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Securities and Exchange Commission vs.

Chenery
Corp., 332 US 194

Lumiqued vs. Exevea, 282 SCRA 125 (1997)


POWER OF DELEGATION:

Mendoza vs. Dizon, 77 Phil 533 (1946)


Realty Exchange Venture Co. vs. Sendino, 233 SCRA
665 (1994)

Jaworski vs PAGCOR and SAGE GR 144463, 14 January


2004

Antipolo Realty Co. vs. NHA, 153 SCRA 399 (1987)


Philippine International Trading Co. vs. Angeles, 263
SCRA 421 (1996)
Christian General Assembly vs. Ignacio, 597 SCRA
266 (2009)
Mitchell Coke and Coke Company vs. Pennsylvania
Railroad Co., 230 US 247 (1913)
US vs. Dorr, 2 Phil 332 (1903)
Cebu United Enterprises vs. Gallofin, 106 Phil 491
(1959)
Crisostomo vs. CA, 258 SCRA 134 (1996)
Viola vs. Alunan III, 277 SCRA 409 (1997)
Larin vs. Executive Secretary, 280 SCRA 713 (1997)
Dario vs. Mison, 176 SCRA 84 (1989)
Tondo Medical Center Employees Assoc. vs. CA, 527
SCRA 746 (2007)
Banda vs. Ermita, 618 SCRA 488 (2010)
Pichay, Jr. vs. Office of the Deputy Executive
Secretary, 677 SCRA 408 (2012)
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs. CA, 171
SCRA 348 (1989)
Balanguan vs. CA, 562 SCRA 184 (2008)
Dacudao vs. Gonzales, 688 SCRA 109 (2003)
Olaguer vs. RTC, 170 SCRA 478 (1989)
Padua vs. Ranada, 390 SCRA 663 (2002)
Joson vs. Executive Secretary, 290 SCRA 279 (1998)
Eugenio vs. CSC, 242 SCRA 196 (1995)
Blaquera vs. Alcala, 295 SCRA 411 (1998)

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2
Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

Realty Exchange Venture Co. vs. Sendino, 233 SCRA 665


(1994)
Lucina Sendino filed a complaint for Specific
Performance against REVI before the office of Appeals,
Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of HLURB. REVI
Cancelled the contract (entitled Reservation Agreement)
for the reservation of Sendino of a 120 sqm house and
lot in Paranaque. For the alleged non-compliance with
the requirement of Sendino as provided in the
Reservation Agreement. OAALA decided in favour of
Sendino ordering to comply and continue with the sale.
On Appeal of the decision was affirmed. This was further
appealed to the Office of the President but the case was
dismissed. MR was also denied.
Issue: W/N the Office of the Pres committed a Serious
Error in declaring that HLURB has quasi-judicial functions
even though theres not express grant by EO 90.
Decision: NO. Section 1 of PD 1344, provides:
Section 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate real
estate trade and business and in addition to its powers
provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National
Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide cases of the following
nature:chanrob1es
virtual
1aw
library
A.

Unsound

real

estate

business

Corporation v. National Housing Authority (153 SCRA


399 [1987]) where We restated that the National
Housing Authority (now HLURB) shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and
business in accordance with the terms of PD No. 957
which defines the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial
powers of said agency.
HLURB must interpret and apply contracts, determine
the rights of the parties under these contracts, and
award damages whenever appropriate. 15 We fail to see
how the HSRC - which possessed jurisdiction over the
actions for specific performance for contractual and
statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots
against developers - had suddenly lost its adjudicatory
powers by the mere fiat of a change in name through
E.O. 90. One thrust of the multiplication of
administrative agencies is that the interpretation of such
contracts and agreements and the determination of
private rights under these agreements is no longer a
uniquely judicial function.
16 The absence of any
provision, express or implied, in E. O. 90, repealing those
quasi-judicial powers inherited by the HSRC from the
National Housing Authority, furthermore militates
against petitioners' position on the question
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against
petitioners.

practices;

B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by


subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the
project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman;
and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual
and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision
lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer,
dealer, broker or salesman.
There is no question that a statute may vest exclusive
original jurisdiction in an administrative agency over
certain disputes and controversies falling within the
agencys special expertise. The constitutionality of such
grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the National Housing
Authority (now Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board)
over cases involving the sale of lots in commercial
subdivisions was upheld in Tropical Homes Inc. v.
National Housing Authority (152 SCRA 540 [1987]) and
again sustained in a later decision in Antipolo Realty
APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2
Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

Philippine International Trading Corp vs Hon Angeles


(GR 108461 Oct 21 1996)
Facts:
- PITC issued an Admin Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01
requiring all importation from China must be
accompanied by a viable and confirmed EXPORT
PROGRAM" of Philippine Products to China carried out
by the importer himself or through a tie-up.
- Desiring to make importations from China, private
respondents Remington and Firestone, both domestic
corporations, applied for authority to import from China
with PITC. They eventually granted authority after
satisfying the requirements and after they executed
respective undertakings to balance their importations
from China.
- Subsequently, for failing to comply with their
undertakings to submit export credits equivalent to the
value of their importations, further import applications
were withheld by PITC from private respondents, such
that the latter were both barred from importing goods
from China
- Remington, with Firestone as Intervenor, filed a
Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with prayer for
issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction against PITC assailing the said
Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 is an undue
restriction of trade, and hence, unconstitutional.
- The trial court ruled that PITC's authority to process and
approve applications for imports and to issue rules and
regulations has already been repealed by EO No. 133,
issued on February 27, 1987 by President Aquino.
- PITC filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari to seek
reversal of the Decision upholding the Petition for
Prohibition and Mandamus of Remington Industrial
Sales (Remington) and Firestone Ceramics (Firestone) ,
questioning the trial court's decision particularly on the

propriety of the lower court's declarations on the validity


of Administrative Order No. 89-08-01.
- Subsequently, when President Ramos went to Beijing,
a new a new trade agreement was entered into between
the Philippines and China, encouraging liberalization of
trade between the two countries. Thereby the President
directing the Department of Trade and Industry and the
PITC to cease implementing Administrative Order No.
SOCPEC 89-08-01.
- In view of the above fact, Remington then expressed its
desire to have the present action to be declared moot
and academic. PITC disagreed that the case has become
moot and academic as a result of abrogation of the said
Administrative Order because Remington still has
outstanding obligation with PITC consisting of charges
for the 0.5% Counter Export Development Service
before the said abrogation

Issue1: W/N PITC is legally empowered to issue


Administrative Orders.
Issue2: W/N Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01
valid?
Decision:1
YES. PITC is legally empowered 1 to issue Administrative
Orders, as a valid exercise of a power ancillary to
legislation. Hence Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 8908-01 is constitutional
Discussion:
The PITC is attached to the DTI 2 (as established by EO
122) as an implementing arm of the said department.

The grant of quasi-legislative powers in administrative bodies is not


unconstitutional. Thus, as a result of the growing complexity of the modern
society it has become necessary to create more and more administrative
bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in the
particular field assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof
with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature
or the courts of justice. This is the reason for the increasing vesture of quasilegislative and quasi-judicial powers in what is now not unreasonably called
the fourth department of the government. 34 Evidently, in the exercise of
such powers, the agency concerned must commonly interpret and apply
contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such contracts.
One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the
interpretation of contracts and the determination of private rights thereunder
is no longer uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by our regular courts.
(Antipolo Realty Corporation v. National Housing Authority, G.R No. L-50444,
August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 399).

As the primary coordinative, promote, facilitative and regulatory arm of


government for the country's trade, industry and investment activities, which
shall act as a catalyst for intensified private sector activity in order to
accelerate and sustain economic growth. In furtherance of this mandate, the
DTI was empowered, among others, to plan, implement, and coordinate
activities of the government related to trade industry and investments; to
formulate and administer policies and guidelines for the investment priorities
plan and the delivery of investment incentives; to formulate country and
product export strategies which will guide the export promotion and
development thrusts of the government. Corollary, the Secretary of Trade and
Industry is given the power to promulgate rules and regulations necessary to
carry out the department's objectives, policies, plans, programs and projects

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2
Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

The PITC, as an implementing arm of attached as an


integral part of DTI as one of its line agencies, has the
authority to issue the questioned Administrative Order.

Decision2:
No. Although PITC has quasi-legislative power, this does
not imply however, that the subject Administrative
Order is valid exercise of such. The original
Administrative Order issued on August 30, 1989, under
which the respondents filed their applications for
importation, was not published in the Official Gazette or
in a newspaper of general circulation. The questioned
Administrative Order, legally, until it is published, is
invalid within the context of Article 2 3 of Civil Code.
Discussion2:
Thus, even before the trade balancing measures issued
by the petitioner were lifted by President Fidel V. Ramos,
the same were never legally effective, and private
respondents, therefore, cannot be made subject to them,
because Administrative Order 89-08-0l embodying the
same was never published, as mandated by law, for its
effectivity.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION4

Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion
of their publication in the Official Gazette (or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines), unless it is otherwise provided

a) From further charging the petitioners the Counter Export Development


Service fee of 0.5% of the total value of the unliquidated or unfulfilled
Undertakings of the private respondents;

ACCORDINGLY, the assailed decision of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED,


to the effect that judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the private
respondents, subject to the following MODIFICATIONS:
1) Enjoining the petitioner:

b) From further implementing the provisions of Administrative Order No.


SOCPEC 89-08-01 and its appurtenant rules; and,
2) Requiring petitioner to approve forthwith all the pending applications of,
and all those that may hereafter be filed by, the petitioner and the Intervenor,
free from and without complying with the requirements prescribed in the
above-stated issuances.

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2
Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

Cebu United Enterprises vs First Assistant Solicitor


- A Suit for Mandatory Injunction was instituted in the
CFI of Cebu to compel Jose Gallorfin (Collector of
Customs, Cebu) to release and deliver to plaintiff two
shipments from the US. As ancillary relief, the plaintiff
prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction, which was granted. Thereafter,
the goods were released to the plaintiff.
The importation of the aforesaid shipments was made
under and by virtue of an Import Control Commission
License No. 1225 issued by the defunct Import Control
Commission. Under the terms of the license, the plaintiff
could import, on a no-dollar remittance basis, overissue
newspapers up to the amount or value of $118,000.00.
The refusal of the defendant to deliver the imported
items is premised on his contention that while the five
bills of lading covering the two shipments of the
overissue newspapers were all dated at Los Angeles,
U.S.A. December 17, 1953, or one day before the
expiration of the import license in question, the vessels
M/S VENTURA and M/S BATAAN, carrying on board the
said merchandise, actually left the ports of
embarkation, Los Angeles, and San Francisco, on
January 12 and January 16, 1954 respectively. Hence,
according to the defendant, the importation was made
without a valid import license, because under the
regulations issued by the Central Bank and the Monetary
Board, "all shipments that left the port of origin after
June 30, 1953, and are covered by ICC licenses, may be
released by the Bureau of Customs without the need of
a Central Bank release certificate; provided they left the
port of origin within the period of validity of the
licenses." No Central Bank certificate for the release of
the goods having been shown or presented to the
defendant, the latter refused to make the delivery.
The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals. The
question raised, however, being purely one of law, the
appeal was certified to us pursuant to a resolution of
said court dated July 19, 1957.
Issue: W/N The appeal has no merit.
The authority of the appellee to import was contained in
the Import Control Commission License No. 17225,
validated on June 18, 1953, and under Resolution 70 of
the Commission (adopted March 27, 1952), the same
had a six-month period of validity counted from the said

date of June 18, 1953. This license states, among other


conditions, that "Commodities covered by this license must be shipped
from the country of origin before the expiry date of the
license, and are subject to sec. 13 of Republic Act No.
650."
Although Republic Act No. 650, creating the Import
Control Commission, expired on July 31, 1953, it is to be
conceded that its duly executed acts can have valid
effects even beyond the life span of said governmental
agency
What is important to consider only is the legal
connotation of the word "shipped" as the term was used
in the license. Defendant maintains that it is when the
vessel leaves the port of embarkation, while plaintiff
holds that it is the dates of the bills of lading, which are
usually issued after the cargo is placed on board the
vessel. That the date of the shipment is the date when
the goods for dispatch are loaded on board the vessel,
and not necessarily when the ship puts to sea, is clearly
implied from our ruling in the case of U.S. Tobacco
Corporation v. Rufino Luna, Et Al., (87 Phil., 4),
The issuance of the bill of lading, furthermore,
presupposes or carries the presumption that the goods
were delivered to the carrier for immediate shipment
(13 C.J.S. sec. 123 (2), p. 235, and cases cited therein). It
does not appear here that the bill of lading specified any
designated day on which the vessels were to lift anchor,
nor was it shown that plaintiff had any knowledge that
the vessels M/S VENTURA and M/S BATAAN were not to
depart soon after he placed his cargo on board and the
corresponding bills of lading issued to him. From this
latter time, the goods, in contemplation of law, are
deemed already in transit
Defendant's reliance upon Central Bank regulations that
the shipment licensed must have "left the port of origin
within the period of validity of the license" is not
maintainable in the present case, because the
regulations came into effect only on July 1, 1953 already
after issuance of the appellee's license and cannot be
read into the same
Appeal of the Defendant was dismissed

