System Maintenance and Environmental Reform in Mexico: Salinas's Preemptive Strategy

Author(s): Stephen P. Mumme

Source: Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 19, No. 1, The Ecological Crisis of Latin America
(Winter, 1992), pp. 123-143
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
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SystemMaintenanceand
Environmental
Reformin Mexico
Salinas'sPreemptive
Strategy
by
StephenP. Mumme
Evidenceof Mexico's ecologicalcrisisis everywhere.
Fiftyyearsof
in a shambles.
economicmiraclesand debacleshave leftits environment
Whether
one considersthenetreduction
of Mexicanforests
by 66 percent
overall,withan annualrateof loss in excess of a millionacres,attendant
problemsof soil erosionanddesertification,
thereduction
oftheLacandon
inthepast40 years,theloss ofthousands
ofspeciesof
jungleby70 percent
ofover60 percent
ofitsstreams
andrivers,
faunaandflora,
thecontamination
the degradation
of its two mostcelebratednaturallakes at Chapala and
Patzcuaro,
themassiveoil spillsalongtheGulfofMexicocoastline,
damagingnationalfisheries
and aquaticlife,theinadequatesanitation
or sewage
in halfofMexico'scitiesandtowns,MexicoCity'sdubiousstatus
facilities
as theworld'sworstmetropolitan
air polluter,or thevirtualabsenceof
hazardous-waste
disposalfacilitiesagainsta backdropof intensivetoxic
wasteproduction,
itis clearMexico'senvironmental
is atthebreaking
point.'
The social costsof ecologicaldeclinehavebeenprofound.
Ruralareas
have bornethebruntof environmental
neglectas publicpoliciesfavoring
commercial
andexport-oriented
agriculture
depressedpricesfortraditional
commodities,
increased
factorcosts,andrewarded
monoculture
production.
The effectsare seen in the declineof sustainableagriculture
practices,
increaseddependency
on pesticidesand artificial
fertilizers,
destruction
of
forestsand otherresourcecommons,displacement
of ruralpopulations,
increasedlabormigration,
andswellingnumbers
ofimmigrants
to Mexico's
cities.In Oaxaca's Mixtecaalone,arablelandhasbeenreduced70 percent,
laborstream(Wright,
forcingthousandsof campesinosintotheitinerant
1990: 95).
Stephen
P.Mummeis a professor
ofpolitical
FortCollins.His
scienceatColoradoStateUniversity,
research
interests
focusonenvironment
andnatural-resources
withspecial
policyinLatinAmerica,
onMexicoandtheMexico-United
emphasis
Statesborder
region.
He hasauthored
orcoauthored
a
widerangeofarticles
andmonographs
including
Apportioning
Groundwater
on theU.S.-Mexico
Border(1988).
LATIN AMERICANPERSPECTIVES, Issue72,Vol. 19 No. 1,Winter1992,123-143
i) 1992LatinAmericanPerspectives

123

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124

LATINAMERICAN PERSPECIlVES

In Mexico's cities,rapidurbanization
has generatedproblemsranging
fromthetraditional
onesofurbaninfrastructure
inwater,sanitation,
waste
andtransport
healthhazardsof
disposal,housing,
tothemorecontemporary
airandtoxicpollution
(Schteingart,
1988:280-284).Mexico'surbanworking
class has beenespeciallyvulnerable
to theecologicalproblemsassociated
withurbangrowth.
Housingscarcity,
inadequate
working
conditions,
spatial
extensions
betweenresidenceandworkplace,
job insecurity,
poortransportation,andinadequaterecourseto healthservicesandothersocialsupports
all combineto increasetherisksof exposureto urbanpollutionandreduce
individual
capacitytodealwithitseffects.
In the1980s,ecologicaldeclinecontributed
totheintensity
andintractabilityofMexico'sdecade-long
economiccrisis.Wholeindustries
havebeen
adversely
affected.
Particularly
hard-hit
arethoserelying
ontheexploitation
of renewablenaturalresources.In regionsaffected
by the expansionof
Mexico'spetroleum
wholesaledestruction
ofecosystems
undercut
industry,
bothsubsistence
andcommercial
agricultural
systems
justas theeconomy
declined(Toledo,1984; VasquezBottelloand Paez, 1987). Oil spillsand
industrial
pollutiondamagedcoastaland inlandfisheries
duringthesame
of thenorth,
excessiverelianceon
period.In theagroexport
breadbaskets
pesticidesand salinatedwaterspoiledproductive
land,reducingyieldsof
in
1990:34). Contractions
exportable
crops(Nuccio,Ornelas,andRestrepo,
such labor-intensive
industries
at a timeof economicrecessionfurther
diminished
theabsorptive
capacityoftheeconomy.
The structural
foundations
of Mexico's environmental
crisiscan be locatedin theliberaldevelopment
strategy
pursuedby Mexico's governing
regimesincethe1940s(Barkin,1990;Cockcroft,
1983).Underthisstrategy,
describedby some as an "allianceforprofits,"
politicalelitesplaced the
oftheMexicanstatebehinditsprivate
resources
sector,
subsidizing
industrial
and urbanization
at theexpenseof ruralareas and resisting
development
demandsforredistribution
oftheresourcesgenerated
byeconomicgrowth.
Through1970 Mexico'sdevelopment
projectfollowedthewell-configured
withitsemphasison shelpathwayof import-substituting
industrialization,
thenationalbourgeoisie
The exhaustion
of
tering
fromforeign
competition.
thisstrategy
infavorofexport-oriented
intheseventies
and
industrialization
in food
Loss ofself-sufficiency
eightiesreinforced
development
inequities.
excessivedependency
on oil exports,intensiveindebtedness,
production,
in social spendingare
inflation,
unemployment,
and a drasticconstriction
prominent
amongtheconsequences.
tothesepressures
after1982,Mexico'sleadership
Responding
jettisoned
thevestigesofnationalpopulisminfavorofwholesaleeconomicliberalization.The new politicsof structural
shackledthegovernment's
adjustment

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Mumme/MAINTENANCEAND REFORM IN MEXICO

