PAHAMOTANG VS.

PNB Case Digest

PAHAMOTANG VS. PNB
G.R. No. 156403, March 21, 2005
FACTS: On July 1, 1972, Melitona Pahamotang died. She was survived by her husband Agustin Pahamotang, and their
eight (8) children, namely: Ana, Genoveva, Isabelita, Corazon, Susana, Concepcion and herein petitioners Josephine
and Eleonor, all surnamed Pahamotang. On September 15, 1972, Agustin filed with the then Court of First Instance of
Davao City a petition for issuance of letters administration over the estate of his deceased wife. The petition, docketed
as Special Case No. 1792, was raffled to Branch VI of said court, hereinafter referred to as the intestate court. In his
petition, Agustin identified petitioners Josephine and Eleonor as among the heirs of his deceased spouse. It appears
that Agustin was appointed petitioners' judicial guardian in an earlier case - Special Civil Case No. 1785 also of the
CFI of Davao City, Branch VI. On December 7, 1972, the intestate court issued an order granting Agustins petition.
The late Agustin then executed several mortgages and later sale of the properties with the PNB and Arguna
respectively. The heirs later questioned the validity of the transactions prejudicial to them. The trial court declared the
real estate mortgage and the sale void but both were valid with respect to the other parties. The decision was reversed
by the Court of Appeals; to the appellate court, petitioners committed a fatal error of mounting a collateral attack on the
foregoing orders instead of initiating a direct action to annul them.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the trial court
RULING: In the present case, the appellate court erred in appreciating laches against petitioners. The element of delay
in questioning the subject orders of the intestate court is sorely lacking. Petitioners were totally unaware of the plan of
Agustin to mortgage and sell the estate properties. There is no indication that mortgagor PNB and vendee Arguna had
notified petitioners of the contracts they had executed with Agustin. Although petitioners finally obtained knowledge of
the subject petitions filed by their father, and eventually challenged the July 18, 1973, October 19, 1974, February 25,
1980 and January 7, 1981 orders of the intestate court, it is not clear from the challenged decision of the appellate court
when they (petitioners) actually learned of the existence of said orders of the intestate court. Absent any indication of
the point in time when petitioners acquired knowledge of those orders, their alleged delay in impugning the validity
thereof certainly cannot be established. And the Court of Appeals cannot simply impute laches against them.

Union Bank v. Santibanez, 452 SCRA 228 | Abu

FACTS: On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim Santibaez entered into a loan agreement
in the amount of P128,000.00.
The amount was intended for the payment of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son,
Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal annual amortizations.
On Dec. 1980, FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement for the payment of another unit of Ford 6600 and one unit of
a Rotamotor. Again, Efraim and Edmund executed a promissory note and a Continuing Guaranty Agreement for the later loan. In
1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City. Edmund was
appointed as the special administrator of the estate. During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and
his sister Florence, executed a Joint Agreement, wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the three
(3) tractors: (2) tractors for Edmund and (1) for Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC,
corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them. In the meantime, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was
executed by and between FCCC and Union Bank, wherein the FCCC assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Bank.
Demand letters were sent by Union Bank to Edmund, but the latter refused to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, Union Bank filed a
Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim Santibaez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City.

Summonses were issued against both, but the one intended for Edmund was not served since he was in the United States and there
was no information on his address or the date of his return to the Philippines. Florence filed her Answer and alleged that the loan
documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her brother
Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null and void; hence, she was not liable to Union Bank under the joint
agreement.
Union Bank asserts that the obligation of the deceased had passed to his legitimate heirs (Edmund and Florence) as provided in
Article 774 of the Civil Code; and that the unconditional signing of the joint agreement estopped Florence, and that she cannot deny
her liability under the said document.
In her comment to the petition, Florence maintains that Union Bank is trying to recover a sum of money from the deceased Efraim
Santibaez; thus the claim should have been filed with the probate court. She points out that at the time of the execution of the joint
agreement there was already an existing probate proceedings. She asserts that even if the agreement was voluntarily executed by her
and her brother Edmund, it should still have been subjected to the approval of the court as it may prejudice the estate, the heirs or
third parties.
ISSUE: W/N the claim of Union Bank should have been filed with the probate court before which the testate estate of the late
Efraim Santibaez was pending. W/N the agreement between Edmund and Florence (which was in effect, a partition of hte estate)
was void considering that it had not been approved by the probate court. W/N there can be a valid partition among the heirs before
the will is probated.
HELD: Well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the deceased, to determine
whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered. The said court is primarily
concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate.
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated. In the
present case, Efraim left a holographic will which contained the provision which reads as follows:
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later after my demise, shall be distributed in the
proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in favor of Edmund and Florence, my children.
The above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision embracing all the properties left by the decedent which might have escaped his
mind at that time he was making his will, and other properties he may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the three (3) subject
tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said tractors among the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement executed by
Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of its execution, there
was already a pending proceeding for the probate of their late fathers holographic will covering the said tractors.
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The bank, purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibaez, should
have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate court is mandatory. This requirement is for the purpose of
protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to
examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule
is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs.
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold Florence accountable for any liability incurred by her late father. The
documentary evidence presented, particularly the promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and
signed only by the late Efraim Santibaez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate
court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty.

