively liable.
Facts:
Civil Case No. CEB27778 was an action for breach of contract with damages instituted on
May 30, 2002 by complainant Marcelino A. Magdadaro (Magdadaro) against Bathala Marketing
Industries, Inc. (BMII), which was raffled to the RTC Branch 20 of Cebu City, presided over by
respondent Judge Bienvenido Saniel, Jr (Judge Saniel).
Magdadaro alleged that he was the owner of a Nissan covered by Philippine National Bank
(PNB) General Insurers Company, Inc. (GICI) Comprehensive Insurance Policy. Subsequently,
Magdadaros car figured in an accident. BMII had to ultimately replace the radiator Magdadaros car
but was later found out to be allegedly reconditioned and was not brand new.
In view of BMIIs failure to repair and replace the radiator tank Magdadaros car under the
contract, the latter filed an action for breach of contract against it. Magdadaro prayed for judgment
awarding in his favor as actual damages, unearned profits, as moral damages, exemplary damages,
and attorneys fees.
At the end of the trial, Judge Saniel directed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda, after which, the case would be submitted for decision. Magdadaro submitted his
Memorandum on
November 9, 2008, which was received by RTC Branch 20 of Cebu City on November 11, 2008.
Judge Saniel rendered a Decision on December 28, 2009 dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No.
CEB27778 for lack of cause of action against the defendants therein.
Magdadaro filed a Notice of Appeal with RTC Branch 20 of Cebu City on February 22, 2010
which was acted upon by said court only on December 2, 2010.
Consequently, Magdadaro filed administrative complaint against respondent Judge
Bienvenido R. Saniel, Jr. for unreasonable delay, gross ignorance of the law, and bias and partiality,
in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, relative to Civil Case No. CEB27778.
Magdadaro alleged that there was delay in resolving Civil Case No. CEB27778, because it
took respondent more than one year to decide the case from the time it was submitted for decision.
To make matters worse, it took the court almost another year to act on his Notice of Appeal and
transmit the records of the case to the appellate court.
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Magdadaro also asserted that respondent was ignorant of the law considering that the latter
did not know the respective liabilities and obligations of the parties in a comprehensive car
insurance contract. Complainant further claimed that respondent was partial or biased in favor of
BMII because respondent, in his Decision dated December 28, 2009 in Civil Case No. CEB27778,
cited certain statements purportedly made by complainant when he testified before the trial court,
but which complainant did not actually say and there were questions and answers which were
incorrectly translated or transcribed in the Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN) which
respondent used against complainant.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Judge Sario can be held guilty for gross ignorant of the law and bias and
partiality.
2. Whether or not Judge Sario can be held guilty for unreasonable delay.
Ruling:
1. No. Judge Sario cannot be held guilty for gross ignorant of the law and bias and partiality.
Clearly, at this point, there is no basis for complainants administrative charges against
respondent for gross ignorance of the law and knowingly rendering unjust judgment, and said
charges are accordingly dismissed.
In Salvador v. Limsiaco, Jr., the Court described the instances when a judge may be held
administratively liable for a judicial error, to wit: It is settled that a judges failure to interpret the
law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented does not necessarily render him
administratively liable. Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad
faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice will be administratively sanctioned. To hold otherwise
would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the
law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.
As we held in Balsamo v. Suan, it should be emphasized, however, that as a matter of policy,
in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not
subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous. He cannot be subjected to
liabilitycivil, criminal or administrativefor any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as
long as he acts in good faith. In such a case, the remedy of the aggrieved party is not to file an
administrative complaint against the judge but to elevate the error to the higher court for review
and correction. The Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of
arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial.
Thus, not every error or mistake that a judge commits in the performance of his duties renders him
liable, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent to do an injustice. Good
faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in
which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge
In this case, there is absolutely no showing that respondent was motivated by bad faith or ill
motive in rendering the decision in Civil Case No. CEB27778. Thus, any error respondent may have
committed in dismissing Civil Case No. CEB-27778 may be corrected by filing an appeal of
respondents Decision before the Court of Appeals, not by instituting an administrative case against
the respondent before this Court.
Page 92 of 110
Moreover, records show that complainant did file an appeal before the Court of Appeals.
Said appeal, is still pending before the appellate court. An administrative complaint against a judge
cannot be pursued simultaneously with the judicial remedies accorded to parties aggrieved by his
erroneous order or judgment. Administrative remedies are neither alternative nor cumulative to
judicial review where such review is available to aggrieved parties and the same has not yet been
resolved with finality. For until there is a final declaration by the appellate court that the challenged
order or judgment is manifestly erroneous, there will be no basis to conclude whether respondent
judge is administratively liable.
2. Judge Sario can be held guilty for unreasonable delay.
However, evidence on record satisfactorily establish respondents guilt for undue delay in
resolving Civil Case No. CEB27778 and in acting upon complainants Notice of Appeal.
lower courts must be decided or resolved within three months from the date they are submitted for
decision or resolution.
As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or
certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless
delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature, these rules
are regarded as mandatory. Judges are oft-reminded of their duty to promptly act upon cases and
matters pending before their courts. Canon 6, Section 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary dictates that judges shall perform all duties, including the delivery of reserved
decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness. Administrative Circular No. 1 dated
January 28, 1988 once more enjoins all magistrates to observe scrupulously the periods prescribed
in Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution, and to act promptly on all motions and interlocutory
matters pending before their courts.
Unfortunately, respondent failed to live up to the exacting standards of duty and
responsibility that his position requires. Complainant had already submitted his Memorandum in
Civil Case No. CEB27778 on November 11, 2008, yet, respondent rendered a decision in the case
only on December 28, 2009. Indeed, respondent failed to decide Civil Case No. CEB27778 within the
three-month period mandated by the Constitution for lower courts to decide or resolve cases.
Records do not show that respondent made any previous attempt to report and request for
extension of time to resolve Civil Case No. CEB27778. Respondent, without providing a reasonable
explanation for the delay, is deemed to have admitted the same.
As if to rub salt into complainants wound, it took RTC Branch 20 of Cebu City, presided over
by respondent, 10 months to approve and act upon complainants Notice of Appeal. The Court is not
convinced by respondents excuse that his court was understaffed. Even with just one clerk of
record in charge of both civil and special proceedings cases, 10 months is an unreasonable length of
time for photocopying and preparing records for transmittal to the Court of Appeals. Judges, clerks
of court, and all other court employees share the same duty and obligation to dispense justice
promptly. They should strive to work together and mutually assist each other to achieve this goal.
But judges have the primary responsibility of maintaining the professional competence of their
staff. Judges should organize and supervise their court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient
Page 93 of 110