125

ofenvironmencapacitytorespond
togrowing
demandsfortheamelioration
talproblems.
Thedecisiontoreducegovernment
restricspending,
eliminate
tionson foreign
investment,
andreduceotherbarriers
to privatecapitalhas
diminished
thestate'sleverageovertheprivatesectorwhileopeningnew
environmenspacesforindustrial
investment
andgrowth,
thereby
increasing
talrisks.Nowhereis thismoreevidentthanalongtheU.S.-Mexicoborder,
wherethenumber
ofmaquiladoraplantsincreasedfrom700 to 1,700,with
dramatic
increasesintoxicwastesandindustrial
pollution.
Paradoxically,
however,
Mexicanleadershavebeenmoreactivethanever
in the fieldof environmental
reform.
Two majorrevisionsof the basic
environmental
law havebeenpromulgated,
alongwithnumerous
modificationsof otherlaws and a hostof technicaland regulatory
The
ordinances.
paradoxof environmental
reform
coupledwitha wideninggap between
is attributable
inthemaintothegrowing
policyandperformance
politicizain the1980sas economiccrisisundermined
tionoftheMexicanelectorate
the regime'slegitimacy.
In fact,Mexico's politicalcrisisantedatesthe
economiccrisisby perhapsa decade (Cockcroft,
1983: 237; Harrisand
Barkin,1982: 11-12).Beginningin 1979,reforms
aimedat shoringup the
government's
legitimacylicensednew politicalpartiesto participatein
electoralpolitics.The 1980s economiccrisisand evidenceof thegovernment'sineptitude
inhandling
the1985earthquake
andotherdisasters
greatly
acceleratedthe politicalmobilizationthatfollowed.New social movements-of ecologists,
women,neighborhood
alliances,and others
-joined
ofmobilization.
The factthatthemajority
of
politicalpartiesas instruments
thesemovements
identified
eitherovertly
or indirectly
withleftist
political
partiesintensified
government
concernwiththemanagement
of political
opposition.
Againstthisbackground,
Mexicanenvironmental
policyin the1980s is
bestunderstood
as "preemptive
reform."
Aimedat diverting
or coopting
threats
to thepoliticalsystemarisingfrompoliticalmobilization,
potential
fromnewlymobilizedgroups,
particularly
preemptive
reform
hasbeenbasic
to theregime'sstrategy
formanaging
politicaldissent;ithas becomeeven
morecriticalat a timeofstructural
adjustment
andintensified
opposition
to
theregime's
policiesfromtheleft.As notedbyColemanandDavis (1983: 3),
such reforms
the other
one substantive,
typicallyhave two dimensions,
The substantive
organizational.
strategy
seeksto reducepoliticalpressures
resources
topotential
criticsofthesystem,
andtheorganizabydistributing
tionalstrategy
seeks to reducethethreatof dissentby providingformal
avenuesofparticipation
topotential
dissenters.
Suchpreemptive
reforms
are
in evidenceunderthecurrent
of CarlosSalinasde
particularly
government
Gortari.

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126

LATINAMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

Salinas's environmental
initiative
maybestbe seen as a situatedand
reactiveresponsetothethreat
ofunconstrained
environmental
mobilization
andas partofa basicstrategy
ofcontaining
politicalmobilization
at a time
of decliningsystemlegitimacyand economiccrisis.Preemptive
reform
challengestheindependence
anddevelopment
of theenvironmental
movementinMexicoandhas beenpartly
effective
individingtheenvironmental
movement
andneutralizing
itseffectiveness
in theMexicanpoliticalarena.
Evenso,environmental
groupshavedramatized
thegapbetweenpolicyand
performance
on environmental
issuesandremaina positiveforceforenvironmental
improvement
andpoliticalchange.
ENVIRONMENTAL MOBILIZATION IN THE EIGHTIES
Mexicanenvironmental
policyas a distinctive
bodyof law originates,
properly
speaking,
oftheFedcralLaw toPrevent
and
withthepromulgation
ControlEnvironmental
Pollutionin 1971. The new law set out general
forpreserving
thequalityofair,water,and soilsand established
principles
in
forthefirst
timean organicbasisforregulating
environmental
conditions
Mexico.Itdidnotstipulate
thenormsandstandards
forimplemennecessary
tation.Inspiredby theeventssurrounding
thefirstUnitedNationsConferinStockholm
in 1972,thelaw was
enceon Environment
andDevelopment
a top-down
whichprecededsignificant
fundamentally
reform
popularmobilizationonenvironmental
issuesinMexicobymorethana decade.As various
almostexclusively
analystshave noted,the1971 legislationwas initiated
withinthegovernment
and countedonlya fewprofessional
associations
andBlizzard,1973).Mounting
evidence
amongitssponsors
(Juergensmeyer
of seriousenvironmental
asidefroma fewscatproblemsnotwithstanding,
teredconservation
concernremained
an exoticissue
groups,environmental
inMexicanpolitics,theprovince
ofelite,mostly
intragovernmental
opinion.
Throughout
the seventies,environmental
concernat the officialand
societallevels languished.The basic law was so generalin contentand
wantingin forcethatit remainedlittlemorethana symbolicdocument
at
was centered
(CabreraAcevedo,1978).Formalregulatory
responsibility
a lowlevelintheMinistry
ofHealth,witheffective
authority
dispersed
across
halfa dozenministries
(Mumme,Bath,andAssetto,1988).Societalinterest
in environmental
issues,continued
to mount
-driven bydeteriorating
conditionsinMexicoCity,depredations
from
oil
the
boom
on
Mexico's
arising
- anditwas articulated
Gulfcoast,andotherfactors
largelybyintellectuals,
academics,anda fewprofessional
todomesticandinternagroupssensitive
tionaltrends,
notbyorganized
environmental
groups."Ecology"was incor-

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Mumme/MAINTENANCEAND REFORM IN MEXICO

127

poratedas an evaluativecategoryin the government's

officialplanning
documents
in1978,butnotuntiltheendoftheLopez Portillo
administration,
in late1981,was moresubstantial
reform
forthcoming.2
The promulgation
ofa newenvironmental
law in January
1982 marked
theturning
pointtowardenvironmental
mobilization
inMexico.Responding
to growing
criticism
ofthegovernment's
intheenvironmental
performance
arena,againcentered
inMexicoCity,thislaw coincidedwith-indeed was
largelyinspired
by-the presidential
campaign
ofMiguelde la Madrid.de la
Madrid'scampaignwas thefirstinMexicoto stressenvironmental
themes.
On takingofficein December1982, de la Madridupgradedecologia's
priority
withinthe administration,
combiningthe portfolios
forhousing,
urbandevelopment,and ecology in a new cabinet-levelministry,
the
de DesarrolloUrbanoyEcologia(Ministry
Secretaria
ofUrbanDevelopment
andEcology- SEDUE), andinvesting
itwithbroader
administrative
authorityin environmental
matters
(SEDUE, 1983;Diario Oficial,1984).
de la Madrid'senvironmental
reform
followedthepattern
ofpreemptive
in thecontextof rising,although
policymaking.First,it was undertaken
poorlyorganized,concernwithenvironmental
pollutionin Mexico City.
de la Madrid'sadvisorssawtheopportunity
tocapitalizeonpopularconcern
byelevating
thepriority
ofenvironmental
issuesonthegovernment's
agenda
andactivelypromoting
environmental
awarenessinMexicansociety.
ofpopularmobilization
theimportance
and
Second,de la Madridstressed
of environmental
soughtthelead in promoting
thedevelopment
interest
groups.Beginning
inmid-1983,
a nationalcampaignofpublicmeetings
and
forumsat thelocal, state,and nationallevelswas undertaken
to promote
environmental
awarenessandpublicizethenewenvironmental
legislation.
The campaignculminated
in a four-day
nationalenvironmental
congress,
June4-8,1984,atwhichde la Madridpresided(Medina,1984). Duringthis
andinterests
wereactively
year-long
campaignenvironmental
organizations
promotedand invitedto participatein the manypublic discussionsof
Mexico'senvironmental
Thecampaignhadtheintended
predicament.
effect
ofpromoting
theorganization
anddevelopment
ofexisting
andnewenvironmentalinterest
in Mexicanpolitheirparticipation
groupsandlegitimizing
tics. New nationalorganizationssuch as the MovimientoEcologista
Mexicano(MexicanEcologyMovement
-MEM), theAlianza Ecologista
(Ecological Alliance- AE), and the Pacto de Ecologistas (Ecologists
mostof
withchapters
nationwide.3
Compact-Pacto)wereformed
Although
theselocalchapters
weresmallandtappedmainlyaneducated,middle-class
ofnationwide
was a fundamentally
new
base,theemergence
organizations
phenomenon.
On a lesserscale,the1983-1984environmental
mobilization

