CSC vs. Sta.

Ana
A. M. No. OCA-01-5, August 1, 2002

Reynaldo Sta. Ana, HR Management Officer I of the office of the Court

Administrator applied for promotion as HRMO III. In support of his application for
promotion to the said position, he submitted the following documents: (1) a Certificate of
Eligibility purportedly issued by the Civil Service Commission certifying that respondent
Sta. Ana passed the Career Service Professional examination; and (2) a Personal Data
Sheet (PDS) dated stating that he passed the CSP examination. Upon verification,
however, respondent was not in the CSC-NCR Master List of those who passed the
MOWE Career Service Professional Examination. Hence, CSC-OLA issued a formal
charge against respondent for Dishonesty and Falsification of Public Document.
Pursuant to the Constitution, the jurisdiction was later transferred to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Are Reynaldos acts constitutive of Falsification of Public Documents.

Held: Yes. Under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of
"use of falsified documents" are (1) that the offender knew that document was falsified
by another person; (2) that the false document is embraced in Art. 171 or in any
subdivisions 1 or 2 of Art. 172; (3) that he used such document (not in judicial
proceedings); and (4) that the use of the false document caused damage to another or
at least it was used with intent to cause such damage. It cannot be gainsaid that
respondent was well aware that the certificate of eligibility he submitted was false
because he knew for a fact that he did not pass the career service examination. It is,
likewise, undeniable that his use of such false document in support of his promotion to
HRMO III prejudiced the other applicants who were genuinely qualified for the position.
Respondent's act of indicating in his personal data sheet that he passed that career
service professional examination when in fact he did not, also makes him liable for
falsification of a document by making an untruthful statement in a narration of facts, as
defined under Art. 171, par. 4, of the Revised Penal Code. In falsification by false
narration of facts, (1) the offender makes untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
(2) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; (3) the
facts narrated are absolutely false; and (4) it was made with a wrongful intent to injure a
third person.

Tad-y vs People
G.R. No. 148862. August 11, 2005

In an entrapment operation, Engineers Rubin Tad-y, Structural Analyst and

Nestor Velez, Building Inspector both of Office of the City Engineer, Bacolod City, were
caught in possession of the marked money for P4,000.00 which they accepted from
Julio Encabo, electrical contractor and duly-authorized representative of Mildred Wong,
offended party and owner of Atrium Building located at Gonzaga Street, Bacolod City.
Such amount was solicited by Tad-y in exchange for the approval and signing of a
building permit. As a consequence thereof, Tady-y and Velez were charged with direct
bribery under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code. The MTC convicted Tady and
acquitted Velez. Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC was denied and CA
affirmed the RTCs decision in toto.
Issue: Is the conviction proper?
Held: No. Direct bribery has the following essential elements: 1. the offender is a public
officer; 2. the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by
himself or through another; 3. such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be
received by the public officer with a view to committing some crime, or in consideration
of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime but the act must be unjust,
or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do; and 4. the act which
the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with the performance
of his official duties. The prosecution is mandated to prove, beyond reasonable doubt,
the essential elements of the felony and that the petitioner is the perpetrator thereof.
There is also no credible evidence on record that the petitioner demanded P4,000.00
from Wong, through Encabo, in exchange for the signing of the certificate of occupancy.
Indeed, it is incredible that the petitioner would demand the said amount as a
precondition to his signing a certificate, considering that, under Section 309 of P.D. No.
1096,he authority to sign said certificate is vested specifically on the building official,
and not on the petitioner.

Ong vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 119858, April 29, 2003
It was alleged that on On 6 July 1990, petitioner, representing ARMAGRI,
executed a trust receipt acknowledging receipt from SOLIDBANK of the goods valued at
P2,532,500.00. On 12 July 1990, petitioner and Benito Ong, representing ARMAGRI,
applied for another letter of credit for P2,050,000.00 to finance the purchase of
merchandise from Fertiphil Corporation. The Bank approved the application, opened the
letter of credit and paid to Fertiphil Corporation the amount of P2,050,000.00. On 23
July 1990, petitioner, signing for ARMAGRI, executed another trust receipt in favor of
the Bank acknowledging receipt of the merchandise. Under the trust receipts,
ARMAGRI undertook to account for the goods held in trust for the Bank, or if the goods
are sold, to turn over the proceeds to the Bank. ARMAGRI also undertook the obligation
to keep the proceeds in the form of money, bills or receivables as the separate property
of the Bank or to return the goods upon demand by the Bank, if not sold. When the trust
receipts became due and demandable, ARMAGRI failed to pay or deliver the goods to
the Bank despite several demand letters. Hence, two Informations charging petitioner of
estafa were filed.
Issue: Is Ong liable, being a mere agent of Armagri?
Held: Yes. The petitioner is a person responsible for violation of the Trust Receipts Law.
The Trust Receipts Law is violated whenever the entrustee fails to: (1) turn over the
proceeds of the sale of the goods, or (2) return the goods covered by the trust receipts if
the goods are not sold. The mere failure to account or return gives rise to the crime
which is malum prohibitum. There is no requirement to prove intent to defraud. Under
the law, mere failure by the entrustee to account for the goods received in trust
constitutes estafa. The Trust Receipts Law punishes dishonesty and abuse of
confidence in the handling of money or goods to the prejudice of public order. The Trust
Receipts Law expressly makes the corporation's officers or employees or other persons
therein responsible for the offense liable to suffer the penalty of imprisonment. True,
petitioner acted on behalf of ARMAGRI. However, it is a well-settled rule that the law of
agency governing civil cases has no application in criminal cases. When a person