dispatch of business, and require at all times the observance of high standards of public service and
fidelity.
RE: CASES SUBMITTED FOR DECISION BEFORE HON. TEOFILO D. BALUMA,
FORMER JUDGE, BRANCH 1, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, TAGBILARAN CITY, BOHOL.
A.M. No. RTJ132355, August 28, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Failure to decide a case within the reglementary period is not excusable and constitutes gross
inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions on the defaulting judge.
Facts:
Before the Court is the request for Certificate of Clearance of Judge Teofilo D. Baluma
(Baluma), former Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, of Tagbilaran City, Bohol,
in support of his application for Retirement/Gratuity Benefits under Republic Act No. 910, as
amended. Judge Baluma availed himself of optional retirement on July 22, 2011.
According to the Certification dated August 19, 2011 of Juan J. Lumanas, Jr. (Lumanas),
Officer-in-Charge, RTC, Branch 1, Tagbilaran City, Bohol, there were 23 cases submitted for
decision/resolution which were left undecided by Judge Baluma. All 23 cases were already beyond
the reglementary period for deciding them by the time Judge Baluma retired.
Deputy Court Administrator Raul Bautista Villanueva required Judge Baluma to explain his
failure to act on the 23 cases. However, Judge Baluma failed to comply with said directive. The
processing of Judge Balumas Application for Clearance has been put on hold pending clearance
from the OCA.
In a letter dated April 4, 2013, Judge Balumas son, Atty. Cristifil D. Baluma, averred that his
father was suffering from depression and requested for the early release of Judge Balumas
retirement pay and other benefits. Atty. Baluma appealed that if any amount needs to be withheld
from Judge Balumas retirement benefits due to the undecided cases, Judge Balumas health
condition be taken into consideration.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Baluma is subject to administrative penalties due to the 23 cases left
undecided upon his optional retirement.
Ruling:
Yes. Judge Baluma is subject to administrative penalties.
The Court has consistently impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and
expeditiously under the time-honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied. Every judge
should decide cases with dispatch and should be careful, punctual, and observant in the
performance of his functions for delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of
our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute. Failure to decide a
case within the reglementary period is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency warranting
the imposition of administrative sanctions on the defaulting judge.
Page 94 of 110
In the present case, the Court takes into account the afore-quoted survey of cases together
with the number of cases Judge Baluma failed to decide within the reglementary period (23 cases
upon his retirement) and the lack of effort on his part to proffer an explanation or express remorse
for his offense but considering as well that he is suffering from depression and that he has no prior
infraction, the Court finds that a fine of P20,000.00 is adequate.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. DESIDERIO W. MACUSI, JR., Sheriff IV,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Tabuk City, Kalinga
A.M. No. P-13-3105, September 11, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Sheriffs and their deputies are the frontline representatives of the justice system, and if,
through their lack of care and diligence in the implementation of judicial writs, they lose the trust
reposed on them, they inevitably diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary As such, the Court
will not tolerate or condone any conduct of judicial agents or employees which would tend to or
actually diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary.
Facts:
Criselda M. Paligan (Paligan) was the plaintiff in Civil Case entitled Ms. Criselda M. Paligan v.
Spouses Cornelio and Leonila Tabanganay, an action for collection of sum of money with damages,
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Tabuk City, Kalinga. In a letter dated July 23,
2009, addressed to the Presiding Judge, MTCC, Tabuk City, Kalinga, Paligan inquired as to the status
of the writ of execution issued on September 10, 2008 by the MTCC, since she had not received any
report or information whether the said writ had already been served. Paligan also furnished the
Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25, of Tabuk City, Kalinga, a copy of her letter.
Judge Victor A. Dalanao (Dalanao), MTCC, Tabuk City, Kalinga, through a 1st Indorsement
dated July 29, 2009, referred Paligans letter to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for
appropriate action. Judge Dalanao reported that the writ of execution, issued on September 10,
2008, was received by the Office of the Provincial Sheriff on September 19, 2008. A return was
made on October 30, 2008 informing the court that the writ was returned unserved. Thereafter,
no other report on the writ was made. Judge Dalanao further observed that a lot of cases are
similarly situated, where not even a report has been submitted as prescribed by the Rules of Court.
In his letter dated November 16, 2009, Desiderio W. Macusi, Jr. (Macusi), Sheriff IV, RTC
Branch 25, Tabuk City, Kalinga, defended himself by calling attention to the fact that he was
appointed as Sheriff only in 2006, while some of the writs of execution in Judge Dalanaos inventory
of cases were issued as early as 1997. While admitting that in some cases, there were late reports
or no reports at all on the writs of execution, Macusi argued that the rule states that the Sheriff
must act with celerity and promptness when they are handed the Writs of Execution yet, the rule
also states that when party litigants, in whose favor the Writs, have been issued, frustrate the
efforts of the Sheriffs to implement those Writs, the latter are relieved from such duty and incur no
administrative liability therefor. Macusi additionally wrote that he did not report regularly despite
the presence of the rules since he relied on the dictates of practicality so as not to waste supplies.
Rules, accordingly are there to guide but they are not absolute, what matters is what one
accomplishes. Macusi then informed the OCA that he had been, in fact, sued before the courts
because of his accomplishments as a Sheriff. As for his failure to submit his estimate of expenses for
Page 95 of 110