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128

LATINAMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

whoseactivists
and ruralconstituencies,
also reachedurbanworking-class
concerns.
demandstoenvironmental
werequicktolinksocioeconomic
andregulaextendedto administrative
Third,thede la Madridinitiative
werethecreationof SEDUE
toryreforms.
Here,theprincipalinnovations
in thenewenvironmental
authority
andtheconsolidation
of administrative
- partofa
decentralization
ministry.
Otherelements
includedadministrative
authority
downward
tostates
muchlargerinitiative
todisperseadministrative
intoplanning
docecologicalconsiderations
andmunicipios,
incorporating
sanctions
umentsat stateandlocal as well as nationallevelsandstiffening
forviolating
1983;Diario Oficial,
environmental
laws(NacionalFinanciera,
1984).
In all theserespects,
approximated
themodelof
thede la Madridreforms
campaign,whichwas popularand
preemptive
reform.
The mobilization
in stimulating
andexpansion,
soughttoplace the
effective
groupformation
It openedup
in a tutelary
mobilization.
government
roleon environmental
forenvironmentally
mindedcitizensand
new organizational
opportunities
in environmental
decision
broadenedthepotentialscope forparticipation
groupsremaking.Underthe new legislation,however,environmental
on thegovernment
forinput.Virtually
no action-forcing
maineddependent
wereavailable(Cabrera
mechanisms,
legislative,
judicial,oradministrative,
side,thereforms
creatednewoccupaAcevedo,1986). On thesubstantive
tionalopportunities
withinthevariouslevelsofgovernment
forpartymemberswithenvironmental
attention
andincreasedthelevelofofficial
interests
to environmental
policydomain.
issuesas a distinct
As preemptive
de la Madrid'sreforms
fellshortoftheir
policy,however,
initiative
hadtheeffect
ofbroadly
intended
objective.First,themobilization
The newlymobilizedenvilegitimizing
environmental
valuesandactivism.
ronmental
groupsprovedto be moreassertiveand criticalof government
withcostlypoliticalresults.
policies and performance
thananticipated,
andBhopalanddomestic
Stimulated
eventslikeChernobyl
byinternational
calamitieslike the1984 San JuanIxhuatepecgas explosionand the1985
MexicoCityearthquake,
environmentalists
wereable to drawconsiderable
togovernment
In thecase ofMexico'sfirst
nuclear
attention
policyfailures.
directly
delayedimplepowerfacilityat LagunaVerde,environmentalists
forovera yearata dailycostestimated
mentation
atU.S. $150,000(Excelin
withSEDUE's performance
sior,July31, 1988: EE1). Dissatisfaction
suchas MexicoCity'sairpollution
contributed
addressing
pressing
problems
- it
to itsreputation
as themosttroubled
in Mexicangovernment
ministry
saw fourdifferent
between1982 and 1988. Suchpressuredemsecretaries
onstrated
thattheenvironmental
in Mexicowas farfrombeing
movement
thoroughly
co-opted.

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Mumme/MAINTENANCEAND REFORM IN MEXICO

129

mobilization
coincidedwiththeonsetof the
Second,theenvironmental
1980seconomiccrisis.Forcedbycreditors
toreducespending
andreallocate
revenues
todebtreduction,
thegovernment
reducedbudgetary
allocationsto
de la Madrid'sterm.ImpleSEDUE, andtheyremained
sparsethroughout
mentation
oftheenvironmental
law remained
symbolic,
confined
tovoluntaryinteradministrative
agreements
(convenios)thatwere honoredin the
breachand to appealsto civicpride.The basic law was notsupplemented
ordinances
withthenecessary
technical
normsandregulatory
(reglamentos)
thatwouldgive it effect.
thusremainedsporadicand largely
Enforcement
nonpunitive
innature.
Third,theenvironmental
mobilization
coincidedwitha majorcrisisof
politicallegitimacy
associatedwiththefailureof theeconomicmodeland
on politicalreform.
The emergence
de la Madrid'ssubsequent
retrenchment
for
of a morevigorousoppositionmovementcreatednew opportunities
withpolitical
critical
ofthePartido
environmentalists
toallythemselves
parties
- PRO).
Revolucionario
Institutional
(Institutional
Revolutionary
Party
By the1988 presidential
elections,a numberof environmental
groups
withoppositionpartiesor linkingtheirdewereeitheraffiliating
directly
mandsindependently
to a critiqueof the politicalsystemas such. The
government's
failuretoaddressMexicoCity'surbanpollution
problemand
to makeconcessionsto environmental
interest
groupson theLagunaVerde
issue,SEDUE's widespread
reputation
forcorruption
andpatronage
rather
thanadministrative
toenvironmental
commitment
values,andgovernment's
abandonmentof sustainableagricultural
programs-thewidely touted
SistemaAlimentaria
Mexicana(MexicanFood System-SAM) of thelate
in the
seventieswas a victim-all contributed
to theerosionof confidence
on environmental
government's
credibility
issues.This,in turn,fueleddemandsforfundamental
forenvironmental
political
changeas theprecondition
improvement.
Attheendofthedela Madridadministration,
theenvironmentalmobilization
boresomeresemblance
toPandora'sbox- theenvironmentalconcernsunleashedweredifficult
toharness.
THE 1988 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN
The environmental
of de la Madrid'ssuccessor,CarlosSalinas
strategy
of environmental
de Gortari,has been shapedby the rapidmobilization
concernand the new saliencyof environmental
issues in the Mexican
inMexicoCity.Heightened
ofenvironmenelectorate,
particularly
visibility
talconcerns
inthemedia,thecampaigns
ofenvironmental
and
organizations,
thebroadening
of environmental
discourseby someof theseorganizations