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2
Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

Crisostomo vs. CA, 258 SCRA 134 (1996)


G.R. No. 106296. July 5, 1996
- Petitioner Isabelo Crisostomo was President of the
Philippine College of Commerce (PCC), having been
appointed to that position by the President of the
Philippines on July 17, 1974.
- Two administrative cases were filed against petitioner
for illegal use of government vehicles, misappropriation
of construction materials belonging to the college,
oppression and harassment, grave misconduct,
nepotism and dishonesty. The administrative cases,
which were filed with the Office of the President, were
subsequently referred to the Office of the Solicitor
General for investigation.
- Petitioner was then preventively suspended from office
- On April 1, 1978, P.D. No. 1341 was issued by then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, CONVERTING THE
PHILIPPINE COLLEGE OF COMMERCE INTO A
POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY, DEFINING ITS OBJECTIVES,
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS, AND
EXPANDING ITS CURRICULAR OFFERINGS.
- After a couple of years, the Trial Court acquitted
Crisostomo and cases before the ombudsman were also
dismissed on the ground that they had become moot
and academic and moved that he be reinstated but is
barred by the PD 1341.
- The People of the Philippines filed a Certiorari before
the CA on the decided case which acquitted Crisostomo
before the CA. CA reversed the Decision of the lower
court.
- PD 1341, Crisostomo argues that P.D. No. 1341, which
converted the PCC into the PUP, did not abolish the PCC.
He contends that if the law had intended the PCC to lose
its existence, it would have specified that the PCC was
being "abolished" rather than "converted" and that if
the PUP was intended to be a new institution, the law
would have said it was being "created." Petitioner claims
that the PUP is merely a continuation of the existence of
the PCC, and, hence, he could be reinstated to his former
position as president.

What took place was a change in academic status of the


educational institution, not in its corporate life. Hence
the change in its name, the expansion of its curricular
offerings, and the changes in its structure and
organization.
As petitioner correctly points out, when the purpose is
to abolish a department or an office or an organization
and to replace it with another one, the lawmaking
authority says so.
The appellate court ruled, however, that the PUP and
the PCC are not "one and the same institution" but "two
different entities" and that since petitioner Crisostomo's
term was coterminous with the legal existence of the
PCC, petitioner's term expired upon the abolition of the
PCC.
- But the reinstatement of petitioner to the position of
president of the PUP could not be ordered by the trial
court because on June 10, 1978, P.D. No. 1437 had been
promulgated fixing the term of office of presidents of
state universities and colleges at six (6) years, renewable
for another term of six (6) years, and authorizing the
President of the Philippines to terminate the terms of
incumbents who were not reappointed.
- In accordance with 7 of the law, therefore, petitioner
became entitled only to retirement benefits or the
payment of separation pay. Petitioner must have
recognized this fact that is why in 1992 he asked then
President Aquino to consider him for appointment to the
same position after it had become vacant in
consequence of the retirement of Dr. Prudente.

Issue: W/N PD 1341 abolished the PCC?


Decision: NO. P.D. No. 1341 did not abolish, but only
changed, the former Philippine College of Commerce
into what is now the Polytechnic University of the
Philippines, in the same way that earlier in 1952, R.A. No.
778 had converted what was then the Philippine School
of Commerce into the Philippine College of Commerce.
APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2
Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

Larin vs Executive Sec (G.R. No. 112745. October 16,


1997)
Facts:
- This is Petition for validity of the petitioner's removal
from service as Asst. Commissioner of the BIR,
questioning the creation of Memorandum Order no.
1645 Administrative Order No. 101 which found him
guilty6 of grave misconduct in the administrative charge
and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal from
office. Likewise, petitioner seeks to assail the legality of
Executive Order No. 132 7
- In his petition, petitioner challenged the authority of
the President to dismiss him from office. He argued that
in so far as presidential appointees who are Career
Executive Service Officers are concerned, the President
exercises only the power of control not the power to
remove. He claimed that there is yet no law enacted by
Congress which authorizes the reorganization by the
Executive Department of executive agencies,
particularly the Bureau of Internal revenue. He said that
the reorganization sought to be effected by the
Executive Department on the basis of E.O. No. 132 is
tainted with bad faith in apparent violation of Section 2
of R.A. 66568
Issue:
Does the President have the power to reorganize the BIR
or to issue the questioned E.O. NO. 132?,

issued by the Office of the President, which provides for the creation of A
Committee to Investigate the Administrative Complaint Against Aquilino T.
Larin, Assistant Commissioner, Bureau of Internal Revenue as well as the
investigation made in pursuance thereto and
6

Petitioner is found guilty of the crimes of violation of Sec 268 (4) of NIRC and
Sec 3 of RA 3019 in Criminal Cases Nos 14208-14209 (ppl vs Larin et. al)
7
Which mandates for the streamlining of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
Under said order, some positions and functions are either abolished,
renamed, decentralized or transferred to other offices, while other offices are
also created. The Excise Tax Service or the Specific Tax Service, of which
petitioner was the Assistant Commissioner, was one of those offices that was
abolished by said executive order.
8

Otherwise known as the Act Protecting the Security of Tenure of Civil Service
Officers and Employees in the Implementation of Government
Reorganization.
9

Decision:
YES. Petitioner is a presidential appointee who belongs
to career service of the Civil Service. Being a presidential
appointee, he comes under the direct disciplining
authority of the President. This is in line with the well
settled principle that the power to remove is inherent in
the power to appoint conferred to the President by
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, it is
ineluctably clear that Memorandum Order No. 164,
which created a committee to investigate the
administrative charge against petitioner, was issued
pursuant to the power of removal of the President.
- Under its Preamble, E.O. No. 132 lays down the legal
basis of its issuance, namely: a) Section 48 and 62 of R.A.
No. 7645, b) Section 63 of E.O. No. 127, and c) Section
20, Book III of E.O. No. 292. Section 48 & 62 of R.A. 7645
clearly mentions the acts of "scaling down, phasing out
and abolition" of offices only and does not cover the
creation of offices or transfer of functions.
- The foregoing provision evidently shows that the
President is authorized to effect organizational changes
including the creation of offices in the department or
agency concerned.
- While the President's power to reorganize can not be
denied, this does not mean however that the
reorganization itself is properly made in accordance with
law. Well-settled is the rule that reorganization is
regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith.9
DISPOSITIVE PORTION10

dismissal or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to


exist. And in that case the security of tenure would not be a Chinese Wall. Be
that as it may, if the abolition which is nothing else but a separation or
removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure,
or otherwise not in good faith, no valid abolition takes place and whatever
abolition is done is void ab initio. There is an invalid abolition as where there
is merely a change of nomenclature of positions or where claims of economy
are belied by the existence of ample funds.
10

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is granted, and petitioner is


hereby reinstated to his position as Assistant Commissioner without loss of
seniority rights and shall be entitled to full backwages from the time of his
separation from service until actual reinstatement unless, in the meanwhile,
he would have reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five years in
which case, he shall be deemed to have retired at such age and entitled
thereafter to the corresponding retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.

Thus, in Dario vs. Mison, this court has had the occasion to clarify that:
"As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the
purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event no

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2
Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

Pichay vs Office of the Dep. Sec


G.R. NO. 196425 - July 24, 2012
- This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with a
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order,
seeking to declare as unconstitutional Executive Order
No. 1311 and to permanently prohibit respondents from
administratively proceeding against petitioner on the
strength of the assailed executive order.
- On April 16, 2001, then President Gloria MacapagalArroyo issued E.O. 1212. On November 15, 2010,
President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive
Order No. 1313 (E.O. 13), abolishing the PAGC and
transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more
particularly to its newly-established Investigative and
Adjudicatory Division (IAD).
- On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar
V. Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint
affidavit for grave misconduct against petitioner
Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of
Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration
(LWUA), which arose from the purchase by the LWUA of
Four Hundred Forty-Five Thousand Three Hundred
Seventy Seven (445,377) shares of stock of Express
Savings Bank, Inc.
- Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad
Cautelam manifesting that a case involving the same
transaction and charge of grave misconduct entitled,
"Rustico B. Tutol, et al. v. Prospero Pichay, et al.", and
docketed as OMB-C-A-10-0426-I, is already pending
before the Office of the Ombudsman.
- In assailing the constitutionality of E.O. 13, petitioner
asseverates that the President is not authorized under
any existing law to create the Investigative and
Adjudicatory Division, Office of the Deputy Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs (IAD-ODESLA) and that by
creating a new, additional and distinct office tasked with
quasi-judicial functions, the President has not only
11

entitled, "Abolishing the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission and


Transferring Its Investigative, Adjudicatory and Recommendatory Functions
to the Office Of The Deputy Executive Secretary For Legal Affairs, Office of the
President"
12
creating the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with
the power to investigate or hear administrative cases or complaints for
possible graft and corruption, among others, against presidential appointees
and to submit its report and recommendations to the President.
13
ABOLISHING THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION AND
TRANSFERRING
ITS
INVESTIGATIVE,
ADJUDICATORY
AND

usurped the powers of congress to create a public office,


appropriate funds and delegate quasi-judicial functions
to administrative agencies but has also encroached upon
the powers of the Ombudsman. Petitioner avers that the
unconstitutionality of E.O. 13 is also evident when
weighed against the due process requirement and equal
protection clause under the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
W/N E.O. 13 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE
POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO CREATE A PUBLIC
OFFICE.
Decision
NO. The President has Continuing Authority to
Reorganize the Executive Department under E.O. 29214.
Section 31 of E.O. 292), vests in the President the
continuing authority to reorganize the offices under him
in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.
Discussion:
- The law grants the President this power in recognition
of the recurring need of every President to reorganize
his office "to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency."
- The Office of the President is the nerve center of the
Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the
Office of the President must be capable of being shaped
and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems
fit to carry out his directives and policies. After all, the
Office of the President is the command post of the
President.
- The abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its
functions to a division specially created within the
ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the
President under his continuing "delegated legislative
authority to reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O.
292.
- Here, the Petitioner is a Presidential Appointee15.
Petitioner is a presidential appointee occupying the
RECOMMENDATORY FUNCTIONS TO THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
14
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987
15

Presidential appointees come under the direct disciplining authority of the


President. This proceeds from the well settled principle that, in the absence
of a contrary law, the power to remove or to discipline is lodged in the same
authority on which the power to appoint is vested.32 Having the power to
remove and/or discipline presidential appointees, the President has the
corollary authority to investigate such public officials and look into their
conduct in office.

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2
Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

high-level position of Chairman of the LWUA.


Necessarily, he comes under the disciplinary jurisdiction
of the President, who is well within his right to order an
investigation into matters that require his informed
decision.
- Presumption of Constitutionality16
===========

16

Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify
its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one.39Petitioner has failed to
discharge the burden of proving the illegality of E.O. 13, which IS indubitably

a valid exercise of the President's continuing authority to reorganize the Office


of the President.

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2
Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

Balanguan et. al vs CA (19th Division) GR 174350 , 2008


- Petition for Certiorari assailing the Decision and
Resolution of CA w/c annulled and set aside the
Resolution of DOJ in HSBC vs Balanguan which dismissed
the criminal complaint for Estafa filed against the
Balanguan.
- In this Petition, Balanguans urge the SC to reverse and
set aside the decision of CA and accordingly, dismiss the
complaint against them in view of the absence of
probable cause
- HSBC filed an estafa case against Balanguans which was
dismissed by the Prosecutor in its Resolution, finding no
probable cause. HSBC appealed to the Secretary of DOJ
by means of a Petition for Review which was also
dismissed. MR was also denied.
- HSBC then went to CA by means of Petition for
Certiorari thereby annulling and setting aside the
resolutions of the DOJ. Balanguans filed an MR before
the CA but was denied.
ISSUE: W/N
Decision:
- The Prosecutor exceeded his authority and gravely
abused his discretion. It must be remembered that a
finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry
into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.

