CIP

2013

ISBN 978-7-208-11923-9

CIP

200001

2013

193

274668

www.ewen.cc

F276.6

100013

8201280

1/32

18.5
4
408,000

ISBN

2014

2014

978-7-208-11923-9/F2200
59.00

4A

1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2
1

2
3
4
5
6
3
1
2
3
4
5
4
1
2

3
4
5
5
1
2
3
4
5
6
6
1
2
3

4
5
7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
8
1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

90

20

20

1998

10

10
100

100

100

1998

1999

10

90

2003

3
3

2003

CEO

13

13

SOX

manager-centered model

entrepreneur-centered model

2013

11 20

1>2

20
Berle Means
20

1932

1997

1999

2003

70025201

1-7

2005

16

1
1

40
40

40

corporate governance

2
3

2000

Pareto efficiency
(1)

1-1

1-1
100

100
50

50

80

20
A 20

X
80
Z

80

B 20
Z

A
90

100

10

1-2
H

Z F
Z

Z H

1-2

A
1000
900

100

100

99
1

100

99

100

B
(3)

1000

1
(2)

900

1-2

Z H

100

999
899

200

A
B

200

1-2

1099

2000

2002

10

122

X
2
200

200
X

10000
30

10000

0.02

Y
30

200

(4)

300

(5)

PL

P
B<PL

B
B

1
0.5

A
B
A

10
5

(6)

0
5

B 5

5
3

B 5

10

100
150

101

1.8

1.5
100

155
102

100

102
2
181.8

153

102
1

155
101

1.5

152
101

102
100
2

150

1
200

101
1

100

102
18.2

101

28.2

1
1
1-3

1-3

1-3

50

1-4

1-3
80

80

80

D
1

79

79
1

74

79

D
1

1
P1

P*

Q*

Q1
P*

P*

1-4

(7)

1-4

(8)

Q1

Q*

(9)

1-5
A

X
X

(10)

1-5

200

1776

50 (11)
140 B

100
150

B
150

140

50
50

150

140
A
A

50
A

40

B
B
140

150

A
B


200

200

1 1>2
1>2

500
550

500
CEO
500

400
500

450
250

50
200

100

3
7

20

(12)

1993
Roland

2000

Lau

Qian and

Zhang and Yi 1997

20

20

2
20

(13)

20
50
(14)

A
C
20

C
20

10> 10 20

A B
A
20
0

A
C
A

20
C

10

10
C

20

C
A

B30
(15)

3
2

50

100

externality

EMBA

1-6
MPR

MSR
MSC MPG

MPG
Q*
Q**

Q**<Q*

(16)

1-6

1-7
MSR

MPR

Q**

Q*
10
8

100
6

1-7

4
2

1999

50

80

MBA

(17)

internalization of externality

10

A
B

100

80
A
A 110 B 95

15

B
A

B
39

30
A

A
B

10

10030

40

40

1-8
1-6

1929

1-8

(18)

Coase 1960

100
200

100

50

100
200

100
120
80

200
50

80

50

80

100

A
B

120
120

110
A

B 95

A
10

30

80

1-9

P
O

S
S

S
S

MBO

1-9

(19)

100

200

120

180
100 (20)
100

50
50

50

(21)

100
4000

20

2000
99

1980

2000

2020

2020

20
4000

1
99
1010

1010
3000

4000

2000

1000

second best

game

100

(22)

the rule of game

120

20

2
13

14

1-10

4
5
5

1
1-10

4
5

(23)

3
4
1

1
1

3
5

2
2

3
1-10
3

TCL

(24)

(25)

10

1-10
4

1-11

10
4

15

6
6

10

10

1-11

1
10

1
1

10

10

10

10

1-12

10
1

1-12

B
10
18

1-11

9
20 19

12

3
15

15
9

10

18

50

75

25

(26)

20

19
(27)

A
A

1
1-13
0
10
15

1-13

0
10

10
0

15

0
1-1
80

160

100
40

120

0
100
30

2
120

2
80

80
3
80

30

Coase 1972
1-1

1
2
3
4

100
80
40
30

100
160
120
120

3
30

1-14

10
15

15
0
20

10

50
50

10

50

10

commitment

50

(28)

10

(29)

(30)

ex ante
hidden information
hidden action

adverse selection

moral hazard

ex post

2001

Akerlof
5

5
20
20

10

10

50

15
18

15

15
15

15
15

15
15

10

1970

A
20

150
120

50

100
0

200

A
150

50

0
10

110

10

A
A

110

150
1100.5

120

37.5
137.5
100

80
80
100

10
1100.8 100
50
220

110
B

200

B
B

50
78.75

0.5

178.75
21.25

178.75

50

200
120

0
0

1-15
1-15

(31)

1-15

signaling

2001

Spence 1973

2001
2002

10
2

10

2
2

10

Posner 2000

screening

2001

Rothschild and Stiglitz

1976

2
1
800

reputation

(32)

6
(33)

100

90
80

10
8

80

1
1

10


principal

agent

2
1

3
3000
5000

20

100

15

80
B
A

80

A
A

25

100
100

100

50

200

A
40
0

50

40
4000
39.6

99
4000

39.6

40

40

1
1
4000

4000

39.6

39.6

10

500

500

X
Y

50

100

200

50

100

80

80

100

80

A
20

A
0

B
B

0
A

50

20
B

100

50
200
50

(34)

50
150

150
50

50

50

0
50

50

50


(35)

(36)

40

32
100
4000

8000

Macaulay
1985

Casadesus-Masanell and Spulber

2002

8
(37)

1999

30

neglignce rule

no Liability

Liability without fault

Liability for fault

100

externality test

credibilty test

(38)

10
10

retaliationtest
A
A

(39)

(40)

100

(1)

100

(2)

100

100

1000

900

(3)

1972

(4)

(5)
(6)

Learned Hand

2002
1

(7)

(8)
(9)
(10) X

Leibenstein

1966

(11)

(12)
20

10

(13)
(14)

(15)

5
20

(16)

20

Q*

(17)
10

100
50

(18)

1991

50

80
110

20

1937

1960
(19)

130

1960

(20)
10

(21)

(22)

20

40
3

1994

(23)

(24)

(25)

1994
20

1951

(26)
1

A
100

60
30

60

1-12
(27)

(28)