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130

LATINAMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

to a critiqueofthesystemitselfhavecombinedto persuadeSalinas'steam
ofthepoliticalvolatility
oftheissue.
The linkageto electoralpoliticswas manifest
as earlyas thepresidential
precampaign
in thesummerandfallof 1987 as politicalpartieson theleft
and therightincorporated
environmental
themesintopartyplatforms.
Alinterest
thoughMexico's principalenvironmental
groupswere politically
cautiousanddid notaffiliate
withpoliticalparties,a numberof prominent
environmentalists
lenttheirsupport
The newPartido
to theleftopposition.4
Verde (Green Party)favoredthe leftpopulistbreakawaycampaignof
Cuauhtemoc
whoseFrente
NacionalDemocratica
Cardenas,
(NationalDemocraticFront- FDN) presented
an unprecedented
challengeto thegovernmentPRI (El Dia, July9, 1987:3).
The urbanelectorate,
particularly
in MexicoCity,with20 percent
ofthe
nationalpopulation
andthenation'spoliticalcenter,
was a crucialtestforthe
PRI. Thesalienceoftheenvironment
forMexicoCity'svoterswashigh,with
votersrankingecologia just behindpersonalsecurityas theirprincipal
noneconomicpriority
and pointingto air pollutionas theirnumberone
concern(Excelsior,December15,1987:Al; January
24, 1988:Al; de Alba,
1989).
Fromthe outset,the Salinas campaigngave special attention
to the
environmental
issue. Salinas directlyaddressedMexico's environmental
predicament
in two important
campaignspeechesand incorporated
the
subjectas subtext
intovariousothers.Twoofhisclosestassociates,Manuel
Camacho Solis, the head of SEDUE untilsteppingdown to directhis
of programming
and
campaign,and PatricioChirinos,formerly
secretary
matters(Excelsior,
budget,were assigned to manage environmental
March 8, 1988: Al). Withoutspecificallycriticizinghis predecessor,
of actualperforSalinas'senvironmental
speechesstressedtheimportance
manceon environmental
issuesandthenecessityof zeroingin on specific
problemareasas majorpriorities
forgovernment
action.Of these,Mexico
Citywas unambiguously
singledout as thetopmostpriority.
Heightened
to environmental
attention
andgovernment
regulation
societycooperation
in protecting
theenvironment
werealso stressed(Excelsior,
(concertacion)
January
29, 1988: Al; February
18, 1988: A4; February
26, 1988; May 9,
1988:Al).
itis difficult
to ascertain
thespecificeffectoftheseinitiatives
Although
in appealingto urbanvoters,the Salinas campaignfounditselfon the
ontheenvironmental
defensive
issueininterparty
contestation.
EnvironmentalistsandoppositionpartiesmademuchofthePRI's failureto addressair
pollutionand sanitation
problemsin Mexico Cityas well as itscontinuing
at theLagunaVerdenuclearpowerplant.In theend,thePRI's
difficulties

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Mumme/MAINTENANCEAND REFORM IN MEXICO

131

poorelectoralperformance
in theFederalDistrict(Mexico City),whereit
receivedjust 27.6 percentof thevote,comparedwith45.9 percentforthe
FDN and 24.3 percentfortheright-of-center
Partidode AccionNacional
(NationalActionParty
-PAN) suggested
itsvulnerability
topublicdissatisfactionwithits environmental
conditionsamongotherfactors(Excelsior,
July28,1988: F1-9).
PREEMPTIVE REFORM UNDER SALINAS
The policythrust
of theSalinas administration
since assumingoffice
December1, 1988,hasbeenstrikingly
reactivetothechallengeofenvironmentalmobilization.
Salinas has identified
his top priority
as economic
of a
recovery
based on rapidliberalization
of theeconomy.5
Privatization
ecowide rangeof parastateindustries,
thecourtingof foreigninvestors,
nomicintegration
withtheUnitedStates,thestreamlining
of government
fiscalpolicy,andothermeasuresareincludedin therestructuring
package.
Othersubstantive
stressedin hiscampaign,ecologyincluded,are
priorities
unequivocally
subsidiary.
to
Containingpublic demandsand managingdissentis instrumental
In thiscontext,
thedemandsofthenewlymobilized
economicconversion.
thatrequirescarefulhanenvironmental
groupsrepresent
a potential
threat
environdling.As criticsof thegovernment's
environmental
performance,
in
mentalistorganizationsdraw attentionto the failuresand tradeoffs
Mexicandevelopment
strategy
at a timeof growingglobalenvironmental
concern.
Thepopularity
ofenvironmental
values,especiallyamongtheurban
harbors
working
andmiddleclassesmostalienatedfrom
theMexicanregime,
thepotential
tostrengthen
oppositemovements
attheexpenseofgovernment
support.Buildingon de la Madrid'sprecedent,
Salinas's environmental
policyhasbeenpreemptive.
THE SUBSTANTIVE DIMENSION

is adminisof Salinas'spolicyreform
On thesubstantive
side,thethrust
trative
environmental
Intencontinuity
coupledwithintensified
regulation.
of environmental
sifiedregulation
has twobasic aspects:thespecification
normsand standards
thatwillgivegreater
forceto thebasicenvironmental
In
law and selectivelygreaterenforcement
of environmental
regulations.
bothcases,Salinashas recognized
theneedtooffer
tangibleevidenceofthe
ofgovernment
tothealienated
sincerity
environmental
promises,
particularly
in the1988elections.
urbanconstituencies
thatabandonedthegovernment

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132

LATINAMERICANPERSPECT1VES

de la Madrid's
In administrative
matters,
Salinashas chosento preserve
system
ofenvironmental
administration
largelyintact.Optingforcontinuity,
inrulesandpersonnel
ofcourse,contrasts
withthewholesaleturnover
typical
of previousadministrations.
As policyreform
thismeasureis largelysymbolic,butitdoes contribute
to thegovernment's
imageof professionalism
andbetterenablesSalinasto maintain
controlovera sensitiveissuearena.
SEDUE remainsthelead agencyforenvironmental
policyadministration,
and its basic structure
is unchanged.Camachowas giventhepolitically
sensitivepostof regentof theFederalDistrictandhas sinceactedas point
manfortheadministration's
environmental
policyinMexicoCity.Chirinos
was assignedthemanagement
of SEDUE, wherea numberof important
officials,
including
SergioReyesLujan,headoftheenvironmental
section,
wereretained.
Regulatory
reform
has centered
on elaborating
an extensivesetof regulationsandtechnicalstandards
togiveforceto thebasic law.The law itself
was alteredlateinthede la Madridadministration
(March1988) withclear
inputfromtheSalinasteamandis thefoundation
oftheregulatory
changes.
al
The newlaw,theLey Generaldel EquilibrioEcologicoy el Protecci6n
Ambiente
(GeneralLaw ofEcologicalEquilibrium
andEnvironmental
ProinvestsSEDUE withgreater
tection),
coordinating
powerin environmental
administration
andclarifies
ofvariousagentheadministrative
competencies
cies in theenvironmental
arena.For thefirsttime,environmental
impact
assessments
arerequiredforall federalpublicworks,potentially
polluting
industries,
mining,
tourist
development,
andsanitation
projects.
Thelawalso
in thebasic environmental
establishesstricter
technicalstandards
spheres
(e.g.,airandwaterquality,
solidandtoxicwaste)andspecifiesmoresevere
penaltiesforviolators(Diario Oficial,1988). Sincemid-1988,newregulationshaveaddressed
intheFederalDistrict,
vehicular
pollution
airpollution,
hazardous-waste
management,
environmental
impactregulation,
and other
matters
(SEDUE, 1989).Anofficial
inchargeofdeveloping
rulesandnorms
atSEDUE anticipates
as manyas 80 newregulations
bytheendofSalinas's
term(Rau'lGuidoGaray,personalcommunication,
July12, 1989).
Although
thenewbattery
of regulations
is ostensibly
applicablenationinthesphereof
wide,MexicoCityhasabsorbedthelion'sshareofattention
implementation
andnewprograms.
Less thantwoweeksaftertakingoffice
Salinas announceda new eight-point
the Federal
agenda forimproving
District's
environment.
Amongitskeyelements
werea regimeforregulating
an innovative
forregulating
traffic,
program
vehicularemissions,
provision
of lead-freegasolinein the FederalDistrict,and a waterconservation
program.
Otherprograms
aimedat theDistrictinvolvedtherevamping
of