Judge Dalanaos approval, Macusi explicated that he dispensed with the same for the winning
parties were already willing to assist him and pay for his expenses.
In a Resolution dated August 18, 2010, the Court treated the instant matter as an
administrative complaint against Macusi and referred the same to Executive Judge Marcelino K.
Wacas (Wacas), RTC Branch 25, Tabuk City, Kalinga, for investigation, report, and recommendation.
The Court also directed Atty. Andomang to facilitate, in coordination with all concerned, the
immediate implementation of the writs of execution listed in Judge Dalanaos inventory and submit
a status report thereon within 30 days from notice.
After his investigation, Judge Wacas submitted a Resolution dated April 20, 2012. Judge
Wacas found substantial evidence that Macusi violated Rule 39, Section 14 and Rule 141, Section 10
of the Rules of Court. According to Judge Wacas, Macusi exercised some degree of discretion,
having his own rules and unmindful of the existing rules and established jurisprudence. In the end,
Judge Wacas recommended that Macusi be found guilty of simple neglect of duty and meted the
penalty of a fine in the amount of Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00).
Macusi submitted his Manifestation and Motion dated May 30, 2013, informing the Court
that he was deemed resigned from government service by operation of law when he filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for the position of City Councilor in Tabuk City, Kalinga for the 2010 Local
Elections. He prayed that the Court dismiss the administrative case against him for being moot and
academic.
Issue:
Whether or not Macusi is administratively liable.
Ruling:
Yes. He is administratively liable
As found by Judge Wacas and the OCA, Macusi violated Rule 39, Section 14 and Rule 141,
Section 10 of the Rules of Court. The raison d etre behind the requirement of periodic reports
under Rule 39, Section 14 of the Rules of Court is to update the court on the status of the execution
and to take necessary steps to ensure the speedy execution of decisions.
As observed by Judge Wacas, Macusi exercised excessive discretion in the execution of the
writs and in the filing of reports thereon. He seemed to have entirely overlooked that the nature of
a sheriffs duty in the execution of a writ issued by a court is purely ministerial. As such, a sheriff
has the duty to perform faithfully and accurately what is incumbent upon him. Conversely, he
exercises no discretion as to the manner of executing a final judgment. Any method of execution
falling short of the requirement of the law deserves reproach and should not be countenanced.
Moreover, difficulties or obstacles in the satisfaction of a final judgment and execution of a
writ do not excuse Macusis total inaction. Neither the Rules nor jurisprudence recognizes any
exception from the periodic filing of reports by sheriffs. If only Macusi submitted such periodic
reports, he could have brought his predicament to the attention of his superiors and the issuing
courts and he could have given his superiors and the issuing courts the opportunity to act and/or
move to address the same.
Page 96 of 110
Sheriffs and their deputies are the frontline representatives of the justice system, and if,
through their lack of care and diligence in the implementation of judicial writs, they lose the trust
reposed on them, they inevitably diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary. It cannot be
overstressed that the image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise, of
the personnel who work there, from the judge to the lowest employee. As such, the Court will not
tolerate or condone any conduct of judicial agents or employees which would tend to or actually
diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary.
Macusis prayer for dismissal of the present case for being moot is baseless. Macusis
constructive resignation from service through filing of his Certificate of Candidacy for the 2010
Local Elections does not render the case against him moot. Resignation is not a way out to evade
administrative liability when a court employee is facing administrative sanction.
HEIRS OF CELESTINO TEVES REPRESENTED BY PAUL JOHN TEVES ABAD ELSA C. AQUINO and
FELIMON E. FERNAN vs. AUGUSTO J. FELICIDARIO, SHERIFF IV, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF
COURT, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA,
A.M. No. P-12-3089, November 13, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro
When a sheriff takes advantage of an erroneous increase of his parcel of land which was
unknown to the true owners by keeping silent on the error, securing a new title reflecting such
increase and afterwards destroying the boundary and improvements of the rightful owners, he is
guilty of dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the service, even if the act is not related to his official
functions. As long as the questioned conduct tarnishes the image and integrity of his public office, the
corresponding penalty may be meted on the erring public officer or employee.
Facts:
The Heirs of Celestino Teves filed a complaint-affidavit with the Office of the Court
Administrator accusing Augusto Felicidario, Sheriff of RTC Manila, of grave misconduct, dishonesty
and conduct unbecoming of an officer of the court. The Heirs alleged that they are the successorsin-interest of the late Celestino Teves to two parcels of land (Lots 263 and 264) distributed under
the Department of Agrarian Reform DAR) Resettlement Project. Lots 263 and 264 measured 965
square meters and 648 square meters, respectively, or 1,613 square meters combined. The late
Celestino Teves and complainants have been in possession of Lots 263 and 264 since 1960. Lots
263 and 264 are adjacent and contiguous to Lot 268, which has been occupied by Felicidario and
with an area of 838 square meters. In May 2003, upon the approval of a new subdivision plan, Lots
263 and 264 were clustered into one lot, designated as Lot 190; while Lot 268 was designated as
Lot 189.2 Under the same plan, the area of Lot 189 was erroneously increased from 838 square
meters to 941 square meters. Felicidario knew of this error but being dishonest, he concealed it
from the DAR. Respondent was eventually issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. M-01182 for
Lot 189, with a total area of 941 square meters. On the basis of OCT No. M-01182 Felicidario started
to unlawfully and forcibly acquire 117 square meters of complainants Lot 190 (disputed area) by
(a) altering and installing concrete boundaries; (b) destroying the riprap and cyclone wires which
served as boundary between Felicidarios Lot 189 and complainants Lot 190; (c) destroying the
comfort room, dirty kitchen, warehouse, and trees in the disputed area; and (d) constructing a
concrete fence with steel gate around Lot 189 and the disputed area. The Heirs were helpless in
preventing Felicidario from performing the aforementioned acts as he bragged that he is a Sheriff of
the RTC of Manila and threatened the Heirs with bodily harm.
Page 97 of 110
The Heirs had filed with the DAR a complaint against Felicidario, which ruled in their favor.
The DAR conducted an investigation and found that under the Certificate of Land Ownership Award
(CLOA) based on the new survey in 2003, 117 square meters were erroneously added to
Felicidarios property, which belonged to the Heirs. The CLOA of the latter have not yet been issued
and the heirs were not aware of the changes until Felicidario destroyed the riprap and cyclone
wires which served as the boundary of the heirs.
Felicidario prayed for dismissal of the case as the acts subject thereof are not related with
his official actions as sheriff. The OCA recommended that Felicidario be found GUILTY of Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and be SUSPENDED for three (3) months without pay.
Issue:
Should Felicidario be held liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
and grave misconduct?
Ruling:
Felicidario is guilty of simple dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service, but not of grave misconduct.
Dishonesty is "intentionally making a false statement on any material fact[;]" and "a
disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity, lack of honesty,
probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud,
deceive or betray."
It is true that Felicidario did not have a hand in the re-survey conducted by the DAR in 2003
which resulted in the increased land area of his Lot 189. Nonetheless, his actuations thereafter
displayed his lack of honesty, fairness, and straightforwardness, not only with his neighbors, but
also with the concerned government agencies/officials.
The Heirs of Teves and Felicidario had been awarded and occupying their respective
properties under the DAR Resettlement Program since 1966, yet, Felicidario did not express
surprise and/or bafflement that the land area of his Lot 189 was significantly increased from 838
square meters to 941 square meters after the 2003 re-survey. Honesty, fairness, and
straightforwardness, as well as good faith and prudence, would have impelled Felicidario to bring
the matter to the attention of complainants and the DAR, and inquire and verify with the DAR his
entitlement to the increased land area, especially when he was well-aware that complainants had
been in possession of the disputed area, and had, in fact, introduced substantial improvements
thereon, for almost four decades. Instead, Felicidario, undeniably benefitting from the increased
land area of Lot 189, held his peace and already proceeded to secure a certificate of title in his name
for Lot 189, with a land area of 941 square meters. When Felicidario was finally issued OCT No. M01182, he invoked the same as justification for occupying the 117-square meter disputed area,
destroying the Heirs improvements thereon, and enclosing Lot 189 (inclusive of the disputed area)
within a concrete fence and steel gate.
Whether or not an error was indeed committed by the DAR officials during the 2003 resurvey, resulting in the increased land area of Lot 189, Felicidario evidently took advantage of
Page 98 of 110