24

(29)
(30)

20
5
2001

50

60

1982
1996

(31)

(32)

(33)

Mirrlees

1975

1976

Holmstrom 1982

(34)

(35)

911

(36)

100
0

(37)

Cheung

2003

(38)

(39)
(40)

200

1969

2
1

nexus of contacts

2-1
2-2

2-1

2-2

2-1

2-2

R&D

2-3

2-3

Coase 1937

Alchian and Demsetz

1>2

1972 Jensen and Meckling

1 2

1976

1996

Cheung

Coase 1937

authority
Williamson 1971

2-4

1983

2-4

contingencies

Tirole 1999
911

2-5

2-5

1993
1994

1994

110
14

1996

2001

2002

2002
8

29

14

fiduciary duties

2-6

2-6

Williamson

1971

2001

Tyler
and Degoey

1996

2-7

2-7

3
1

1937

1
3
1

4
2

N N 1

/2

N 10

45

100

4950

10
8

N 100

N 10
100 1 99

45

4950

2-

2-8

2-9

(1)

2-9

2-9

20
40
2-9

Lazear

1979

60

1975

1979

1980

relationship-specific investment
monopolist
hold-up problems

3
8

A
5.5

2.5

5.5 3

2.5

1.5

B
A

make-it-or-buy-it

make-or-buy

Akedof

1970

1995

Knight K
1921

vision
Shackle 1979 Casson 1982

Yang and Ng

1994

Alchian and Demsetz

1972

residual control rights

residual claims

Milgrom and Roberts

1994

1999
1

Calabresi and Melamed

1972

1
1

500

200

0.5

100

100

100

50

500

Alchian and Demsetz

monitor

1972

A
B

B
1995

Li and Zhang

Hart and Moore 1990

2000

(2)

hidden information
A

100
200

1995

2-10

Li and Zhang

2000

2-10

2-10
0
100
2-10

0.2

0.8
2-11

2-11


2-11

1995


1996

Shleifer and Vishny

1997
A

15

A
5

stake-holder

(3)

100

MBA

Berle and Means

1932

2-12

2-12

100

1981

1993
4

1997

1996

20

1996

80

C
A

B
C

B
C
D

abc
A

B
A

abc

B
C

abc

derivative security

10

10
(4)

voice

100

10000

A
B

1999

limited liability
Easterbrook and Fischel

1985

15
Chandler 1977

19

1995
2
4

20
5

50

100
10

90
100
15

(5)

2002

2002

1000

100
900

10

community

(6)

A
50

20050
A

100

50

50
A

200
100

100
40

marine venture

11

law merchant

1997

B
A

abc
A

(1)

(2)

1996

2001

1997
(3)
(4)

3
5

(5)

(6)

Easterbrook and Fischel

1985

relational contract

3
1

stakeholders

Shleifer and Vishny

2
4

1997

2
20

60

Ralph Cordiner

(1)
(2)

Holmstorm
Milgrom 1991

(3)

100

90

10
5

80

Dixit 1997

Dixit 1997

market value
earnings per share

economic value added

EVA

GAAP

(4)

50

10

100

50

50
0

(5)

L M

M
M

II
M

L D
M

M
50

100
S D
60 120

S
90

75
I

III

D
80 160

M
S
120

M
S

L D

L D
I

1/3

25
16.67

II
S
L

30
D

L
S
S

40

L D
S

30
30

L
15

III

L D

40

L D

40

S
L D

S
S

III
S

I
S

III

L D
S

80

L D

III
III
S

III
D L

(6)

X
W P

W
W

P
W

X
P

(7)

X
xw

wx
x w

1000
10
500

1200

500

1000

90

100
0
1000

300

30
500

600

100
1000

10
0

(8)

IT

IBM

2004
20

20

60
2004

20

40

11

11

(9)

200

(10)

Johnson & Johnson

20

80

1986

1982

35
1986

1982

1985

5.25

Monks
and Minow

2001

p.45

1968

Wrigley

Wrigley
4
William

Wrigley

Wrigley

Wrigley

Wrigley
Monks and Minow

2001

p.2

Wrigley

1996
1996
20

1990

36

90


Armstrong World Industries Inc.
33

61
1989 10 12

500
4
Monks and Minow 2001 pp.38

1990

500

15
56
1990 1

Philadelphia Inquirer

10

99

500

5.8
39

36

200

The Business Roundtable

20

90

20

(1)
Tirole 2001

Blair
Hansmann

Kraakman

2000

(2)
(3) Gorton

2000
Schmid

2000

2001

1995

Boatright

2002

(4)

(5)

(6)

Henry Hansmann

Grossman Hart 1986

(7) Aghion
(8)
(9)
(10)

Bolton

2000

Hart Moore 1990

Dewatripont Tirole 1994

1992

1996
5
1997
Hansmann

1996 2001

1999
Aoki 1994

(1)

(2)

dual class
dual class
500
33
33

1000
1000

100
(3)

(4)

authorized share capital

5

1000

outstanding

5000

3000

2000

2000
80

10

Yankee

20

90
1

30
50

20

80

20

(5)

5000

5500

500

1999
283

1140

80
(6)

EXXON

IT
1980

1999

1999

290

2000
0

Rajan

240

Zingales

1995

(7)

4-1
4-1

39
37
11

48

38

47

53

25

17

MM

MM

(8)

MM
MM

rO

rS

rB

28

B S

(9)

4.1

rO

B S

rBrS
B

rO

4.1

4.2

MM

12

10

50
20

80

8.4

80
12
4-1

4-1

4-1

4.1

80

80

80

(10)

MM

Jensen and Meckling

1976

20

100
50

80

100
50
50
50
80

60

80

100
40

20
50

50
4-2

4-2

4-2

100

100

50
30

80

4-2
50

40

30

50
5

80
45

50

90
5

50
5
X

65

50

X/2

20
5

X/2

70

X/2

50

X/2
X/2

50
70

X/2

X/2

X
X

(11)

50
100

100
20

65

50

100

55
A

50
B

50
50

B
A

50
55
B

50

100

25

50

A
50
55

50

A
5

55

50

100
100

100
55

50

50

100
4-3

4-3

4-3


4-4

4-4

4-4

IT

IT
IT

Hart 2001

Jensen

1986

100
100
(12)