- It must be remembered that a preliminary investigation


is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, and that the DOJ is not
a quasi-judicial agency17 exercising a quasi-judicial
function when it reviews the findings of a public
prosecutor regarding the presence of probable cause
- Though some cases describe the public prosecutor's
power to conduct a preliminary investigation as quasijudicial in nature, this is true only to the extent that, like
quasi-judicial bodies18, the prosecutor is an officer of the
executive department exercising powers akin to those of
a court, and the similarity ends at this point.
- The alleged circumstances of the case at bar make up
the elements of abuse of confidence, deceit or
fraudulent means, and damage under Art. 315 of the
Revised Penal Code on estafa and/or qualified estafa.
They give rise to the presumption or reasonable belief
that the offense of estafa has been committed; and,
thus, the filing of an Information against petitioners
Bernyl and Katherene is warranted.
- Considering the allegations, issues and arguments
adduced, SC dismissed the instant petition for being the
wrong remedy under the Revised Rules of Court, as well
as for petitioner Bernyl and Katherene's failure to
sufficiently show that the challenged Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals were rendered in
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

Discussion:
- The Court of Appeals found fault in the DOJ's failure to
identify and discuss the issues raised by HSBC in its
Petition for Review. And, in support thereof, HSBC
maintains that it is incorrect to argue that "it was not
necessary for the Secretary of Justice to have his
resolution recite the facts and the law on which it was
based," because courts and quasi-judicial bodies should
faithfully comply with Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution requiring that decisions rendered by them
should state clearly and distinctly the facts of the case
and the law on which the decision is based
17

A quasi-judicial agency performs adjudicatory functions such that its


awards, determine the rights of parties, and their decisions have the same
effect as judgments of a court. A quasi-judicial agency performs adjudicatory
functions such that its awards, determine the rights of parties, and their

18

A quasi-judicial body is an organ of government other than a court and


other than a legislature which affects the rights of private parties through
either adjudication or rule-making.

decisions have the same effect as judgments of a court.

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2
Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

EUGENIO vs. CSC et al G.R. No. 115863 March 31, 1995


FACTS: .
Eugenio is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear
Research Institute. She applied for a Career Executive
Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank,. She was given
a CES eligibility and was recommended to the President
for a CESO rank by the Career Executive Service Board.
Then respondent Civil Service Commission passed a
Resolution which abolished the CESB, relying on the
provisions of Section 17, Title I, Subtitle A. Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 allegedly conferring on the
Commission the power and authority to effect changes
in
its
organization
as
the
need
arises.
Said resolution states:

Pursuant thereto, the Career Executive Service Board,


shall now be known as the Office for Career Executive
Service of the Civil Service Commission. Accordingly, the
existing personnel, budget, properties and equipment of
the Career Executive Service Board shall now form part
of the Office for Career Executive Service.
Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as
the Career Executive Service Board which recommended
her CESO Rank IV has been abolished, petitioner filed the
petition at bench to annul, among others, said
resolution.
ISSUE: WON CSC given the authority to abolish the office
of the CESB
HELD: the petition is granted and Resolution of the
respondent Commission is hereby annulled and set aside
NO
1. The controlling fact is that the CESB was created in PD
No. 1 on September 1, 1974. It cannot be disputed,
therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can
only be abolished by the legislature. This follows an
unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and
abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative
function
In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted
any law authorizing the abolition of the CESB. On the
contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from
1975 to 1993, the legislature has set aside funds for the
operation of CESB.

Respondent Commission, however, invokes Section 17,


Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the Administrative
Code of 1987 as the source of its power to abolish the
CESB.
But as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor
General, Section 17 must be read together with Section
16 of the said Code which enumerates the offices under
the respondent Commission.
As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that
respondent Commissions power to reorganize is limited
to offices under its control as enumerated in Section 16..
2. . From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an
autonomous entity, albeit administratively attached to
respondent Commission. As conceptualized by the
Reorganization Committee the CESB shall be
autonomous. It is expected to view the problem of
building up executive manpower in the government with
a broad and positive outlook.
The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not
negated by its attachment to respondent Commission.
By said attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the
control of respondent Commission. Under the
Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of attaching
one functionally inter-related government agency to
another is to attain policy and program coordination.
This is clearly etched out in Section 38(3), Chapter 7,
Book IV of the aforecited Code, to wit:
(3) Attachment. (a) This refers to the lateral
relationship between the department or its equivalent
and attached agency or corporation for purposes of
policy and program coordination. The coordination may
be accomplished by having the department represented
in the governing board of the attached agency or
corporation, either as chairman or as a member, with or
without voting rights, if this is permitted by the charter;
having the attached corporation or agency comply with
a system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the
progress of programs and projects; and having the
department or its equivalent provide general policies
through its representative in the board, which shall serve
as the framework for the internal policies of the
attached corporation or agency.
NOTES:

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2
Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the


Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of its power
to abolish the CESB. Section 17 provides:
Sec. 17. Organizational Structure. Each office of the
Commission shall be headed by a Director with at least
one Assistant Director, and may have such divisions as
are necessary independent constitutional body, the
Commissionmay effect changes in the organization as
the need arises.
Sec. 16. Offices in the Commission. The Commission
shall have the following offices:
(1) The Office of the Executive
(2) The Merit System Protection Board composed of a
Chairman and two (2) members
(3) The Office of Legal Affairs
(4) The Office of Planning and Management
(5) The Central Administrative Office.
(6) The Office of Central Personnel Records
(7) The Office of Position Classification and
Compensation
(8) The Office of Recruitment, Examination and
Placement
(9) The Office of Career Systems and Standards
(10) The Office of Human Resource Development
(11) The Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit.
(12) The Office of Personnel Relations
(13) The Office of Corporate Affairs
(14) The Office of Retirement
(15) The Regional and Field Offices.

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2
Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

Blaquera vs Alcala
Facts: On Feb. 21, 1992, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 268
which granted each official and employee of the
government the productivity incentive benefits in a
maximum amount equivalent to 30% of the employees
one month basic salary but which amount not be less
than P2, 000.00. Said AO provided that the
productivity incentive benefits shall be granted only for
the year 1991. Accordingly, all heads of agencies,
including government boards of government-owned or
controlled corporations and financial institutions, are
strictly
prohibited
from
granting
productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 and
future years pending the result of a comprehensive
study being undertaken by the Office of the Pres.
The petitioners, who are officials and employees of
several government departments and agencies, were
paid incentive benefits for the year 1992. Then, on Jan.
19, 1993, then Pres. Ramos issued AO 29 authorizing the
grant of productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992
in the maximum amount of P1, 000.00 and reiterating
the prohibition under Sec. 7 of AO 268, enjoining the
grant of productivity incentive benefits without prior
approval of the President. Sec. 4 of AO 29 directed all
departments, offices and agencies which authorized
payment of productivity incentive bonus for the year
1992 in excess of P1, 000.00 to immediately cause the
refund of the excess. In compliance therewith, the heads
of the departments or agencies of the government
concerned
caused
the
deduction
from
petitioners salaries or allowances of the amounts
needed to cover the alleged overpayments.

Pres. can, by virtue of his power of control, review,


modify, alter or nullify any action or decision of his
subordinate in the executive departments, bureau or
offices
under
him.
When the Pres. issued AO 29 limiting the amount
of incentive benefits, enjoining heads of government
agencies from granting incentive benefits without
approval from him and directing the refund of the excess
over the prescribed amount, the Pres. was just
exercising his power of control over executive
departments.
The Pres. issued subject AOs to regulate the grant of
productivity incentive benefits and to prevent
discontent, dissatisfaction and demoralization among
government personnel by committing limited resources
of government for the equal payment of incentives and
awards. The Pres. was only exercising his power of
control by modifying the acts of the heads of the
government agencies who granted incentive benefits to
their employees without appropriate clearance from the
Office of the Pres., thereby resulting in the uneven
distribution
of
government
resources.
The Presidents duty to execute the law is of
constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of executive
departments.

Issue: Whether or not AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in


the valid exercise of presidential control over the
executive
departments

Held: The Pres. is the head of the government.


Governmental power and authority are exercised and
implemented through him. His power includes the
control of executive departments as provided under Sec.
17,
Art.
VII
of
the
Constitution.
Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify
or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute
the judgment of the former for that of the latter. The
APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2
Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

Lumiqued vs Exevea
FACTS:
Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the
Department of Agrarian Reform - Cordillera
Autonomous Region (DAR-CAR) until President Fidel V.
Ramos dismissed him from that position pursuant to
Administrative Order No. 52 dated May 12, 1993.
The following three complaints were filed by DAR-CAR
Regional Cashier and private respondent Jeannette
Obar-Zamudio with the Board of Discipline of the DAR:
-charged with malversation through falsification of
official documents. From May to September 1989,
Lumiqued allegedly committed at least 93 counts of
falsification by padding gasoline receipts.
-private respondent accused Lumiqued with violation of
Commission on Audit (COA) rules and regulations,
alleging that during the months of April, May, July,
August, September and October 1989, he made
unliquidated cash advances in the total amount of
P116,000.00
-charged with oppression and harassment. According to
private respondent, her two previous complaints
prompted Lumiqued to retaliate by relieving her from
her post as Regional Cashier without just cause
The DOJ made appropriate action by forming a
committee to investigate the complaints against
Lumiqued. *Committee hearings on the complaints
were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued
was not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date,
he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable him
to employ the services of counsel. The committee
granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his
counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so
the committee deemed the case submitted for
resolution. Acting on the report and recommendation,
former Justice Secretary Franklin M. Drilon adopted the
same in his Memorandum to President Fidel V. Ramos
dated October 22, 1992. On May 12, 1993, President
Fidel V. Ramos himself issued Administrative Order No.
52 (A.O. No. 52), 16 finding Lumiqued administratively
liable for dishonesty in the alteration of fifteen gasoline
receipts, and dismissing him from the service, with
forfeiture of his retirement and other benefits.
Petition for appeal addressed to Pres Ramos was filed by
Lumiqued praying that A.O. No. 52 be reconsidered and
that he be reinstated to his former position "with all the
benefits accorded to him by law and existing rules and

regulations." The OP denied the motion. Second motion


was filed but on May 19, 1994, 20 however, before his
motion could be resolved, Lumiqued died. On
September 28, 1994, 21 Secretary Quisumbing denied
the second motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
On May 19, 1994, 20 however, before his motion could
be resolved, Lumiqued died. On September 28, 1994, 21
Secretary Quisumbing denied the second motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.

In view of Lumiqued's death on May 19, 1994, his heirs


instituted this petition for certiorari and mandamus,
questioning such order.
ISSUES:
1. WON the administrative investigation conducted by
the DOJ is valid.
2. WON the right to counsel by Lumiques was violated.
HELD:
1. Yes. While it is true that under the Administrative
Code of 1987, the DOJ shall "administer the criminal
justice system in accordance with the accepted
processes thereof consisting in the investigation of the
crimes, prosecution of offenders and administration of
the correctional system," conducting criminal
investigations is not its sole function. By its power to
"perform such other functions as may be provided by
law," prosecutors may be called upon to conduct
administrative
investigations.
Accordingly,
the
investigating committee created by Department Order
No. 145 was duty-bound to conduct the administrative
investigation in accordance with the rules therefor.
Moreover, the committee's findings pinning culpability
for the charges of dishonesty and grave misconduct
upon Lumiqued were not, as shown above, fraught with
procedural mischief
2. No. under existing laws, a party in an administrative
inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel,
irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the
respondent's capacity to represent himself, and no duty
rests on such a body to furnish the person being
investigated with counsel.
In an administrative
proceeding such as the one that transpired below, a
respondent (such as Lumiqued) has the option of
engaging the services of counsel or not. Excerpts from
the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearings
attended by Lumiqued clearly show that he was

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2
Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

confident of his capacity and so opted to represent


himself . Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in
administrative investigations because such inquiries are
conducted merely to determine whether there are facts
that merit disciplinary measures against erring public
officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining
the dignity of government service.

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2
Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

BANDA V. ERMITA
G.R. No. 166620
April 20, 2010
FACTS:
Sometime in 1987, The National Printing Office
(NPO) was formed during the term of former President
Aquino by virtue of Executive Order No. 285 which
provided, among others, the creation of the NPO from
the merger of the Government Printing Office and the
relevant printing units of the Philippine Information
Agency (PIA). In 2004, President Arroyo issued Executive
Order No. 378 on 2004 amending Section 6 of Executive
Order No. 285 by, inter alia, removing the exclusive
jurisdiction of the NPO over the printing services
requirements
of
government
agencies
and
instrumentalities.
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 378,
government agencies and instrumentalities are allowed
to source their printing services from the private sector
through competitive bidding, subject to the condition
that the services offered by the private supplier be of
superior quality and lower in cost compared to what was
offered by the NPO. Executive Order No. 378 also limited
NPOs appropriation in the General Appropriations Act
to its income.
As such, the petitioners perceived that Executive
Order No. 378 is a threat to their security of tenure as
employees of the NPO. Hence, they filed this petition.
ISSUES:
a) Whether or not President Arroyo has the power
to issue Executive Order No. 378?
b) Whether or not EO 378 is constitutional?
HELD:
a) YES. President Arroyo was granted by law to
issue Executive Order No. 378.

of the Office of the President Proper and the agencies


under it.
The issuance of Executive Order No. 378 by
President Arroyo is an exercise of a delegated legislative
power granted by the aforementioned Section 31,
Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of the Administrative Code
of 1987, which provides for the continuing authority of
the President to reorganize the Office of the President,
in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.
This is a matter already well-entrenched in
jurisprudence. The reorganization of such an office
through executive or administrative order is also
recognized in the Administrative Code of 1987.
In the present instance, involving neither
abolition nor transfer of offices, the assailed action is a
mere reorganization under the general provisions of the
law consisting mainly of streamlining the NTA in the
interest of simplicity, economy and efficiency. It is an act
well within the authority of the President motivated and
carried out, according to the findings of the appellate
court, in good faith, a factual assessment that this Court
could only but accept.
b) YES . EO 378 is constitutional.
The basic evidentiary rule is that he who asserts a
fact or the affirmative of an issue has the burden of
proving it. The petitioners failed to allege, much less
prove, sufficient facts to show that the limitation of the
NPOs budget to its own income would indeed lead to
the abolition of the position, or removal from office, of
any employee. Neither did they present any shred of
proof of their assertion that the changes in the functions
of the NPO were for political considerations that had
nothing to do with improving the efficiency of, or
encouraging operational economy in, the said agency.
Furthermore, the Court finds that the petition failed to
show any constitutional infirmity or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
President Arroyos issuance of Executive Order No. 378.