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Mumme/MAINTENANCEAND REFORM IN MEXICO

133

garbageandsanitation
systems,
thedevelopment
ofurbangreenspace,and
theplanting
oftrees(Excelsior,December15, 1988:A4).
Despitetheseinitiatives,
manyof whichare genuinelyinnovative
and
evenunprecedented,
theSalinasenvironmental
hasremained
reform
largely
formalist
andsymbolic.
Contradicting
official
promises,
budgetary
resources
to SEDUE and theFederalDistricthave been reducedto cope withthe
economiccrisis.Officialspokesmenfortheenvironmental
agencieshave
beenopeninpeggingfiscalimprovements
torenewedeconomicgrowth
and
assistance(RamonOjeda Mestre,personalcommunication,
foreign
July11,
1989). In thelattercategory,
theSalinasadministration
signeda technical
assistanceagreement
withtheU.S. Environmental
Protection
Agencyin
October1989 directedat Mexico City(ComercioExterior,1989), and it
receivedan $850 millionecologyloanfromJapan,also aimedat supporting
itsairpollution
program
fortheFederalDistrict(Nauman,1989). Evenso,
theenvironmental
underthemostsevere
programhas to date functioned
financial
restrictions.6
Thus, in criticalrespects,Mexico's economiccrisishas undermined
of theenvironmental
enforcement
law. Despiteformalregulations,
actual
implementation
remainsad hoc. In 1989, SEDUE announceda special
programof intensified
of the500 mostpollutingindustries
in
inspections
MexicoCity,andsomeindustries
havesuffered
finesorclosuresforviolating
air qualitynorms.Closures,however,remainrareand are almostalways
as leadingadministrators
temporary,
publiclyasserttheprimacy
ofjobs and
overenvironmental
productivity
quality.SEDUE's industrial
enforcement
staff,
chargedwithinvestigating
inthemetropolitan
35,000industries
area,
consistsofa paltry
nineinvestigators
(Excelsior,
February
12,1990:A4, Uno
Mds Uno,June6, 1990).7 It bearsmentioning
in thisregardthatpromises
madeby thede la Madridadministration
to relocatehazardousindustries
awayfromMexicoCityremainunfulfilled.
The Salinasadministration
has soughtto deflectcriticism,
however,by
its efforts
on a few demonstration
concentrating
projectsthatappearto
projecta bona fideconcernforenvironmental
improvement.8
Since the
haveputintoplace an ambitious
springof 1989,officials
multidimensional
andtransit
regimeofmotorvehicleemissionsinspections
aimed
regulations
atreducing
airpollutioninMexicoCity,80 percent
ofwhichis attributed
to
motorvehicles.Underthisprogram,
labeledundia sinauto,motorists
must
havetheir
vehicles'emissionsinspected
annually
andleavetheircarsathome
at leastoncea week.Environmental
groupsandcitizenshavebeenenlisted
on a voluntary
basisto assistpoliceinadministering
theprogram.
Theprogram
is offto a shakystartandremains
badlyunderfunded,
butit
hasbeenreceivedfavorably
bymostenvironmental
Becauseithits
groups.9

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134

LATINAMERICANPERSPECrIVES

as a
atthemostprosperous,
ithasbeenrepresented
byMexicoCityofficials
populistmeasureby whichthesacrificesof a few,the2.5 millionprivate
vehicleowners,
benefit
themany,
thecity's17.5millionvehiclelessresidents
commitment
(Anders,1989:6). Evenso, criticsarguethatthegovernment's
isbeliedbythefactthatithassimultaneously
toreducing
vehicular
pollution
ofmotorvehicles,offsetbeenencouraging
theproduction
andconsumption
ofreducedvehiclecirculation.'0
tingthebenefits
Criticsalso arguethatthe
whose
has been susceptibleto influenceby largeindustries
government
managers
andemployees
areinconvenienced
bydiminished
personalmobilityonedaya week(Excelsior,February
14, 1990:A5). Automobile
dealers,
infact,report
anupsurge
insalesthattheyattribute
topurchases
ofadditional
to circumvent
automobiles
theundia sinautorestrictions
(White,1990:8).
In general,such high-profile
demonstration
projects,althoughpolitically
valuableforthegovernment,
also drawattention
toitscurrent
triagestrategy
ofenvironmental
andthefailuretoregulate
otherareasdesperremediation
atelyin needofattention."
In viewofthegovernment's
toenforce
reluctance
theenvironmental
law,
hasbeenarranging
and
one ofSEDUE's mostvisibleactivities
interagency
government-to-industry
agreements
bywhichsignatories
promiseto attend
to environmental
improvements.
Such agreements,
however,arevoluntary
is theiruncertain
andlackforce.Evenmoretroubling
statusas government
industries
areprivatized."2
parastate
In thesamevein,theSalinasadministration,
evenmorethanitspredecesofcooperative
betweenstate
sor,has stressedtheimportance
arrangements
and society,placingtheonusof environmental
on thepublic
improvement
atlarge.Thisappealtocivicdutyhassomeresonance
andservesanimportant
educational
butitis basicallyrhetorical
andfallsconsiderably
short
function,
of effective
of stateenvironmental
It typically
implementation
regulations.
orexhibits
onecologicalthemes,
entailsgovernment-sponsored
celebrations
mobilization
of urbanneighborhoods
to planttreesor collectgarbage,and
otherlow-costmeasurestopromote
environmental
awareness.
In sum,thepaperreforms
are substantial,
amplifying
thepotentialfor
implementing
theenvironmental
regulations
by specifying
thebasic stanin thepublicand private
dardsagainstwhichenvironmental
performance
sectorsmaybe assessed.In thefirsttwoyearsof Salinas'sterm,however,
therehas been littlechangein thegovernment's
regulatory
posture.There
are exceptions,
in MexicoCity,but
suchas thevehicle-emissions
program
even heregovernment
policyis contradictory
and the programremains
woefully
underfunded.
Itsprivatization
initiatives
jeopardize,moreover,
the
formalagreements
alreadymadeby thegovernment's
parastatesectorby
- at least temporarily
- outsidethe
placingimportant
sectorsof industry

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Mumme/MAINTENANCEAND REFORM IN MEXICO

135

toenvironmental
orbitofvoluntary
commitment
improvement.
Underthese
basic
circumstances,
itseemsfairtocharacterize
theSalinasadministration's
as moresymbolicthansubstantive.
At theveryleast,Salinas
commitment
has been unwillingto compromiseor limithis economicdevelopment
inpursuit
strategy
ofenvironmental
values.
THE ORGANIZATIONAL DIMENSION