complainants ignorance of the situation in order to acquire OCT No. M-01182 with nary an
opposition. It bears to stress DAR declared erroneous the increase in land area of respondents Lot
189 after the 2003 re-survey and the PARO had already instituted proceedings before the DARAB
for the correction of Felicidarios OCT No. M-01182. While Felicidario is seeking to have the final
and executory DAR Region IV-A Order set aside by the Office of the President, as things stand at
present, the basis for Felicidarios legal title to the disputed area is doubtful, at best. Considering
that the increase in land area of Lot 189 was due to the (erroneous) result of the 2003 re-survey of
the Sampaloc Townsite by the DAR; that Felicidario s dishonesty was committed through his silence
and/or inaction, when the circumstances demanded otherwise, rather than his active and/or
express misrepresentation to the complainants and concerned public officials; and that Felicidario
committed the dishonesty in his private life and not in the course of performance of his official
functions, the Court holds him guilty of only simple dishonesty.
Felicidarios deportment under the circumstances likewise constitute conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service. In addition to being dishonest, respondent appears to have illegally
forced his way into the disputed area. As a Sheriff, he is expected to be familiar with court
procedure and processes, especially those concerning the execution of orders and decisions of the
courts. It is difficult for the Court to believe that respondent is completely unaware that even as the
registered owner of the real property and with the barangay officials assistance, he cannot simply
enter and take possession of the disputed area and destroy the Heirs improvements thereon. He
must first initiate an ejectment case against the Heirs before the appropriate court and secure a
court order and writ of possession.
The Civil Service law and rules do not give a concrete description of what specific acts
constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, but the Court defined such an
offense as acts or omissions that violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or tend to
diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary, thereby prejudicing the best interest of the
administration of justice. In Government Service Insurance System v. Mayordomo, the Court further
declared that the administrative offense of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
need not be related to or connected with the public officers official functions. As long as the
questioned conduct tarnishes the image and integrity of his public office, the corresponding penalty
may be meted on the erring public officer or employee.
Felicidarios transgressions may not be related to his official duties and functions, but
certainly reflect badly upon the entire Judiciary. He failed to live up to the high ethical standards
demanded by the office he occupies. It cannot be overemphasized that every employee of the
judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. Like any public servant, he
must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the performance of his official
duties but in his personal and private dealings with other people, to preserve the Courts good
name and standing. This is because the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the
conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat, from the judge to the least
and lowest of its personnel. Thus, it becomes the imperative sacred duty of each and every one in
the court to maintain its good name and standing as a true temple of justice.
However, precisely because Felicidario was not acting in the performance of his official
duties, he cannot be administratively liable for misconduct, whether grave or simple. The offense
committed by petitioner is not "misconduct." To constitute misconduct, the act or acts must have a
direct relation to and be connected with the performance of his official duties.
Page 99 of 110

RAUL K. SAN BUENAVENTURA vs. TIMOTEO A. MIGRINO, CLERK OF COURT III,
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 69, PASIG CITY
A.M. No. P-08-2574, January 22, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Castro
As clerk of Court and administrative assistant of the judge, one is tasked is tasked to keep a
calendar of cases for pre-trial, trial, and those with motions to set for hearing and to give preference to
habeas corpus cases, election cases, special civil actions, and those required by law. Here, the clerk of
court showed carelessness and indifference in the performance of his duties. He cannot simply reason
that he had nothing to do with the resetting and the setting of the hearings. That is an unacceptable
excuse, especially in light of Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel which
requires that court personnel shall at all times perform official duties properly and diligently.
Furthermore, it is incumbent upon the clerk of court to regularly check not only the status of the cases
but also the functions of the other court personnel and employees under his supervision.
Facts:
Raul K. San Buenaventura (San Buenaventura) alleges that after the decision of this Court in
a civil case became final and executory on April 3, 2006, he filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Execution on August 17, 2006, requesting that the said motion be heard on August 22, 2006.
According to complainant San Buenaventura, Timoteo A. Migrio (Migrio) set the hearing on
October 13, 2006 and refused to grant his request for an earlier setting. San Buenaventura further
narrated that the MeTC issued an order informing the parties that the said motion had already been
submitted for resolution. However, the MeTC issued another order deferring the resolution of the
said motion since the records of the case had been elevated to the Regional Trial Court as the
defendant of the civil case had filed an Annulment of the Judgment and Partition on the decision of
the Supreme Court which was sought to be executed.
According to San Buenaventura, Migrio claimed that the MeTC was not yet served a copy of
the Supreme Court decision and entry of judgment, yet when San Buenaventura made further
inquiries, he discovered that the MeTC had already received its copies as early as August 7, 2006.
San Buenaventura further alleged that he and his counsel requested Migrio on several occasions to
inform the MeTC Presiding Judge of the Supreme Court decision and the entry of judgment so that
their pending motion could be resolved. These requests, however, were not acted upon by Migrio,
forcing San Buenaventura to file a Motion with Leave of Court for the Immediate Resolution of
Plaintiffs Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Execution on April 13, 2007. It was only on July 20,
2007 when the said motion for the issuance of a writ of execution was finally resolved, or after
almost a year from the date of filing of said motion. With regard to the issuance of the writ of
execution, complainant San Buenaventura also stated that despite repeated follow-ups and
requests, respondent Migrio belatedly issued the said writ only on November 14, 2007, or after
almost four months from the time the order of its issuance was given.
As reported in the Sheriffs Return dated December 4, 2007, defendant Josefa refused to
leave the subject premises when he was served the Notice to Vacate dated November 19, 2007. On
January 25, 2008, the Order dated January 8, 2008 directing the issuance of a writ of demolition
was released. Complainant San Buenaventura further alleged that respondent Migrio informed
him that the said writ could not yet be issued since an alleged third-party claimant filed a motion
for reconsideration and a motion to suspend implementation of the demolition order, among
others, was filed on January 28, 2008. Said motions were set to be heard on February 22, 2008
which complainant San Buenaventura asserted was violative of Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of
Page 100 of 110