150
50

20

A
B

100

A
50

80
30

80

A
B

100

80

1/3
1/3

B
50

1/3 30

A
80

46.7
A

1/3 20
1/3

46.7

1/3

1/3

30
50

50

0
A

0
B

B
A
1/3
A

60

A
B

15
1/3

50

30
B
B

30

1/3
60

A
B

4-2
4-2

A
B
A
B

20
30

80
50

0
30

50
0

3
51
49

51

90

34

50

60

1/3
A

34

50

40

30

20
40

40

B
60

A
60
60
60
A

20

68

B
50

50
60

60
30

30

60

80

30

50

60

55

50

55

27.5

30

B
B

(13)

50

4-5
60

50

2/3

4-5

60
50
55

59

40

59

50
49
55

45

50

10

40

30

B
4-3

A
B

55

2.5
25

10
30

50
40

55
50

25
11.25

30

50

1.25

50

A
25
11.25

50
25
45
11.25
1.25
10

10


22.5

50

45

2.5

2.5

30
A

B
55

50

20
20

(14)

A
30
A

40

55
50

10
52

45
4.5

B
10

A
4.5

4-3
14.5
50

55

37.5

14.5
22.5

4.5
40

45

18
B

Dewtripont and Tirole

1994

Kaplan
VC

119

213

VC

VC

VC

Stromberg

2001

14

Shleifer and Vishny

1000

500
1000

500

500

90
1000

1997

90

1500
500

1800
1800
1000
1000

1800

90

1620

Leland and Pyle

1977
100

200

200
100
100

400
200

50

100

Ross

1977

1000
1000

2000

1500
95

1000

1000

50
1000

1000

50

2000

100

Myers

100
100
26.7

100

100

220

220
0.5

66.7

33.3
200

146.7

100

Asquith Mullins

Myers

120
100

50

120

100
73.7

1984

100
2

220
73.3

Majluf

1984

1986

Myers

1
2001

(15)

(1)

2002

(2)
(3)

(4) Lease
Levy
Zingales

McConnell

Mikkelson

1983

1984

1982
1994

DeAngelo
45.5
82

Rydqvist

DeAngelo

L.

1985

1985

Zingales
6.5

1995
Horner
4

1988

20

(5)

(6)

Myers

2001

(7)

Rajan-Zingales

1995

(8)
(9)

Modigliani

Miller

1958

(10)

(11)

(12)

Aghion

Bolton

1992

Hart 2001

(13) Morck

Shleifer

Vishny

1988

Tobin Q

Stultz 1988

(14)

golden parachute

(15)

2002

(1)

Jensen and Meckling

formal contracts
norms

1976

Easterbrook and Fischel

informal contracts

1991
1996

10

20

10

20

(2)

by-

law

1
1

(3)

Kaplow and Shavell 1996

fair market price

Law
Merchant

relational contract

Baker

Gibbons and Murphy 2002

Easter-brook and Fischel

1991

self-enforcing

Easterbrook and Fischel

1991

enabling

features

Delaware
20
(4)

share

vote

bond holders
proxy
2/3
Easterbrook and Fischel

1991

10
A
A

51

B 49

A
10

10

B
A

n'

n'

Clark

1984

(5)

15

Proxy
4

(6)

enable

20

100
99

99

99

1
(7)

20
1

99

(8)

90

50
40
100

1/3

100
1/3
4
70

30

cheap votes
A

A
B

20

71.4

73.7

30

(9)

100
70

100

60

60

10

10

10
2001

voice

simple majority rule

51

2/3

30
90
Grossman Hart 1988

51

case by case

1970
1998

150000
1000
52.5

50
53

1997
CISCO

6720

1980

19000
1990
41.6

60
61.5

trust

R.P.Scherer

R.P.Scherer

Karla Scherer

20

80

proxy
Manufactures Nation Bank
470400
50

10
Monks and Minow

2001

111 112

Citicorp
CEO

1987
CEO

CEO

CEO

76

98

GE
100

CEO

GE

Spencer Stuart
1988
15

13
1998

12

1/3

11

26

(10)

1993

13

93

Spencer Stuart
5
1998
CEO

1/4

1993
1/4

S&P
1993
CEO 1

1998
1998

500

73

100

1998

78

14

CEO 1

10

1993

CEO

S&P 500

7
11 13

1/2

1988
1/3

10

1993
1998
50

25

15
1993

10

1999
90

10

CEO

20

1/4

1
5

10

CEO
CEO

1998
98
13

88

77

CEO

S&P 500
58

CEO

CEO

CEO

1/4

20

CEO

CEO

CEO
CEO

4
3

CEO

CEO

CEO
93

CEO

CEO
CEO

1/3

CEO

2/3

CEO

15
CEO

CEO
CEO

CEO
CEO

CEO

President

CEO

M
CEO

EO

group
chief executive of ficer

executive officer

CEO

CEO

CEO

fiduciary
the duty of care

fiduciary duties
the duty of loyalty

trust

100

10

(11)

60

2001
Cooter

1985

(12)

Clark
1911

1986

(13)

1000
60

10
(14)

Smith
Van Gorkom Trans Union
55

Van Gorkom (15)

CEO

Jay Pritzker
CEO

Van Gorkom
CEO
Jay Pritzker

CEO

Van Gorkom
Clark
126
55

1986

business judgment rule

Wrigley

Clark

1985

P.136

(16)1968

Wrigley
4

William Wrigley

Wrigley

Armand Hammer

Occidental Petroleum
5000

good will

225000

(17)1989

Hammer
5500

30

Hammer

120000
Hammer
Hammer

Hammer

Hammer
(18)

Hammer
Hammer
Hammer

11100

10

1110

Hammer
200
1998
Hammer

1988
8600

Hammer

80
19851988
99

600

1800

Hammer
1976

72

Hammer
5

Hammer
Hammer
Hammer

A
B

50

95

1000

50
A

950

6
10

Pantry Pride

45

Relon

Relon

45
Pantry Pride

53

(19)

Paramount
225

125
125

200

(20)

Easterbrook and Fischel

1991

special facts

corporate opportunity doctrine

1000
5

1000
7

7
2

1000

2000

(21)

2000

1933
1933

10

1
2

Clark

1985

11 B

10
20

P.310

1933

16

10

1933

3
3
3

1
40
200

10
20

A
50

20
100

10
15

20

10
5

10
B B
15
B

40

B
10

50
50

150
5

10
C C

200
5
20

200

10

40
15

50
80

50

50
50

50

85
85
85

250

1
15
250
15
2400
P.488

8800

2400
250

8800

1
Clark

1985

Traynor

30
30
30

2.7

100

100

A
20

300

20
A
Singer v. Magnavox Co.

100

Singer v. Magnavox Co. TMC

M
84
M
Long form
16 M
M

Clark

Magnavox
9

TMC

9
M
MC

1985 p.520
84

16

TMC
8
9
20
90

90

30

10
10

6
100
100
100

100

100

100

100

50
100

1
50

150

70
20

Donahue Rodd Electriogype Co.