The preemptive
character
of environmental
policyunderSalinasis also
on theorganizational
The approachused herehas two
apparent
dimension.
inenvironmental
anexpandedarenaforpotential
basicfeatures:
participation
and
decisionmakingin a depoliticized
contextand increasedintervention
withthe
management
ofenvironmental
interest
groups.Evenbycomparison
de la Madridadministration,
theSalinasapproachhasadoptedtheclassicpan
o palo tacticsofgovernment
co-optation.
in environmental
Expandingarenasforcitizenparticipation
decision
makinghas beena basicthemeoftheSalinasprogram.
The 1988 environin
mentallaw aimsat thisendwithnewprovisions
forcitizenparticipation
environmental
enforcement.
Title5, entitled
"SocialParticipation,"
provides
forconsultation
of "workers,
withrepresentatives
business,campesinos,
educational
institutions,
privatenonprofit
organizations,
andotherrepresentativesofsocietyatlarge"inenvironmental
policydevelopment.
It requires
thegovernment
to seekformalagreements
inenvironmental
ofcooperation
matters
witha widerangeofprivateandpublicorganizations
as wellas with
new mediaforthepurposeof promoting
environmental
awareness,and it
requirestheformalrepresentation
of "principalsectorsof society"on the
Comisi6nNacionalde Ecologia(NationalEcologyCommission),
theinteragencycoordinating
bodyon environmental
affairs.
Title6, chapter7, goes
thananypreviouslaw in including
farther
citizensin theprocessofpolicy
enforcement.
Underitsprovisions,
thecitizensmaydenounceviolationsof
theenvironmental
law to SEDUE, andtheagencymustformally
acknowledge thedenunciation
within15 daysand providean officialinvestigative
reportand actionbriefwithin30 days of theoriginalcomplaint(Diario
Oficial,1988).Paralleltotheseformal
changesintheenvironmental
law,the
hasplacedheavystresson state-society
Salinasadministration
cooperation.
A good exampleof whatthismeansin practiceis foundin thefederal
district.
16 wards
Undernew administrative
changes,each of thedistrict's
oftheward
(delegaciones)hasanenvironmental
committee,
andthefacilities
aremadeavailabletoneighborhood
groupsforthepurposeofsupporting
the
environmental
government's
programs
(Ojeda Mestre,personalcommuniareone oftheimportant
cation,July11,1989).Theselocalcommittees
new

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136

LATINAMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

arenasforfulfilling
theconsultative
requirements
oftheenvironmental
law.
environmental
Ostensibly,
participation
is a politicallyneutralact and the
facilitiesare available to all mannerof environmental
groups.In fact,
in the government-sanctioned
participation
environmental
committees
is
system-affirming
andviewedbymanyas a partisan
commitment.
Byofficial
accounts,however,the initialresponsehas been less thansatisfactory.
Accordingto RamonOjeda Mestre,Mexico City'sleadingenvironmental
lowlevelsofpublicparticipation
administrator,
maybe attributed
tothefact
thatmanymiddle-and working-class
time
peoplehave less discretionary
availableforvoluntary
civicactivities
becauseoftheeconomiccrisis.Amore
criticalinterpretation
mightwellfastenon thegeneralalienation
ofMexico
City'scitizensfromsuchgovernment-sponsored
participation
mechanisms
(Ward,1989).Whatis clearis thattheformal
avenuesofparticipation
created
inan old-fashioned
bythenewlaw continue
tobe implemented
co-optative
manneraimedatchanneling
dissentinsystem-sustaining
directions.
Interviewswithenvironmental
in the summerof 1989
organizations
hasbeenpartially
thattheSalinasadministration
suggest,
however,
effective,
in co-optingenvironmental
certainlymorethanits predecessor,
activists
directlyintogovernment
service.Severalleadersof thePactojoined the
Camachoteamshortly
afterSalinastookoffice(AlfonsoCipresVillareal,
personalcommunication,
July11,1989).Otherleadersadmitted
havingbeen
solicitedforadministrative
positionsby thenew administration,
although
theydeclinedtheoffers(Aridjis,personalcommunication,
July12, 1989;
CipresVillareal,personalcommunication,
July11, 1989; Ojeda Mestre,
personalcommunication,
July11,1989).
The Salinasadministration
hasalsobeenselectiveinallocating
participativeincentives.
Variousenvironmental
groupshave complainedof being
on environexcludedfromgovernment-convened
forums
andconsultations
mentalmatters.
thesecomplaintscome moststrongly
from
Interestingly,
criticism
ofthegovernment's
groupsthathavebeendirectly
activeinlinking
of thepoliticalsystemitself.Such
environmental
to criticism
performance
groupsincludetheAlianza,thePartidoVerde,and thePacto,all of which
advocatea moreradical,
critics
havealleged
environmentalism.
Other
grass-roots
morecoercivetactics,
andpersonal
harassment.
including
presscensorship
Prominent
hereis the elite environmental
group,the Grupode Cien
(Groupof One Hundred-theCien). The Cien,formedin 1985,is a loose
in
of Mexico's leadingartistsand intellectuals
interested
agglomeration
issues.The prominence
of theirmembers,
speakingouton environmental
manyof whom serve or have servedin rankingpositionsin Mexican
accesstothemediaanda certain
lendsthegroupconsiderable
government,
andclout.Since Salinas
insulation
fromthestate,enhancing
itscredibility

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Mumme/MAINTENANCEAND REFORM IN MEXICO

137

ambassador
assumedoffice,theCien's nominalhead,thepoetand former
withpressuring
themediato
HomeroAridjis,has chargedthegovernment
forums,
and
ignoretheCien's appeals,failingto includeit in government
July12, 1989;
harassingits leadership(Aridjis,personalcommunication,
Excelsior,October9, 1988:A4).13In Aridjis'sview,theSalinasadministrationhas systematically
theexpressionof environmental
soughtto restrict
in this
organizations
and has been farmorecoercivethanitspredecessor
regard.
employed,thegeneralpicture
Althoughsuchharassment
is selectively
is one of
thatemergesfromconversations
withMexicanenvironmentalists
interestgroups.Formal
heightenedstatemanagement
of environmental
avenuesof participation
havebeenexpanded,butin practicethetreatment
of organizedgroupsin thesestateforumshas been discriminatory.
More
channels.
Despite
politicized
groupshavedifficulty
gainingaccesstoofficial
new openingsforcitizenparticipation
in enforcement,
coupledwithimwiththeenvironmental
provedstandards
againstwhichtoassesscompliance
remainslow."4And,
laws,citizenandgroupinvolvement
in theseactivities
projects
as we haveseen,thereis littleevidenceso farthat,demonstration
excepted,SEDUE's regulatory
activitieshave increasedsince Salinas assumedoffice.
The use of environmental
is
of mobilization
policyforthecontainment
towardtheurbanpoor.In an
also seenwithrespecttothestate'sdisposition
excellentstudyof theZona del Ajusco,a largesemiforested
area on the
periphery
of thefederaldistrict
designatedas an ecologicalzone,Pezzoli
used the"ecological-zone"
(1990) has shownhowgovernment
authorities
With
to manipulate
andcontrolthedemandsofurbansquatters.
designation
newlyestabpressingbasic needsforhousing,services,and employment,
by theregime's
lishedsquatter
communities
are availableformobilization
a potential
constitute
thoseon theleft,and therefore
critics,particularly
threat.
In thiscase,ecologicalzoning-one aspectof thede la Madridand
inthe
inMexicoCity- hasbecomean important
instrument
Salinasreforms
FederalDistrict'ssocial controlarsenalforrestricting
theclaimsof urban
commuandinfluencing
whichgroupsandwhichleadersinsquatter
squatters
resources
nitiesmaymakeeffective
claimsongovernment
(Pezzoli,1990:6-7).
whileextensive,
do notappear
In sum,Salinas'sorganizational
reforms,
influtosignificantly
policysystemtogreater
openMexico'senvironmental
leadersand
ence by environmental
groups.Evidencefromenvironmental
officialsanddataon government
performance
pointtowardan
government
criticism
anddissent,
effort
tocontainandmanageenvironmental
channeling
officialconsultative
forumsof a corporative
natureby which
it through
criticism
Thestructure
ofthenew
environmental
canbe filtered
andsoftened.