PNB vs. CA et al
~ vbdiaz

PNB vs. CA et al
G.R. No. 121597
June 29, 2001
FACTS: The spouses Chua were the owners of a parcel of land covered by a TCT and registered in their names. Upon the
husbands death, the probate court appointed his son, private respondent Allan as special administrator of the deceaseds intestate
estate. The court also authorized Allan to obtain a loan accommodation from PNB to be secured by a real estate mortgage over the
above-mentioned parcel of land, which Allan did for P450,000.00 with interest.
For failure to pay the loan in full, the bank extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage. During the auction, PNB was the
highest bidder. However, the loan having a payable balance, to claim this deficiency, PNB instituted an action with the RTC,
Balayan, Batangas, against both Mrs. Chua and Allan.
The RTC rendered its d
ecision, ordering the dismissal of PNBs complaint. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision by dismissing PNBs appeal for
lack of merit.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: The WON it was error for the CA to rule that petitioner may no longer pursue by civil action the recovery of the balance of
indebtedness after having foreclosed the property securing the same.
HELD: petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
No
Petitioner relies on Prudential Bank v. Martinez, 189 SCRA 612, 615 (1990), holding that in extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage,
when the proceeds of the sale are insufficient to pay the debt, the mortgagee has the right to recover the deficiency from the
mortgagor.
However, it must be pointed out that petitioners cited cases involve ordinary debts secured by a mortgage. The case at bar, we must
stress, involves a foreclosure of mortgage arising out of a settlement of estate, wherein the administrator mortgaged a property
belonging to the estate of the decedent, pursuant to an authority given by the probate court. As the CA correctly stated, the Rules of
Court on Special Proceedings comes into play decisively. The applicable rule is Section 7 of Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court (
which PNB contends is not.)
In the present case it is undisputed that the conditions under the aforecited rule have been complied with [see notes]. It follows that
we must consider Sec. 7 of Rule 86, appropriately applicable to the controversy at hand, which in summary [and case law as well]
grants to the mortgagee three distinct, independent and mutually exclusive remedies that can be alternatively pursued by the
mortgage creditor for the satisfaction of his credit in case the mortgagor dies, among them:
(1) to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim;
(2) to foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any deficiency as an ordinary claim; and
(3) to rely on the mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the same at any time before it is barred by prescription without right to
file a claim for any deficiency.
Clearly petitioner herein has chosen the mortgage-creditors option of extrajudicially foreclosing the mortgaged property of the
Chuas. This choice now bars any subsequent deficiency claim against the estate of the deceased. Petitioner may no longer avail of
the complaint for the recovery of the balance of indebtedness against said estate, after petitioner foreclosed the property securing the
mortgage in its favor. It follows that in this case no further liability remains on the part of respondents and the deceaseds estate.