The law grants the President the power to


reorganize the Office of the President in recognition of
the recurring need of every President to reorganize his
or her office to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency. To remain effective and efficient, it must be
capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President
in the manner the Chief Executive deems fit to carry out
presidential directives and policies. The Administrative
Code provides that the Office of the President consists
APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2
Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

Jaworski vs PAGCOR and SAGE


GR 144463, 14 January 2004
PAGCORs19 Board of Directors an instrument called
"Grant of Authority and Agreement for the
Operation of Sports Betting and Internet Gaming",
which granted SAGE20 the authority to operate and
maintain Sports Betting station in PAGCORs casino
locations, and Internet Gaming facilities to service
local and international bettors, provided that to the
satisfaction of PAGCOR, appropriate safeguards and
procedures are established to ensure the integrity and
fairness of the games.
Senator R. Jaworski, as member of the Senate and
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Games,
Amusement and Sports, filed a petition, praying that
the grant of authority by PAGCOR in favor of SAGE be
nullified for the following reasons:
1. He maintains that PAGCOR committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when it authorized SAGE to operate
gambling on the internet. He contends that PAGCOR
is not authorized to operate gambling on the internet
for the reason that PD 1869 could not have possibly
contemplated internet gambling since at the time of its
enactment, the internet was inexistent and gambling
activities were confined exclusively to real-space.
2. Further, he argues that the internet, being
an international network of computers, necessarily
transcends the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines,
and the grant to SAGE of authority to operate internet
gambling contravenes the limitation in PAGCORs
franchise, under Section 14 of P.D. No. 1869 which
provides that PAGCOR shall conduct gambling
activities or games of chance on land or water within
the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.
3. Internet gambling does not fall under any of
the categories of the authorized gambling activities
enumerated under Section 10 of P.D. No. 1869 which
grants PAGCOR the "right, privilege and authority to
operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and
other recreation or amusement places, sports gaming
pools, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic
of the Philippines."1 He contends that internet
gambling could not have been included within the
19

A GOCC existing under Presidential Decree No. 1869 issued on July 11, 1983
by then President Ferdinand Marcos created to xxx To establish and operate
clubs and casinos, for amusement and recreation, including sports, gaming
pools (basketball, football, lotteries, etc.) and such other forms of amusement
and recreation including games of chance, which may be allowed by law
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and which will: x x x (3)
minimize, if not totally eradicate, the evils, malpractices and corruptions that

commonly accepted definition of "gambling casinos",


"clubs" or "other recreation or amusement places" as
these terms refer to a physical structure in real-space
where people who intend to bet or gamble go and play
games of chance authorized by law

Issue: WHETHER RESPONDENT PAGCOR ACTED


WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION,
OR GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, WHEN IT
AUTHORIZED RESPONDENT SAGE TO OPERATE
INTERNET GAMBLING ON THE BASIS OF ITS
RIGHT "TO OPERATE AND MAINTAIN GAMBLING
CASINOS, CLUBS AND OTHER AMUSEMENT
PLACES" UNDER SECTION 10 OF P.D. 1869;
Decision:
PAGCOR has acted beyond the limits of its authority
when it passed on or shared its franchise to SAGE
A legislative franchise is a special privilege granted
by the state to corporations. It is a privilege of public
concern which cannot be exercised at will and
pleasure, but should be reserved for public control and
administration, either by the government directly, or by
public agents, under such conditions and regulations
as the government may impose on them in the interest
of the public. It is Congress that prescribes the
conditions on which the grant of the franchise may be
made. Thus the manner of granting the franchise, to
whom it may be granted, the mode of conducting the
business, the charter and the quality of the service to
be rendered and the duty of the grantee to the public
in exercising the franchise are almost always defined
in clear and unequivocal language.
While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter
into operators and/or management contracts, it is not
allowed under the same charter to relinquish or
share its franchise, much less grant a veritable
franchise to another entity such as SAGE.
PAGCOR cannot delegate its power in view of the
legal principle of delegata potestas delegare non
potest21, inasmuch as there is nothing in the charter to
show that it has been expressly authorized to do so.
Citing Lim v. Pacquing, the Court clarified that "since
are normally prevalent in the conduct and operation of gambling clubs and
casinos without direct government involvement.xxx
20
Abbrevation for Sports and Games and Entertainment Corporation. A
Corporation.
21
In constitutional and administrative law, the principle delegata potestas
non potest delegari (Latin) states that "no delegated powers can be further
delegated". Alternatively, it can be stated delegatus non potest delegare,
"one to whom power is delegated cannot himself further delegate that
power".

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2
Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

ADC has no franchise from Congress to operate the


jai-alai, it may not so operate even if it has a license or
permit from the City Mayor to operate the jai-alai in the
City of Manila." By the same token, SAGE has to
obtain a separate legislative franchise and not
"ride on" PAGCORs franchise if it were to legally
operate on-line Internet gambling.
The "Grant of Authority and Agreement to Operate
Sports Betting and Internet Gaming" executed by
PAGCOR in favor of SAGE is declared NULL and
VOID.

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2
Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

G.R. Nos. 86540-41 November 6, 1989


MANTRUSTE SYSTEMS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ASSET
PRIVATIZATION
TRUST,
MAKATI
AGROTRADING, INC., and LA FILIPINA UY GONGCO.
CORP., respondents.
Facts:
- in 1986 (at the time when Freedom Constitution
was in force) Mantruste System, Inc. (MSI) entered
into an "interim lease agreement" with the
Development Bank of the Philippines (owner of the
Bayview Plaza Hotel) wherein the former would
operate the hotel for "a minimum of three months or
until such time that the said properties are sold to
MSI or other third parties by DBP.
- On December 8, 1986 the President issued
Proclamation No. 50 entitled "Launching a Program
for the Expeditious Disposition or Privatization of
Certain Government Corporations and/or the
(acquired) Assets thereof, and creating a Committee
on Privatization and the Asset Privatization Trust."
- The Bayview Hotel properties were among the
government assets Identified for privatization and
were consequently transferred from DBP to APT for
disposition.
- To effect the disposition of the property, the DBP
notified MSI that it was terminating the "interim lease
agreement." in Sept 1987 (after more than a year)
- MSI, in its reply to the said termination, said that it
is of the opinion that since its lease on the hotel
properties has been for more than one year now, its
lease status has taken the character of a long term
one. As such MSI as the lessee has acquired certain
rights and of firm contention that it has acquired a
priority right to the purchase of Bayview Hotel
properties over and above other interested parties
and does not need to participate in a property
bidding that was on going at that time.

22

- APT responded firmly that they disagree with MSIs


claims and recommended to join the bidding instead
should they intend to acquire the property.
- Eventually, Mantruste being firm to their stand, did
not join the bidding. As a result, the bid was awarded
to another company.
- MSI filed a Civil Complaint to prevent such transfer
of Bayview and from them being ejected. RTC
rendered a decision in favor of MSI.
- APT appealed to CA. CA nullified RTC's decision
on the ground that RTC's decision is violative of
Section 3122 of Proclamation No. 50-A and rejected
RTCs opinion in the case that the above provision
of Proclamation No. 50-A is unconstitutional
because it ceased to be operative in view of the
1987 Constitution
Issue:
- W/N Proclamation No. 50, that was promulgated
1986, has ceased to be operative in view of the 1987
Constitution
- W/N Sec 31 of Proclamation No. 50 impinges upon
the judicial power as defined in Section 1, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution
Decision:
NO. Proclamation No. 50-A continued to be
operative after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution, by virtue of Section 323, Article XVIII
(Transitory Provisions) providing that:
Section 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A does not
infringe any provision of the Constitution. It does not
impair the inherent power of courts "to settle actual
controversies which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government" (Sec.
1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). The power to define,
prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the
various courts belongs to the legislature, except that
it may not deprive the Supreme Court of its
jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5,

which provides:
23

No court or administrative agency shall issue any restraining


order or injunction against the Trust in connection with the
acquisition, sale or disposition of assets transferred to it . . . Nor
shall such order or injunction be issued against any purchaser
of assets sold by the Trust to prevent such purchaser from taking
possession of any assets purchased by him.

Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders,


proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive
issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain
operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2
Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

Article VIII of the Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987


Constitution).
The President, in the exercise of her legislative
power under the Freedom Constitution, issued
Proclamation No. 50-A prohibiting the courts from
issuing restraining orders and writs of injunction
against the APT and the purchasers of any assets
sold by it, to prevent courts from interfering in the
discharge, by this instrumentality of the executive
branch of the Government, of its task of carrying out
"the expeditious disposition and privatization of
certain government corporations and/or the assets
thereof' (Proc. No. 50), absent any grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction
on its part. This proclamation, not being inconsistent
with the Constitution and not having been repealed
or revoked by Congress, has remained operative
(Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution).
- Under the system of separation of powers set up
in the Constitution, the power of the courts over the
other branches and instrumentalities of the
Government is limited only to the determination of
"whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion (by them) amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction" in the exercise of their authority and in
the performance of their assigned tasks (Sec. 1, Art.
VIII, 1987 Constitution).
- There can be no justification for judicial
interference in the business of an administrative
agency, except when it violates a citizen's
constitutional rights, or commits a grave abuse of
discretion, or acts in excess of, or without
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the
decision of the Court of Appeals, the petition for
review is dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against
the petitioner

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2
Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

PELAEZ VS AUDITOR GENERAL (1965)


FACTS:
Pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative
Code (RAC) of 1917, authorizing the President of
the Philippines to create new municipalities among
others,
then President (Macapagal) issued
Executive Orders creating 33 municipalities.
Thereafter, then a special civil action was instituted
by Emmanuel Pelaez as then the Vice President
and taxpayer against the Auditor General to restrain
him, as well as his representatives and agents, from
passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in
the implementation of said executive orders and/or
any disbursement by said municipalities.
ISSUE:
Whether the Executive Orders were valid and thus
constituted due delegation of power
HELD:
No.
R.A. 2370 (1960) has impliedly repealed Sec. 68 of
RAC when it expressed:
Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries
altered nor their names changed except under the
provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.
Thus, the power to fix such common boundary, in
order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction
between adjoining municipalities, may partake of
an administrative nature involving, as it does, the
adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the
law creating said municipalities the authority to
create
municipal
corporations
is
essentially legislative in nature. The authority to
create
municipal
corporations
is
essentially legislative in nature; the creation of
municipalities, is not an administrative function, but
one which is essentially and eminently legislative in
character.

(b) fix a standard the limits of which are


sufficiently determinate or determinable to which
the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions.
Without a statutory declaration of policy, the
delegate would in effect, make or formulate such
policy, which is the essence of every law; and,
without the aforementioned standard, there would
be no means to determine, with reasonable
certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or
beyond the scope of his authority. Hence, he could
thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to
make the law, but, also and this is worse to
unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with
the end sought to be attained by the Act of
Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation
of powers and the system of checks and balances,
and, consequently, undermining the very foundation
of our Republican system.
Further, the 1935 Constitution (Art VII, Sec 11) has
granted the President control over all executive
departments and with regard to local governments,
only supervision. He was then denied the power to
control local governments by the very Constitution
itself. If the President was allowed to create a
municipality, he could, in effect, remove any of its
officials, by creating a new municipality and
including therein the barrio in which the official
concerned resides, for his office would thereby
become vacant. Thus, by merely brandishing the
power to create a new municipality (if he had it),
without actually creating it, he could compel local
officials to submit to his dictation, thereby, in effect,
exercising over them the power of control denied to
him by the Constitution.