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138

LATINAMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

is consistent
withgovernment-dominated
arenasofenvironmental
participation
foundin otherpolicysectors;thatis,itis corporatist
modesofparticipation
and criticismto
in nature,designedto confineparticipation
and tutelary
of
thedevelopment
system-sustaining
modalitiesratherthanencouraging
Suchmodesofparticipaindependent
movements
forsocialtransformation.
of
tionare whollyconsistent
withwhatwe would expectfroma pattern
preemptive
reform.
CONCLUSION: PREEMPTIVE REFORM AND
THE FUTURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
The preemptive
in thesubstantive
and
pattern
ofreform
thatis apparent
is commonin
dimensions
ofSalinas'senvironmental
reforms
organizational
for
Mexicanpoliticsandis animportant
explanation
partoftheconventional
the survivalof theone-party
system.The criticalquestionsin thiscase
forachieving
progress
revolvearoundtheimplications
oftheSalinasstrategy
crisisand thelikely
towardtheamelioration
of Mexico's environmental
impactof thesemeasureson thedevelopment
of Mexico's environmental
movement.
The answerstothesequestionscanbe adducedinpartfromtheevidence
formovingeffecsurveyedabove.Withrespectto theimmediate
potential
in Mexico,theSalinasprogram
tivelytowardenvironmental
improvement
measures.Thesestatutory
has largelyoffered
formalrather
thansubstantive
changes,it mustbe said,represent
positiveand necessarystepstowardan
in basic law by
effective
regulatory
regimeand markan improvement
theSalinasadministration
withthepast.Unfortunately,
hasbeen
comparison
reluctant
thevehicular-emissions
and
to give effectto thenew legislation,
traffic
in Mexico Cityand otherdemonstration
programs
being
programs
important
exceptions.
Thegovernment
hasmadeitclear,however,
thatenvironmental
regulation
is hostageto economicrecovery.
Hereinlies one of the mostimportant
is predicated
on
forSalinas'sstrategy
ofeconomicrecovery
contradictions,
market
andrapidexpansionof
increasedforeign
investment,
liberalization,
Mexicanexports.Such a strategy
contradicts
objectivesestablishedin the
intheshortterm,is being
environmental
law inthatliberalization,
certainly
carriedforwardwithlittleconcernforits environmental
impacts.Such
areseeninthegovernment's
contradictions
decisiontopromote
theproducofmotorvehicles,itsfailuretodeliveron promisesto
tionandconsumption
relocatehazardousurbanindustries,
itsturning
a blindeye to theenvironmentalconsequencesof an explosionof maquiladoras
on theU.S.-Mexico

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Mumme/MAINTENANCEAND REFORM IN MEXICO

139

andmanyotherpolicies.Whether
border,
ornotthegovernment
is successful
inattracting
credits
andtechnical
assistancetoaddressselectedenvironmental problems,thesestructural
will function
contradictions
as severeconon environmental
straints
improvement.
Withrespectto thefutureof the environmental
Salinas's
movement,
preemptive
reforms,
as seen above, have alreadytakena toll. Ranking
atSEDUE frankly
officials
admitthatenvironmentalist
hassubsided
pressure
sincethelatedela Madridadministration
(Altamirano,
1989).Thecorporatist
structure
ofparticipation
inthenewenvironmental
established
lawthreatens
thesolidarity
of theenvironmental
movement
by allowingthegovernment
to rewardthosegroupswhoseagendasare less criticalof thesystemitself
andexcludeonesofa morecriticalbent.Undertheseconditions,
traditional
problemsofgroupmobilization
in Mexico,personalism,
lackof resources,
ideologicalrivalries,
andothersourcesofdivisionarereadilyexploited.
Even so, theenvironmental
movement
is thelatestand newestformof
andcontinues
politicalmobilization
tobe a potential
tothegovernliability
ment.The 1988electionsdemonstrated
thepoliticalvolatility
oftheenvironmentalissueand established
thefactthattheenvironmental
issuewas not
monopolized
byPRI. The continuing
gapbetweenpolicyandperformance,
amplifiedby thegovernment's
latestroundof policycommitments
and
standards
fortheirevaluation,
affords
forenvironmental
ampleopportunity
groupsandopposition
partiestobuildon publicconcernforenvironmental
improvement
inbothurbanandruralsettings.
Itis significant,
moreover,
thatimportant
voicesamongtheenvironmentalistshave notmoderated
theirpolitico-environmental
critique.Although
theSalinasadministration
hasgivenpriority
tomanaging
interest
articulation
anddissentas itmovesonitseconomicagenda,pressures
forpoliticalchange
persist.The environmental
movement
is contributing
tothesepressures
and
has a criticalstakein furthering
reform
of thepoliticalsystem.Democratic
is thebasicprerequisite
reform
foreffective
in environmental
participation
decisionmakingandstatecommitment
toenvironmental
values.
In sum,thereis littledoubtthattheenvironmental
movement
has galvanizedforcesthatarenowcontributing
toMexico'stransformation.
Preemptivereform,
judged in theseterms,mayhave slowedthemobilization
of
environmental
interests
andtempered
itscritique.
However,thebasicforces
unleashedby environmental
mobilizationhave broadenedthe public's
awarenessofthefailings
ofthesystem
andexpandedtherangeoforganized
groupscriticalof itsmanagers.
In thiscontext,
thesystem-affirming
power
of preemptive
is notlikelyto succeedin putting
reform
theenvironmental
geniebackin itsbottle.