participates in the commission of a crime, he cannot escape punishment on the ground

that he simply acted as an agent of another party.

Chan vs. Sandiganbayan

G. R. No. 149613. August 9, 2005
Petitioner Pamela Chan was hired as Accounting Clerk II at NBI in Cebu City. While on
leave, Josephine Daclan, auditor from the Commission on Audit (COA) conducted a routine
audit examination on December 27, 1995. Since Chan was on leave, the audit was conducted
upon Delza Bas as designated. The auditor found that all collections for the period beginning
December 7, 1995 up to the date of the audit, December 27, 1995, were accounted for and
signed by Bas. On January 24, 1996, the same auditor conducted another audit examination.
Since petitioner had already reported for work, the audit covered the period beginning June 15,
1995. The auditor found a shortage of P290,228.00 in petitioners cash accountability. The
auditor thus issued a demand letter to petitioner to restitute the missing funds and explain the
shortage. Another audit covering June 15, 1995 up to March 1, 1996 was conducted. As a
result, the auditor found that petitioner had a cumulative shortage of cash accountability in the
amount of P333,360.00 which was reflected in her Cash Examination Report dated March 1,
1996, signed by petitioner. Again the auditor issued a demand letter to petitioner requiring her to
explain the shortage incurred, to which petitioner did not respond. The COA Region VII thus
filed a complaint against petitioner for Malversation of Public Funds in the amount
ofP333,360.00 with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman (Visayas) on April 10, 1996. By
Resolution dated February 18, 1997, said office found probable cause against petitioner and
recommended the filing of the corresponding information against her. Petitioner was thus
indicted before the RTC of Cebu City for Malversation of Public Funds and was convicted. The
Sandiganbayan affirmed the conviction. Asserting that she was denied due process because of
COAs refusal to re-audit and averring that Bas shortage was mixed with hers, the petitioner
went before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Is the petition meritorious?
Held: No. The burden of proof that the subject audit reports contain errors sufficient to merit a
re-audit lies with petitioner. The discrepancy, if true, is too minimal to merit a re-audit
considering the amount of shortage incurred. Also, Granted that Bas was given official
designation during all the times that she acted as collection officer, petitioners liability is not, by
that fact alone, mitigated. Petitioner could still be held liable for the amount unremitted by Bas if
it can be shown that the latter was under her supervision. Petitioner, nonetheless, could have
shown that she was not remiss in her supervision of Bas, by way of rebutting the disputable
presumption in Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code which states:The failure of a public officer
to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon

demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such
missing funds or property to personal use. Petitioner, however, failed to do so. Not only did she
omit to report the shortages of Bas to the proper authority upon her discovery thereof; she even
practically admitted to having assisted Bas in covering up such shortages. The fact that
petitioner did not personally use the missing funds is not a valid defense and will not exculpate
him from his criminal liability. The fact that (the) immediate superiors of the accused (petitioner
herein) have acquiesced to the practice of giving out cash advances for convenience did not
legalize the disbursements".