Clark

1985

p.499

Donahue Rodd Electriogype Co

Rodd Electriogype

35

77
Donahue

10

La Porta

1997

La Porta

1997

49

49

18
21

(22)

0.08
10
2.23

2
6

GNP

0.6
3
27.26
0.19

1
0.46
19951996
0.12

0.3
16.79
2.14
5-1

GNP

49

0.58

0.21

IPO
5-1

1994

IPO 95.7
96.6

0.23
35.45

0.6
0.3
0.46
0.21
0.40

35.45
27.26
16.79
10.00
21.29

2.23
2.14
0.12
0.19
1.02

5-1

1911

(23)

0.5

(1)

La Porta

(2) Easterbrrok

1997

1998

2000

2002

Shleifer

Wolfenson

2002

Fischel 1991

(3)

A
A

B
property rule
liability rule
Calabresi and Melamed

A
B
1972

B
A

Kaplow and Shavell

1996

(4)

(5)

enable

(6)

(7)
(8) 2003

(9)

Harris

Raviv

1989

(10)

Monks

(11)

Minow

(12)
Ford Motor Co. 170 N

2001

(13) Dodge v

W 668

Mich 1919

(14)
(15) Smith v

Van Gorkom 488 A.2d 858 872

(16) Shlensky v Wrigley

(17)

237 N

Monks and Minow

Del 1985

E 2d 776 780

2001

373

App 1968

376

(18)

(19) 506 A

2d 173

(20)

Monks

(21)
Clark

1985

182

Minow

Del 1986
2001

Monks
350

Clark
Minow

2001

198

1985

199

361

(22)
(23)
Eisenber
Sheehan 1988
Berle Means

1976

Demsetz
La Porta

1983
1999

Demsetz

Lehn 1985
51

Shleifer Vishny 1986

Morck
Holderness Kroszner Sheehan 1998

1998

Vishny

27
30

La Porta

Shleifer

10

1988

Holdermess

6-1
e*

e*

e*

6-1

Leibenstein

1986

Machlup
1967
Hart 1983

Nalebuff

Willig 1985

Stiglitz 1983

Schmidt 2000

Holmstrom 1982a

Holmstrom 1982b

market for corporate control

takeover

Manne 1965

Scherer

1980

70
80
0.7

Grossman and Hart 1980

150
100
1.5

0.8

Grossman and Hart 1980

5
10

10

3
90

10

greenmail

Poison Pill
100

fair price provision

20

200

white knight

crown jewel
Pac Man

2
10
Fama 1980

Holmstrom 1982b


60

59

58

59

58

59
57

58

57

59

6-2

(1)

58

6-2

0
5
5

10

10
5

52
10

0
10

0.5

1/2

Baker

6-3
Gibbons

6-3
Murphy 2000

6-3

6-4

6-4

10

6
3

4
12

(2)

0.5

0.5

12

10

1/3
1/3
0.5


59

10

10

10
1/2

Green
5

Porter
5

1984

identity

Merry

1984

anony mous society

gossip

Shearmur and Klein

1997
Kreps

1990
10

15

kreps

1990

1
20

20

2000
20
20

2000

10
19101912

50
30

De Long

(3)

1997

JP

CEO

6-5
(4)

6-5

identity

6-5

6-6

6-6

6-7

6-7

2001

100
100

100

120
20

120

residue
R

1:1
23.49

37

58

10
10.01
10.02

10
10

1000

1
60

1000
5


(1)
Weingast
Kreps

Fudenberg and Maskin

1990
1982

Kandori

Milgrom

1992
Holmstrom 1982b

(2)

10

(3)
(4)

1986

15

JP
1

2003

North

(1)

MBA

10

a
0

7.1
7.3

7.2

7-1

7-1

(2)

7.9

7.11

7.12

(3)

7.12
k

1
k 1

k 2

20

20

7.12

7.12

A
A
A

B
A

7.12
b

7.11

k
b

100
100

500

200

200
100

200

Holmstrom 1982

a
p

0.5
p a
e 1

0.5

65
70

65
70

a 2p

2p

2
3p

CEO

CEO

(4)

AT&T

1984

5
60
5

5
5

Harris and Raviv

1979

(5)

(6)

efficiency wage

C>0
1
u

P Pu

C
C 1

(7)

P Pu

C/P

P
100 P 0.4
125

250

0.8

50

m
1

100

800
10020.1 2020.5

P 0.1
m 100

1000
20

m
1600

CEO
CEO
(8)

20

m2P
m
P 10/m
P 0.5
200
800
100/0.1 100/0.5

m10

100

0.2

500
10

50

Holmstrom Milgrom 1991

(9)

(10)

4
a b
4

a b

c d
c d

Holmstrom Milgrom 1991

100
99

1
0.5

99
1

0.5

99

100
1

99

Aichian and Demsetz

1972

Holmstrom 1982

100

100

100

1
1

100
0

99
1
100

1
100

99

100

100

(11)20

80

50
99

McAfee and McMillan

1991

1995

Li and Zhang

2001

B
A

B B

A
A
A

B
B

B
A

2
1

0.6
1

0.4
0.567

0.433

0.6

0.4

(12)

Aghion

40

Bohon

60

Aghion and Bolton

Aghion
IBM

500

Bohon and

10

1
10

59

Weitzman 1980

5
100
20

150
150

120
10

150

50

140
10

18

20
140

116
A
A

1
2

10

12

10
12

12

20

20

50

70

80

90

500

1986

89
19891997

200

6.9

2002
41

18

150
17

1999

1998
37

13.2

15

16

(13)

CEO
109

17

24

(14)