NOTES:
Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, which states that:
Sec. 7. Rule 86. Mortgage debt due from estate. A creditor holding a claim against the deceased secured by mortgage or other
collateral security, may abandon the security and prosecute his claim in the manner provided in this rule, and share in the general
distribution of the assets of the estate; or he may foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security, by action in court, making the
executor or administrator a party defendant, and if there is a judgment for a deficiency, after the sale of the mortgaged premises, or
the property pledged, in the foreclosure or other proceeding to realize upon the security, he may claim his deficiency judgment in
the manner provided in the preceding section; or he may rely upon his mortgage or other security alone and foreclose the same at
any time within the period of the statute of limitations, and in that event he shall not be admitted as a creditor, and shall receive no
share in the distribution of the other assets of the estate; but nothing herein contained shall prohibit the executor or administrator
from redeeming the property mortgaged or pledged by paying the debt for which it is hold as security, under the direction of the
court if the court shall adjudge it to be for the interest of the estate that such redemption shall be made.
To begin with, it is clear from the text of Section 7, Rule 89, that once the deed of real estate mortgage is recorded in the proper
Registry of Deeds, together with the corresponding court order authorizing the administrator to mortgage the property, said deed
shall be valid as if it has been executed by the deceased himself. Section 7 provides in part:
Sec. 7. Rule 89. Regulations for granting authority to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber estate The court having jurisdiction
of the estate of the deceased may authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage, or otherwise
encumber real estate, in cases provided by these rules when it appears necessary or beneficial under the following regulations:
xxx
(f) There shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the province in which the real estate thus sold, mortgaged, or otherwise
encumbered is situated, a certified copy of the order of the court, together with the deed of the executor or administrator for such
real estate, which shall be valid as if the deed had been executed by the deceased in his lifetime.

CASE DIGEST
Aldamiz v. Judge of CFI Mindoro
December 29, 1949
Moran, C.J.
FACTS: Santiago Rementeria y
Aldamizcogeascoa, the decedent was a
Spaniard and member of the commercial
partnership "Aldamiz y Rementeria." The other
members were his brothers. Santiago
Rementeria died in Spain in 1937, and probate
proceedings were instituted in the same year in
the CFI of Mindoro by Gavino Aldamiz
represented by Atty. Juan L. Luna. Gavino
Aldamiz was appointed administrator and was
again represented by respondent Atty. Juan
Luna.
After ten years from the date of his appointment,
Gavino Aldamiz, as administrator, through his
attorney, Juan L. Luna, submitted his accounts
for the years 1944, 1945 and 1946 and also a
project of partition with a view to closing the
proceedings. The court approved the accounts
but refused to approve the project of partition
unless all debts including attorney's fees be first
paid. In the project of partition, it was expressly
stated that attorney's fees, debts and incidental
expenses would be proportionately paid by the
beneficiaries after the closure of the testate

proceedings, but the court refused to sanction

this clause of the project. Attorney Luna, to
comply with the wishes of the court, without filing
a written petition to have his professional fees
fixed, and without previous notice to all the
interested parties, submitted evidence of his
services and professional standing so that the
court may fix his compensation and the
administrator may make payment thereof.
It is to be noted that Attorney Luna served as
attorney for the administrator as legal
consultants to Santiago and his brothers and to
the "Aldamiz y Rementeria,". He did not charge
them professional services, thus showing
disinterested and extreme liberality due to
friendship and other personal considerations
toward his clients. When he wanted to close
accounts of the estate, he showed no interest in
demanding for payment by preferring to leave
the matter to the future negotiation or
understanding with the interested parties. When
the amount of his fees was fixed by the court
and Gavino Aldamiz asked him for a substantial
reduction, he answered that it was not he who
had fixed the amount but the court, and advised
his client to file a motion for reconsideration, with
the assurance that he would offer no objection to
any reduction in amount and to any extension of
the time for paying what might be granted by the
court.

The Court issued its order of January 21, 1947,

awarding respondent Attorney Luna, in payment
of his professional services, an aggregate sum
of P28,000. Petitioner was able to pay P5,000
only, and upon his failure to pay the balance
after several demands made upon him by
respondent attorney, the latter filed an ex-parte
motion for execution which was granted by the
respondent Court.
ISSUE: WON the court erred in fixing the
amount of attorneys fees and issuing a writ of
execution (YES)
HELD:
1. The correct procedure for the collection of
attorney's fees, is for the counsel to request the
administrator to make payment and file an action
against him in his personal capacity and not as
an administrator should he fail to pay. If the
judgment is rendered against the administrator
and he pays, he may include the fees so paid in
his account to the court. The attorney also may,
instead of bringing such an action, file a petition
in the testate or intestate proceeding "asking
that the court, after notice to all persons
interested, allow his claim and direct the
administrator to pay it as an expense of
administration."
No written petition for the payment of attorney's
fees has ever been filed by the respondent
attorney and the interested parties had not been
previously notified thereof nor of the hearing
held by the court. Consequently, the order
issued by the respondent court for the payment
of the respondents fees and all subsequent