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140

LATINAMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

NOTES
1. Amongbasicsourceson Mexico'senvironmental
predicament
arethedatareport
ofthe
UnitedNationsEnvironmental
Programme
(1989),theWorldResourcesInstitute's
guidetothe
globalenvironment
(1990), andSEDUE's nationalenvironmental
report(1986). Otheruseful
sourcesincludeWright
(1990) andNuccio,Ornelas,andRestrepo(1990).
2. A majorrevisionof theenvironmental
law was undertaken
in December1981. (This
law was itselfsubstantially
revisedin 1984inconnection
withthede la Madridenvironmental
reforms.)Apartfromthisinitiative,
the L6pez Portillogovernment
initiatedair pollution
inMexicoCityon a smallscale (see Mumme,Bath,andAssetto,1988).
monitoring
3. Foundedin 1982 shortly
beforethede la Madridpresidential
campaign,MEM is the
oldestandlargestofthenational
general-purpose
environmental
federations
(see Redcliff,
1987:
inlargemeasure,
is attributable
44-46).Itsrapidgrowth
tothegovernment's
however,
promotion
of theenvironmental
issue.The Pactoand AE wereformedduringor after1983 in director
indirect
responseto thegovernment's
mobilization
campaign.Moretraditional
conservation
groupssuchas Pronatura,
whichdo predatetheenvironmental
mobilization
oftheeighties,
were
withinternational
typically
affiliated
environmental
andapolitical
organizations
andhada narrower
orientation.
Theynevertheless
receiveda majorboostwiththeenvironmental
mobilization.
4. Conversations
withenvironmental
leadersand newspaperaccountsof thecampaign
revealstrong
criticism
ofthegovernment
duringthe1988elections:TheNationalCoordinating
andEcologicalMovements,
of prominent
environmental
AssemblyofAntinuclear
comprised
leaders,urgeda voteagainstthePRI candidatetoprotest
thegovernment's
decisiontoproceed
withtheLagunaVerdenuclearplant.Thecallwas reissuedonelectiondayformaximum
impact
(Excelsior,July6, 1988:A4).
5. SpeakingbeforetheSixthMinisterial
in LatinAmericaand
Meetingon Environment
theCaribbean,
Chirinosstatedflatly
that"without
further
economicgrowth
thenationsofLatin
Americawillbe unableto attendto theenvironment,"
is to
concluding
with"Today'spriority
grow"(La Jornada,March31, 1989:7). Thethemeis regularly
reiterated
bySalinas.
6. SEDUE's budgetforfiscal1989 was reportedly
cutbackby 36 percent(information
provided
byJanet
Rich,theJohnson
School,University
ofTexas).TheFederalDistrict's
ecology
of authorized
at 13 percent
at midyear
budgetin 1989 was operating
expenditures
(Excelsior,
July19, 1989: A4). The FederalDistrict'scombinedbudgetforpolice,social welfare,and
ecologyin 1990was reported
tobe $1.8 million,
mostofwhichwas assignedtopublicsecurity
(Excelsior,November25, 1989:A25).
7. Nationwide,
theagencyhasjust140 inspectors
(Rich,1991: 30).
8. These projectsincludehigh-profile
reforestation
of biocampaigns,thedesignation
Such
sphereand othernatural-resource
reserves,and a ban on thekillingof marineturtles.
inpartbecauseofinternational
measuresareimportant
andhavebeenundertaken
pressure
(e.g.,
of Mexicanproducts,
debt-for-nature
and thelike),buttheydo notentailthe
swaps,boycotts
commitment
ofsignificant
resources
bytheMexicanstate.Inthissensetheyarelow-costoptions
withhighpublic visibilitythatdo not reallychallengeimportant
politicaland economic
orcoredevelopment
constituencies
valuesoftheMexicangovernment.
Reforestation
projects
havebeenespeciallyattractive
fortheirlow costandspecialvalueforenlisting
publicparticiIn conjunction
withWorldEnvironment
pationinenvironmental
programs.
Day,June4, 1990,
forexample,a massiveprogram
to enlisteveryfamilyin Mexico Cityin planting
a treewas
spearheadedby Salinas. The programwas widelycriticizedby environmental
groupsas
and detracting
fromotherconcerns.It was also perceivedas highlypoliticized,
superficial

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Mumme/MAINTENANCEAND REFORM IN MEXICO

141

becausetheFederalDistrict
issueda challengeto the
regentManuelCamachoSolis explicitly
leftopposition
leaderCuauhtemoc
Cardenastoenlistinthetree-planting
campaignas an actof
nationalsolidarity.
Cardenasresponded
bycallingforMexicansto"plantthetreeofdemocracy"
instead(Excelsior,May29, 1990:A4; May30, 1990:A5; June4, 1990:Al; UnoMas Uno,June
6, 1990: 3).
9. PollsinFebruary
1990showedthatresidents
ofMexicoCitysupported
themeasureby
margins
inexcessof80 percent.
WhentheFederalDistrict
considered
suspending
theprogram
at theend of thewinterinversion
season,environmental
forits
groupsweighedin strongly
continuation
(Excelsior,January
20, 1990:A25; January
25, 1990:A5; January
26, 1990: A4;
February
29, 1990:Al).
10. Underone program,
thegovernment
has providedsubsidiestoVolkswagen
of Mexico
toproducelow-costBeetlesforMexicanconsumers
(White,1990: 8). A government
studyhas
shownthatMexicoCityrealizeda netgainof 67,554vehiclesin 1989,attributing
partof the
increasetothehoyno circulaprogram
itself(Excelsior,February
17,1990:A31).
11.The government's
failureto respondeffectively
offorest
firesin Quintana
tothethreat
Roo in 1989 is a case in point.Notuntilenvironmental
themby
groupsmanagedtoembarrass
drawinginternational
attention
to theproblemdid federalagenciestakeactionto controlthe
firesinSeptember
1989.By thattimelargesectionsofQuintanaRoo's forests
hadbeenseverely
see Lazaroff,
damaged(forbackground
1989).
12. Since 1983, 750 of the1,150parastate,
or government-owned,
industries
have been
privatized
(Interamerican
Development
Bank,1990: 150). Although
thegovernment
continues
to have a monopolyon certainstrategic
in Article27 of theMexican
industries
protected
constitution
and nuclearpower,amongothers),
(petroleum,
electricity,
railroads,uranium,
Salinashas indicatedthatnearlyeverything
else is negotiable.Majorproducers
of toxicand
hazardouschemicalsareamongthoseon theauctionblock,toinclude75 percent
ofthenational
fertilizer
andpesticidemonopoly
(FERTIMEX). The agreements
signedbetweenSEDUE and
thegovernment
corporations
technically
do notcontinueto applyto thedivestedsectors;new
agreements
mustbe signedwiththeseindustries.
Attheveryleastthisamountstoa temporary
nullification
of manyof theenvironmental
agreements
thegovernment
has reached.Although
- insofar
someobservers
arguethatprivatization
as itbringsless corruption,
greater
discipline,
andincreasedforeign
investment
totheMexicaneconomy-may provea netboontoenvironmentalpractices,
itintroduces
newuncertainties
andnewrisksintotheenvironmental
equation.
13. Itbearsmentioning
thatoneoftheCien'sleaders,theprofessor
andcolumnist
Fernando
was recruited
Cesarman,
bySalinastoheadtheenvironmental
think
sectionofthePRI's official
de EstudiosPoliticos,Econ6micos,y Sociales (Institute
tank,theInstitutional
of Political,
Economic,andSocial Studies-IEPES); UnoMas Uno,October8, 1988).His tenure
wasbrief,
becausethegovernment
terminated
IEPES in 1990.
14. Government
campaignslike"Cada FamiliaunArbol,"whichmobilizethousands
fora
shortperiodoftime,tendtomaskthisrelatively
lowlevelofpopularparticipation.
all
Virtually
ofthegovernment
in 1989 perceivedflagging
andenvironmental
I interviewed
representatives
fortheirorganizations
publicsupport
andprograms.

REFERENCES
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