10
Rosen

1992

1
CEO

0.1 0.16

(15)

Murphy Jensen

1990

CEO

1.35
3.25

1000
CEO

1000
75

20

80
80
1980
100

30

1.2

3.9

1.25

CEO
25
250

Murphy Jensen

Abowd 1990

20

38

200

3
14

2
3

3
6

90

100

263
365

1.4

500

4
10

90

20

19811986

16000
(16)

1990

36

10

200

30
30

30

1998

1999
30
(17)

1999

24
30
70

5
10
1

10

10
3

20

50

10

fiduciary dutis

(1)

(2)
(3)
(4)

(5)

1996

Holmstrom Milgrom 1987

Milgrom Roberts

1996

1992

4
Lazear

Rosen

1981

Malcomson

1984

(6) Eaton

White

1982

(7)

Shapiro

Stiglitz

1984

300
300

500
500

(8)

300
2000

(9)

(10)

38
38
3

(13)

2001

(14)

2004

451

(15)

2004

464

(16)
(17)

2000

2
2001

(11)

(12)

8
1

20
(1)

2
3
4
5

Doeringer and Piore 1971

Malcomson

1984

3
20
20
8

25

20
IBM

20

65

80

30

40

15

20

(2)

Milgrom Roberts

Becker

1964

10
3

1992

11

MBA

MBA
8

MBA
8

MBA

100

Williamson 1979
100
200

Klein Crawford and Aichian

90

1978
10
100

130

90
3

30

50
(3)

Aoki 1988

Azariades

1975

Baily

1974

Holmstrom 1982

Harris and
Kreps 1990

10
20
15

0
3

10
10

15

25

5
35
15

3
10
5

10

30

15

10

10
30

10

10

1988

Aoki

(4)

1998

10

4
Hutchens
8-1

(5)

1989

8-1

Becker

1962

45

65

Lazear

1979

Becker and Stigler

1974

60

V>0
0

C
60

8-2
60

8-2
60

8-2

8-2
8-2

20

20

20

60

40
0
20

20

40
20

V
W

8-2

8-2
60

60

60
60

Shleifer and Summers

1988

Bhagat Shleifer and Vishny

1990

5000

4000

Calvo and Wellisz

Rosen

1982

Carmichael

1988

1979
Prescott and Visscher

Weiss 1984

1980

MacDonald

1982

Waldman

1984

Harris and

Waldman

1984

Malcomson

1988

10

Lazear and Rosen 1981

10

MacLeod and
30

Malcomson

1984

10
500

20

1000
500

500
1000

100

1000

200
200

100

1000

100

A
20

10

Lazear
1997

0 1
0

Lambert

Larcker and Weigelt

1989

CEO
CEO
CEO

100

Milgrom 1988

(6)

IBM

Lazear

1989

Lazear
1997
1984

AT&T
AT&T

Dow Chemical
Corporation

Lazear 1989

CEO

CEO

Spence 1973

20
10

30
20

10
15

12
20

10

20

10
20

10
8
4

16
20

10

12

1949

650
650
(7)

(8)

8
(9)

(10)

20

(11)

Carmichael

1988

(12)

10
(13)

2000

6
4

1979

(1) Lazear

1998

(2)

Milgrom Roberts

1992

11

(3)

(4)

5
5

5
(5)
(6)

(7)
1982
(8)
(9)

200

(10)

(11)

(12)

(13)

2001

Abowd, John, 1990, "Does Performance-based Managerial Compensation Affect Corporate Performance?", Industrial and Labour
Relations Review, 43:52S-73S.
Aghion, Philippe, and Patrick Bolton, 1992, "An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting". Review of Economic Studies,
59:473-494.
Akerlof, G., 1970, "The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84:488500.
Alchian, Armen and Harold Demsetz, 1972, "Production, Information Cost, and Economic Organization", American Economic Review,
62:777-795.
Aoki, M, 1988, Information, Incentives and Bargaining in the Japanese Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Aoki, M., 1994, "The Contingent Governance of Teams: An Analysis of Institutional Comple-mentarity", International Economic Review
35:657-675.
Asquith, Paul and David W. Mullins, 1986, "Equity Issues and Offering Dilution", Journal of Financial Econiomics, 15 (2):61-89.
Azariades, C., 1975, "Implicit Contracts and Underemployment Equilibria", Journal of Political Economy, 83:1183-1202.
Baily, M., 1974, "Wages and Employment under Uncertain Demand", Review of Economic Studies, 41:37-50.
Baker, George, Robert Gibbons and Kevin Murphy, 2002, "Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm", Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 117:39-83.

Becker, George, 1964, Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to Education, New York: Columbia
University Press.
Becker, G., 1962, "Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis", Journal of Political Economy, 70:9-49.
Becker, G. and G. Stigler, 1974, "Law Enforcement and Compensation of Enforcers", Journal of Legal Studies, 3:1-18.
Berle, Adolf and Gardiner Means, 1932, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, London: Macmillan.
Bhagat, S., A. Shleifer and R. Vishny, 1990, "Hostile Takeovers in 1980s: The Return to Corporate Specialization", Brookings Papers:
Microeconomics.
Blair, M., 1995, Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First Century, Washington: Brookings
Institution.
Boatright, John, 2002, "Contractors as stakeholders: Reconciling stakeholder theory with the nexus-of-contracts firm". Journal of Banking
and Finance 26:1837-1852.
Calabresi, G., and A. D. Melamed, 1972, "Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral", Harvard Law
Review, 85:1089-1128.
Calvo, G. and S. Wellisz, 1979, "Hierarchies, ability, and income distribution", Journal of Political Economy, 87:991-1010.
Carmichael, H., 1988. "Incentives in Academics: Why is There Tenure ?", Journal of Political Economy, 96:453-472.
Casadesus-Masanell and Daniel Spulber, 2002, "Trust and Incentives in Agency", mimeo, Harvard Business School.
Casson, Mark, 1982, The Entrepreneur: An Economic Theory, Martin Robertson, Oxford.
Chandler, Alfred, 1977, The Visible Hand-The Managerial Revolution in Amercian Business, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Cheung, Steven, 1969, Theory of Share Tenancy with Special Application to Asian Agriculture and the First Phase of Taiwan Land
Reform, the University of Chicago Press.
Cheung, Steven, 1983, "The Contractual Natural of the Firm", Journal of Law and Economics, 26:1-21.
Clark, Robert, C., 1985, Corporate Law, Little, Brown and Company.
Coase, R.H., 1937, "The Nature of the firm", Economica, IV:368-405.
Coase, R.H., 1960, "The Problem of Social Cost", Journal of Law and Economics, 3:1-44.
Coase, R. H., 1972, "Durability and Monopoly", Journal of Law and Economics, 15:143-150.
Cooter, Robert, 1985, "Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution", California Law Review, January, Vol. 73, pp.151.
DeAngelo, Harry and Linda DeAngelo, 1985, "Managerial ownership of voting rights", Journal of Financial Economics, 14:33-39.
De Long, J. Bradford, 1997, "Did J. P. Morgan's Men add Value? An Economist's Perspective on Financial Capitalism", in Daniel B. klein
(ed.) Reputation, Michigan University Press.
Demsetz, Harold, 1983, "The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm", Journal of Law and Economics, 26:375-390.
Demsetz, Harold and Kenneth Lehn, 1985, "The structure of corporate ownership: Causes and consequences", Journal of Political
Economy, 93:1155-1177.
Dewatripont, Mathias, and Jean Tirole, 1994, "A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder
Congruence". The Quarterly Journal of Economics:1027-1054.
Dixit, Avinash, 1997, "Power of Incentives in Private versus Public Organization", American Economic Review, Volume 87, Issue 2,
Papers and Proceedings of Hundred and Fourth Annual Meeting of American Economic Association, 378-382.
Doeringer, P. and M. Piore, Internal Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis, Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath.