Although Congress may delegate to another branch


of the Government the power to fill in the details in
the execution, enforcement or administration of a
law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the
principle of separation of powers, that said law:
(a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein
the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate and
APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2
Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

CHRISTIAN GENERAL ASSEMBLY (CGA)


SPS IGNACIO (2009)

VS

FACTS:
Owners of subject property in Pulilan , Bulacan,
Spouses Ignacio, and CGA entered into a Contract
to Sell for the said subdivision lot with stipulations
on downpayment, installment terms and period.
CGA paid the downpayment and religiously paid its
monthly installments until it was discovered that
subject property had flaws and defects in its title;
that said lot was a property under litigation. CGA
filed an action before the RTC against Ignacio for
fraudulent concealment of property under litigation.
Ignacio moved to have the action dismissed
contending that the HLURB has jurisdiction over
their claims.

contracts, One thrust of the multiplication of


administrative agencies is that the interpretation of
contracts and the determination of private rights
thereunder is no longer a uniquely judicial
function, exercisable only by our regular courts.

ISSUE:
Whether HLURB has jurisdiction over the complaint

HELD:
Yes. HLURB had its beginning when pursuant to PD
No. 957 NHA was created intended to closely
supervise and regulate the real estate subdivision
and condominium businesses in order to curb the
growing number of swindling and fraudulent
manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous
subdivision and condominium sellers and operators.
By virtue of succeeding executive orders, NHAs
jurisdiction expanded until its functions were
transferred to the Human Settlements Regulatory
Commission (HSRC) until it was eventually
renamed HLURB.
HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over complaints
arising from contracts between the subdivision
developer and the lot buyer or those aimed at
compelling the subdivision developer to comply with
its contractual and statutory obligations to make the
subdivision a better place to live in.
In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial
powers which an administrative agency may
exercise is defined in the enabling act of such
agency. In other words, the extent to which an
administrative entity may exercise such powers
depends largely, if not wholly on the provisions of
the statute creating or empowering such agency. In
the exercise of such powers, the agency concerned
must commonly interpret and apply contracts and
determine the rights of private parties under such
APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2
Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

ENRIQUE GARCIA VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (1992)


211 SCRA 219
FACTS: In November 1990, President Corazon
Aquino issued Executive Order No. 438 which
imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and
charges imposed by law on all articles imported into
the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad
valorem tax. This additional duty was imposed
across the board on all imported articles, including
crude oil and other oil products imported into the
Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the
additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was
passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that
crude oil and other oil products continued to be
taxed at 9%. Enrique Garcia, a representative from
Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are
unconstitutional for they violate Section 24 of Article
VI of the Constitution which provides:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff
bills, bills authorizing increase of the
public debt, bills of local application,
and private bills shall originate
exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may
propose
or
concur
with
amendments

than the Executive Department. It does not follow,


however, that Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478,
assuming they may be characterized as revenue
measures, are prohibited to be exercised by the
President, that they must be enacted instead by the
Congress of the Philippines.
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution
provides as follows:

(2) The Congress may, by law,


authorize the President to fix within
specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as it may
impose, tariff rates, import and
export
quotas,
tonnage
and
wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the
national development program of the
Government.

There is thus explicit constitutional permission to


Congress to authorize the President subject to such
limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may
impose to fix within specific limits tariff rates . . .
and other duties or imposts . . . . In this case, it is
the Tariff and Customs Code which authorized the
President to issue the said EOs.

He contends that since the Constitution vests the


authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the
President may not assume such power by issuing
Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the
nature of revenue-generating measures.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are


constitutional.

HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the


Constitution, the enactment of appropriation,
revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of
course, within the province of the Legislative rather
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Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES


ASSOCIATION v THE COURT OF APPEALS
527 SCRA 746 G.R. No. 167324 - on delegation of
powers
J. Chico-Nazario
Facts:
In 1999, the DOH launched the Health Sector
Reform Agenda (HSRA). It provided for five general
areas of reform:
To provide fiscal autonomy to government
hospitals;
Secure funding for priority public health
programs;
Promote the development of local health
systems and ensure its effective performance;
Strengthen the capacities of health
regulatory agencies;
Expand the coverage of the National Health
Insurance Program (NHIP)
On 24 May 1999, then President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada issued Executive Order No. 102, entitled
Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the
Department of Health, which provided for the
changes in the roles, functions, and organizational
processes of the DOH. Under the assailed executive
order, the DOH refocused its mandate from being
the sole provider of health services to being a
provider of specific health services and technical
assistance, as a result of the devolution of basic
services to local government units.
A petition for the nullification of the Health Sector
Reform Agenda (HSRA) Philippines 1999-2004 of
the Department of Health (DOH); and Executive
Order No. 102, Redirecting the Functions and
Operations of the Department of Health,
Petitioners alleged that the HSRA should be
declared void, since it runs counter to the aspiration
and ideals of the Filipino people as embodied in the
Constitution. They claim that the HSRA's policies of
fiscal autonomy, income generation, and revenue
enhancement violate Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15
and 18 of Article II, Section 1 of Article III; Sections
11 and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3 of
Article XV of the 1987 Constitution. Such policies
allegedly resulted in making inaccessible free
medicine and free medical services.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the HSRA cannot


be declared void for violating Sections 5, 9, 10, 11,
13, 15, 18 of Article II; Section 1 of Article III;
Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections 1
and 3(2) of Article XV, all of the 1987 Constitution,
which directly or indirectly pertain to the duty of the
State to protect and promote the peoples right to
health and well-being. It reasoned that the
aforementioned provisions of the Constitution are
not self-executing; they are not judicially
enforceable constitutional rights and can only
provide guidelines for legislation. The Court of
Appeals held that Executive Order No. 102 is
detrimental to the health of the people cannot be
made a justiciable issue. The question of whether
the HSRA will bring about the development or
disintegration of the health sector is within the realm
of the political department.

Issue:
WON EO 102 is void on the ground that it was
issued in excess of the president's authority.
Held: No. EO 102 is valid.
Executive Order No. 102 is well within the
constitutional power of the President to issue. The
President did not usurp any legislative prerogative
in issuing Executive Order No. 102. It is an exercise
of the President's constitutional power of control
over the executive department, supported by the
provisions of the Administrative Code, recognized
by other statutes, and consistently affirmed by this
Court.
The HSRA cannot be nullified based solely on
petitioners' bare allegations that it violates the
general principles expressed in the non selfexecuting provisions they cite herein. There are two
reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged
infringement of broad constitutional principles: basic
considerations of due process and the limitations of
judicial power.
Petitioners also claim that Executive Order No. 102
is void on the ground that it was issued by the
President in excess of his authority. They maintain
that the structural and functional reorganization of
the DOH is an exercise of legislative functions,
which the President usurped when he issued
Executive Order No. 102. This line of argument is
without basis.

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2
Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

In Domingo v. Zamora, this Court explained the


rationale behind the President's continuing authority
under the Administrative Code to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the
President. The law grants the President the power
to reorganize the Office of the President in
recognition of the recurring need of every President
to reorganize his or her office "to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency." To remain effective and
efficient, it must be capable of being shaped and
reshaped by the President in the manner the Chief
Executive deems fit to carry out presidential
directives and policies.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition
is DENIED. This Court AFFIRMS the assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 26
November 2004, declaring both the HSRA and
Executive Order No. 102 as valid. No costs.

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2
Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

La Bugal-BLaan v. Ramos
G.R. No. 127882. December 1, 2004. J.
Panganiban
Facts:
The Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before
the Court challenges the constitutionality of (1)
Republic Act 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of
1995); (2) its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(DENR Administrative Order [DAO] 96-40); and (3)
the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement
(FTAA) dated 30 March 1995, executed by the
government with Western Mining Corporation
(Philippines), Inc. (WMCP).
On 27 January 2004, the Court en banc
promulgated its Decision, granting the Petition and
declaring the unconstitutionality of certain
provisions of RA 7942, DAO 96-40, as well as of the
entire FTAA executed between the government and
WMCP, mainly on the finding that FTAAs are
service contracts prohibited by the 1987
Constitution. The Decision struck down the subject
FTAA for being similar to service contracts,[9]
which, though permitted under the 1973
Constitution, were subsequently denounced for
being antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over
our natural resources, because they allowed foreign
control over the exploitation of our natural
resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino nation.
The Decision quoted several legal scholars and
authors who had criticized service contracts for,
inter alia, vesting in the foreign contractor exclusive
management and control of the enterprise, including
operation of the field in the event petroleum was
discovered; control of production, expansion and
development; nearly unfettered control over the
disposition
and
sale
of
the
products
discovered/extracted; effective ownership of the
natural resource at the point of extraction; and
beneficial ownership of our economic resources.
According to the Decision, the 1987 Constitution
(Section 2 of Article XII) effectively banned such
service contracts. Subsequently, Victor O. Ramos
(Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources [DENR]), Horacio Ramos (Director,
Mines and Geosciences Bureau [MGB-DENR]),
Ruben Torres (Executive Secretary), and the WMC
(Philippines) Inc. filed separate Motions for
Reconsideration.

Petitioners argued that no amendatory laws have


been passed to make the Mining Act of 1995
conform to constitutional strictures (assuming that,
at present, it does not); that public respondents will
continue to implement and enforce the statute until
this Court rules otherwise; and that the said law
continues to be the source of legal authority in
accepting, processing and approving numerous
applications for mining rights.
Issue:
WON the court can decide on the controversy on the
ground that it is a justiciable question.
Held: Yes, it is a justiciable question.

All the protagonists are in agreement that the Court


has jurisdiction to decide this controversy, even
assuming it to be moot.
Petitioners stress the following points. First, while a
case becomes moot and academic when there is
no more actual controversy between the parties or
no useful purpose can be served in passing upon
the merits,[18] what is at issue in the instant case
is not only the validity of the WMCP FTAA, but also
the constitutionality of RA 7942 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations. Second, the
acts of private respondent cannot operate to cure
the law of its alleged unconstitutionality or to divest
this Court of its jurisdiction to decide. Third, the
Constitution imposes upon the Supreme Court the
duty to declare invalid any law that offends the
Constitution.
Petitioners also argue that no amendatory laws
have been passed to make the Mining Act of 1995
conform to constitutional strictures (assuming that,
at present, it does not); that public respondents will
continue to implement and enforce the statute until
this Court rules otherwise; and that the said law
continues to be the source of legal authority in
accepting, processing and approving numerous
applications for mining rights.
Indeed, it appears that as of June 30, 2002, some
43 FTAA applications had been filed with the Mines
and Geosciences Bureau (MGB), with an aggregate
area of 2,064,908.65 hectares -- spread over Luzon,
the Visayas and Mindanao[19] -- applied for. It may
be a bit far-fetched to assert, as petitioners do, that
each and every FTAA that was entered into under

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Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

the provisions of the Mining Act invites potential


litigation for as long as the constitutional issues are
not resolved with finality. Nevertheless, we must
concede that there exists the distinct possibility that
one or more of the future FTAAs will be the subject
of yet another suit grounded on constitutional
issues.
But of equal if not greater significance is the cloud
of uncertainty hanging over the mining industry,
which is even now scaring away foreign
investments. Attesting to this climate of anxiety is
the fact that the Chamber of Mines of the Philippines
saw the urgent need to intervene in the case and to
present its position during the Oral Argument; and
that Secretary General Romulo Neri of the National
Economic
Development
Authority
(NEDA)
requested this Court to allow him to speak, during
that Oral Argument, on the economic consequences
of the Decision of January 27, 2004.[20]
We are convinced. We now agree that the Court
must recognize the exceptional character of the
situation and the paramount public interest involved,
as well as the necessity for a ruling to put an end to
the uncertainties plaguing the mining industry and
the affected communities as a result of doubts cast
upon the constitutionality and validity of the Mining
Act, the subject FTAA and future FTAAs, and the
need to avert a multiplicity of suits. Paraphrasing
Gonzales v. Commission on Elections,[21] it is
evident that strong reasons of public policy demand
that the constitutionality issue be resolved now.[22]
In further support of the immediate resolution of the
constitutionality issue, public respondents cite Acop
v. Guingona,[23] to the effect that the courts will
decide a question -- otherwise moot and academic - if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review.
[24] Public respondents ask the Court to avoid a
situation in which the constitutionality issue may
again arise with respect to another FTAA, the
resolution of which may not be achieved until after it
has become too late for our mining industry to grow
out of its infancy. They also recall Salonga v. Cruz
Pao,[25] in which this Court declared that (t)he
Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and
controlling constitutional principles, precepts,
doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of
educating the bench and bar on the extent of
protection given by constitutional guarantees. x x x.