People vs. Castillo

G.R. No. 118912, May 28, 2004

Manolito Hernandez, Ricardo, Quintin and Cosme Hernandez had a drinking

session. When Manolito asked his father Buenaventura, for permission to sleep at his
uncles house, the latter refused. Manolito got annoyed and ran towards the north.
Buenaventura started his jeepney and together with Dante, his son, Cosme, his
newphew, Quintin and Ricardo followed Manolito. They eventually caught up in the road
where they found Manolito in an altercation with Juanito. Manolito hit Juanito with a
stone in the head. Alarmed, Buenaventura offered to take Juanito to the hospital. While
on the way to the hospital. Buenaventura instructed Romeo, one of his sons, to fetch
Manolito. Romeo looked for his brother Manolito and saw the latter lying prostrate,
being ganged up by Quintin and Ricardo. He witnessed Quintin stabbing the body of the
motionless victim with a shiny object while Ricardo was astride the victim, beating the
latters head with a stone. Fearfully, he shouted and begged them to stop prompting the
two assailants to turn to him. He thus ran back home. On the way he met his cousin
Cosme, who, upon being told of the incident, rushed to the crime scene. When Cosme
arrived at the spot where the victim was attacked, he saw the victim all bloodied and
lying on the ground. Quintin and Ricardo were nowhere to be found. Autopsy showed
Manolito died of sever cerebral hemorrhage. The two accused denied the allegations
claiming that they left Manolito upon his request and that the latter was probable beaten
up by the other three drunk men they met while on their way home that night. The RTC
convicted Quintin and accused Ricardo Castillo. CA affirmed RTCs decision, hence, the
accused appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Did the CA err in giving undue credence to the testimony of Romeo, the lone
eyewitness?
Held: No. It is settled that when a conviction hinges on the credibility of witnesses, the assessment
of the trial court is accorded the highest degree of respect. In the present case, the trial court
observed that: . . [P]rosecution witness Romeo Hernandez is a credible young man and his
statement stated in court is likewise credible and worthy of belief. Said witness is, from the
observation of the court, a refined person and the same testified in [a] clear and straightforward

manner. Time and again, this Court has held that the testimony of a sole eyewitness, which is clear,
straightforward and worthy of credence by the trial court, is sufficient to support a conviction.
Treachery was clearly demonstrated by the manner by which appellant, while astride the victim,
struck the latters head with a piece of stone. The victim, who was proven to be then lying on his
belly with his face down on the ground, was rendered defenseless, as the other assailant stabbed
him. It was, therefore, clear that Quintin and appellant employed means to insure the commission of
the crime without risk to themselves. The appellate court, however, correctly disregarded abuse of
superior strength as this circumstance is already absorbed by treachery.

People vs. Olaybar

G.R. No. 150630-31
October 1, 2003
Rose Ann Into y Avenido, an eight-year old child, lives with her family at a
squatters area in Pasay City. On 05 September 2000, around seven oclock in the
evening, Rose Ann was playing with her friends when Olaybar brought her to a parked
jeepney in the nearby parking lot. Inside the jeepney, Olaybar made Rose Ann lie down
and had his penis inserted into her vagina. After a while, Olaybar made her sit on his lap
and put his penis inside her anus. That night, when brought home by Olaybar, Rose Ann
told her mother, Rea, that Olaybar molested her. Rea confronted Olaybar but the latter
denied having done anything to Rose Ann. Rea warned Olaybar never to come near
Rose Ann again. The following evening, on 06 September 2000, between seven oclock
and seven-thirty, Olaybar called Rose Ann and, despite the warning made the previous
night, he again brought her to a parked jeepney, made her sit on his lap and inserted his
penis into her anus. He then escorted her home. Rose Ann, just as before, told her
mother of what had transpired. Rea confronted Olaybar but the latter once more denied
any wrongdoing. Rea sought the help of one Roger Siobert and, this time, Olaybar
admitted to Roger what he had done. Rea went to the police to report the incident.
When examined, genital findings show clear evidence of blunt force or penetrating
trauma." Olaybar had nothing to offer but alibi for his defense. Two Informations for rape
were filed against Olaybar for which he was convicted and sentenced to Death. With the
imposition of the penalty of death, the records were elevated to the Supreme Court for
review.
Issue: Should the death penalty be imposed?
Held: The testimony of the victim was clear and corroborated by medical examination
results. There is no question that Olaybar is guilty of the two charges. The trial court has
decreed the penalty of death on account of circumstance numbered 6 of Article 266A, i.e., that when "the offender knows that he is afflicted HIV, AIDS or any other sexually
transmissible disease and the virus or disease is transmitted to the victim," the
imposition of the extreme penalty of death would be warranted. While Rose Ann has
contracted a sexually transmitted-disease, no evidence, however, has been adduced to
show the latters being aware of his own affliction with such a disease. In fact, that
aggravating circumstance is not even alleged in the two Informations. In Criminal Case

No. 00-1600, the penalty imposed upon appellant for the offense of statutory rape,
absent any aggravating circumstance that can be considered, must, accordingly, be
reduced to reclusion perpetua. In Criminal Case No. 00-1601, the penalty for the
offense of rape by sexual assault, conformably with Article 266-B of the Code, is prision
mayor or one degree lower than that imposed for rape by sexual intercourse. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and absent any modifying circumstance, the
imposable penalty should then be anywhere from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten
(10) years of prision mayor medium, as maximum penalty, and anywhere within the
range of from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision correccional, as
minimum penalty, for the offense. s