Easterbrook, Frank and Daniel Fischel, 1985, "Limited Liability and the Corporation", University of California Law Review, 52:89-117.
Easterbrook, Frank and Daniel Fischel, 1991, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, Harvard University Press.
Eisenber, Melvin, 1976, The Structure of the Corporation: A legal analysis, Little, Brown and Co., Boston.
Fama, E., 1980, "Agency problems and the theory of the firm", Journal of Political Economy, 88:288-307.
Fudenberg, D., and E. Maskin, 1986, "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Imcomplete Information",
Econometrica, 54:533-556.
Gorton, G. and F. Schmid, 2000, "Class Struggle inside the Firm: A Study of German Codetermination", NBER Working Paper 7945.
Green, E. and R. Porter, 1984, "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information", Econometrica, 52:87-100.
Grossman, S. and O. Hart, 1980, "Takeover bids, the free-rider problem, and the theory of the corporation", Bell Journal of Economics,
11:42-64.
Grossman, S. and O. Hart, 1986, "The costs and the benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical and lateral integration", Journal of
Political Economy 94:691-719.
Grossman, S. and O. Hart, 1988, "One share-one vote and the market for corporate control", Journal of Financial Economics, 20:175-202.
Hansmann, H., 1996, The Ownership of Enterprise, Cambridge, MA: Bellnap Harvard.
, 2001

Hansmann, H. And R. Kraakman, 2000, "The End of History for Corporate Law", Working Paper.
Harris, M. and B. Holmstrom, 1982, "A Theory of Wage Dynamics", Review of Economic Studies, 49:315-333.
Harris, M. and A. Raviv, 1979, "Optimal Incentive Contracts with Imperfect Information", Journal of Economic Theory, 2 (3): pp.231259.

Harris, M. and A. Raviv, 1989, "The Design of Securities", Journal of Financial Economics, 24:255-287.
Harris, M. and Y. Weiss, "Job Matching with Finite Horizon and Risk Aversion", Journal of Political Economy, 92:758-779. Hart, O.,
1983, "The Market mechanism as an incentive scheme", Bell Journal of Economics, 74:366-382.
Hart, O., 1995, Firm, Contracts, and Financial Structure, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hart, O., 2001, "Financial Contracting", Journal of Economic Perspective, 39:1079-1100.
Hart, O. and J. Moore, 1990, "Property rights and the nature of the firm", Journal of Political Economy, 98:1119-1158. Holderness,
Clifford and Dennis Sheehan, 1988, "The role of majority shareholders in publicly held corporations: An exploratory analysis", Journal of
Financial Economics, 20:317-346.
Holderness, Clifford, Randall Kroszner and Dennis Sheehan, 1999, "Were the good old days that good? Changes in managerial stock
ownership since the great depression", Journal of Finance, 54 (2):435-469.
Holmstrom, B., 1979, "Moral Hazard and Observability", Bell Journal of Economics, 10:74-91.
Holmstrom, B., 1982a, "Moral Hazard in Team", Bell Journal of Economics, 13:392-415.
Holmstrom, B., 1982b, "Managerial incentive problems-A dynamic perspective", in: Essays in economics and management in honour of
Lars Wahlbeck. Helsinki: Swedish School of Economics.
Holmstrom, B. and P. Milgrom, 1987, "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives", Econometrica, 55: pp.
303-328.
Holmstrom, B. and P. Milgrom, 1991, "Multi-task Principal-agent Analysis: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design",
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 7:24-52.
Horner, M., 1988, "The value of the corporate voting rights", Journal of Banking and Finance, 12:69-83.
Hucthens, R., 1989, "Seniority, Wages and Productivity: A Turbulent Decade", Journal of Economic Perspective, 3:49-64.

Jensen, Michael, 1986, "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers", American Economic Review, 76 (2):323329.
Jensen, Michael and William Meckling, 1976, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure",
Journal of Financial Economics, 3 (4):305-360.
Jensen, Michael and Kevin Murphy, 1990, "Performance Pay and Top Management Incentives", Journal of Political Economy, 98:225264.
Kandori, M., 1992, "Social norms and community enforcement", Review of Economic Studies, 59 (1):61-68.
Kaplan, Steven and Per Stromber, 2001, "Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital
Contracts", University of Chicago Graduate School of Business.
Kaplow, Louis and Steven Shavell, 1996, "Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis", Harvard Law Review, Vol.
109, pp. 715-775.
Klein, B., and R. Crawford and A. Alchian, "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process", Journal
of Law and Economics, 21:297-326.
Kreps, D., 1990, "Corporate Culture and Economic Theory", in: James Alt and Kenneth Shepsle (ed.): Perspective on Positive Political
Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kreps, D., P. Milgrom, J., Roberts and R. Wilson, 1982, "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma", Journal of
Economic Theory, 27:245-252.
Lambert, R., D. Larcker and K. Weigelt, 1989, "Tournaments and the Structure of Organizational Incentives", draft, the Wharton School,
University of Pennsylvnia.
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, 1997, "Legal Determinants of External Finance",
Journal of Finance, 52:1131-1150.