The mootness of the case in relation to the WMCP


FTAA led the undersigned ponente to state in his
dissent to the Decision that there was no more
justiciable controversy and the plea to nullify the
Mining Law has become a virtual petition for
declaratory relief.[26] The entry of the Chamber of
Mines of the Philippines, Inc., however, has put into
focus the seriousness of the allegations of
unconstitutionality of RA 7942 and DAO 96-40
which converts the case to one for prohibition[27] in
the enforcement of the said law and regulations.
Indeed, this CMP entry brings to fore that the real
issue in this case is whether paragraph 4 of Section
2 of Article XII of the Constitution is contravened by
RA 7942 and DAO 96-40, not whether it was
violated by specific acts implementing RA 7942 and
DAO 96-40. [W]hen an act of the legislative
department is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, settling the controversy becomes the
duty of this Court. By the mere enactment of the
questioned law or the approval of the challenged
action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a
judicial controversy even without any other overt act.
[28] This ruling can be traced from Taada v.
Angara,[29] in which the Court said:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate
on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution,
the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy.
Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the
judiciary to settle the dispute.
xxx
xxx
x
xx
As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized
in many cases, it will not shirk, digress from or
abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the
Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of
discretion brought before it in appropriate cases,
committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or
department of the government.[30]
Additionally, the entry of CMP into this case has also
effectively forestalled any possible objections
arising from the standing or legal interest of the
original parties.

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For all the foregoing reasons, we believe that the


Court should proceed to a resolution of the
constitutional issues in this case.
AFTER ALL IS SAID AND DONE, it is clear that
there is unanimous agreement in the Court upon the
key principle that the State must exercise full control
and supervision over the exploration, development
and utilization of mineral resources.

referred to in paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article XII


of the Constitution; and (3) the Financial and
Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated
March 30, 1995 executed by the government and
Western Mining Corporation Philippines Inc.
(WMCP), except Sections 7.8 and 7.9 of the subject
FTAA which are hereby INVALIDATED for being
contrary to public policy and for being grossly
disadvantageous to the government.

This Court cannot but be mindful that any decision


rendered in this case will ultimately impact not only
the cultural communities which lodged the instant
Petition, and not only the larger community of the
Filipino people now struggling to survive amidst a
fiscal/budgetary deficit, ever increasing prices of
fuel, food, and essential commodities and services,
the shrinking value of the local currency, and a
government hamstrung in its delivery of basic
services by a severe lack of resources, but also
countless future generations of Filipinos.
For this latter group of Filipinos yet to be born, their
eventual access to education, health care and basic
services, their overall level of well-being, the very
shape of their lives are even now being determined
and affected partly by the policies and directions
being adopted and implemented by government
today. And in part by the this Resolution rendered
by this Court today.
Verily, the mineral wealth and natural resources of
this country are meant to benefit not merely a select
group of people living in the areas locally affected by
mining activities, but the entire Filipino nation,
present and future, to whom the mineral wealth
really belong. This Court has therefore weighed
carefully the rights and interests of all concerned,
and decided for the greater good of the greatest
number. JUSTICE FOR ALL, not just for some;
JUSTICE FOR THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE,
not just for the here and now.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT
the respondents and the intervenors Motions for
Reconsideration; to REVERSE and SET ASIDE this
Courts January 27, 2004 Decision; to DISMISS the
Petition; and to issue this new judgment declaring
CONSTITUTIONAL (1) Republic Act No. 7942 (the
Philippine Mining Law), (2) its Implementing Rules
and Regulations contained in DENR Administrative
Order (DAO) No. 9640 -- insofar as they relate to
financial and technical assistance agreements
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Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

Conference of Maritime Agencies v. POEA


G.R. No. 114714
FACTS:
Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning
Agencies, Inc., an incorporated association of
licensed Filipino manning agencies, and its copetitioners, all licensed manning agencies which
hire and recruit Filipino seamen for and in behalf of
their respective foreign ship-owner-principals, urge
to annul Resolution No. 01, series of 1994, of the
Governing Board" of the POEA and POEA
Memorandum Circular No. 05.
Petitioners contend that POEA does not
have the power and authority to fix and promulgate
rates affecting death and workmen's compensation
of Filipino seamen working in ocean-going vessels;
only Congress can.

The reasons given above for the delegation


of legislative powers in general are particularly
applicable to administrative bodies. With the
proliferation of specialized activities and their
attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature
has found it more and more necessary to entrust to
administrative agencies the authority to issue rules
to carry out the general provisions of the statute.
This is called the "power of subordinate legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may
implement the broad policies laid down in a statute
by "filling in" the details which the Congress may not
have the opportunity or competence to provide. This
is effected by their promulgation of what are known
as supplementary regulations, such as the
implementing rules issued by the Department of
Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations
have the force and effect of law.

Governing Board Resolution No. 1: the


POEA Governing Board resolves to amend and
increase the compensation and other benefits as
specified under Part II, Section. C, paragraph 1 and
Section L, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the POEA
Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the POEA can promulgate
rules by virtue of delegation of legislative power?
HELD:
YES! The principle, of non-delegation of
powers is applicable to all the three major powers of
the Government but is especially important in the
case of the legislative power because of the many
instances when delegation is permitted. The
occasions are rare when executive or judicial
powers have to be delegated by the authorities to
which they legally pertain. In the case of legislative
power, however, such occasions have become
more and more frequent, if not necessary. This had
led to the observation that the delegation of
legislative power has become the rule and its nondelegation the exception.
The reason is the increasing complexity of
the task of government and the growing inability of
the legislature to cope directly with the myriad
problems demanding its attention. These solutions
may, however, be expected from its delegates, who
are supposed to be experts in the particular fields
assigned to them.
APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2
Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979)


FACTS:
President Carter terminated a treaty with Taiwan,
and a few Congressional members felt that this
deprived them of their Constitutional with respect to
a change in the supreme law of the land. Congress
has taken no official action. However, no
Congressional action was ever taken. The Senate
considered a resolution that would require the
President to get Senate approval before any mutual
defense treaty could be terminated, but there was
no final vote on the resolution.

ISSUE:
Whether the issue as the President can terminate a
treaty without Congressional approval is a nonjusticiable political question.

HELD:
Yes, because it involves the authority of the
President in the conduct of our country's foreign
relations and the extent to which the Senate or the
Congress is authorized to negate the action of the
President. The question of the efficacy of
ratifications by state legislatures, in the light of
previous rejection or attempted withdrawal, should
be regarded as a political question pertaining to the
political departments, with the ultimate authority in
the Congress in the exercise of its control over the
promulgation of the adoption of the Amendment.
The controversy is a non-justiciable political dispute
that should be left for resolution by the Executive
and Legislative Branches of the Government and
might be answered in different ways for different
amendments which must surely be controlled by
political standards, rather than standards easily
characterized as "judicially manageable". In light of
the absence of any constitutional provision
governing the termination of a treaty, and the fact
that different termination procedures may be
appropriate for different treaties, the instant case, in
my view, also "must surely be controlled by political
standards."
APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2
Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

Olaguer vs RTC, G.R. No. 81385. February 21,


1989

FACTS:

HELD:

When the Development Bank of the Philippines


(DBP) provided certain financing accommodations
to Philippine Journalists, Inc. (PJI), Publisher, the
voting rights over 67% of the total subscribed and
outstanding voting shares of stock of the company
held by the stockholders were assigned to the bank.
The bank appointed some stockholders as proxies
to exercise its right to vote. But when PJI defaulted,
the bank cancelled the said proxies and designated
as its proxies petitioner Eduardo Olaguer, Jose Mari
Velez and Manuel de Leon. DBP scheduled a
special stockholders meeting for the purpose of
electing new set of directors. However, complaints
were filed against them due to some alleged illegal
acts committed by them. Among which is that
Olaguer continued to exercise and retain full
management and control of PJI despite of his
termination of his appointment as member of the
board of directors of DBP by Pres. Aquino. It was
alleged that Olaguer, et. al have been acting as
corporate officers and/or members of the board
without their having been elected by the majority
vote of stockholders and without their owning in their
own right even a single qualifying share. It was also
alleged in the complaint, that petitioner Reyes had
been sending out notices to private respondents
about an alleged stockholders meeting to be held on
December 21, 1987 at the PJI building, and that in
the letter written by the DBP chief legal counsel, it
is stated that petitioner Olaguer and his associates
who claim to be members of the board and
corporate officers of PJI do not represent DBP and
that they are not authorized to act in its behalf.

No. Olaguer, being a fiscal agent of the PCGG and


Chairman of the Board of Directors of the PJI, was
acting for and in behalf of the PCGG. Under Section
2 of Executive Order No. 14, the Sandiganbayan
has exclusive and original jurisdiction over all cases
regarding "the funds, moneys, assets and properties
illegally acquired by Former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close
relatives, subordinate, business associates,
dummies, agents, or nominees," civil or criminal,
including incidents arising from such cases. The
Decision of the Sandiganbayan is subject to review
on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court. In
the exercise of its functions, the PCGG is a co-equal
body with the regional trial courts and co-equal
bodies have no power to control the other. The
regional trial courts and the Court of Appeals have
no jurisdiction over the PCGG in the exercise of its
powers under the applicable Executive Orders and
Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution
and, therefore, may not interfere with and restrain or
set aside the orders and actions of the PCGG. The
Commission should not be embroiled in and
swamped by legal suits before inferior courts all over
the land. Otherwise, the Commission will be forced
to spend valuable time defending all its actuations in
such courts. This will defeat the very purpose behind
the creation of the Commission.

A complaint was filed in the RTC of Manila however,


Olaguer contested that he has just been designated
the fiscal and team leader of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
assigned to the PJI and that all his actions are
sanctioned and reported to PCGG.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over
the case notwithstanding Olaguer's appointment as
fiscal agent of the PCGG.
APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2
Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

G.R. No. L-45127

May 5, 1989

Petitioner: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,


represented by the Provincial Fiscal of Leyte
Respondent:
HON. JUDGE AUXENCIO C.
DACUYCUY,
CELESTINO
S.
MATONDO,
SEGUNDINO A, CAVAL and CIRILO M. ZANORIA
(TOPIC: TESTS FOR VALID DELEGATION)
Ponente: REGALADO, J.:
FACTS:
The Private respondents were charged of violation
of Republic Act 4670. During the arraignment the
Private respondents pleaded guilty and moved to
quash the charge on the ground that the facts of the
charge do not constitute offense, Sec 32 of the said
law is null and void for being unconstitutional.
The disputed section of Republic Act
No. 4670 provides:
Sec. 32. Penal Provision. A
person who shall wilfully interfere
with, restrain or coerce any teacher
in the exercise of his rights
guaranteed by this Act or who shall
in any other manner commit any act
to defeat any of the provisions of this
Act shall, upon conviction, be
punished by a fine of not less than
one hundred pesos nor more than
one thousand pesos, or by
imprisonment, in the discretion of the
court. (Emphasis supplied).
The private respondents contend that in the
penalties imposed by the said law, it is apparent that
it has no prescribed period or term for the imposable
penalty of imprisonment. While a minimum and
maximum amount for the penalty of fine is specified,
there is no equivalent provision for the penalty of
imprisonment, although both appear to be qualified
by the phrase "in the discretion of the court. The
determination of what Congress intended to be the
duration of the penalty of imprisonment would be
violative of the constitutional prohibition against
undue delegation of legislative power, and that the
absence of a provision on the specific term of
imprisonment constitutes that penalty into a cruel
and unusual form of punishment. Hence, said
Section 32 is unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Whether the absence of designated limits in fixing
the length of service of a term of imprisonment (as
in Sec 32 of RA 4670) constitutes an exercise of
undue delegation of powers?
HELD:
Yes. The court held that It is not for the courts to fix
the term of imprisonment where no points of
reference have been provided by the legislature.
What valid delegation presupposes and
sanctions is an exercise of discretion to fix the
length of service of a term of imprisonment
which must be encompassed within specific or
designated limits provided by law, the absence
of which designated limits well constitute such
exercise as an undue delegation, if not-an outright
intrusion into or assumption, of legislative power.
Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 provides for an
indeterminable period of imprisonment, with neither
a minimum nor a maximum duration having been set
by the legislative authority. The courts are thus
given a wide latitude of discretion to fix the term of
imprisonment, without even the benefit of any
sufficient standard, such that the duration thereof
may range, in the words of respondent judge, from
one minute to the life span of the accused.
Irremissibly, this cannot be allowed. It vests in the
courts a power and a duty essentially legislative in
nature and which, as applied to this case, does
violence to the rules on separation of powers as well
as the non-delegability of legislative powers. This
time, the preumption of constitutionality has to yield.
On the foregoing considerations, and by virtue of the
separability clause in Section 34 of Republic Act No.
4670, the penalty of imprisonment provided in
Section 32 thereof should be, as it is hereby,
declared unconstitutional.
It follows, therefore, that a ruling on the proper
interpretation of the actual term of imprisonment, as
may have been intended by Congress, would be
pointless and academic. It is, however, worth
mentioning that the suggested application of the socalled rule or principle of parallelism, whereby a fine
of P1,000.00 would be equated with one year of
imprisonment, does not merit judicial acceptance. A
fine, whether imposed as a single or as an
alternative penalty, should not and cannot be
reduced or converted into a prisonv term; it is to be

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2
Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

considered as a separate and independent penalty


consonant with Article 26 of the Revised Penal
Code. 23 It is likewise declared a discrete principal
penalty in the graduated scales of penalties in
Article 71 of said Code. There is no rule for
transmutation of the amount of a fine into a term of
imprisonment. Neither does the Code contain any
provision that a fine when imposed in conjunction
with imprisonment is subordinate to the latter
penalty. In sum, a fine is as much a principal penalty
as imprisonment. Neither is subordinate to the other

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2
Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

Dacudao vs Gonzales, 688 SCRA 109 (2013)


Facts:

The petitioners filed a case of syndicated


estafa against Celso Delos Angeles and his
associates in the Legacy Group of
companies, after the petitioners were
defrauded in a business venture.