orders implementing it, are null and void, as

having been issued an excess of jurisdiction.
2. The order of execution is also null and void
because a writ of execution is not the proper
procedure allowed by the Rules of the Court for
the payment of debts and expenses of
administration. The proper procedure is for the
court to order the sale of personal estate or the
sale of mortgaged of real property of the
deceased and all debts or expenses of
administration should be paid out of the proceeds of the sale or
mortgage. The order for
the sale or mortgage should be issued upon
motion of the administrator and with the written
notice to all the heirs, legatees and devisees
residing in the Philippines.
Execution may issue only where the devisees,
legatees or heirs have entered into possession
of their respective portions in the estate prior to
settlement and payment of the debts and
expenses of administration and it is later
ascertained that there are such debts and
expenses to be paid, in which case "the court
having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for
that purpose, after hearing, settle the amount of
their several liabilities, and order how much and
in what manner each person shall contribute,
and may issue execution if circumstances
require.

Case Digest: Quita v. CA

Published by paul on | Leave a response
FE D. QUITA, petitioner, VS. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN, respondents
December 22, 1998
Facts:
Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on May 18, 1941. No children were born out of
their marriage. On July 23, 1954, petitioner obtained a final judgment of divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. On April 16,
1972, Arturo died leaving no will. On August 31, 1972, Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the RTC for issuance of letters of
administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan, claiming to
be the surviving spouse of Arturo Dandan and the surviving children, all surnamed Padlan, opposed the petition. The RTC expressed
that the marriage between Antonio and petitioner subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972, that the marriage existed between
private respondent and Arturo was clearly void since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.
The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Issues:
1. Should the case be remanded to the lower court?
2. Who between the petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the decedent?
Held:

If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to
which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No dispute exists as to the right of the six Padlan children to inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they have been
duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan, nor as to their respective
hereditary shares.
Private respondent is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship. Her
marriage to Arturo being a bigamous marriage considered void ab inito under Articles 80 and 83 of the Civil Code renders her not a
surviving spouse.
The decision of the Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case is affirmed.

The Incompetent Carmen Caniza v. Court of Appeals, Pedro and Leonora EstradaG.R. No. 110427; February 24, 1997
Facts:
Carmen Caniza (94), a spinster, a retired pharmacist, and former professor of the Collegeof Chemistry and Pharmacy of the
University of the Philippines, was declared incompetent by judgment of the QC RTC in a guardianship proceeding instituted by her
niece, Amparo A.Evangelista. She was so adjudged because of her advanced age and physical infirmitieswhich included cataracts in
both eyes and senile dementia. Amparo A. Evangelista wasappointed legal guardian of her person and estate. Amparo commenced a
suit to eject thespouses Estrada from the said premises. In their Answer, the defendants declared that theyhad been living in Caiza's
house since the 1960's; that in consideration of their faithfulservice they had been considered by Caiza as her own family, and the
latter had in fact executed a holographic will by which she "bequeathed" to the Estradas the house and lot inquestion.The MTC
rendered judgment in favor of Caniza. The RTC reversed said decision.The appellate court affirmed the RTC's judgment.
Issue:
Evangelista's authority.
Ruling:
The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them by Caiza clearly denotes herintention that they remain in possession
thereof, and legally incapacitated her judicialguardian, Amparo Evangelista, from evicting them therefrom, since their ouster would
beinconsistent with the ward's will.A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator's death, it may be changedor
revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can beclaimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit:
"No will shall pass either real or personalproperty unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court" (ART.
838,id.). An owner's intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing property byhis tolerance, is not inconsistent with the
former's taking back possession in the meantimefor any reason deemed sufficient. And that in this case there was sufficient cause for
theowner's resumption of possession is apparent: she needed to generate income from thehouse on account of the physical
infirmities afflicting her, arising from her extreme age.Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a competent court the general
guardian of both theperson and the estate of her aunt, Carmen Caiza. Her Letters of Guardianship clearlyinstalled her as the
"guardian over the person and properties of the incompetent CARMENCANIZA with full authority to take possession of the
property of said incompetent in any province or provinces in which it may be situated and to perform all other acts necessaryfor
the management of her properties . . " By that appointment, it became Evangelista'sduty to care for her aunt's person, to attend to her
physical and spiritual needs, to assureher well-being, with right to custody of her person in preference to relatives and friends.
It also became her right and duty to get possession of, and exercise control over, Caiza'sproperty, both real and personal, it being
recognized principle that the ward has no right to possession or control of his property during her incompetency. That right to
manage theward's estate carries with it the right to take possession thereof and recover it fromanyone who retains it, and bring and
defend such actions as may be needful for thispurpose