La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, 1998, "Law and Finance", Journal of Political
Economy, 106:1113-1155.
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, 1999, "Corporate Ownership around the World",
Journal of Finance, Vol. 54, No. 2:471-517.
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, 2000, "Investor protection and corporate governance",
Journal of Financial Economics, 58:3-27.
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, 2002, "Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation",
Journal of Finance, 57:1147-1170.
Lau, L, Yingyi Qian and G. Roland, 2000, "Reform without Lossers: An Interpretation of China's Dual-Track Approach to Reform",
Journal of Political Economy, 108:120-163.
Lazear, E., 1979, "Why is There Mandatory Retirement?", Journal of Political Economy, 87:1261-1284.
Lazear, E., 1989, "Pay Equality and Industrial Politics", Journal of Political Economy, 97:561-580.
Lazear, E., 1997, Personnel Economics, Cambridge, Mass. and London, England: MIT Press.
Lazear, E., 1998, Personnel Economics for Managers, John Wiley & Sons Inc.
Lazear, E. and S. Rosen, 1981, "Rank Order Tournaments as Optimal Labor Contracts", Journal of Political Economy, 89:841-864.
Lease, Ronald, John McConnell and Wayne Mikkelson, 1984, "The Market Value of Differential Voting Rights in Closely Held
Corporations", Journal of Business, 57:443-471.
Leibenstein, H., 1966, "Allocative Efficiency versus X-Efficiency", American Economic Review, 56:392-451.
Leland, H. and D. Pyle, 1977, "Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation", Journal of Finance,
32:371-387.

Levy, Haim, 1982, "Economic valuation of voting power of common stocks", Journal of Finance, 38:79-93.
Li, Shuhe and Weiying Zhang, (2001), "Optimal Assignment of Principalship in Teams", Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization, 44:105-127.
Macaulay, Stewart, 1985, "An Empirical View of Contract", Wisconsin Law Review, 1985 (3):465-482.
MacDonald, G., 1982, "Information in production", Econometrica, 50:1143-1162.
Machlup, F., 1967, "Theories of the firm: Marginalist, Behavioral, and Managerial", American Economic Review, 57:1-33.
MacLeod, W. and J. Malcomson, 1988, "Reputation and Hierarchy in Dynamic Models of Employment", Journal of Political Economy,
96:832-854.
Malcomson, J. (1984) "Work Incentives, Hierarchy, and Internal Labor Markets." Journal Political Economy, 92: pp.486-507.
Manne, H., 1965, "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control", Journal of Political Economy, 73:110-120.
McAfee, R. and J. McMillan, 1991, "Optimal Contracts for Teams", International Economic Review, 32:561-577.
Merry, S. E., 1984, "Rethinking Gossip and Scandal", in Donald Black (ed.) Toward a General Theory of Social Control, New York:
Academic Press.
Milgrom, P. 1988, "Employment Contracts, Influence Activities, and Efficient Organization Design", Quarterly Journal of Economics,
96:42-60.
Milgrom, P., D. North and B. Weingast, 1990, "The Role of institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and
the Champagne Fairs", Economics and Politics, 2:1-23.
Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts, 1992, Economics, Organization, and Management, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
,
,
,
, 2004
Mirrlees, J., 1975, "The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behavior: Part I", Nuffield College, Oxford. (1999, Review of
Economic Studies, 66:3-22.)

Morck, Randall, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, 1988, "Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis",
Journal of Financial Economics, 20:293-315.
Modigliani, Franco and Merton Miller, 1958, "The Cost of Capital, Corporate Finance, and the Theory of Investment", American
Economic Review, 48 (4):261-297.
Monks, Robert and Nell Minow, 2001, Corporate Governance, 2nd edition, Blackwell Publishers.
Myers, Stewart, 1984, "The Capital Structure Puzzle", Journal of Finance, 39 (3):575-602.
Myers, Stewart, 2001, "Capital Structure", Journal of Economic Perspective, 15 (2):81-102.
Myers, Stewart, and Nicholas Majluf, 1984, "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information That
Investors Do Not Have", Journal of Financial Economics, 13 (2):187-221.
Nalebuff, B, and J. Stiglitz, 1983, "Information, Competition, and Markets", American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings,
73:278-283.
Posner, E., 2000, Law and Social Norms, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
Prescott, E. and M. Visscher, 1980, "Organizational Capital", Journal of Political Economy, 88:446-461.
Rajan, Raghuram, and Luigi Zingales, 1995, "What Do We Know about Capital Structure? Some Evidence from International Data",
Journal of Finance, 50 (5):1421-1460.
Rosen, S., 1982, "Authority, Control, and Distribution of Earnings", Bell Journal of Economics, 13:31-323.
Rosen, S., 1992, "Contracts and the Market for Executives", in L. Werin and L. Wijkander (eds.), Contract Economics, Oxford: Basil
Blackwell.
Ross, Stephen, 1977, "The Determination of Financial Structure: the Incentive-Signaling Approach", Bell Journal of Economics, 8 (1):2340.
Rothschild, M. and J. Stiglitz, 1976, "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Market", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90:629-649.