Thereafter, the DOJ Secretary Gonzales


issued Department Order 182 which directs
all prosecutors in the country to forward all
cases already filed against Celso Delos
Angeles, Jr and his associates to the
secretariat of DOJ in Manila for appropriate
action.

However, in separate order which in


Memorandun dated March 2009, it was said
that cases already filed against Celso Delos
Santos et. al of the Legacy Group of
companies in Cagayan De Oro City need to
be sent anymore to the secretariat of DOJ
Manila.

Because of such orders, the complaint of


petitioners was forwarded to the secretariat
of the Special Panel of the DOJ of Manila.

Aggrieved, Spouses Dacudao filed a petition


for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
assailing to the respondent Secretary of
Justice grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the D.O. and Memorandum which
accordingly violated their right to due
process, right to equal protection of the law
and right to speedy disposition of the cases.

group. The function involved is purely executive and


adminstrative.
Furthermore, Preliminary Investigation is not a
quasi-judicial proceeding. The DOJ as a primary
prosecution arm of the government, does not
exercise a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the
findings of a public prosecutor on the finding of
probable cause in any case.

Issue:
Whether or not the Secretary of DOJ commited
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Department
Order 182 and Memorandum?

Held:
No. The Secretary of DOJ did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the DO 182.
The Secretary of Justice did not exercise any judicial
or quasi-judicial functions because his questioned
issuance were ostensibly intended to ensure his
subordinates' efficiency and economy in conducting
the preliminary investigation involving the legacy
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Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

G.R. No. 71977 February 27, 1987

HELD:

DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, M.P.,petitioners, vs.


HON. MANUEL ALBA in his capacity as the
MINISTER OF THE BUDGET, respondents.

Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly


over extends the privilege granted under said
Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to
indiscriminately transfer funds from one department,
bureau, office or agency of the Executive
Department to any program, project or activity of any
department, bureau or office included in the General
Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment,
without regard as to whether or not the funds to be
transferred are actually savings in the item from
which the same are to be taken, or whether or not
the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the
item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not
only completely disregard the standards set in the
fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue
delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes
beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such
constitutional infirmities render the provision in
question null and void.

FACTS:

Assailed in this petition for prohibition with


prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is the
constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section
44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise
known as the "Budget Reform Decree of 1977."
One of the grounds relied upon by the
Petitioners, is that stated in Paragraph D which
states that Section 44 of the same decree
amounts to undue delegation of legislative
powers to the executive
The conflict between paragraph 1 of Section 44
of Presidential Decree No. 1177 and Section
16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution is
readily perceivable from a mere cursory reading
thereof. Said paragraph 1 of Section 44
provides:
The President shall have the authority to
transfer any fund, appropriated for the
different departments, bureaus, offices and
agencies of the Executive Department,
which are included in the General
Appropriations Act, to any program, project
or activity of any department, bureau, or
office included in the General Appropriations
Act or approved after its enactment.

On the other hand, the constitutional provision


under consideration reads as follows:
Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed
authorizing any transfer of appropriations,
however, the President, the Prime Minister,
the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of
constitutional commis ions may by law be
authorized to augment any item in the
general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other
items of their respective appropriations.

ISSUE: WON Presidential Decree 1777 amounts to


undue delegation of legislative powers to the
executive

Thomas M. Cooley in his "A Treatise on the


Constitutional Limitations," Vol. 1, Eight Edition,
Little, Brown and Company, Boston, explained:
... The legislative and judicial are coordinate
departments of the government, of equal
dignity; each is alike supreme in the exercise
of its proper functions, and cannot directly or
indirectly, while acting within the limits of its
authority, be subjected to the control or
supervision of the other, without an
unwarrantable assumption by that other of
power which, by the Constitution, is not
conferred upon it. The Constitution
apportions the powers of government, but it
does not make any one of the three
departments subordinate to another, when
exercising the trust committed to it. The
courts may declare legislative enactments
unconstitutional and void in some cases, but
not because the judicial power is superior in
degree or dignity to the legislative. Being
required to declare what the law is in the
cases which come before them, they must
enforce the Constitution, as the paramount
law, whenever a legislative enactment
comes in conflict with it. But the courts sit,
not to review or revise the legislative action,
but to enforce the legislative will, and it is
only where they find that the legislature has
failed to keep within its constitutional limits,
that they are at liberty to disregard its action;

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2
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and in doing so, they only do what every


private citizen may do in respect to the
mandates of the courts when the judges
assumed to act and to render judgments or
decrees without jurisdiction. "In exercising
this high authority, the judges claim no
judicial supremacy; they are only the
administrators of the public will. If an act of
the legislature is held void, it is not because
the judges have any control over the
legislative power, but because the act is
forbidden by the Constitution, and because
the will of the people, which is therein
declared, is paramount to that of their
representatives expressed in any law."
[Lindsay v. Commissioners, & c., 2 Bay, 38,
61; People v. Rucker, 5 Col. 5; Russ v.
Com., 210 Pa. St. 544; 60 Atl. 169, 1 L.R.A.
[N.S.] 409, 105 Am. St. Rep. 825] (pp. 332334).
Indeed, where the legislature or the executive
branch is acting within the limits of its authority, the
judiciary cannot and ought not to interfere with the
former. But where the legislature or the executive
acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers,
it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what
the other branches of the government had assumed
to do as void. This is the essence of judicial power
conferred by the Constitution "in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by
law" [Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution;
Art. X, Section 1 of the 1973 Constitution and which
was adopted as part of the Freedom Constitution,
and Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution] and
which power this Court has exercised in many
instances. *
The instant petition is granted. Paragraph 1 of
Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is
declared null and void for being unconstitutional.

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Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

G.R. No. 141949

CEFERINO PADUA, petitioner, vs. HON.


SANTIAGO RANADA, PRESIDING JUDGE OF
MAKATI, RTC, BRANCH 137 et al

existing laws. Provided: Finally, that pending finality


of the decision, the Board may require the Petitioner
to deposit in whole or in part in escrow the
provisionally approved adjustment or initial toll
rates." (Emphasis supplied)

FACTS:

October 14, 2002

The Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) issued


Resolution No. 2001-89 authorizing provisional
toll rate adjustments at the Metro Manila Skyway
The above Resolution approving provisional toll
rate adjustments was published in the
newspapers of general circulation.
Tracing back the events that led to the issuance
of the said Resolution, it appears that Citra
Metro Manila Tollways Corporation (CITRA)
filed with the TRB an application for an interim
adjustment of the toll rates at the Metro Manila
Skyway Project Stage 1.CITRA moored its
petition on the provisions of the "Supplemental
Toll Operation Agreement" (STOA), authorizing
it, as the investor, to apply for and if warranted,
to be granted an interim adjustment of toll rates
in the event of a "significant currency
devaluation."
Claiming that the peso exchange rate to a U.S.
dollar had devaluated, CITRA alleged that there
was a compelling need for the increase of the toll
rates to meet the loan obligations of the Project
and the substantial increase in debt-service
burden.
Due to heavy opposition, CITRAs petition
remained unresolved. This prompted CITRA to
file an "Urgent Motion for Provisional Approval,"
this time, invoking Section 3, Rule 10 of the
"Rules of Practice and Procedure Governing
Hearing Before the Toll Regulatory Board" (TRB
Rules of Procedure) which provides:

CITRA moved to withdraw its "Urgent Motion for


Provisional Approval" without prejudice to its
right to seek or be granted provisional relief
under the above-quoted provisions of the TRB
Rules of Procedure, obviously, referring to the
power of the Board to act on its own initiative.
Hence, petitioners Ceferino Padua and Eduardo
Zialcita, as toll payer assail before this Court the
validity and legality of TRB Resolution No. 200189.
As a toll payer, Padua claims that: (1) Resolution
No. 2001-89 was issued without the required
publication and in violation of due process; (2)
alone, TRB Executive Director Jaime S.
Dumlao, Jr., could not authorize the provisional
toll rate adjustments because the TRB is a
collegial body; and (3) CITRA has no standing to
apply for a toll fee increase since it is an
"investor" and not a "franchisee-operator."
Private respondent CITRA, in its comment
counters that: (1) the TRB has primary
administrative jurisdiction over all matters
relating to toll rates; (2) prohibition is an
inappropriate remedy because its function is to
restrain acts about to be done and not acts
already accomplished; (3) Resolution No. 200189 was issued in accordance with law; (4)
Section 3, Rule 10 of the TRB Rules is
constitutional; and (5) private respondent and
the Republic of the Philippines would suffer
more irreparable damages than petitioner.

ISSUE: WON TRB has jurisdiction to issue


Resolution No. 2001-89 authorizing provisional toll
rate adjustments at the Metro Manila Skyway

"SECTION 3. Provisional Relief. Upon the filing of


an application or petition for the approval of the
HELD:
initial toll rate or toll rate adjustment, or at any stage,
thereafter, the Board may grant on motion of the
We take cognizance of the wealth of jurisprudence
pleader or in its own initiative, the relief prayed for
on the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction
without prejudice to a final decision after completion
and exhaustion of administrative remedies. In this
of the hearing should the Board find that the
era of clogged court dockets, the need for
pleading, together with the affidavits and supporting
specialized administrative boards or commissions
documents attached thereto and such additional
with the special knowledge, experience and
evidence as may have been requested and
capability to hear and determine promptly disputes
presented, substantially support the provisional
on technical matters or intricate questions of facts,
order; Provided: That the Board may, motu proprio,
subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of
continue to issue orders or grant relief in the
discretion, is indispensable. Between the power
exercise of its powers of general supervision under
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lodged in an administrative body and a court, the


unmistakable trend is to refer it to the former."[24] In
Industrial Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,we
ruled:
"x x x, if the case is such that its determination
requires the expertise, specialized skills and
knowledge of the proper administrative bodies
because technical matters or intricate questions of
facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained
in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will
be supplied by the courts even though the matter is
within the proper jurisdiction of a court."
Petitioner Paduas "Urgent Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order to Stop Arbitrary Toll Fee
Increases" is DENIED and petitioner Zialcitas
"Petition for Prohibition" is DISMISSED.

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Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

G.R. No. 115844. August 15,1997


CESAR G. VIOLA, Chairman, Bgy. 167, Zone 15,
District II, Manila, petitioner, vs. HON. RAFAEL
M. ALUNAN III, Secretary, DILG, ALEX L. DAVID,
President/Secretary General, National Liga ng
mga Barangay, LEONARDO L. ANGAT,
President, City of Manila, Liga ng mga
Barangay,respondents.

FACTS: Petitioner Cesar Viola, a Bgy. Chairman,


challenged the validity of Art. III, 1-2 of the
Revised Implementing Rules and Guidelines
for the General Elections of the Liga ng mga
Barangay Officers so far as they provide for
the election of first, second and third vice
presidents and for auditors for the National
Liga ng mga Barangay and its chapters.
Petitioners contention is that the
positions in question are in excess of those
provided in the Local Government Code (R.A.
No. 7160),Petitioner argues that, in providing
for the positions of first, second and third vice
presidents and auditor for each chapter, 12 of the Implementing Rules expand the
number of positions authorized in 493 of the
Local Government Code in violation of the
principle that implementing rules and
regulations cannot add or detract from the
provisions of the law they are designed to
implement.

deem necessary for the


management of the chapter.
We hold that 493 of the Local
Government Code, in directing the board of
directors of the liga to create such other
positions as may be deemed necessary for
the management of the chapter[s], embodies
a fairly intelligible standard. There is no
undue delegation of power by Congress.
While the board of directors of a local
chapter can create additional positions to
provide for the needs of the chapter, the
board of directors of the National Liga must
be deemed to have the power to create
additional positions not only for its
management but also for that of all the
chapters at the municipal, city, provincial and
metropolitan
political
subdivision
levels. Otherwise the National Liga would be
no different from the local chapters.
Section 493 actually gives the board the
power to [1] appoint its secretary and
treasurer and [2] create such other positions
as it may deem necessary for the
management of the chapter. The additional
positions to be created need not therefore be
appointive positions.