Court as it has been mandated therein that the time and date of the hearing of motions must not be
later than 10 days after the filing of the motion. Complainant San Buenaventura also claimed that it
was respondent Migrio who filled in, or at the least, facilitated the setting of the hearing of the
motion at a very late date, on February 22, 2008.
Complainant San Buenaventura maintained that respondent Migrio should be
administratively sanctioned for setting the hearings of various motions in their case over long
periods of time and for unduly interfering in Civil Case No. 6798.
Migrio denied the accusations hurled against him.
Issue:
1. Whether Migrio is guilty of neglect of duty
2. Whether the case should be dismissed by reason of the death of Migrio
3. Whether Judge Jacqueline J. Ongpauco should be held administratively liable for undue
delay in resolving the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution
Ruling:
1. The Court adopt the findings of fact of the OCA and hold respondent Migrio liable for
simple neglect of duty.
Simple neglect of duty is defined as the failure of an employee to give proper attention to a
required task or to disregard a duty due to carelessness or indifference.11 It is classified as a less
grave offense under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service and is
punishable with suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense
and dismissal for the second offense.
In the instant case, it is incumbent upon Migrio as the Clerk of Court and the
administrative assistant of the judge, to assist in the management of the calendar of the court,
particularly in the scheduling of cases and in all other matters not involving the exercise of
discretion or judgment of the judge. Migrio is tasked to keep a calendar of cases for pre-trial, trial,
and those with motions to set for hearing and to give preference to habeas corpus cases, election
cases, special civil actions, and those required by law. Here, Migrio showed carelessness and
indifference in the performance of his duties. He cannot simply reason that "he had nothing to do
with the resetting and the setting of the hearings." That is an unacceptable excuse, especially in light
of Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel which requires that court
personnel shall at all times perform official duties properly and diligently.
Indeed, as found by the Investigating Judge and the OCA, Migrio was guilty of delay in
scheduling the Motion for Issuance of the Writ of Execution particularly when the subject decision
in Civil Case No. 6798, an unlawful detainer case that is governed by the Rule on Summary
Procedure, had already become final and executory. As such, Migrio should have given preference
to San Buenaventuras motion which was filed on August 17, 2006. Granting that the requested date
for hearing fell on a Tuesday, a non-hearing day for the Acting Presiding Judge, Migrio should have
set the date of the next hearing well within the 10-day period mandated under Section 5, Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court.
Page 101 of 110

Moreover, as the officer of the court next in line to the Presiding Judge, it is incumbent upon
Migrio to regularly check not only the status of the cases but also the functions of the other court
personnel and employees under his supervision. It is important to stress that as clerk of court,
respondent Migrio should take charge of the administrative aspects of the courts business and
chronicle its will and directions, keep the records and seal, issue processes, enter judgments and
orders, and give upon request, certified copies of the records of the court. 15Thus, it is clear that
respondent Migrio was remiss of his duties when he failed to supervise his subordinates well and
to efficiently conduct the proper administration of justice.
2. No, the case will not be dismissed.
The death or retirement of any judicial officer from the service does not preclude the
finding of any administrative liability to which he shall still be answerable. In the instant case, an
investigation was completed and two recommendations were already given by the OCA pointing to
the misdemeanor of respondent Migrio.
In previous cases, the Court held that the jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing
of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official had
ceased in office during the pendency of his case. The Court retains its jurisdiction either to
pronounce the respondent official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof. A contrary
rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implication ... If
innocent, respondent official merits vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the
government which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the
corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation.
3. Yes, Judge Ongpauco may be held administratively liable.
The recommendation of the OCA to file a separate administrative complaint against Judge
Jacqueline J. Ongpauco for undue delay in resolving the motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution in Civil Case No. 6798 is well-taken. We quote the findings of the OCA, thus:
However, the delay in the execution of the judgment could not be wholly attributed
to the respondent, but also to Acting Presiding Judge Ongpauco as it concerned judicial
orders issued by her.
It must be pointed out that the subject decision in Civil Case No. 6798 had already
become final and executory. In fact, an entry of judgment was already issued by the
Supreme Court where the case was elevated. Hence, as such, execution of the said decision
should have been issued as a matter of right, in accordance with Section 1, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court. However, instead of immediately ordering the execution of the final
judgment, Judge Ongpauco allowed the case to drag on through several resettings of the
hearings of the case on such grounds as (1) the defendant not being around; (2) the records
of the case were not yet in the courts possession; (3) the granting of the defendants motion
and manifestation to submit his comment/opposition to plaintiffs motion for execution; (4)
the records of the case had been elevated anew to the Regional Trial Court.
Judge Ongpauco, however, was not included as a respondent because she was not named in
the complaint. But the fact is it was she who signed the orders, and both the Report dated
September 29, 2008 of the Office of the Court Administrator and the Investigation Report dated
March 26, 2009 of Judge Mejorada contained the same observation. It is imperative that she be
Page 102 of 110

formally charged and required to file her comment to answer the charge of undue delay in
rendering an order in the civil case.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. HON. CADER P. INDAR, AL HAJ, PRESIDING
JUDGE and ABDULRAHMAN D. PIANG, PROCESS SERVER, BRANCH 14, both of the REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 14, COTABATO CITY
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2287, January 22, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Castro
OCA Circular No. 7-2003 clearly states that court personnel should indicate in their bundy
cards the truthful and accurate times of their arrival at, and departure from, the office. Process
Servers entries in his DTRs for dates that had not yet come to pass were a clear violation of OCA
Circular No. 7-2003. Furthermore, Section 4, Rule XVII (on Government Office Hours) of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws also
provides that falsification or irregularities in the keeping of time records will render the guilty officer
or employee administratively liable.
A judge who deliberately and continuously fails and refuses to comply with the resolution of
the Supreme Court is guilty of gross misconduct and insubordination. Thus, when it took three
directives and three years for a judge to submit his Comment on an administrative matter against him
and another, and failure to offer any apology and/or explanation for his long delay in complying with
the directives/orders of the OCA and this Court, said conduct constitutes no less than a clear act of
defiance, revealing the judges deliberate disrespect and indifference to the authority of the Court. It is
completely unacceptable especially for a judge.
Facts:
Abdulrahman D. Piang (Piang) was appointed Process Server of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 14 of Cotabato City on January 25, 2010 and assumed office on February 15, 2010.
Piang was required by the Office of the Court Administrator, Office of Administrative Services (OCAOAS) to submit several documents, which included a complete Daily Time Records (DTR) or Bundy
Card, verified as to the prescribed office hours by the Presiding Judge/Clerk of Court, one month
from the date of his assumption, which Piang subsequently submitted. Piang was, thereafter,
required by OCA-OAS to comment on his anomalous DTR. Piang explained that it was an honest
mistake caused by his lack of knowledge of the policies being implemented by the office. He claimed
that he understood the OCA-OAS directive to submit "complete DTR or Bundy Card verified as to
prescribed office hours by the Presiding Judge/Clerk of court, one month from the date of
assumption" to mean that he should already submit DTRs for the remaining days of February and of
the whole month of March 2010 even though he had not yet worked on those days. He further
explained that he had no fraudulent intention and that the error was due to sheer inadvertence on
his part alone, being too excited to perform his duties and to have the documents signed by former
Judge Cader P. Indar (Indar). He simply forgot to seek advice from Judge Indar.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), later on found sufficient reason to hold Piang
administratively liable for failure to submit true and accurate DTRs/Bundy Cards amounts to
falsification which is punishable by dismissal, and under Civil Service Rules and Regulations, it is
dishonesty. The OCA, however, took into consideration the mitigating circumstance of Piang
acknowledging his infractions, as well as the fact that this is his first offense.
Page 103 of 110