Rydqvist, 1987, "Empirical Investigation of the Voting Premium", Working Paper 35, Northwestern University.
Schmidt, Klaus M. "Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition," Review of Economic Studies 1997, 64, pp.191-213.
Shackle, G.L.S., 1979, "Imagination, Formalism, and Choice" in Rizzo, Mario, J. (ed). op. cit. p.19.
Shearmur, J. and D. Klein, 1997, "Good Conduct in the Great Society: Adam Smith and the Role of Reputation", in Daniel Klein (ed.)
Reputation, the University of Michigan Press.
Sherer, F., 1980, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, 2nd edition, Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing
Company.
Shleifer, A. and L. Summers, 1988, "Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers", A. Auerbach (ed.) Corporate Takeovers: A Causes and
Consequences, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Shleifer, Andrei and Robert Vishny, 1986, "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control", Journal of Political Economy, 94:461-488.
Shleifer, Andrei and Robert Vishny, 1997, "A Survey of Corporate Governance", Journal of Finance, LII, No. 2, 737-783.
Shleifer, Andrei and Robert Vishny, 2002, "Investor Protection and Equity Markets", Working Paper, Harvard University and New York
University.
Shleifer, Andrei and D. Wolfenson, 2002, "Investor Protection and Equity Markets", Journal of Financial Economics, 66:3-27.
Spence, A. M., 1973, "Job Marketing Signaling", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87:355-374.
Stultz, Rene, 1988, "Managerial Control of Voting Rights", Journal of Financial Economics, 20:25-29.
Tirole, Jean, 1999, "Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?", Econometrica, 67:741-781.
Tirole, Jean, 2001, "Corporate Governance." Econometrica, 69:1-35.

Tyler, T. and P. Degoey, 1996, "Trust in Organizational Authorities: The Influence of Motive Attributions on Willingness to Accept
Decisions", in R. Kramer and T. Tyler (eds.): Trust in Organization: Frontiers of Theory and Research, Sage Publications (1996).
Waldman, M., 1984, "Job assignment, signaling, and efficiency", Rand Journal of Economics, 15:255-270.
Weitzman, Martin L. 1980, "The 'Ratchet Principle' and Performance Incentives," Bell Journal of Economics, 11 (1): pp.302-308.
Willig, R.D., 1985, Corporate Governance and Product Market Structure. Mimeo, Princeton University.
Williamson, O., 1971, "The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations", American Economic Review, 61:112-123.
Williamson,

., 1975, Market and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, New York: The Free Press.

Williamson, O., 1979, "Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations", Journal of Law and Economics, 22:233261.
Williamson, O., 1980, "Organization of Work: A comparative Institutional Assessment", Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,
1:5-38.
Yang, Xiaokai and Ng, Yew-Kwang, 1994, "Theory of the Firm and Structure of Residual Right", Journal of Econcomic Behavior and
Organization.
Zhang, Weiying, and Gang Yi, 1997, "China's Gradual Reform: A Historical Perspective", C. A. Tisdell and J.C. Chai (eds.), China' s
Economic Growth and Transition, New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc.
Zhang, Weiying, 2000, "Why Are Entrepreneurs Liquidity-Constrained?", Annals of Economic and Finance, Vol 1 (No.1):165-188.
Zingales, Luigi, 1994, "The value of the voting right: A study of the Milan stock exchange experience", Review of Financial Studies,
52:449-476.
Zingales, Luigi, 1995, "What Determines the Value of Corporate Votes?", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110:1075-1110.

29

1996

2001
2002

1993

15

2000
2001
2004
1997
2001
14

2004
2002

2001
2004
2000
2002

23

1997

2003

2000
2001

1999
1998

1
1995

1996

1996
2000

2001
2002
2002

2003
2003

2004
1999

2002

2003

1969

2001
1996
2001

Abowd, John
Aghion, Philippe
Akerlof, G.
Alchian, Armen
Aoki, M
Asquith, Paul
Azariades, C.
Baily, M.
Baker, George
Becker, George
Berle, Adolf
Bhagat, S.

Blair, M.
Boatright, John
Bolton, Patrick
Calabresi, G.
Calvo, G.
Carmichael, H.
Casadesus - Masanell
Casson, Mark
Chandler, Alfred
Cheung, Steven
Clark, Robert
Coase, R. H.
Cooter, Robert
Crawford, R.
DeAngelo, Harry
DeAngelo, Linda

Degoey, P.
De Long, J.B.
Demsetz, Harold
Dewatripont, Mathiasand
Dixit, Avinash
Doeringer, P.
Easterbrook, Frank
Eaton
Eisenber, Melvin
Fama, E.
Fischel, Daneil
Fudenberg, D.
Gibbons, Robert
Gorton, G.
Green, E.
Grossman, S.

Hansmann, H.
Harris, M.
Hart, O.
Holderness, Clifford
Holmstrom, B.
Horner, M.
Hutchens, R.
Jensen, Michael
Kandori, M
Kaplan, Steven
Kaplow, Louis
Klein, B.
Knight, K.
Kraakman, R.
Kreps, D.
Kroszner, Randall

Lambert, R.
La Porta, Rafael
Larcker, D.
Lau, L.
Lazear, E.
Lease, Ronald
Lehn, Kenneth
Leibenstein, H.
Leland, H.
Levy, Haim
Li, Shuhe
Macaulay, Stewart
MacDonald, G.
MacLeod, W.
Machlup, F.
Majluf, Nicholas

Malcomson, J.
Manne, H.
Maskin, E.
McAfee, R.
McConnell, John
McMillan, J.
Means, Gardiner
Meckling, William
Melamed, A. D.
Merry, S. E.
Mikkelson, Wayne
Milgrom, P.
Miller, Merton
Minow, Nell
Mirrlees, J.
Morck, Randall

Modigliani, Franco
Monks, Robert
Moore, J.
Mullins, David W.
Murphy, Kevin
Myers, Stewart
Nalebuff, B
Ng, Yew-Kwang
North, D. B. Weingast
Piore, M.
Porter, R.
Posner, E.
Prescott, E
Pyle, D.
Qian, Yingyi
Rajan, Raghuram

Raviv, A.
Roberts, J.
Roland, G.
Rosen, S.
Ross, Stephen
Rothschild, M.
Rydqvist
Scherer, F.
Schmid, F.
Schmidt, Klaus M.
Shackle, G. L. S.
Shapiro
Shavell, Steven
Shearmur, J.
Sheehan, Dennis
Shleifer, A.

Spence, A. M.
Spulber, Daniel
Stigler, G.
Stiglitz, J.
Stultz, Rene
Summers, L.
Stromberg, Per
Tirole, Jean
Tyler, T.
Vishny, R
Visscher, M.
Waldman, M.
Weigelt, K.
Weingast, B.
Weiss, Y.
Weitzman, Martin L.

Wellisz, S.
White
Willig, R. D.
Williamson, O.
Wolfenson, D.
Yang, Xiao Kai
Yi, Gang
Zhang, Weiying
Zingales, Luigi

59
A

AT&T
B

CEO

CEO

IBM
J

K
-

M
MM