ISSUE: Is the power to create additional positions


necessary for the management of the National
Liga and Local Liga Chapter vested upon the
respective Board of Directors.
HELD: Contrary to petitioners contention, the
creation of the additional positions is
authorized by the LGC which provides as
follows:
493. Organization. The liga at
the municipal, city, provincial,
metropolitan
political
subdivision, and national
levels
directly
elect
a
president, a vice-president,
and five (5) members of the
board of directors. The board
shall appoint its secretary
and treasurer and create
such other positions as it may
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JEAN L. ARNAULT vs EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS


FACTS:

Petitioner was an attorney in-fact in the negotiations


for the purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong
Estates by the Government of the Philippines.

The Senate of the Philippines adopted Resolution


No. 8, whereby created a Special Committee to
determine whether the said purchase was honest,
valid and proper, and whether the price involved in
the deal was fair and just, the parties responsible
therefor, any other facts the Committee in
pursuance of said Resolution.

Petitioner was asked to whom a part of the purchase


price was delivered. Petitioner refused to answer
this question.

Petitioner was imprisoned in the new Bilibid Prison


until such time when he shall reveal to the Senate
the name of the person who received the part of the
purchase price.

Since the legislature is given a large discretion in


reference to the means it may employ to promote
the general welfare, and alone may judge what
means are necessary and appropriate to
accomplish an end which the Constitution makes
legitimate, the courts cannot undertake to decide
whether the means adopted by the legislature are
the only means or even the best means possible to
attain the end sought, for such course would best
the exercise of police power of the state in the
judicial department.

The judicial department of the government has no


right or power or authority to do, much in the same
manner that the legislative department may not
invade the judicial realm in the ascertainment of
truth and in the application and interpretation of the
law, in what is known as the judicial process,
because that would be in direct conflict with the
fundamental principle of separation of powers
established in the Constitution. The only instances
when judicial intervention may lawfully be invoke are
when there has been a violation of a constitutional
inhibition, or when there has been an arbitrary
exercise of the legislative discretion.

Petitioner contended that the Senate of the


Philippines has no power to punish him for contempt
for refusing to reveal the name of the person to
whom he gave the money to, that the Legislature
lacks authority to punish him for contempt.
ISSUE:
WON the courts have the right to review the findings
of legislative bodies in the exercise of the
prerogative of legislation, or interfere with their
proceedings.
RULING:
There was an inherent fundamental error in the
course of action that the lower court followed. It
assumed that courts have the right to review the
findings of legislative bodies in the exercise of the
prerogative if legislation, or interfere with their
proceedings or their discretion in what is known as
the legislative process.
APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2
Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

US vs Ang Tang Ho, GR No. 17122, February 27,


1922
Facts:
At its special session of 1919, the Philippine
Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled "An Act
penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and
speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under
extraordinary
circumstances,
regulating
the
distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the
Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of
State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations.
August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a
proclamation fixing the price at which rice should be
sold.
August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the
defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging him with the sale of
rice at an excessive price when he sold to Pedro
Trinidad, one ganta of rice at the price of eighty
centavos (P.80), which is a price greater than that fixed
by Executive Order No. 53 of the Governor-General of
the Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, under
the authority of section 1 of Act No. 2868.

complete when it left the legislature as it failed to


specify what conditions the Governor-General shall
issue the proclamation as the said Act states for any
cause. It also failed to define extraordinary rise that
such proclamation by the Governor-General aims to
prevent. Lastly, the said Act authorized the
promulgation of temporary rules and emergency
measures by the Governor-General.
It must be conceded that, after the passage of act No.
2868, and before any rules and regulations were
promulgated by the Governor-General, a dealer in rice
could sell it at any price, even at a peso per "ganta,"
and that he would not commit a crime, because there
would be no law fixing the price of rice, and the sale of
it at any price would not be a crime. That is to say, in
the absence of a proclamation, it was not a crime to
sell rice at any price. Hence, it must follow that, if the
defendant committed a crime, it was because the
Governor-General issued the proclamation. There was
no act of the Legislature making it a crime to sell rice
at any price, and without the proclamation, the sale of
it at any price was to a crime.

Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and


sentenced to five months' imprisonment and to pay a
fine of P500, from which he appealed to this court,
claiming that the lower court erred in finding Executive
Order No. 53 of 1919, to be of any force and effect, in
finding the accused guilty of the offense charged, and
in imposing the sentence.
The official records show that the Act was to take effect
on its approval; that it was approved July 30, 1919; that
the Governor-General issued his proclamation on the
1st of August, 1919; and that the law was first
published on the 13th of August, 1919; and that the
proclamation itself was first published on the 20th of
August, 1919.
Issue:
Whether or not the Philippine Legislature passed Act
No. 2868 delegation to the Governor General a valid
delegation of power?
Held:
No. The said Act constituted an invalid delegation of
power since the said Act authorized the GovernorGeneral to promulgate laws and not merely rules and
regulations to effect the law. The said Act was not

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2
Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

ANTIPOLO REALTY CORPORATION vs. THE


NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY (NHA), Hon. G.V.
Tobias, in his capacity as General Manager of the
National Housing Authority, The Hon. Jacobo C. Clave,
in his capacity as Presidential Executive Assistant and
Virgilio A. Yuson (G. R. No. L-50444 August 31, 1987)

ISSUE:
Whether or not in hearing the complaint of Yuson and in
ordering the reinstatement of the
Contract to Sell between the parties NHA assumed the
performance of judicial or quasi-judicial functions which it
was not authorized to perform.

FACTS:

HELD:

Jose Hernando acquired prospective and beneficial


ownership over Lot. No. 15, Block IV of the Ponderosa
Heights Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal, from the petitioner
Antipolo Realty Corporation under a Contract to Sell. On
28 August 1974, Hernando transferred his rights over the
said lot to private respondent Virgilio Yuson, embodied in
a Deed of Assignment and Substitution of Obligor.
However, for failure of Antipolo Realty to develop the
subdivision project in accordance with its undertaking
under Clause 17 of the Contract to Sell (subdivision
beautification), Mr. Yuson paid only the arrearages
pertaining to the period up to, and including, the month of
August 1972 and stopped all monthly installment
payments falling due thereafter.

No. It is by now commonplace learning that many


administrative
agencies exercise
and perform
adjudicatory powers and functions, though to a limited
extent only. Limited delegation of judicial or quasi-judicial
authority to administrative agencies (e.g., the Securities
and Exchange Commission and the National Labor
Relations Commission) is well recognized in our
jurisdiction,basically because the need for special
competence and experience has been recognized as
essential in the resolution of questions of complex or
specialized character and because of a companion
recognition that the dockets of our regular courts have
remained crowded and clogged.

On 14 October 1976, the president of Antipolo Realty


sent a notice to private respondent Yuson advising that
the required improvements in the subdivision had already
been completed, and requesting resumption of payment
of the monthly installments on Lot No. 15. For his part,
Mr. Yuson replied that he would conform with the request
as soon as he was able to verify the truth of the
representation in the notice. In a second letter dated 27
November 1976, Antipolo Realty reiterated its request
citing the decision rendered by the National Housing
Authority (NHA) on 25 October 1976 in Case No. 252
(entitled "Jose B. Viado Jr., complainant vs. Conrado S.
Reyes, respondent") declaring Antipolo Realty to have
"substantially complied with its commitment to the lot
buyers pursuant to the Contract to Sell. A formal demand
was made for full and immediate payment of the amount
of P16,994.73, representing installments which, Antipolo
Realty alleged, had accrued during the period while the
improvements were being completed i.e., between
September 1972 and October 1976.

The Court held that under the law creating NHA it is


empowered to regulate the real estate trade
and business involving ...specific performance of
contractual and statutory obligations filed by
buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against
the owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman..
The Court held that under the "sense-making and
expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction . . . the courts
cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a
question which is within the jurisdiction of an
administrative tribunal where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the
special knowledge, experience, and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is
essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory
statute administered."

Yuson refused to pay the September 1972 - October


1976 monthly installments but agreed to pay the post
October 1976 installments. Antipolo Realty responded by
rescinding the Contract to Sell, and claiming the forfeiture
of all installment payments previously made by Mr.
Yuson. Yuson brought his dispute with Antipolo Realty
before NHA. Antipolo Realty filed a motion to dismiss,
which NHA denied. After hearing, the NHA rendered a
decision on 9 March 1978 ordering the reinstatement of
the Contract to Sell. A motion for reconsideration of
Antipolo Realty was also denied.

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2
Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

DARIO VS MISON
FACTS:

President Aquino promulgated Proclamation


No. 3 Declaring a National Policy to implement
the reforms mandated by the people, protecting
their basic rights, adopting a provisional
constitution and providing for an orderly
transition to a government under a new
Constitution.

Then the President issued a number of executive


orders and directives reorganizing various other
government offices, which led to EO No. 127
provided for the reorganization of the Bureau of
Customs and prescribed a new staffing pattern.

The petitioner was a Deputy Commissioner at


the Bureau of Customs.

The petitioner was one of the personnel that


were terminated from office.

ISSUE:

WON the petitioners dismissal was legal.

HELD:

With respect to EO No. 127, Commissioner


submits that under Section 59 thereof, those
incumbents whose positions are not included
therein or who are not reappointed shall be
deemed separated from the service. He submits
that because the removed personnel have not
been reappointed they are considered
terminated. To begin with the Commissioners
appointing power is subject to the provisions of
EO No. 39. Under EO No. 39 the Commissioner
of Customs may appoint all Bureau personnels
except those appointed by the President.
Accordingly
with
respect
to
Deputy
Commissioner Dario, Commissioner Mison could
not have validly terminated them, they being
Presidential appointees.

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2
Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

G.R. No. 131255 May 20, 1998


JOSON vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
PONENTE: PUNO, J.:
FACTS:
Private respondents submitted a letter-complaint
against HON. EDUARDO NONATO JOSON, in his capacity
as the Governor of the Province of Nueva Ecija to the
Office of the President. The President, acting on the
complaint, instructed in writing the then Secretary of
the Interior and Local Governments (SILG) Robert
Barbers to "[t]ake appropriate preemptive and
investigative actions," but to "[b]reak not the peace.
The Secretary of DILG then proceeded, requiring the
petitioner to submit his answers. After asking for
extensions for filing his answer, the petitioner instead
submitted a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the DILG
had no jurisdiction over the case and no authority to
require him, to answer the complaint. Pending the
resolution of the motion to Dismiss, the Executive
Secretary, by authority of the President, adopted the
findings and recommendation of the DILG Secretary,
finding Nueva Ecija Governor Eduardo Nonato Joson
guilty of grave misconduct and abuse of authority and
is meted the penalty of suspension from office for a
period of six (6) months without pay.
The Court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the implementation of the order of the
Executive Secretary. Despite the restraining order, the
said suspension was implemented, and Oscar Tinio was
installed as Acting Governor of the province.
Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a petition alleging that
the Court of Appeals Gravely Erred In applying the
Alter-Ego Principle because, contrary to law, it was the
Secretary of the DILG who was exercising the powers of
the President which are clearly vested by law only upon
him or the executive secretary
Issue:
Whether the Secretary of DILG has jurisdiction and
authority over the case
Held:
Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions
against elective local officials is lodged in two
authorities: the Disciplining Authority and the
Investigating Authority. This is explicit from A.O. No. 23.
Pursuant to these provisions,
the power to investigate may be delegated to the DILG
or a Special Investigating Committee, as may be
constituted by the Disciplining Authority. This is not
undue delegation, contrary to petitioner Joson's claim.

The President remains the Disciplining Authority. What


is delegated is the power to investigate, not the power
to discipline
Moreover, the power of the DILG to investigate
administrative complaints is based on the alter-ego
principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency.
Thus:
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the
establishment of a single executive, all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department, the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents of the
Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act
in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that
he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are
performed by and through the executive departments,
and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the
Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive. 55
This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the
President. 56 The power of control is provided in the
Constitution, thus:
Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed
Control is said to be the very heart of the power of the
presidency. 58 As head of the Executive Department,
the President, however, may delegate some of his
powers to the Cabinet members except when he is
required by the Constitution to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he acts
personally. 59 The members of Cabinet may act for and
in behalf of the President in certain matters because
the President cannot be expected to exercise his
control (and supervisory) powers personally all the
time. Each head of a department is, and must be, the
President's alter ego in the matters of that department
where the President is required by law to exercise
authority.
Note: The resolution issued by the Executive Secretary,
however was declared null and void on the grounds of
non-compliance to the procedure by which an
administrative case involving Elective Official must be
investigated as specified in the Local Government Code
and A.O. No. 23. Section 62

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2
Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

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