In a Resolution, the Court required (1) Piang to manifest if he was willing to submit the case
for decision/resolution based on the pleadings filed, and (2) Judge Indar to submit his comment on
the present matter, otherwise, it shall be deemed waived and the case against him will be decided
based on the records at hand. Piang filed his Manifestation expressing his willingness to submit the
instant administrative case for resolution based on the submitted pleadings and requesting
leniency of the Court in deciding his case. In another Resolution, the Court required Judge Indar to
show cause why he failed to comply with the earlier Resolution of the Court and directed him anew
to submit the required comment.
Thereafter, Acting Presiding Judge Bansawan Z. Ibrahim (Ibrahim), Al Haj, RTC-Branch 14 of
Cotabato City, informed the OCA, that Judge Indar, who was by then already suspended because of
another administrative case, had not been in touch with the court, thus, Judge Ibrahim believed that
Judge Indar would no longer submit his comment on the present case. Judge Ibrahim also vouched
for the absence of malice on the part of Piang when he prepared the subject DTRs; Piang was
merely not advised properly.
Court Administrator Marquez submitted a reportin which he recommended that (1) Piang
to be suspended for a year without pay; (2) Judge Indar be found guilty of gross misconduct and
insubordination and a penalty of fine (Php 40, 000) against the latter. Six months thereafter, Judge
Indar finally submitted his Comment on October 7, 2013.
Issue:
1. Whether Piang is guilty of dishonesty.
2. Whether Judge Indar is guilty of gross misconduct and insubordination.
Ruling:
1. Piang is guilty of dishonesty.
OCA Circular No. 7-2003 clearly states that court personnel should indicate in their bundy
cards the truthful and accurate times of their arrival at, and departure from, the office. As the
Court has previously ruled, court employees must follow the clear mandate of OCA Circular No. 72003. Piangs entries in his February and March 2010 DTRs for dates that had not yet come to pass
were a clear violation of OCA Circular No. 7-2003. Furthermore, Section 4, Rule XVII (on
Government Office Hours) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292
and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws also provides that falsification or irregularities in the
keeping of time records will render the guilty officer or employee administratively liable.
There is no other way but for the Court to view Piangs falsification of his February and
March 2010 DTRs as tantamount to dishonesty. He cannot claim honest mistake as he was fully
aware when he accomplished his DTRs for February and March 2010 that there were dates that had
not yet even come to pass and for which he could not have reported for work yet. He even
meticulously and, thus, intentionally, entered varying time-in and time-out for each date in said
DTRs. Piang need not be advised of the policies at RTC-Branch 14 of Cotabato City. Truthfulness and
accuracy in the DTRs should be complied with in any office, government offices most especially.
Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal
from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and perpetual
Page 104 of 110

disqualification for reemployment in government service. Indeed, dishonesty is a malevolent act
that has no place in the judiciary. This Court has defined dishonesty as the "(d)isposition to lie,
cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity
in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray." 19
Nonetheless, the Court has recognized exceptions to the rule, and imposed penalties less
severe than dismissal from service upon a dishonest employee. In Falsification of Daily Time
Records of Ma. Emcisa A. Benedictos, Administrative Officer I, Regional Trial Court, Malolos City,
Bulacan, the Court ratiocinated:
[I]n several administrative cases, the Court refrained from imposing the actual penalties in
the presence of mitigating factors. There were several cases, particularly involving
dishonesty, in which the Court meted a penalty lower than dismissal because of the
existence of mitigating circumstances.
In another case, the Court did not impose the severe penalty of dismissal because the
respondents acknowledged their infractions, demonstrated remorse, and had dedicated long years
of service to the judiciary. Instead, the Court imposed the penalty of suspension for six months on
Ting, and the forfeiture of Esmerios salary equivalent to six months on account of the latters
retirement.
In the case at bar, considering that Piang readily admitted his infraction and that this is
Piangs first administrative case, a similar penalty of six (6) months suspension, instead of
dismissal, is already sufficient.
2. Judge Indar is guilty of gross misconduct and insubordination.
It took three directives and three years for Judge Indar to submit his Comment on the
present administrative matter against him and Piang. In a letter dated April 20, 2010, Court
Administrator Marquez required Judge Indar to comment on why he signed Piangs DTRs for
February and March 2010 even if these were not yet due. In a Resolution issued more than a year
later, on June 29, 2011, the Court likewise ordered Judge Indar to submit his comment on the
matter of Piangs anomalous DTRs. Then, in another Resolution dated February 8, 2012, the Court
already required Judge Indar to show cause why he failed to comply with the Resolution dated June
29, 2011 and directed him once more to file his comment. Despite being given notices of the
aforementioned letter and Resolutions, Judge Indar filed his Comment only on October 7, 2013, and
even then, he did not offer any apology and/or explanation for his long delay in complying with the
directives/orders of the OCA and this Court. In fact, Judge Indar has still not complied with the
show-cause order of the Court contained in its Resolution dated February 8, 2012. It is worthy to
note further that Judge Indar, at that time, was already suspended pending investigation of another
administrative case against him, and Judge Indar failed to file his comment and compliance with the
directives/orders of the Court in said other case.
The conduct exhibited by Judge Indar constitutes no less than a clear act of defiance,
revealing his deliberate disrespect and indifference to the authority of the Court. It is completely
unacceptable especially for a judge.
The judges must respect the orders and decisions of higher tribunals, especially the
Supreme Court from which all other courts take their bearings. A resolution of the Supreme Court is
not to be construed as a mere request nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately or
Page 105 of 110

selectively. Respondents failure to comply with the repeated directives of this Court constitutes
gross disrespect to its lawful orders and directives, bordering on willful contumacy. In AlontoFrayna v. Astih, it was held: A judge who deliberately and continuously fails and refuses to comply
with the resolution of this Court is guilty of gross misconduct and insubordination. It is gross
misconduct and even outright disrespect for this Court for respondent to exhibit indifference to the
resolutions requiring him to comment on the accusations contained in the complaint against him.
Respondents continued refusal to comply with the lawful orders underscores his lack of
respect for authority and a defiance for law and order which is at the very core of his position. This
is anathema to those who seek a career in the judiciary because obedience to the dictates of the law
and justice is demanded of every judge. How else would respondent judge endeavor to serve justice
and uphold the law, let alone lead his peers, when he disdains to follow even simple directives?
In the Judiciary, moral integrity is more than a cardinal virtue, it is a necessity. The exacting
standards of conduct demanded from judges are designed to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. When the judge himself becomes the transgressor of the
law which he is sworn to apply, he places his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law
and impairs public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary itself.
Judging by the foregoing standards, the Court can only conclude that Judge Indar is guilty of
gross misconduct and insubordination for his long delay in complying, as well as for his total noncompliance, with the directives/orders of the OCA and this Court.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. JUDGE BORROMEO BUSTAMANTE
A.M. NO. MTJ-12-1806, April 7, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Castro
This Court has always emphasized the need for judges to decide cases within the
constitutionally prescribed 90-day period. Any delay in the administration of justice, no matter how
brief, deprives the litigant of his right to a speedy disposition of his case. Not only does it magnify the
cost of seeking justice, it undermines the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary, lowers its
standards, and brings it to disrepute. A member of the bench cannot pay mere lip service to the 90-day
requirement he/she should instead persevere in its implementation. Heavy caseload and demanding
workload are not valid reasons to fall behind the mandatory period for disposition of cases. The Court
usually allows reasonable extensions of time to decide cases in view of the heavy caseload of the trial
courts. If a judge is unable to comply with the 90day reglementary period for deciding cases or
matters, he/she can, for good reasons, ask for an extension and such request is generally granted. But
Judge Bustamante did not ask for an extension in any of these cases. Having failed to decide a case
within the required period, without any order of extension granted by the Court, Judge Bustamante is
liable for undue delay that merits administrative sanction. In Office of the Court Administrator v.
Garcia-Blanco, the Court held that the 90-day reglementary period is mandatory. Failure to decide
cases within the reglementary period constitutes a ground for administrative liability except when
there are valid reasons for the delay.
Facts:
Considering the impending retirement of Judge Borromeo R. Bustamante (Bustamante), a

judicial audit of the MTCC was conducted by a team from the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA). OCA found that there were 35 undecided cases before the court of Judge Bustamante. OCA
issued letter to Judge Bustamante demanding explanation and ordered compliance. Judge
Bustamante complied and consequently resolved 33 out of 35 cases pending before his court.
Page 106 of 110
However OCA later issued a memorandum of its findings and found that Judge Bustamante
had decided 33 out of the 35 cases for decision in his court. Of the 33 cases decided by Judge
Bustamante, 13 were still within the reglementary period while 20 were already beyond the
reglementary period. Of the 20 cases Judge Bustamante had decided beyond the reglementary
period, 10 were decided more than a year after their respective due dates (ranging from 1 year and
8 days to 4 years and 7 months beyond the due dates) and 10 were decided within a year after their
respective due dates (ranging from 5 days to 6 months beyond the due dates).
Judge Bustamante had also resolved 6 out of the 23 cases with pending incidents in his
court, all of which were resolved beyond their respective reglementary periods (ranging from 5
days to 3 years, 8 months, and 16 days after the due dates). As for the 17 other cases with pending
incidents in his court, Judge Bustamante reasoned that (a) the motions require further hearing (b)
there is a need to await the resolution of other cases pending before other courts and (c) oversight.
The OCA noted, though, that Judge Bustamante failed to submit any order setting the pending
incidents for hearing or holding in abeyance the resolution of the same until the related cases
before other courts have already been decided.
Unconvinced by Judge Bustamantes explanations/reasons for his delay in deciding cases
and resolving pending incidents, the OCA recommended that retired Judge Borromeo R.
Bustamantebe fined in the amount of P20,000 for gross inefficiency.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Bustamante is guilty of undue delay in rendering decisions and
resolutions pending amounting to gross inefficiency.
Ruling:
Yes. Judge Bustamante is guilty of undue delay in rendering decisions and resolutions
pending amounting to gross inefficiency.
The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the OCA.
Decision-making, among other duties, is the primordial and most important duty of a
member of the bench. The speedy disposition of cases in the courts is a primary aim of the judiciary
so the ends of justice may not be compromised and the judiciary will be true to its commitment to
provide litigants their constitutional right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of their cases.
The Constitution, Code of Judicial Conduct, and jurisprudence consistently mandate that a
judge must decide cases within 90 days from submission. As the Court summed up in Re: Report on
the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Br. 4, Dolores, Eastern Samar, A judge is mandated to
render a decision not more than 90 days from the time a case is submitted for decision. Judges are
to dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the period specified in the
Constitution, that is, 3 months from the filing of the last pleading, brief or memorandum. Failure to
observe said rule constitutes a ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting judge,
absent sufficient justification for his noncompliance therewith.
Page 107 of 110

Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that judges should administer
justice without delay. Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 states that judges shall dispose of the courts business
promptly and decide cases within the required periods. A judge cannot choose his deadline for
deciding cases pending before him. Without an extension granted by this Court, the failure to decide
even a single case within the required period constitutes gross inefficiency that merits
administrative sanction.
A judge cannot choose his deadline for deciding cases pending before him. Without an
extension granted by this Court, the failure to decide even a single case within the required period
constitutes gross inefficiency that merits administrative sanction.
Rule 3.05 mandates judges to attend promptly to the business of the court and decide cases
within the periods prescribed by law and the Rules. Under the 1987 Constitution, lower court
judges are also mandated to decide cases within 90 days from submission.
Judges must closely adhere to the Code of Judicial Conduct in order to preserve the
integrity, competence and independence of the judiciary and make the administration of justice
more efficient. Time and again, we have stressed the need to strictly observe this duty so as not to
negate our efforts to minimize, if not totally eradicate, the twin problems of congestion and delay
that have long plagued our courts.
In Office of the Court Administrator v. GarciaBlanco, the Court held that the 90-day
reglementary period is mandatory. Failure to decide cases within the reglementary period
constitutes a ground for administrative liability except when there are valid reasons for the delay.
This Court has always emphasized the need for judges to decide cases within the
constitutionally prescribed 90-day period. Any delay in the administration of justice, no matter how
brief, deprives the litigant of his right to a speedy disposition of his case. Not only does it magnify
the cost of seeking justice, it undermines the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary, lowers
its standards, and brings it to disrepute. A member of the bench cannot pay mere lip service to the
90-day requirement he/she should instead persevere in its implementation. Heavy caseload and
demanding workload are not valid reasons to fall behind the mandatory period for disposition of
cases. The Court usually allows reasonable extensions of time to decide cases in view of the heavy
caseload of the trial courts. If a judge is unable to comply with the 90day reglementary period for
deciding cases or matters, he/she can, for good reasons, ask for an extension and such request is
generally granted. But Judge Bustamante did not ask for an extension in any of these cases. Having
failed to decide a case within the required period, without any order of extension granted by the
Court, Judge Bustamante is liable for undue delay that merits administrative sanction.
PRESIDING JUDGE JUAN GABRIEL HIZON ALANO, MARY ANNABELLE A. KATIPUNAN, SUZEE
WONG JAMOTILLO, ANALIE DEL RIO BALITUNG, EDWINO JAYSON OLIVEROS AND ROBERTO
BABAODONO vs. PADMA LATIP SAHI
A.M. No. P-11-302, June 25, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Castro
While it is true that respondent Sahi is merely human and may commit mistakes, there is
simply no excuse for making the same mistakes repeatedly despite her superior constantly calling her
attention to correct them. Granting that respondent Sahi was not good at using computers in the
beginning, she should have taken steps to learn and hone her computer skills which were essential to
her work. The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the
Page 108 of 110

dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, must always be beyond reproach
and must be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.
Facts:
Complainant Judge Alano alleges that from the day he resumed office, respondent Sahi
never prepared any court calendar or minutes. He further alleges that respondent Sahi does not
know how to speak the Yakan and Visayan dialects, which is necessary for her position. Also,
complainant Judge Hizon gathered that even prior to 2004, it was Mary Annabelle A. Katipunan
(one of the complainants) who prepared the minutes of proceedings, calendar of cases and kept
records of the same. Respondent Sahi also abused her position when she required one of the
complainants, Suzee Wong Jamotillo, Court Stenographer I, to fill up her Income Tax Return to
include names of children that are not her own. She also required complainant Analie Del Rio
Balitung to prepare a promissory note in favor of a party litigant in an election protest before
another court. Complainant Judge Alano claims that in all cases he heard since 2004, he was the one
who would usually interpret the testimonies of the witnesses into English, to avoid inconvenience
and delay in the proceedings. He asserts that when respondent Sahi was assigned in the Office of
the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Basilan Province, her stay was no longer extended and she
was directed by the Court to return to her official position at the 2nd MCTC, Sumisip-MalusoLantawan, Basilan. From the time that respondent Sahi reported back to office, she was not in the
office for more than a month and worse, her Daily Time Records from August 2009 to May 2010
bore no signature of those authorized to sign the same.
After respondent Sahi received her Notice of Unsatisfactory Rating, complainant Judge
Alano again called her attention due to her inexcusable errors in formatting and grammar.
Therafter, respondent Sahi calendared only one case. In the morning of the same day, a
representative from the Provincial Prosecutors Office approached complainant Katipunan
regarding the cases that are calendared on that day, since respondent Sahi failed to post a copy
outside the courtroom. Consequently, at around 1:00 oclock of the same day, respondent Sahi
failed to call the case for hearing, as she was not around. However, the courts logbook shows that
she was present at that time. Because of respondent Sahis inefficiency and stubborn refusal to
perform her duties, complainant Judge Alano decided to relieve her of her duties and designated
complainants Jamotillo and Balitung as acting court interpreters. The other complainants claim that
the Sahi even tried to implicate them when she was sued for extortion. They assert that respondent
Sahi would always manipulate her officemates to do her job and falsely implicate those who would
do otherwise.
In her Comment, respondent Sahi vehemently denied the charges against her and asserted
that the allegations in the Verified Complaint are maliciously concocted lies which are just part of
complainant Judge Alanos scheme to get back at her for earlier filing a complaint for grave abuse of
authority against said Judge. The Office of Court Administrator recommended that Respondent Sahi
be held guilty for Inefficiency and Incompetence in the Performance of Official Duties.
Issue:
Whether or not Sahi is administratively liable for inefficiency and incompetence in the
performance of official duties
Ruling:
Page 109 of 110
Yes. The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA that respondent Sahi is administratively
liable for inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties. The charge that
respondent Sahi was remiss in her duties as court interpreter has been duly proven. Not only do the
complainants corroborate one another, but the documentary evidence supports the charge. The
foregoing incidents demonstrate respondent Sahis indifference to her work and lack of effort to
improve despite already receiving unsatisfactory performance ratings for the first and second
semesters of 2008.
Respondent Sahis general denial carries little weight. As the preceding paragraphs will
show, there are specific charges against her, supported by documentary evidence, which she had
the opportunity to directly address and explain, but she merely glossed over. Her allegations that
complainant Judge Alano was merely retaliating against her after she filed an administrative case
against him; that the other complainants are mere stooges, subservient to complainant Judge Alano;
that Judge Alano had been pressuring employees to leave the court; and that complainant Judge
Alano gave her unsatisfactory performance rating because he did not like her from the very
beginning, are all uncorroborated and self-serving.
In contrast, complainants have adequately shown that respondent Sahis unsatisfactory
performance ratings were warranted in view of the error-filled output she had consistently
produced and her indifferent attitude towards her work. While it is true that respondent Sahi is
merely human and may commit mistakes, there is simply no excuse for making the same mistakes
repeatedly despite her superior constantly calling her attention to correct them. Granting that
respondent Sahi was not good at using computers in the beginning, she should have taken steps to
learn and hone her computer skills which were essential to her work.
As the Court pronounced in Judge Domingo-Regala v. Sultan:
No other office in the government service exacts a greater demand for moral
righteousness and uprightness from an employee than the judiciary. The conduct and
behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice,
from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, must always be beyond reproach and must be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Public officers must be accountable
to the people at all times and serve them with the utmost degree of responsibility and
efficiency. Any act which falls short of the exacting standards for public office, especially on
the part of those expected to preserve the image of the judiciary, shall not be countenanced.
It is the imperative and sacred duty of each and everyone in the court to maintain its good
name and standing as a true temple of justice.
Page 110 of 110

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Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008-2015) Legal Ethics

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008-2015) Legal Ethics

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008-2015) Legal Ethics

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008-2015) Legal Ethics

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008-2015) Legal Ethics

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008-2015) Legal Ethics

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008-2015) Legal Ethics

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Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008-2015) Legal Ethics

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Yes, the respondents can be administratively punished for their actions.

Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper, unlawful conduct motivated by a

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Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008-2015) Legal Ethics

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008-2015) Legal Ethics

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008-2015) Legal Ethics

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008-2015) Legal Ethics

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008-2015) Legal Ethics

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008-2015) Legal Ethics

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008-2015) Legal Ethics

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008-2015) Legal Ethics

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008-2015) Legal Ethics

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Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008-2015) Legal Ethics

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Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008-2015) Legal Ethics

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008-2015) Legal Ethics

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Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008-2015) Legal Ethics

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Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008-2015) Legal Ethics

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Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008-2015) Legal Ethics

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008-2015) Legal Ethics

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008-2015) Legal Ethics

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008-2015) Legal Ethics

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008-2015) Legal Ethics

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008-2015) Legal Ethics